From f7c4220e56be1d8fc2bc339984fb5919ee02cf4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2010 14:25:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 244/323] x86: stackprotector: Avoid random pool on rt Origin: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/projects/rt/5.10/older/patches-5.10.204-rt100.tar.xz CPU bringup calls into the random pool to initialize the stack canary. During boot that works nicely even on RT as the might sleep checks are disabled. During CPU hotplug the might sleep checks trigger. Making the locks in random raw is a major PITA, so avoid the call on RT is the only sensible solution. This is basically the same randomness which we get during boot where the random pool has no entropy and we rely on the TSC randomnness. Reported-by: Carsten Emde Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h index 7fb482f0f25b..3df0a95c9e13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ */ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) { - u64 canary; + u64 canary = 0; u64 tsc; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 @@ -76,8 +76,14 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. + * For preempt-rt we need to weaken the randomness a bit, as + * we can't call into the random generator from atomic context + * due to locking constraints. We just leave canary + * uninitialized and use the TSC based randomness on top of it. */ +#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); +#endif tsc = rdtsc(); canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); canary &= CANARY_MASK; -- 2.43.0