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diff --git a/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c b/servers/slapd/overlays/ppolicy.c
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+/* $OpenLDAP$ */
+/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2004-2021 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2004-2005 Howard Chu, Symas Corporation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2004 Hewlett-Packard Company.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
+ * Public License.
+ *
+ * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
+ * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
+ * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
+ */
+/* ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
+ * This work was developed by Howard Chu for inclusion in
+ * OpenLDAP Software, based on prior work by Neil Dunbar (HP).
+ * This work was sponsored by the Hewlett-Packard Company.
+ */
+
+#include "portable.h"
+
+/* This file implements "Password Policy for LDAP Directories",
+ * based on draft behera-ldap-password-policy-09
+ */
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY
+
+#include <ldap.h>
+#include "lutil.h"
+#include "slap.h"
+#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES
+#define LIBLTDL_DLL_IMPORT /* Win32: don't re-export libltdl's symbols */
+#include <ltdl.h>
+#endif
+#include <ac/errno.h>
+#include <ac/time.h>
+#include <ac/string.h>
+#include <ac/ctype.h>
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef MODULE_NAME_SZ
+#define MODULE_NAME_SZ 256
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE
+#define PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE 5
+#endif
+
+/* Per-instance configuration information */
+typedef struct pp_info {
+ struct berval def_policy; /* DN of default policy subentry */
+ int use_lockout; /* send AccountLocked result? */
+ int hash_passwords; /* transparently hash cleartext pwds */
+ int forward_updates; /* use frontend for policy state updates */
+ int send_netscape_controls; /* send netscape password controls */
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t pwdFailureTime_mutex;
+} pp_info;
+
+/* Our per-connection info - note, it is not per-instance, it is
+ * used by all instances
+ */
+typedef struct pw_conn {
+ struct berval dn; /* DN of restricted user */
+} pw_conn;
+
+static pw_conn *pwcons;
+static int ppolicy_cid;
+static int ov_count;
+
+typedef struct pass_policy {
+ AttributeDescription *ad; /* attribute to which the policy applies */
+ int pwdMinAge; /* minimum time (seconds) until passwd can change */
+ int pwdMaxAge; /* time in seconds until pwd will expire after change */
+ int pwdInHistory; /* number of previous passwords kept */
+ int pwdCheckQuality; /* 0 = don't check quality, 1 = check if possible,
+ 2 = check mandatory; fail if not possible */
+ int pwdMinLength; /* minimum number of chars in password */
+ int pwdExpireWarning; /* number of seconds that warning controls are
+ sent before a password expires */
+ int pwdGraceAuthNLimit; /* number of times you can log in with an
+ expired password */
+ int pwdLockout; /* 0 = do not lockout passwords, 1 = lock them out */
+ int pwdLockoutDuration; /* time in seconds a password is locked out for */
+ int pwdMaxFailure; /* number of failed binds allowed before lockout */
+ int pwdMaxRecordedFailure; /* number of failed binds to store */
+ int pwdFailureCountInterval; /* number of seconds before failure
+ counts are zeroed */
+ int pwdMustChange; /* 0 = users can use admin set password
+ 1 = users must change password after admin set */
+ int pwdAllowUserChange; /* 0 = users cannot change their passwords
+ 1 = users can change them */
+ int pwdSafeModify; /* 0 = old password doesn't need to come
+ with password change request
+ 1 = password change must supply existing pwd */
+ char pwdCheckModule[MODULE_NAME_SZ]; /* name of module to dynamically
+ load to check password */
+} PassPolicy;
+
+typedef struct pw_hist {
+ time_t t; /* timestamp of history entry */
+ struct berval pw; /* old password hash */
+ struct berval bv; /* text of entire entry */
+ struct pw_hist *next;
+} pw_hist;
+
+/* Operational attributes */
+static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdChangedTime, *ad_pwdAccountLockedTime,
+ *ad_pwdFailureTime, *ad_pwdHistory, *ad_pwdGraceUseTime, *ad_pwdReset,
+ *ad_pwdPolicySubentry;
+
+static struct schema_info {
+ char *def;
+ AttributeDescription **ad;
+} pwd_OpSchema[] = {
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdChangedTime' ) "
+ "DESC 'The time the password was last changed' "
+ "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+ "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+ "SINGLE-VALUE NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdChangedTime },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdAccountLockedTime' ) "
+ "DESC 'The time an user account was locked' "
+ "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+ "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+ "SINGLE-VALUE "
+#if 0
+ /* Not until Relax control is released */
+ "NO-USER-MODIFICATION "
+#endif
+ "USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdAccountLockedTime },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.19 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdFailureTime' ) "
+ "DESC 'The timestamps of the last consecutive authentication failures' "
+ "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+ "ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+ "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdFailureTime },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdHistory' ) "
+ "DESC 'The history of users passwords' "
+ "EQUALITY octetStringMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 "
+ "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdHistory },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.21 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdGraceUseTime' ) "
+ "DESC 'The timestamps of the grace login once the password has expired' "
+ "EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 "
+ "NO-USER-MODIFICATION USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdGraceUseTime },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdReset' ) "
+ "DESC 'The indication that the password has been reset' "
+ "EQUALITY booleanMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 "
+ "SINGLE-VALUE USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdReset },
+ { "( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.23 "
+ "NAME ( 'pwdPolicySubentry' ) "
+ "DESC 'The pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this object' "
+ "EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch "
+ "SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 "
+ "SINGLE-VALUE "
+#if 0
+ /* Not until Relax control is released */
+ "NO-USER-MODIFICATION "
+#endif
+ "USAGE directoryOperation )",
+ &ad_pwdPolicySubentry },
+ { NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+static AttributeDescription *ad_pwdMinAge, *ad_pwdMaxAge, *ad_pwdInHistory,
+ *ad_pwdCheckQuality, *ad_pwdMinLength, *ad_pwdMaxFailure,
+ *ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit, *ad_pwdExpireWarning, *ad_pwdLockoutDuration,
+ *ad_pwdFailureCountInterval, *ad_pwdCheckModule, *ad_pwdLockout,
+ *ad_pwdMustChange, *ad_pwdAllowUserChange, *ad_pwdSafeModify,
+ *ad_pwdAttribute, *ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure;
+
+#define TAB(name) { #name, &ad_##name }
+
+static struct schema_info pwd_UsSchema[] = {
+ TAB(pwdAttribute),
+ TAB(pwdMinAge),
+ TAB(pwdMaxAge),
+ TAB(pwdInHistory),
+ TAB(pwdCheckQuality),
+ TAB(pwdMinLength),
+ TAB(pwdMaxFailure),
+ TAB(pwdMaxRecordedFailure),
+ TAB(pwdGraceAuthNLimit),
+ TAB(pwdExpireWarning),
+ TAB(pwdLockout),
+ TAB(pwdLockoutDuration),
+ TAB(pwdFailureCountInterval),
+ TAB(pwdCheckModule),
+ TAB(pwdMustChange),
+ TAB(pwdAllowUserChange),
+ TAB(pwdSafeModify),
+ { NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t chk_syntax_mutex;
+
+enum {
+ PPOLICY_DEFAULT = 1,
+ PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT,
+ PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT
+};
+
+static ConfigDriver ppolicy_cf_default;
+
+static ConfigTable ppolicycfg[] = {
+ { "ppolicy_default", "policyDN", 2, 2, 0,
+ ARG_DN|ARG_QUOTE|ARG_MAGIC|PPOLICY_DEFAULT, ppolicy_cf_default,
+ "( OLcfgOvAt:12.1 NAME 'olcPPolicyDefault' "
+ "DESC 'DN of a pwdPolicy object for uncustomized objects' "
+ "SYNTAX OMsDN SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+ { "ppolicy_hash_cleartext", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+ ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_HASH_CLEARTEXT,
+ (void *)offsetof(pp_info,hash_passwords),
+ "( OLcfgOvAt:12.2 NAME 'olcPPolicyHashCleartext' "
+ "DESC 'Hash passwords on add or modify' "
+ "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+ { "ppolicy_forward_updates", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+ ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET,
+ (void *)offsetof(pp_info,forward_updates),
+ "( OLcfgOvAt:12.4 NAME 'olcPPolicyForwardUpdates' "
+ "DESC 'Allow policy state updates to be forwarded via updateref' "
+ "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+ { "ppolicy_use_lockout", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+ ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET|PPOLICY_USE_LOCKOUT,
+ (void *)offsetof(pp_info,use_lockout),
+ "( OLcfgOvAt:12.3 NAME 'olcPPolicyUseLockout' "
+ "DESC 'Warn clients with AccountLocked' "
