Adding upstream version 3.5.24.upstream/3.5.24upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 507 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/tls/tls_verify.c b/src/tls/tls_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d5f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls/tls_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	tls_verify 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	peer name and peer certificate verification
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#define TLS_INTERNAL
+/*	#include <tls.h>
+/*
+/*	int	tls_verify_certificate_callback(ok, ctx)
+/*	int	ok;
+/*	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+/*
+/*	int     tls_log_verify_error(TLScontext)
+/*	TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/*	char *tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
+/*	X509   *peercert;
+/*	TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/*	char *tls_issuer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
+/*	X509   *peercert;
+/*	TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/*
+/*	const char *tls_dns_name(gn, TLScontext)
+/*	const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+/*	TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	tls_verify_certificate_callback() is called several times (directly
+/*	or indirectly) from crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It collects errors
+/*	and trust information at each element of the trust chain.
+/*	The last call at depth 0 sets the verification status based
+/*	on the cumulative winner (lowest depth) of errors vs. trust.
+/*	We always return 1 (continue the handshake) and handle trust
+/*	and peer-name verification problems at the application level.
+/*
+/*	tls_log_verify_error() (called only when we care about the
+/*	peer certificate, that is not when opportunistic) logs the
+/*	reason why the certificate failed to be verified.
+/*
+/*	tls_peer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
+/*	certificate subject, or an empty string if no CommonName was
+/*	found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
+/*	freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
+/*	ASCII characters.
+/*
+/*	tls_issuer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
+/*	certificate issuer, or an empty string if no CommonName was
+/*	found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
+/*	freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
+/*	ASCII characters.
+/*
+/*	tls_dns_name() returns the string value of a GENERAL_NAME
+/*	from a DNS subjectAltName extension. If non-printable characters
+/*	are found, a null string is returned instead. Further sanity
+/*	checks may be added if the need arises.
+/*
+/*	Arguments:
+/* .IP ok
+/*	Result of prior verification: non-zero means success.  In
+/*	order to reduce the noise level, some tests or error reports
+/*	are disabled when verification failed because of some
+/*	earlier problem.
+/* .IP ctx
+/*	SSL application context. This links to the Postfix TLScontext
+/*	with enforcement and logging options.
+/* .IP gn
+/*	An OpenSSL GENERAL_NAME structure holding a DNS subjectAltName
+/*	to be decoded and checked for validity.
+/* .IP peercert
+/*	Server or client X.509 certificate.
+/* .IP TLScontext
+/*	Server or client context for warning messages.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	tls_peer_CN(), tls_issuer_CN() and tls_dns_name() log a warning
+/*	when 1) the requested information is not available in the specified
+/*	certificate, 2) the result exceeds a fixed limit, 3) the result
+/*	contains NUL characters or the result contains non-printable or
+/*	non-ASCII characters.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want.
+/*	The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge
+/*	the use of his software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Originally written by:
+/*	Lutz Jaenicke
+/*	BTU Cottbus
+/*	Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/*	Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/*	D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*
+/*	Updated by:
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*
+/*	Victor Duchovni
+/*	Morgan Stanley
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+
+/* TLS library. */
+
+#define TLS_INTERNAL
+#include <tls.h>
+
+/* update_error_state - safely stash away error state */
+
+static void update_error_state(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int depth,
+			               X509 *errorcert, int errorcode)
+{
+    /* No news is good news */
+    if (TLScontext->errordepth >= 0 && TLScontext->errordepth <= depth)
+	return;
+
+    /*
+     * The certificate pointer is stable during the verification callback,
+     * but may be freed after the callback returns.  Since we delay error
+     * reporting till later, we bump the refcount so we can rely on it still
+     * being there until later.
+     */
+    if (TLScontext->errorcert != 0)
+	X509_free(TLScontext->errorcert);
+    if (errorcert != 0)
+	X509_up_ref(errorcert);
+    TLScontext->errorcert = errorcert;
+    TLScontext->errorcode = errorcode;
+    TLScontext->errordepth = depth;
+}
+
+/* tls_verify_certificate_callback - verify peer certificate info */
+
+int     tls_verify_certificate_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    char    buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+    X509   *cert;
+    int     err;
+    int     depth;
+    int     max_depth;
+    SSL    *con;
+    TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
+
+    /* May be NULL as of OpenSSL 1.0, thanks for the API change! */
+    cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+    TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);
+    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+    /* Don't log the internal root CA unless there's an unexpected error. */
+    if (ok && TLScontext->tadepth > 0 && depth > TLScontext->tadepth)
+	return (1);
+
+    /*
+     * Certificate chain depth limit violations are mis-reported by the
+     * OpenSSL library, from SSL_CTX_set_verify(3):
+     * 
+     * The certificate verification depth set with SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth()
+     * stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced
+     * will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not
+     * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected.
