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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 12:50:00 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 12:50:00 +0000
commit333f7ecfa3e040191c66b2b92f6c117ca2cbac1d (patch)
tree178a8f140927896970f47930dae9213161268f10 /src/newgrp.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadshadow-7a3c824ac8e117e9f9605a313cb29c3adb9da24d.tar.xz
shadow-7a3c824ac8e117e9f9605a313cb29c3adb9da24d.zip
Adding upstream version 1:4.8.1.upstream/1%4.8.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--src/newgrp.c879
1 files changed, 879 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/newgrp.c b/src/newgrp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3c44e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/newgrp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,879 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#ident "$Id$"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "getdef.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+/*@-exitarg@*/
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+
+/*
+ * Global variables
+ */
+const char *Prog;
+
+extern char **newenvp;
+extern char **environ;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+static int ngroups;
+static /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/GETGROUPS_T *grouplist;
+#endif
+
+static bool is_newgrp;
+
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+static char audit_buf[80];
+#endif
+
+/* local function prototypes */
+static void usage (void);
+static void check_perms (const struct group *grp,
+ struct passwd *pwd,
+ const char *groupname);
+static void syslog_sg (const char *name, const char *group);
+
+/*
+ * usage - print command usage message
+ */
+static void usage (void)
+{
+ if (is_newgrp) {
+ (void) fputs (_("Usage: newgrp [-] [group]\n"), stderr);
+ } else {
+ (void) fputs (_("Usage: sg group [[-c] command]\n"), stderr);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool ingroup(const char *name, struct group *gr)
+{
+ char **look;
+ bool notfound = true;
+
+ look = gr->gr_mem;
+ while (*look && notfound)
+ notfound = strcmp (*look++, name);
+
+ return !notfound;
+}
+
+/*
+ * find_matching_group - search all groups of a gr's group id for
+ * membership of a given username
+ * but check gr itself first
+ */
+static /*@null@*/struct group *find_matching_group (const char *name, struct group *gr)
+{
+ gid_t gid = gr->gr_gid;
+
+ if (ingroup(name, gr))
+ return gr;
+
+ setgrent ();
+ while ((gr = getgrent ()) != NULL) {
+ if (gr->gr_gid != gid) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A group with matching GID was found.
+ * Test for membership of 'name'.
+ */
+ if (ingroup(name, gr))
+ break;
+ }
+ endgrent ();
+ return gr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_perms - check if the user is allowed to switch to this group
+ *
+ * If needed, the user will be authenticated.
+ *
+ * It will not return if the user could not be authenticated.
+ */
+static void check_perms (const struct group *grp,
+ struct passwd *pwd,
+ const char *groupname)
+{
+ bool needspasswd = false;
+ struct spwd *spwd;
+ char *cp;
+ const char *cpasswd;
+
+ /*
+ * see if she is a member of this group (i.e. in the list of
+ * members of the group, or if the group is her primary group).
+ *
+ * If she isn't a member, she needs to provide the group password.
+ * If there is no group password, she will be denied access
+ * anyway.
+ *
+ */
+ if ( (grp->gr_gid != pwd->pw_gid)
+ && !is_on_list (grp->gr_mem, pwd->pw_name)) {
+ needspasswd = true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If she does not have either a shadowed password, or a regular
+ * password, and the group has a password, she needs to give the
+ * group password.
+ */
+ spwd = xgetspnam (pwd->pw_name);
+ if (NULL != spwd) {
+ pwd->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
+ }
+
+ if ((pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0') && (grp->gr_passwd[0] != '\0')) {
+ needspasswd = true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now I see about letting her into the group she requested. If she
+ * is the root user, I'll let her in without having to prompt for
+ * the password. Otherwise I ask for a password if she flunked one
+ * of the tests above.
+ */
+ if ((getuid () != 0) && needspasswd) {
+ /*
+ * get the password from her, and set the salt for
+ * the decryption from the group file.
+ */
+ cp = getpass (_("Password: "));
+ if (NULL == cp) {
+ goto failure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * encrypt the key she gave us using the salt from the
+ * password in the group file. The result of this encryption
+ * must match the previously encrypted value in the file.
