Adding upstream version 2.10.0+dfsg.upstream/2.10.0+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

7 files changed, 1883 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.c b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f30d82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/* mbed TLS headers */
+#include <mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h>
+#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
+#include <mbedtls/version.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
+
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+	ERROR("EXIT from BL2\n");
+	panic();
+}
+
+/*
+ * mbed TLS initialization function
+ */
+void mbedtls_init(void)
+{
+	static int ready;
+	void *heap_addr;
+	size_t heap_size = 0;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!ready) {
+		if (atexit(cleanup))
+			panic();
+
+		err = plat_get_mbedtls_heap(&heap_addr, &heap_size);
+
+		/* Ensure heap setup is proper */
+		if (err < 0) {
+			ERROR("Mbed TLS failed to get a heap\n");
+			panic();
+		}
+		assert(heap_size >= TF_MBEDTLS_HEAP_SIZE);
+
+		/* Initialize the mbed TLS heap */
+		mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(heap_addr, heap_size);
+
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
+		mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf(snprintf);
+#endif
+		ready = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following helper function simply returns the default allocated heap.
+ * It can be used by platforms for their plat_get_mbedtls_heap() implementation.
+ */
+int get_mbedtls_heap_helper(void **heap_addr, size_t *heap_size)
+{
+	static unsigned char heap[TF_MBEDTLS_HEAP_SIZE];
+
+	assert(heap_addr != NULL);
+	assert(heap_size != NULL);
+
+	*heap_addr = heap;
+	*heap_size = sizeof(heap);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.mk b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2c6430
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${MBEDTLS_COMMON_MK},1)
+MBEDTLS_COMMON_MK	:=	1
+
+# MBEDTLS_DIR must be set to the mbed TLS main directory (it must contain
+# the 'include' and 'library' subdirectories).
+ifeq (${MBEDTLS_DIR},)
+  $(error Error: MBEDTLS_DIR not set)
+endif
+
+MBEDTLS_INC		=	-I${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include
+
+MBEDTLS_MAJOR=$(shell grep -hP "define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR" ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/mbedtls/*.h | grep -oe '\([0-9.]*\)')
+MBEDTLS_MINOR=$(shell grep -hP "define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR" ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/mbedtls/*.h | grep -oe '\([0-9.]*\)')
+$(info MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR is [${MBEDTLS_MAJOR}] MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR is [${MBEDTLS_MINOR}])
+
+# Specify mbed TLS configuration file
+ifeq (${MBEDTLS_MAJOR}, 2)
+        $(info Deprecation Notice: Please migrate to Mbedtls version 3.x (refer to TF-A documentation for the exact version number))
+	MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE             ?=	"<drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_config-2.h>"
+else ifeq (${MBEDTLS_MAJOR}, 3)
+	ifeq (${PSA_CRYPTO},1)
+		MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE     ?=      "<drivers/auth/mbedtls/psa_mbedtls_config.h>"
+	else
+		MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE	?=	"<drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_config-3.h>"
+	endif
+endif
+
+$(eval $(call add_define,MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE))
+
+MBEDTLS_SOURCES	+=		drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.c
+
+LIBMBEDTLS_SRCS		+= $(addprefix ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/,		\
+					aes.c 				\
+					asn1parse.c 			\
+					asn1write.c 			\
+					cipher.c 			\
+					cipher_wrap.c 			\
+					constant_time.c			\
+					memory_buffer_alloc.c		\
+					oid.c 				\
+					platform.c 			\
+					platform_util.c			\
+					bignum.c			\
+					gcm.c 				\
+					md.c				\
+					pk.c 				\
+					pk_wrap.c 			\
+					pkparse.c 			\
+					pkwrite.c 			\
+					sha256.c            		\
+					sha512.c            		\
+					ecdsa.c				\
+					ecp_curves.c			\
+					ecp.c				\
+					rsa.c				\
+					x509.c 				\
+					x509_crt.c 			\
+					)
+
+ifeq (${MBEDTLS_MAJOR}, 2)
+	LIBMBEDTLS_SRCS +=  $(addprefix ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/,	\
+						rsa_internal.c		\
+						)
+else ifeq (${MBEDTLS_MAJOR}, 3)
+	LIBMBEDTLS_SRCS +=  $(addprefix ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/,	\
+						bignum_core.c		\
+						rsa_alt_helpers.c	\
+						hash_info.c		\
+						)
+
+	# Currently on Mbedtls-3 there is outstanding bug due to usage
+	# of redundant declaration[1], So disable redundant-decls
+	# compilation flag to avoid compilation error when compiling with
+	# Mbedtls-3.
+	# [1]: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6910
+	LIBMBEDTLS_CFLAGS += -Wno-error=redundant-decls
+endif
+
+ifeq (${PSA_CRYPTO},1)
+LIBMBEDTLS_SRCS         += $(addprefix ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/,    	\
+					psa_crypto.c                   	\
+					psa_crypto_client.c            	\
+					psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c   	\
+					psa_crypto_hash.c              	\
+					psa_crypto_rsa.c               	\
+					psa_crypto_ecp.c               	\
+					psa_crypto_slot_management.c   	\
+					)
+endif
+
+# The platform may define the variable 'TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG' to select the key
+# algorithm to use. If the variable is not defined, select it based on
+# algorithm used for key generation `KEY_ALG`. If `KEY_ALG` is not defined,
+# then it is set to `rsa`.
