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-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch32/bl1_arch_setup.c15
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch32/bl1_context_mgmt.c172
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch32/bl1_entrypoint.S99
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch32/bl1_exceptions.S165
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c19
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c131
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S108
-rw-r--r--bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S287
-rw-r--r--bl1/bl1.ld.S169
-rw-r--r--bl1/bl1.mk38
-rw-r--r--bl1/bl1_fwu.c745
-rw-r--r--bl1/bl1_main.c302
-rw-r--r--bl1/bl1_private.h33
-rw-r--r--bl1/tbbr/tbbr_img_desc.c65
14 files changed, 2348 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bl1/aarch32/bl1_arch_setup.c b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_arch_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce04aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_arch_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include "../bl1_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * TODO: Function that does the first bit of architectural setup.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_arch_setup(void)
+{
+
+}
diff --git a/bl1/aarch32/bl1_context_mgmt.c b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_context_mgmt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d35a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_context_mgmt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+#include "../bl1_private.h"
+
+/*
+ * Following arrays will be used for context management.
+ * There are 2 instances, for the Secure and Non-Secure contexts.
+ */
+static cpu_context_t bl1_cpu_context[2];
+static smc_ctx_t bl1_smc_context[2];
+
+/* Following contains the next cpu context pointer. */
+static void *bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr;
+
+/* Following contains the next smc context pointer. */
+static void *bl1_next_smc_context_ptr;
+
+/* Following functions are used for SMC context handling */
+void *smc_get_ctx(unsigned int security_state)
+{
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+ return &bl1_smc_context[security_state];
+}
+
+void smc_set_next_ctx(unsigned int security_state)
+{
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+ bl1_next_smc_context_ptr = &bl1_smc_context[security_state];
+}
+
+void *smc_get_next_ctx(void)
+{
+ return bl1_next_smc_context_ptr;
+}
+
+/* Following functions are used for CPU context handling */
+void *cm_get_context(uint32_t security_state)
+{
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+ return &bl1_cpu_context[security_state];
+}
+
+void cm_set_next_context(void *context)
+{
+ assert(context != NULL);
+ bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr = context;
+}
+
+void *cm_get_next_context(void)
+{
+ return bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Following function copies GP regs r0-r4, lr and spsr,
+ * from the CPU context to the SMC context structures.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_ctx(const regs_t *cpu_reg_ctx,
+ smc_ctx_t *next_smc_ctx)
+{
+ next_smc_ctx->r0 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R0);
+ next_smc_ctx->r1 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R1);
+ next_smc_ctx->r2 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R2);
+ next_smc_ctx->r3 = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_GPREG_R3);
+ next_smc_ctx->lr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_LR);
+ next_smc_ctx->spsr_mon = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SPSR);
+ next_smc_ctx->scr = read_ctx_reg(cpu_reg_ctx, CTX_SCR);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Following function flushes the SMC & CPU context pointer and its data.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void flush_smc_and_cpu_ctx(void)
+{
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&bl1_next_smc_context_ptr,
+ sizeof(bl1_next_smc_context_ptr));
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)bl1_next_smc_context_ptr,
+ sizeof(smc_ctx_t));
+
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr,
+ sizeof(bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr));
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)bl1_next_cpu_context_ptr,
+ sizeof(cpu_context_t));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function prepares the context for Secure/Normal world images.
+ * Normal world images are transitioned to HYP(if supported) else SVC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_prepare_next_image(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ unsigned int security_state, mode = MODE32_svc;
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+ entry_point_info_t *next_bl_ep;
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+ assert(desc != NULL);
+
+ /* Get the entry point info. */
+ next_bl_ep = &desc->ep_info;
+
+ /* Get the image security state. */
+ security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_bl_ep->h.attr);
+
+ /* Prepare the SPSR for the next BL image. */
+ if ((security_state != SECURE) && (GET_VIRT_EXT(read_id_pfr1()) != 0U)) {
+ mode = MODE32_hyp;
+ }
+
+ next_bl_ep->spsr = SPSR_MODE32(mode, SPSR_T_ARM,
+ SPSR_E_LITTLE, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+ /* Allow platform to make change */
+ bl1_plat_set_ep_info(image_id, next_bl_ep);
+
+ /* Prepare the cpu context for the next BL image. */
+ cm_init_my_context(next_bl_ep);
+ cm_prepare_el3_exit(security_state);
+ cm_set_next_context(cm_get_context(security_state));
+
+ /* Prepare the smc context for the next BL image. */
+ smc_set_next_ctx(security_state);
+ copy_cpu_ctx_to_smc_ctx(get_regs_ctx(cm_get_next_context()),
+ smc_get_next_ctx());
+
+ /*
+ * If the next image is non-secure, then we need to program the banked
+ * non secure sctlr. This is not required when the next image is secure
+ * because in AArch32, we expect the secure world to have the same
+ * SCTLR settings.
+ */
+ if (security_state == NON_SECURE) {
+ cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
+ u_register_t ns_sctlr;
+
+ /* Temporarily set the NS bit to access NS SCTLR */
+ write_scr(read_scr() | SCR_NS_BIT);
+ isb();
+
+ ns_sctlr = read_ctx_reg(get_regs_ctx(ctx), CTX_NS_SCTLR);
+ write_sctlr(ns_sctlr);
+ isb();
+
+ write_scr(read_scr() & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
+ isb();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Flush the SMC & CPU context and the (next)pointers,
+ * to access them after caches are disabled.
+ */
+ flush_smc_and_cpu_ctx();
+
+ /* Indicate that image is in execution state. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED;
+
+ print_entry_point_info(next_bl_ep);
+}
diff --git a/bl1/aarch32/bl1_entrypoint.S b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_entrypoint.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b22015e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_entrypoint.S
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <el3_common_macros.S>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+#include <smccc_macros.S>
+
+ .globl bl1_vector_table
+ .globl bl1_entrypoint
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Setup the vector table to support SVC & MON mode.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_base bl1_vector_table
+ b bl1_entrypoint
+ b report_exception /* Undef */
+ b bl1_aarch32_smc_handler /* SMC call */
+ b report_prefetch_abort /* Prefetch abort */
+ b report_data_abort /* Data abort */
+ b report_exception /* Reserved */
+ b report_exception /* IRQ */
+ b report_exception /* FIQ */
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * bl1_entrypoint() is the entry point into the trusted
+ * firmware code when a cpu is released from warm or
+ * cold reset.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+func bl1_entrypoint
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+* If the reset address is programmable then bl1_entrypoint() is
+* executed only on the cold boot path. Therefore, we can skip the warm
+* boot mailbox mechanism.
+* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+*/
+ el3_entrypoint_common \
+ _init_sctlr=1 \
+ _warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
+ _secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
+ _init_memory=1 \
+ _init_c_runtime=1 \
+ _exception_vectors=bl1_vector_table \
+ _pie_fixup_size=0
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Perform BL1 setup
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl bl1_setup
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Jump to main function.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl bl1_main
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Jump to next image.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Get the smc_context for next BL image,
+ * program the gp/system registers and save it in `r4`.
+ */
+ bl smc_get_next_ctx
+ mov r4, r0
+
+ /* Only turn-off MMU if going to secure world */
+ ldr r5, [r4, #SMC_CTX_SCR]
+ tst r5, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ bne skip_mmu_off
+
+ /*
+ * MMU needs to be disabled because both BL1 and BL2/BL2U execute
+ * in PL1, and therefore share the same address space.