+ */
+ cpasswd = pw_encrypt (cp, grp->gr_passwd);
+ strzero (cp);
+
+ if (NULL == cpasswd) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to crypt password with previous salt: %s\n"),
+ Prog, strerror (errno));
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "Failed to crypt password with previous salt of group '%s'",
+ groupname));
+ goto failure;
+ }
+
+ if (grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' ||
+ strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "authentication new-gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "Invalid password for group '%s' from '%s'",
+ groupname, pwd->pw_name));
+ (void) sleep (1);
+ (void) fputs (_("Invalid password.\n"), stderr);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "authentication new-gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) grp->gr_gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_GRP_AUTH, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+failure:
+ /* The closelog is probably unnecessary, but it does no
+ * harm. -- JWP
+ */
+ closelog ();
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (groupname) {
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-group=%s", groupname);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+/*
+ * syslog_sg - log the change of group to syslog
+ *
+ * The logout will also be logged when the user will quit the
+ * sg/newgrp session.
+ */
+static void syslog_sg (const char *name, const char *group)
+{
+ const char *loginname = getlogin ();
+ const char *tty = ttyname (0);
+ char *free_login = NULL, *free_tty = NULL;
+
+ if (loginname != NULL) {
+ free_login = xstrdup (loginname);
+ loginname = free_login;
+ }
+ if (tty != NULL) {
+ free_tty = xstrdup (tty);
+ tty = free_tty;
+ }
+
+ if (loginname == NULL) {
+ loginname = "???";
+ }
+ if (tty == NULL) {
+ tty = "???";
+ } else if (strncmp (tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) {
+ tty += 5;
+ }
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "user '%s' (login '%s' on %s) switched to group '%s'",
+ name, loginname, tty, group));
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * We want to fork and exec the new shell in the child, leaving the
+ * parent waiting to log the session close.
+ *
+ * The parent must ignore signals generated from the console
+ * (SIGINT, SIGQUIT, SIGHUP) which might make the parent terminate
+ * before its child. When bash is exec'ed as the subshell, it
+ * generates a new process group id for itself, and consequently
+ * only SIGHUP, which is sent to all process groups in the session,
+ * can reach the parent. However, since arbitrary programs can be
+ * specified as login shells, there is no such guarantee in general.
+ * For the same reason, we must also ignore stop signals generated
+ * from the console (SIGTSTP, SIGTTIN, and SIGTTOU) in order to
+ * avoid any possibility of the parent being stopped when it
+ * receives SIGCHLD from the terminating subshell. -- JWP
+ */
+ {
+ pid_t child;
+
+ /* Ignore these signals. The signal handlers will later be
+ * restored to the default handlers. */
+ (void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ (void) signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
+ (void) signal (SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+ (void) signal (SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
+ (void) signal (SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN);
+ (void) signal (SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN);
+ child = fork ();
+ if ((pid_t)-1 == child) {
+ /* error in fork() */
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure forking: %s\n"),
+ is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg", strerror (errno));
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-group=%s", group);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ } else if (child != 0) {
+ /* parent - wait for child to finish, then log session close */
+ int cst = 0;
+ gid_t gid = getgid();
+ struct group *grp = getgrgid (gid);
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ do {
+ errno = 0;
+ pid = waitpid (child, &cst, WUNTRACED);
+ if ((pid == child) && (WIFSTOPPED (cst) != 0)) {
+ /* The child (shell) was suspended.