+ifeq (${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG},)
+    ifeq (${KEY_ALG}, ecdsa)
+        TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG		:=	ecdsa
+    else
+        TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG		:=	rsa
+    endif
+endif
+
+ifeq (${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE},)
+    ifneq ($(findstring rsa,${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG}),)
+        ifeq (${KEY_SIZE},)
+            TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE		:=	2048
+        else ifneq ($(filter $(KEY_SIZE), 1024 2048 3072 4096),)
+            TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE		:=	${KEY_SIZE}
+        else
+            $(error "Invalid value for KEY_SIZE: ${KEY_SIZE}")
+        endif
+    else ifneq ($(findstring ecdsa,${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG}),)
+        ifeq (${KEY_SIZE},)
+            TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE		:=	256
+        else ifneq ($(filter $(KEY_SIZE), 256 384),)
+            TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE		:=	${KEY_SIZE}
+        else
+            $(error "Invalid value for KEY_SIZE: ${KEY_SIZE}")
+        endif
+    endif
+endif
+
+ifeq (${HASH_ALG}, sha384)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_SHA384
+else ifeq (${HASH_ALG}, sha512)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_SHA512
+else
+    TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_SHA256
+endif
+
+ifeq (${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG},ecdsa)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA
+else ifeq (${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG},rsa)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_RSA
+else ifeq (${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG},rsa+ecdsa)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID	:=	TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
+else
+    $(error "TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG=${TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG} not supported on mbed TLS")
+endif
+
+ifeq (${DECRYPTION_SUPPORT}, aes_gcm)
+    TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM	:=	1
+else
+    TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM	:=	0
+endif
+
+# Needs to be set to drive mbed TLS configuration correctly
+$(eval $(call add_defines,\
+    $(sort \
+        TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID \
+        TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_SIZE \
+        TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID \
+        TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM \
+)))
+
+$(eval $(call MAKE_LIB,mbedtls))
+
+endif
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.c b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..230cec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* mbed TLS headers */
+#include <mbedtls/gcm.h>
+#include <mbedtls/md.h>
+#include <mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h>
+#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
+#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
+#include <mbedtls/version.h>
+#include <mbedtls/x509.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
+
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#define LIB_NAME		"mbed TLS"
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+/*
+ * CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE value is as per current stronger algorithm available
+ * so make sure that mbed TLS MD maximum size must be lesser than this.
+ */
+CASSERT(CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE >= MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
+	assert_mbedtls_md_size_overflow);
+
+#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+	  CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
+
+/*
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+ *     algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ *     parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ *
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+ *     algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *     subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING
+ * }
+ *
+ * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *     digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *     digest OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the library and export the descriptor
+ */
+static void init(void)
+{
+	/* Initialize mbed TLS */
+	mbedtls_init();
+}
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+/*
+ * Verify a signature.
+ *
+ * Parameters are passed using the DER encoding format following the ASN.1
+ * structures detailed above.
+ */
+static int verify_signature(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
+			    void *sig_ptr, unsigned int sig_len,
+			    void *sig_alg, unsigned int sig_alg_len,
+			    void *pk_ptr, unsigned int pk_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_oid, sig_params;
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf signature;
+	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+	mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+	mbedtls_pk_context pk = {0};
+	int rc;
+	void *sig_opts = NULL;
+	const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+	unsigned char *p, *end;
+	unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+	/* Get pointers to signature OID and parameters */
+	p = (unsigned char *)sig_alg;
+	end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_alg_len);
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid, &sig_params);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the actual signature algorithm (MD + PK) */
+	rc = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&sig_oid, &sig_params, &md_alg, &pk_alg, &sig_opts);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	/* Parse the public key */
+	mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
+	p = (unsigned char *)pk_ptr;
+	end = (unsigned char *)(p + pk_len);
+	rc = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &pk);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end2;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the signature (bitstring) */
+	p = (unsigned char *)sig_ptr;
+	end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_len);
+	signature.tag = *p;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &signature.len);
+	if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != signature.len)) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end1;
+	}
+	signature.p = p;
+
+	/* Calculate the hash of the data */
+	md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+	if (md_info == NULL) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end1;
+	}
+	p = (unsigned char *)data_ptr;
+	rc = mbedtls_md(md_info, p, data_len, hash);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end1;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify the signature */
+	rc = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(pk_alg, sig_opts, &pk, md_alg, hash,
+			mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info),
+			signature.p, signature.len);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end1;
+	}
+
+	/* Signature verification success */
+	rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+
+end1:
+	mbedtls_pk_free(&pk);
+end2:
+	mbedtls_free(sig_opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match a hash
+ *
+ * Digest info is passed in DER format following the ASN.1 structure detailed
+ * above.
