Adding upstream version 247.3.upstream/247.3upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/core/efi-random.c b/src/core/efi-random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bc74fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core/efi-random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "chattr-util.h"
+#include "efi-random.h"
+#include "efivars.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "random-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+
+/* If a random seed was passed by the boot loader in the LoaderRandomSeed EFI variable, let's credit it to
+ * the kernel's random pool, but only once per boot. If this is run very early during initialization we can
+ * instantly boot up with a filled random pool.
+ *
+ * This makes no judgement on the entropy passed, it's the job of the boot loader to only pass us a seed that
+ * is suitably validated. */
+
+static void lock_down_efi_variables(void) {
+        const char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        /* Paranoia: let's restrict access modes of these a bit, so that unprivileged users can't use them to
+         * identify the system or gain too much insight into what we might have credited to the entropy
+         * pool. */
+        FOREACH_STRING(p,
+                       "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/LoaderRandomSeed-4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f",
+                       "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/LoaderSystemToken-4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f") {
+
+                r = chattr_path(p, 0, FS_IMMUTABLE_FL, NULL);
+                if (r == -ENOENT)
+                        continue;
+                if (r < 0)
+                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to drop FS_IMMUTABLE_FL from %s, ignoring: %m", p);
+
+                if (chmod(p, 0600) < 0)
+                        log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to reduce access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", p);
+        }
+}
+
+int efi_take_random_seed(void) {
+        _cleanup_free_ void *value = NULL;
+        _cleanup_close_ int random_fd = -1;
+        size_t size;
+        int r;
+
+        /* Paranoia comes first. */
+        lock_down_efi_variables();
+
+        if (access("/run/systemd/efi-random-seed-taken", F_OK) < 0) {
+                if (errno != ENOENT) {
+                        log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to determine whether we already used the random seed token, not using it.");
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                /* ENOENT means we haven't used it yet. */
+        } else {
+                log_debug("EFI random seed already used, not using again.");
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        r = efi_get_variable(EFI_VENDOR_LOADER, "LoaderRandomSeed", NULL, &value, &size);
+        if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+                log_debug_errno(r, "System lacks EFI support, not initializing random seed from EFI variable.");
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (r == -ENOENT) {
+                log_debug_errno(r, "Boot loader did not pass LoaderRandomSeed EFI variable, not crediting any entropy.");
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read LoaderRandomSeed EFI variable, ignoring: %m");
+
+        if (size == 0)
+                return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Random seed passed from boot loader has zero size? Ignoring.");
+
+        random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
+        if (random_fd < 0)
+                return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom for writing, ignoring: %m");
+
+        /* Before we use the seed, let's mark it as used, so that we never credit it twice. Also, it's a nice
+         * way to let users known that we successfully acquired entropy from the boot laoder. */
+        r = touch("/run/systemd/efi-random-seed-taken");
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to mark EFI random seed as used, not using it: %m");
+
+        r = random_write_entropy(random_fd, value, size, true);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to credit entropy, ignoring: %m");
+
+        log_info("Successfully credited entropy passed from boot loader.");
+        return 1;
+}