+     * 
+     * We set a limit that is one higher than the user requested limit. If this
+     * higher limit is reached, we raise an error even a trusted root CA is
+     * present at this depth. This disambiguates trust chain truncation from
+     * an incomplete trust chain.
+     */
+    max_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con) - 1;
+
+    /*
+     * We never terminate the SSL handshake in the verification callback,
+     * rather we allow the TLS handshake to continue, but mark the session as
+     * unverified. The application is responsible for closing any sessions
+     * with unverified credentials.
+     */
+    if (max_depth >= 0 && depth > max_depth) {
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+	ok = 0;
+    }
+    if (ok == 0)
+	update_error_state(TLScontext, depth, cert, err);
+
+    if (TLScontext->log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) {
+	if (cert)
+	    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+	else
+	    strcpy(buf, "<unknown>");
+	msg_info("%s: depth=%d verify=%d subject=%s",
+		 TLScontext->namaddr, depth, ok, printable(buf, '?'));
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* tls_log_verify_error - Report final verification error status */
+
+void    tls_log_verify_error(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+    char    buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+    int     err = TLScontext->errorcode;
+    X509   *cert = TLScontext->errorcert;
+    int     depth = TLScontext->errordepth;
+
+#define PURPOSE ((depth>0) ? "CA": TLScontext->am_server ? "client": "server")
+
+    if (err == X509_V_OK)
+	return;
+
+    /*
+     * Specific causes for verification failure.
+     */
+    switch (err) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+
+	/*
+	 * We expect the error cert to be the leaf, but it is likely
+	 * sufficient to omit it from the log, even less user confusion.
+	 */
+	msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+		 "not trusted by local or TLSA policy", TLScontext->namaddr);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+	msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+		 "self-signed certificate", TLScontext->namaddr);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+
+	/*
+	 * There is no difference between issuing cert not provided and
+	 * provided, but not found in CAfile/CApath. Either way, we don't
+	 * trust it.
+	 */
+	if (cert)
+	    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
+	else
+	    strcpy(buf, "<unknown>");
+	msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: untrusted issuer %s",
+		 TLScontext->namaddr, printable(buf, '?'));
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+	msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate not"
+		 " yet valid", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+	msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate has"
+		 " expired", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+	msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: not designated for "
+		 "use as a %s certificate", TLScontext->namaddr, PURPOSE);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+	msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
+		 "certificate chain longer than limit(%d)",
+		 TLScontext->namaddr, depth - 1);
+	break;
+    default:
+	msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: num=%d:%s",
+		 PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr, err,
+		 X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef DONT_GRIPE
+#define DONT_GRIPE 0
+#define DO_GRIPE 1
+#endif
+
+/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */
+
+static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid, const char *label,
+			        const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int gripe)
+{
+    const char *myname = "tls_text_name";
+    int     pos;
+    X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+    ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
+    int     asn1_type;
+    int     utf8_length;
+    unsigned char *utf8_value;
+    int     ch;
+    unsigned char *cp;
+
+    if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
+	if (gripe != DONT_GRIPE) {
+	    msg_warn("%s: %s: peer certificate has no %s",
+		     myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	    tls_print_errors();
+	}
+	return (0);
+    }
+#if 0
+
+    /*
+     * If the match is required unambiguous, insist that that no other values
+     * be present.
+     */
+    if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, pos) >= 0) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: multiple %ss in peer certificate",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	return (0);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos)) == 0) {
+	/* This should not happen */
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s entry",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	tls_print_errors();
+	return (0);
+    }
+    if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) {
+	/* This should not happen */
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s data",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	tls_print_errors();
+	return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Convert everything into UTF-8. This is a super-set of ASCII, so we
+     * don't have to bother with separate code paths for ASCII-like content.