+ "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+ { "ppolicy_send_netscape_controls", "on|off", 1, 2, 0,
+ ARG_ON_OFF|ARG_OFFSET,
+ (void *)offsetof(pp_info,send_netscape_controls),
+ "( OLcfgOvAt:12.6 NAME 'olcPPolicySendNetscapeControls' "
+ "DESC 'Send Netscape policy controls' "
+ "EQUALITY booleanMatch "
+ "SYNTAX OMsBoolean SINGLE-VALUE )", NULL, NULL },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ARG_IGNORED }
+};
+
+static ConfigOCs ppolicyocs[] = {
+ { "( OLcfgOvOc:12.1 "
+ "NAME 'olcPPolicyConfig' "
+ "DESC 'Password Policy configuration' "
+ "SUP olcOverlayConfig "
+ "MAY ( olcPPolicyDefault $ olcPPolicyHashCleartext $ "
+ "olcPPolicyUseLockout $ olcPPolicyForwardUpdates $ "
+ "olcPPolicySendNetscapeControls ) )",
+ Cft_Overlay, ppolicycfg },
+ { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+ppolicy_cf_default( ConfigArgs *c )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)c->bi;
+ pp_info *pi = (pp_info *)on->on_bi.bi_private;
+ int rc = ARG_BAD_CONF;
+
+ assert ( c->type == PPOLICY_DEFAULT );
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default\n", 0, 0, 0);
+
+ switch ( c->op ) {
+ case SLAP_CONFIG_EMIT:
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default emit\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ rc = 0;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pi->def_policy )) {
+ rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_vals,
+ &pi->def_policy );
+ if ( rc ) return rc;
+ rc = value_add_one( &c->rvalue_nvals,
+ &pi->def_policy );
+ }
+ break;
+ case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default delete\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) {
+ ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+ pi->def_policy.bv_val = NULL;
+ }
+ pi->def_policy.bv_len = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ case SLAP_CONFIG_ADD:
+ /* fallthrough to LDAP_MOD_ADD */
+ case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==> ppolicy_cf_default add\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ if ( pi->def_policy.bv_val ) {
+ ber_memfree ( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+ }
+ pi->def_policy = c->value_ndn;
+ ber_memfree( c->value_dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &c->value_dn );
+ BER_BVZERO( &c->value_ndn );
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort ();
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static time_t
+parse_time( char *atm )
+{
+ struct lutil_tm tm;
+ struct lutil_timet tt;
+ time_t ret = (time_t)-1;
+
+ if ( lutil_parsetime( atm, &tm ) == 0) {
+ lutil_tm2time( &tm, &tt );
+ ret = tt.tt_sec;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+account_locked( Operation *op, Entry *e,
+ PassPolicy *pp, Modifications **mod )
+{
+ Attribute *la;
+
+ assert(mod != NULL);
+
+ if ( !pp->pwdLockout )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (la = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) != NULL ) {
+ BerVarray vals = la->a_nvals;
+
+ /*
+ * there is a lockout stamp - we now need to know if it's
+ * a valid one.
+ */
+ if (vals[0].bv_val != NULL) {
+ time_t then, now;
+ Modifications *m;
+
+ if (!pp->pwdLockoutDuration)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((then = parse_time( vals[0].bv_val )) == (time_t)0)
+ return 1;
+
+ now = slap_get_time();
+
+ if (now < then + pp->pwdLockoutDuration)
+ return 1;
+
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ m->sml_flags = 0;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+ m->sml_next = *mod;
+ *mod = m;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* IMPLICIT TAGS, all context-specific */
+#define PPOLICY_WARNING 0xa0L /* constructed + 0 */
+#define PPOLICY_ERROR 0x81L /* primitive + 1 */
+
+#define PPOLICY_EXPIRE 0x80L /* primitive + 0 */
+#define PPOLICY_GRACE 0x81L /* primitive + 1 */
+
+static const char ppolicy_ctrl_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYRESPONSE;
+static const char ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRED;
+static const char ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid[] = LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRING;
+
+static LDAPControl *
+create_passcontrol( Operation *op, int exptime, int grace, LDAPPasswordPolicyError err )
+{
+ BerElementBuffer berbuf, bb2;
+ BerElement *ber = (BerElement *) &berbuf, *b2 = (BerElement *) &bb2;
+ LDAPControl c = { 0 }, *cp;
+ struct berval bv;
+ int rc;
+
+ BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value );
+
+ ber_init2( ber, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+ ber_printf( ber, "{" /*}*/ );
+
+ if ( exptime >= 0 ) {
+ ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+ ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_EXPIRE, exptime );
+ rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 );
+ (void)ber_free_buf(b2);
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ cp = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv );
+ ch_free( bv.bv_val );
+ } else if ( grace > 0 ) {
+ ber_init2( b2, NULL, LBER_USE_DER );
+ ber_printf( b2, "ti", PPOLICY_GRACE, grace );
+ rc = ber_flatten2( b2, &bv, 1 );
+ (void)ber_free_buf(b2);
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ cp = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ber_printf( ber, "tO", PPOLICY_WARNING, &bv );
+ ch_free( bv.bv_val );
+ }
+
+ if (err != PP_noError ) {
+ ber_printf( ber, "te", PPOLICY_ERROR, err );
+ }
+ ber_printf( ber, /*{*/ "N}" );
+
+ if (ber_flatten2( ber, &c.ldctl_value, 0 ) == -1) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cp = op->o_tmpalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl ) + c.ldctl_value.bv_len, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_ctrl_oid;
+ cp->ldctl_iscritical = 0;
+ cp->ldctl_value.bv_val = (char *)&cp[1];
+ cp->ldctl_value.bv_len = c.ldctl_value.bv_len;
+ AC_MEMCPY( cp->ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_val, c.ldctl_value.bv_len );
+fail:
+ (void)ber_free_buf(ber);
+
+ return cp;
+}
+
+static LDAPControl *
+create_passexpiry( Operation *op, int expired, int warn )
+{
+ LDAPControl *cp;
+ char buf[sizeof("-2147483648")];
+ struct berval bv = { .bv_val = buf, .bv_len = sizeof(buf) };
+
+ bv.bv_len = snprintf( bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len, "%d", warn );
+
+ cp = op->o_tmpalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl ) + bv.bv_len, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( expired ) {
+ cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid;
+ } else {
+ cp->ldctl_oid = (char *)ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid;
+ }
+ cp->ldctl_iscritical = 0;
+ cp->ldctl_value.bv_val = (char *)&cp[1];
+ cp->ldctl_value.bv_len = bv.bv_len;
+ AC_MEMCPY( cp->ldctl_value.bv_val, bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len );
+ return cp;
+}
+
+static LDAPControl **
+add_passcontrol( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl *ctrl )
+{
+ LDAPControl **ctrls, **oldctrls = rs->sr_ctrls;
+ int n;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if ( oldctrls ) {
+ for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ )
+ ;
+ }
+ n += 2;
+
+ ctrls = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof( LDAPControl * ), n, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+ n = 0;
+ if ( oldctrls ) {
+ for ( ; oldctrls[n]; n++ ) {
+ ctrls[n] = oldctrls[n];
+ }
+ }
+ ctrls[n] = ctrl;
+ ctrls[n+1] = NULL;
+
+ rs->sr_ctrls = ctrls;
+
+ return oldctrls;
+}
+
+static void
+ppolicy_get_default( PassPolicy *pp )
+{
+ memset( pp, 0, sizeof(PassPolicy) );
+
+ pp->ad = slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword;
+
+ /* Users can change their own password by default */
+ pp->pwdAllowUserChange = 1;
+ if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure )
+ pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE;
+}
+
+
+static void
+ppolicy_get( Operation *op, Entry *e, PassPolicy *pp )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+ pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+ Attribute *a;
+ BerVarray vals;
+ int rc;
+ Entry *pe = NULL;
+#if 0
+ const char *text;
+#endif
+
+ ppolicy_get_default( pp );
+
+ if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdPolicySubentry )) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * entry has no password policy assigned - use default
+ */
+ vals = &pi->def_policy;
+ if ( !vals->bv_val )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ } else {
+ vals = a->a_nvals;
+ if (vals[0].bv_val == NULL) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "ppolicy_get: NULL value for policySubEntry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ goto defaultpol;
+ }
+ }
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, vals, NULL, NULL, 0, &pe );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+ if ( rc ) goto defaultpol;
+
+#if 0 /* Only worry about userPassword for now */
+ if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAttribute )))
+ slap_bv2ad( &a->a_vals[0], &pp->ad, &text );
+#endif
+
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinAge ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxAge ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxAge, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdInHistory ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdInHistory, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckQuality ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdCheckQuality, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMinLength ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMinLength, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxFailure ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMaxRecordedFailure ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceAuthNLimit ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdGraceAuthNLimit, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdExpireWarning ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdExpireWarning, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureCountInterval ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdFailureCountInterval, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockoutDuration ) )
