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diff --git a/doc/guide/admin/sasl.sdf b/doc/guide/admin/sasl.sdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2cabecc --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/guide/admin/sasl.sdf @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@ +# $OpenLDAP$ +# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved. +# COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT. + +H1: Using SASL + +OpenLDAP clients and servers are capable of authenticating via the +{{TERM[expand]SASL}} ({{TERM:SASL}}) framework, which is detailed +in {{REF:RFC4422}}. This chapter describes how to make use of +SASL in OpenLDAP. + +There are several industry standard authentication mechanisms that +can be used with SASL, including {{TERM:GSSAPI}} for {{TERM:Kerberos}} +V, {{TERM:DIGEST-MD5}}, and {{TERM:PLAIN}} and {{TERM:EXTERNAL}} +for use with {{TERM[expand]TLS}} (TLS). + +The standard client tools provided with OpenLDAP Software, such as +{{ldapsearch}}(1) and {{ldapmodify}}(1), will by default attempt +to authenticate the user to the {{TERM:LDAP}} directory server using +SASL. Basic authentication service can be set up by the LDAP +administrator with a few steps, allowing users to be authenticated +to the slapd server as their LDAP entry. With a few extra steps, +some users and services can be allowed to exploit SASL's proxy +authorization feature, allowing them to authenticate themselves and +then switch their identity to that of another user or service. + +This chapter assumes you have read {{Cyrus SASL for System +Administrators}}, provided with the {{PRD:Cyrus SASL}} +package (in {{FILE:doc/sysadmin.html}}) and have a working Cyrus +SASL installation. You should use the Cyrus SASL {{EX:sample_client}} +and {{EX:sample_server}} to test your SASL installation before +attempting to make use of it with OpenLDAP Software. + +Note that in the following text the term {{user}} is used to describe +a person or application entity who is connecting to the LDAP server +via an LDAP client, such as {{ldapsearch}}(1). That is, the term +{{user}} not only applies to both an individual using an LDAP client, +but to an application entity which issues LDAP client operations +without direct user control. For example, an e-mail server which +uses LDAP operations to access information held in an LDAP server +is an application entity. + + +H2: SASL Security Considerations + +SASL offers many different authentication mechanisms. This section +briefly outlines security considerations. + +Some mechanisms, such as PLAIN and LOGIN, offer no greater security +over LDAP {{simple}} authentication. Like LDAP {{simple}} +authentication, such mechanisms should not be used unless you have +adequate security protections in place. It is recommended that +these mechanisms be used only in conjunction with {{TERM[expand]TLS}} +(TLS). Use of PLAIN and LOGIN are not discussed further in this +document. + +The DIGEST-MD5 mechanism is the mandatory-to-implement authentication +mechanism for LDAPv3. Though DIGEST-MD5 is not a strong authentication +mechanism in comparison with trusted third party authentication +systems (such as {{TERM:Kerberos}} or public key systems), it does +offer significant protections against a number of attacks. Unlike +the {{TERM:CRAM-MD5}} mechanism, it prevents chosen plaintext +attacks. DIGEST-MD5 is favored over the use of plaintext password +mechanisms. The CRAM-MD5 mechanism is deprecated in favor of +DIGEST-MD5. Use of {{SECT:DIGEST-MD5}} is discussed below. + +The GSSAPI mechanism utilizes {{TERM:GSS-API}} {{TERM:Kerberos}} V +to provide secure authentication services. The KERBEROS_V4 mechanism +is available for those using Kerberos IV. Kerberos is viewed as a +secure, distributed authentication system suitable for both small +and large enterprises. Use of {{SECT:GSSAPI}} and {{SECT:KERBEROS_V4}} +are discussed below. + +The EXTERNAL mechanism utilizes authentication services provided +by lower level network services such as {{TERM[expand]TLS}} ({{TERM:TLS}}). When +used in conjunction with {{TERM:TLS}} {{TERM:X.509}}-based public +key technology, EXTERNAL offers strong authentication. +TLS is discussed in the {{SECT:Using TLS}} chapter. + +EXTERNAL can also be used with the {{EX:ldapi:///}} transport, as +Unix-domain sockets can report the UID and GID of the client process. + +There are other strong authentication mechanisms to choose from, +including {{TERM:OTP}} (one time passwords) and {{TERM:SRP}} (secure +remote passwords). These mechanisms are not discussed in this +document. + + +H2: SASL Authentication + +Getting basic SASL authentication running involves a few steps. +The first step configures your slapd server