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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 13:00:47 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 13:00:47 +0000 |
commit | 2cb7e0aaedad73b076ea18c6900b0e86c5760d79 (patch) | |
tree | da68ca54bb79f4080079bf0828acda937593a4e1 /test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | systemd-2cb7e0aaedad73b076ea18c6900b0e86c5760d79.tar.xz systemd-2cb7e0aaedad73b076ea18c6900b0e86c5760d79.zip |
Adding upstream version 247.3.upstream/247.3upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh')
-rwxr-xr-x | test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh | 236 |
1 files changed, 236 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh b/test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8d009fb --- /dev/null +++ b/test/units/testsuite-22.03.sh @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +#! /bin/bash +# +# Basic tests for types creating/writing files +# + +set -e +set -x + +rm -fr /tmp/{f,F,w} +mkdir /tmp/{f,F,w} +touch /tmp/file-owned-by-root + +# +# 'f' +# +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/1 0644 - - - - +f /tmp/f/2 0644 - - - This string should be written +EOF + +### '1' should exist and be empty +test -f /tmp/f/1; ! test -s /tmp/f/1 +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/f/1) = "root:root:644" + +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/f/2) = "root:root:644" +test "$(< /tmp/f/2)" = "This string should be written" + +### The perms are supposed to be updated even if the file already exists. +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/1 0666 daemon daemon - This string should not be written +EOF + +# file should be empty +! test -s /tmp/f/1 +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/f/1) = "daemon:daemon:666" + +### But we shouldn't try to set perms on an existing file which is not a +### regular one. +mkfifo /tmp/f/fifo +chmod 644 /tmp/f/fifo + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/fifo 0666 daemon daemon - This string should not be written +EOF + +test -p /tmp/f/fifo +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/f/fifo) = "root:root:644" + +### 'f' should not follow symlinks. +ln -s missing /tmp/f/dangling +ln -s /tmp/file-owned-by-root /tmp/f/symlink + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/dangling 0644 daemon daemon - - +f /tmp/f/symlink 0644 daemon daemon - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/f/missing +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/file-owned-by-root) = "root:root:644" + +### Handle read-only filesystem gracefully: we shouldn't fail if the target +### already exists and have the correct perms. +mkdir /tmp/f/rw-fs +mkdir /tmp/f/ro-fs + +touch /tmp/f/rw-fs/foo +chmod 644 /tmp/f/rw-fs/foo + +mount -o bind,ro /tmp/f/rw-fs /tmp/f/ro-fs + +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/ro-fs/foo 0644 - - - - This string should not be written +EOF +test -f /tmp/f/ro-fs/foo; ! test -s /tmp/f/ro-fs/foo + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/ro-fs/foo 0666 - - - - +EOF +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/f/fifo) = "root:root:644" + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/ro-fs/bar 0644 - - - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/f/ro-fs/bar + +### 'f' shouldn't follow unsafe paths. +mkdir /tmp/f/daemon +ln -s /root /tmp/f/daemon/unsafe-symlink +chown -R --no-dereference daemon:daemon /tmp/f/daemon + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/f/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit 0644 daemon daemon - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/f/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit + +# +# 'F' +# +echo "This should be truncated" >/tmp/F/truncated +echo "This should be truncated" >/tmp/F/truncated-with-content + +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/created 0644 - - - - +F /tmp/F/created-with-content 0644 - - - new content +F /tmp/F/truncated 0666 daemon daemon - - +F /tmp/F/truncated-with-content 0666 daemon daemon - new content +EOF + +test -f /tmp/F/created; ! test -s /tmp/F/created +test -f /tmp/F/created-with-content +test "$(< /tmp/F/created-with-content)" = "new content" +test -f /tmp/F/truncated; ! test -s /tmp/F/truncated +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/F/truncated) = "daemon:daemon:666" +test -s /tmp/F/truncated-with-content +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/F/truncated-with-content) = "daemon:daemon:666" + +### We shouldn't try to truncate anything but regular files since the behavior is +### unspecified in the other cases. +mkfifo /tmp/F/fifo + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/fifo 0644 - - - - +EOF + +test -p /tmp/F/fifo + +### 'F' should not follow symlinks. +ln -s missing /tmp/F/dangling +ln -s /tmp/file-owned-by-root /tmp/F/symlink + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/F/dangling 0644 daemon daemon - - +f /tmp/F/symlink 0644 daemon daemon - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/F/missing +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/file-owned-by-root) = "root:root:644" + +### Handle read-only filesystem gracefully: we shouldn't fail if the target +### already exists and is empty. +mkdir /tmp/F/rw-fs +mkdir /tmp/F/ro-fs + +touch /tmp/F/rw-fs/foo +chmod 644 /tmp/F/rw-fs/foo + +mount -o bind,ro /tmp/F/rw-fs /tmp/F/ro-fs + +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo 0644 - - - - +EOF +test -f /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo; ! test -s /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo + +echo "truncating is not allowed anymore" >/tmp/F/rw-fs/foo +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo 0644 - - - - +EOF + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo 0644 - - - - This string should not be written +EOF +test -f /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo; ! test -s /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo + +# Trying to change the perms should fail. +>/tmp/F/rw-fs/foo +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo 0666 - - - - +EOF +test $(stat -c %U:%G:%a /tmp/F/ro-fs/foo) = "root:root:644" + +### Try to create a new file. +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/ro-fs/bar 0644 - - - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/F/ro-fs/bar + +### 'F' shouldn't follow unsafe paths. +mkdir /tmp/F/daemon +ln -s /root /tmp/F/daemon/unsafe-symlink +chown -R --no-dereference daemon:daemon /tmp/F/daemon + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +F /tmp/F/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit 0644 daemon daemon - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/F/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit + +# +# 'w' +# +touch /tmp/w/overwritten + +### nop if the target does not exist. +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /tmp/w/unexistent 0644 - - - new content +EOF +! test -e /tmp/w/unexistent + +### no argument given -> fails. +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /tmp/w/unexistent 0644 - - - - +EOF + +### write into an empty file. +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /tmp/w/overwritten 0644 - - - old content +EOF +test -f /tmp/w/overwritten +test "$(< /tmp/w/overwritten)" = "old content" + +### new content is overwritten +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /tmp/w/overwritten 0644 - - - new content +EOF +test -f /tmp/w/overwritten +test "$(< /tmp/w/overwritten)" = "new content" + +### writing into an 'exotic' file should be allowed. +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /dev/null - - - - new content +EOF + +### 'w' follows symlinks +ln -s ./overwritten /tmp/w/symlink +systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +w /tmp/w/symlink - - - - $(readlink -e /tmp/w/symlink) +EOF +readlink -e /tmp/w/symlink +test "$(< /tmp/w/overwritten)" = "/tmp/w/overwritten" + +### 'w' shouldn't follow unsafe paths. +mkdir /tmp/w/daemon +ln -s /root /tmp/w/daemon/unsafe-symlink +chown -R --no-dereference daemon:daemon /tmp/w/daemon + +! systemd-tmpfiles --create - <<EOF +f /tmp/w/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit 0644 daemon daemon - - +EOF +! test -e /tmp/w/daemon/unsafe-symlink/exploit |