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-rw-r--r--src/shared/pkcs11-util.c932
1 files changed, 932 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/shared/pkcs11-util.c b/src/shared/pkcs11-util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e74f0be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/shared/pkcs11-util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,932 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "escape.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include "openssl-util.h"
+#endif
+#include "pkcs11-util.h"
+#include "random-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+
+bool pkcs11_uri_valid(const char *uri) {
+ const char *p;
+
+ /* A very superficial checker for RFC7512 PKCS#11 URI syntax */
+
+ if (isempty(uri))
+ return false;
+
+ p = startswith(uri, "pkcs11:");
+ if (!p)
+ return false;
+
+ if (isempty(p))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!in_charset(p, ALPHANUMERICAL "-_?;&%="))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#if HAVE_P11KIT
+
+int uri_from_string(const char *p, P11KitUri **ret) {
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *uri = NULL;
+
+ assert(p);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
+ if (!uri)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p11_kit_uri_parse(p, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, uri) != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *ret = TAKE_PTR(uri);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+P11KitUri *uri_from_module_info(const CK_INFO *info) {
+ P11KitUri *uri;
+
+ assert(info);
+
+ uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
+ if (!uri)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *p11_kit_uri_get_module_info(uri) = *info;
+ return uri;
+}
+
+P11KitUri *uri_from_slot_info(const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info) {
+ P11KitUri *uri;
+
+ assert(slot_info);
+
+ uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
+ if (!uri)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *p11_kit_uri_get_slot_info(uri) = *slot_info;
+ return uri;
+}
+
+P11KitUri *uri_from_token_info(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
+ P11KitUri *uri;
+
+ assert(token_info);
+
+ uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
+ if (!uri)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *p11_kit_uri_get_token_info(uri) = *token_info;
+ return uri;
+}
+
+CK_RV pkcs11_get_slot_list_malloc(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SLOT_ID **ret_slotids,
+ CK_ULONG *ret_n_slotids) {
+
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(ret_slotids);
+ assert(ret_n_slotids);
+
+ for (unsigned tries = 0; tries < 16; tries++) {
+ _cleanup_free_ CK_SLOT_ID *slotids = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG n_slotids = 0;
+
+ rv = m->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL, &n_slotids);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return rv;
+ if (n_slotids == 0) {
+ *ret_slotids = NULL;
+ *ret_n_slotids = 0;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ slotids = new(CK_SLOT_ID, n_slotids);
+ if (!slotids)
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+
+ rv = m->C_GetSlotList(0, slotids, &n_slotids);
+ if (rv == CKR_OK) {
+ *ret_slotids = TAKE_PTR(slotids);
+ *ret_n_slotids = n_slotids;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ return rv;
+
+ /* Hu? Maybe somebody plugged something in and things changed? Let's try again */
+ }
+
+ return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+}
+
+char *pkcs11_token_label(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
+ char *t;
+
+ /* The label is not NUL terminated and likely padded with spaces, let's make a copy here, so that we
+ * can strip that. */
+ t = strndup((char*) token_info->label, sizeof(token_info->label));
+ if (!t)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strstrip(t);
+ return t;
+}
+
+char *pkcs11_token_manufacturer_id(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
+ char *t;
+
+ t = strndup((char*) token_info->manufacturerID, sizeof(token_info->manufacturerID));
+ if (!t)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strstrip(t);
+ return t;
+}
+
+char *pkcs11_token_model(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
+ char *t;
+
+ t = strndup((char*) token_info->model, sizeof(token_info->model));
+ if (!t)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strstrip(t);
+ return t;
+}
+
+int pkcs11_token_login(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
+ const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
+ const char *friendly_name,
+ const char *icon_name,
+ const char *keyname,
+ usec_t until,
+ char **ret_used_pin) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *token_uri_string = NULL, *token_uri_escaped = NULL, *id = NULL, *token_label = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *token_uri = NULL;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO updated_token_info;
+ int uri_result, r;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(token_info);
+
+ token_label = pkcs11_token_label(token_info);
+ if (!token_label)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ token_uri = uri_from_token_info(token_info);
+ if (!token_uri)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &token_uri_string);
+ if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
+
+ if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)) {
+ rv = m->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, NULL, 0);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to log into security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ log_info("Successfully logged into security token '%s' via protected authentication path.", token_label);