+ * BL2/BL2U will initialize the address space according to its
+ * own requirement.
+ */
+ bl disable_mmu_icache_secure
+ stcopr r0, TLBIALL
+ dsb sy
+ isb
+
+skip_mmu_off:
+ /* Restore smc_context from `r4` and exit secure monitor mode. */
+ mov r0, r4
+ monitor_exit
+endfunc bl1_entrypoint
diff --git a/bl1/aarch32/bl1_exceptions.S b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_exceptions.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a6815f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch32/bl1_exceptions.S
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl1/bl1.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+#include <smccc_macros.S>
+
+ .globl bl1_aarch32_smc_handler
+
+
+func bl1_aarch32_smc_handler
+ /* On SMC entry, `sp` points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save `lr`. */
+ str lr, [sp, #SMC_CTX_LR_MON]
+
+ /* ------------------------------------------------
+ * SMC in BL1 is handled assuming that the MMU is
+ * turned off by BL2.
+ * ------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+ /* ----------------------------------------------
+ * Detect if this is a RUN_IMAGE or other SMC.
+ * ----------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov lr, #BL1_SMC_RUN_IMAGE
+ cmp lr, r0
+ bne smc_handler
+
+ /* ------------------------------------------------
+ * Make sure only Secure world reaches here.
+ * ------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ ldcopr r8, SCR
+ tst r8, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ blne report_exception
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Pass control to next secure image.
+ * Here it expects r1 to contain the address of a entry_point_info_t
+ * structure describing the BL entrypoint.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov r8, r1
+ mov r0, r1
+ bl bl1_print_next_bl_ep_info
+
+#if SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT
+ bl print_debug_loop_message
+debug_loop:
+ b debug_loop
+#endif
+
+ mov r0, r8
+ bl bl1_plat_prepare_exit
+
+ stcopr r0, TLBIALL
+ dsb sy
+ isb
+
+ /*
+ * Extract PC and SPSR based on struct `entry_point_info_t`
+ * and load it in LR and SPSR registers respectively.
+ */
+ ldr lr, [r8, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_PC_OFFSET]
+ ldr r1, [r8, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_PC_OFFSET + 4)]
+ msr spsr_xc, r1
+
+ /* Some BL32 stages expect lr_svc to provide the BL33 entry address */
+ cps #MODE32_svc
+ ldr lr, [r8, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_LR_SVC_OFFSET]
+ cps #MODE32_mon
+
+ add r8, r8, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET
+ ldm r8, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
+ exception_return
+endfunc bl1_aarch32_smc_handler
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Save Secure/Normal world context and jump to
+ * BL1 SMC handler.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+func smc_handler
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Save the GP registers.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ smccc_save_gp_mode_regs
+
+ /*
+ * `sp` still points to `smc_ctx_t`. Save it to a register
+ * and restore the C runtime stack pointer to `sp`.
+ */
+ mov r6, sp
+ ldr sp, [r6, #SMC_CTX_SP_MON]
+
+ ldr r0, [r6, #SMC_CTX_SCR]
+ and r7, r0, #SCR_NS_BIT /* flags */
+
+ /* Switch to Secure Mode */
+ bic r0, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ stcopr r0, SCR
+ isb
+
+ /* If caller is from Secure world then turn on the MMU */
+ tst r7, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ bne skip_mmu_on
+
+ /* Turn on the MMU */
+ mov r0, #DISABLE_DCACHE
+ bl enable_mmu_svc_mon
+
+ /*
+ * Invalidate `smc_ctx_t` in data cache to prevent dirty data being
+ * used.
+ */
+ mov r0, r6
+ mov r1, #SMC_CTX_SIZE
+ bl inv_dcache_range
+
+ /* Enable the data cache. */
+ ldcopr r9, SCTLR
+ orr r9, r9, #SCTLR_C_BIT
+ stcopr r9, SCTLR
+ isb
+
+skip_mmu_on:
+ /* Prepare arguments for BL1 SMC wrapper. */
+ ldr r0, [r6, #SMC_CTX_GPREG_R0] /* smc_fid */
+ mov r1, #0 /* cookie */
+ mov r2, r6 /* handle */
+ mov r3, r7 /* flags */
+ bl bl1_smc_wrapper
+
+ /* Get the smc_context for next BL image */
+ bl smc_get_next_ctx
+ mov r4, r0
+
+ /* Only turn-off MMU if going to secure world */
+ ldr r5, [r4, #SMC_CTX_SCR]
+ tst r5, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ bne skip_mmu_off
+
+ /* Disable the MMU */
+ bl disable_mmu_icache_secure
+ stcopr r0, TLBIALL
+ dsb sy
+ isb
+
+skip_mmu_off:
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Do the transition to next BL image.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov r0, r4
+ monitor_exit
+endfunc smc_handler
diff --git a/bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3de536
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include "../bl1_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function that does the first bit of architectural setup that affects
+ * execution in the non-secure address space.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_arch_setup(void)
+{
+ /* Set the next EL to be AArch64 */
+ write_scr_el3(read_scr_el3() | SCR_RW_BIT);
+}
diff --git a/bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9a7e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include "../bl1_private.h"
+
+/* Following contains the cpu context pointers. */
+static void *bl1_cpu_context_ptr[2];
+entry_point_info_t *bl2_ep_info;
+
+
+void *cm_get_context(uint32_t security_state)
+{
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+ return bl1_cpu_context_ptr[security_state];
+}
+
+void cm_set_context(void *context, uint32_t security_state)
+{
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(security_state));
+ bl1_cpu_context_ptr[security_state] = context;
+}
+
+#if ENABLE_RME
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function prepares the entry point information to run BL2 in Root world,
+ * i.e. EL3, for the case when FEAT_RME is enabled.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_prepare_next_image(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ image_desc_t *bl2_desc;
+
+ assert(image_id == BL2_IMAGE_ID);
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ bl2_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(BL2_IMAGE_ID);
+ assert(bl2_desc != NULL);
+
+ /* Get the entry point info. */
+ bl2_ep_info = &bl2_desc->ep_info;
+
+ bl2_ep_info->spsr = (uint32_t)SPSR_64(MODE_EL3, MODE_SP_ELX,
+ DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+ /*
+ * Flush cache since bl2_ep_info is accessed after MMU is disabled
+ * before jumping to BL2.
+ */
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)bl2_ep_info, sizeof(entry_point_info_t));
+
+ /* Indicate that image is in execution state. */
+ bl2_desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED;
+
+ /* Print debug info and flush the console before running BL2. */
+ print_entry_point_info(bl2_ep_info);
+}
+#else
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function prepares the context for Secure/Normal world images.
+ * Normal world images are transitioned to EL2(if supported) else EL1.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_prepare_next_image(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+
+ /*
+ * Following array will be used for context management.
+ * There are 2 instances, for the Secure and Non-Secure contexts.
+ */
+ static cpu_context_t bl1_cpu_context[2];
+
+ unsigned int security_state, mode = MODE_EL1;
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+ entry_point_info_t *next_bl_ep;
+
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the build flag to save AArch32 system registers in CPU
+ * context is not set for AArch64-only platforms.