environment so that it +can communicate with client programs using the security system in +place at your site. This usually involves setting up a service key, +a public key, or other form of secret. The second step concerns +mapping authentication identities to LDAP {{TERM:DN}}'s, which +depends on how entries are laid out in your directory. An explanation +of the first step will be given in the next section using Kerberos +V4 as an example mechanism. The steps necessary for your site's +authentication mechanism will be similar, but a guide to every +mechanism available under SASL is beyond the scope of this chapter. +The second step is described in the section {{SECT:Mapping +Authentication Identities}}. + + +H3: GSSAPI + +This section describes the use of the SASL GSSAPI mechanism and +Kerberos V with OpenLDAP. It will be assumed that you have Kerberos +V deployed, you are familiar with the operation of the system, and +that your users are trained in its use. This section also assumes +you have familiarized yourself with the use of the GSSAPI mechanism +by reading {{Configuring GSSAPI and Cyrus SASL}} (provided with +Cyrus SASL in the {{FILE:doc/gssapi}} file) and successfully +experimented with the Cyrus provided {{EX:sample_server}} and +{{EX:sample_client}} applications. General information about +Kerberos is available at {{URL:http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/}}. + +To use the GSSAPI mechanism with {{slapd}}(8) one must create a service +key with a principal for {{ldap}} service within the realm for the host +on which the service runs. For example, if you run {{slapd}} on +{{EX:directory.example.com}} and your realm is {{EX:EXAMPLE.COM}}, +you need to create a service key with the principal: + +> ldap/directory.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM + +When {{slapd}}(8) runs, it must have access to this key. This is +generally done by placing the key into a keytab file, +{{FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab}}. See your Kerberos and Cyrus SASL +documentation for information regarding keytab location settings. + +To use the GSSAPI mechanism to authenticate to the directory, the +user obtains a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) prior to running the +LDAP client. When using OpenLDAP client tools, the user may mandate +use of the GSSAPI mechanism by specifying {{EX:-Y GSSAPI}} as a +command option. + +For the purposes of authentication and authorization, {{slapd}}(8) +associates an authentication request DN of the form: + +> uid=<primary[/instance]>,cn=<realm>,cn=gssapi,cn=auth + +Continuing our example, a user with the Kerberos principal +{{EX:kurt@EXAMPLE.COM}} would have the associated DN: + +> uid=kurt,cn=example.com,cn=gssapi,cn=auth + +and the principal {{EX:ursula/admin@FOREIGN.REALM}} would have the +associated DN: + +> uid=ursula/admin,cn=foreign.realm,cn=gssapi,cn=auth + + +The authentication request DN can be used directly ACLs and +{{EX:groupOfNames}} "member" attributes, since it is of legitimate +LDAP DN format. Or alternatively, the authentication DN could be +mapped before use. See the section {{SECT:Mapping Authentication +Identities}} for details. + + +H3: KERBEROS_V4 + +This section describes the use of the SASL KERBEROS_V4 mechanism +with OpenLDAP. It will be assumed that you are familiar with the +workings of the Kerberos IV security system, and that your site has +Kerberos IV deployed. Your users should be familiar with +authentication policy, how to receive credentials in +a Kerberos ticket cache, and how to refresh expired credentials. + +Note: KERBEROS_V4 and Kerberos IV are deprecated in favor of GSSAPI +and Kerberos V. + +Client programs will need to be able to obtain a session key for +use when connecting to your LDAP server. This allows the LDAP server +to know the identity of the user, and allows the client to know it +is connecting to a legitimate server. If encryption layers are to +be used, the session key can also be used to help negotiate that +option. + +The slapd server runs the service called "{{ldap}}", and the server +will require a srvtab file with a service key. SASL aware client +programs will be obtaining an "ldap" service ticket with the user's +ticket granting ticket (TGT), with the instance of the ticket +matching the hostname of the OpenLDAP server. For example, if your +realm is named {{EX:EXAMPLE.COM}} and the slapd server is running +on the host named {{EX:directory.example.com}}, the {{FILE:/etc/srvtab}} +file on the server will have a service key + +> ldap.directory@EXAMPLE.COM + +When an LDAP client is authenticating a user to the directory using +the KERBEROS_IV mechanism, it will request a session key for that +same principal, either