diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | src/edit_open.c | 456 |
1 files changed, 456 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/edit_open.c b/src/edit_open.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..864dcea --- /dev/null +++ b/src/edit_open.c @@ -0,0 +1,456 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC + * + * Copyright (c) 2015-2021 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it. + * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <grp.h> +#include <pwd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> + +#include "sudo.h" +#include "sudo_edit.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(HAVE_SETREUID) || defined(HAVE_SETEUID) + +void +switch_user(uid_t euid, gid_t egid, int ngroups, GETGROUPS_T *groups) +{ + int serrno = errno; + debug_decl(switch_user, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "set uid:gid to %u:%u(%u)", (unsigned int)euid, (unsigned int)egid, + ngroups > 0 ? (unsigned int)groups[0] : (unsigned int)egid); + + /* When restoring root, change euid first; otherwise change it last. */ + if (euid == ROOT_UID) { + if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0) + sudo_fatal("seteuid(ROOT_UID)"); + } + if (setegid(egid) != 0) + sudo_fatal("setegid(%d)", (int)egid); + if (ngroups != -1) { + if (sudo_setgroups(ngroups, groups) != 0) + sudo_fatal("setgroups"); + } + if (euid != ROOT_UID) { + if (seteuid(euid) != 0) + sudo_fatal("seteuid(%u)", (unsigned int)euid); + } + errno = serrno; + + debug_return; +} + +#if defined(HAVE_FACCESSAT) && defined(AT_EACCESS) +/* + * Returns true if the open directory fd is owned or writable by the user. + */ +int +dir_is_writable(int dfd, struct sudo_cred *user_cred, struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + struct stat sb; + int rc; + debug_decl(dir_is_writable, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + + /* If the user owns the dir we always consider it writable. */ + if (sb.st_uid == user_cred->uid) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "user uid %u matches directory uid %u", + (unsigned int)user_cred->uid, (unsigned int)sb.st_uid); + debug_return_int(true); + } + + /* Change uid/gid/groups to invoking user, usually needs root perms. */ + if (cur_cred->euid != ROOT_UID) { + if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0) + sudo_fatal("seteuid(ROOT_UID)"); + } + switch_user(user_cred->uid, user_cred->gid, user_cred->ngroups, + user_cred->groups); + + /* Access checks are done using the euid/egid and group vector. */ + rc = faccessat(dfd, ".", W_OK, AT_EACCESS); + + /* Restore uid/gid/groups, may need root perms. */ + if (user_cred->uid != ROOT_UID) { + if (seteuid(ROOT_UID) != 0) + sudo_fatal("seteuid(ROOT_UID)"); + } + switch_user(cur_cred->euid, cur_cred->egid, cur_cred->ngroups, + cur_cred->groups); + + if (rc == 0) + debug_return_int(true); + if (errno == EACCES || errno == EROFS) + debug_return_int(false); + debug_return_int(-1); +} +#else +static bool +group_matches(gid_t target, struct sudo_cred *cred) +{ + int i; + debug_decl(group_matches, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + if (target == cred->gid) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "user gid %u matches directory gid %u", (unsigned int)cred->gid, + (unsigned int)target); + debug_return_bool(true); + } + for (i = 0; i < cred->ngroups; i++) { + if (target == cred->groups[i]) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "user gid %u matches directory gid %u", + (unsigned int)cred->groups[i], (unsigned int)target); + debug_return_bool(true); + } + } + debug_return_bool(false); +} + +/* + * Returns true if the open directory fd is owned or writable by the user. + */ +int +dir_is_writable(int dfd, struct sudo_cred *user_cred, struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + struct stat sb; + debug_decl(dir_is_writable, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + + /* If the user owns the dir we always consider it writable. */ + if (sb.st_uid == user_cred->uid) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "user uid %u matches directory uid %u", + (unsigned int)user_cred->uid, (unsigned int)sb.st_uid); + debug_return_int(true); + } + + /* Other writable? */ + if (ISSET(sb.st_mode, S_IWOTH)) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "directory is writable by other"); + debug_return_int(true); + } + + /* Group writable? */ + if (ISSET(sb.st_mode, S_IWGRP)) { + if (group_matches(sb.st_gid, user_cred)) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO|SUDO_DEBUG_LINENO, + "directory is writable by one of the user's groups"); + debug_return_int(true); + } + } + + errno = EACCES; + debug_return_int(false); +} +#endif /* HAVE_FACCESSAT && AT_EACCESS */ + +#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW +static int +sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(int dfd, char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode) +{ + debug_decl(sudo_edit_openat_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + debug_return_int(openat(dfd, path, oflags|O_NOFOLLOW, mode)); +} +#else +/* + * Returns true if fd and path don't match or path is a symlink. + * Used on older systems without O_NOFOLLOW. + */ +static bool +sudo_edit_is_symlink(int fd, char *path) +{ + struct stat sb1, sb2; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_is_symlink, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + /* + * Treat [fl]stat() failure like there was a symlink. + */ + if (fstat(fd, &sb1) == -1 || lstat(path, &sb2) == -1) + debug_return_bool(true); + + /* + * Make sure we did not open a link and that what we opened + * matches what is currently on the file system. + */ + if (S_ISLNK(sb2.st_mode) || + sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) { + debug_return_bool(true); + } + + debug_return_bool(false); +} + +static int +sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(int dfd, char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode) +{ + int fd = -1, odfd = -1; + struct stat sb; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_openat_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + /* Save cwd and chdir to dfd */ + if ((odfd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + if (fchdir(dfd) == -1) { + close(odfd); + debug_return_int(-1); + } + + /* + * Check if path is a symlink. This is racey but we