diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/namespace.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/core/namespace.c | 2384 |
1 files changed, 2384 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdf427a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/namespace.c @@ -0,0 +1,2384 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <linux/loop.h> +#include <sched.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <sys/mount.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "base-filesystem.h" +#include "dev-setup.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "format-util.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "list.h" +#include "loop-util.h" +#include "loopback-setup.h" +#include "mkdir.h" +#include "mount-util.h" +#include "mountpoint-util.h" +#include "namespace-util.h" +#include "namespace.h" +#include "nulstr-util.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "socket-util.h" +#include "sort-util.h" +#include "stat-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "tmpfile-util.h" +#include "umask-util.h" +#include "user-util.h" + +#define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC) + +typedef enum MountMode { + /* This is ordered by priority! */ + INACCESSIBLE, + MOUNT_IMAGES, + BIND_MOUNT, + BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, + PRIVATE_TMP, + PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY, + PRIVATE_DEV, + BIND_DEV, + EMPTY_DIR, + SYSFS, + PROCFS, + READONLY, + READWRITE, + TMPFS, + READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */ + _MOUNT_MODE_MAX, +} MountMode; + +typedef struct MountEntry { + const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */ + MountMode mode:5; + bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */ + bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */ + bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */ + bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */ + bool applied:1; /* Already applied */ + char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */ + const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */ + char *source_malloc; + const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */ + char *options_malloc; + unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */ + unsigned n_followed; + LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options); +} MountEntry; + +/* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys and /proc into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted + * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */ +static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = { + { "/proc", PROCFS, false }, + { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false }, + { "/sys", SYSFS, false }, +}; + +/* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */ +static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = { + { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */ + { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true }, + { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true }, + { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true }, + { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true }, + { "/sys", READONLY, false }, + { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true }, + { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */ + { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, + { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true }, + { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true }, +}; + +/* ProtectKernelModules= option */ +static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = { +#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR + { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, +#endif + { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, +}; + +/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */ +static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = { + { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, + { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, +}; + +/* + * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of + * system should be protected by ProtectSystem= + */ +static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = { + { "/home", READONLY, true }, + { "/run/user", READONLY, true }, + { "/root", READONLY, true }, +}; + +/* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */ +static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = { + { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, + { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, + { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, +}; + +/* ProtectHome=yes table */ +static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = { + { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true }, + { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true }, + { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true }, +}; + +/* ProtectSystem=yes table */ +static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = { + { "/usr", READONLY, false }, + { "/boot", READONLY, true }, + { "/efi", READONLY, true }, +#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR + { "/lib", READONLY, true }, + { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, + { "/bin", READONLY, true }, +# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN + { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, +# endif +#endif +}; + +/* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */ +static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = { + { "/usr", READONLY, false }, + { "/boot", READONLY, true }, + { "/efi", READONLY, true }, + { "/etc", READONLY, false }, +#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR + { "/lib", READONLY, true }, + { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, + { "/bin", READONLY, true }, +# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN + { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, +# endif +#endif +}; + +/* + * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything + * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS, + * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables= + * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal. + * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome= + * shall manage those, orthogonally). + */ +static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = { + { "/", READONLY, false }, + { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ + { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ + { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */ + { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ + { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ + { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ +}; + +static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = { + [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible", + [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind", + [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind", + [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp", + [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev", + [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev", + [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty", + [SYSFS] = "sysfs", + [PROCFS] = "procfs", + [READONLY] = "read-only", + [READWRITE] = "read-write", + [TMPFS] = "tmpfs", + [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images", + [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit", +}; + +DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode); + +static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) { + assert(p); + + /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that, + * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */ + + return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const; +} + +static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) { + assert(p); + + return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY); +} + +static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) { + assert(p); + + return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const; +} + +static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) { + assert(p); + + return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const; +} + +static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) { + assert(p); + + p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc); + p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc); + p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc); + p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options); +} + +static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) { + char **i; + + assert(p); + + /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */ + + STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { + bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false; + const char *e = *i; + + /* Look for any prefixes */ + if (startswith(e, "-")) { + e++; + ignore = true; + } + if (startswith(e, "+")) { + e++; + needs_prefix = true; + } + + if (!path_is_absolute(e)) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Path is not absolute: %s", e); + + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = e, + .mode = mode, + .ignore = ignore, + .