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diff --git a/docs/getting_started/build-internals.rst b/docs/getting_started/build-internals.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..390c367 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/build-internals.rst @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Internal Build Options +====================== + +|TF-A| internally uses certain options that are not exposed directly through +:ref:`build-options <build options>` but enabled or disabled indirectly and +depends on certain options to be enabled or disabled. + +.. _build_options_internal: + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS``: This boolean option provides context save/restore + operations when entering/exiting an EL2 execution context. This is of primary + interest when Armv8.4-SecEL2 or RME extension is implemented. + Default is 0 (disabled). This option will be set to 1 (enabled) when ``SPD=spmd`` + and ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2`` is set or when ``ENABLE_RME`` is set to 1 (enabled). + +- ``FFH_SUPPORT``: This boolean option provides support to enable Firmware First + handling (FFH) of External aborts and SError interrupts originating from lower + ELs which gets trapped in EL3. This option will be set to 1 (enabled) if + ``HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST_NS`` is set. Currently only NS world routes EA to EL3 but + in future when Secure/Realm wants to use FFH then they can introduce new macros + which will enable this option implicitly. diff --git a/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst b/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80baf9c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1327 @@ +Build Options +============= + +The TF-A build system supports the following build options. Unless mentioned +otherwise, these options are expected to be specified at the build command +line and are not to be modified in any component makefiles. Note that the +build system doesn't track dependency for build options. Therefore, if any of +the build options are changed from a previous build, a clean build must be +performed. + +.. _build_options_common: + +Common build options +-------------------- + +- ``AARCH32_INSTRUCTION_SET``: Choose the AArch32 instruction set that the + compiler should use. Valid values are T32 and A32. It defaults to T32 due to + code having a smaller resulting size. + +- ``AARCH32_SP`` : Choose the AArch32 Secure Payload component to be built as + as the BL32 image when ``ARCH=aarch32``. The value should be the path to the + directory containing the SP source, relative to the ``bl32/``; the directory + is expected to contain a makefile called ``<aarch32_sp-value>.mk``. + +- ``AMU_RESTRICT_COUNTERS``: Register reads to the group 1 counters will return + zero at all but the highest implemented exception level. Reads from the + memory mapped view are unaffected by this control. + +- ``ARCH`` : Choose the target build architecture for TF-A. It can take either + ``aarch64`` or ``aarch32`` as values. By default, it is defined to + ``aarch64``. + +- ``ARM_ARCH_FEATURE``: Optional Arm Architecture build option which specifies + one or more feature modifiers. This option has the form ``[no]feature+...`` + and defaults to ``none``. It translates into compiler option + ``-march=armvX[.Y]-a+[no]feature+...``. See compiler's documentation for the + list of supported feature modifiers. + +- ``ARM_ARCH_MAJOR``: The major version of Arm Architecture to target when + compiling TF-A. Its value must be numeric, and defaults to 8 . See also, + *Armv8 Architecture Extensions* and *Armv7 Architecture Extensions* in + :ref:`Firmware Design`. + +- ``ARM_ARCH_MINOR``: The minor version of Arm Architecture to target when + compiling TF-A. Its value must be a numeric, and defaults to 0. See also, + *Armv8 Architecture Extensions* in :ref:`Firmware Design`. + +- ``ARM_BL2_SP_LIST_DTS``: Path to DTS file snippet to override the hardcoded + SP nodes in tb_fw_config. + +- ``ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS`` : path to an alternate manifest file used as the + SPMC Core manifest. Valid when ``SPD=spmd`` is selected. + +- ``BL2``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to BL2 + image for the ``fip`` target. In this case, the BL2 in the TF-A will not be + built. + +- ``BL2U``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to + BL2U image. In this case, the BL2U in TF-A will not be built. + +- ``RESET_TO_BL2``: Boolean option to enable BL2 entrypoint as the CPU reset + vector instead of the BL1 entrypoint. It can take the value 0 (CPU reset to BL1 + entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to BL2 entrypoint). + The default value is 0. + +- ``BL2_RUNS_AT_EL3``: This is an implicit flag to denote that BL2 runs at EL3. + While it is explicitly set to 1 when RESET_TO_BL2 is set to 1 it can also be + true in a 4-world system where RESET_TO_BL2 is 0. + +- ``BL2_ENABLE_SP_LOAD``: Boolean option to enable loading SP packages from the + FIP. Automatically enabled if ``SP_LAYOUT_FILE`` is provided. + +- ``BL2_IN_XIP_MEM``: In some use-cases BL2 will be stored in eXecute In Place + (XIP) memory, like BL1. In these use-cases, it is necessary to initialize + the RW sections in RAM, while leaving the RO sections in place. This option + enable this use-case. For now, this option is only supported + when RESET_TO_BL2 is set to '1'. + +- ``BL31``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to + BL31 image for the ``fip`` target. In this case, the BL31 in TF-A will not + be built. + +- ``BL31_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies a + file that contains the BL31 private key in PEM format or a PKCS11 URI. If + ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and it will be used to save the key. + +- ``BL32``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to + BL32 image for the ``fip`` target. In this case, the BL32 in TF-A will not + be built. + +- ``BL32_EXTRA1``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to + Trusted OS Extra1 image for the ``fip`` target. + +- ``BL32_EXTRA2``: This is an optional build option which specifies the path to + Trusted OS Extra2 image for the ``fip`` target. + +- ``BL32_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies a + file that contains the BL32 private key in PEM format or a PKCS11 URI. If + ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and it will be used to save the key. + +- ``BL33``: Path to BL33 image in the host file system. This is mandatory for + ``fip`` target in case TF-A BL2 is used. + +- ``BL33_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies a + file that contains the BL33 private key in PEM format or a PKCS11 URI. If + ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and it will be used to save the key. + +- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication + and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves. + If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option + ``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use: +- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection +- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features +- 2: Return address signing to its standard level +- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions +- 4: Turn on branch target identification mechanism + + The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options + and resulting PAuth/BTI features. + + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + | Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI | + +=======+==============+=======+=====+ + | 0 | none | N | N | + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + | 1 | standard | Y | Y | + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + | 2 | pac-ret | Y | N | + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + | 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N | + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + | 4 | bti | N | Y | + +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ + + This option defaults to 0. + Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world + irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it. + +- ``BUILD_MESSAGE_TIMESTAMP``: String used to identify the time and date of the + compilation of each build. It must be set to a C string (including quotes + where applicable). Defaults to a string that contains the time and date of + the compilation. + +- ``BUILD_STRING``: Input string for VERSION_STRING, which allows the TF-A + build to be uniquely identified. Defaults to the current git commit id. + +- ``BUILD_BASE``: Output directory for the build. Defaults to ``./build`` + +- ``CFLAGS``: Extra user options appended on the compiler's command line in + addition to the options set by the build system. + +- ``COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU``: This option indicates whether the platform may + release several CPUs out of reset. It can take either 0 (several CPUs may be + brought up) or 1 (only one CPU will ever be brought up during cold reset). + Default is 0. If the platform always brings up a single CPU, there is no + need to distinguish between primary and secondary CPUs and the boot path can + be optimised. The ``plat_is_my_cpu_primary()`` and + ``plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup()`` platform porting interfaces do not need + to be implemented in this case. + +- ``COT``: When Trusted Boot is enabled, selects the desired chain of trust. + Defaults to ``tbbr``. + +- ``CRASH_REPORTING``: A non-zero value enables a console dump of processor + register state when an unexpected exception occurs during execution of + BL31. This option defaults to the value of ``DEBUG`` - i.e. by default + this is only enabled for a debug build of the firmware. + +- ``CREATE_KEYS``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It tells the + certificate generation tool to create new keys in case no valid keys are + present or specified. Allowed options are '0' or '1'. Default is '1'. + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS`` : Boolean option that, when set to 1, will cause + the AArch32 system registers to be included when saving and restoring the + CPU context. The option must be set to 0 for AArch64-only platforms (that + is on hardware that does not implement AArch32, or at least not at EL1 and + higher ELs). Default value is 1. + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS``: Boolean option that, when set to 1, will cause the FP + registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context. Default + is 0. + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS``: Numeric value to include Memory Tagging Extension + registers in cpu context. This must be enabled, if the platform wants to use + this feature in the Secure world and MTE is enabled at ELX. This flag can + take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. + Default value is 0. + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_NEVE_REGS``: Numeric value, when set will cause the Armv8.4-NV + registers to be saved/restored when entering/exiting an EL2 execution + context. This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default value is 0. + +- ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS``: Numeric value to enable the Pointer + Authentication for Secure world. This will cause the ARMv8.3-PAuth registers + to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context as part of world + switch. This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is 0. + + Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective + of the value of this flag if the CPU supports it. + +- ``DEBUG``: Chooses between a debug and release build. It can take either 0 + (release) or 1 (debug) as values. 0 is the default. + +- ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT``: This build flag enables the user to select the + authenticated decryption algorithm to be used to decrypt firmware/s during + boot. It accepts 2 values: ``aes_gcm`` and ``none``. The default value of + this flag is ``none`` to disable firmware decryption which is an optional + feature as per TBBR. + +- ``DISABLE_BIN_GENERATION``: Boolean option to disable the generation + of the binary image. If set to 1, then only the ELF image is built. + 0 is the default. + +- ``DISABLE_MTPMU``: Numeric option to disable ``FEAT_MTPMU`` (Multi Threaded + PMU). ``FEAT_MTPMU`` is an optional feature available on Armv8.6 onwards. + This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default is ``0``. + +- ``DYN_DISABLE_AUTH``: Provides the capability to dynamically disable Trusted + Board Boot authentication at runtime. This option is meant to be enabled only + for development platforms. ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT`` flag must be set if this + flag has to be enabled. 0 is the default. + +- ``E``: Boolean option to make warnings into errors. Default is 1. + + When specifying higher warnings levels (``W=1`` and higher), this option + defaults to 0. This is done to encourage contributors to use them, as they + are expected to produce warnings that would otherwise fail the build. New + contributions are still expected to build with ``W=0`` and ``E=1`` (the + default). + +- ``EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE``: This option enables booting an EL3 payload instead of + the normal boot flow. It must specify the entry point address of the EL3 + payload. Please refer to the "Booting an EL3 payload" section for more + details. + +- ``ENABLE_AMU_AUXILIARY_COUNTERS``: Enables support for AMU auxiliary counters + (also known as group 1 counters). These are implementation-defined counters, + and as such require additional platform configuration. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_AMU_FCONF``: Enables configuration of the AMU through FCONF, which + allows platforms with auxiliary counters to describe them via the + ``HW_CONFIG`` device tree blob. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_ASSERTIONS``: This option controls whether or not calls to ``assert()`` + are compiled out. For debug builds, this option defaults to 1, and calls to + ``assert()`` are left in place. For release builds, this option defaults to 0 + and calls to ``assert()`` function are compiled out. This option can be set + independently of ``DEBUG``. It can also be used to hide any auxiliary code + that is only required for the assertion and does not fit in the assertion + itself. + +- ``ENABLE_BACKTRACE``: This option controls whether to enable backtrace + dumps or not. It is supported in both AArch64 and AArch32. However, in + AArch32 the format of the frame records are not defined in the AAPCS and they + are defined by the implementation. This implementation of backtrace only + supports the format used by GCC when T32 interworking is disabled. For this + reason enabling this option in AArch32 will force the compiler to only + generate A32 code. This option is enabled by default only in AArch64 debug + builds, but this behaviour can be overridden in each platform's Makefile or + in the build command line. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_AMU``: Numeric value to enable Activity Monitor Unit + extensions. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. This is an optional architectural feature + available on v8.4 onwards. Some v8.2 implementations also implement an AMU + and this option can be used to enable this feature on those systems as well. + This flag can take the values 0 to 2, the default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_AMUv1p1``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_AMUv1p1`` + extension. ``FEAT_AMUv1p1`` is an optional feature available on Arm v8.6 + onwards. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_CSV2_2``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_CSV2_2`` + extension. It allows access to the SCXTNUM_EL2 (Software Context Number) + register during EL2 context save/restore operations. ``FEAT_CSV2_2`` is an + optional feature available on Arm v8.0 onwards. This flag can take values + 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. + Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_DIT``: Numeric value to enable ``FEAT_DIT`` (Data Independent + Timing) extension. It allows setting the ``DIT`` bit of PSTATE in EL3. + ``FEAT_DIT`` is a mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.4 + and upwards. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_ECV``: Numeric value to enable support for the Enhanced Counter + Virtualization feature, allowing for access to the CNTPOFF_EL2 (Counter-timer + Physical Offset register) during EL2 to EL3 context save/restore operations. + Its a mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.6 and upwards. + This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_FGT``: Numeric value to enable support for FGT (Fine Grain Traps) + feature allowing for access to the HDFGRTR_EL2 (Hypervisor Debug Fine-Grained + Read Trap Register) during EL2 to EL3 context save/restore operations. + Its a mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.6 and upwards. + This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_HCX``: Numeric value to set the bit SCR_EL3.HXEn in EL3 to + allow access to HCRX_EL2 (extended hypervisor control register) from EL2 as + well as adding HCRX_EL2 to the EL2 context save/restore operations. Its a + mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.7 and upwards. This + flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_MTE_PERM``: Numeric value to enable support for + ``FEAT_MTE_PERM``, which introduces Allocation tag access permission to + memory region attributes. ``FEAT_MTE_PERM`` is a optional architectural + feature available from v8.9 and upwards. This flag can take the values 0 to + 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default value is + ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_PAN``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_PAN`` (Privileged + Access Never) extension. ``FEAT_PAN`` adds a bit to PSTATE, generating a + permission fault for any privileged data access from EL1/EL2 to virtual + memory address, accessible at EL0, provided (HCR_EL2.E2H=1). It is a + mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.1 and upwards. This + flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_RNG``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_RNG`` extension. + ``FEAT_RNG`` is an optional feature available on Arm v8.5 onwards. This + flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_RNG_TRAP``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_RNG_TRAP`` + extension. This feature is only supported in AArch64 state. This flag can + take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. + Default value is ``0``. ``FEAT_RNG_TRAP`` is an optional feature from + Armv8.5 onwards. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_SB``: Boolean option to let the TF-A code use the ``FEAT_SB`` + (Speculation Barrier) instruction ``FEAT_SB`` is an optional feature and + defaults to ``0`` for pre-Armv8.5 CPUs, but is mandatory for Armv8.5 or + later CPUs. It is enabled from v8.5 and upwards and if needed can be + overidden from platforms explicitly. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_SEL2``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_SEL2`` (Secure EL2) + extension. ``FEAT_SEL2`` is a mandatory feature available on Arm v8.4. + This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_TWED``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_TWED`` (Delayed + trapping of WFE Instruction) extension. ``FEAT_TWED`` is a optional feature + available on Arm v8.6. This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default is ``0``. + + When ``ENABLE_FEAT_TWED`` is set to ``1``, WFE instruction trapping gets + delayed by the amount of value in ``TWED_DELAY``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_VHE``: Numeric value to enable the ``FEAT_VHE`` (Virtualization + Host Extensions) extension. It allows access to CONTEXTIDR_EL2 register + during EL2 context save/restore operations.