+     * If the payload is ASCII then we won't waste lots of CPU cycles
+     * converting it into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
+     * reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
+     * content.
+     * 
+     * XXX Don't bother optimizing the string length error check. It is not
+     * worth the complexity.
+     */
+    asn1_type = ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str);
+    if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: error decoding peer %s of ASN.1 type=%d",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, asn1_type);
+	tls_print_errors();
+	return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * No returns without cleaning up. A good optimizer will replace multiple
+     * blocks of identical code by jumps to just one such block.
+     */
+#define TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(x) do { \
+	char *__tls_text_name_temp = (x); \
+	OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); \
+	return (__tls_text_name_temp); \
+    } while (0)
+
+    /*
+     * Remove trailing null characters. They would give false alarms with the
+     * length check and with the embedded null check.
+     */
+#define TRIM0(s, l) do { while ((l) > 0 && (s)[(l)-1] == 0) --(l); } while (0)
+
+    TRIM0(utf8_value, utf8_length);
+
+    /*
+     * Enforce the length limit, because the caller will copy the result into
+     * a fixed-length buffer.
+     */
+    if (utf8_length >= CCERT_BUFSIZ) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: peer %s too long: %d",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, utf8_length);
+	TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Reject embedded nulls in ASCII or UTF-8 names. OpenSSL is responsible
+     * for producing properly-formatted UTF-8.
+     */
+    if (utf8_length != strlen((char *) utf8_value)) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: NULL character in peer %s",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Reject non-printable ASCII characters in UTF-8 content.
+     * 
+     * Note: the code below does not find control characters in illegal UTF-8
+     * sequences. It's OpenSSL's job to produce valid UTF-8, and reportedly,
+     * it does validation.
+     */
+    for (cp = utf8_value; (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) {
+	if (ISASCII(ch) && !ISPRINT(ch)) {
+	    msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable content in peer %s",
+		     myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
+	    TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
+	}
+    }
+    TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(mystrdup((char *) utf8_value));
+}
+
+/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */
+
+const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn,
+			         const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+    const char *myname = "tls_dns_name";
+    char   *cp;
+    const char *dnsname;
+    int     len;
+
+    /*
+     * Peername checks are security sensitive, carefully scrutinize the
+     * input!
+     */
+    if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
+	msg_panic("%s: Non DNS input argument", myname);
+
+    /*
+     * We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as
+     * ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member.
+     */
+    if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
+	return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name
+     */
+    dnsname = (const char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5);
+    len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+    TRIM0(dnsname, len);
+
+    /*
+     * Per Dr. Steven Henson of the OpenSSL development team, ASN1_IA5STRING
+     * values can have internal ASCII NUL values in this context because
+     * their length is taken from the decoded ASN1 buffer, a trailing NUL is
+     * always appended to make sure that the string is terminated, but the
+     * ASN.1 length may differ from strlen().
+     */
+    if (len != strlen(dnsname)) {
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: internal NUL in subjectAltName",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX: Should we be more strict and call valid_hostname()? So long as
+     * the name is safe to handle, if it is not a valid hostname, it will not
+     * compare equal to the expected peername, so being more strict than
+     * "printable" is likely excessive...
+     */
+    if (*dnsname && !allprint(dnsname)) {
+	cp = mystrdup(dnsname);
+	msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable characters in subjectAltName: %.100s",
+		 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, printable(cp, '?'));
+	myfree(cp);
+	return 0;
+    }
+    return (dnsname);
+}
+
+/* tls_peer_CN - extract peer common name from certificate */
+
+char   *tls_peer_CN(X509 *peercert, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+    char   *cn;
+
+    cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(peercert), NID_commonName,
+		       "subject CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE);
+    return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
+}
+
+/* tls_issuer_CN - extract issuer common name from certificate */
+
+char   *tls_issuer_CN(X509 *peer, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
+{
+    X509_NAME *name;
+    char   *cn;
+
+    name = X509_get_issuer_name(peer);
+
+    /*
+     * If no issuer CN field, use Organization instead. CA certs without a CN
+     * are common, so we only complain if the organization is also missing.
+     */
+    if ((cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_commonName,
+			    "issuer CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0)
+	cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_organizationName,
+			   "issuer Organization", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE);
+    return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
+}
+
+#endif