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix, + }; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) { + char **i; + + assert(p); + + /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the + * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */ + + STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { + + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = *i, + .mode = EMPTY_DIR, + .ignore = false, + .read_only = true, + .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, + .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, + }; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) { + size_t i; + + assert(p); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + const BindMount *b = binds + i; + + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = b->destination, + .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT, + .read_only = b->read_only, + .nosuid = b->nosuid, + .source_const = b->source, + .ignore = b->ignore_enoent, + }; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) { + assert(p); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { + const MountImage *m = mount_images + i; + + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = m->destination, + .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES, + .source_const = m->source, + .image_options = m->mount_options, + .ignore = m->ignore_enoent, + }; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) { + assert(p); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { + const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i; + _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + bool ro = false; + int r; + + if (!path_is_absolute(t->path)) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Path is not absolute: %s", + t->path); + + str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options); + if (!str) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str); + + ro = flags & MS_RDONLY; + if (ro) + flags ^= MS_RDONLY; + + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = t->path, + .mode = TMPFS, + .read_only = ro, + .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o), + .flags = flags, + }; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) { + size_t i; + + assert(p); + assert(mounts); + + /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */ + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i), + .mode = mounts[i].mode, + .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect, + }; + + return 0; +} + +static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) { + assert(p); + + switch (protect_home) { + + case PROTECT_HOME_NO: + return 0; + + case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect); + + case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect); + + case PROTECT_HOME_YES: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect); + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectHome= value"); + } +} + +static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) { + assert(p); + + switch (protect_system) { + + case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO: + return 0; + + case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect); + + case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect); + + case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL: + return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect); + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectSystem= value"); + } +} + +static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) { + int d; + + /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */ + d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b)); + if (d != 0) + return d; + + /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */ + return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode); +} + +static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) { + size_t i; + + /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */ + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + char *s; + + if (m[i].has_prefix) + continue; + + s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i)); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_and_replace(m[i].path_malloc, s); + m[i].has_prefix = true; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { + MountEntry *f, *t, *previous; + + assert(m); + assert(n); + + /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */ + + for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) { + + /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare() + * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */ + if (previous && + path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) && + !f->applied && !previous->applied) { + log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode)); + previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); /* Propagate the read-only flag to the remaining entry */ + mount_entry_done(f); + continue; + } + + *t = *f; + previous = t; + t++; + } + + *n = t - m; +} + +static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { + MountEntry *f, *t; + const char *clear = NULL; + + assert(m); + assert(n); + + /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly + * ordered already. */ + + for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { + + /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop + * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */ + if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) { + log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear); + mount_entry_done(f); + continue; + } + + clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL; + + *t = *f; + t++; + } + + *n = t - m; +} + +static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { + MountEntry *f, *t; + + assert(m); + assert(n); + + /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the + * list is ordered by prefixes. */ + + for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { + + /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */ + if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) { + MountEntry *p; + bool found = false; + + /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */ + for (p = t-1; p >= m; p--) { + if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */ + if (found && p->mode == f->mode) { + log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)", + mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode), + mount_entry_path(p), mount_mode_to_string(p->mode)); + mount_entry_done(f); + continue; + } + } + + *t = *f; + t++; + } + + *n = t - m; +} + +static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { + MountEntry *f, *t; + + assert(m); + assert(n); + + /* Nothing to do */ + if (!root_directory) + return; + + /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */ + + for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { + + if (!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) { + log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f)); + mount_entry_done(f); + continue; + } + + *t = *f; + t++; + } + + *n = t - m; +} + +static int clone_device_node( + const char *d, + const char *temporary_mount, + bool *make_devnode) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL; + const char *dn, *bn, *t; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (stat(d, &st) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d); + return -ENXIO; + } + + return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d); + } + + if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) && + !