From de848d9e9146434817c65d74d1d0313e9d729462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 14:01:37 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1.4.0. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- modules/pam_tally2/README | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 156 insertions(+) create mode 100644 modules/pam_tally2/README (limited to 'modules/pam_tally2/README') diff --git a/modules/pam_tally2/README b/modules/pam_tally2/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3fd30e --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/pam_tally2/README @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +pam_tally2 — The login counter (tallying) module + +━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ + +DESCRIPTION + +This module maintains a count of attempted accesses, can reset count on +success, can deny access if too many attempts fail. + +pam_tally2 comes in two parts: pam_tally2.so and pam_tally2. The former is the +PAM module and the latter, a stand-alone program. pam_tally2 is an (optional) +application which can be used to interrogate and manipulate the counter file. +It can display user counts, set individual counts, or clear all counts. Setting +artificially high counts may be useful for blocking users without changing +their passwords. For example, one might find it useful to clear all counts +every midnight from a cron job. + +Normally, failed attempts to access root will not cause the root account to +become blocked, to prevent denial-of-service: if your users aren't given shell +accounts and root may only login via su or at the machine console (not telnet/ +rsh, etc), this is safe. + +OPTIONS + +GLOBAL OPTIONS + + This can be used for auth and account module types. + + onerr=[fail|succeed] + + If something weird happens (like unable to open the file), return with + PAM_SUCCESS if onerr=succeed is given, else with the corresponding PAM + error code. + + file=/path/to/counter + + File where to keep counts. Default is /var/log/tallylog. + + audit + + Will log the user name into the system log if the user is not found. + + silent + + Don't print informative messages. The messages printed without the + silent option leak presence of accounts on the system because they are + not printed for non-existing accounts. + + no_log_info + + Don't log informative messages via syslog(3). + + debug + + Always log tally count when it is incremented as a debug level message + to the system log. + +AUTH OPTIONS + + Authentication phase first increments attempted login counter and checks if + user should be denied access. If the user is authenticated and the login + process continues on call to pam_setcred(3) it resets the attempts counter. + + deny=n + + Deny access if tally for this user exceeds n. + + lock_time=n + + Always deny for n seconds after failed attempt. + + unlock_time=n + + Allow access after n seconds after failed attempt. If this option is + used the user will be locked out for the specified amount of time after + he exceeded his maximum allowed attempts. Otherwise the account is + locked until the lock is removed by a manual intervention of the system + administrator. + + magic_root + + If the module is invoked by a user with uid=0 the counter is not + incremented. The sysadmin should use this for user launched services, + like su, otherwise this argument should be omitted. + + even_deny_root + + Root account can become unavailable. + + root_unlock_time=n + + This option implies even_deny_root option. Allow access after n seconds + to root account after failed attempt. If this option is used the root + user will be locked out for the specified amount of time after he + exceeded his maximum allowed attempts. + + serialize + + Serialize access to the tally file using locks. This option might be + used only for non-multithreaded services because it depends on the + fcntl locking of the tally file. Also it is a good idea to use this + option only in such configurations where the time between auth phase + and account or setcred phase is not dependent on the authenticating + client. Otherwise the authenticating client will be able to prevent + simultaneous authentications by the same user by simply artificially + prolonging the time the file record lock is held. + +ACCOUNT OPTIONS + + Account phase resets attempts counter if the user is not magic root. This + phase can be used optionally for services which don't call pam_setcred(3) + correctly or if the reset should be done regardless of the failure of the + account phase of other modules. + + magic_root + + If the module is invoked by a user with uid=0 the counter is not + changed. The sysadmin should use this for user launched services, like + su, otherwise this argument should be omitted. + +NOTES + +pam_tally2 is not compatible with the old pam_tally faillog file format. This +is caused by requirement of compatibility of the tallylog file format between +32bit and 64bit architectures on multiarch systems. + +There is no setuid wrapper for access to the data file such as when the +pam_tally2.so module is called from xscreensaver. As this would make it +impossible to share PAM configuration with such services the following +workaround is used: If the data file cannot be opened because of insufficient +permissions (EACCES) the module returns PAM_IGNORE. + +EXAMPLES + +Add the following line to /etc/pam.d/login to lock the account after 4 failed +logins. Root account will be locked as well. The accounts will be automatically +unlocked after 20 minutes. The module does not have to be called in the account +phase because the login calls pam_setcred(3) correctly. + +auth required pam_securetty.so +auth required pam_tally2.so deny=4 even_deny_root unlock_time=1200 +auth required pam_env.so +auth required pam_unix.so +auth required pam_nologin.so +account required pam_unix.so +password required pam_unix.so +session required pam_limits.so +session required pam_unix.so +session required pam_lastlog.so nowtmp +session optional pam_mail.so standard + + +AUTHOR + +pam_tally2 was written by Tim Baverstock and Tomas Mraz. + -- cgit v1.2.3