+ */
+static int verify_hash(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
+		       void *digest_info_ptr, unsigned int digest_info_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf hash_oid, params;
+	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+	const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+	unsigned char *p, *end, *hash;
+	unsigned char data_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Digest info should be an MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, but padding after
+	 * it is allowed.  This is necessary to support multiple hash
+	 * algorithms.
+	 */
+	p = (unsigned char *)digest_info_ptr;
+	end = p + digest_info_len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	end = p + len;
+
+	/* Get the hash algorithm */
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &hash_oid, &params);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	rc = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&hash_oid, &md_alg);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+	if (md_info == NULL) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/* Hash should be octet string type and consume all bytes */
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+	if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != len)) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/* Length of hash must match the algorithm's size */
+	if (len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+	hash = p;
+
+	/* Calculate the hash of the data */
+	p = (unsigned char *)data_ptr;
+	rc = mbedtls_md(md_info, p, data_len, data_hash);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/* Compare values */
+	rc = memcmp(data_hash, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
+	  CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+/*
+ * Map a generic crypto message digest algorithm to the corresponding macro used
+ * by Mbed TLS.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_md_type_t md_type(enum crypto_md_algo algo)
+{
+	switch (algo) {
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA512:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA384:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA256:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+	default:
+		/* Invalid hash algorithm. */
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a hash
+ *
+ * output points to the computed hash
+ */
+static int calc_hash(enum crypto_md_algo md_algo, void *data_ptr,
+		     unsigned int data_len,
+		     unsigned char output[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE])
+{
+	const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+
+	md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type(md_algo));
+	if (md_info == NULL) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the hash of the data, it is safe to pass the
+	 * 'output' hash buffer pointer considering its size is always
+	 * bigger than or equal to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE.
+	 */
+	return mbedtls_md(md_info, data_ptr, data_len, output);
+}
+#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+	  CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
+
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+/*
+ * Stack based buffer allocation for decryption operation. It could
+ * be configured to balance stack usage vs execution speed.
+ */
+#define DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE		128
+
+static int aes_gcm_decrypt(void *data_ptr, size_t len, const void *key,
+			   unsigned int key_len, const void *iv,
+			   unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
+			   unsigned int tag_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
+	mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
+	unsigned char buf[DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE];
+	unsigned char tag_buf[CRYPTO_MAX_TAG_SIZE];
+	unsigned char *pt = data_ptr;
+	size_t dec_len;
+	int diff, i, rc;
+	size_t output_length __unused;
+
+	mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, key, key_len * 8);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, NULL, 0);
+#else
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len);
+#endif
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		dec_len = MIN(sizeof(buf), len);
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+		rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, dec_len, pt, buf);
+#else
+		rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt, dec_len, buf, sizeof(buf), &output_length);
+#endif
+
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+			goto exit_gcm;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(pt, buf, dec_len);
+		pt += dec_len;
+		len -= dec_len;
+	}
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
+#else
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &output_length, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
+#endif
+
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+	for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
+		diff |= ((const unsigned char *)tag)[i] ^ tag_buf[i];
+
+	if (diff != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	/* GCM decryption success */
+	rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+
+exit_gcm:
+	mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated decryption of an image
+ */
+static int auth_decrypt(enum crypto_dec_algo dec_algo, void *data_ptr,
+			size_t len, const void *key, unsigned int key_len,
+			unsigned int key_flags, const void *iv,
+			unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
+			unsigned int tag_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	assert((key_flags & ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER) == 0);
+
+	switch (dec_algo) {
+	case CRYPTO_GCM_DECRYPT:
+		rc = aes_gcm_decrypt(data_ptr, len, key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
+				     tag, tag_len);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+	}
+
+	return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM */
+
+/*
+ * Register crypto library descriptor
+ */
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
+		    auth_decrypt, NULL);
+#else
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
+		    NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
+		    auth_decrypt, NULL);
+#else
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
+		    NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, NULL, NULL, calc_hash, NULL, NULL);
+#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.mk b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd36730
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2015-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+include drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.mk
+
+ifeq (${PSA_CRYPTO},1)
+	# Some of the PSA functions are declared in multiple header files
+	# that triggers this warning.
+	TF_CFLAGS      	+=     	-Wno-error=redundant-decls
+	MBEDTLS_SOURCES +=	drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_psa_crypto.c
+else
+	MBEDTLS_SOURCES +=	drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_crypto.c
+endif
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_psa_crypto.c b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_psa_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5891acf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_psa_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* mbed TLS headers */
+#include <mbedtls/gcm.h>
+#include <mbedtls/md.h>
+#include <mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h>
+#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
+#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
+#include <mbedtls/version.h>
+#include <mbedtls/x509.h>
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+#include <psa/crypto_platform.h>
+#include <psa/crypto_types.h>
+#include <psa/crypto_values.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#define LIB_NAME		"mbed TLS PSA"
+
+/* Maximum length of R_S pair in the ECDSA signature in bytes */
+#define MAX_ECDSA_R_S_PAIR_LEN	64U
+
+/* Size of ASN.1 length and tag in bytes*/
+#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN	1U
+#define SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG	1U
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+/*
+ * CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE value is as per current stronger algorithm available
+ * so make sure that mbed TLS MD maximum size must be lesser than this.