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.", + d); + + dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d); + + /* First, try to create device node properly */ + if (*make_devnode) { + mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode); + r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev); + mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); + if (r >= 0) + goto add_symlink; + if (errno != EPERM) + return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d); + + /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */ + *make_devnode = false; + } + + /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device + * node. So create a dummy bind-mount target. + * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */ + r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0); + if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) + return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d); + + /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard + * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or + * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */ + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + +add_symlink: + bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/"); + if (!bn) + return 0; + + /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */ + if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/%u:%u", + temporary_mount, + S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block", + major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755); + + t = strjoina("../", bn); + if (symlink(t, sl) < 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl); + + return 0; +} + +static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) { + static const char devnodes[] = + "/dev/null\0" + "/dev/zero\0" + "/dev/full\0" + "/dev/random\0" + "/dev/urandom\0" + "/dev/tty\0"; + + char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX"; + const char *d, *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL; + bool can_mknod = true; + _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u; + int r; + + assert(m); + + u = umask(0000); + + if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount)) + return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount); + + dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev"); + (void) mkdir(dev, 0755); + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + r = label_fix_container(dev, "/dev", 0); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev); + goto fail; + } + + devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts"); + (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755); + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx. + * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible. + * Thus, in that case make a clone. + * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */ + r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx"); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m"); + goto fail; + } else if (r > 0) { + devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx"); + if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) { + r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx); + goto fail; + } + } else { + r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } + + devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm"); + (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755); + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue"); + (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755); + (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); + + devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages"); + (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755); + (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); + + devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log"); + if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog); + + NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) { + r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod); + /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */ + if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) + goto fail; + } + + r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount); + + /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be + * missing when the service is started with RootDirectory. This is + * consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. + */ + (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); + + /* Unmount everything in old /dev */ + r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + (void) rmdir(dev); + (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); + + return 0; + +fail: + if (devpts) + (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); + + if (devshm) + (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); + + if (devhugepages) + (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); + + if (devmqueue) + (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); + + (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); + (void) rmdir(dev); + (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); + + return r; +} + +static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) { + int r; + + assert(m); + + /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the service's + * /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */ + + (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); + + r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m"); + if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */ + return 0; + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + +static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) { + int r; + + assert(m); + + (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); + + r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m"); + if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */ + return 0; + + /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */ + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + +static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { + const char *entry_path; + int r; + + assert(m); + assert(ns_info); + + entry_path = mount_entry_path(m); + + /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in + * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by + * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything + * mounted on /proc/ first. */ + + (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755); + (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0); + + if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || + ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) { + _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL; + + /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it + * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it + * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is + * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was + * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */ + + opts = strjoin("hidepid=", + ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ? "off" : + protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc), + ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID ? ",subset=pid" : ""); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts); + if (r < 0) { + if (r != -EINVAL) + return r; + + /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is + * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which + * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc + * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */ + } else + return 1; + } + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + +static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) { + const char *entry_path, *inner_path; + int r; + + assert(m); + + entry_path = mount_entry_path(m); + inner_path = m->path_const; + + /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new tmpfs */ + + (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755); + (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0); + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = label_fix_container(entry_path, inner_path, 0); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path); + + return 1; +} + +static int mount_images(const MountEntry *m) { + _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; + _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL; + _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL; + _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT; + DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags; + int r; + + assert(m); + + r = verity_settings_load(&verity, mount_entry_source(m), NULL, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); + + dissect_image_flags = + (m->read_only ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : 0) | + (verity.data_path ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0); + + r = loop_device_make_by_path( + mount_entry_source(m), + m->read_only ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */, + verity.data_path ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN, + &loop_device); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for image: %m"); + + r = dissect_image( + loop_device->fd, + &verity, + m->image_options, + dissect_image_flags, + &dissected_image); + /* No partition table? Might be a single-filesystem image, try again */ + if (!verity.data_path && r == -ENOPKG) + r = dissect_image( + loop_device->fd, + &verity, + m->image_options, + dissect_image_flags|DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, + &dissected_image); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m"); + + r = dissected_image_decrypt( + dissected_image, + NULL, + &verity, + dissect_image_flags, + &decrypted_image); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m"); + + r = mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); + r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to umount under destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); + + r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, mount_entry_path(m), UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image: %m"); + + if (decrypted_image) { + r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m"); + } + + loop_device_relinquish(loop_device); + + return 1; +} + +static int follow_symlink( + const char *root_directory, + MountEntry *m) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; + int r; + + /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we + * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at + * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the + * end and already have a fully normalized name. */ + + r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m)); + if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */ + return 1; + + if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */ + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), + "Symlink loop on '%s'.", + mount_entry_path(m)); + + log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s → %s.", mount_entry_path(m), target); + + free_and_replace(m->path_malloc, target); + m->has_prefix = true; + + m->n_followed ++; + + return 0; +} + +static int apply_mount( + const char *root_directory, + MountEntry *m, + const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL; + bool rbind = true, make = false; + const char *what; + int r; + + assert(m); + assert(ns_info); + + log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m)); + + switch (m->mode) { + + case INACCESSIBLE: { + _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL; + const char *runtime_dir; + struct stat target; + + /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there + * is anything... Then, overmount it with an + * inaccessible path. */ + (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); + + if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore) + return 0; + + return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m", + mount_entry_path(m)); + } + + if (geteuid() == 0) + runtime_dir = "/run"; + else { + if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + runtime_dir = tmp; + } + + r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), + "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed"); + what = inaccessible; + break; + } + + case READONLY: + case READWRITE: + case READWRITE_IMPLICIT: + r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0); + if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) + return 0; + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m", + mount_entry_path(m)); + if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY + * bit for the mount point if needed. */ + return 0; + /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */ + what = mount_entry_path(m); + break; + + case BIND_MOUNT: + rbind = false; + + _fallthrough_; + case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: { + _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL; + + /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note + * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as + * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */ + + r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL); + if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m)); + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m)); + + log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s → %s.", mount_entry_source(m), chased); + + free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased); + + what = mount_entry_source(m); + make = true; + break; + } + + case EMPTY_DIR: + case TMPFS: + return mount_tmpfs(m); + + case PRIVATE_TMP: + case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY: + what = mount_entry_source(m); + make = true; + break; + + case PRIVATE_DEV: + return mount_private_dev(m); + + case BIND_DEV: + return mount_bind_dev(m); + + case SYSFS: + return mount_sysfs(m); + + case PROCFS: + return mount_procfs(m, ns_info); + + case MOUNT_IMAGES: + return mount_images(m); + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unknown mode"); + } + + assert(what); + + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL); + if (r < 0) { + bool try_again = false; + + if (r == -ENOENT && make) { + struct stat st; + + /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create + the destination, then try again. */ + + if (stat(what, &st) < 0) + log_error_errno(errno, "Mount point source '%s' is not accessible: %m", what); + else { + int q; + + (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); + + if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + q = mkdir(mount_entry_path(m), 0755) < 0 ? -errno : 0; + else + q = touch(mount_entry_path(m)); + + if (q < 0) + log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m", + mount_entry_path(m)); + else + try_again = true; + } + } + + if (try_again) + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m)); + } + + log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m)); + return 0; +} + +static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { + unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0; + bool submounts = false; + int r = 0; + + assert(m); + assert(proc_self_mountinfo); + + if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) { + new_flags |= MS_RDONLY; + flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY; + } + + if (m->nosuid) { + new_flags |= MS_NOSUID; + flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID; + } + + if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */ + return 0; + + /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's + * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the + * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace + * and running Linux <= 4.17. */ + submounts = + mount_entry_read_only(m) && + !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); + if (submounts) + r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); + else + r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo); + + /* Not that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked + * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we + * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */ + + if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) + return 0; + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m), + submounts ? " and its submounts" : ""); + return 0; +} + +static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { + assert(ns_info); + + /* + * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=, + * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the + * first place... + */ + + return ns_info->mount_apivfs || + ns_info->protect_control_groups || + ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables || + ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || + ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL; +} + +static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts( + const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, + char** read_write_paths, + char** read_only_paths, + char** inaccessible_paths, + char** empty_directories, + size_t n_bind_mounts, + size_t n_temporary_filesystems, + size_t n_mount_images, + const char* tmp_dir, + const