``FEAT_VHE`` is a mandatory + architectural feature and is enabled from v8.1 and upwards. It can take + values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. + Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_TCR2``: Numeric value to set the bit SCR_EL3.ENTCR2 in EL3 to + allow access to TCR2_EL2 (extended translation control) from EL2 as + well as adding TCR2_EL2 to the EL2 context save/restore operations. Its a + mandatory architectural feature and is enabled from v8.9 and upwards. This + flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_S2PIE``: Numeric value to enable support for FEAT_S2PIE + at EL2 and below, and context switch relevant registers. This flag + can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_S1PIE``: Numeric value to enable support for FEAT_S1PIE + at EL2 and below, and context switch relevant registers. This flag + can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_S2POE``: Numeric value to enable support for FEAT_S2POE + at EL2 and below, and context switch relevant registers. This flag + can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_S1POE``: Numeric value to enable support for FEAT_S1POE + at EL2 and below, and context switch relevant registers. This flag + can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_GCS``: Numeric value to set the bit SCR_EL3.GCSEn in EL3 to + allow use of Guarded Control Stack from EL2 as well as adding the GCS + registers to the EL2 context save/restore operations. This flag can take + the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. + Default value is ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_LTO``: Boolean option to enable Link Time Optimization (LTO) + support in GCC for TF-A. This option is currently only supported for + AArch64. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_MPAM``: Numeric value to enable lower ELs to use MPAM + feature. MPAM is an optional Armv8.4 extension that enables various memory + system components and resources to define partitions; software running at + various ELs can assign themselves to desired partition to control their + performance aspects. + + This flag can take values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. When this option is set to ``1`` or ``2``, EL3 allows lower ELs to + access their own MPAM registers without trapping into EL3. This option + doesn't make use of partitioning in EL3, however. Platform initialisation + code should configure and use partitions in EL3 as required. This option + defaults to ``2`` since MPAM is enabled by default for NS world only. + The flag is automatically disabled when the target + architecture is AArch32. + +- ``ENABLE_MPMM``: Boolean option to enable support for the Maximum Power + Mitigation Mechanism supported by certain Arm cores, which allows the SoC + firmware to detect and limit high activity events to assist in SoC processor + power domain dynamic power budgeting and limit the triggering of whole-rail + (i.e. clock chopping) responses to overcurrent conditions. Defaults to ``0``. + +- ``ENABLE_MPMM_FCONF``: Enables configuration of MPMM through FCONF, which + allows platforms with cores supporting MPMM to describe them via the + ``HW_CONFIG`` device tree blob. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_PIE``: Boolean option to enable Position Independent Executable(PIE) + support within generic code in TF-A. This option is currently only supported + in BL2, BL31, and BL32 (TSP) for AARCH64 binaries, and + in BL32 (SP_min) for AARCH32. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_PMF``: Boolean option to enable support for optional Performance + Measurement Framework(PMF). Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_PSCI_STAT``: Boolean option to enable support for optional PSCI + functions ``PSCI_STAT_RESIDENCY`` and ``PSCI_STAT_COUNT``. Default is 0. + In the absence of an alternate stat collection backend, ``ENABLE_PMF`` must + be enabled. If ``ENABLE_PMF`` is set, the residency statistics are tracked in + software. + +- ``ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION``: Boolean option to enable runtime + instrumentation which injects timestamp collection points into TF-A to + allow runtime performance to be measured. Currently, only PSCI is + instrumented. Enabling this option enables the ``ENABLE_PMF`` build option + as well. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_SPE_FOR_NS`` : Numeric value to enable Statistical Profiling + extensions. This is an optional architectural feature for AArch64. + This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. The default is 2 but is automatically disabled when the target + architecture is AArch32. + +- ``ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable Scalable Vector Extension + (SVE) for the Non-secure world only. SVE is an optional architectural feature + for AArch64. Note that when SVE is enabled for the Non-secure world, access + to SIMD and floating-point functionality from the Secure world is disabled by + default and controlled with ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD. + This is to avoid corruption of the Non-secure world data in the Z-registers + which are aliased by the SIMD and FP registers. The build option is not + compatible with the ``CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS`` build option, and will raise an + assert on platforms where SVE is implemented and ``ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS`` + enabled. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. At this time, this build option cannot be + used on systems that have SPM_MM enabled. The default is 1. + +- ``ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD``: Boolean option to enable SVE for the Secure world. + SVE is an optional architectural feature for AArch64. Note that this option + requires ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS to be enabled. The default is 0 and it is + automatically disabled when the target architecture is AArch32. + +- ``ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR``: String option to enable the stack protection + checks in GCC. Allowed values are "all", "strong", "default" and "none". The + default value is set to "none". "strong" is the recommended stack protection + level if this feature is desired. "none" disables the stack protection. For + all values other than "none", the ``plat_get_stack_protector_canary()`` + platform hook needs to be implemented. The value is passed as the last + component of the option ``-fstack-protector-$ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR``. + +- ``ENCRYPT_BL31``: Binary flag to enable encryption of BL31 firmware. This + flag depends on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` build flag. + +- ``ENCRYPT_BL32``: Binary flag to enable encryption of Secure BL32 payload. + This flag depends on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` build flag. + +- ``ENC_KEY``: A 32-byte (256-bit) symmetric key in hex string format. It could + either be SSK or BSSK depending on ``FW_ENC_STATUS`` flag. This value depends + on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` build flag. + +- ``ENC_NONCE``: A 12-byte (96-bit) encryption nonce or Initialization Vector + (IV) in hex string format. This value depends on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` + build flag. + +- ``ERROR_DEPRECATED``: This option decides whether to treat the usage of + deprecated platform APIs, helper functions or drivers within Trusted + Firmware as error. It can take the value 1 (flag the use of deprecated + APIs as error) or 0. The default is 0. + +- ``ETHOSN_NPU_DRIVER``: boolean option to enable a SiP service that can + configure an Arm® Ethos™-N NPU. To use this service the target platform's + ``HW_CONFIG`` must include the device tree nodes for the NPU. Currently, only + the Arm Juno platform has this included in its ``HW_CONFIG`` and the platform + only loads the ``HW_CONFIG`` in AArch64 builds. Default is 0. + +- ``ETHOSN_NPU_TZMP1``: boolean option to enable TZMP1 support for the + Arm® Ethos™-N NPU. Requires ``ETHOSN_NPU_DRIVER`` and + ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT`` to be enabled. + +- ``ETHOSN_NPU_FW``: location of the NPU firmware binary + (```ethosn.bin```). This firmware image will be included in the FIP and + loaded at runtime. + +- ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING``: When set to ``1``, enable handling of exceptions + targeted at EL3. When set ``0`` (default), no exceptions are expected or + handled at EL3, and a panic will result. The exception to this rule is when + ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2`` is set to ``1``, in which case, only exceptions + occuring during normal world execution, are trapped to EL3. Any exception + trapped during secure world execution are trapped to the SPMC. This is + supported only for AArch64 builds. + +- ``EVENT_LOG_LEVEL``: Chooses the log level to use for Measured Boot when + ``MEASURED_BOOT`` is enabled. For a list of valid values, see ``LOG_LEVEL``. + Default value is 40 (LOG_LEVEL_INFO). + +- ``FAULT_INJECTION_SUPPORT``: ARMv8.4 extensions introduced support for fault + injection from lower ELs, and this build option enables lower ELs to use + Error Records accessed via System Registers to inject faults. This is + applicable only to AArch64 builds. + + This feature is intended for testing purposes only, and is advisable to keep + disabled for production images. + +- ``FIP_NAME``: This is an optional build option which specifies the FIP + filename for the ``fip`` target. Default is ``fip.bin``. + +- ``FWU_FIP_NAME``: This is an optional build option which specifies the FWU + FIP filename for the ``fwu_fip`` target. Default is ``fwu_fip.bin``. + +- ``FW_ENC_STATUS``: Top level firmware's encryption numeric flag, values: + + :: + + 0: Encryption is done with Secret Symmetric Key (SSK) which is common + for a class of devices. + 1: Encryption is