+ */
+CASSERT(CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE >= MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
+	assert_mbedtls_md_size_overflow);
+
+#endif /*
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+	*/
+
+static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(
+						mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
+{
+	assert((md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) ||
+	       (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) ||
+	       (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512));
+
+	return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) (md_type + 0x5);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+ *     algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ *     parameters              ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ *
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+ *     algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *     subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING
+ * }
+ *
+ * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *     digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ *     digest OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ */
+
+/*
+ * We pretend using an external RNG (through MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
+ * mbedTLS config option) so we need to provide an implementation of
+ * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). Provide a fake one, since we do not
+ * actually have any external RNG and TF-A itself doesn't engage in
+ * cryptographic operations that demands randomness.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
+			mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
+			uint8_t *output, size_t output_size,
+			size_t *output_length)
+{
+	return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the library and export the descriptor
+ */
+static void init(void)
+{
+	/* Initialize mbed TLS */
+	mbedtls_init();
+
+	/* Initialise PSA mbedTLS */
+	psa_status_t status = psa_crypto_init();
+
+	if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		ERROR("Failed to initialize %s crypto (%d).\n", LIB_NAME, status);
+		panic();
+	}
+
+	INFO("PSA crypto initialized successfully!\n");
+}
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+
+static void construct_psa_key_alg_and_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg,
+					   mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+					   psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_family,
+					   psa_algorithm_t *psa_alg,
+					   psa_key_type_t *psa_key_type)
+{
+	psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+
+	switch (pk_alg) {
+	case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:
+		*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg);
+		*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY;
+		break;
+	case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+		*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_md_alg);
+		*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_ecc_family);
+		break;
+	default:
+		*psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+		*psa_key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
+TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
+
+/*
+ * This is a helper function to detect padding byte (if the MSB bit of the
+ * first data byte is set to 1, for example 0x80) and on detection, ignore the
+ * padded byte(0x00) and increase the buffer pointer beyond padded byte and
+ * decrease the length of the buffer by 1.
+ *
+ * On Success returns 0, error otherwise.
+ **/
+static inline int ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(unsigned char **buf_start,
+					       size_t *buf_len)
+{
+	unsigned char *local_buf = *buf_start;
+
+	/* Check for negative number */
+	if ((local_buf[0] & 0x80U) != 0U) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((local_buf[0] == 0U) && (local_buf[1] > 0x7FU) &&
+	    (*buf_len > 1U)) {
+		*buf_start = &local_buf[1];
+		(*buf_len)--;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a helper function that gets a pointer to the encoded ECDSA publicKey
+ * and its length (as per RFC5280) and returns corresponding decoded publicKey
+ * and its length. As well, it retrieves the family of ECC key in the PSA
+ * format.
+ *
+ * This function returns error(CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE) on ASN.1 parsing failure,
+ * otherwise success(0).
+ **/
+static int get_ecdsa_pkinfo_from_asn1(unsigned char **pk_start,
+				      unsigned int *pk_len,
+				      psa_ecc_family_t *psa_ecc_family)
+{
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid, alg_params;
+	mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned char *pk_end;
+	size_t len;
+	size_t curve_bits;
+	unsigned char *pk_ptr = *pk_start;
+
+	pk_end = pk_ptr + *pk_len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len,
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	pk_end = pk_ptr + len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &alg_oid, &alg_params);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	if (alg_params.tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) {
+		if (mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(&alg_params, &grp_id) != 0) {
+			return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		}
+		*psa_ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id,
+							   &curve_bits);
+	} else {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	pk_end = pk_ptr + len - (alg_oid.len + alg_params.len +
+		 2 * (SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN + SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG));
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&pk_ptr, pk_end, &len);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	*pk_start = pk_ptr;
+	*pk_len = len;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ecdsa-Sig-Value  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+ *   r     INTEGER,
+ *   s     INTEGER
+ * }
+ *
+ * This helper function that gets a pointer to the encoded ECDSA signature and
+ * its length (as per RFC5280) and returns corresponding decoded signature
+ * (R_S pair) and its size.
+ *
+ * This function returns error(CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE) on ASN.1 parsing failure,
+ * otherwise success(0).
+ **/
+static int get_ecdsa_signature_from_asn1(unsigned char *sig_ptr,
+					 size_t *sig_len,
+					 unsigned char *r_s_pair)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned char *sig_end;
+	size_t len, r_len, s_len;
+
+	sig_end = sig_ptr + *sig_len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &len,
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	sig_end = sig_ptr + len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &r_len,
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	if (ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(&sig_ptr, &r_len) != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	(void)memcpy((void *)&r_s_pair[0], (const void *)sig_ptr, r_len);
+
+	sig_ptr = sig_ptr + r_len;
+	sig_end = sig_ptr + len - (r_len + (SIZE_OF_ASN1_LEN +
+		  SIZE_OF_ASN1_TAG));
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&sig_ptr, sig_end, &s_len,
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	if (ignore_asn1_int_padding_byte(&sig_ptr, &s_len) != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	(void)memcpy((void *)&r_s_pair[r_len], (const void *)sig_ptr, s_len);
+
+	*sig_len = s_len + r_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /*
+	* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
+	* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
+	**/
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature.
