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+SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address]
+ [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file]
+ [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
+ [-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
+ [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]
+ [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination
+ [command]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+ executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure
+ encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
+ network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets
+ can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+ ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be
+ specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form
+ ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove his/her identity to
+ the remote machine using one of several methods (see below).
+
+ If a command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
+ login shell.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+ -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+ -A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent
+ such as ssh-agent(1). This can also be specified on a per-host
+ basis in a configuration file.
+
+ Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+ the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
+ from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+ that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+ the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see
+ -J).
+
+ -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+ -B bind_interface
+ Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to
+ connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems
+ with more than one address.
+
+ -b bind_address
+ Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
+ the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
+ address.
+
+ -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+ stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
+ connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by
+ gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow
+ connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+ The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+ configuration files; see the Compression option.
+
+ -c cipher_spec
+ Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+ cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order
+ of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more
+ information.
+
+ -D [bind_address:]port
+ Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
+ This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+ side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
+ connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+ the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+ determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
+ the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
+ as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
+ Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
+ configuration file.
+
+ IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
+ square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
+ ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
+ the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
+ be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
+ bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+ bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+ that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+ -E log_file
+ Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
+
+ -e escape_char
+ Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+ The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+ line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
+ connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+ followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
+ character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
+ fully transparent.
+
+ -F configfile
+ Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
+ configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+ configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
+ default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. If
+ set to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], no configuration files will be read.
+
+ -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+ This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
+ passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
+ implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
+ remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+ If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+ then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
+ forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
+ the background.
+
+ -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
+ Match blocks and exit.
+
+ -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used
+ on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+ on the master process.
+
+ -I pkcs11
+ Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
+ with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication.
+
+ -i identity_file
+ Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
+ key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity files may also
+ be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It
+ is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities
+ specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been
+ explicitly specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will
+ also try to load certificate information from the filename
+ obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
+
+ -J destination
+ Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to
+ the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
+ TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
+ jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
+ is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
+ Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line
+ generally apply to the destination host and not any specified
+ jump hosts. Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump
+ hosts.
+
+ -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
+ of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+
+ -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+ server.
+
+ -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
+ -L local_socket:host:hostport
+ -L local_socket:remote_socket
+ Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+ on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+ and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by
+ allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
+ side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
+ Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
+ socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
+ a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
+ socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
+
+ Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+ Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses
+ can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+
+ By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+ GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be
+ used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
+ bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+ bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+ that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+ -l login_name
+ Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
+ may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
+ Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with
+ confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation
+ that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session).
+ Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
+ details.
+
+ -m mac_spec
+ A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code)
+ algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs
+ keyword for more information.
+
+ -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
+ forwarding ports.
+
+ -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+ stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
+ common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
+ machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
+ start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
+ be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
+ program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
+ ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
+ option.)
+
+ -O ctl_cmd
+ Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
+ the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+ and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
+ (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
+ forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
+ forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
+ (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
+ requests).
+
+ -o option
+ Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+ configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
+ which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
+ of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ ssh_config(5).
+
+ AddKeysToAgent
+ AddressFamily
+ BatchMode
+ BindAddress
+ CanonicalDomains
+ CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ CanonicalizeHostname
+ CanonicalizeMaxDots
+ CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+ CASignatureAlgorithms
+ CertificateFile
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ CheckHostIP
+ Ciphers
+ ClearAllForwardings
+ Compression
+ ConnectionAttempts
+ ConnectTimeout
+ ControlMaster
+ ControlPath
+ ControlPersist
+ DynamicForward
+ EscapeChar
+ ExitOnForwardFailure
+ FingerprintHash
+ ForwardAgent
+ ForwardX11
+ ForwardX11Timeout
+ ForwardX11Trusted
+ GatewayPorts
+ GlobalKnownHostsFile
+ GSSAPIAuthentication
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ HashKnownHosts
+ Host
+ HostbasedAuthentication
+ HostbasedKeyTypes
+ HostKeyAlgorithms
+ HostKeyAlias
+ Hostname
+ IdentitiesOnly
+ IdentityAgent
+ IdentityFile
+ IPQoS
+ KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ KbdInteractiveDevices
+ KexAlgorithms
+ LocalCommand
+ LocalForward
+ LogLevel
+ MACs
+ Match
+ NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+ NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+ PasswordAuthentication
+ PermitLocalCommand
+ PKCS11Provider
+ Port
+ PreferredAuthentications
+ ProxyCommand
+ ProxyJump
+ ProxyUseFdpass
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ PubkeyAuthentication
+ RekeyLimit
+ RemoteCommand
+ RemoteForward
+ RequestTTY
+ SendEnv
+ ServerAliveInterval
+ ServerAliveCountMax
+ SetEnv
+ StreamLocalBindMask
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ StrictHostKeyChecking
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ Tunnel
+ TunnelDevice
+ UpdateHostKeys
+ User
+ UserKnownHostsFile
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS
+ VisualHostKey
+ XAuthLocation
+
+ -p port
+ Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
+ a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+ -Q query_option
+ Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
+ version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported
+ symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
+ support authenticated encryption), help (supported query terms
+ for use with the -Q flag), mac (supported message integrity
+ codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types), key-cert
+ (certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key types),
+ key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms),
+ protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and sig
+ (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword
+ from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5) that takes an algorithm list
+ may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option.
