From de848d9e9146434817c65d74d1d0313e9d729462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 14:01:37 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1.4.0. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- modules/pam_unix/support.c | 887 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 887 insertions(+) create mode 100644 modules/pam_unix/support.c (limited to 'modules/pam_unix/support.c') diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41db1f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c @@ -0,0 +1,887 @@ +/* + * Copyright information at end of file. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "pam_cc_compat.h" +#include "pam_inline.h" +#include "support.h" +#include "passverify.h" + +/* this is a front-end for module-application conversations */ + +int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, + int type, const char *text) +{ + int retval = PAM_SUCCESS; + + if (off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) { + retval = pam_prompt(pamh, type, NULL, "%s", text); + } + return retval; +} + +/* + * set the control flags for the UNIX module. + */ + +unsigned long long _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, + int *rounds, int *pass_min_len, int argc, + const char **argv) +{ + unsigned long long ctrl; + char *val; + int j; + + D(("called.")); + + ctrl = UNIX_DEFAULTS; /* the default selection of options */ + + /* set some flags manually */ + + if (getuid() == 0 && !(flags & PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK)) { + D(("IAMROOT")); + set(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl); + } + if (flags & PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK) { + D(("UPDATE_AUTHTOK")); + set(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl); + } + if (flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) { + D(("PRELIM_CHECK")); + set(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl); + } + if (flags & PAM_SILENT) { + D(("SILENT")); + set(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl); + } + + /* preset encryption method with value from /etc/login.defs */ + val = pam_modutil_search_key(pamh, LOGIN_DEFS, "ENCRYPT_METHOD"); + if (val) { + for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) { + if (unix_args[j].token && unix_args[j].is_hash_algo + && !strncasecmp(val, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) { + break; + } + } + if (j >= UNIX_CTRLS_) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized ENCRYPT_METHOD value [%s]", val); + } else { + ctrl &= unix_args[j].mask; /* for turning things off */ + ctrl |= unix_args[j].flag; /* for turning things on */ + } + free (val); + + /* read number of rounds for crypt algo */ + if (rounds && (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl))) { + val = pam_modutil_search_key(pamh, LOGIN_DEFS, "SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS"); + + if (val) { + *rounds = strtol(val, NULL, 10); + set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl); + free (val); + } + } + } + + /* now parse the arguments to this module */ + + for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) { + const char *str = NULL; + + D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv)); + + for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) { + if (unix_args[j].token + && (str = pam_str_skip_prefix_len(*argv, + unix_args[j].token, + strlen(unix_args[j].token))) != NULL) { + break; + } + } + + if (str == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, + "unrecognized option [%s]", *argv); + } else { + /* special cases */ + if (j == UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD) { + if (remember == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, + "option remember not allowed for this module type"); + continue; + } + *remember = strtol(str, NULL, 10); + if ((*remember == INT_MIN) || (*remember == INT_MAX)) + *remember = -1; + if (*remember > 400) + *remember = 400; + } else if (j == UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN) { + if (pass_min_len == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, + "option minlen not allowed for this module type"); + continue; + } + *pass_min_len = atoi(str); + } else if (j == UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS) { + if (rounds == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, + "option rounds not allowed for this module type"); + continue; + } + *rounds = strtol(str, NULL, 10); + } + + ctrl &= unix_args[j].mask; /* for turning things off */ + ctrl |= unix_args[j].flag; /* for turning things on */ + } + } + + if (UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) + && pass_min_len && *pass_min_len > 8) + { + pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Password minlen reset to 8 characters"); + *pass_min_len = 8; + } + + if (flags & PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) { + D(("DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK")); + set(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl); + } + + /* Set default rounds for blowfish, gost-yescrypt and yescrypt */ + if (off(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl) && rounds != NULL) { + if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) || + on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) || + on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) { + *rounds = 5; + set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl); + } + } + + /* Enforce sane "rounds" values */ + if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) { + if (on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) || + on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) { + if (*rounds < 3 || *rounds > 11) + *rounds = 5; + } else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) { + if (*rounds < 4 || *rounds > 31) + *rounds = 5; + } else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) { + if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX)) { + /* don't care about bogus values */ + *rounds = 0; + unset(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl); + } else if (*rounds >= 