+ if (ret_used_pin)
+ *ret_used_pin = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED)) {
+ log_info("No login into security token '%s' required.", token_label);
+ if (ret_used_pin)
+ *ret_used_pin = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ token_uri_escaped = cescape(token_uri_string);
+ if (!token_uri_escaped)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ id = strjoin("pkcs11:", token_uri_escaped);
+ if (!id)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ for (unsigned tries = 0; tries < 3; tries++) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+ char **i, *e;
+
+ e = getenv("PIN");
+ if (e) {
+ passwords = strv_new(e);
+ if (!passwords)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ string_erase(e);
+ if (unsetenv("PIN") < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unset $PIN: %m");
+ } else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL;
+
+ if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY))
+ r = asprintf(&text,
+ "Please enter correct PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s (final try):",
+ token_label, friendly_name);
+ else if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW))
+ r = asprintf(&text,
+ "PIN has been entered incorrectly previously, please enter correct PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s:",
+ token_label, friendly_name);
+ else if (tries == 0)
+ r = asprintf(&text,
+ "Please enter PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s:",
+ token_label, friendly_name);
+ else
+ r = asprintf(&text,
+ "Please enter PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s (try #%u):",
+ token_label, friendly_name, tries+1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ /* We never cache PINs, simply because it's fatal if we use wrong PINs, since usually there are only 3 tries */
+ r = ask_password_auto(text, icon_name, id, keyname, until, 0, &passwords);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query PIN for security token '%s': %m", token_label);
+ }
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, passwords) {
+ rv = m->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*) *i, strlen(*i));
+ if (rv == CKR_OK) {
+
+ if (ret_used_pin) {
+ char *c;
+
+ c = strdup(*i);
+ if (!c)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ *ret_used_pin = c;
+ }
+
+ log_info("Successfully logged into security token '%s'.", token_label);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ "PIN has been locked, please reset PIN of security token '%s'.", token_label);
+ if (!IN_SET(rv, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to log into security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ /* Referesh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
+ rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slotid, &updated_token_info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to acquire updated security token information for slot %lu: %s",
+ slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ token_info = &updated_token_info;
+ log_notice("PIN for token '%s' is incorrect, please try again.", token_label);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to log into token '%s'.", token_label);
+}
+
+int pkcs11_token_find_x509_certificate(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ P11KitUri *search_uri,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *ret_object) {
+
+ bool found_class = false, found_certificate_type = false;
+ _cleanup_free_ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes_buffer = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG n_attributes, a, n_objects;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objects[2];
+ CK_RV rv, rv2;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(search_uri);
+ assert(ret_object);
+
+ attributes = p11_kit_uri_get_attributes(search_uri, &n_attributes);
+ for (a = 0; a < n_attributes; a++) {
+
+ /* We use the URI's included match attributes, but make them more strict. This allows users
+ * to specify a token URL instead of an object URL and the right thing should happen if
+ * there's only one suitable key on the token. */
+
+ switch (attributes[a].type) {
+
+ case CKA_CLASS: {
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS c;
+
+ if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(c))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CLASS attribute size.");
+
+ memcpy(&c, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(c));
+ if (c != CKO_CERTIFICATE)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an X.509 certificate, refusing.");
+
+ found_class = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE: {
+ CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE t;
+
+ if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(t))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE attribute size.");
+
+ memcpy(&t, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(t));
+ if (t != CKC_X_509)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an X.509 certificate, refusing.");
+
+ found_certificate_type = true;
+ break;
+ }}
+ }
+
+ if (!found_class || !found_certificate_type) {
+ /* Hmm, let's slightly extend the attribute list we search for */
+
+ attributes_buffer = new(CK_ATTRIBUTE, n_attributes + !found_class + !found_certificate_type);
+ if (!attributes_buffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ memcpy(attributes_buffer, attributes, sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE) * n_attributes);
+
+ if (!found_class) {