+ *
+ * Parameters are passed using the DER encoding format following the ASN.1
+ * structures detailed above.
+ */
+static int verify_signature(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
+			    void *sig_ptr, unsigned int sig_len,
+			    void *sig_alg, unsigned int sig_alg_len,
+			    void *pk_ptr, unsigned int pk_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_oid, sig_params;
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf signature;
+	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+	mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+	int rc;
+	void *sig_opts = NULL;
+	unsigned char *p, *end;
+	unsigned char *local_sig_ptr;
+	size_t local_sig_len;
+	psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_family = 0U;
+	__unused unsigned char reformatted_sig[MAX_ECDSA_R_S_PAIR_LEN] = {0};
+
+	/* construct PSA key algo and type */
+	psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+	psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+	psa_key_id_t psa_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_NULL;
+	psa_key_type_t psa_key_type;
+	psa_algorithm_t psa_alg;
+
+	/* Get pointers to signature OID and parameters */
+	p = (unsigned char *)sig_alg;
+	end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_alg_len);
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid, &sig_params);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the actual signature algorithm (MD + PK) */
+	rc = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&sig_oid, &sig_params, &md_alg, &pk_alg, &sig_opts);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the signature (bitstring) */
+	p = (unsigned char *)sig_ptr;
+	end = (unsigned char *)(p + sig_len);
+	signature.tag = *p;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &signature.len);
+	if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != signature.len)) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end2;
+	}
+
+	local_sig_ptr = p;
+	local_sig_len = signature.len;
+
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
+TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
+	if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
+		rc = get_ecdsa_signature_from_asn1(local_sig_ptr,
+						   &local_sig_len,
+						   reformatted_sig);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			goto end2;
+		}
+
+		local_sig_ptr = reformatted_sig;
+
+		rc = get_ecdsa_pkinfo_from_asn1((unsigned char **)&pk_ptr,
+						&pk_len,
+						&psa_ecc_family);
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			goto end2;
+		}
+	}
+#endif /*
+	* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_ECDSA || \
+	* TF_MBEDTLS_KEY_ALG_ID == TF_MBEDTLS_RSA_AND_ECDSA
+	**/
+
+	/* Convert this pk_alg and md_alg to PSA key type and key algorithm */
+	construct_psa_key_alg_and_type(pk_alg, md_alg, psa_ecc_family,
+				       &psa_alg, &psa_key_type);
+
+
+	if ((psa_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) || (psa_key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE)) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end2;
+	}
+
+	/* filled-in key_attributes */
+	psa_set_key_algorithm(&psa_key_attr, psa_alg);
+	psa_set_key_type(&psa_key_attr, psa_key_type);
+	psa_set_key_usage_flags(&psa_key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
+
+	/* Get the key_id using import API */
+	status = psa_import_key(&psa_key_attr,
+				pk_ptr,
+				(size_t)pk_len,
+				&psa_key_id);
+
+	if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end2;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Hash calculation and Signature verification of the given data payload
+	 * is wrapped under the psa_verify_message function.
+	 */
+	status = psa_verify_message(psa_key_id, psa_alg,
+				    data_ptr, data_len,
+				    local_sig_ptr, local_sig_len);
+
+	if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_SIGNATURE;
+		goto end1;
+	}
+
+	/* Signature verification success */
+	rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+
+end1:
+	/*
+	 * Destroy the key if it is created successfully
+	 */
+	psa_destroy_key(psa_key_id);
+end2:
+	mbedtls_free(sig_opts);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match a hash
+ *
+ * Digest info is passed in DER format following the ASN.1 structure detailed
+ * above.
+ */
+static int verify_hash(void *data_ptr, unsigned int data_len,
+		       void *digest_info_ptr, unsigned int digest_info_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf hash_oid, params;
+	mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+	unsigned char *p, *end, *hash;
+	size_t len;
+	int rc;
+	psa_status_t status;
+	psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
+
+	/*
+	 * Digest info should be an MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, but padding after
+	 * it is allowed.  This is necessary to support multiple hash
+	 * algorithms.
+	 */
+	p = (unsigned char *)digest_info_ptr;
+	end = p + digest_info_len;
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				  MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	end = p + len;
+
+	/* Get the hash algorithm */
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &hash_oid, &params);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/* Hash should be octet string type and consume all bytes */
+	rc = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+	if ((rc != 0) || ((size_t)(end - p) != len)) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+	hash = p;
+
+	rc = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&hash_oid, &md_alg);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
+	psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+
+	/* Length of hash must match the algorithm's size */
+	if (len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_md_alg)) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate Hash and compare it against the retrieved hash from
+	 * the certificate (one shot API).