+
+ -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
+ suppressed.
+
+ -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+ -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
+ -R remote_socket:host:hostport
+ -R remote_socket:local_socket
+ -R [bind_address:]port
+ Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+ on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local
+ side.
+
+ This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port
+ or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is
+ made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded
+ over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local
+ machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port
+ hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was
+ specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward
+ connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
+ client.
+
+ Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+ Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+ the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+ the address in square brackets.
+
+ By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
+ the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
+ specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
+ M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
+ interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+ if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+ sshd_config(5)).
+
+ If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+ allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+ When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
+ printed to the standard output.
+
+ -S ctl_path
+ Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
+ sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
+ Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
+ ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+ -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+ system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure
+ transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem
+ is specified as the remote command.
+
+ -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+
+ -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute
+ arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+ very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
+ options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+ -V Display the version number and exit.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+ progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
+ authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
+ increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
+
+ -W host:port
+ Requests that standard input and output on the client be
+ forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
+ -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these
+ can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command
+ line options.
+
+ -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
+ Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
+ devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
+ (remote_tun).
+
+ The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+ M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If
+ remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the
+ Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).
+
+ If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default
+ tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel
+ forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
+ -w.
+
+ -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
+ basis in a configuration file.
+
+ X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
+ ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+ user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+ through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
+ to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+ For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
+ extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
+ option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
+ more information.
+
+ -x Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+ -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+ subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+ -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
+ default this information is sent to stderr.
+
+ ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
+ configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
+ and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+ The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
+
+ The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
+ authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
+ challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
+ Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
+ PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order.
+
+ Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
+ in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+ machine, the user is non-root and the user names are the same on both
+ sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home
+ directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of
+ the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+ considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify
+ the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+ and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This
+ authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS
+ spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator:
+ /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are
+ inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
+
+ Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
+ public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
+ decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
+ the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
+ creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
+ server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+ ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
+ one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of
+ ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+
+ The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
+ for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
+ which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client
+ proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
+ the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
+
+ The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
+ authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
+ different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to
+ DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag).
+
+ The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores
+ the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA),
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA),
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted
+ ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+ (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
+ home directory. The user should then copy the public key to
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
+ The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
+ and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this,
+ the user can log in without giving the password.
+
+ A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
+ certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
+ signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
+ trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
+ public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
+ more information.
+
+ The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+ may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally)
+ the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+ Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
+ arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of
+ challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see
+ login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
+
+ Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
+ password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+ since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+ someone listening on the network.
+
+ ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+ identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
+ stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
+ the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
+ hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
+ host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
+ password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
+ attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
+ StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
+ whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+ When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+ either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
+ command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
+ normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the
+ remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+ If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
+ pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
+ The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
+
+ If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
+ characters noted below.
+
+ If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
+ can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting
+ the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
+ even if a tty is used.
+
+ The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+ exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+
+ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+ When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
+ functions through the use of an escape character.
+
+ A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+ character other than those described below. The escape character must
+ always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
+ character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
+ configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+ The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
+
+ ~. Disconnect.
+
+ ~^Z Background ssh.
+
+ ~# List forwarded connections.
+
+ ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+ X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+ ~? Display a list of escape characters.
+
+ ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer
+ supports it).
+
+ ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
+ forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also
+ allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
+ -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
+ remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
+ !command allows the user to execute a local command if the
+ PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic
+ help is available, using the -h option.
+
+ ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer
+ supports it).
+
+ ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+ to stderr.
+
+ ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+ to stderr.
+
+TCP FORWARDING
+ Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be
+ specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
+ possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
+ server; another is going through firewalls.