char* var_tmp_dir, + const char *creds_path, + const char* log_namespace) { + + size_t protect_home_cnt; + size_t protect_system_cnt = + (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) : + ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) : + ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0))); + + protect_home_cnt = + (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) : + ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) : + ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ? + ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0))); + + return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir + + strv_length(read_write_paths) + + strv_length(read_only_paths) + + strv_length(inaccessible_paths) + + strv_length(empty_directories) + + n_bind_mounts + + n_mount_images + + n_temporary_filesystems + + ns_info->private_dev + + (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) + + (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) + + (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) + + (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) + + protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt + + (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) + + (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) + + (creds_path ? 2 : 1) + + !!log_namespace; +} + +static void normalize_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) { + assert(root_directory); + assert(n_mounts); + assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0); + + typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare); + + drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts); + drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts); + drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts); + drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts); +} + +static bool root_read_only( + char **read_only_paths, + ProtectSystem protect_system) { + + /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */ + + if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT) + return true; + + if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/")) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static bool home_read_only( + char** read_only_paths, + char** inaccessible_paths, + char** empty_directories, + const BindMount *bind_mounts, + size_t n_bind_mounts, + const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, + size_t n_temporary_filesystems, + ProtectHome protect_home) { + + size_t i; + + /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes, + * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple + * settings. */ + + if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) + return true; + + if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") || + prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") || + prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home")) + return true; + + for (i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++) + if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home")) + return true; + + /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */ + for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) + if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home")) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static int verity_settings_prepare( + VeritySettings *verity, + const char *root_image, + const void *root_hash, + size_t root_hash_size, + const char *root_hash_path, + const void *root_hash_sig, + size_t root_hash_sig_size, + const char *root_hash_sig_path, + const char *verity_data_path) { + + int r; + + assert(verity); + + if (root_hash) { + void *d; + + d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d); + verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size; + verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; + } + + if (root_hash_sig) { + void *d; + + d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d); + verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size; + verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; + } + + if (verity_data_path) { + r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = verity_settings_load( + verity, + root_image, + root_hash_path, + root_hash_sig_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +int setup_namespace( + const char* root_directory, + const char* root_image, + const MountOptions *root_image_options, + const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, + char** read_write_paths, + char** read_only_paths, + char** inaccessible_paths, + char** empty_directories, + const BindMount *bind_mounts, + size_t n_bind_mounts, + const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, + size_t n_temporary_filesystems, + const MountImage *mount_images, + size_t n_mount_images, + const char* tmp_dir, + const char* var_tmp_dir, + const char *creds_path, + const char *log_namespace, + unsigned long mount_flags, + const void *root_hash, + size_t root_hash_size, + const char *root_hash_path, + const void *root_hash_sig, + size_t root_hash_sig_size, + const char *root_hash_sig_path, + const char *verity_data_path, + DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags, + char **error_path) { + + _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; + _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL; + _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL; + _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT; + MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL; + bool require_prefix = false; + const char *root; + size_t n_mounts; + int r; + + assert(ns_info); + + if (mount_flags == 0) + mount_flags = MS_SHARED; + + if (root_image) { + dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT; + + /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */ + if (root_read_only(read_only_paths, + ns_info->protect_system) && + home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories, + bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems, + ns_info->protect_home) && + strv_isempty(read_write_paths)) + dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY; + + r = verity_settings_prepare( + &verity, + root_image, + root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path, + root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path, + verity_data_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path); + + r = loop_device_make_by_path( + root_image, + FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */, + FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN, + &loop_device); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m"); + + r = dissect_image( + loop_device->fd, + &verity, + root_image_options, + dissect_image_flags, + &dissected_image); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m"); + + r = dissected_image_decrypt( + dissected_image, + NULL, + &verity, + dissect_image_flags, + &decrypted_image); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m"); + } + + if (root_directory) + root = root_directory; + else { + /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like + * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure + * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */ + (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755); + + /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating + * directly in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being + * potentially obscured my other mounts we already applied. + * We use the same mount point for all images, which is safe, since they all live + * in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each other. */ + + root = "/run/systemd/unit-root"; + (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700); + require_prefix = true; + } + + n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts( + ns_info, + read_write_paths, + read_only_paths, + inaccessible_paths, + empty_directories, + n_bind_mounts, + n_temporary_filesystems, + n_mount_images, + tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, + creds_path, + log_namespace); + + if (n_mounts > 0) { + m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts); + if (!mounts) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (tmp_dir) { + bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/tmp", + .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, + .source_const = tmp_dir, + }; + } + + if (var_tmp_dir) { + bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/var/tmp", + .