from the ticket cache or by obtaining a new +one from the Kerberos server. This will require the TGT to be +available and valid in the cache as well. If it is not present or +has expired, the client may print out the message: + +> ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Local error + +When the service ticket is obtained, it will be passed to the LDAP +server as proof of the user's identity. The server will extract +the identity and realm out of the service ticket using SASL +library calls, and convert them into an {{authentication request +DN}} of the form + +> uid=<username>,cn=<realm>,cn=<mechanism>,cn=auth + +So in our above example, if the user's name were "adamson", the +authentication request DN would be: + +> uid=adamsom,cn=example.com,cn=kerberos_v4,cn=auth + +This authentication request DN can be used directly ACLs or, +alternatively, mapped prior to use. See the section {{SECT:Mapping +Authentication Identities}} for details. + + +H3: DIGEST-MD5 + +This section describes the use of the SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism +using secrets stored either in the directory itself or in Cyrus +SASL's own database. DIGEST-MD5 relies on the client and the server +sharing a "secret", usually a password. The server generates a +challenge and the client a response proving that it knows the shared +secret. This is much more secure than simply sending the secret +over the wire. + +Cyrus SASL supports several shared-secret mechanisms. To do this, +it needs access to the plaintext password (unlike mechanisms which +pass plaintext passwords over the wire, where the server can store +a hashed version of the password). + +The server's copy of the shared-secret may be stored in Cyrus SASL's +own {{sasldb}} database, in an external system accessed via +{{saslauthd}}, or in LDAP database itself. In either case it is +very important to apply file access controls and LDAP access controls +to prevent exposure of the passwords. The configuration and commands +discussed in this section assume the use of Cyrus SASL 2.1. + +To use secrets stored in {{sasldb}}, simply add users with the +{{saslpasswd2}} command: + +> saslpasswd2 -c <username> + +The passwords for such users must be managed with the {{saslpasswd2}} +command. + +To use secrets stored in the LDAP directory, place plaintext passwords +in the {{EX:userPassword}} attribute. It will be necessary to add +an option to {{EX:slapd.conf}} to make sure that passwords set using +the LDAP Password Modify Operation are stored in plaintext: + +> password-hash {CLEARTEXT} + +Passwords stored in this way can be managed either with {{ldappasswd}}(1) +or by simply modifying the {{EX:userPassword}} attribute. Regardless of +where the passwords are stored, a mapping will be needed from +authentication request DN to user's DN. + +The DIGEST-MD5 mechanism produces authentication IDs of the form: + +> uid=<username>,cn=<realm>,cn=digest-md5,cn=auth + +If the default realm is used, the realm name is omitted from the ID, +giving: + +> uid=<username>,cn=digest-md5,cn=auth + +See {{SECT: Mapping Authentication Identities}} below for information +on optional mapping of identities. + +With suitable mappings in place, users can specify SASL IDs when +performing LDAP operations, and the password stored in {{sasldb}} or in +the directory itself will be used to verify the authentication. +For example, the user identified by the directory entry: + +> dn: cn=Andrew Findlay+uid=u000997,dc=example,dc=com +> objectclass: inetOrgPerson +> objectclass: person +> sn: Findlay +> uid: u000997 +> userPassword: secret + +can issue commands of the form: + +> ldapsearch -Y DIGEST-MD5 -U u000997 ... + +Note: in each of the above cases, no authorization identity (e.g. +{{EX:-X}}) was provided. Unless you are attempting {{SECT:SASL +Proxy Authorization}}, no authorization identity should be specified. +The server will infer an authorization identity from authentication +identity (as described below). + + +H3: EXTERNAL + +The SASL EXTERNAL mechanism makes use of an authentication performed +by a lower-level protocol: usually {{TERM:TLS}} or Unix {{TERM:IPC}} + +Each transport protocol returns Authentication Identities in its own +format: + +H4: TLS Authentication Identity Format + +This is the Subject DN from the client-side certificate. +Note that DNs are displayed differently by LDAP and by X.509, so +a certificate issued to +> C=gb, O=The Example Organisation, CN=A Person + +will produce an authentication identity of: + +> cn=A Person,o=The Example Organisation,c=gb + +Note that you must set a suitable value for TLSVerifyClient to make the server +request the use of a client-side certificate. Without this, the SASL EXTERNAL +mechanism