+ && lutil_atoi( &pp->pwdLockoutDuration, a->a_vals[0].bv_val ) != 0 )
+ goto defaultpol;
+
+ if ( ( a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdCheckModule ) ) ) {
+ strncpy( pp->pwdCheckModule, a->a_vals[0].bv_val,
+ sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule) );
+ pp->pwdCheckModule[sizeof(pp->pwdCheckModule)-1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdLockout )))
+ pp->pwdLockout = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+ if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdMustChange )))
+ pp->pwdMustChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+ if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdAllowUserChange )))
+ pp->pwdAllowUserChange = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+ if ((a = attr_find( pe->e_attrs, ad_pwdSafeModify )))
+ pp->pwdSafeModify = bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv );
+
+ if ( pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure < pp->pwdMaxFailure )
+ pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = pp->pwdMaxFailure;
+ if ( !pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure )
+ pp->pwdMaxRecordedFailure = PPOLICY_DEFAULT_MAXRECORDED_FAILURE;
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, pe );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+ return;
+
+defaultpol:
+ if ( pe ) {
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, pe );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+ }
+
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "ppolicy_get: using default policy\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+
+ ppolicy_get_default( pp );
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static int
+password_scheme( struct berval *cred, struct berval *sch )
+{
+ int e;
+
+ assert( cred != NULL );
+
+ if (sch) {
+ sch->bv_val = NULL;
+ sch->bv_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (cred->bv_val == NULL) ||
+ (cred->bv_val[0] != '{')) return LDAP_OTHER;
+
+ for(e = 1; cred->bv_val[e] && cred->bv_val[e] != '}'; e++);
+ if (cred->bv_val[e]) {
+ int rc;
+ rc = lutil_passwd_scheme( cred->bv_val );
+ if (rc) {
+ if (sch) {
+ sch->bv_val = cred->bv_val;
+ sch->bv_len = e;
+ }
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+ return LDAP_OTHER;
+}
+
+static int
+check_password_quality( struct berval *cred, PassPolicy *pp, LDAPPasswordPolicyError *err, Entry *e, char **txt )
+{
+ int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS, ok = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ char *ptr;
+ struct berval sch;
+
+ assert( cred != NULL );
+ assert( pp != NULL );
+ assert( txt != NULL );
+
+ ptr = cred->bv_val;
+
+ *txt = NULL;
+
+ if ((cred->bv_len == 0) || (pp->pwdMinLength > cred->bv_len)) {
+ rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ if ( err ) *err = PP_passwordTooShort;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to know if the password is already hashed - if so
+ * what scheme is it. The reason being that the "hash" of
+ * {cleartext} still allows us to check the password.
+ */
+ rc = password_scheme( cred, &sch );
+ if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ if ((sch.bv_val) && (strncasecmp( sch.bv_val, "{cleartext}",
+ sch.bv_len ) == 0)) {
+ /*
+ * We can check the cleartext "hash"
+ */
+ ptr = cred->bv_val + sch.bv_len;
+ } else {
+ /* everything else, we can't check */
+ if (pp->pwdCheckQuality == 2) {
+ rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We can't check the syntax of the password, but it's not
+ * mandatory (according to the policy), so we return success.
+ */
+
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (pp->pwdCheckModule[0]) {
+#ifdef SLAPD_MODULES
+ lt_dlhandle mod;
+ const char *err;
+
+ if ((mod = lt_dlopen( pp->pwdCheckModule )) == NULL) {
+ err = lt_dlerror();
+
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "check_password_quality: lt_dlopen failed: (%s) %s.\n",
+ pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 );
+ ok = LDAP_OTHER; /* internal error */
+ } else {
+ /* FIXME: the error message ought to be passed thru a
+ * struct berval, with preallocated buffer and size
+ * passed in. Module can still allocate a buffer for
+ * it if the provided one is too small.
+ */
+ int (*prog)( char *passwd, char **text, Entry *ent );
+
+ if ((prog = lt_dlsym( mod, "check_password" )) == NULL) {
+ err = lt_dlerror();
+
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "check_password_quality: lt_dlsym failed: (%s) %s.\n",
+ pp->pwdCheckModule, err, 0 );
+ ok = LDAP_OTHER;
+ } else {
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+ ok = prog( ptr, txt, e );
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+ if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "check_password_quality: module error: (%s) %s.[%d]\n",
+ pp->pwdCheckModule, *txt ? *txt : "", ok );
+ }
+ }
+
+ lt_dlclose( mod );
+ }
+#else
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "check_password_quality: external modules not "
+ "supported. pwdCheckModule ignored.\n", 0, 0, 0);
+#endif /* SLAPD_MODULES */
+ }
+
+
+ if (ok != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ rc = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ if (err) *err = PP_insufficientPasswordQuality;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_pwdhistory( struct berval *bv, char **oid, time_t *oldtime, struct berval *oldpw )
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ struct berval nv, npw;
+ ber_len_t i, j;
+
+ assert (bv && (bv->bv_len > 0) && (bv->bv_val) && oldtime && oldpw );
+
+ if ( oid ) {
+ *oid = 0;
+ }
+ *oldtime = (time_t)-1;
+ BER_BVZERO( oldpw );
+
+ ber_dupbv( &nv, bv );
+
+ /* first get the time field */
+ for ( i = 0; (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+ ;
+ if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+ goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+ }
+ nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+ ptr = nv.bv_val;
+ *oldtime = parse_time( ptr );
+ if (*oldtime == (time_t)-1) {
+ goto exit_failure;
+ }
+
+ /* get the OID field */
+ for (ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+ ;
+ if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+ goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+ }
+ nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+ if ( oid ) {
+ *oid = ber_strdup( ptr );
+ }
+
+ /* get the length field */
+ for ( ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); (i < nv.bv_len) && (nv.bv_val[i] != '#'); i++ )
+ ;
+ if ( i == nv.bv_len ) {
+ goto exit_failure; /* couldn't locate the '#' separator */
+ }
+ nv.bv_val[i++] = '\0'; /* terminate the string & move to next field */
+ oldpw->bv_len = strtol( ptr, NULL, 10 );
+ if (errno == ERANGE) {
+ goto exit_failure;
+ }
+
+ /* lastly, get the octets of the string */
+ for ( j = i, ptr = &(nv.bv_val[i]); i < nv.bv_len; i++ )
+ ;
+ if ( i - j != oldpw->bv_len) {
+ goto exit_failure; /* length is wrong */
+ }
+
+ npw.bv_val = ptr;
+ npw.bv_len = oldpw->bv_len;
+ ber_dupbv( oldpw, &npw );
+ ber_memfree( nv.bv_val );
+
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+exit_failure:;
+ if ( oid && *oid ) {
+ ber_memfree(*oid);
+ *oid = NULL;
+ }
+ if ( oldpw->bv_val ) {
+ ber_memfree( oldpw->bv_val);
+ BER_BVZERO( oldpw );
+ }
+ ber_memfree( nv.bv_val );
+
+ return LDAP_OTHER;
+}
+
+static void
+add_to_pwd_history( pw_hist **l, time_t t,
+ struct berval *oldpw, struct berval *bv )
+{
+ pw_hist *p, *p1, *p2;
+
+ if (!l) return;
+
+ p = ch_malloc( sizeof( pw_hist ));
+ p->pw = *oldpw;
+ ber_dupbv( &p->bv, bv );
+ p->t = t;
+ p->next = NULL;
+
+ if (*l == NULL) {
+ /* degenerate case */
+ *l = p;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * advance p1 and p2 such that p1 is the node before the
+ * new one, and p2 is the node after it
+ */
+ for (p1 = NULL, p2 = *l; p2 && p2->t <= t; p1 = p2, p2=p2->next );
+ p->next = p2;
+ if (p1 == NULL) { *l = p; return; }
+ p1->next = p;
+}
+
+#ifndef MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ
+#define MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ 1024
+#endif /* MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ */
+
+static void
+make_pwd_history_value( char *timebuf, struct berval *bv, Attribute *pa )
+{
+ char str[ MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ ];
+ int nlen;
+
+ snprintf( str, MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ,
+ "%s#%s#%lu#", timebuf,
+ pa->a_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax->ssyn_oid,
+ (unsigned long) pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len );
+ str[MAX_PWD_HISTORY_SZ-1] = 0;
+ nlen = strlen(str);
+
+ /*
+ * We have to assume that the string is a string of octets,
+ * not readable characters. In reality, yes, it probably is
+ * a readable (ie, base64) string, but we can't count on that
+ * Hence, while the first 3 fields of the password history
+ * are definitely readable (a timestamp, an OID and an integer
+ * length), the remaining octets of the actual password
+ * are deemed to be binary data.