+ static const CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ .type = CKA_CLASS,
+ .pValue = (CK_OBJECT_CLASS*) &class,
+ .ulValueLen = sizeof(class),
+ };
+ }
+
+ if (!found_certificate_type) {
+ static const CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE type = CKC_X_509;
+
+ attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ .type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE,
+ .pValue = (CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE*) &type,
+ .ulValueLen = sizeof(type),
+ };
+ }
+
+ attributes = attributes_buffer;
+ }
+
+ rv = m->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attributes, n_attributes);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to initialize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ rv = m->C_FindObjects(session, objects, ELEMENTSOF(objects), &n_objects);
+ rv2 = m->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to find objects: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ if (rv2 != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to finalize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ if (n_objects == 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
+ "Failed to find selected X509 certificate on token.");
+ if (n_objects > 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ),
+ "Configured URI matches multiple certificates, refusing.");
+
+ *ret_object = objects[0];
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL
+int pkcs11_token_read_x509_certificate(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object,
+ X509 **ret_cert) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ void *buffer = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attribute = {
+ .type = CKA_VALUE
+ };
+ CK_RV rv;
+ _cleanup_(X509_freep) X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ rv = m->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, &attribute, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to read X.509 certificate size off token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ buffer = malloc(attribute.ulValueLen);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ attribute.pValue = buffer;
+
+ rv = m->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, &attribute, 1);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to read X.509 certificate data off token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ p = attribute.pValue;
+ x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, attribute.ulValueLen);
+ if (!x509)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Failed parse X.509 certificate.");
+
+ name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
+ if (!name)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Failed to acquire X.509 subject name.");
+
+ t = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
+ if (!t)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to format X.509 subject name as string.");
+
+ log_debug("Using X.509 certificate issued for '%s'.", t);
+
+ *ret_cert = TAKE_PTR(x509);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int pkcs11_token_find_private_key(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ P11KitUri *search_uri,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *ret_object) {
+
+ bool found_decrypt = false, found_class = false, found_key_type = false;
+ _cleanup_free_ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes_buffer = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG n_attributes, a, n_objects;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objects[2];
+ CK_RV rv, rv2;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(search_uri);
+ assert(ret_object);
+
+ attributes = p11_kit_uri_get_attributes(search_uri, &n_attributes);
+ for (a = 0; a < n_attributes; a++) {
+
+ /* We use the URI's included match attributes, but make them more strict. This allows users
+ * to specify a token URL instead of an object URL and the right thing should happen if
+ * there's only one suitable key on the token. */
+
+ switch (attributes[a].type) {
+
+ case CKA_CLASS: {
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS c;
+
+ if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(c))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CLASS attribute size.");
+
+ memcpy(&c, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(c));
+ if (c != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Selected PKCS#11 object is not a private key, refusing.");
+
+ found_class = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKA_DECRYPT: {
+ CK_BBOOL b;
+
+ if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(b))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_DECRYPT attribute size.");
+
+ memcpy(&b, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(b));
+ if (!b)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Selected PKCS#11 object is not suitable for decryption, refusing.");
+
+ found_decrypt = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CKA_KEY_TYPE: {
+ CK_KEY_TYPE t;
+
+ if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(t))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute size.");
+
+ memcpy(&t, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(t));
+ if (t != CKK_RSA)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an RSA key, refusing.");
+
+ found_key_type = true;
+ break;
+ }}
+ }
+
+ if (!found_decrypt || !found_class || !found_key_type) {
+ /* Hmm, let's slightly extend the attribute list we search for */
+
+ attributes_buffer = new(CK_ATTRIBUTE, n_attributes + !found_decrypt + !found_class + !found_key_type);