+
+ In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC
+ client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
+ support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user
+ connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to
+ forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program
+ locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote
+ server.
+
+ The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC
+ server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname
+ M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667:
+
+ $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+ $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
+
+ The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
+ specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
+ start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections
+ are made within the time specified, ssh will exit.
+
+X11 FORWARDING
+ If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
+ -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
+ environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+ automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+ programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+ encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+ from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
+ Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
+ configuration files.
+
+ The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+ display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
+ ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+ connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+ ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+ For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+ it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+ carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+ is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+ machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+ If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
+ the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
+ agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
+ remote side.
+
+VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+ When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
+ server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
+ StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined
+ using ssh-keygen(1):
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+ If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
+ accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
+ are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
+ fingerprint algorithm to match.
+
+ Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
+ fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+ using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
+ ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
+ session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known
+ server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
+ when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns
+ are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
+ remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
+ not guaranteed proof.
+
+ To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
+ known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+
+ If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
+ available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource
+ record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
+ able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
+
+ In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+ M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
+ the zonefile for host.example.com:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+
+ The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that
+ the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+
+ $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+
+ Finally the client connects:
+
+ $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+ [...]
+ Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+ Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+
+ See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+ ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
+ the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
+ securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
+ whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
+ traffic).
+
+ The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
+ remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
+ 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
+ to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+
+ On the client:
+
+ # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+ # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+ # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+
+ On the server:
+
+ # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+ # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+
+ Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following
+ entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
+ tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+ tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+ tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+
+ Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
+ more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
+ permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
+ isakmpd(8).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+ ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+ DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
+ X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
+ point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
+ M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
+ and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special
+ value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+ channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY
+ explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
+ insecure (and will require the user to manually
+ copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+ HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+ LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
+ systems that use this variable.
+
+ MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+ PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
+ compiling ssh.
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
+ passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
+ from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal
+ associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
+ set, it will execute the program specified by
+ SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
+ passphrase. This is particularly useful when
+ calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
+ (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
+ redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
+ work.)
+
+ SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE Allows further control over the use of an askpass
+ program. If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then
+ ssh will never attempt to use one. If it is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then ssh will prefer to use the askpass
+ program instead of the TTY when requesting
+ passwords. Finally, if the variable is set to
+ M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for
+ all passphrase input regardless of whether DISPLAY
+ is set.
+
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
+ communicate with the agent.
+
+ SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
+ connection. The variable contains four space-
+ separated values: client IP address, client port
+ number, server IP address, and server port number.
+
+ SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
+ a forced command is executed. It can be used to
+ extract the original arguments.
+
+ SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
+ device) associated with the current shell or
+ command. If the current session has no tty, this
+ variable is not set.
+
+ SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface
+ names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested
+ by the client.
+
+ SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may
+ contain a pathname to a file that lists the
+ authentication methods successfully used when the
+ session was established, including any public keys
+ that were used.
+
+ TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
+ zone if it was set when the daemon was started
+ (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
+ connections).
+
+ USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+ Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
+ M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
+ allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
+ PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+ ~/.rhosts
+ This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
+ some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
+ user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
+ reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
+ user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
+ recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
+ user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.shosts
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+ host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+ configuration and authentication information. There is no
+ general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+ secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+ for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+ Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+ for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
+ described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly
+ sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+ user, and not accessible by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/config
+ This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
+ configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
+ the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+
+ ~/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+ ENVIRONMENT, above.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
+ sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+ accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
+ ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
+ possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
+ will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
+ AES-128.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+ Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not
+ sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+
+ ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+ Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+ into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+ keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
+ file.
+
+ ~/.ssh/rc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+ /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It
+ should only be writable by root.
+
+ /etc/shosts.equiv
+ This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+ allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+ rlogin/rsh.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
+ options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
+ used for host-based authentication.
+
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+ Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
+ by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+ all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable.
+ See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
+
+ /etc/ssh/sshrc
+ Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+ just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
+ sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+ ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+ error occurred.
+
+SEE ALSO
+ scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
+ tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+ S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
+ Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
+ RFC 4251, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
+ RFC 4252, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+ Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
+
+ T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
+ 4254, January 2006.
+
+ J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
+ (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
+
+ F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
+ Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
+
+ J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
+ Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
+
+ M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+ Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
+
+ B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+ Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
+
+ M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+ the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
+
+ J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
+ Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
+
+ D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
+ Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
+
+ A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
+ Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 6.8 July 15, 2020 OpenBSD 6.8