+ */
+ if (el_implemented(1) == EL_IMPL_A64ONLY) {
+ ERROR("EL1 supports AArch64-only. Please set build flag "
+ "CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS = 0\n");
+ panic();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+ assert(desc != NULL);
+
+ /* Get the entry point info. */
+ next_bl_ep = &desc->ep_info;
+
+ /* Get the image security state. */
+ security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_bl_ep->h.attr);
+
+ /* Setup the Secure/Non-Secure context if not done already. */
+ if (cm_get_context(security_state) == NULL)
+ cm_set_context(&bl1_cpu_context[security_state], security_state);
+
+ /* Prepare the SPSR for the next BL image. */
+ if ((security_state != SECURE) && (el_implemented(2) != EL_IMPL_NONE)) {
+ mode = MODE_EL2;
+ }
+
+ next_bl_ep->spsr = (uint32_t)SPSR_64((uint64_t) mode,
+ (uint64_t)MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+ /* Allow platform to make change */
+ bl1_plat_set_ep_info(image_id, next_bl_ep);
+
+ /* Prepare the context for the next BL image. */
+ cm_init_my_context(next_bl_ep);
+ cm_prepare_el3_exit(security_state);
+
+ /* Indicate that image is in execution state. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED;
+
+ print_entry_point_info(next_bl_ep);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_RME */
diff --git a/bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f61c060
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <el3_common_macros.S>
+
+ .globl bl1_entrypoint
+ .globl bl1_run_bl2_in_root
+
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * bl1_entrypoint() is the entry point into the trusted
+ * firmware code when a cpu is released from warm or
+ * cold reset.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+func bl1_entrypoint
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * If the reset address is programmable then bl1_entrypoint() is
+ * executed only on the cold boot path. Therefore, we can skip the warm
+ * boot mailbox mechanism.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ el3_entrypoint_common \
+ _init_sctlr=1 \
+ _warm_boot_mailbox=!PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS \
+ _secondary_cold_boot=!COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU \
+ _init_memory=1 \
+ _init_c_runtime=1 \
+ _exception_vectors=bl1_exceptions \
+ _pie_fixup_size=0
+
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Perform BL1 setup
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl bl1_setup
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Program APIAKey_EL1 and enable pointer authentication.
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl pauth_init_enable_el3
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Initialize platform and jump to our c-entry point
+ * for this type of reset.
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl bl1_main
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Disable pointer authentication before jumping to next boot image.
+ * --------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl pauth_disable_el3
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+
+ /* --------------------------------------------------
+ * Do the transition to next boot image.
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#if ENABLE_RME
+ b bl1_run_bl2_in_root
+#else
+ b el3_exit
+#endif
+endfunc bl1_entrypoint
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * void bl1_run_bl2_in_root();
+ * This function runs BL2 in root/EL3 when RME is enabled.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+func bl1_run_bl2_in_root
+ /* read bl2_ep_info */
+ adrp x20, bl2_ep_info
+ add x20, x20, :lo12:bl2_ep_info
+ ldr x20, [x20]
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------
+ * MMU needs to be disabled because BL2 executes
+ * in EL3. It will initialize the address space
+ * according to its own requirements.
+ * ---------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl disable_mmu_icache_el3
+ tlbi alle3
+
+ ldp x0, x1, [x20, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_PC_OFFSET]
+ msr elr_el3, x0
+ msr spsr_el3, x1
+
+ ldp x6, x7, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x30)]
+ ldp x4, x5, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x20)]
+ ldp x2, x3, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x10)]
+ ldp x0, x1, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x0)]
+ exception_return
+endfunc bl1_run_bl2_in_root
diff --git a/bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eaaf59a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2022, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl1/bl1.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Very simple stackless exception handlers used by BL1.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ .globl bl1_exceptions
+
+vector_base bl1_exceptions
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Current EL with SP0 : 0x0 - 0x200
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0
+ mov x0, #SYNC_EXCEPTION_SP_EL0
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0
+
+vector_entry IrqSP0
+ mov x0, #IRQ_SP_EL0
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry IrqSP0
+
+vector_entry FiqSP0
+ mov x0, #FIQ_SP_EL0
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry FiqSP0
+
+vector_entry SErrorSP0
+ mov x0, #SERROR_SP_EL0
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SErrorSP0
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx
+ mov x0, #SYNC_EXCEPTION_SP_ELX
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx
+
+vector_entry IrqSPx
+ mov x0, #IRQ_SP_ELX
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry IrqSPx
+
+vector_entry FiqSPx
+ mov x0, #FIQ_SP_ELX
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry FiqSPx
+
+vector_entry SErrorSPx
+ mov x0, #SERROR_SP_ELX
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SErrorSPx
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64
+ /* Enable the SError interrupt */
+ msr daifclr, #DAIF_ABT_BIT
+
+ str x30, [sp, #CTX_GPREGS_OFFSET + CTX_GPREG_LR]
+
+ /* Expect only SMC exceptions */
+ mrs x30, esr_el3
+ ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+ cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SMC
+ b.ne unexpected_sync_exception
+
+ b smc_handler64
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64
+
+vector_entry IrqA64
+ mov x0, #IRQ_AARCH64
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry IrqA64
+
+vector_entry FiqA64
+ mov x0, #FIQ_AARCH64
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry FiqA64
+
+vector_entry SErrorA64
+ mov x0, #SERROR_AARCH64
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SErrorA64
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32
+ mov x0, #SYNC_EXCEPTION_AARCH32
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32
+
+vector_entry IrqA32
+ mov x0, #IRQ_AARCH32
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry IrqA32
+
+vector_entry FiqA32
+ mov x0, #FIQ_AARCH32
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry FiqA32
+
+vector_entry SErrorA32
+ mov x0, #SERROR_AARCH32
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+end_vector_entry SErrorA32
+
+
+func smc_handler64
+
+ /* ----------------------------------------------
+ * Detect if this is a RUN_IMAGE or other SMC.
+ * ----------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov x30, #BL1_SMC_RUN_IMAGE
+ cmp x30, x0
+ b.ne smc_handler
+
+ /* ------------------------------------------------
+ * Make sure only Secure world reaches here.
+ * ------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mrs x30, scr_el3
+ tst x30, #SCR_NS_BIT
+ b.ne unexpected_sync_exception
+
+ /* ----------------------------------------------
+ * Handling RUN_IMAGE SMC. First switch back to
+ * SP_EL0 for the C runtime stack.
+ * ----------------------------------------------
+ */
+ ldr x30, [sp, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP]
+ msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0
+ mov sp, x30
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Pass EL3 control to next BL image.
+ * Here it expects X1 with the address of a entry_point_info_t
+ * structure describing the next BL image entrypoint.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov x20, x1
+
+ mov x0, x20
+ bl bl1_print_next_bl_ep_info
+
+ ldp x0, x1, [x20, #ENTRY_POINT_INFO_PC_OFFSET]
+ msr elr_el3, x0
+ msr spsr_el3, x1
+ ubfx x0, x1, #MODE_EL_SHIFT, #2
+ cmp x0, #MODE_EL3
+ b.ne unexpected_sync_exception
+
+ bl disable_mmu_icache_el3
+ tlbi alle3
+ dsb ish /* ERET implies ISB, so it is not needed here */
+
+#if SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT
+ bl print_debug_loop_message
+debug_loop:
+ b debug_loop
+#endif
+
+ mov x0, x20
+ bl bl1_plat_prepare_exit
+
+ ldp x6, x7, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x30)]
+ ldp x4, x5, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x20)]
+ ldp x2, x3, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x10)]
+ ldp x0, x1, [x20, #(ENTRY_POINT_INFO_ARGS_OFFSET + 0x0)]
+ exception_return
+endfunc smc_handler64
+
+unexpected_sync_exception:
+ mov x0, #SYNC_EXCEPTION_AARCH64
+ bl plat_report_exception
+ no_ret plat_panic_handler
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Save Secure/Normal world context and jump to
+ * BL1 SMC handler.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+smc_handler:
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Save x0-x29 and ARMv8.3-PAuth (if enabled) registers.