will not be offered. +Refer to the {{SECT:Using TLS}} chapter for details. + +H4: IPC (ldapi:///) Identity Format + +This is formed from the Unix UID and GID of the client process: + +> gidNumber=<number>+uidNumber=<number>,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth + +Thus, a client process running as {{EX:root}} will be: + +> gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth + + +H3: Mapping Authentication Identities + +The authentication mechanism in the slapd server will use SASL +library calls to obtain the authenticated user's "username", based +on whatever underlying authentication mechanism was used. This +username is in the namespace of the authentication mechanism, and +not in the normal LDAP namespace. As stated in the sections above, +that username is reformatted into an authentication request DN of +the form + +> uid=<username>,cn=<realm>,cn=<mechanism>,cn=auth + +or + +> uid=<username>,cn=<mechanism>,cn=auth + +depending on whether or not <mechanism> employs the concept of +"realms". Note also that the realm part will be omitted if the +default realm was used in the authentication. + +The {{ldapwhoami}}(1) command may be used to determine the identity +associated with the user. It is very useful for determining proper +function of mappings. + +It is not intended that you should add LDAP entries of the above +form to your LDAP database. Chances are you have an LDAP entry for +each of the persons that will be authenticating to LDAP, laid out +in your directory tree, and the tree does not start at cn=auth. +But if your site has a clear mapping between the "username" and an +LDAP entry for the person, you will be able to configure your LDAP +server to automatically map a authentication request DN to the +user's {{authentication DN}}. + +Note: it is not required that the authentication request DN nor the +user's authentication DN resulting from the mapping refer to an +entry held in the directory. However, additional capabilities +become available (see below). + +The LDAP administrator will need to tell the slapd server how to +map an authentication request DN to a user's authentication DN. +This is done by adding one or more {{EX:authz-regexp}} directives to +the {{slapd.conf}}(5) file. This directive takes two arguments: + +> authz-regexp <search pattern> <replacement pattern> + +The authentication request DN is compared to the search pattern +using the regular expression functions {{regcomp}}() and {{regexec}}(), +and if it matches, it is rewritten as the replacement pattern. If +there are multiple {{EX:authz-regexp}} directives, only the first +whose search pattern matches the authentication identity is used. +The string that is output from the replacement pattern should be +the authentication DN of the user or an LDAP URL. If replacement +string produces a DN, the entry named by this DN need not be held +by this server. If the replace string produces an LDAP URL, that +LDAP URL must evaluate to one and only one entry held by this server. + +The search pattern can contain any of the regular expression +characters listed in {{regexec}}(3C). The main characters of note +are dot ".", asterisk "*", and the open and close parenthesis "(" +and ")". Essentially, the dot matches any character, the asterisk +allows zero or more repeats of the immediately preceding character +or pattern, and terms in parenthesis are remembered for the replacement +pattern. + +The replacement pattern will produce either a DN or URL referring +to the user. Anything from the authentication request DN that +matched a string in parenthesis in the search pattern is stored in +the variable "$1". That variable "$1" can appear in the replacement +pattern, and will be replaced by the string from the authentication +request DN. If there were multiple sets of parentheses in the search +pattern, the variables $2, $3, etc are used. + +H3: Direct Mapping + +Where possible, direct mapping of the authentication request DN to +the user's DN is generally recommended. Aside from avoiding the +expense of searching for the user's DN, it allows mapping to +DNs which refer to entries not held by this server. + +Suppose the authentication request DN is written as: + +> uid=adamson,cn=example.com,cn=gssapi,cn=auth + +and the user's actual LDAP entry is: + +> uid=adamson,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com + +then the following {{EX:authz-regexp}} directive in {{slapd.conf}}(5) +would provide for direct mapping. + +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,]*),cn=example.com,cn=gssapi,cn=auth +> uid=$1,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com + +An even more lenient rule could be written as + +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,]*),cn=[^,]*,cn=auth +> uid=$1,ou=people,dc=example,dc=com + +Be careful about setting the search pattern too leniently, however, +since it may mistakenly allow persons to become authenticated as a +DN to which they should not have access. It is better to write +several strict directives than one lenient directive which has +security holes. If there is only one authentication mechanism in +place at your site, and zero or one realms in use, you might be +able to map between authentication identities and LDAP DN's with a +single {{EX:authz-regexp}} directive. + +Don't forget to allow for the case where the realm is omitted as +well as the case with an explicitly specified realm. This may well +require a separate {{EX:authz-regexp}} directive for each case, with +the explicit-realm entry being listed first. + +H3: Search-based mappings + +There are a number of cases where mapping to a LDAP URL may be +appropriate. For instance, some sites may have person objects +located in multiple areas of the LDAP tree, such as if there were +an {{EX:ou=accounting}} tree and an {{EX:ou=engineering}} tree, +with persons interspersed between them. Or, maybe the desired +mapping must be based upon information in the user's information. +Consider the need to map the above authentication request DN to +user whose entry is as follows: + +> dn: cn=Mark Adamson,ou=People,dc=Example,dc=COM +> objectclass: person +> cn: Mark Adamson +> uid: adamson + +The information in the authentication request DN is insufficient +to allow the user's DN to be directly derived, instead the user's +DN must be searched for. For these situations, a replacement pattern +which produces a LDAP URL can be used in the {{EX:authz-regexp}} +directives. This URL will then be used to perform an internal +search of the LDAP database to find the person's authentication DN. + +An LDAP URL, similar to other URL's, is of the form + +> ldap://<host>/<base>?<attrs>?<scope>?<filter> + +This contains all of the elements necessary to perform an LDAP +search: the name of the server <host>, the LDAP DN search base +<base>, the LDAP attributes to retrieve <attrs>, the search scope +<scope> which is one of the three options "base", "one", or "sub", +and lastly an LDAP search filter <filter>. Since the search is for +an LDAP DN within the current server, the <host> portion should be +empty. The <attrs> field is also ignored since only the DN is of +concern. These two elements are left in the format of the URL to +maintain the clarity of what information goes where in the string. + +Suppose that the person in the example from above did in fact have +an authentication username of "adamson" and that information was +kept in the attribute "uid" in their LDAP entry. The {{EX:authz-regexp}} +directive might be written as + +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,]*),cn=example.com,cn=gssapi,cn=auth +> ldap:///ou=people,dc=example,dc=com??one?(uid=$1) + +This will initiate an internal search of the LDAP database inside +the slapd server. If the search returns exactly one entry, it is +accepted as being the DN of the user. If there are more than one +entries returned, or if there are zero entries returned, the +authentication fails and the user's connection is left bound as the +authentication request DN. + +The attributes that are used in the search filter <filter> in the +URL should be indexed to allow faster searching. If they are not, +the authentication step alone can take uncomfortably long periods, +and users may assume the server is down. + +A more complex site might have several realms in use, each mapping +to a different subtree in the directory. These can be handled with +statements of the form: + +> # Match Engineering realm +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,]*),cn=engineering.example.com,cn=digest-md5,cn=auth +> ldap:///dc=eng,dc=example,dc=com??one?(&(uid=$1)(objectClass=person)) +> +> # Match Accounting realm +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,].*),cn=accounting.example.com,cn=digest-md5,cn=auth +> ldap:///dc=accounting,dc=example,dc=com??one?(&(uid=$1)(objectClass=person)) +> +> # Default realm is customers.example.com +> authz-regexp +> uid=([^,]*),cn=digest-md5,cn=auth +> ldap:///dc=customers,dc=example,dc=com??one?