done with Binding Secret Symmetric Key (BSSK) which is + unique per device. + + This flag depends on ``DECRYPTION_SUPPORT`` build flag. + +- ``GENERATE_COT``: Boolean flag used to build and execute the ``cert_create`` + tool to create certificates as per the Chain of Trust described in + :ref:`Trusted Board Boot`. The build system then calls ``fiptool`` to + include the certificates in the FIP and FWU_FIP. Default value is '0'. + + Specify both ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1`` and ``GENERATE_COT=1`` to include support + for the Trusted Board Boot feature in the BL1 and BL2 images, to generate + the corresponding certificates, and to include those certificates in the + FIP and FWU_FIP. + + Note that if ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=0`` and ``GENERATE_COT=1``, the BL1 and BL2 + images will not include support for Trusted Board Boot. The FIP will still + include the corresponding certificates. This FIP can be used to verify the + Chain of Trust on the host machine through other mechanisms. + + Note that if ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1`` and ``GENERATE_COT=0``, the BL1 and BL2 + images will include support for Trusted Board Boot, but the FIP and FWU_FIP + will not include the corresponding certificates, causing a boot failure. + +- ``GICV2_G0_FOR_EL3``: Unlike GICv3, the GICv2 architecture doesn't have + inherent support for specific EL3 type interrupts. Setting this build option + to ``1`` assumes GICv2 *Group 0* interrupts are expected to target EL3, both + by :ref:`platform abstraction layer<platform Interrupt Controller API>` and + :ref:`Interrupt Management Framework<Interrupt Management Framework>`. + This allows GICv2 platforms to enable features requiring EL3 interrupt type. + This also means that all GICv2 Group 0 interrupts are delivered to EL3, and + the Secure Payload interrupts needs to be synchronously handed over to Secure + EL1 for handling. The default value of this option is ``0``, which means the + Group 0 interrupts are assumed to be handled by Secure EL1. + +- ``HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST_NS``: When set to ``1``, External Aborts and SError + Interrupts, resulting from errors in NS world, will be always trapped in + EL3 i.e. in BL31 at runtime. When set to ``0`` (default), these exceptions + will be trapped in the current exception level (or in EL1 if the current + exception level is EL0). + +- ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY``: On most Arm systems to-date, platform-specific + software operations are required for CPUs to enter and exit coherency. + However, newer systems exist where CPUs' entry to and exit from coherency + is managed in hardware. Such systems require software to only initiate these + operations, and the rest is managed in hardware, minimizing active software + management. In such systems, this boolean option enables TF-A to carry out + build and run-time optimizations during boot and power management operations. + This option defaults to 0 and if it is enabled, then it implies + ``WARMBOOT_ENABLE_DCACHE_EARLY`` is also enabled. + + If this flag is disabled while the platform which TF-A is compiled for + includes cores that manage coherency in hardware, then a compilation error is + generated. This is based on the fact that a system cannot have, at the same + time, cores that manage coherency in hardware and cores that don't. In other + words, a platform cannot have, at the same time, cores that require + ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY=1`` and cores that require + ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY=0``. + + Note that, when ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY`` is enabled, version 2 of + translation library (xlat tables v2) must be used; version 1 of translation + library is not supported. + +- ``IMPDEF_SYSREG_TRAP``: Numeric value to enable the handling traps for + implementation defined system register accesses from lower ELs. Default + value is ``0``. + +- ``INVERTED_MEMMAP``: memmap tool print by default lower addresses at the + bottom, higher addresses at the top. This build flag can be set to '1' to + invert this behavior. Lower addresses will be printed at the top and higher + addresses at the bottom. + +- ``KEY_ALG``: This build flag enables the user to select the algorithm to be + used for generating the PKCS keys and subsequent signing of the certificate. + It accepts 5 values: ``rsa``, ``rsa_1_5``, ``ecdsa``, ``ecdsa-brainpool-regular`` + and ``ecdsa-brainpool-twisted``. The option ``rsa_1_5`` is the legacy PKCS#1 + RSA 1.5 algorithm which is not TBBR compliant and is retained only for + compatibility. The default value of this flag is ``rsa`` which is the TBBR + compliant PKCS#1 RSA 2.1 scheme. + +- ``KEY_SIZE``: This build flag enables the user to select the key size for + the algorithm specified by ``KEY_ALG``. The valid values for ``KEY_SIZE`` + depend on the chosen algorithm and the cryptographic module. + + +---------------------------+------------------------------------+ + | KEY_ALG | Possible key sizes | + +===========================+====================================+ + | rsa | 1024 , 2048 (default), 3072, 4096 | + +---------------------------+------------------------------------+ + | ecdsa | 256 (default), 384 | + +---------------------------+------------------------------------+ + | ecdsa-brainpool-regular | unavailable | + +---------------------------+------------------------------------+ + | ecdsa-brainpool-twisted | unavailable | + +---------------------------+------------------------------------+ + +- ``HASH_ALG``: This build flag enables the user to select the secure hash + algorithm. It accepts 3 values: ``sha256``, ``sha384`` and ``sha512``. + The default value of this flag is ``sha256``. + +- ``LDFLAGS``: Extra user options appended to the linkers' command line in + addition to the one set by the build system. + +- ``LOG_LEVEL``: Chooses the log level, which controls the amount of console log + output compiled into the build. This should be one of the following: + + :: + + 0 (LOG_LEVEL_NONE) + 10 (LOG_LEVEL_ERROR) + 20 (LOG_LEVEL_NOTICE) + 30 (LOG_LEVEL_WARNING) + 40 (LOG_LEVEL_INFO) + 50 (LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + + All log output up to and including the selected log level is compiled into + the build. The default value is 40 in debug builds and 20 in release builds. + +- ``MEASURED_BOOT``: Boolean flag to include support for the Measured Boot + feature. This flag can be enabled with ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT`` in order to + provide trust that the code taking the measurements and recording them has + not been tampered with. + + This option defaults to 0. + +- ``MARCH_DIRECTIVE``: used to pass a -march option from the platform build + options to the compiler. An example usage: + + .. code:: make + + MARCH_DIRECTIVE := -march=armv8.5-a + +- ``NON_TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It + specifies a file that contains the Non-Trusted World private key in PEM + format or a PKCS11 URI. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and it + will be used to save the key. + +- ``NS_BL2U``: Path to NS_BL2U image in the host file system. This image is + optional. It is only needed if the platform makefile specifies that it + is required in order to build the ``fwu_fip`` target. + +- ``NS_TIMER_SWITCH``: Enable save and restore for non-secure timer register + contents upon world switch. It can take either 0 (don't save and restore) or + 1 (do save and restore). 0 is the default. An SPD may set this to 1 if it + wants the timer registers to be saved and restored. + +- ``OPTEE_SP_FW_CONFIG``: DTC build flag to include OP-TEE as SP in + tb_fw_config device tree. This flag is defined only when + ``ARM_SPMC_MANIFEST_DTS`` manifest file name contains pattern optee_sp. + +- ``OVERRIDE_LIBC``: This option allows platforms to override the default libc + for the BL image. It can be either 0 (include) or 1 (remove). The default + value is 0. + +- ``PL011_GENERIC_UART``: Boolean option to indicate the PL011 driver that + the underlying hardware is not a full PL011 UART but a minimally compliant + generic UART, which is a subset of the PL011. The driver will not access + any register that is not part of the SBSA generic UART specification. + Default value is 0 (a full PL011 compliant UART is present). + +- ``PLAT``: Choose a platform to build TF-A for. The chosen platform name + must be subdirectory of any depth under ``plat/``, and must contain a + platform makefile named ``platform.mk``. For example, to build TF-A for the + Arm Juno board, select PLAT=juno. + +- ``PRELOADED_BL33_BASE``: This option enables booting a preloaded BL33 image + instead of the normal boot flow. When defined, it must specify the entry + point address for the preloaded BL33 image. This option is incompatible with + ``EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE``. If both are defined, ``EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE`` has priority + over ``PRELOADED_BL33_BASE``. + +- ``PROGRAMMABLE_RESET_ADDRESS``: This option indicates whether the reset + vector address can be programmed or is fixed on the platform. It can take + either 0 (fixed) or 1 (programmable). Default is 0. If the platform has a + programmable reset address, it is expected that a CPU will start executing + code directly at the right address, both on a cold and warm reset. In this + case, there is no need to identify the entrypoint on boot and the boot path + can be optimised. The ``plat_get_my_entrypoint()`` platform porting interface + does not need to be implemented in this case. + +- ``PSCI_EXTENDED_STATE_ID``: As per PSCI1.0 Specification, there are 2 formats + possible for the PSCI power-state parameter: original and extended State-ID + formats. This flag if set to 1, configures the generic PSCI layer to use the + extended format. The default value of this flag is 0, which means by default + the original power-state format is used by