+ * Save PMCR_EL0 and disable Cycle Counter.
+ * TODO: Revisit to store only SMCCC specified registers.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl prepare_el3_entry
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Load and program stored APIAKey firmware key.
+ * Re-enable pointer authentication in EL3, as it was
+ * disabled before jumping to the next boot image.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl pauth_load_bl1_apiakey_enable
+#endif
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Populate the parameters for the SMC handler. We
+ * already have x0-x4 in place. x5 will point to a
+ * cookie (not used now). x6 will point to the context
+ * structure (SP_EL3) and x7 will contain flags we need
+ * to pass to the handler.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mov x5, xzr
+ mov x6, sp
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Restore the saved C runtime stack value which will
+ * become the new SP_EL0 i.e. EL3 runtime stack. It was
+ * saved in the 'cpu_context' structure prior to the last
+ * ERET from EL3.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ ldr x12, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_RUNTIME_SP]
+
+ /* ---------------------------------------------
+ * Switch back to SP_EL0 for the C runtime stack.
+ * ---------------------------------------------
+ */
+ msr spsel, #MODE_SP_EL0
+ mov sp, x12
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Save the SPSR_EL3, ELR_EL3, & SCR_EL3 in case there
+ * is a world switch during SMC handling.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ mrs x16, spsr_el3
+ mrs x17, elr_el3
+ mrs x18, scr_el3
+ stp x16, x17, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SPSR_EL3]
+ str x18, [x6, #CTX_EL3STATE_OFFSET + CTX_SCR_EL3]
+
+ /* Copy SCR_EL3.NS bit to the flag to indicate caller's security */
+ bfi x7, x18, #0, #1
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Go to BL1 SMC handler.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ bl bl1_smc_handler
+
+ /* -----------------------------------------------------
+ * Do the transition to next BL image.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ b el3_exit
diff --git a/bl1/bl1.ld.S b/bl1/bl1.ld.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49dda85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/bl1.ld.S
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The .data section gets copied from ROM to RAM at runtime. Its LMA should be
+ * 16-byte aligned to allow efficient copying of 16-bytes aligned regions in it.
+ * Its VMA must be page-aligned as it marks the first read/write page.
+ */
+#define DATA_ALIGN 16
+
+#include <common/bl_common.ld.h>
+#include <lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h>
+
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(PLATFORM_LINKER_FORMAT)
+OUTPUT_ARCH(PLATFORM_LINKER_ARCH)
+ENTRY(bl1_entrypoint)
+
+MEMORY {
+ ROM (rx): ORIGIN = BL1_RO_BASE, LENGTH = BL1_RO_LIMIT - BL1_RO_BASE
+ RAM (rwx): ORIGIN = BL1_RW_BASE, LENGTH = BL1_RW_LIMIT - BL1_RW_BASE
+}
+
+SECTIONS {
+ ROM_REGION_START = ORIGIN(ROM);
+ ROM_REGION_LENGTH = LENGTH(ROM);
+ RAM_REGION_START = ORIGIN(RAM);
+ RAM_REGION_LENGTH = LENGTH(RAM);
+
+ . = BL1_RO_BASE;
+
+ ASSERT(. == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE),
+ "BL1_RO_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.")
+
+#if SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA
+ .text . : {
+ __TEXT_START__ = .;
+
+ *bl1_entrypoint.o(.text*)
+ *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*))
+ *(.vectors)
+ __TEXT_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+
+ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ __TEXT_END__ = .;
+ } >ROM
+
+ /* .ARM.extab and .ARM.exidx are only added because Clang needs them */
+ .ARM.extab . : {
+ *(.ARM.extab* .gnu.linkonce.armextab.*)
+ } >ROM
+
+ .ARM.exidx . : {
+ *(.ARM.exidx* .gnu.linkonce.armexidx.*)
+ } >ROM
+
+ .rodata . : {
+ __RODATA_START__ = .;
+
+ *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*))
+
+ RODATA_COMMON
+
+ /*
+ * No need to pad out the .rodata section to a page boundary. Next is
+ * the .data section, which can mapped in ROM with the same memory
+ * attributes as the .rodata section.
+ *
+ * Pad out to 16 bytes though as .data section needs to be 16-byte
+ * aligned and lld does not align the LMA to the alignment specified
+ * on the .data section.
+ */
+ __RODATA_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+ __RODATA_END__ = .;
+
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ } >ROM
+#else /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */
+ .ro . : {
+ __RO_START__ = .;
+
+ *bl1_entrypoint.o(.text*)
+ *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.text*))
+ *(SORT_BY_ALIGNMENT(.rodata*))
+
+ RODATA_COMMON
+
+ *(.vectors)
+
+ __RO_END__ = .;
+
+ /*
+ * Pad out to 16 bytes as the .data section needs to be 16-byte aligned
+ * and lld does not align the LMA to the alignment specified on the
+ * .data section.
+ */
+ . = ALIGN(16);
+ } >ROM
+#endif /* SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA */
+
+ ASSERT(__CPU_OPS_END__ > __CPU_OPS_START__,
+ "cpu_ops not defined for this platform.")
+
+ ROM_REGION_END = .;
+ . = BL1_RW_BASE;
+
+ ASSERT(BL1_RW_BASE == ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE),
+ "BL1_RW_BASE address is not aligned on a page boundary.")
+
+ DATA_SECTION >RAM AT>ROM
+
+ __DATA_RAM_START__ = __DATA_START__;
+ __DATA_RAM_END__ = __DATA_END__;
+
+ STACK_SECTION >RAM
+ BSS_SECTION >RAM
+ XLAT_TABLE_SECTION >RAM
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+ /*
+ * The base address of the coherent memory section must be page-aligned to
+ * guarantee that the coherent data are stored on their own pages and are
+ * not mixed with normal data. This is required to set up the correct memory
+ * attributes for the coherent data page tables.
+ */
+ .coherent_ram (NOLOAD) : ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE) {
+ __COHERENT_RAM_START__ = .;
+ *(.tzfw_coherent_mem)
+ __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ = .;
+
+ /*
+ * Memory page(s) mapped to this section will be marked as device
+ * memory. No other unexpected data must creep in. Ensure the rest of
+ * the current memory page is unused.
+ */
+ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ __COHERENT_RAM_END__ = .;
+ } >RAM
+#endif /* USE_COHERENT_MEM */
+
+ __BL1_RAM_START__ = ADDR(.data);
+ __BL1_RAM_END__ = .;
+
+ __DATA_ROM_START__ = LOADADDR(.data);
+ __DATA_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.data);
+
+ /*
+ * The .data section is the last PROGBITS section so its end marks the end
+ * of BL1's actual content in Trusted ROM.
