From 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 12:05:51 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 5.10.209. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- .../process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 311 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 311 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst (limited to 'Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst') diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..43cdc67e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +.. _embargoed_hardware_issues: + +Embargoed hardware issues +========================= + +Scope +----- + +Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category +of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux +kernel. + +Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated +differently because they usually affect all Operating Systems ("OS") and +therefore need coordination across different OS vendors, distributions, +hardware vendors and other parties. For some of the issues, software +mitigations can depend on microcode or firmware updates, which need further +coordination. + +.. _Contact: + +Contact +------- + +The Linux kernel hardware security team is separate from the regular Linux +kernel security team. + +The team only handles the coordination of embargoed hardware security +issues. Reports of pure software security bugs in the Linux kernel are not +handled by this team and the reporter will be guided to contact the regular +Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/ +`) instead. + +The team can be contacted by email at . This +is a private list of security officers who will help you to coordinate an +issue according to our documented process. + +The list is encrypted and email to the list can be sent by either PGP or +S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the reporter's PGP key or S/MIME +certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME certificate are available from +the following URLs: + + - PGP: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.asc + - S/MIME: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.crt + +While hardware security issues are often handled by the affected hardware +vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or individuals who have +identified a potential hardware flaw. + +Hardware security officers +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +The current team of hardware security officers: + + - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow) + - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fellow) + - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow) + +Operation of mailing-lists +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in our process are hosted on +Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By providing this service, members +of Linux Foundation's IT operations personnel technically have the +ability to access the embargoed information, but are obliged to +confidentiality by their employment contract. Linux Foundation IT +personnel are also responsible for operating and managing the rest of +kernel.org infrastructure. + +The Linux Foundation's current director of IT Project infrastructure is +Konstantin Ryabitsev. + + +Non-disclosure agreements +------------------------- + +The Linux kernel hardware security team is not a formal body and therefore +unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreements. The kernel community +is aware of the sensitive nature of such issues and offers a Memorandum of +Understanding instead. + + +Memorandum of Understanding +--------------------------- + +The Linux kernel community has a deep understanding of the requirement to +keep hardware security issues under embargo for coordination between +different OS vendors, distributors, hardware vendors and other parties. + +The Linux kernel community has successfully handled hardware security +issues in the past and has the necessary mechanisms in place to allow +community compliant development under embargo restrictions. + +The Linux kernel community has a dedicated hardware security team for +initial contact, which oversees the process of handling such issues under +embargo rules. + +The hardware security team identifies the developers (domain experts) who +will form the initial response team for a particular issue. The initial +response team can bring in further developers (domain experts) to address +the issue in the best technical way. + +All involved developers pledge to adhere to the embargo rules and to keep +the received information confidential. Violation of the pledge will lead to +immediate exclusion from the current issue and removal from all related +mailing-lists. In addition, the hardware security team will also exclude +the offender from future issues. The impact of this consequence is a highly +effective deterrent in our community. In case a violation happens the +hardware security team will inform the involved parties immediately. If you +or anyone becomes aware of a potential violation, please report it +immediately to the Hardware security officers. + + +Process +^^^^^^^ + +Due to the globally distributed nature of Linux kernel development, +face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to address hardware security +issues. Phone conferences are hard to coordinate due to time zones and +other factors and should be only used when absolutely necessary. Encrypted +email has been proven to be the most effective and secure communication +method for these types of issues. + +Start of Disclosure +""""""""""""""""""" + +Disclosure starts by contacting the Linux kernel hardware security team by +email. This initial contact should contain a description of the problem and +a list of any known affected hardware. If your organization builds or +distributes the affected hardware, we encourage you to also consider what +other hardware could be affected. + +The hardware security team will provide an incident-specific encrypted +mailing-list which will be used for initial discussion with the reporter, +further disclosure and coordination. + +The hardware security team will provide the disclosing party a list of +developers (domain experts) who should be informed initially about the +issue after confirming with the developers that they will adhere to this +Memorandum of Understanding and the documented process. These developers +form the initial response team and will be responsible for handling the +issue after initial contact. The hardware security team is supporting the +response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation +development process. + +While individual developers might be covered by a non-disclosure agreement +via their employer, they cannot enter individual non-disclosure agreements +in their role as Linux kernel developers. They will, however, agree to +adhere to this documented process and the Memorandum of Understanding. + +The disclosing party should provide a list of