the PSCI implementation. This flag + should be specified by the platform makefile and it governs the return value + of PSCI_FEATURES API for CPU_SUSPEND smc function id. When this option is + enabled on Arm platforms, the option ``ARM_RECOM_STATE_ID_ENC`` needs to be + set to 1 as well. + +- ``PSCI_OS_INIT_MODE``: Boolean flag to enable support for optional PSCI + OS-initiated mode. This option defaults to 0. + +- ``ENABLE_FEAT_RAS``: Boolean flag to enable Armv8.2 RAS features. RAS features + are an optional extension for pre-Armv8.2 CPUs, but are mandatory for Armv8.2 + or later CPUs. This flag can take the values 0 or 1. The default value is 0. + NOTE: This flag enables use of IESB capability to reduce entry latency into + EL3 even when RAS error handling is not performed on the platform. Hence this + flag is recommended to be turned on Armv8.2 and later CPUs. + +- ``RESET_TO_BL31``: Enable BL31 entrypoint as the CPU reset vector instead + of the BL1 entrypoint. It can take the value 0 (CPU reset to BL1 + entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to BL31 entrypoint). + The default value is 0. + +- ``RESET_TO_SP_MIN``: SP_MIN is the minimal AArch32 Secure Payload provided + in TF-A. This flag configures SP_MIN entrypoint as the CPU reset vector + instead of the BL1 entrypoint. It can take the value 0 (CPU reset to BL1 + entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to SP_MIN entrypoint). The default value is 0. + +- ``ROT_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies a + file that contains the ROT private key in PEM format or a PKCS11 URI and + enforces public key hash generation. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is + accepted and it will be used to save the key. + +- ``SAVE_KEYS``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It tells the + certificate generation tool to save the keys used to establish the Chain of + Trust. Allowed options are '0' or '1'. Default is '0' (do not save). + +- ``SCP_BL2``: Path to SCP_BL2 image in the host file system. This image is optional. + If a SCP_BL2 image is present then this option must be passed for the ``fip`` + target. + +- ``SCP_BL2_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies a + file that contains the SCP_BL2 private key in PEM format or a PKCS11 URI. + If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and it will be used to save the key. + +- ``SCP_BL2U``: Path to SCP_BL2U image in the host file system. This image is + optional. It is only needed if the platform makefile specifies that it + is required in order to build the ``fwu_fip`` target. + +- ``SDEI_SUPPORT``: Setting this to ``1`` enables support for Software + Delegated Exception Interface to BL31 image. This defaults to ``0``. + + When set to ``1``, the build option ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` must also be + set to ``1``. + +- ``SEPARATE_CODE_AND_RODATA``: Whether code and read-only data should be + isolated on separate memory pages. This is a trade-off between security and + memory usage. See "Isolating code and read-only data on separate memory + pages" section in :ref:`Firmware Design`. This flag is disabled by default + and affects all BL images. + +- ``SEPARATE_NOBITS_REGION``: Setting this option to ``1`` allows the NOBITS + sections of BL31 (.bss, stacks, page tables, and coherent memory) to be + allocated in RAM discontiguous from the loaded firmware image. When set, the + platform is expected to provide definitions for ``BL31_NOBITS_BASE`` and + ``BL31_NOBITS_LIMIT``. When the option is ``0`` (the default), NOBITS + sections are placed in RAM immediately following the loaded firmware image. + +- ``SEPARATE_BL2_NOLOAD_REGION``: Setting this option to ``1`` allows the + NOLOAD sections of BL2 (.bss, stacks, page tables) to be allocated in RAM + discontiguous from loaded firmware images. When set, the platform need to + provide definitions of ``BL2_NOLOAD_START`` and ``BL2_NOLOAD_LIMIT``. This + flag is disabled by default and NOLOAD sections are placed in RAM immediately + following the loaded firmware image. + +- ``SMC_PCI_SUPPORT``: This option allows platforms to handle PCI configuration + access requests via a standard SMCCC defined in `DEN0115`_. When combined with + UEFI+ACPI this can provide a certain amount of OS forward compatibility + with newer platforms that aren't ECAM compliant. + +- ``SPD``: Choose a Secure Payload Dispatcher component to be built into TF-A. + This build option is only valid if ``ARCH=aarch64``. The value should be + the path to the directory containing the SPD source, relative to + ``services/spd/``; the directory is expected to contain a makefile called + ``<spd-value>.mk``. The SPM Dispatcher standard service is located in + services/std_svc/spmd and enabled by ``SPD=spmd``. The SPM Dispatcher + cannot be enabled when the ``SPM_MM`` option is enabled. + +- ``SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT``: This option introduces an infinite loop in BL1. It can + take either 0 (no loop) or 1 (add a loop). 0 is the default. This loop stops + execution in BL1 just before handing over to BL31. At this point, all + firmware images have been loaded in memory, and the MMU and caches are + turned off. Refer to the "Debugging options" section for more details. + +- ``SPMC_AT_EL3`` : This boolean option is used jointly with the SPM + Dispatcher option (``SPD=spmd``). When enabled (1) it indicates the SPMC + component runs at the EL3 exception level. The default value is ``0`` ( + disabled). This configuration supports pre-Armv8.4 platforms (aka not + implementing the ``FEAT_SEL2`` extension). + +- ``SPMC_AT_EL3_SEL0_SP`` : Boolean option to enable SEL0 SP load support when + ``SPMC_AT_EL3`` is enabled. The default value if ``0`` (disabled). This + option cannot be enabled (``1``) when (``SPMC_AT_EL3``) is disabled. + +- ``SPMC_OPTEE`` : This boolean option is used jointly with the SPM + Dispatcher option (``SPD=spmd``) and with ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2=0`` to + indicate that the SPMC at S-EL1 is OP-TEE and an OP-TEE specific loading + mechanism should be used. + +- ``SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2`` : This boolean option is used jointly with the SPM + Dispatcher option (``SPD=spmd``). When enabled (1) it indicates the SPMC + component runs at the S-EL2 exception level provided by the ``FEAT_SEL2`` + extension. This is the default when enabling the SPM Dispatcher. When + disabled (0) it indicates the SPMC component runs at the S-EL1 execution + state or at EL3 if ``SPMC_AT_EL3`` is enabled. The latter configurations + support pre-Armv8.4 platforms (aka not implementing the ``FEAT_SEL2`` + extension). + +- ``SPM_MM`` : Boolean option to enable the Management Mode (MM)-based Secure + Partition Manager (SPM) implementation. The default value is ``0`` + (disabled). This option cannot be enabled (``1``) when SPM Dispatcher is + enabled (``SPD=spmd``). + +- ``SP_LAYOUT_FILE``: Platform provided path to JSON file containing the + description of secure partitions. The build system will parse this file and + package all secure partition blobs into the FIP. This file is not + necessarily part of TF-A tree. Only available when ``SPD=spmd``. + +- ``SP_MIN_WITH_SECURE_FIQ``: Boolean flag to indicate the SP_MIN handles + secure interrupts (caught through the FIQ line). Platforms can enable + this directive if they need to handle such interruption. When enabled, + the FIQ are handled in monitor mode and non secure world is not allowed + to mask these events. Platforms that enable FIQ handling in SP_MIN shall + implement the api ``sp_min_plat_fiq_handler()``. The default value is 0. + +- ``SVE_VECTOR_LEN``: SVE vector length to configure in ZCR_EL3. + Platforms can configure this if they need to lower the hardware + limit, for example due to asymmetric configuration or limitations of + software run at lower ELs. The default is the architectural maximum + of 2048 which should be suitable for most configurations, the + hardware will limit the effective VL to the maximum physically supported + VL. + +- ``TRNG_SUPPORT``: Setting this to ``1`` enables support for True + Random Number Generator Interface to BL31 image. This defaults to ``0``. + +- ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT``: Boolean flag to include support for the Trusted Board + Boot feature. When set to '1', BL1 and BL2 images include support to load + and verify the certificates and images in a FIP, and BL1 includes support + for the Firmware Update. The default value is '0'. Generation and inclusion + of certificates in the FIP and FWU_FIP depends upon the value of the + ``GENERATE_COT`` option. + + .. warning:: + This option depends on ``CREATE_KEYS`` to be enabled. If the keys + already exist in disk, they will be overwritten without further notice. + +- ``TRUSTED_WORLD_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It + specifies a file that contains the Trusted World private key in PEM + format or a PKCS11 URI. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, only a file is accepted and + it will be used to save the key. + +- ``TSP_INIT_ASYNC``: Choose BL32 initialization method as asynchronous or + synchronous, (see "Initializing a BL32 Image" section in + :ref:`Firmware Design`). It can take the value 0 (BL32 is initialized using + synchronous method) or 1 (BL32 is initialized using asynchronous method). + Default is 0. + +- ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT``: A non zero value enables the interrupt + routing model which routes non-secure interrupts asynchronously from TSP + to EL3 causing immediate preemption of TSP. The EL3 is responsible + for saving and restoring the TSP context in this routing model. The + default routing model (when the value is 0) is to route non-secure + interrupts to TSP allowing it to save its context and hand over + synchronously to EL3 via an SMC. + + .. note:: + When ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``, ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT`` + must also be set to ``1``. + +- ``TS_SP_FW_CONFIG``: DTC build flag to include Trusted Services (Crypto and + internal-trusted-storage) as SP in tb_fw_config device tree. + +- ``TWED_DELAY``: Numeric value to be set in order to delay the trapping of + WFE instruction. ``ENABLE_FEAT_TWED`` build option must be enabled to set + this delay. It can take values in the range (0-15). Default value is ``0`` + and based on this value, 2^(TWED_DELAY + 8) cycles will be delayed. + Platforms need to explicitly update this value based on their requirements. + +- ``USE_ARM_LINK``: This flag determines whether to enable support for ARM + linker. When the ``LINKER`` build variable points to the armlink linker, + this flag is enabled automatically. To enable support for armlink, platforms + will have to provide a scatter file for the BL image. Currently, Tegra + platforms use the armlink support to compile BL3-1 images. + +- ``USE_COHERENT_MEM``: This flag determines whether to include the coherent + memory region in the BL memory map or not (see "Use of Coherent memory in + TF-A" section in :ref:`Firmware Design`). It can take the value 1 + (Coherent memory region is included) or 0 (Coherent memory region is + excluded). Default is 1. + +- ``ARM_IO_IN_DTB``: This flag determines whether to use IO based on the + firmware configuration framework. This will move the io_policies into a + configuration device tree, instead of static structure in the code base. + +- ``COT_DESC_IN_DTB``: This flag determines whether to create COT descriptors + at runtime using fconf. If this flag is enabled, COT descriptors are + statically captured in tb_fw_config file in the form of device tree nodes + and properties. Currently, COT descriptors used by BL2 are moved to the + device tree and COT descriptors used by BL1 are retained in the code + base statically. + +- ``SDEI_IN_FCONF``: This flag determines whether to configure SDEI setup in + runtime using firmware configuration framework. The platform specific SDEI + shared and private events configuration is retrieved from device tree rather + than static C structures at compile time. This is only supported if + SDEI_SUPPORT build flag is enabled. + +- ``SEC_INT_DESC_IN_FCONF``: This flag determines whether to configure Group 0 + and Group1 secure interrupts using the firmware configuration framework. The + platform specific secure interrupt property descriptor is retrieved from + device tree in runtime rather than depending on static C structure at compile + time. + +- ``USE_ROMLIB``: This flag determines whether library at ROM will be used. + This feature creates a library of functions to be placed in ROM and thus + reduces SRAM usage. Refer to :ref:`Library at ROM` for further details. Default + is 0. + +- ``V``: Verbose build. If assigned anything other than 0, the build commands + are printed. Default is 0. + +- ``VERSION_STRING``: String used in the log output for each TF-A image. + Defaults to a string formed by concatenating the version number, build type + and build string. + +- ``W``: Warning level. Some compiler warning options of interest have been + regrouped and put in the root Makefile. This flag can take the values 0 to 3, + each level enabling more warning options. Default is 0. + + This option is closely related to the ``E`` option, which enables + ``-Werror``. + + - ``W=0`` (default) + + Enables a wide assortment of warnings, most notably ``-Wall`` and + ``-Wextra``, as well as various bad practices and things that are likely to + result in errors. Includes some compiler specific flags. No warnings are + expected at this level for any build. + + - ``W=1`` + + Enables warnings we want the generic build to include but are too time + consuming to fix at the moment. It re-enables warnings taken out for + ``W=0`` builds (a few of the ``-Wextra`` additions). This level is expected + to eventually be merged into ``W=0``. Some warnings are expected on some + builds, but new contributions should not introduce new ones. + + - ``W=2`` (recommended) + + Enables warnings we want the generic build to include but cannot be enabled + due to external libraries. This level is expected to eventually be merged + into ``W=0``. Lots of warnings are expected, primarily from external + libraries like zlib and compiler-rt, but new controbutions should not + introduce new ones. + + - ``W=3`` + + Enables warnings that are informative but not necessary and generally too + verbose and frequently ignored. A very large number of warnings are + expected. + + The exact set of warning flags depends on the compiler and TF-A warning + level, however they are all succinctly set in the top-level Makefile. Please + refer to the `GCC`_ or `Clang`_ documentation for more information on the + individual flags. + +- ``WARMBOOT_ENABLE_DCACHE_EARLY`` : Boolean option to enable D-cache early on + the CPU after warm boot. This is applicable for platforms which do not + require interconnect programming to enable cache coherency (eg: single + cluster platforms). If this option is enabled, then warm boot path + enables D-caches immediately after enabling MMU. This option defaults to 0. + +- ``SUPPORT_STACK_MEMTAG``: This flag determines whether to enable memory + tagging for stack or not. It accepts 2 values: ``yes`` and ``no``. The + default value of this flag is ``no``. Note this option must be enabled only + for ARM architecture greater than Armv8.5-A. + +- ``ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT``: This flag determines whether to enable ``AT`` + speculative errata workaround or not. It accepts 2 values: ``1`` and ``0``. + The default value of this flag is ``0``. + + ``AT`` speculative errata workaround disables stage1 page table walk for + lower ELs (EL1 and EL0) in EL3 so that ``AT`` speculative fetch at any point + produces either the correct result or failure without TLB allocation. + + This boolean option enables errata for all below CPUs. + + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + | Errata | CPU | Workaround Define | + +=========+==============+=========================+ + | 1165522 | Cortex-A76 | ``ERRATA_A76_1165522`` | + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + | 1319367 | Cortex-A72 | ``ERRATA_A72_1319367`` | + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + | 1319537 | Cortex-A57 | ``ERRATA_A57_1319537`` | + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + | 1530923 | Cortex-A55 | ``ERRATA_A55_1530923`` | + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + | 1530924 | Cortex-A53 | ``ERRATA_A53_1530924`` | + +---------+--------------+-------------------------+ + + .. note:: + This option is enabled by build only if platform sets any of above defines + mentioned in ’Workaround Define' column in the table. + If this option is enabled for the EL3 software then EL2 software also must + implement this workaround due to the behaviour of the errata mentioned + in new SDEN document which will get published soon. + +- ``RAS_TRAP_NS_ERR_REC_ACCESS``: This flag enables/disables the SCR_EL3.TERR + bit, to trap access to the RAS ERR and RAS ERX registers from lower ELs. + This flag is disabled by default. + +- ``OPENSSL_DIR``: This option is used to provide the path to a directory on the + host machine where a custom installation of OpenSSL is located, which is used + to build the certificate generation, firmware encryption and FIP tools. If + this option is not set, the default OS installation will be used. + +- ``USE_SP804_TIMER``: Use the SP804 timer instead of the Generic Timer for + functions that wait for an arbitrary time length (udelay and mdelay). The + default value is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_BRBE_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable access to the branch record + buffer registers from NS ELs when FEAT_BRBE is implemented. BRBE is an + optional architectural feature for AArch64. This flag can take the values + 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. The default is 0 + and it is automatically disabled when the target architecture is AArch32. + +- ``ENABLE_TRBE_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable access of trace buffer + control registers from NS ELs, NS-EL2 or NS-EL1(when NS-EL2 is implemented + but unused) when FEAT_TRBE is implemented. TRBE is an optional architectural + feature for AArch64. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. The default is 0 and it is automatically + disabled when the target architecture is AArch32. + +- ``ENABLE_SYS_REG_TRACE_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable trace system + registers access from NS ELs, NS-EL2 or NS-EL1 (when NS-EL2 is implemented + but unused). This feature is available if trace unit such as ETMv4.x, and + ETE(extending ETM feature) is implemented. This flag can take the values + 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. The default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_TRF_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable trace filter control registers + access from NS ELs, NS-EL2 or NS-EL1 (when NS-EL2 is implemented but unused), + if FEAT_TRF is implemented. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align + with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. This flag is disabled by default. + +- ``PLAT_RSS_NOT_SUPPORTED``: Boolean option to enable the usage of the PSA + APIs on platforms that doesn't support RSS (providing Arm CCA HES + functionalities). When enabled (``1``), a mocked version of the APIs are used. + The default value is 0. + +- ``CONDITIONAL_CMO``: Boolean option to enable call to platform-defined routine + ``plat_can_cmo`` which will return zero if cache management operations should + be skipped and non-zero otherwise. By default, this option is disabled which + means platform hook won't be checked and CMOs will always be performed when + related functions are called. + +- ``ERRATA_ABI_SUPPORT``: Boolean option to enable support for Errata management + firmware interface for the BL31 image. By default its disabled (``0``). + +- ``ERRATA_NON_ARM_INTERCONNECT``: Boolean option to enable support for the + errata mitigation for platforms with a non-arm interconnect using the errata + ABI. By default its disabled (``0``). + +- ``ENABLE_CONSOLE_GETC``: Boolean option to enable `getc()` feature in console + driver(s). By default it is disabled (``0``) because it constitutes an attack + vector into TF-A by potentially allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary data. + This option should only be enabled on a need basis if there is a use case for + reading characters from the console. + +GICv3 driver options +-------------------- + +GICv3 driver files are included using directive: + +``include drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3.mk`` + +The driver can be configured with the following options set in the platform +makefile: + +- ``GICV3_SUPPORT_GIC600``: Add support for the GIC-600 variants of GICv3. + Enabling this option will add runtime detection support for the + GIC-600, so is safe to select even for a GIC500 implementation. + This option defaults to 0. + +- ``GICV3_SUPPORT_GIC600AE_FMU``: Add support for the Fault Management Unit + for GIC-600 AE. Enabling this option will introduce support to initialize + the FMU. Platforms should call the init function during boot to enable the + FMU and its safety mechanisms. This option defaults to 0. + +- ``GICV3_IMPL_GIC600_MULTICHIP``: Selects GIC-600 variant with multichip + functionality. This option defaults to 0 + +- ``GICV3_OVERRIDE_DISTIF_PWR_OPS``: Allows override of default implementation + of ``arm_gicv3_distif_pre_save`` and ``arm_gicv3_distif_post_restore`` + functions. This is required for FVP platform which need to simulate GIC save + and restore during SYSTEM_SUSPEND without powering down GIC. Default is 0. + +- ``GIC_ENABLE_V4_EXTN`` : Enables GICv4 related changes in GICv3 driver. + This option defaults to 0. + +- ``GIC_EXT_INTID``: When set to ``1``, GICv3 driver will support extended + PPI (1056-1119) and SPI (4096-5119) range. This option defaults to 0. + +Debugging options +----------------- + +To compile a debug version and make the build more verbose use + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all + +AArch64 GCC 11 uses DWARF version 5 debugging symbols by default. Some tools +(for example Arm-DS) might not support this and may need an older version of +DWARF symbols to be emitted by GCC. This can be achieved by using the +``-gdwarf-<version>`` flag, with the version being set to 2, 3, 4 or 5. Setting +the version to 4 is recommended for Arm-DS. + +When debugging logic problems it might also be useful to disable all compiler +optimizations by using ``-O0``. + +.. warning:: + Using ``-O0`` could cause output images to be larger and base addresses + might need to be recalculated (see the **Memory layout on Arm development + platforms** section in the :ref:`Firmware Design`). + +Extra debug options can be passed to the build system by setting ``CFLAGS`` or +``LDFLAGS``: + +.. code:: shell + + CFLAGS='-O0 -gdwarf-2' \ + make PLAT=<platform> DEBUG=1 V=1 all + +Note that using ``-Wl,`` style compilation driver options in ``CFLAGS`` will be +ignored as the linker is called directly. + +It is also possible to introduce an infinite loop to help in debugging the +post-BL2 phase of TF-A. This can be done by rebuilding BL1 with the +``SPIN_ON_BL1_EXIT=1`` build flag. Refer to the :ref:`build_options_common` +section. In this case, the developer may take control of the target using a +debugger when indicated by the console output. When using Arm-DS, the following +commands can be used: + +:: + + # Stop target execution + interrupt + + # + # Prepare your debugging environment, e.g. set breakpoints + # + + # Jump over the debug loop + set var $AARCH64::$Core::$PC = $AARCH64::$Core::$PC + 4 + + # Resume execution + continue + +.. _build_options_experimental: + +Experimental build options +--------------------------- + +Common build options +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- ``DRTM_SUPPORT``: Boolean flag to enable support for Dynamic Root of Trust + for Measurement (DRTM). This feature has trust dependency on BL31 for taking + the measurements and recording them as per `PSA DRTM specification`_. For + platforms which use BL2 to load/authenticate BL31 ``TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT`` can + be used and for the platforms which use ``RESET_TO_BL31`` platform owners + should have mechanism to authenticate BL31. This option defaults to 0. + +- ``ENABLE_RME``: Numeric value to enable support for the ARMv9 Realm + Management Extension. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with + the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default value is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable Scalable Matrix Extension + (SME), SVE, and FPU/SIMD for the non-secure world only. These features share + registers so are enabled together. Using this option without + ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD=1 will cause SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD instructions in secure + world to trap to EL3. Requires ``ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS`` to be set as SME is a + superset of SVE. SME is an optional architectural feature for AArch64. + At this time, this build option cannot be used on systems that have + SPD=spmd/SPM_MM and atempting to build with this option will fail. + This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` + mechanism. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_SME2_FOR_NS``: Numeric value to enable Scalable Matrix Extension + version 2 (SME2) for the non-secure world only. SME2 is an optional + architectural feature for AArch64. + This should be set along with ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS=1, if not, the default SME + accesses will still be trapped. This flag can take the values 0 to 2, to + align with the ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` mechanism. Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD``: Boolean option to enable the Scalable Matrix + Extension for secure world. Used along with SVE and FPU/SIMD. + ENABLE_SME_FOR_NS and ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD must also be set to use this. + Default is 0. + +- ``ENABLE_SPMD_LP`` : This boolean option is used jointly with the SPM + Dispatcher option (``SPD=spmd``). When enabled (1) it indicates support + for logical partitions in EL3, managed by the SPMD as defined in the + FF-A v1.2 specification. This flag is disabled by default. This flag + must not be used if ``SPMC_AT_EL3`` is enabled. + +- ``FEATURE_DETECTION``: Boolean option to enable the architectural features + detection mechanism. It detects whether the Architectural features enabled + through feature specific build flags are supported by the PE or not by + validating them either at boot phase or at runtime based on the value + possessed by the feature flag (0 to 2) and report error messages at an early + stage. This flag will also enable errata ordering checking for ``DEBUG`` + builds. + + This prevents and benefits us from EL3 runtime exceptions during context save + and restore routines guarded by these build flags. Henceforth validating them + before their usage provides more control on the actions taken under them. + + The mechanism permits the build flags to take values 0, 1 or 2 and + evaluates them accordingly. + + Lets consider ``ENABLE_FEAT_HCX``, build flag for ``FEAT_HCX`` as an example: + + :: + + ENABLE_FEAT_HCX = 0: Feature disabled statically at compile time. + ENABLE_FEAT_HCX = 1: Feature Enabled and the flag is validated at boottime. + ENABLE_FEAT_HCX = 2: Feature Enabled and the flag is validated at runtime. + + In the above example, if the feature build flag, ``ENABLE_FEAT_HCX`` set to + 0, feature is disabled statically during compilation. If it is defined as 1, + feature is validated, wherein FEAT_HCX is detected at boot time. In case not + implemented by the PE, a hard panic is generated. Finally, if the flag is set + to 2, feature is validated at runtime. + + Note that the entire implementation is divided into two phases, wherein as + as part of phase-1 we are supporting the values 0,1. Value 2 is currently not + supported and is planned to be handled explicilty in phase-2 implementation. + + ``FEATURE_DETECTION`` macro is disabled by default. Platforms can explicitly + make use of this by mechanism, by enabling it to validate whether they have + set their build flags properly at an early phase. + +- ``PSA_CRYPTO``: Boolean option for enabling MbedTLS PSA crypto APIs support. + The platform will use PSA compliant Crypto APIs during authentication and + image measurement process by enabling this option. It uses APIs defined as + per the `PSA Crypto API specification`_. This feature is only supported if + using MbedTLS 3.x version. It is disabled (``0``) by default. + +- ``TRANSFER_LIST``: Setting this to ``1`` enables support for Firmware + Handoff using Transfer List defined in `Firmware Handoff specification`_. + This defaults to ``0``. Current implementation follows the Firmware Handoff + specification v0.9. + +- ``USE_DEBUGFS``: When set to 1 this option exposes a virtual filesystem + interface through BL31 as a SiP SMC function. + Default is disabled (0). + +Firmware update options +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- ``PSA_FWU_SUPPORT``: Enable the firmware update mechanism as per the + `PSA FW update specification`_. The default value is 0. + PSA firmware update implementation has few limitations, such as: + + - BL2 is not part of the protocol-updatable images. If BL2 needs to + be updated, then it should be done through another platform-defined + mechanism. + + - It assumes the platform's hardware supports CRC32 instructions. + +- ``NR_OF_FW_BANKS``: Define the number of firmware banks. This flag is used + in defining the firmware update metadata structure. This flag is by default + set to '2'. + +- ``NR_OF_IMAGES_IN_FW_BANK``: Define the number of firmware images in each + firmware bank. Each firmware bank must have the same number of images as per + the `PSA FW update specification`_. + This flag is used in defining the firmware update metadata structure. This + flag is by default set to '1'. + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* + +.. _DEN0115: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0115/latest +.. _PSA FW update specification: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/ +.. _PSA DRTM specification: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0113/a +.. _GCC: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Warning-Options.html +.. _Clang: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html +.. _Firmware Handoff specification: https://github.com/FirmwareHandoff/firmware_handoff/releases/tag/v0.9 +.. _PSA Crypto API specification: https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/ diff --git a/docs/getting_started/docs-build.rst b/docs/getting_started/docs-build.