(&(uid=$1)(objectClass=person)) + +Note that the explicitly-named realms are handled first, to avoid +the realm name becoming part of the UID. Also note the use of scope +and filters to limit matching to desirable entries. + +Note as well that {{EX:authz-regexp}} internal search are subject +to access controls. Specifically, the authentication identity +must have {{EX:auth}} access. + +See {{slapd.conf}}(5) for more detailed information. + + +H2: SASL Proxy Authorization + +The SASL offers a feature known as {{proxy authorization}}, which +allows an authenticated user to request that they act on the behalf +of another user. This step occurs after the user has obtained an +authentication DN, and involves sending an authorization identity +to the server. The server will then make a decision on whether or +not to allow the authorization to occur. If it is allowed, the +user's LDAP connection is switched to have a binding DN derived +from the authorization identity, and the LDAP session proceeds with +the access of the new authorization DN. + +The decision to allow an authorization to proceed depends on the +rules and policies of the site where LDAP is running, and thus +cannot be made by SASL alone. The SASL library leaves it up to the +server to make the decision. The LDAP administrator sets the +guidelines of who can authorize to what identity by adding information +into the LDAP database entries. By default, the authorization +features are disabled, and must be explicitly configured by the +LDAP administrator before use. + + +H3: Uses of Proxy Authorization + +This sort of service is useful when one entity needs to act on the +behalf of many other users. For example, users may be directed to +a web page to make changes to their personal information in their +LDAP entry. The users authenticate to the web server to establish +their identity, but the web server CGI cannot authenticate to the +LDAP server as that user to make changes for them. Instead, the +web server authenticates itself to the LDAP server as a service +identity, say, + +> cn=WebUpdate,dc=example,dc=com + +and then it will SASL authorize to the DN of the user. Once so +authorized, the CGI makes changes to the LDAP entry of the user, +and as far as the slapd server can tell for its ACLs, it is the +user themself on the other end of the connection. The user could +have connected to the LDAP server directly and authenticated as +themself, but that would require the user to have more knowledge +of LDAP clients, knowledge which the web page provides in an easier +format. + +Proxy authorization can also be used to limit access to an account +that has greater access to the database. Such an account, perhaps +even the root DN specified in {{slapd.conf}}(5), can have a strict +list of people who can authorize to that DN. Changes to the LDAP +database could then be only allowed by that DN, and in order to +become that DN, users must first authenticate as one of the persons +on the list. This allows for better auditing of who made changes +to the LDAP database. If people were allowed to authenticate +directly to the privileged account, possibly through the {{EX:rootpw}} +{{slapd.conf}}(5) directive or through a {{EX:userPassword}} +attribute, then auditing becomes more difficult. + +Note that after a successful proxy authorization, the original +authentication DN of the LDAP connection is overwritten by the new +DN from the authorization request. If a service program is able to +authenticate itself as its own authentication DN and then authorize +to other DN's, and it is planning on switching to several different +identities during one LDAP session, it will need to authenticate +itself each time before authorizing to another DN (or use a different +proxy authorization mechanism). The slapd server does not keep +record of the service program's ability to switch to other DN's. +On authentication mechanisms like Kerberos this will not require +multiple connections being made to the Kerberos server, since the +user's TGT and "ldap" session key are valid for multiple uses for +the several hours of the ticket lifetime. + + +H3: SASL Authorization Identities + +The SASL authorization identity is sent to the LDAP server via the +{{EX:-X}} switch for {{ldapsearch}}(1) and other tools, or in the +{{EX:*authzid}} parameter to the {{lutil_sasl_defaults}}() call. +The identity can be in one of two forms, either + +> u:<username> + +or + +> dn:<dn> + +In the first form, the <username> is from the same namespace as +the authentication identities above. It is the user's username as +it is referred to by the underlying authentication mechanism. +Authorization identities of this form are converted into a DN format +by the same function that the authentication process used, producing +an {{authorization request DN}} of the form + +> uid=<username>,cn=<realm>,cn=<mechanism>,cn=auth + +That authorization request DN is then run through the same +{{EX:authz-regexp}} process to convert it into a legitimate authorization +DN from the database. If it cannot be converted due to a failed +search from an LDAP URL, the authorization request fails with +"inappropriate access". Otherwise, the