+ * Suspend sg/newgrp. */
+ kill (getpid (), SIGSTOP);
+ /* wake child when resumed */
+ kill (child, SIGCONT);
+ }
+ } while ( ((pid == child) && (WIFSTOPPED (cst) != 0))
+ || ((pid != child) && (errno == EINTR)));
+ /* local, no need for xgetgrgid */
+ if (NULL != grp) {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "user '%s' (login '%s' on %s) returned to group '%s'",
+ name, loginname, tty, grp->gr_name));
+ } else {
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
+ "user '%s' (login '%s' on %s) returned to group '%lu'",
+ name, loginname, tty,
+ (unsigned long) gid));
+ /* Either the user's passwd entry has a
+ * GID that does not match with any group,
+ * or the group was deleted while the user
+ * was in a newgrp session.*/
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
+ "unknown GID '%lu' used by user '%s'",
+ (unsigned long) gid, name));
+ }
+ closelog ();
+ exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (cst)) ? WEXITSTATUS (cst)
+ : WTERMSIG (cst) + 128);
+ }
+
+ /* child - restore signals to their default state */
+ (void) signal (SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ (void) signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ (void) signal (SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ (void) signal (SIGTSTP, SIG_DFL);
+ (void) signal (SIGTTIN, SIG_DFL);
+ (void) signal (SIGTTOU, SIG_DFL);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ free(free_login);
+ free(free_tty);
+}
+#endif /* USE_SYSLOG */
+
+/*
+ * newgrp - change the invokers current real and effective group id
+ */
+int main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ bool initflag = false;
+ int i;
+ bool is_member = false;
+ bool cflag = false;
+ int err = 0;
+ gid_t gid;
+ char *cp;
+ char *progbase;
+ const char *name, *prog;
+ char *group = NULL;
+ char *command = NULL;
+ char **envp = environ;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ /*@null@*/struct group *grp;
+
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ struct sgrp *sgrp;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_help_open ();
+#endif
+ (void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
+ (void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ (void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+
+ /*
+ * Save my name for error messages and save my real gid incase of
+ * errors. If there is an error i have to exec a new login shell for
+ * the user since her old shell won't have fork'd to create the
+ * process. Skip over the program name to the next command line
+ * argument.
+ *
+ * This historical comment, and the code itself, suggest that the
+ * behavior of the system/shell on which it was written differed
+ * significantly from the one I am using. If this process was
+ * started from a shell (including the login shell), it was fork'ed
+ * and exec'ed as a child by that shell. In order to get the user
+ * back to that shell, it is only necessary to exit from this
+ * process which terminates the child of the fork. The parent shell,
+ * which is blocked waiting for a signal, will then receive a
+ * SIGCHLD and will continue; any changes made to the process
+ * persona or the environment after the fork never occurred in the
+ * parent process.
+ *
+ * Bottom line: we want to save the name and real gid for messages,
+ * but we do not need to restore the previous process persona and we
+ * don't need to re-exec anything. -- JWP
+ */
+ Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ is_newgrp = (strcmp (Prog, "newgrp") == 0);
+ OPENLOG (is_newgrp ? "newgrp" : "sg");
+ gid = getgid ();
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+
+ initenv ();
+
+ pwd = get_my_pwent ();
+ if (NULL == pwd) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
+ Prog);
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+#endif
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) getuid ()));
+ closelog ();
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ name = pwd->pw_name;
+
+ /*
+ * Parse the command line. There are two accepted flags. The first
+ * is "-", which for newgrp means to re-create the entire
+ * environment as though a login had been performed, and "-c", which
+ * for sg causes a command string to be executed.
+ *
+ * The next argument, if present, must be the new group name. Any
+ * remaining remaining arguments will be used to execute a command
+ * as the named group. If the group name isn't present, I just use
+ * the login group ID of the current user.
+ *
+ * The valid syntax are
+ * newgrp [-] [groupid]
+ * newgrp [-l] [groupid]
+ * sg [-]
+ * sg [-] groupid [[-c command]
+ */
+ if ( (argc > 0)
+ && ( (strcmp (argv[0], "-") == 0)
+ || (strcmp (argv[0], "-l") == 0))) {
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ initflag = true;
+ }
+ if (!is_newgrp) {
+ /*
+ * Do the command line for everything that is
+ * not "newgrp".
+ */
+ if ((argc > 0) && (argv[0][0] != '-')) {
+ group = argv[0];
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ } else {
+ usage ();
+ closelog ();
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (argc > 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * skip -c if specified so both forms work:
+ * "sg group -c command" (as in the man page) or
+ * "sg group command" (as in the usage message).
+ */
+ if ((argc > 1) && (strcmp (argv[0], "-c") == 0)) {
+ command = argv[1];
+ } else {
+ command = argv[0];
+ }
+ cflag = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Do the command line for "newgrp". It's just making sure
+ * there aren't any flags and getting the new group name.
+ */
+ if ((argc > 0) && (argv[0][0] == '-')) {
+ usage ();
+ goto failure;
+ } else if (argv[0] != (char *) 0) {
+ group = argv[0];
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * get the group file entry for her login group id.
+ * the entry must exist, simply to be annoying.