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, + .source_const = var_tmp_dir, + }; + } + + r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (ns_info->private_dev) + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/dev", + .mode = PRIVATE_DEV, + .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, + }; + + if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) { + r = append_static_mounts(&m, + protect_kernel_tunables_table, + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table), + ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) { + r = append_static_mounts(&m, + protect_kernel_modules_table, + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table), + ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) { + r = append_static_mounts(&m, + protect_kernel_logs_table, + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table), + ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup", + .mode = READONLY, + }; + + r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) { + r = append_static_mounts(&m, + apivfs_table, + ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table), + ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + if (ns_info->protect_hostname) { + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname", + .mode = READONLY, + }; + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname", + .mode = READONLY, + }; + } + + if (creds_path) { + /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide + * everything else. */ + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/run/credentials", + .mode = TMPFS, + .read_only = true, + .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, + .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC, + }; + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = creds_path, + .mode = BIND_MOUNT, + .read_only = true, + .source_const = creds_path, + }; + } else { + /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole + * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */ + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/run/credentials", + .mode = INACCESSIBLE, + .ignore = true, + }; + } + + if (log_namespace) { + _cleanup_free_ char *q; + + q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace); + if (!q) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto finish; + } + + *(m++) = (MountEntry) { + .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal", + .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, + .read_only = true, + .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q), + }; + } + + assert(mounts + n_mounts == m); + + /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */ + r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); + } + + /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */ + + if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { + r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m"); + if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS)) + /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter + * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then + * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case + * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */ + r = -ENOANO; + + goto finish; + } + + /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace + * shows up in the parent */ + if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { + r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + if (root_image) { + /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */ + r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + if (decrypted_image) { + r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m"); + goto finish; + } + } + + loop_device_relinquish(loop_device); + + } else if (root_directory) { + + /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */ + r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root); + goto finish; + } + if (r == 0) { + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + } else { + /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */ + r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */ + if (root_image || root_directory) + (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); + + if (n_mounts > 0) { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL; + size_t j; + + /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of + * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */ + proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re"); + if (!proc_self_mountinfo) { + r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m"); + if (error_path) + *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo"); + goto finish; + } + + /* First round, establish all mounts we need */ + for (;;) { + bool again = false; + + for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) { + + if (m->applied) + continue; + + r = follow_symlink(root, m); + if (r < 0) { + if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) + *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); + goto finish; + } + if (r == 0) { + /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might + * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed + * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry + * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */ + again = true; + break; + } + + r = apply_mount(root, m, ns_info); + if (r < 0) { + if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) + *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); + goto finish; + } + + m->applied = true; + } + + if (!again) + break; + + normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); + } + + /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */ + deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1); + if (!deny_list) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto finish; + } + for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++) + deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); + deny_list[j] = NULL; + + /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */ + for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) { + r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); + if (r < 0) { + if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) + *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); + goto finish; + } + } + } + + /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */ + r = mount_move_root(root); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not + * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since + * what's disconnected is disconnected. */ + if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { + r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m"); + goto finish; + } + + r = 0; + +finish: + if (n_mounts > 0) + for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++) + mount_entry_done(m); + + free(mounts); + + return r; +} + +void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) { + size_t i; + + assert(b || n == 0); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(b[i].source); + free(b[i].destination); + } + + free(b); +} + +int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + BindMount *c; + + assert(b); + assert(n); + assert(item); + + s = strdup(item->source); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + + d = strdup(item->destination); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount)); + if (!c) + return -ENOMEM; + + *b = c; + + c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) { + .source = TAKE_PTR(s), + .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), + .read_only = item->read_only, + .nosuid = item->nosuid, + .recursive = item->recursive, + .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, + }; + + return 0; +} + +MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) { + size_t i; + + assert(n); + assert(m || *n == 0); + + for (i = 0; i < *n; i++) { + free(m[i].source); + free(m[i].destination); + mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options); + } + + free(m); + *n = 0; + return NULL; +} + +int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL; + MountOptions *i; + MountImage *c; + + assert(m); + assert(n); + assert(item); + + s = strdup(item->source); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + + d = strdup(item->destination); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) { + _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o; + + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return -ENOMEM; + + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = i->partition_designator, + .options = strdup(i->options), + }; + if (!o->options) + return -ENOMEM; + + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o)); + } + + c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage)); + if (!c) + return -ENOMEM; + + *m = c; + + c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) { + .source = TAKE_PTR(s), + .