DN string is now a legitimate +authorization DN ready to undergo approval. + +If the authorization identity was provided in the second form, with +a {{EX:"dn:"}} prefix, the string after the prefix is already in +authorization DN form, ready to undergo approval. + + +H3: Proxy Authorization Rules + +Once slapd has the authorization DN, the actual approval process +begins. There are two attributes that the LDAP administrator can +put into LDAP entries to allow authorization: + +> authzTo +> authzFrom + +Both can be multivalued. The {{EX:authzTo}} attribute is a +source rule, and it is placed into the entry associated with the +authentication DN to tell what authorization DNs the authenticated +DN is allowed to assume. The second attribute is a destination +rule, and it is placed into the entry associated with the requested +authorization DN to tell which authenticated DNs may assume it. + +The choice of which authorization policy attribute to use is up to +the administrator. Source rules are checked first in the person's +authentication DN entry, and if none of the {{EX:authzTo}} rules +specify the authorization is permitted, the {{EX:authzFrom}} +rules in the authorization DN entry are then checked. If neither +case specifies that the request be honored, the request is denied. +Since the default behavior is to deny authorization requests, rules +only specify that a request be allowed; there are no negative rules +telling what authorizations to deny. + +The value(s) in the two attributes are of the same form as the +output of the replacement pattern of a {{EX:authz-regexp}} directive: +either a DN or an LDAP URL. For example, if a {{EX:authzTo}} +value is a DN, that DN is one the authenticated user can authorize +to. On the other hand, if the {{EX:authzTo}} value is an LDAP +URL, the URL is used as an internal search of the LDAP database, +and the authenticated user can become ANY DN returned by the search. +If an LDAP entry looked like: + +> dn: cn=WebUpdate,dc=example,dc=com +> authzTo: ldap:///dc=example,dc=com??sub?(objectclass=person) + +then any user who authenticated as {{EX:cn=WebUpdate,dc=example,dc=com}} +could authorize to any other LDAP entry under the search base +{{EX:dc=example,dc=com}} which has an objectClass of {{EX:Person}}. + + +H4: Notes on Proxy Authorization Rules + +An LDAP URL in a {{EX:authzTo}} or {{EX:authzFrom}} attribute +will return a set of DNs. Each DN returned will be checked. Searches +which return a large set can cause the authorization process to +take an uncomfortably long time. Also, searches should be performed +on attributes that have been indexed by slapd. + +To help produce more sweeping rules for {{EX:authzFrom}} and +{{EX:authzTo}}, the values of these attributes are allowed to +be DNs with regular expression characters in them. This means a +source rule like + +> authzTo: dn.regex:^uid=[^,]*,dc=example,dc=com$ + +would allow that authenticated user to authorize to any DN that +matches the regular expression pattern given. This regular expression +comparison can be evaluated much faster than an LDAP search for +{{EX:(uid=*)}}. + +Also note that the values in an authorization rule must be one of +the two forms: an LDAP URL or a DN (with or without regular expression +characters). Anything that does not begin with "{{EX:ldap://}}" is +taken as a DN. It is not permissible to enter another authorization +identity of the form "{{EX:u:<username>}}" as an authorization rule. + + +H4: Policy Configuration + +The decision of which type of rules to use, {{EX:authzFrom}} +or {{EX:authzTo}}, will depend on the site's situation. For +example, if the set of people who may become a given identity can +easily be written as a search filter, then a single destination +rule could be written. If the set of people is not easily defined +by a search filter, and the set of people is small, it may be better +to write a source rule in the entries of each of those people who +should be allowed to perform the proxy authorization. + +By default, processing of proxy authorization rules is disabled. +The {{EX:authz-policy}} directive must be set in the +{{slapd.conf}}(5) file to enable authorization. This directive can +be set to {{EX:none}} for no rules (the default), {{EX:to}} for +source rules, {{EX:from}} for destination rules, or {{EX:both}} for +both source and destination rules. + +Source rules are extremely powerful. If ordinary users have +access to write the {{EX:authzTo}} attribute in their own +entries, then they can write rules that would allow them to authorize +as anyone else. As such, when using source rules, the +{{EX:authzTo}} attribute should be protected with an ACL that +only allows privileged users to set its values. + |