+ if (!attributes_buffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ memcpy(attributes_buffer, attributes, sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE) * n_attributes);
+
+ if (!found_decrypt) {
+ static const CK_BBOOL yes = true;
+
+ attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ .type = CKA_DECRYPT,
+ .pValue = (CK_BBOOL*) &yes,
+ .ulValueLen = sizeof(yes),
+ };
+ }
+
+ if (!found_class) {
+ static const CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+
+ attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ .type = CKA_CLASS,
+ .pValue = (CK_OBJECT_CLASS*) &class,
+ .ulValueLen = sizeof(class),
+ };
+ }
+
+ if (!found_key_type) {
+ static const CK_KEY_TYPE type = CKK_RSA;
+
+ attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ .type = CKA_KEY_TYPE,
+ .pValue = (CK_KEY_TYPE*) &type,
+ .ulValueLen = sizeof(type),
+ };
+ }
+
+ attributes = attributes_buffer;
+ }
+
+ rv = m->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attributes, n_attributes);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to initialize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ rv = m->C_FindObjects(session, objects, ELEMENTSOF(objects), &n_objects);
+ rv2 = m->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to find objects: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ if (rv2 != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to finalize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ if (n_objects == 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
+ "Failed to find selected private key suitable for decryption on token.");
+ if (n_objects > 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ),
+ "Configured private key URI matches multiple keys, refusing.");
+
+ *ret_object = objects[0];
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int pkcs11_token_decrypt_data(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object,
+ const void *encrypted_data,
+ size_t encrypted_data_size,
+ void **ret_decrypted_data,
+ size_t *ret_decrypted_data_size) {
+
+ static const CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
+ .mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ };
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) CK_BYTE *dbuffer = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG dbuffer_size = 0;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(encrypted_data);
+ assert(encrypted_data_size > 0);
+ assert(ret_decrypted_data);
+ assert(ret_decrypted_data_size);
+
+ rv = m->C_DecryptInit(session, (CK_MECHANISM*) &mechanism, object);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to initialize decryption on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ dbuffer_size = encrypted_data_size; /* Start with something reasonable */
+ dbuffer = malloc(dbuffer_size);
+ if (!dbuffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rv = m->C_Decrypt(session, (CK_BYTE*) encrypted_data, encrypted_data_size, dbuffer, &dbuffer_size);
+ if (rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ erase_and_free(dbuffer);
+
+ dbuffer = malloc(dbuffer_size);
+ if (!dbuffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rv = m->C_Decrypt(session, (CK_BYTE*) encrypted_data, encrypted_data_size, dbuffer, &dbuffer_size);
+ }
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to decrypt key on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ log_info("Successfully decrypted key with security token.");
+
+ *ret_decrypted_data = TAKE_PTR(dbuffer);
+ *ret_decrypted_data_size = dbuffer_size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int pkcs11_token_acquire_rng(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ void *buffer = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+ size_t rps;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(m);
+
+ /* While we are at it, let's read some RNG data from the PKCS#11 token and pass it to the kernel
+ * random pool. This should be cheap if we are talking to the device already. Note that we don't
+ * credit any entropy, since we don't know about the quality of the pkcs#11 token's RNG. Why bother
+ * at all? There are two sides to the argument whether to generate private keys on tokens or on the
+ * host. By crediting some data from the token RNG to the host's pool we at least can say that any
+ * key generated from it is at least as good as both sources individually. */
+
+ rps = random_pool_size();
+
+ buffer = malloc(rps);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rv = m->C_GenerateRandom(session, buffer, rps);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
+ "Failed to generate RNG data on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom for writing: %m");
+
+ r = loop_write(fd, buffer, rps, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to write PKCS#11 acquired random data to /dev/urandom: %m");
+
+ log_debug("Successfully written %zu bytes random data acquired via PKCS#11 to kernel random pool.", rps);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int token_process(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
+ const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info,
+ const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
+ P11KitUri *search_uri,
+ pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *token_label = NULL;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(slot_info);
+ assert(token_info);
+
+ token_label = pkcs11_token_label(token_info);
+ if (!token_label)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rv = m->C_OpenSession(slotid, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Failed to create session for security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ if (callback)