+	 */
+	status = psa_hash_compare(psa_md_alg,
+				  data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
+				  (const uint8_t *)hash, len);
+
+	if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /*
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY || \
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+	*/
+
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+/*
+ * Map a generic crypto message digest algorithm to the corresponding macro used
+ * by Mbed TLS.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_md_type_t md_type(enum crypto_md_algo algo)
+{
+	switch (algo) {
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA512:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA384:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
+	case CRYPTO_MD_SHA256:
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+	default:
+		/* Invalid hash algorithm. */
+		return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a hash
+ *
+ * output points to the computed hash
+ */
+static int calc_hash(enum crypto_md_algo md_algo, void *data_ptr,
+		     unsigned int data_len,
+		     unsigned char output[CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE])
+{
+	size_t hash_length;
+	psa_status_t status;
+	psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
+
+	/* convert the md_alg to psa_algo */
+	psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type(md_algo));
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the hash of the data, it is safe to pass the
+	 * 'output' hash buffer pointer considering its size is always
+	 * bigger than or equal to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE.
+	 */
+	status = psa_hash_compute(psa_md_alg, data_ptr, (size_t)data_len,
+				  (uint8_t *)output, CRYPTO_MD_MAX_SIZE,
+				  &hash_length);
+	if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_HASH;
+	}
+
+	return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /*
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY || \
+	* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+	*/
+
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+/*
+ * Stack based buffer allocation for decryption operation. It could
+ * be configured to balance stack usage vs execution speed.
+ */
+#define DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE		128
+
+static int aes_gcm_decrypt(void *data_ptr, size_t len, const void *key,
+			   unsigned int key_len, const void *iv,
+			   unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
+			   unsigned int tag_len)
+{
+	mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
+	mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
+	unsigned char buf[DEC_OP_BUF_SIZE];
+	unsigned char tag_buf[CRYPTO_MAX_TAG_SIZE];
+	unsigned char *pt = data_ptr;
+	size_t dec_len;
+	int diff, i, rc;
+	size_t output_length __unused;
+
+	mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, key, key_len * 8);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len, NULL, 0);
+#else
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv, iv_len);
+#endif
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		dec_len = MIN(sizeof(buf), len);
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+		rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, dec_len, pt, buf);
+#else
+		rc = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt, dec_len, buf, sizeof(buf), &output_length);
+#endif
+
+		if (rc != 0) {
+			rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+			goto exit_gcm;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(pt, buf, dec_len);
+		pt += dec_len;
+		len -= dec_len;
+	}
+
+#if (MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR < 3)
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
+#else
+	rc = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &output_length, tag_buf, sizeof(tag_buf));
+#endif
+
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	/* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+	for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++)
+		diff |= ((const unsigned char *)tag)[i] ^ tag_buf[i];
+
+	if (diff != 0) {
+		rc = CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+		goto exit_gcm;
+	}
+
+	/* GCM decryption success */
+	rc = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+
+exit_gcm:
+	mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated decryption of an image
+ */
+static int auth_decrypt(enum crypto_dec_algo dec_algo, void *data_ptr,
+			size_t len, const void *key, unsigned int key_len,
+			unsigned int key_flags, const void *iv,
+			unsigned int iv_len, const void *tag,
+			unsigned int tag_len)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	assert((key_flags & ENC_KEY_IS_IDENTIFIER) == 0);
+
+	switch (dec_algo) {
+	case CRYPTO_GCM_DECRYPT:
+		rc = aes_gcm_decrypt(data_ptr, len, key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
+				     tag, tag_len);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return CRYPTO_ERR_DECRYPTION;
+	}
+
+	return CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM */
+
+/*
+ * Register crypto library descriptor
+ */
+#if CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
+		    auth_decrypt, NULL);
+#else
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, calc_hash,
+		    NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_ONLY
+#if TF_MBEDTLS_USE_AES_GCM
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
+		    auth_decrypt, NULL);
+#else
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, verify_signature, verify_hash, NULL,
+		    NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+#elif CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_HASH_CALC_ONLY
+REGISTER_CRYPTO_LIB(LIB_NAME, init, NULL, NULL, calc_hash, NULL, NULL);
+#endif /* CRYPTO_SUPPORT == CRYPTO_AUTH_VERIFY_AND_HASH_CALC */
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509.mk b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0557e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+include drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.mk
+
+MBEDTLS_SOURCES	+=	drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509_parser.c
diff --git a/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509_parser.c b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bde5bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2023, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+/*
+ * X509 parser based on mbed TLS
+ *
+ * This module implements functions to check the integrity of a X509v3
+ * certificate ASN.1 structure and extract authentication parameters from the
+ * extensions field, such as an image hash or a public key.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* mbed TLS headers */
+#include <mbedtls/asn1.h>
+#include <mbedtls/oid.h>
+#include <mbedtls/platform.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/img_parser_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_common.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+
+/* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */
+#define MAX_OID_STR_LEN			64
+
+#define LIB_NAME	"mbed TLS X509v3"
+
+/* Temporary variables to speed up the authentication parameters search. These
+ * variables are assigned once during the integrity check and used any time an
+ * authentication parameter is requested, so we do not have to parse the image
+ * again */
+static mbedtls_asn1_buf tbs;
+static mbedtls_asn1_buf v3_ext;
+static mbedtls_asn1_buf pk;
+static mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg;
+static mbedtls_asn1_buf signature;
+
+/*
+ * Clear all static temporary variables.