+ *
+ * Perhaps in the past, but the default behavior now depends on the
+ * group entry, so it had better exist. -- JWP
+ */
+ grp = xgetgrgid (pwd->pw_gid);
+ if (NULL == grp) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: GID '%lu' does not exist\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long) pwd->pw_gid);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "GID '%lu' does not exist",
+ (unsigned long) pwd->pw_gid));
+ goto failure;
+ } else {
+ group = grp->gr_name;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+ /*
+ * get the current users groupset. The new group will be added to
+ * the concurrent groupset if there is room, otherwise you get a
+ * nasty message but at least your real and effective group id's are
+ * set.
+ */
+ /* don't use getgroups(0, 0) - it doesn't work on some systems */
+ i = 16;
+ for (;;) {
+ grouplist = (GETGROUPS_T *) xmalloc (i * sizeof (GETGROUPS_T));
+ ngroups = getgroups (i, grouplist);
+ if (i > ngroups && !(ngroups == -1 && errno == EINVAL)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ /* not enough room, so try allocating a larger buffer */
+ free (grouplist);
+ i *= 2;
+ }
+ if (ngroups < 0) {
+ perror ("getgroups");
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (group) {
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-group=%s", group);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_SETGROUPS */
+
+ /*
+ * now we put her in the new group. The password file entry for her
+ * current user id has been gotten. If there was no optional group
+ * argument she will have her real and effective group id set to the
+ * set to the value from her password file entry.
+ *
+ * If run as newgrp, or as sg with no command, this process exec's
+ * an interactive subshell with the effective GID of the new group.
+ * If run as sg with a command, that command is exec'ed in this
+ * subshell. When this process terminates, either because the user
+ * exits, or the command completes, the parent of this process
+ * resumes with the current GID.
+ *
+ * If a group is explicitly specified on the command line, the
+ * interactive shell or command is run with that effective GID.
+ * Access will be denied if no entry for that group can be found in
+ * /etc/group. If the current user name appears in the members list
+ * for that group, access will be granted immediately; if not, the
+ * user will be challenged for that group's password. If the
+ * password response is incorrect, if the specified group does not
+ * have a password, or if that group has been locked by gpasswd -R,
+ * access will be denied. This is true even if the group specified
+ * has the user's login GID (as shown in /etc/passwd). If no group
+ * is explicitly specified on the command line, the effect is
+ * exactly the same as if a group name matching the user's login GID
+ * had been explicitly specified. Root, however, is never
+ * challenged for passwords, and is always allowed access.
+ *
+ * The previous behavior was to allow access to the login group if
+ * no explicit group was specified, irrespective of the group
+ * control file(s). This behavior is usually not desirable. A user
+ * wishing to return to the login group has only to exit back to the
+ * login shell. Generating yet more shell levels in order to
+ * provide a convenient "return" to the default group has the
+ * undesirable side effects of confusing the user, scrambling the
+ * history file, and consuming system resources. The default now is
+ * to lock out such behavior. A sys admin can allow it by explicitly
+ * including the user's name in the member list of the user's login
+ * group. -- JWP
+ */
+ grp = getgrnam (group); /* local, no need for xgetgrnam */
+ if (NULL == grp) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: group '%s' does not exist\n"), Prog, group);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+ /* when using pam_group, she will not be listed in the groups
+ * database. However getgroups() will return the group. So
+ * if she is listed there already it is ok to grant membership.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+ if (grp->gr_gid == grouplist[i]) {
+ is_member = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_SETGROUPS */
+ /*
+ * For splitted groups (due to limitations of NIS), check all
+ * groups of the same GID like the requested group for
+ * membership of the current user.
+ */
+ if (!is_member) {
+ grp = find_matching_group (name, grp);
+ if (NULL == grp) {
+ /*
+ * No matching group found. As we already know that
+ * the group exists, this happens only in the case
+ * of a requested group where the user is not member.
+ *
+ * Re-read the group entry for further processing.
+ */
+ grp = xgetgrnam (group);
+ assert (NULL != grp);
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ sgrp = getsgnam (group);
+ if (NULL != sgrp) {
+ grp->gr_passwd = sgrp->sg_passwd;
+ grp->gr_mem = sgrp->sg_mem;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to access this group.
+ */
+ if (!is_member) {
+ check_perms (grp, pwd, group);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * all successful validations pass through this point. The group id
+ * will be set, and the group added to the concurrent groupset.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+ if (getdef_bool ("SYSLOG_SG_ENAB")) {
+ syslog_sg (name, group);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SYSLOG */
+
+ gid = grp->gr_gid;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+ /*
+ * I am going to try to add her new group id to her concurrent group
+ * set. If the group id is already present i'll just skip this part.