+ */
+ AC_MEMCPY( str + nlen, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val, pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len );
+ nlen += pa->a_nvals[0].bv_len;
+ bv->bv_val = ch_malloc( nlen + 1 );
+ AC_MEMCPY( bv->bv_val, str, nlen );
+ bv->bv_val[nlen] = '\0';
+ bv->bv_len = nlen;
+}
+
+static void
+free_pwd_history_list( pw_hist **l )
+{
+ pw_hist *p;
+
+ if (!l) return;
+ p = *l;
+ while (p) {
+ pw_hist *pp = p->next;
+
+ free(p->pw.bv_val);
+ free(p->bv.bv_val);
+ free(p);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ *l = NULL;
+}
+
+typedef struct ppbind {
+ slap_overinst *on;
+ int send_ctrl;
+ int set_restrict;
+ LDAPControl **oldctrls;
+ Modifications *mod;
+ LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr;
+ PassPolicy pp;
+} ppbind;
+
+static void
+ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, LDAPControl **oldctrls )
+{
+ int n;
+
+ assert( rs->sr_ctrls != NULL );
+ assert( rs->sr_ctrls[0] != NULL );
+
+ for ( n = 0; rs->sr_ctrls[n]; n++ ) {
+ if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_ctrl_oid ||
+ rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_pwd_expired_oid ||
+ rs->sr_ctrls[n]->ldctl_oid == ppolicy_pwd_expiring_oid ) {
+ op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls[n], op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ rs->sr_ctrls[n] = (LDAPControl *)(-1);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( rs->sr_ctrls[n] == NULL ) {
+ /* missed? */
+ }
+
+ op->o_tmpfree( rs->sr_ctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+ rs->sr_ctrls = oldctrls;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private;
+ if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) {
+ ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, ppb->oldctrls );
+ }
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_bind_response( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ ppbind *ppb = op->o_callback->sc_private;
+ slap_overinst *on = ppb->on;
+ pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+ Modifications *mod = ppb->mod, *m;
+ int pwExpired = 0;
+ int ngut = -1, warn = -1, age, rc;
+ Attribute *a;
+ time_t now, pwtime = (time_t)-1;
+ struct lutil_tm now_tm;
+ struct lutil_timet now_usec;
+ char nowstr[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+ char nowstr_usec[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE+8 ];
+ struct berval timestamp, timestamp_usec;
+ BackendInfo *bi = op->o_bd->bd_info;
+ LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+ Entry *e;
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+ /* If we already know it's locked, just get on with it */
+ if ( ppb->pErr != PP_noError ) {
+ goto locked;
+ }
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = bi;
+
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ ldap_pvt_gettime(&now_tm); /* stored for later consideration */
+ lutil_tm2time(&now_tm, &now_usec);
+ now = now_usec.tt_sec;
+ timestamp.bv_val = nowstr;
+ timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(nowstr);
+ slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+ /* Separate timestamp for pwdFailureTime with microsecond granularity */
+ strcpy(nowstr_usec, nowstr);
+ timestamp_usec.bv_val = nowstr_usec;
+ timestamp_usec.bv_len = timestamp.bv_len;
+ snprintf( timestamp_usec.bv_val + timestamp_usec.bv_len-1, sizeof(".123456Z"), ".%06dZ", now_usec.tt_usec );
+ timestamp_usec.bv_len += STRLENOF(".123456");
+
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS ) {
+ int i = 0, fc = 0;
+
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+ m->sml_flags = 0;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+ m->sml_numvals = 1;
+ m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp_usec );
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp_usec );
+ m->sml_next = mod;
+ mod = m;
+
+ /*
+ * Count the pwdFailureTimes - if it's
+ * greater than the policy pwdMaxFailure,
+ * then lock the account.
+ */
+ if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) != NULL) {
+ for(i=0; a->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) {
+
+ /*
+ * If the interval is 0, then failures
+ * stay on the record until explicitly
+ * reset by successful authentication.
+ */
+ if (ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval == 0) {
+ fc++;
+ } else if (now <=
+ parse_time(a->a_nvals[i].bv_val) +
+ ppb->pp.pwdFailureCountInterval) {
+
+ fc++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We only count those failures
+ * which are not due to expire.
+ */
+ }
+ /* Do we have too many timestamps? If so, delete some values.
+ * We don't bother to sort the values here. OpenLDAP keeps the
+ * values in order by default. Fundamentally, relying on the
+ * information here is wrong anyway; monitoring systems should
+ * be tracking Bind failures in syslog, not here.
+ */
+ if (a->a_numvals >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) {
+ int j = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure-1;
+ /* If more than 2x, cheaper to perform a Replace */
+ if (a->a_numvals >= 2 * ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure) {
+ struct berval v, nv;
+
+ /* Change the mod we constructed above */
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+ m->sml_numvals = ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure;
+ v = m->sml_values[0];
+ nv = m->sml_nvalues[0];
+ ch_free(m->sml_values);
+ ch_free(m->sml_nvalues);
+ m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 );
+ m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), ppb->pp.pwdMaxRecordedFailure+1 );
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++) {
+ ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[a->a_numvals-j+i]);
+ ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[a->a_numvals-j+i]);
+ }
+ m->sml_values[i] = v;
+ m->sml_nvalues[i] = nv;
+ } else {
+ /* else just delete some */
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+ m->sml_numvals = a->a_numvals - j;
+ m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 );
+ m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), m->sml_numvals+1 );
+ for (i=0; i<m->sml_numvals; i++) {
+ ber_dupbv(&m->sml_values[i], &a->a_vals[i]);
+ ber_dupbv(&m->sml_nvalues[i], &a->a_nvals[i]);
+ }
+ m->sml_next = mod;
+ mod = m;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure > 0) &&
+ (fc >= ppb->pp.pwdMaxFailure - 1)) {
+
+ /*
+ * We subtract 1 from the failure max
+ * because the new failure entry hasn't
+ * made it to the entry yet.
+ */
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+ m->sml_flags = 0;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+ m->sml_numvals = 1;
+ m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+ m->sml_next = mod;
+ mod = m;
+ }
+ } else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL)
+ pwtime = parse_time( a->a_nvals[0].bv_val );
+
+ /* delete all pwdFailureTimes */
+ if ( attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) {
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ m->sml_flags = 0;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdFailureTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+ m->sml_next = mod;
+ mod = m;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * check to see if the password must be changed
+ */
+ if ( ppb->pp.pwdMustChange &&
+ (a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset )) &&
+ bvmatch( &a->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv ) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * need to inject client controls here to give
+ * more information. For the moment, we ensure
+ * that we are disallowed from doing anything
+ * other than change password.
+ */
+ if ( ppb->set_restrict ) {
+ ber_dupbv( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn,
+ &op->o_conn->c_ndn );
+ }
+
+ ppb->pErr = PP_changeAfterReset;
+
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * the password does not need to be changed, so
+ * we now check whether the password has expired.
+ *
+ * We can skip this bit if passwords don't age in
+ * the policy. Also, if there was no pwdChangedTime
+ * attribute in the entry, the password never expires.
+ */
+ if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge == 0) goto grace;
+
+ if (pwtime != (time_t)-1) {
+ /*
+ * Check: was the last change time of
+ * the password older than the maximum age
+ * allowed. (Ignore case 2 from I-D, it's just silly.)
+ */
+ if (now - pwtime > ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge ) pwExpired = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+grace:
+ if (!pwExpired) goto check_expiring_password;
+
+ if ((a = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) == NULL)
+ ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit;
+ else {
+ for(ngut=0; a->a_nvals[ngut].bv_val; ngut++);
+ ngut = ppb->pp.pwdGraceAuthNLimit - ngut;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ngut is the number of remaining grace logins
+ */
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "ppolicy_bind: Entry %s has an expired password: %d grace logins\n",
+ e->e_name.bv_val, ngut, 0);
+
+ if (ngut < 1) {
+ ppb->pErr = PP_passwordExpired;
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add a grace user time to the entry
+ */
+ m = ch_calloc( sizeof(Modifications), 1 );
+ m->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+ m->sml_flags = 0;
+ m->sml_type = ad_pwdGraceUseTime->ad_cname;
+ m->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+ m->sml_numvals = 1;
+ m->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ m->sml_nvalues = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+ ber_dupbv( &m->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+ m->sml_next = mod;
+ mod = m;
+
+check_expiring_password:
+ /*
+ * Now we need to check to see
+ * if it is about to expire, and if so, should the user
+ * be warned about it in the password policy control.