+ */
+static void clear_temp_vars(void)
+{
+#define ZERO_AND_CLEAN(x)					\
+	do {							\
+		zeromem(&x, sizeof(x));				\
+		clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&x, sizeof(x));	\
+	} while (0);
+
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(tbs)
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(v3_ext);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(pk);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(sig_alg);
+	ZERO_AND_CLEAN(signature);
+
+#undef ZERO_AND_CLEAN
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get X509v3 extension
+ *
+ * Global variable 'v3_ext' must point to the extensions region
+ * in the certificate.  OID may be NULL to request that get_ext()
+ * is only being called for integrity checking.
+ */
+static int get_ext(const char *oid, void **ext, unsigned int *ext_len)
+{
+	int oid_len, ret, is_critical;
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	const unsigned char *end;
+	char oid_str[MAX_OID_STR_LEN];
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf extn_oid;
+
+	p = v3_ext.p;
+	end = v3_ext.p + v3_ext.len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check extensions integrity.  At least one extension is
+	 * required: the ASN.1 specifies a minimum size of 1, and at
+	 * least one extension is needed to authenticate the next stage
+	 * in the boot chain.
+	 */
+	do {
+		unsigned char *end_ext_data;
+
+		ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+		}
+		end_ext_data = p + len;
+
+		/* Get extension ID */
+		ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+		}
+		extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+		extn_oid.p = p;
+		p += extn_oid.len;
+
+		/* Get optional critical */
+		ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(&p, end_ext_data, &is_critical);
+		if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) {
+			return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Data should be octet string type and must use all bytes in
+		 * the Extension.
+		 */
+		ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &len,
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+		if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end_ext_data)) {
+			return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+		}
+
+		/* Detect requested extension */
+		oid_len = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(oid_str,
+							 MAX_OID_STR_LEN,
+							 &extn_oid);
+		if ((oid_len == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) || (oid_len < 0)) {
+			return IMG_PARSER_ERR;
+		}
+
+		if ((oid != NULL) &&
+		    ((size_t)oid_len == strlen(oid_str)) &&
+		    (strcmp(oid, oid_str) == 0)) {
+			/* Extension must be ASN.1 DER */
+			if (len < 2) {
+				/* too short */
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+
+			if ((p[0] & 0x1F) == 0x1F) {
+				/* multi-byte ASN.1 DER tag, not allowed */
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+
+			if ((p[0] & 0xDF) == 0) {
+				/* UNIVERSAL 0 tag, not allowed */
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+
+			*ext = (void *)p;
+			*ext_len = (unsigned int)len;
+
+			/* Advance past the tag byte */
+			p++;
+
+			if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, end_ext_data, &len)) {
+				/* not valid DER */
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+
+			if (p + len != end_ext_data) {
+				/* junk after ASN.1 object */
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+
+			return IMG_PARSER_OK;
+		}
+
+		/* Next */
+		p = end_ext_data;
+	} while (p < end);
+
+	return (oid == NULL) ? IMG_PARSER_OK : IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check the integrity of the certificate ASN.1 structure.
+ *
+ * Extract the relevant data that will be used later during authentication.
+ *
+ * This function doesn't clear the static variables located on the top of this
+ * file in case of an error. It is only called from check_integrity(), which
+ * performs the cleanup if necessary.
+ */
+static int cert_parse(void *img, unsigned int img_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end, *pk_end;
+	mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg1;
+	/*
+	 * The unique ASN.1 DER encoding of [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER { v3(2} }.
+	 */
+	static const char v3[] = {
+		/* The outer CONTEXT SPECIFIC 0 tag */
+		MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0,
+		/* The number bytes used to encode the inner INTEGER */
+		3,
+		/* The tag of the inner INTEGER */
+		MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER,
+		/* The number of bytes needed to represent 2 */
+		1,
+		/* The actual value 2 */
+		2,
+	};
+
+	p = (unsigned char *)img;
+	len = img_len;
+	crt_end = p + len;
+	end = crt_end;
+
+	/*
+	 * Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+	 *      tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
+	 *      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+	 *      signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+	 */
+	tbs.p = p;
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	end = p + len;
+	tbs.len = end - tbs.p;
+
+	/*
+	 * Version  ::=  [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }
+	 * -- only v3 accepted
+	 */
+	if (((end - p) <= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(v3)) ||
+	    (memcmp(p, v3, sizeof(v3)) != 0)) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += sizeof(v3);
+
+	/*
+	 * CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += len;
+
+	/*
+	 * signature            AlgorithmIdentifier
+	 */
+	sig_alg1.p = p;
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	sig_alg1.len = (p + len) - sig_alg1.p;
+	p += len;
+
+	/*
+	 * issuer               Name
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
+	 *      notBefore      Time,
+	 *      notAfter       Time }
+	 *
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += len;
+
+	/*
+	 * subject              Name
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += len;
+
+	/*
+	 * SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+	 */
+	pk.p = p;
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	pk_end = p + len;
+	pk.len = pk_end - pk.p;
+
+	/* algorithm */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, pk_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += len;
+
+	/* Key is a BIT STRING and must use all bytes in SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, pk_end, &len);
+	if ((ret != 0) || (p + len != pk_end)) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p = pk_end;
+
+	/*
+	 * issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+	 * subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+	 * -- technically these contain BIT STRINGs but that is not worth
+	 * -- validating
+	 */
+	for (int i = 1; i < 3; i++) {
+		ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+					   MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | i);
+		/*
+		 * Unique IDs are obsolete, so MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
+		 * is the common case.