+ */
+ __BL1_ROM_END__ = __DATA_ROM_START__ + __DATA_SIZE__;
+
+ ASSERT(__BL1_ROM_END__ <= BL1_RO_LIMIT,
+ "BL1's ROM content has exceeded its limit.")
+
+ __BSS_SIZE__ = SIZEOF(.bss);
+
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+ __COHERENT_RAM_UNALIGNED_SIZE__ =
+ __COHERENT_RAM_END_UNALIGNED__ - __COHERENT_RAM_START__;
+#endif /* USE_COHERENT_MEM */
+
+ ASSERT(. <= BL1_RW_LIMIT, "BL1's RW section has exceeded its limit.")
+ RAM_REGION_END = .;
+}
diff --git a/bl1/bl1.mk b/bl1/bl1.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53946ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/bl1.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+BL1_SOURCES += bl1/${ARCH}/bl1_arch_setup.c \
+ bl1/${ARCH}/bl1_context_mgmt.c \
+ bl1/${ARCH}/bl1_entrypoint.S \
+ bl1/${ARCH}/bl1_exceptions.S \
+ bl1/bl1_main.c \
+ lib/cpus/${ARCH}/cpu_helpers.S \
+ lib/cpus/errata_report.c \
+ lib/el3_runtime/${ARCH}/context_mgmt.c \
+ plat/common/plat_bl1_common.c \
+ plat/common/${ARCH}/platform_up_stack.S \
+ ${MBEDTLS_SOURCES}
+
+ifeq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+BL1_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S \
+ lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S
+endif
+
+ifeq (${TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT},1)
+BL1_SOURCES += bl1/bl1_fwu.c
+endif
+
+ifeq (${ENABLE_PMF},1)
+BL1_SOURCES += lib/pmf/pmf_main.c
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(findstring gcc,$(notdir $(LD))),)
+ BL1_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--sort-section=alignment
+else ifneq ($(findstring ld,$(notdir $(LD))),)
+ BL1_LDFLAGS += --sort-section=alignment
+endif
+
+BL1_DEFAULT_LINKER_SCRIPT_SOURCE := bl1/bl1.ld.S
diff --git a/bl1/bl1_fwu.c b/bl1/bl1_fwu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d4dc7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/bl1_fwu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl1/bl1.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+
+#include "bl1_private.h"
+
+/*
+ * Function declarations.
+ */
+static int bl1_fwu_image_copy(unsigned int image_id,
+ uintptr_t image_src,
+ unsigned int block_size,
+ unsigned int image_size,
+ unsigned int flags);
+static int bl1_fwu_image_auth(unsigned int image_id,
+ uintptr_t image_src,
+ unsigned int image_size,
+ unsigned int flags);
+static int bl1_fwu_image_execute(unsigned int image_id,
+ void **handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
+static register_t bl1_fwu_image_resume(register_t image_param,
+ void **handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
+static int bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(void **handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
+static int bl1_fwu_image_reset(unsigned int image_id,
+ unsigned int flags);
+__dead2 static void bl1_fwu_done(void *client_cookie, void *reserved);
+
+/*
+ * This keeps track of last executed secure image id.
+ */
+static unsigned int sec_exec_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Top level handler for servicing FWU SMCs.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+u_register_t bl1_fwu_smc_handler(unsigned int smc_fid,
+ u_register_t x1,
+ u_register_t x2,
+ u_register_t x3,
+ u_register_t x4,
+ void *cookie,
+ void *handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+
+ switch (smc_fid) {
+ case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_COPY:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_copy((uint32_t)x1, x2,
+ (uint32_t)x3, (uint32_t)x4, flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_AUTH:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_auth((uint32_t)x1, x2,
+ (uint32_t)x3, flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_EXECUTE:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_execute((uint32_t)x1, &handle,
+ flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_RESUME:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_resume((register_t)x1, &handle,
+ flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_SEC_IMAGE_DONE:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(&handle, flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_IMAGE_RESET:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, bl1_fwu_image_reset((uint32_t)x1, flags));
+
+ case FWU_SMC_UPDATE_DONE:
+ bl1_fwu_done((void *)x1, NULL);
+
+ default:
+ assert(false); /* Unreachable */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Utility functions to keep track of the images that are loaded at any time.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef PLAT_FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES
+#define FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES PLAT_FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES
+#else
+#define FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES 10
+#endif
+
+static unsigned int bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES] = {
+ [0 ... FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES-1] = INVALID_IMAGE_ID
+};
+
+/*
+ * Adds an image_id to the bl1_fwu_loaded_ids array.
+ * Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
+ */
+static int bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Check if the ID is already in the list */
+ for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
+ if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find an empty slot */
+ for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
+ if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == INVALID_IMAGE_ID) {
+ bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] = image_id;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an image_id from the bl1_fwu_loaded_ids array.
+ * Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
+ */
+static int bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Find the ID */
+ for (i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
+ if (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id) {
+ bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function checks if the specified image overlaps another image already
+ * loaded. It returns 0 if there is no overlap, a negative error code otherwise.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_image_check_overlaps(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ const image_desc_t *desc, *checked_desc;
+ const image_info_t *info, *checked_info;
+
+ uintptr_t image_base, image_end;
+ uintptr_t checked_image_base, checked_image_end;
+
+ checked_desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+ checked_info = &checked_desc->image_info;
+
+ /* Image being checked mustn't be empty. */
+ assert(checked_info->image_size != 0);
+
+ checked_image_base = checked_info->image_base;
+ checked_image_end = checked_image_base + checked_info->image_size - 1;
+ /* No need to check for overflows, it's done in bl1_fwu_image_copy(). */
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < FWU_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_IMAGES; i++) {
+
+ /* Skip INVALID_IMAGE_IDs and don't check image against itself */
+ if ((bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == INVALID_IMAGE_ID) ||
+ (bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i] == image_id))
+ continue;
+
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(bl1_fwu_loaded_ids[i]);
+
+ /* Only check images that are loaded or being loaded. */
+ assert ((desc != NULL) && (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET));
+
+ info = &desc->image_info;
+
+ /* There cannot be overlaps with an empty image. */
+ if (info->image_size == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ image_base = info->image_base;
+ image_end = image_base + info->image_size - 1;
+ /*
+ * Overflows cannot happen. It is checked in
+ * bl1_fwu_image_copy() when the image goes from RESET to
+ * COPYING or COPIED.
+ */
+ assert (image_end > image_base);
+
+ /* Check if there are overlaps. */
+ if (!((image_end < checked_image_base) ||
+ (checked_image_end < image_base))) {
+ VERBOSE("Image with ID %d overlaps existing image with ID %d",
+ checked_desc->image_id, desc->image_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for copying secure images in AP Secure RAM.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_image_copy(unsigned int image_id,
+ uintptr_t image_src,
+ unsigned int block_size,
+ unsigned int image_size,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ uintptr_t dest_addr;
+ unsigned int remaining;
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+ if (desc == NULL) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Invalid image ID %u\n", image_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The request must originate from a non-secure caller and target a
+ * secure image. Any other scenario is invalid.