+ r = callback(m, session, slotid, slot_info, token_info, search_uri, userdata);
+ else
+ r = 1; /* if not callback was specified, just say we found what we were looking for */
+
+ rv = m->C_CloseSession(session);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
+ log_warning("Failed to close session on PKCS#11 token, ignoring: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int slot_process(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
+ P11KitUri *search_uri,
+ pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri* slot_uri = NULL, *token_uri = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *token_uri_string = NULL;
+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+ CK_SLOT_INFO slot_info;
+ int uri_result;
+ CK_RV rv;
+
+ assert(m);
+
+ /* We return -EAGAIN for all failures we can attribute to a specific slot in some way, so that the
+ * caller might try other slots before giving up. */
+
+ rv = m->C_GetSlotInfo(slotid, &slot_info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to acquire slot info for slot %lu, ignoring slot: %s", slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ slot_uri = uri_from_slot_info(&slot_info);
+ if (!slot_uri)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *slot_uri_string = NULL;
+
+ uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(slot_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &slot_uri_string);
+ if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to format slot URI, ignoring slot: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("Found slot with URI %s", slot_uri_string);
+ }
+
+ rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slotid, &token_info);
+ if (rv == CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT) {
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "Token not present in slot, ignoring.");
+ } else if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to acquire token info for slot %lu, ignoring slot: %s", slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ token_uri = uri_from_token_info(&token_info);
+ if (!token_uri)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &token_uri_string);
+ if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ if (search_uri && !p11_kit_uri_match_token_info(search_uri, &token_info))
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "Found non-matching token with URI %s.",
+ token_uri_string);
+
+ log_debug("Found matching token with URI %s.", token_uri_string);
+
+ return token_process(
+ m,
+ slotid,
+ &slot_info,
+ &token_info,
+ search_uri,
+ callback,
+ userdata);
+}
+
+static int module_process(
+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
+ P11KitUri *search_uri,
+ pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL, *module_uri_string = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri* module_uri = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ CK_SLOT_ID *slotids = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG n_slotids = 0;
+ int uri_result;
+ CK_INFO info;
+ size_t k;
+ CK_RV rv;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(m);
+
+ /* We ignore most errors from modules here, in order to skip over faulty modules: one faulty module
+ * should not have the effect that we don't try the others anymore. We indicate such per-module
+ * failures with -EAGAIN, which let's the caller try the next module. */
+
+ name = p11_kit_module_get_name(m);
+ if (!name)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ log_debug("Trying PKCS#11 module %s.", name);
+
+ rv = m->C_GetInfo(&info);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to get info on PKCS#11 module, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ module_uri = uri_from_module_info(&info);
+ if (!module_uri)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(module_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &module_uri_string);
+ if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to format module URI, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("Found module with URI %s", module_uri_string);
+
+ rv = pkcs11_get_slot_list_malloc(m, &slotids, &n_slotids);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ log_warning("Failed to get slot list, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if (n_slotids == 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "This module has no slots? Ignoring module.");
+
+ for (k = 0; k < n_slotids; k++) {
+ r = slot_process(
+ m,
+ slotids[k],
+ search_uri,
+ callback,
+ userdata);
+ if (r != -EAGAIN)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+int pkcs11_find_token(
+ const char *pkcs11_uri,
+ pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_modules_finalize_and_releasep) CK_FUNCTION_LIST **modules = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *search_uri = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Execute the specified callback for each matching token found. If nothing is found returns
+ * -EAGAIN. Logs about all errors, except for EAGAIN, which the caller has to log about. */
+
+ if (pkcs11_uri) {
+ r = uri_from_string(pkcs11_uri, &search_uri);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI '%s': %m", pkcs11_uri);
+ }
+
+ modules = p11_kit_modules_load_and_initialize(0);
+ if (!modules)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to initialize pkcs11 modules");
+
+ for (CK_FUNCTION_LIST **i = modules; *i; i++) {
+ r = module_process(
+ *i,
+ search_uri,
+ callback,
+ userdata);
+ if (r != -EAGAIN)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return -EAGAIN;
+}
+
+#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-05 19:06:16 +0000