+ *
+ * If the password has expired, and we're in the grace period, then
+ * we don't need to do this bit. Similarly, if we don't have password
+ * aging, then there's no need to do this bit either.
+ */
+ if ((ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge < 1) || (pwExpired) || (ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning < 1))
+ goto done;
+
+ age = (int)(now - pwtime);
+
+ /*
+ * We know that there is a password Change Time attribute - if
+ * there wasn't, then the pwdExpired value would be true, unless
+ * there is no password aging - and if there is no password aging,
+ * then this section isn't called anyway - you can't have an
+ * expiring password if there's no limit to expire.
+ */
+ if (ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age < ppb->pp.pwdExpireWarning ) {
+ /*
+ * Set the warning value.
+ */
+ warn = ppb->pp.pwdMaxAge - age; /* seconds left until expiry */
+ if (warn < 0) warn = 0; /* something weird here - why is pwExpired not set? */
+
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "ppolicy_bind: Setting warning for password expiry for %s = %d seconds\n",
+ op->o_req_dn.bv_val, warn, 0 );
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+locked:
+ if ( mod ) {
+ Operation op2 = *op;
+ SlapReply r2 = { REP_RESULT };
+ slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL };
+ LDAPControl c, *ca[2];
+
+ op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY;
+ op2.o_callback = &cb;
+ op2.orm_modlist = mod;
+ op2.orm_no_opattrs = 0;
+ op2.o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn;
+ op2.o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn;
+
+ /* If this server is a shadow and forward_updates is true,
+ * use the frontend to perform this modify. That will trigger
+ * the update referral, which can then be forwarded by the
+ * chain overlay. Obviously the updateref and chain overlay
+ * must be configured appropriately for this to be useful.
+ */
+ if ( SLAP_SHADOW( op->o_bd ) && pi->forward_updates ) {
+ op2.o_bd = frontendDB;
+
+ /* Must use Relax control since these are no-user-mod */
+ op2.o_relax = SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL;
+ op2.o_ctrls = ca;
+ ca[0] = &c;
+ ca[1] = NULL;
+ BER_BVZERO( &c.ldctl_value );
+ c.ldctl_iscritical = 1;
+ c.ldctl_oid = LDAP_CONTROL_RELAX;
+ } else {
+ /* If not forwarding, don't update opattrs and don't replicate */
+ if ( SLAP_SINGLE_SHADOW( op->o_bd )) {
+ op2.orm_no_opattrs = 1;
+ op2.o_dont_replicate = 1;
+ }
+ op2.o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ }
+ rc = op2.o_bd->be_modify( &op2, &r2 );
+ slap_mods_free( mod, 1 );
+ }
+
+ if ( ppb->send_ctrl ) {
+
+ /* Do we really want to tell that the account is locked? */
+ if ( ppb->pErr == PP_accountLocked && !pi->use_lockout ) {
+ ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+ }
+ ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, warn, ngut, ppb->pErr );
+ } else if ( pi->send_netscape_controls ) {
+ if ( ppb->pErr != PP_noError || pwExpired ) {
+ ctrl = create_passexpiry( op, 1, 0 );
+ } else if ( warn > 0 ) {
+ ctrl = create_passexpiry( op, 0, warn );
+ }
+ }
+ if ( ctrl ) {
+ ppb->oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+ op->o_callback->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_ctrls_cleanup;
+ }
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = bi;
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_bind( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+
+ /* Reset lockout status on all Bind requests */
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+ }
+
+ /* Root bypasses policy */
+ if ( !be_isroot_dn( op->o_bd, &op->o_req_ndn )) {
+ Entry *e;
+ int rc;
+ ppbind *ppb;
+ slap_callback *cb;
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback),
+ 1, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1);
+ ppb->on = on;
+ ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+ ppb->set_restrict = 1;
+
+ /* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */
+
+ cb->sc_response = ppolicy_bind_response;
+ cb->sc_private = ppb;
+ overlay_callback_after_backover( op, cb, 1 );
+
+ /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+ if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+ ppb->send_ctrl = 1;
+ }
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+ ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp );
+
+ rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod );
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+ if ( rc ) {
+ ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked;
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, NULL );
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Reset the restricted info for the next session on this connection */
+static int
+ppolicy_connection_destroy( BackendDB *bd, Connection *conn )
+{
+ if ( pwcons && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ ch_free( pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+ }
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Check if this connection is restricted */
+static int
+ppolicy_restrict(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+ int send_ctrl = 0;
+
+ /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+ if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+ send_ctrl = 1;
+ }
+
+ if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ LDAPControl **oldctrls;
+ /* if the current authcDN doesn't match the one we recorded,
+ * then an intervening Bind has succeeded and the restriction
+ * no longer applies. (ITS#4516)
+ */
+ if ( !dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn,
+ &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+ ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, PP_changeAfterReset );
+ oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+ }
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS,
+ "Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password" );
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+ }
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_compare_response(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ /* map compare responses to bind responses */
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE )
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE )
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS;
+
+ ppolicy_bind_response( op, rs );
+
+ /* map back to compare */
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS )
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE;
+ else if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS )
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE;
+
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_compare(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+
+ if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE )
+ return rs->sr_err;
+
+ /* Did we receive a password policy request control?
+ * Are we testing the userPassword?
+ */
+ if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] &&
+ op->orc_ava->aa_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword ) {
+ Entry *e;
+ int rc;
+ ppbind *ppb;
+ slap_callback *cb;
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( sizeof(ppbind)+sizeof(slap_callback),
+ 1, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ ppb = (ppbind *)(cb+1);
+ ppb->on = on;
+ ppb->pErr = PP_noError;
+ ppb->send_ctrl = 1;
+ /* failures here don't lockout the connection */
+ ppb->set_restrict = 0;
+
+ /* Setup a callback so we can munge the result */
+
+ cb->sc_response = ppolicy_compare_response;
+ cb->sc_private = ppb;
+ overlay_callback_after_backover( op, cb, 1 );
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+ ppolicy_get( op, e, &ppb->pp );
+
+ rc = account_locked( op, e, &ppb->pp, &ppb->mod );
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+
+ if ( rc ) {
+ ppb->pErr = PP_accountLocked;
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_COMPARE_FALSE, NULL );
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_add(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+ pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+ PassPolicy pp;
+ Attribute *pa;
+ const char *txt;
+
+ if ( ppolicy_restrict( op, rs ) != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE )
+ return rs->sr_err;
+
+ /* If this is a replica, assume the provider checked everything */
+ if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) )
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+ /* Check for password in entry */
+ if ((pa = attr_find( op->oq_add.rs_e->e_attrs,
+ slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword )))
+ {
+ assert( pa->a_vals != NULL );
+ assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 0 ] ) );
+
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &pa->a_vals[ 1 ] ) ) {
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION, "Password policy only allows one password value" );
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * new entry contains a password - if we're not the root user
+ * then we need to check that the password fits in with the
+ * security policy for the new entry.
+ */
+ ppolicy_get( op, op->ora_e, &pp );
+ if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0 && !be_isroot( op )) {
+ struct berval *bv = &(pa->a_vals[0]);
+ int rc, send_ctrl = 0;
+ LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError;
+ char *txt;
+
+ /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+ if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+ send_ctrl = 1;
+ }
+ rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, op->ora_e, &txt );
+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ LDAPControl **oldctrls = NULL;
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+ ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr );
+ oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+ }
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, rc, txt ? txt : "Password fails quality checking policy" );
+ if ( txt ) {
+ free( txt );
+ }
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+ }
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * A controversial bit. We hash cleartext
+ * passwords provided via add and modify operations
+ * You're not really supposed to do this, since
+ * the X.500 model says "store attributes" as they
+ * get provided. By default, this is what we do
+ *
+ * But if the hash_passwords flag is set, we hash
+ * any cleartext password attribute values via the
+ * default password hashing scheme.
+ */
+ if ((pi->hash_passwords) &&
+ (password_scheme( &(pa->a_vals[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS)) {
+ struct berval hpw;
+
+ slap_passwd_hash( &(pa->a_vals[0]), &hpw, &txt );
+ if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * hashing didn't work. Emit an error.