+		 */
+		if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+			if (ret != 0) {
+				return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+			}
+			p += len;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * extensions      [3]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
+	 * }
+	 *
+	 * X.509 and RFC5280 allow omitting the extensions entirely.
+	 * However, in TF-A, a certificate with no extensions would
+	 * always fail later on, as the extensions contain the
+	 * information needed to authenticate the next stage in the
+	 * boot chain.  Furthermore, get_ext() assumes that the
+	 * extensions have been parsed into v3_ext, and allowing
+	 * there to be no extensions would pointlessly complicate
+	 * the code.  Therefore, just reject certificates without
+	 * extensions.  This is also why version 1 and 2 certificates
+	 * are rejected above.
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3);
+	if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Extensions  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
+	 * -- must use all remaining bytes in TBSCertificate
+	 */
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+				   MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+	if ((ret != 0) || (len != (size_t)(end - p))) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	v3_ext.p = p;
+	v3_ext.len = len;
+	p += len;
+
+	/* Check extensions integrity */
+	ret = get_ext(NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret != IMG_PARSER_OK) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	end = crt_end;
+
+	/*
+	 *  }
+	 *  -- end of TBSCertificate
+	 *
+	 *  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
+	 *  -- Does not need to be parsed.  Ensuring it is bitwise
+	 *  -- identical (including the tag!) with the first signature
+	 *  -- algorithm is sufficient.
+	 */
+	if ((sig_alg1.len >= (size_t)(end - p)) ||
+	    (0 != memcmp(sig_alg1.p, p, sig_alg1.len))) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	p += sig_alg1.len;
+	memcpy(&sig_alg, &sig_alg1, sizeof(sig_alg));
+
+	/*
+	 * signatureValue       BIT STRING
+	 * } -- must consume all bytes
+	 */
+	signature.p = p;
+	ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end, &len);
+	if ((ret != 0) || ((p + len) != end)) {
+		return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT;
+	}
+	signature.len = end - signature.p;
+
+	return IMG_PARSER_OK;
+}
+
+
+/* Exported functions */
+
+static void init(void)
+{
+	mbedtls_init();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for cert_parse() that clears the static variables used by it in case
+ * of an error.
+ */
+static int check_integrity(void *img, unsigned int img_len)
+{
+	int rc = cert_parse(img, img_len);
+
+	if (rc != IMG_PARSER_OK)
+		clear_temp_vars();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract an authentication parameter from an X509v3 certificate
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to the extracted data and its length.
+ * Depending on the type of parameter, a pointer to the data stored in the
+ * certificate may be returned (i.e. an octet string containing a hash). Other
+ * data may need to be copied and formatted (i.e. integers). In the later case,
+ * a buffer of the correct type needs to be statically allocated, filled and
+ * returned.
+ */
+static int get_auth_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc,
+		void *img, unsigned int img_len,
+		void **param, unsigned int *param_len)
+{
+	int rc = IMG_PARSER_OK;
+
+	/* We do not use img because the check_integrity function has already
+	 * extracted the relevant data (v3_ext, pk, sig_alg, etc) */
+
+	switch (type_desc->type) {
+	case AUTH_PARAM_RAW_DATA:
+		/* Data to be signed */
+		*param = (void *)tbs.p;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)tbs.len;
+		break;
+	case AUTH_PARAM_HASH:
+	case AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR:
+		/* All these parameters are included as X509v3 extensions */
+		rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len);
+		break;
+	case AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY:
+		if (type_desc->cookie != NULL) {
+			/* Get public key from extension */
+			rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len);
+		} else {
+			/* Get the subject public key */
+			*param = (void *)pk.p;
+			*param_len = (unsigned int)pk.len;
+		}
+		break;
+	case AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG:
+		/* Get the certificate signature algorithm */
+		*param = (void *)sig_alg.p;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)sig_alg.len;
+		break;
+	case AUTH_PARAM_SIG:
+		/* Get the certificate signature */
+		*param = (void *)signature.p;
+		*param_len = (unsigned int)signature.len;
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(IMG_CERT, LIB_NAME, init,
+		       check_integrity, get_auth_param);