10000000) { + *rounds = 9999999; + } + } + } + + /* auditing is a more sensitive version of debug */ + + if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) { + set(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl); + } + /* return the set of flags */ + + D(("done.")); + return ctrl; +} + +/* ************************************************************** * + * Useful non-trivial functions * + * ************************************************************** */ + + /* + * the following is used to keep track of the number of times a user fails + * to authenticate themself. + */ + +#define FAIL_PREFIX "-UN*X-FAIL-" +#define UNIX_MAX_RETRIES 3 + +struct _pam_failed_auth { + char *user; /* user that's failed to be authenticated */ + char *name; /* attempt from user with name */ + int uid; /* uid of calling user */ + int euid; /* euid of calling process */ + int count; /* number of failures so far */ +}; + +#ifndef PAM_DATA_REPLACE +#error "Need to get an updated libpam 0.52 or better" +#endif + +static void _cleanup_failures(pam_handle_t * pamh, void *fl, int err) +{ + int quiet; + const void *service = NULL; + const void *ruser = NULL; + const void *rhost = NULL; + const void *tty = NULL; + struct _pam_failed_auth *failure; + + D(("called")); + + quiet = err & PAM_DATA_SILENT; /* should we log something? */ + err &= PAM_DATA_REPLACE; /* are we just replacing data? */ + failure = (struct _pam_failed_auth *) fl; + + if (failure != NULL) { + + if (!quiet && !err) { /* under advisement from Sun,may go away */ + + /* log the number of authentication failures */ + if (failure->count > 1) { + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, + &service); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, + &ruser); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, + &rhost); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, + &tty); + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, + "%d more authentication failure%s; " + "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d " + "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s " + "%s%s", + failure->count - 1, failure->count == 2 ? "" : "s", + failure->name, failure->uid, failure->euid, + tty ? (const char *)tty : "", ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "", + rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "", + (failure->user && failure->user[0] != '\0') + ? " user=" : "", failure->user + ); + + if (failure->count > UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, + "service(%s) ignoring max retries; %d > %d", + service == NULL ? "**unknown**" : (const char *)service, + failure->count, + UNIX_MAX_RETRIES); + } + } + } + _pam_delete(failure->user); /* tidy up */ + _pam_delete(failure->name); /* tidy up */ + free(failure); + } +} + +/* + * _unix_getpwnam() searches only /etc/passwd and NIS to find user information + */ +static void _unix_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *data, int error_status UNUSED) +{ + free(data); +} + +int _unix_getpwnam(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name, + int files, int nis, struct passwd **ret) +{ + FILE *passwd; + char buf[16384]; + int matched = 0, buflen; + char *slogin, *spasswd, *suid, *sgid, *sgecos, *shome, *sshell, *p; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + if (!matched && files) { + int userlen = strlen(name); + passwd = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r"); + if (passwd != NULL) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), passwd) != NULL) { + if ((buf[userlen] == ':') && + (strncmp(name, buf, userlen) == 0)) { + p = buf + strlen(buf) - 1; + while (isspace(*p) && (p >= buf)) { + *p-- = '\0'; + } + matched = 1; + break; + } + } + fclose(passwd); + } + } + +#if defined(HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN) && defined (HAVE_YP_BIND) && defined (HAVE_YP_MATCH) && defined (HAVE_YP_UNBIND) + if (!matched && nis) { + char *userinfo = NULL, *domain = NULL; + int len = 0, i; + len = yp_get_default_domain(&domain); + if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) { + len = yp_bind(domain); + } + if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) { + i = yp_match(domain, "passwd.byname", name, + strlen(name), &userinfo, &len); + yp_unbind(domain); + if ((i == YPERR_SUCCESS) && ((size_t)len < sizeof(buf))) { + strncpy(buf, userinfo, sizeof(buf) - 1); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + matched = 1; + } + } + } +#else + /* we don't have NIS support, make compiler happy. */ + (void) nis; +#endif + + if (matched && (ret != NULL)) { + *ret = NULL; + + slogin = buf; + + spasswd = strchr(slogin, ':'); + if (spasswd == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *spasswd++ = '\0'; + + suid = strchr(spasswd, ':'); + if (suid == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *suid++ = '\0'; + + sgid = strchr(suid, ':'); + if (sgid == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *sgid++ = '\0'; + + sgecos = strchr(sgid, ':'); + if (sgecos == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *sgecos++ = '\0'; + + shome = strchr(sgecos, ':'); + if (shome == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *shome++ = '\0'; + + sshell = strchr(shome, ':'); + if (sshell == NULL) { + return matched; + } + *sshell++ = '\0'; + + buflen = sizeof(struct passwd) + + strlen(slogin) + 1 + + strlen(spasswd) + 1 + + strlen(sgecos) + 1 + + strlen(shome) + 1 + + strlen(sshell) + 1; + *ret = malloc(buflen); + if (*ret == NULL) { + return matched; + } + memset(*ret, '\0', buflen); + + (*ret)->pw_uid = strtol(suid, &p, 10); + if ((strlen(suid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) { + free(*ret); + *ret = NULL; + return matched; + } + + (*ret)->pw_gid = strtol(sgid, &p, 10); + if ((strlen(sgid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) { + free(*ret); + *ret = NULL; + return matched; + } + + p = ((char*)(*ret)) + sizeof(struct passwd); + (*ret)->pw_name = strcpy(p, slogin); + p += strlen(p) + 1; + (*ret)->pw_passwd = strcpy(p, spasswd); + p += strlen(p) + 1; + (*ret)->pw_gecos = strcpy(p, sgecos); + p += strlen(p) + 