detect whether + * we lost the race in sudo_edit_is_symlink() after the open. + */ + if (lstat(path, &sb) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) + goto done; + if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { + errno = ELOOP; + goto done; + } + + fd = open(path, oflags, mode); + if (fd == -1) + goto done; + + /* + * Post-open symlink check. This will leave a zero-length file if + * O_CREAT was specified but it is too dangerous to try and remove it. + */ + if (sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) { + close(fd); + fd = -1; + errno = ELOOP; + } + +done: + /* Restore cwd */ + if (odfd != -1) { + if (fchdir(odfd) == -1) + sudo_fatal("%s", U_("unable to restore current working directory")); + close(odfd); + } + + debug_return_int(fd); +} +#endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ + +static int +sudo_edit_open_nonwritable(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode, + struct sudo_cred *user_cred, struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + const int dflags = DIR_OPEN_FLAGS; + int dfd, fd, is_writable; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_open_nonwritable, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + if (path[0] == '/') { + dfd = open("/", dflags); + path++; + } else { + dfd = open(".", dflags); + if (path[0] == '.' && path[1] == '/') + path += 2; + } + if (dfd == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + + for (;;) { + char *slash; + int subdfd; + + /* + * Look up one component at a time, avoiding symbolic links in + * writable directories. + */ + is_writable = dir_is_writable(dfd, user_cred, cur_cred); + if (is_writable == -1) { + close(dfd); + debug_return_int(-1); + } + + path += strspn(path, "/"); + slash = strchr(path, '/'); + if (slash == NULL) + break; + *slash = '\0'; + if (is_writable) + subdfd = sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(dfd, path, dflags, 0); + else + subdfd = openat(dfd, path, dflags, 0); + *slash = '/'; /* restore path */ + close(dfd); + if (subdfd == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + path = slash + 1; + dfd = subdfd; + } + + if (is_writable) { + close(dfd); + errno = EISDIR; + debug_return_int(-1); + } + + /* + * For "sudoedit /" we will receive ENOENT from openat() and sudoedit + * will try to create a file with an empty name. We treat an empty + * path as the cwd so sudoedit can give a sensible error message. + */ + fd = openat(dfd, *path ? path : ".", oflags, mode); + close(dfd); + debug_return_int(fd); +} + +#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW +int +sudo_edit_open(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode, int sflags, + struct sudo_cred *user_cred, struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + int fd; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_open, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW)) + oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + if (ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_CHECKDIR) && user_cred->uid != ROOT_UID) { + fd = sudo_edit_open_nonwritable(path, oflags|O_NONBLOCK, mode, + user_cred, cur_cred); + } else { + fd = open(path, oflags|O_NONBLOCK, mode); + } + if (fd != -1 && !ISSET(oflags, O_NONBLOCK)) + (void) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); + debug_return_int(fd); +} +#else +int +sudo_edit_open(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode, int sflags, + struct sudo_cred *user_cred, struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + struct stat sb; + int fd; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_open, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + /* + * Check if path is a symlink. This is racey but we detect whether + * we lost the race in sudo_edit_is_symlink() after the file is opened. + */ + if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW)) { + if (lstat(path, &sb) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) + debug_return_int(-1); + if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { + errno = ELOOP; + debug_return_int(-1); + } + } + + if (ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_CHECKDIR) && user_cred->uid != ROOT_UID) { + fd = sudo_edit_open_nonwritable(path, oflags|O_NONBLOCK, mode, + user_cred, cur_cred); + } else { + fd = open(path, oflags|O_NONBLOCK, mode); + } + if (fd == -1) + debug_return_int(-1); + if (!ISSET(oflags, O_NONBLOCK)) + (void) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); + + /* + * Post-open symlink check. This will leave a zero-length file if + * O_CREAT was specified but it is too dangerous to try and remove it. + */ + if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW) && sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) { + close(fd); + fd = -1; + errno = ELOOP; + } + + debug_return_int(fd); +} +#endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */ + +/* + * Verify that the parent dir of a new file exists and is not writable + * by the user. This fails early so the user knows ahead of time if the + * edit won't succeed. Additional checks are performed when copying the + * temporary file back to the origin so there are no TOCTOU issues. + * Does not modify the value of errno. + */ +bool +sudo_edit_parent_valid(char *path, int sflags, struct sudo_cred *user_cred, + struct sudo_cred *cur_cred) +{ + const int serrno = errno; + struct stat sb; + bool ret = false; + char *slash; + int dfd; + debug_decl(sudo_edit_parent_valid, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT); + + /* Get dirname of path (the slash is restored later). */ + slash = strrchr(path, '/'); + if (slash == NULL) { + /* cwd */ + path = "."; + } else if (slash == path) { + path = "/"; + slash = NULL; + } else { + *slash = '\0'; + } + + /* + * The parent directory is allowed to be a symbolic link unless + * *its* parent is writable and CD_SUDOEDIT_CHECK is set. + */ + dfd = sudo_edit_open(path, DIR_OPEN_FLAGS, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH, + sflags|CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW, user_cred, cur_cred); + if (dfd != -1) { + if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) + ret = true; + close(dfd); + } + if (slash != NULL) + *slash = '/'; + + /* Restore errno. */ + errno = serrno; + + debug_return_bool(ret); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID || HAVE_SETREUID || HAVE_SETEUID */ |