+ * If the group doesn't fit, i'll complain loudly and skip this
+ * part.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+ if (gid == grouplist[i]) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == ngroups) {
+ if (ngroups >= sysconf (_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) {
+ (void) fputs (_("too many groups\n"), stderr);
+ } else {
+ grouplist[ngroups++] = gid;
+ if (setgroups (ngroups, grouplist) != 0) {
+ perror ("setgroups");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Close all files before changing the user/group IDs.
+ *
+ * The needed structure should have been copied before, or
+ * permission to read the database will be required.
+ */
+ endspent ();
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ endsgent ();
+#endif
+ endpwent ();
+ endgrent ();
+
+ /*
+ * Set the effective GID to the new group id and the effective UID
+ * to the real UID. For root, this also sets the real GID to the
+ * new group id.
+ */
+ if (setgid (gid) != 0) {
+ perror ("setgid");
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (setuid (getuid ()) != 0) {
+ perror ("setuid");
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if the "-c" flag was used. If it was, i just create a shell
+ * command for her using the argument that followed the "-c" flag.
+ */
+ if (cflag) {
+ closelog ();
+ execl (SHELL, "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0);
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-gid=%lu", (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+#endif
+ perror (SHELL);
+ exit ((errno == ENOENT) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * I have to get the pathname of her login shell. As a favor, i'll
+ * try her environment for a $SHELL value first, and then try the
+ * password file entry. Obviously this shouldn't be in the
+ * restricted command directory since it could be used to leave the
+ * restricted environment.
+ *
+ * Note that the following assumes this user's entry in /etc/passwd
+ * does not have a chroot * prefix. If it does, the * will be copied
+ * verbatim into the exec path. This is probably not an issue
+ * because if this user is operating in a chroot jail, her entry in
+ * the version of /etc/passwd that is accessible here should
+ * probably never have a chroot shell entry (but entries for other
+ * users might). If I have missed something, and this causes you a
+ * problem, try using $SHELL as a workaround; also please notify me
+ * at jparmele@wildbear.com -- JWP
+ */
+ cp = getenv ("SHELL");
+ if (!initflag && (NULL != cp)) {
+ prog = cp;
+ } else if ((NULL != pwd->pw_shell) && ('\0' != pwd->pw_shell[0])) {
+ prog = pwd->pw_shell;
+ } else {
+ prog = SHELL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now I try to find the basename of the login shell. This will
+ * become argv[0] of the spawned command.
+ */
+ progbase = (char *) Basename ((char *) prog);
+
+ /*
+ * Switch back to her home directory if i am doing login
+ * initialization.
+ */
+ if (initflag) {
+ if (chdir (pwd->pw_dir) != 0) {
+ perror ("chdir");
+ }
+
+ while (NULL != *envp) {
+ if (strncmp (*envp, "PATH=", 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp (*envp, "HOME=", 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp (*envp, "SHELL=", 6) == 0 ||
+ strncmp (*envp, "TERM=", 5) == 0)
+ addenv (*envp, NULL);
+
+ envp++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (NULL != *envp) {
+ addenv (*envp, NULL);
+ envp++;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf), "changing new-gid=%lu",
+ (unsigned long) gid);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 1);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Exec the login shell and go away. We are trying to get back to
+ * the previous environment which should be the user's login shell.
+ */
+ err = shell (prog, initflag ? (char *) 0 : progbase, newenvp);
+ exit ((err == ENOENT) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
+ /*@notreached@*/
+ failure:
+
+ /*
+ * The previous code, when run as newgrp, re-exec'ed the shell in
+ * the current process with the original gid on error conditions.
+ * See the comment above. This historical behavior now has the
+ * effect of creating unlogged extraneous shell layers when the
+ * command line has an error or there is an authentication failure.
+ * We now just want to exit with error status back to the parent
+ * process. The closelog is probably unnecessary, but it does no
+ * harm. -- JWP
+ */
+ closelog ();
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ if (NULL != group) {
+ snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
+ "changing new-group=%s", group);
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ audit_buf, NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ } else {
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_CHGRP_ID, Prog,
+ "changing", NULL,
+ (unsigned int) getuid (), 0);
+ }
+#endif
+ exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+}
+