+ */
+ if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed from secure world.\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_SECURE) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed for non-secure images.\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether the FWU state machine is in the correct state. */
+ if ((desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) &&
+ (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_COPYING)) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed at this point of the FWU"
+ " process.\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if ((image_src == 0U) || (block_size == 0U) ||
+ check_uptr_overflow(image_src, block_size - 1)) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed due to invalid image source"
+ " or block size\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPYING) {
+ /*
+ * There must have been at least 1 copy operation for this image
+ * previously.
+ */
+ assert(desc->copied_size != 0U);
+ /*
+ * The image size must have been recorded in the 1st copy
+ * operation.
+ */
+ image_size = desc->image_info.image_size;
+ assert(image_size != 0);
+ assert(desc->copied_size < image_size);
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Continuing image copy in blocks\n");
+ } else { /* desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_RESET */
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Initial call to copy an image\n");
+
+ /*
+ * image_size is relevant only for the 1st copy request, it is
+ * then ignored for subsequent calls for this image.
+ */
+ if (image_size == 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Copy not allowed due to invalid image"
+ " size\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the image size to load is within limit */
+ if (image_size > desc->image_info.image_max_size) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Image size out of bounds\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the given image size. */
+ desc->image_info.image_size = image_size;
+
+ /* Make sure the image doesn't overlap other images. */
+ if (bl1_fwu_image_check_overlaps(image_id) != 0) {
+ desc->image_info.image_size = 0;
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: This image overlaps another one\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * copied_size must be explicitly initialized here because the
+ * FWU code doesn't necessarily do it when it resets the state
+ * machine.
+ */
+ desc->copied_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the given block size is more than the total image size
+ * then clip the former to the latter.
+ */
+ remaining = image_size - desc->copied_size;
+ if (block_size > remaining) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Block size is too big, clipping it.\n");
+ block_size = remaining;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure the source image is mapped in memory. */
+ if (bl1_plat_mem_check(image_src, block_size, flags) != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Source image is not mapped.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(image_id) != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Too many images loaded at the same time.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow the platform to handle pre-image load before copying */
+ if (desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
+ if (bl1_plat_handle_pre_image_load(image_id) != 0) {
+ ERROR("BL1-FWU: Failure in pre-image load of image id %d\n",
+ image_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Everything looks sane. Go ahead and copy the block of data. */
+ dest_addr = desc->image_info.image_base + desc->copied_size;
+ (void)memcpy((void *) dest_addr, (const void *) image_src, block_size);
+ flush_dcache_range(dest_addr, block_size);
+
+ desc->copied_size += block_size;
+ desc->state = (block_size == remaining) ?
+ IMAGE_STATE_COPIED : IMAGE_STATE_COPYING;
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Copy operation successful.\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for authenticating Normal/Secure images.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_image_auth(unsigned int image_id,
+ uintptr_t image_src,
+ unsigned int image_size,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int result;
+ uintptr_t base_addr;
+ unsigned int total_size;
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+ if (desc == NULL)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) {
+ if (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication from secure world "
+ "while in invalid state\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE) {
+ if (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication of secure image "
+ "from non-secure world while not in copied state\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_RESET) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication of non-secure image "
+ "from non-secure world while in invalid state\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
+ /*
+ * Image is in COPIED state.
+ * Use the stored address and size.
+ */
+ base_addr = desc->image_info.image_base;
+ total_size = desc->image_info.image_size;
+ } else {
+ if ((image_src == 0U) || (image_size == 0U) ||
+ check_uptr_overflow(image_src, image_size - 1)) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Auth not allowed due to invalid"
+ " image source/size\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Image is in RESET state.
+ * Check the parameters and authenticate the source image in place.
+ */
+ if (bl1_plat_mem_check(image_src, image_size,
+ desc->ep_info.h.attr) != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication arguments source/size not mapped\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (bl1_fwu_add_loaded_id(image_id) != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Too many images loaded at the same time.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ base_addr = image_src;
+ total_size = image_size;
+
+ /* Update the image size in the descriptor. */
+ desc->image_info.image_size = total_size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Authenticate the image.
+ */
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Authenticating image_id:%d\n", image_id);
+ result = auth_mod_verify_img(image_id, (void *)base_addr, total_size);
+ if (result != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Authentication Failed err=%d\n", result);
+
+ /*
+ * Authentication has failed.
+ * Clear the memory if the image was copied.
+ * This is to prevent an attack where this contains
+ * some malicious code that can somehow be executed later.
+ */
+ if (desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_COPIED) {
+ /* Clear the memory.*/
+ zero_normalmem((void *)base_addr, total_size);
+ flush_dcache_range(base_addr, total_size);
+
+ /* Indicate that image can be copied again*/
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Even if this fails it's ok because the ID isn't in the array.
+ * The image cannot be in RESET state here, it is checked at the
+ * beginning of the function.
+ */
+ (void)bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(image_id);
+ return -EAUTH;
+ }
+
+ /* Indicate that image is in authenticated state. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED;
+
+ /* Allow the platform to handle post-image load */
+ result = bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load(image_id);
+ if (result != 0) {
+ ERROR("BL1-FWU: Failure %d in post-image load of image id %d\n",
+ result, image_id);
+ /*
+ * Panic here as the platform handling of post-image load is
+ * not correct.
+ */
+ plat_error_handler(result);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Flush image_info to memory so that other
+ * secure world images can see changes.
+ */
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&desc->image_info,
+ sizeof(image_info_t));
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Authentication was successful\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for executing Secure images.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_image_execute(unsigned int image_id,
+ void **handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ /* Get the image descriptor. */
+ image_desc_t *desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+
+ /*
+ * Execution is NOT allowed if:
+ * image_id is invalid OR
+ * Caller is from Secure world OR
+ * Image is Non-Secure OR
+ * Image is Non-Executable OR
+ * Image is NOT in AUTHENTICATED state.
+ */
+ if ((desc == NULL) ||
+ (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE) ||
+ (GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_SECURE) ||
+ (EP_GET_EXE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == NON_EXECUTABLE) ||
+ (desc->state != IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED)) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Execution not allowed due to invalid state/args\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Executing Secure image\n");
+
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* Save NS-EL1 system registers. */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+#endif
+
+ /* Prepare the image for execution. */
+ bl1_prepare_next_image(image_id);
+
+ /* Update the secure image id. */
+ sec_exec_image_id = image_id;
+
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ *handle = cm_get_context(SECURE);
+#else
+ *handle = smc_get_ctx(SECURE);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for resuming execution in the other security
+ * world
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static register_t bl1_fwu_image_resume(register_t image_param,
+ void **handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+ unsigned int resume_sec_state;
+ unsigned int caller_sec_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags);
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor for last executed secure image id. */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(sec_exec_image_id);
+ if (caller_sec_state == NON_SECURE) {
+ if (desc == NULL) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Resume not allowed due to no available"
+ "secure image\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* desc must be valid for secure world callers */
+ assert(desc != NULL);
+ }
+
+ assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE);
+ assert(EP_GET_EXE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == EXECUTABLE);
+
+ if (caller_sec_state == SECURE) {
+ assert(desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED);
+
+ /* Update the flags. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED;
+ resume_sec_state = NON_SECURE;
+ } else {
+ assert(desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED);
+
+ /* Update the flags. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED;
+ resume_sec_state = SECURE;
+ }
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Resuming %s world context\n",
+ (resume_sec_state == SECURE) ? "secure" : "normal");
+
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* Save the EL1 system registers of calling world. */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(caller_sec_state);
+
+ /* Restore the EL1 system registers of resuming world. */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(resume_sec_state);
+
+ /* Update the next context. */
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(resume_sec_state);
+
+ *handle = cm_get_context(resume_sec_state);
+#else
+ /* Update the next context. */
+ cm_set_next_context(cm_get_context(resume_sec_state));
+
+ /* Prepare the smc context for the next BL image. */
+ smc_set_next_ctx(resume_sec_state);
+
+ *handle = smc_get_ctx(resume_sec_state);
+#endif
+ return image_param;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for resuming normal world context.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_sec_image_done(void **handle, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+
+ /* Make sure caller is from the secure world */
+ if (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == NON_SECURE) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Image done not allowed from normal world\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor for last executed secure image id */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(sec_exec_image_id);
+
+ /* desc must correspond to a valid secure executing image */
+ assert(desc != NULL);
+ assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == SECURE);
+ assert(EP_GET_EXE(desc->ep_info.h.attr) == EXECUTABLE);
+ assert(desc->state == IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED);
+
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+ int rc = bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(sec_exec_image_id);
+ assert(rc == 0);
+#else
+ bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(sec_exec_image_id);
+#endif
+
+ /* Update the flags. */
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
+ sec_exec_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID;
+
+ INFO("BL1-FWU: Resuming Normal world context\n");
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /*
+ * Secure world is done so no need to save the context.
