From 802a7af111c9ddb438ca4fd8c5cc35534e199fda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:17 +0000 Subject: upstream: implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange (KEX) phase. Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file. with markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14 Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Last-Update: 2023-12-21 Patch-Name: CVE-2023-48795.patch --- PROTOCOL | 26 +++++++++++++++++ kex.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kex.h | 1 + packet.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- sshconnect2.c | 14 +++------ sshd.c | 8 ++++-- 6 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL index ecdacb9dc..bbe7ea560 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL +++ b/PROTOCOL @@ -102,6 +102,32 @@ OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as described at: http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519 +1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension + +OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under +a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the +RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the +initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append +"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server +may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms +are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored +if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets. + +When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm +name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to +the the protocol: + +a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or + out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the + connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. + Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages + that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as + SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. +b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the + packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the + duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first + SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS). + 2. Connection protocol changes 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index 763c45536..bda0473f7 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ #endif /* prototype */ -static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); +static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { @@ -207,6 +207,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) return 1; } +/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ +static int +has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) +{ + char *cp; + + if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) + return 0; + free(cp); + return 1; +} + /* * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. * Caller must free returned string. @@ -214,7 +226,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) char * kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) { - char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; + char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p; size_t len; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') @@ -231,10 +243,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) } strlcpy(ret, a, len); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { - if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { - free(m); + if (has_any_alg(ret, p)) continue; /* Algorithm already present */ - } if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { free(tmp); @@ -466,7 +476,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; - error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */ + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: " + "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq); + } + error("%s: type %u seq %u", __func__, type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) @@ -538,6 +553,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) return r; + if (ninfo >= 1024) { + error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected " + "<=1024, received %u", ninfo); + return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh); + } for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) return r; @@ -638,7 +658,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) error("%s: no hex", __func__); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error); ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; @@ -674,7 +694,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; - if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) @@ -939,7 +959,13 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) } static int -kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) +kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext) +{ + return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext); +} + +static int +kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; @@ -964,13 +990,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) sprop=peer; } - /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ - if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { - char *ext; - - ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); - kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); - free(ext); + /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */ + if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + if (kex->server) { + kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c"); + kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, + "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"); + } else { + kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, + "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); + } + if (kex->kex_strict) { + debug3("%s: will use strict KEX ordering", __func__); + if (seq != 0) + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, + "strict KEX violation: " + "KEXINIT was not the first packet"); + } } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h index 938dca03b..c60e592ec 100644 --- a/kex.h +++ b/kex.h @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ struct kex { u_int kex_type; char *server_sig_algs; int ext_info_c; + int kex_strict; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; struct sshbuf *client_version; diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c index 00e3180cb..78c357b14 100644 --- a/packet.c +++ b/packet.c @@ -1208,8 +1208,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ - if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) + if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) { + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number " + "wrapped during initial key exchange"); + } logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); + } if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; @@ -1217,6 +1222,12 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + debug("%s: resetting send seqnr %u", __func__, + state->p_send.seqnr); + state->p_send.seqnr = 0; + } + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) @@ -1350,8 +1361,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ - r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); - if (r != 0) + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) @@ -1638,10 +1648,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } + if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; - if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) + if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) { + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number " + "wrapped during initial key exchange"); + } logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); + } if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; @@ -1707,6 +1723,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; + if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + debug("%s: resetting read seqnr %u", __func__, + state->p_read.seqnr); + state->p_read.seqnr = 0; + } /* do we need to rekey? */ if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) { @@ -1731,10 +1752,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; - if (*typep) { - state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; - DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + if (*typep == 0) { + /* no message ready */ + return 0; + } + state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + + /* Always process disconnect messages */ + if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ + do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && + reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" + "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); + free(msg); + return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; } + + /* + * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial + * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed + * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate + * protocol errors. + */ + if (ssh->kex != NULL && + (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) + return 0; + /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */ switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); @@ -1749,19 +1799,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; - case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ - do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && - reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? - SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, - "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" - "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); - free(msg); - return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; @@ -2240,6 +2277,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || @@ -2402,6 +2440,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || @@ -2729,6 +2768,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); + debug2("%s: sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", __func__, buf); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index c47fc31a6..61392c934 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); free(all_key); - if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) + if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, + "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = @@ -423,7 +424,6 @@ struct cauthmethod { }; static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(ssh); @@ -591,13 +591,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) return r; } -/* ARGSUSED */ -static int -input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) -{ - return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); -} - void userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) { @@ -679,6 +672,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error); return 0; } diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index fb9b7b7fb..e894ad6f7 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -2405,10 +2405,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; struct kex *kex; + char *s; int r; - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( - options.kex_algorithms); + if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, + "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal( options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal( @@ -2517,6 +2520,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: send test: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif + free(s); debug("KEX done"); }