1; + (*ret)->pw_dir = strcpy(p, shome); + p += strlen(p) + 1; + (*ret)->pw_shell = strcpy(p, sshell); + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_pam_unix_getpwnam_%s", name); + + if (pam_set_data(pamh, buf, + *ret, _unix_cleanup) != PAM_SUCCESS) { + free(*ret); + *ret = NULL; + } + } + + return matched; +} + +/* + * _unix_comsefromsource() is a quick check to see if information about a given + * user comes from a particular source (just files and nis for now) + * + */ +int _unix_comesfromsource(pam_handle_t *pamh, + const char *name, int files, int nis) +{ + return _unix_getpwnam(pamh, name, files, nis, NULL); +} + +/* + * verify the password of a user + */ + +#include +#include + +static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, + unsigned long long ctrl, const char *user) +{ + int retval, child, fds[2]; + struct sigaction newsa, oldsa; + + D(("called.")); + /* create a pipe for the password */ + if (pipe(fds) != 0) { + D(("could not make pipe")); + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + + if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) { + /* + * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause + * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which + * may kill the application or worse. + * + * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can + * override this behavior. + */ + memset(&newsa, '\0', sizeof(newsa)); + newsa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; + sigaction(SIGCHLD, &newsa, &oldsa); + } + + /* fork */ + child = fork(); + if (child == 0) { + static char *envp[] = { NULL }; + const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; + + /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */ + + /* reopen stdin as pipe */ + if (dup2(fds[0], STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdin"); + _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL); + } + + if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD, + PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD, + PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD) < 0) { + _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL); + } + + if (geteuid() == 0) { + /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error + out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */ + if (setuid(0) == -1) { + D(("setuid failed")); + _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL); + } + } + + /* exec binary helper */ + args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER; + args[1] = user; + if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */ + args[2]="nullok"; + } else { + args[2]="nonull"; + } + + DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL; + execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, (char *const *) args, envp); + DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL; + + /* should not get here: exit with error */ + D(("helper binary is not available")); + _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL); + } else if (child > 0) { + /* wait for child */ + /* if the stored password is NULL */ + int rc=0; + if (passwd != NULL) { /* send the password to the child */ + int len = strlen(passwd); + + if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) + len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE; + if (write(fds[1], passwd, len) == -1 || + write(fds[1], "", 1) == -1) { + pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot send password to helper: %m"); + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + passwd = NULL; + } else { /* blank password */ + if (write(fds[1], "", 1) == -1) { + pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot send password to helper: %m"); + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + } + close(fds[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */ + close(fds[1]); + /* wait for helper to complete: */ + while ((rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (rc<0) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc); + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } else if (!WIFEXITED(retval)) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd abnormal exit: %d", retval); + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } else { + retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval); + } + } else { + D(("fork failed")); + close(fds[0]); + close(fds[1]); + retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + + if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) { + sigaction(SIGCHLD, &oldsa, NULL); /* restore old signal handler */ + } + + D(("returning %d", retval)); + return retval; +} + +/* + * _unix_blankpasswd() is a quick check for a blank password + * + * returns TRUE if user does not have a password + * - to avoid prompting for one in such cases (CG) + */ + +int +_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *name) +{ + struct passwd *pwd = NULL; + char *salt = NULL; + int daysleft; + int retval; + + D(("called")); + + /* + * This function does not have to be too smart if something goes + * wrong, return FALSE and let this case to be treated somewhere + * else (CG) + */ + + if (on(UNIX_NULLRESETOK, ctrl)) { + retval = _unix_verify_user(pamh, ctrl, name, &daysleft); + if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { + /* password reset is enforced, allow authentication with empty password */ + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "user [%s] has expired blank password, enabling nullok", name); + set(UNIX__NULLOK, ctrl); + } + } + + if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) + return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */ + + /* UNIX passwords area */ + + retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt); + + if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) { + /* salt will not be set here so we can return immediately */ + if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS) + return 1; + else + return 0; + } + + /* Does this user have a password? */ + if (salt == NULL) { + retval = 0; + } else { + if (strlen(salt) == 0) + retval = 1; + else + retval = 0; + } + + /* tidy up */ + + if (salt) + _pam_delete(salt); + + return retval; +} + +int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name + ,const char *p, unsigned long long ctrl) +{ + struct passwd *pwd = NULL; + char *salt = NULL; + char *data_name; + char pw[MAXPASS + 1]; + int retval; + + + D(("called")); + +#ifdef HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY + if (off(UNIX_NODELAY, ctrl)) { + D(("setting delay")); + (void) pam_fail_delay(pamh, 2000000); /* 2 sec delay for on failure */ + } +#endif + + /* locate the entry for this user */ + + D(("locating user's record")); + + retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt); + + data_name = (char *) malloc(sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) + strlen(name)); + if (data_name == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "no memory for data-name"); + } else { + strcpy(data_name, FAIL_PREFIX); + strcpy(data_name + sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) - 1, name); + } + + if (p != NULL && strlen(p) > MAXPASS) { + memset(pw, 0, sizeof(pw)); + p = strncpy(pw, p, sizeof(pw) - 1); + } + + if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) { + D(("running helper binary")); + retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name); + } else { + D(("user's record unavailable")); + p = NULL; + if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) { + /* this might be a typo and the user has given a password + instead of a username. Careful with this. */ + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, + "check pass; user (%s) unknown", name); + } else { + name = NULL; + if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl) || pwd == NULL) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, + "check pass; user unknown"); + } else { + /* don't log failure as another pam module can succeed */ + goto cleanup; + } + } + } + } else { + retval = verify_pwd_hash(pamh, p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)); + } + + if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { + if (data_name) /* reset failures */ + pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, NULL, _cleanup_failures); + } else { + if (data_name != NULL) { + struct _pam_failed_auth *new = NULL; + const struct _pam_failed_auth *old = NULL; + + /* get a failure recorder */ + + new = (struct _pam_failed_auth *) + malloc(sizeof(struct _pam_failed_auth)); + + if (new != NULL) { + + const char *login_name; + const void *void_old; + + + login_name = pam_modutil_getlogin(pamh); + if (login_name == NULL) { + login_name = ""; + } + + new->user = strdup(name ? name : ""); + new->uid = getuid(); + new->euid = geteuid(); + new->name = strdup(login_name); + + /* any previous failures for this user ? */ + if (pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, &void_old) + == PAM_SUCCESS) + old = void_old; + else + old = NULL; + + if (old != NULL) { + new->count = old->count + 1; + if (new->count >= UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) { + retval = PAM_MAXTRIES; + } + } else { + const void *service=NULL; + const void *ruser=NULL; + const void *rhost=NULL; + const void *tty=NULL; + + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, + &service); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, + &ruser); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, + &rhost); + (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, + &tty); + + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, + "authentication failure; " + "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d " + "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s " + "%s%s", + new->name, new->uid, new->euid, + tty ? (const char *)tty : "", + ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "", + rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "", + (new->user && new->user[0] != '\0') + ? " user=" : "", + new->user + ); + new->count = 1; + } + + pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, new, _cleanup_failures); + + } else { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, + "no memory for failure recorder"); + } + } + } + +cleanup: + memset(pw, 0, sizeof(pw)); /* clear memory of the password */ + if (data_name) + _pam_delete(data_name); + if (salt) + _pam_delete(salt); + + D(("done [%d].", retval)); + + return retval; +} + +int +_unix_verify_user(pam_handle_t *pamh, + unsigned long long ctrl, + const char *name, + int *daysleft) +{ + int retval; + struct spwd *spent; + struct passwd *pwent; + + retval = get_account_info(pamh, name, &pwent, &spent); + if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) { + pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, + "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))", + name); + return retval; + } + + if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + + if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) { + retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, name, daysleft); + if (retval == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL && + on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW, ctrl)) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + } else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + if (on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW,ctrl)) + return PAM_SUCCESS; + else + return retval; + } else + retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, daysleft); + + return retval; +} + +/* ****************************************************************** * + * Copyright (c) Jan Rękorajski 1999. + * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8. + * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996. + * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996. + * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, + * including the disclaimer of warranties. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of + * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are + * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is + * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and + * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ -- cgit v1.2.3