+ */
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
+ rs->sr_text = txt;
+ send_ldap_error( op, rs, LDAP_OTHER, "Password hashing failed" );
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+
+ memset( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val, 0, pa->a_vals[0].bv_len);
+ ber_memfree( pa->a_vals[0].bv_val );
+ pa->a_vals[0].bv_val = hpw.bv_val;
+ pa->a_vals[0].bv_len = hpw.bv_len;
+ }
+
+ /* If password aging is in effect, set the pwdChangedTime */
+ if ( pp.pwdMaxAge || pp.pwdMinAge ) {
+ struct berval timestamp;
+ char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+ time_t now = slap_get_time();
+
+ timestamp.bv_val = timebuf;
+ timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf);
+ slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+ attr_merge_one( op->ora_e, ad_pwdChangedTime, &timestamp, &timestamp );
+ }
+ }
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_mod_cb( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_callback *sc = op->o_callback;
+ op->o_callback = sc->sc_next;
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+ }
+ op->o_tmpfree( sc, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_modify( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *)op->o_bd->bd_info;
+ pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+ int i, rc, mod_pw_only, pwmod, pwmop = -1, deladd,
+ hsize = 0, hskip;
+ PassPolicy pp;
+ Modifications *mods = NULL, *modtail = NULL,
+ *ml, *delmod, *addmod;
+ Attribute *pa, *ha, at;
+ const char *txt;
+ pw_hist *tl = NULL, *p;
+ int zapReset, send_ctrl = 0, free_txt = 0;
+ Entry *e;
+ struct berval newpw = BER_BVNULL, oldpw = BER_BVNULL,
+ *bv, cr[2];
+ LDAPPasswordPolicyError pErr = PP_noError;
+ LDAPControl *ctrl = NULL;
+ LDAPControl **oldctrls = NULL;
+ int is_pwdexop = 0;
+ int got_del_grace = 0, got_del_lock = 0, got_pw = 0, got_del_fail = 0;
+ int got_changed = 0, got_history = 0;
+
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL, NULL, 0, &e );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on;
+
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+ /* If this is a replica, we may need to tweak some of the
+ * provider's modifications. Otherwise, just pass it through.
+ */
+ if ( SLAPD_SYNC_IS_SYNCCONN( op->o_connid ) ) {
+ Modifications **prev;
+ Attribute *a_grace, *a_lock, *a_fail;
+
+ a_grace = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime );
+ a_lock = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime );
+ a_fail = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime );
+
+ for( prev = &op->orm_modlist, ml = *prev; ml; ml = *prev ) {
+
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword )
+ got_pw = 1;
+
+ /* If we're deleting an attr that didn't exist,
+ * drop this delete op
+ */
+ if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE ||
+ ml->sml_op == SLAP_MOD_SOFTDEL ) {
+ int drop = 0;
+
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) {
+ if ( !a_grace || got_del_grace ) {
+ drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ } else {
+ got_del_grace = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) {
+ if ( !a_lock || got_del_lock ) {
+ drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ } else {
+ got_del_lock = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) {
+ if ( !a_fail || got_del_fail ) {
+ drop = ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ } else {
+ got_del_fail = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ( drop ) {
+ *prev = ml->sml_next;
+ ml->sml_next = NULL;
+ slap_mods_free( ml, 1 );
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ prev = &ml->sml_next;
+ }
+
+ /* If we're resetting the password, make sure grace, accountlock,
+ * and failure also get removed.
+ */
+ if ( got_pw ) {
+ if ( a_grace && !got_del_grace ) {
+ ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+ ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+ ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+ ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+ ml->sml_values = NULL;
+ ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+ ml->sml_next = NULL;
+ *prev = ml;
+ prev = &ml->sml_next;
+ }
+ if ( a_lock && !got_del_lock ) {
+ ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+ ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+ ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+ ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+ ml->sml_values = NULL;
+ ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+ ml->sml_next = NULL;
+ *prev = ml;
+ }
+ if ( a_fail && !got_del_fail ) {
+ ml = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+ ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ ml->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+ ml->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+ ml->sml_numvals = 0;
+ ml->sml_values = NULL;
+ ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+ ml->sml_next = NULL;
+ *prev = ml;
+ }
+ }
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Did we receive a password policy request control? */
+ if ( op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] ) {
+ send_ctrl = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* See if this is a pwdModify exop. If so, we can
+ * access the plaintext passwords from that request.
+ */
+ {
+ slap_callback *sc;
+
+ for ( sc = op->o_callback; sc; sc=sc->sc_next ) {
+ if ( sc->sc_response == slap_null_cb &&
+ sc->sc_private ) {
+ req_pwdexop_s *qpw = sc->sc_private;
+ newpw = qpw->rs_new;
+ oldpw = qpw->rs_old;
+ is_pwdexop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ppolicy_get( op, e, &pp );
+
+ for ( ml = op->orm_modlist,
+ pwmod = 0, mod_pw_only = 1,
+ deladd = 0, delmod = NULL,
+ addmod = NULL,
+ zapReset = 1;
+ ml != NULL; modtail = ml, ml = ml->sml_next )
+ {
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == pp.ad ) {
+ pwmod = 1;
+ pwmop = ml->sml_op;
+ if ((deladd == 0) && (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE) &&
+ (ml->sml_values) && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] ))
+ {
+ deladd = 1;
+ delmod = ml;
+ }
+
+ if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) ||
+ (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE))
+ {
+ if ( ml->sml_values && !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[0] )) {
+ if ( deladd == 1 )
+ deladd = 2;
+
+ /* FIXME: there's no easy way to ensure
+ * that add does not cause multiple
+ * userPassword values; one way (that
+ * would be consistent with the single
+ * password constraint) would be to turn
+ * add into replace); another would be
+ * to disallow add.
+ *
+ * Let's check at least that a single value
+ * is being added
+ */
+ if ( addmod || !BER_BVISNULL( &ml->sml_values[ 1 ] ) ) {
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ rs->sr_text = "Password policy only allows one password value";
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+
+ addmod = ml;
+ } else {
+ /* replace can have no values, add cannot */
+ assert( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE );
+ }
+ }
+
+ } else if ( !(ml->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL) && !is_at_operational( ml->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
+ mod_pw_only = 0;
+ /* modifying something other than password */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a request to explicitly add a pwdReset
+ * attribute, then we suppress the normal behaviour on
+ * password change, which is to remove the pwdReset
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * This enables an administrator to assign a new password
+ * and place a "must reset" flag on the entry, which will
+ * stay until the user explicitly changes his/her password.
+ */
+ if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdReset ) {
+ if ((ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_ADD) ||
+ (ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_REPLACE))
+ zapReset = 0;
+ }
+ if ( ml->sml_op == LDAP_MOD_DELETE ) {
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdGraceUseTime ) {
+ got_del_grace = 1;
+ } else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdAccountLockedTime ) {
+ got_del_lock = 1;
+ } else if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdFailureTime ) {
+ got_del_fail = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ( ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdChangedTime ) {
+ got_changed = 1;
+ } else if (ml->sml_desc == ad_pwdHistory ) {
+ got_history = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn ) && !mod_pw_only ) {
+ if ( dn_match( &op->o_conn->c_ndn,
+ &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "connection restricted to password changing only\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
+ rs->sr_text = "Operations are restricted to bind/unbind/abandon/StartTLS/modify password";
+ pErr = PP_changeAfterReset;
+ goto return_results;
+ } else {
+ ch_free( pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn.bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if we have a "safe password modify policy", then we need to check if we're doing
+ * a delete (with the old password), followed by an add (with the new password).
+ *
+ * If we got just a delete with nothing else, just let it go. We also skip all the checks if
+ * the root user is bound. Root can do anything, including avoid the policies.
+ */
+
+ if (!pwmod) goto do_modify;
+
+ /*
+ * Build the password history list in ascending time order
+ * We need this, even if the user is root, in order to maintain
+ * the pwdHistory operational attributes properly.
+ */
+ if (addmod && pp.pwdInHistory > 0 && (ha = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdHistory ))) {
+ struct berval oldpw;
+ time_t oldtime;
+
+ for(i=0; ha->a_nvals[i].bv_val; i++) {
+ rc = parse_pwdhistory( &(ha->a_nvals[i]), NULL,
+ &oldtime, &oldpw );
+
+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue; /* invalid history entry */
+
+ if (oldpw.bv_val) {
+ add_to_pwd_history( &tl, oldtime, &oldpw,
+ &(ha->a_nvals[i]) );
+ oldpw.bv_val = NULL;
+ oldpw.bv_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ for(p=tl; p; p=p->next, hsize++); /* count history size */
+ }
+
+ if (be_isroot( op )) goto do_modify;
+
+ /* NOTE: according to draft-behera-ldap-password-policy
+ * pwdAllowUserChange == FALSE must only prevent pwd changes
+ * by the user the pwd belongs to (ITS#7021) */
+ if (!pp.pwdAllowUserChange && dn_match(&op->o_req_ndn, &op->o_ndn)) {
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
+ rs->sr_text = "User alteration of password is not allowed";
+ pErr = PP_passwordModNotAllowed;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+
+ /* Just deleting? */
+ if (!addmod) {
+ /* skip everything else */
+ pwmod = 0;
+ goto do_modify;
+ }
+
+ /* This is a pwdModify exop that provided the old pw.