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), + .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options), + .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, + }; + + return 0; +} + +void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) { + size_t i; + + assert(t || n == 0); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(t[i].path); + free(t[i].options); + } + + free(t); +} + +int temporary_filesystem_add( + TemporaryFileSystem **t, + size_t *n, + const char *path, + const char *options) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL; + TemporaryFileSystem *c; + + assert(t); + assert(n); + assert(path); + + p = strdup(path); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!isempty(options)) { + o = strdup(options); + if (!o) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem)); + if (!c) + return -ENOMEM; + + *t = c; + + c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) { + .path = TAKE_PTR(p), + .options = TAKE_PTR(o), + }; + + return 0; +} + +static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) { + _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; + int r; + + /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */ + r = access(prefix, F_OK); + if (r >= 0) + return 0; + if (errno != ENOENT) + return -errno; + + r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (mkdir(t, 0777) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (chmod(t, 01777) < 0) { + r = -errno; + (void) rmdir(t); + return r; + } + + if (rename(t, prefix) < 0) { + r = -errno; + (void) rmdir(t); + return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */ + } + + return 0; + +} + +static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) { + _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL; + char bid[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX]; + sd_id128_t boot_id; + bool rw = true; + int r; + + assert(id); + assert(prefix); + assert(path); + + /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a + * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */ + + r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", sd_id128_to_string(boot_id, bid), "-", id, "-XXXXXX"); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077) + if (!mkdtemp(x)) { + if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno)) + rw = false; + else + return -errno; + } + + if (rw) { + y = strjoin(x, "/tmp"); + if (!y) + return -ENOMEM; + + RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { + if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + r = label_fix_container(y, prefix, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (tmp_path) + *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y); + } else { + /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being + * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real + * file system. */ + r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + *path = TAKE_PTR(x); + return 0; +} + +int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) { + _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL; + _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL; + char *b; + int r; + + assert(id); + assert(tmp_dir); + assert(var_tmp_dir); + + r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */ + *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a); + *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b); + + return 0; +} + +int setup_netns(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2]) { + _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1; + int r, q; + + assert(netns_storage_socket); + assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); + assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); + + /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our + * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first + * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join + * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket + * pair. + * + * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */ + + if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) + return -errno; + + netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (netns == -EAGAIN) { + /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */ + + if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto fail; + } + + (void) loopback_setup(); + + netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY); + if (netns < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto fail; + } + + r = 1; + + } else if (netns < 0) { + r = netns; + goto fail; + + } else { + /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */ + if (setns(netns, CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto fail; + } + + r = 0; + } + + q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (q < 0) { + r = q; + goto fail; + } + +fail: + (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); + return r; +} + +int open_netns_path(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path) { + _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1; + int q, r; + + assert(netns_storage_socket); + assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); + assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); + assert(path); + + /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a netns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in + * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_netns() which will allocate a + * new anonymous netns if needed. */ + + if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) + return -errno; + + netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (netns == -EAGAIN) { + /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */ + + netns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (netns < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto fail; + } + + r = fd_is_network_ns(netns); + if (r == 0) { /* Not a netns? Refuse early. */ + r = -EINVAL; + goto fail; + } + if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */ + goto fail; + + r = 1; + + } else if (netns < 0) { + r = netns; + goto fail; + } else + r = 0; /* Already allocated */ + + q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (q < 0) { + r = q; + goto fail; + } + +fail: + (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); + return r; +} + +bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) { + const char *t, *ns_proc; + + t = namespace_type_to_string(type); + if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */ + return false; + + ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t); + return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0; +} + +static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = { + [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no", + [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes", + [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only", + [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES); + +static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = { + [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no", + [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes", + [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full", + [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES); + +static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = { + [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt", + [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup", + [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts", + [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc", + [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user", + [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid", + [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType); + +static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = { + [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default", + [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess", + [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible", + [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc); + +static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = { + [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all", + [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset); |