contacts for all other +entities who have already been, or should be, informed about the issue. +This serves several purposes: + + - The list of disclosed entities allows communication accross the + industry, e.g. other OS vendors, HW vendors, etc. + + - The disclosed entities can be contacted to name experts who should + participate in the mitigation development. + + - If an expert which is required to handle an issue is employed by an + listed entity or member of an listed entity, then the response teams can + request the disclosure of that expert from that entity. This ensures + that the expert is also part of the entity's response team. + +Disclosure +"""""""""" + +The disclosing party provides detailed information to the initial response +team via the specific encrypted mailing-list. + +From our experience the technical documentation of these issues is usually +a sufficient starting point and further technical clarification is best +done via email. + +Mitigation development +"""""""""""""""""""""" + +The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes +an existing one if appropriate. + +Using a mailing-list is close to the normal Linux development process and +has been successfully used in developing mitigations for various hardware +security issues in the past. + +The mailing-list operates in the same way as normal Linux development. +Patches are posted, discussed and reviewed and if agreed on applied to a +non-public git repository which is only accessible to the participating +developers via a secure connection. The repository contains the main +development branch against the mainline kernel and backport branches for +stable kernel versions as necessary. + +The initial response team will identify further experts from the Linux +kernel developer community as needed. Bringing in experts can happen at any +time of the development process and needs to be handled in a timely manner. + +If an expert is employed by or member of an entity on the disclosure list +provided by the disclosing party, then participation will be requested from +the relevant entity. + +If not, then the disclosing party will be informed about the experts +participation. The experts are covered by the Memorandum of Understanding +and the disclosing party is requested to acknowledge the participation. In +case that the disclosing party has a compelling reason to object, then this +objection has to be raised within five work days and resolved with the +incident team immediately. If the disclosing party does not react within +five work days this is taken as silent acknowledgement. + +After acknowledgement or resolution of an objection the expert is disclosed +by the incident team and brought into the development process. + + +Coordinated release +""""""""""""""""""" + +The involved parties will negotiate the date and time where the embargo +ends. At that point the prepared mitigations are integrated into the +relevant kernel trees and published. + +While we understand that hardware security issues need coordinated embargo +time, the embargo time should be constrained to the minimum time which is +required for all involved parties to develop, test and prepare the +mitigations. Extending embargo time artificially to meet conference talk +dates or other non-technical reasons is creating more work and burden for +the involved developers and response teams as the patches need to be kept +up to date in order to follow the ongoing upstream kernel development, +which might create conflicting changes. + +CVE assignment +"""""""""""""" + +Neither the hardware security team nor the initial response team assign +CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the development process. If CVEs are +provided by the disclosing party they can be used for documentation +purposes. + +Process ambassadors +------------------- + +For assistance with this process we have established ambassadors in various +organizations, who can answer questions about or provide guidance on the +reporting process and further handling. Ambassadors are not involved in the +disclosure of a particular issue, unless requested by a response team or by +an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: + + ============= ======================================================== + ARM Grant Likely + AMD Tom Lendacky + IBM Z Christian Borntraeger + IBM Power Anton Blanchard + Intel Tony Luck + Qualcomm Trilok Soni + + Microsoft James Morris + VMware + Xen Andrew Cooper + + Canonical John Johansen + Debian Ben Hutchings + Oracle Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk + Red Hat Josh Poimboeuf + SUSE Jiri Kosina + + Amazon + Google Kees Cook + ============= ======================================================== + +If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please +contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to +understand and support our process fully and is ideally well connected in +the Linux kernel community. + +Encrypted mailing-lists +----------------------- + +We use encrypted mailing-lists for communication. The operating principle +of these lists is that email sent to the list is encrypted either with the +list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certificate. The mailing-list +software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it individually for each +subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME certificate. Details +about the mailing-list software and the setup which is used to ensure the +security of the lists and protection of the data can be found here: +https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/remail. + +List keys +^^^^^^^^^ + +For initial contact see :ref:`Contact`. For incident specific mailing-lists +the key and S/MIME certificate are conveyed to the subscribers by email +sent from the specific list. + +Subscription to incident specific lists +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +Subscription is handled by the response teams. Disclosed parties who want +to participate in the communication send a list of potential subscribers to +the response team so the response team can validate subscription requests. + +Each subscriber needs to send a subscription request to the response team +by email. The email must be signed with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME +certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be available from a public key +server and is ideally connected to the Linux kernel's PGP web of trust. See +also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html. + +The response team verifies that the subscriber request is valid and adds +the subscriber to the list. After subscription the subscriber will receive +email from the mailing-list which is signed either with the list's PGP key +or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscriber's email client can extract +the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the signature so the subscriber +can send encrypted email to the list. + -- cgit v1.2.3