+ * We need to create a Delete mod for this old pw and
+ * let the matching value get found later
+ */
+ if (pp.pwdSafeModify && oldpw.bv_val ) {
+ ml = (Modifications *)ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ ml->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ ml->sml_desc = pp.ad;
+ ml->sml_type = pp.ad->ad_cname;
+ ml->sml_numvals = 1;
+ ml->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_malloc( 2 * sizeof( struct berval ) );
+ ber_dupbv( &ml->sml_values[0], &oldpw );
+ BER_BVZERO( &ml->sml_values[1] );
+ ml->sml_next = op->orm_modlist;
+ op->orm_modlist = ml;
+ delmod = ml;
+ deladd = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (pp.pwdSafeModify && deladd != 2) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "change password must use DELETE followed by ADD/REPLACE\n",
+ 0, 0, 0 );
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS;
+ rs->sr_text = "Must supply old password to be changed as well as new one";
+ pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+
+ /* Check age, but only if pwdReset is not TRUE */
+ pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset );
+ if ((!pa || !bvmatch( &pa->a_nvals[0], &slap_true_bv )) &&
+ pp.pwdMinAge > 0) {
+ time_t pwtime = (time_t)-1, now;
+ int age;
+
+ if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) != NULL)
+ pwtime = parse_time( pa->a_nvals[0].bv_val );
+ now = slap_get_time();
+ age = (int)(now - pwtime);
+ if ((pwtime != (time_t)-1) && (age < pp.pwdMinAge)) {
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ rs->sr_text = "Password is too young to change";
+ pErr = PP_passwordTooYoung;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* pa is used in password history check below, be sure it's set */
+ if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL && delmod) {
+ /*
+ * we have a password to check
+ */
+ bv = oldpw.bv_val ? &oldpw : delmod->sml_values;
+ /* FIXME: no access checking? */
+ rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt );
+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "old password check failed: %s\n", txt, 0, 0 );
+
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ rs->sr_text = "Must supply correct old password to change to new one";
+ pErr = PP_mustSupplyOldPassword;
+ goto return_results;
+
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * replace the delete value with the (possibly hashed)
+ * value which is currently in the password.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &delmod->sml_values[i] ); i++ ) {
+ free( delmod->sml_values[i].bv_val );
+ BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[i] );
+ }
+ free( delmod->sml_values );
+ delmod->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof(struct berval), 2 );
+ BER_BVZERO( &delmod->sml_values[1] );
+ ber_dupbv( &(delmod->sml_values[0]), &(pa->a_nvals[0]) );
+ }
+ }
+
+ bv = newpw.bv_val ? &newpw : &addmod->sml_values[0];
+ if (pp.pwdCheckQuality > 0) {
+
+ rc = check_password_quality( bv, &pp, &pErr, e, (char **)&txt );
+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ rs->sr_err = rc;
+ if ( txt ) {
+ rs->sr_text = txt;
+ free_txt = 1;
+ } else {
+ rs->sr_text = "Password fails quality checking policy";
+ }
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If pwdInHistory is zero, passwords may be reused */
+ if (pa && pp.pwdInHistory > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Last check - the password history.
+ */
+ /* FIXME: no access checking? */
+ if (slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, pa, bv, &txt ) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ /*
+ * This is bad - it means that the user is attempting
+ * to set the password to the same as the old one.
+ */
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ rs->sr_text = "Password is not being changed from existing value";
+ pErr = PP_passwordInHistory;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+
+ /* We need this when reduce pwdInHistory */
+ hskip = hsize - pp.pwdInHistory;
+
+ /*
+ * Iterate through the password history, and fail on any
+ * password matches.
+ */
+ at = *pa;
+ at.a_vals = cr;
+ cr[1].bv_val = NULL;
+ for(p=tl; p; p=p->next) {
+ if(hskip > 0){
+ hskip--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ cr[0] = p->pw;
+ /* FIXME: no access checking? */
+ rc = slap_passwd_check( op, NULL, &at, bv, &txt );
+
+ if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) continue;
+
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
+ rs->sr_text = "Password is in history of old passwords";
+ pErr = PP_passwordInHistory;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+ }
+
+do_modify:
+ if (pwmod) {
+ struct berval timestamp;
+ char timebuf[ LDAP_LUTIL_GENTIME_BUFSIZE ];
+ time_t now = slap_get_time();
+
+ /* If the conn is restricted, set a callback to clear it
+ * if the pwmod succeeds
+ */
+ if (!BER_BVISEMPTY( &pwcons[op->o_conn->c_conn_idx].dn )) {
+ slap_callback *sc = op->o_tmpcalloc( 1, sizeof( slap_callback ),
+ op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ sc->sc_next = op->o_callback;
+ /* Must use sc_response to insure we reset on success, before
+ * the client sees the response. Must use sc_cleanup to insure
+ * that it gets cleaned up if sc_response is not called.
+ */
+ sc->sc_response = ppolicy_mod_cb;
+ sc->sc_cleanup = ppolicy_mod_cb;
+ op->o_callback = sc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * keep the necessary pwd.. operational attributes
+ * up to date.
+ */
+
+ if (!got_changed) {
+ timestamp.bv_val = timebuf;
+ timestamp.bv_len = sizeof(timebuf);
+ slap_timestamp( &now, &timestamp );
+
+ mods = NULL;
+ if (pwmop != LDAP_MOD_DELETE) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+ mods->sml_numvals = 1;
+ mods->sml_values = (BerVarray) ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+ mods->sml_nvalues = (BerVarray) ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+
+ ber_dupbv( &mods->sml_values[0], &timestamp );
+ ber_dupbv( &mods->sml_nvalues[0], &timestamp );
+ } else if (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdChangedTime )) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ }
+ if (mods) {
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdChangedTime;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!got_del_grace && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdGraceUseTime )) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdGraceUseTime;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+
+ if (!got_del_lock && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdAccountLockedTime )) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdAccountLockedTime;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+
+ if (!got_del_fail && attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdFailureTime )) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdFailureTime;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+
+ /* Delete the pwdReset attribute, since it's being reset */
+ if ((zapReset) && (attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdReset ))) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdReset;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+
+ /* Delete all pwdInHistory attribute */
+ if (!got_history && pp.pwdInHistory == 0 &&
+ attr_find(e->e_attrs, ad_pwdHistory )){
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+
+ if (!got_history && pp.pwdInHistory > 0){
+ if (hsize >= pp.pwdInHistory) {
+ /*
+ * We use the >= operator, since we are going to add
+ * the existing password attribute value into the
+ * history - thus the cardinality of history values is
+ * about to rise by one.
+ *
+ * If this would push it over the limit of history
+ * values (remembering - the password policy could have
+ * changed since the password was last altered), we must
+ * delete at least 1 value from the pwdHistory list.
+ *
+ * In fact, we delete '(#pwdHistory attrs - max pwd
+ * history length) + 1' values, starting with the oldest.
+ * This is easily evaluated, since the linked list is
+ * created in ascending time order.
+ */
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_calloc( sizeof( Modifications ), 1 );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_DELETE;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+ mods->sml_numvals = hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1;
+ mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ),
+ hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 2 );
+ BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[ hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1 ] );
+ for(i=0,p=tl; i < (hsize - pp.pwdInHistory + 1); i++, p=p->next) {
+ BER_BVZERO( &mods->sml_values[i] );
+ ber_dupbv( &(mods->sml_values[i]), &p->bv );
+ }
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+ }
+ free_pwd_history_list( &tl );
+
+ /*
+ * Now add the existing password into the history list.
+ * This will be executed even if the operation is to delete
+ * the password entirely.
+ *
+ * This isn't in the spec explicitly, but it seems to make
+ * sense that the password history list is the list of all
+ * previous passwords - even if they were deleted. Thus, if
+ * someone tries to add a historical password at some future
+ * point, it will fail.