+ * Just restore the Non-Secure context.
+ */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+
+ /* Update the next context. */
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+ *handle = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+#else
+ /* Update the next context. */
+ cm_set_next_context(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+ /* Prepare the smc context for the next BL image. */
+ smc_set_next_ctx(NON_SECURE);
+
+ *handle = smc_get_ctx(NON_SECURE);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function provides the opportunity for users to perform any
+ * platform specific handling after the Firmware update is done.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+__dead2 static void bl1_fwu_done(void *client_cookie, void *reserved)
+{
+ NOTICE("BL1-FWU: *******FWU Process Completed*******\n");
+
+ /*
+ * Call platform done function.
+ */
+ bl1_plat_fwu_done(client_cookie, reserved);
+ assert(false);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function resets an image to IMAGE_STATE_RESET. It fails if the image is
+ * being executed.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int bl1_fwu_image_reset(unsigned int image_id, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ image_desc_t *desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(image_id);
+
+ if ((desc == NULL) || (GET_SECURITY_STATE(flags) == SECURE)) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Reset not allowed due to invalid args\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ switch (desc->state) {
+
+ case IMAGE_STATE_RESET:
+ /* Nothing to do. */
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_STATE_INTERRUPTED:
+ case IMAGE_STATE_AUTHENTICATED:
+ case IMAGE_STATE_COPIED:
+ case IMAGE_STATE_COPYING:
+
+ if (bl1_fwu_remove_loaded_id(image_id) != 0) {
+ WARN("BL1-FWU: Image reset couldn't find the image ID\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->copied_size != 0U) {
+ /* Clear the memory if the image is copied */
+ assert(GET_SECURITY_STATE(desc->ep_info.h.attr)
+ == SECURE);
+
+ zero_normalmem((void *)desc->image_info.image_base,
+ desc->copied_size);
+ flush_dcache_range(desc->image_info.image_base,
+ desc->copied_size);
+ }
+
+ /* Reset status variables */
+ desc->copied_size = 0;
+ desc->image_info.image_size = 0;
+ desc->state = IMAGE_STATE_RESET;
+
+ /* Clear authentication state */
+ auth_img_flags[image_id] = 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_STATE_EXECUTED:
+ default:
+ assert(false); /* Unreachable */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/bl1/bl1_main.c b/bl1/bl1_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fe5511
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/bl1_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_features.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl1/bl1.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/auth_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h>
+#include <drivers/console.h>
+#include <lib/bootmarker_capture.h>
+#include <lib/cpus/errata.h>
+#include <lib/pmf/pmf.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <smccc_helpers.h>
+#include <tools_share/uuid.h>
+
+#include "bl1_private.h"
+
+static void bl1_load_bl2(void);
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+uint64_t bl1_apiakey[2];
+#endif
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+ PMF_REGISTER_SERVICE(bl_svc, PMF_RT_INSTR_SVC_ID,
+ BL_TOTAL_IDS, PMF_DUMP_ENABLE)
+#endif
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Helper utility to calculate the BL2 memory layout taking into consideration
+ * the BL1 RW data assuming that it is at the top of the memory layout.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_calc_bl2_mem_layout(const meminfo_t *bl1_mem_layout,
+ meminfo_t *bl2_mem_layout)
+{
+ assert(bl1_mem_layout != NULL);
+ assert(bl2_mem_layout != NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Remove BL1 RW data from the scope of memory visible to BL2.
+ * This is assuming BL1 RW data is at the top of bl1_mem_layout.
+ */
+ assert(BL1_RW_BASE > bl1_mem_layout->total_base);
+ bl2_mem_layout->total_base = bl1_mem_layout->total_base;
+ bl2_mem_layout->total_size = BL1_RW_BASE - bl1_mem_layout->total_base;
+
+ flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)bl2_mem_layout, sizeof(meminfo_t));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Setup function for BL1.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_setup(void)
+{
+ /* Perform early platform-specific setup */
+ bl1_early_platform_setup();
+
+ /* Perform late platform-specific setup */
+ bl1_plat_arch_setup();
+
+#if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
+ /*
+ * Assert that the ARMv8.3-PAuth registers are present or an access
+ * fault will be triggered when they are being saved or restored.
+ */
+ assert(is_armv8_3_pauth_present());
+#endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function to perform late architectural and platform specific initialization.
+ * It also queries the platform to load and run next BL image. Only called
+ * by the primary cpu after a cold boot.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_main(void)
+{
+ unsigned int image_id;
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+ PMF_CAPTURE_TIMESTAMP(bl_svc, BL1_ENTRY, PMF_CACHE_MAINT);
+#endif
+
+ /* Announce our arrival */
+ NOTICE(FIRMWARE_WELCOME_STR);
+ NOTICE("BL1: %s\n", version_string);
+ NOTICE("BL1: %s\n", build_message);
+
+ INFO("BL1: RAM %p - %p\n", (void *)BL1_RAM_BASE, (void *)BL1_RAM_LIMIT);
+
+ print_errata_status();
+
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+ u_register_t val;
+ /*
+ * Ensure that MMU/Caches and coherency are turned on
+ */
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ val = read_sctlr_el3();
+#else
+ val = read_sctlr();
+#endif
+ assert((val & SCTLR_M_BIT) != 0);
+ assert((val & SCTLR_C_BIT) != 0);
+ assert((val & SCTLR_I_BIT) != 0);
+ /*
+ * Check that Cache Writeback Granule (CWG) in CTR_EL0 matches the
+ * provided platform value
+ */
+ val = (read_ctr_el0() >> CTR_CWG_SHIFT) & CTR_CWG_MASK;
+ /*
+ * If CWG is zero, then no CWG information is available but we can
+ * at least check the platform value is less than the architectural
+ * maximum.
+ */
+ if (val != 0)
+ assert(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE == SIZE_FROM_LOG2_WORDS(val));
+ else
+ assert(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE <= MAX_CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
+#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+
+ /* Perform remaining generic architectural setup from EL3 */
+ bl1_arch_setup();
+
+ crypto_mod_init();
+
+ /* Initialize authentication module */
+ auth_mod_init();
+
+ /* Initialize the measured boot */
+ bl1_plat_mboot_init();
+
+ /* Perform platform setup in BL1. */
+ bl1_platform_setup();
+
+#if ENABLE_PAUTH
+ /* Store APIAKey_EL1 key */
+ bl1_apiakey[0] = read_apiakeylo_el1();
+ bl1_apiakey[1] = read_apiakeyhi_el1();
+#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
+
+ /* Get the image id of next image to load and run. */
+ image_id = bl1_plat_get_next_image_id();
+
+ /*
+ * We currently interpret any image id other than
+ * BL2_IMAGE_ID as the start of firmware update.
+ */
+ if (image_id == BL2_IMAGE_ID)
+ bl1_load_bl2();
+ else
+ NOTICE("BL1-FWU: *******FWU Process Started*******\n");
+
+ /* Teardown the measured boot driver */
+ bl1_plat_mboot_finish();
+
+ bl1_prepare_next_image(image_id);
+
+#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
+ PMF_CAPTURE_TIMESTAMP(bl_svc, BL1_EXIT, PMF_CACHE_MAINT);
+#endif
+
+ console_flush();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function locates and loads the BL2 raw binary image in the trusted SRAM.
+ * Called by the primary cpu after a cold boot.
+ * TODO: Add support for alternative image load mechanism e.g using virtio/elf
+ * loader etc.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void bl1_load_bl2(void)
+{
+ image_desc_t *desc;
+ image_info_t *info;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Get the image descriptor */
+ desc = bl1_plat_get_image_desc(BL2_IMAGE_ID);
+ assert(desc != NULL);
+
+ /* Get the image info */
+ info = &desc->image_info;
+ INFO("BL1: Loading BL2\n");
+
+ err = bl1_plat_handle_pre_image_load(BL2_IMAGE_ID);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ ERROR("Failure in pre image load handling of BL2 (%d)\n", err);
+ plat_error_handler(err);
+ }
+
+ err = load_auth_image(BL2_IMAGE_ID, info);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ ERROR("Failed to load BL2 firmware.\n");
+ plat_error_handler(err);
+ }
+
+ /* Allow platform to handle image information. */
+ err = bl1_plat_handle_post_image_load(BL2_IMAGE_ID);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ ERROR("Failure in post image load handling of BL2 (%d)\n", err);
+ plat_error_handler(err);
+ }
+
+ NOTICE("BL1: Booting BL2\n");
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Function called just before handing over to the next BL to inform the user
+ * about the boot progress. In debug mode, also print details about the BL
+ * image's execution context.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bl1_print_next_bl_ep_info(const entry_point_info_t *bl_ep_info)
+{
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ NOTICE("BL1: Booting BL31\n");
+#else
+ NOTICE("BL1: Booting BL32\n");
+#endif /* __aarch64__ */
+ print_entry_point_info(bl_ep_info);
+}
+
+#if SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT
+void print_debug_loop_message(void)
+{
+ NOTICE("BL1: Debug loop, spinning forever\n");
+ NOTICE("BL1: Please connect the debugger to continue\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Top level handler for servicing BL1 SMCs.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+u_register_t bl1_smc_handler(unsigned int smc_fid,
+ u_register_t x1,
+ u_register_t x2,
+ u_register_t x3,
+ u_register_t x4,
+ void *cookie,
+ void *handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ /* BL1 Service UUID */
+ DEFINE_SVC_UUID2(bl1_svc_uid,
+ U(0xd46739fd), 0xcb72, 0x9a4d, 0xb5, 0x75,
+ 0x67, 0x15, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0xbb, 0x4a);
+
+
+#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
+ /*
+ * Dispatch FWU calls to FWU SMC handler and return its return
+ * value
+ */
+ if (is_fwu_fid(smc_fid)) {
+ return bl1_fwu_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+ handle, flags);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (smc_fid) {
+ case BL1_SMC_CALL_COUNT:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, BL1_NUM_SMC_CALLS);
+
+ case BL1_SMC_UID:
+ SMC_UUID_RET(handle, bl1_svc_uid);
+
+ case BL1_SMC_VERSION:
+ SMC_RET1(handle, BL1_SMC_MAJOR_VER | BL1_SMC_MINOR_VER);
+
+ default:
+ WARN("Unimplemented BL1 SMC Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid);
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+ }
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * BL1 SMC wrapper. This function is only used in AArch32 mode to ensure ABI
+ * compliance when invoking bl1_smc_handler.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+u_register_t bl1_smc_wrapper(uint32_t smc_fid,
+ void *cookie,
+ void *handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ u_register_t x1, x2, x3, x4;
+
+ assert(handle != NULL);
+
+ get_smc_params_from_ctx(handle, x1, x2, x3, x4);
+ return bl1_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, flags);
+}
diff --git a/bl1/bl1_private.h b/bl1/bl1_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61fb5be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/bl1_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2021, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef BL1_PRIVATE_H
+#define BL1_PRIVATE_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+
+extern entry_point_info_t *bl2_ep_info;
+
+/******************************************
+ * Function prototypes
+ *****************************************/
+void bl1_arch_setup(void);
+
+void bl1_prepare_next_image(unsigned int image_id);
+void bl1_run_bl2_in_root(void);
+
+u_register_t bl1_fwu_smc_handler(unsigned int smc_fid,
+ u_register_t x1,
+ u_register_t x2,
+ u_register_t x3,
+ u_register_t x4,
+ void *cookie,
+ void *handle,
+ unsigned int flags);
+
+#endif /* BL1_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/bl1/tbbr/tbbr_img_desc.c b/bl1/tbbr/tbbr_img_desc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4836712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bl1/tbbr/tbbr_img_desc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include <bl1/tbbr/tbbr_img_desc.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+
+image_desc_t bl1_tbbr_image_descs[] = {
+ {
+ .image_id = FWU_CERT_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_1, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = BL2_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = BL2_LIMIT - BL2_BASE,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_1, entry_point_info_t, SECURE),
+ },
+#if NS_BL1U_BASE
+ {
+ .image_id = NS_BL1U_IMAGE_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1, entry_point_info_t, NON_SECURE | EXECUTABLE),
+ .ep_info.pc = NS_BL1U_BASE,
+ },
+#endif
+#if SCP_BL2U_BASE
+ {
+ .image_id = SCP_BL2U_IMAGE_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_1, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = SCP_BL2U_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = SCP_BL2U_LIMIT - SCP_BL2U_BASE,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_1, entry_point_info_t, SECURE),
+ },
+#endif
+#if BL2U_BASE
+ {
+ .image_id = BL2U_IMAGE_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = BL2U_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = BL2U_LIMIT - BL2U_BASE,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1, entry_point_info_t, SECURE | EXECUTABLE),
+ .ep_info.pc = BL2U_BASE,
+ },
+#endif
+#if NS_BL2U_BASE
+ {
+ .image_id = NS_BL2U_IMAGE_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1, entry_point_info_t, NON_SECURE),
+ },
+#endif
+ BL2_IMAGE_DESC,
+
+ {
+ .image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID,
+ }
+};
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-21 20:44:38 +0000