+ */
+ if ((pa = attr_find( e->e_attrs, pp.ad )) != NULL) {
+ mods = (Modifications *) ch_malloc( sizeof( Modifications ) );
+ mods->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_ADD;
+ mods->sml_flags = SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL;
+ mods->sml_type.bv_val = NULL;
+ mods->sml_desc = ad_pwdHistory;
+ mods->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+ mods->sml_numvals = 1;
+ mods->sml_values = ch_calloc( sizeof( struct berval ), 2 );
+ mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_val = NULL;
+ mods->sml_values[ 1 ].bv_len = 0;
+ make_pwd_history_value( timebuf, &mods->sml_values[0], pa );
+ mods->sml_next = NULL;
+ modtail->sml_next = mods;
+ modtail = mods;
+
+ } else {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "ppolicy_modify: password attr lookup failed\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Controversial bit here. If the new password isn't hashed
+ * (ie, is cleartext), we probably should hash it according
+ * to the default hash. The reason for this is that we want
+ * to use the policy if possible, but if we hash the password
+ * before, then we're going to run into trouble when it
+ * comes time to check the password.
+ *
+ * Now, the right thing to do is to use the extended password
+ * modify operation, but not all software can do this,
+ * therefore it makes sense to hash the new password, now
+ * we know it passes the policy requirements.
+ *
+ * Of course, if the password is already hashed, then we
+ * leave it alone.
+ */
+
+ if ((pi->hash_passwords) && (addmod) && !newpw.bv_val &&
+ (password_scheme( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), NULL ) != LDAP_SUCCESS))
+ {
+ struct berval hpw, bv;
+
+ slap_passwd_hash( &(addmod->sml_values[0]), &hpw, &txt );
+ if (hpw.bv_val == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * hashing didn't work. Emit an error.
+ */
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
+ rs->sr_text = txt;
+ goto return_results;
+ }
+ bv = addmod->sml_values[0];
+ /* clear and discard the clear password */
+ memset(bv.bv_val, 0, bv.bv_len);
+ ber_memfree(bv.bv_val);
+ addmod->sml_values[0] = hpw;
+ }
+ }
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+ return SLAP_CB_CONTINUE;
+
+return_results:
+ free_pwd_history_list( &tl );
+ op->o_bd->bd_info = (BackendInfo *)on->on_info;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ ctrl = create_passcontrol( op, -1, -1, pErr );
+ oldctrls = add_passcontrol( op, rs, ctrl );
+ }
+ send_ldap_result( op, rs );
+ if ( free_txt ) {
+ free( (char *)txt );
+ rs->sr_text = NULL;
+ }
+ if ( send_ctrl ) {
+ if ( is_pwdexop ) {
+ if ( rs->sr_flags & REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED ) {
+ op->o_tmpfree( oldctrls, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
+ oldctrls = NULL;
+ rs->sr_flags |= REP_CTRLS_MUSTBEFREED;
+
+ } else {
+ ctrls_cleanup( op, rs, oldctrls );
+ }
+ }
+ return rs->sr_err;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_parseCtrl(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs,
+ LDAPControl *ctrl )
+{
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ctrl->ldctl_value ) ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "passwordPolicyRequest control value not absent";
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ op->o_ctrlflag[ppolicy_cid] = ctrl->ldctl_iscritical
+ ? SLAP_CONTROL_CRITICAL
+ : SLAP_CONTROL_NONCRITICAL;
+
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int
+attrPretty(
+ Syntax *syntax,
+ struct berval *val,
+ struct berval *out,
+ void *ctx )
+{
+ AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
+ const char *err;
+ int code;
+
+ code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err );
+ if ( !code ) {
+ ber_dupbv_x( out, &ad->ad_type->sat_cname, ctx );
+ }
+ return code;
+}
+
+static int
+attrNormalize(
+ slap_mask_t use,
+ Syntax *syntax,
+ MatchingRule *mr,
+ struct berval *val,
+ struct berval *out,
+ void *ctx )
+{
+ AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
+ const char *err;
+ int code;
+
+ code = slap_bv2ad( val, &ad, &err );
+ if ( !code ) {
+ ber_str2bv_x( ad->ad_type->sat_oid, 0, 1, out, ctx );
+ }
+ return code;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_init(
+ BackendDB *be,
+ ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info;
+ pp_info *pi;
+
+ if ( SLAP_ISGLOBALOVERLAY( be ) ) {
+ /* do not allow slapo-ppolicy to be global by now (ITS#5858) */
+ if ( cr ){
+ snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg),
+ "slapo-ppolicy cannot be global" );
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 );
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Has User Schema been initialized yet? */
+ if ( !pwd_UsSchema[0].ad[0] ) {
+ const char *err;
+ int i, code;
+
+ for (i=0; pwd_UsSchema[i].def; i++) {
+ code = slap_str2ad( pwd_UsSchema[i].def, pwd_UsSchema[i].ad, &err );
+ if ( code ) {
+ if ( cr ){
+ snprintf( cr->msg, sizeof(cr->msg),
+ "User Schema load failed for attribute \"%s\". Error code %d: %s",
+ pwd_UsSchema[i].def, code, err );
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "%s\n", cr->msg, 0, 0 );
+ }
+ return code;
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ Syntax *syn;
+ MatchingRule *mr;
+
+ syn = ch_malloc( sizeof( Syntax ));
+ *syn = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax;
+ syn->ssyn_pretty = attrPretty;
+ ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_syntax = syn;
+
+ mr = ch_malloc( sizeof( MatchingRule ));
+ *mr = *ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality;
+ mr->smr_normalize = attrNormalize;
+ ad_pwdAttribute->ad_type->sat_equality = mr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pi = on->on_bi.bi_private = ch_calloc( sizeof(pp_info), 1 );
+
+ if ( !pwcons ) {
+ /* accommodate for c_conn_idx == -1 */
+ pwcons = ch_calloc( sizeof(pw_conn), dtblsize + 1 );
+ pwcons++;
+ }
+
+ ov_count++;
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_open(
+ BackendDB *be,
+ ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+ return overlay_register_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST );
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_close(
+ BackendDB *be,
+ ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+#ifdef SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE
+ overlay_unregister_control( be, LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST );
+#endif /* SLAP_CONFIG_DELETE */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ppolicy_db_destroy(
+ BackendDB *be,
+ ConfigReply *cr
+)
+{
+ slap_overinst *on = (slap_overinst *) be->bd_info;
+ pp_info *pi = on->on_bi.bi_private;
+
+ on->on_bi.bi_private = NULL;
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_destroy( &pi->pwdFailureTime_mutex );
+ free( pi->def_policy.bv_val );
+ free( pi );
+
+ ov_count--;
+ if ( ov_count <=0 && pwcons ) {
+ pw_conn *pwc = pwcons;
+ pwcons = NULL;
+ pwc--;
+ ch_free( pwc );
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *extops[] = {
+ LDAP_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static slap_overinst ppolicy;
+
+int ppolicy_initialize()
+{
+ int i, code;
+
+ for (i=0; pwd_OpSchema[i].def; i++) {
+ code = register_at( pwd_OpSchema[i].def, pwd_OpSchema[i].ad, 0 );
+ if ( code ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
+ "ppolicy_initialize: register_at failed\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ return code;
+ }
+ /* Allow Manager to set these as needed */
+ if ( is_at_no_user_mod( (*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type )) {
+ (*pwd_OpSchema[i].ad)->ad_type->sat_flags |=
+ SLAP_AT_MANAGEABLE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_PASSWORDPOLICYREQUEST,
+ SLAP_CTRL_ADD|SLAP_CTRL_BIND|SLAP_CTRL_MODIFY, extops,
+ ppolicy_parseCtrl, &ppolicy_cid );
+ if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+ return code;
+ }
+
+ /* We don't expect to receive these controls, only send them */
+ code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRED,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+ return code;
+ }
+
+ code = register_supported_control( LDAP_CONTROL_X_PASSWORD_EXPIRING,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+ if ( code != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, "Failed to register control %d\n", code, 0, 0 );
+ return code;
+ }
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &chk_syntax_mutex );
+
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_type = "ppolicy";
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_flags = SLAPO_BFLAG_SINGLE;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_init = ppolicy_db_init;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_open = ppolicy_db_open;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_close = ppolicy_db_close;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_db_destroy = ppolicy_db_destroy;
+
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_add = ppolicy_add;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_bind = ppolicy_bind;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_compare = ppolicy_compare;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_delete = ppolicy_restrict;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_modify = ppolicy_modify;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_op_search = ppolicy_restrict;
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_connection_destroy = ppolicy_connection_destroy;
+
+ ppolicy.on_bi.bi_cf_ocs = ppolicyocs;
+ code = config_register_schema( ppolicycfg, ppolicyocs );
+ if ( code ) return code;
+
+ return overlay_register( &ppolicy );
+}
+
+#if SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY == SLAPD_MOD_DYNAMIC
+int init_module(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ return ppolicy_initialize();
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(SLAPD_OVER_PPOLICY) */