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50fff57 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/docs-build.rst @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +Building Documentation +====================== + +To create a rendered copy of this documentation locally you can use the +`Sphinx`_ tool to build and package the plain-text documents into HTML-formatted +pages. + +If you are building the documentation for the first time then you will need to +check that you have the required software packages, as described in the +*Prerequisites* section that follows. + +.. note:: + An online copy of the documentation is available at + https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/tf-a, if you want to view a rendered + copy without doing a local build. + +Prerequisites +------------- + +For building a local copy of the |TF-A| documentation you will need: + +- Python 3 (3.8 or later) +- PlantUML (1.2017.15 or later) +- `Poetry`_ (Python dependency manager) +- Optionally, the `Dia`_ application can be installed if you need to edit + existing ``.dia`` diagram files, or create new ones. + + +Below is an example set of instructions to get a working environment (tested on +Ubuntu): + +.. code:: shell + + sudo apt install python3 python3-pip plantuml [dia] + curl -sSL https://install.python-poetry.org | python3 - + +Building rendered documentation +------------------------------- + +To install Python dependencies using Poetry: + +.. code:: shell + + poetry install + +Poetry will create a new virtual environment and install all dependencies listed +in ``pyproject.toml``. You can get information about this environment, such as +its location and the Python version, with the command: + +.. code:: shell + + poetry env info + +If you have already sourced a virtual environment, Poetry will respect this and +install dependencies there. + +Once all dependencies are installed, the documentation can be compiled into +HTML-formatted pages from the project root directory by running: + +.. code:: shell + + poetry run make doc + +Output from the build process will be placed in: ``docs/build/html``. + +Other Output Formats +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +We also support building documentation in other formats. From the ``docs`` +directory of the project, run the following command to see the supported +formats. + +.. code:: shell + + poetry run make -C docs help + +To build the documentation in PDF format, additionally ensure that the following +packages are installed: + +- FreeSerif font +- latexmk +- librsvg2-bin +- xelatex +- xindy + +Below is an example set of instructions to install the required packages +(tested on Ubuntu): + +.. code:: shell + + sudo apt install fonts-freefont-otf latexmk librsvg2-bin texlive-xetex xindy + +Once all the dependencies are installed, run the command ``poetry run make -C +docs latexpdf`` to build the documentation. Output from the build process +(``trustedfirmware-a.pdf``) can be found in ``docs/build/latex``. + +Building rendered documentation from Poetry's virtual environment +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The command ``poetry run`` used in the steps above executes the input command +from inside the project's virtual environment. The easiest way to activate this +virtual environment is with the ``poetry shell`` command. + +Running ``poetry shell`` from the directory containing this project, activates +the same virtual environment. This creates a sub-shell through which you can +build the documentation directly with ``make``. + +.. code:: shell + + poetry shell + make doc + +Type ``exit`` to deactivate the virtual environment and exit this new shell. For +other use cases, please see the official `Poetry`_ documentation. + +Building rendered documentation from a container +------------------------------------------------ + +There may be cases where you can not either install or upgrade required +dependencies to generate the documents, so in this case, one way to +create the documentation is through a docker container. The first step is +to check if `docker`_ is installed in your host, otherwise check main docker +page for installation instructions. Once installed, run the following script +from project root directory + +.. code:: shell + + docker run --rm -v $PWD:/tf-a sphinxdoc/sphinx \ + bash -c 'cd /tf-a && + apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl plantuml && + curl -sSL https://install.python-poetry.org | python3 - && + ~/.local/bin/poetry install && ~/.local/bin/poetry run make doc' + +The above command fetches the ``sphinxdoc/sphinx`` container from `docker +hub`_, launches the container, installs documentation requirements and finally +creates the documentation. Once done, exit the container and output from the +build process will be placed in: ``docs/build/html``. + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* + +.. _Sphinx: http://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/ +.. _Poetry: https://python-poetry.org/docs/ +.. _pip homepage: https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/ +.. _Dia: https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Dia +.. _docker: https://www.docker.com/ +.. _docker hub: https://hub.docker.com/repository/docker/sphinxdoc/sphinx diff --git a/docs/getting_started/image-terminology.rst b/docs/getting_started/image-terminology.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66f47e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/image-terminology.rst @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +Image Terminology +================= + +This page contains the current name, abbreviated name and purpose of the various +images referred to in the Trusted Firmware project. + +Common Image Features +--------------------- + +- Some of the names and abbreviated names have changed to accommodate new + requirements. The changed names are as backward compatible as possible to + minimize confusion. Where applicable, the previous names are indicated. Some + code, documentation and build artefacts may still refer to the previous names; + these will inevitably take time to catch up. + +- The main name change is to prefix each image with the processor it corresponds + to (for example ``AP_``, ``SCP_``, ...). In situations where there is no + ambiguity (for example, within AP specific code/documentation), it is + permitted to omit the processor prefix (for example, just BL1 instead of + ``AP_BL1``). + +- Previously, the format for 3rd level images had 2 forms; ``BL3`` was either + suffixed with a dash ("-") followed by a number (for example, ``BL3-1``) or a + subscript number, depending on whether rich text formatting was available. + This was confusing and often the dash gets omitted in practice. Therefore the + new form is to just omit the dash and not use subscript formatting. + +- The names no longer contain dash ("-") characters at all. In some places (for + example, function names) it's not possible to use this character. All dashes + are either removed or replaced by underscores ("_"). + +- The abbreviation BL stands for BootLoader. This is a historical anomaly. + Clearly, many of these images are not BootLoaders, they are simply firmware + images. However, the BL abbreviation is now widely used and is retained for + backwards compatibility. + +- The image names are not case sensitive. For example, ``bl1`` is + interchangeable with ``BL1``, although mixed case should be avoided. + +Trusted Firmware Images +----------------------- + +Firmware Image Package: ``FIP`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is a packaging format used by TF-A to package firmware images in a single +binary. The number and type of images that should be packed in a FIP is +platform-specific and may include TF-A images and other firmware images +required by the platform. For example, most platforms require a BL33 image +which corresponds to the normal world bootloader (e.g. UEFI or U-Boot). + +AP Boot ROM: ``AP_BL1`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Typically, this is the first code to execute on the AP and cannot be modified. +Its primary purpose is to perform the minimum initialization necessary to load +and authenticate an updateable AP firmware image into an executable RAM +location, then hand-off control to that image. + +AP RAM Firmware: ``AP_BL2`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the 2nd stage AP firmware. It is currently also known as the "Trusted +Boot Firmware". Its primary purpose is to perform any additional initialization +required to load and authenticate all 3rd level firmware images into their +executable RAM locations, then hand-off control to the EL3 Runtime Firmware. + +EL3 Runtime Firmware: ``AP_BL31`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Also known as "SoC AP firmware" or "EL3 monitor firmware". Its primary purpose +is to handle transitions between the normal and secure world. + +Secure-EL1 Payload (SP): ``AP_BL32`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Typically this is a TEE or Trusted OS, providing runtime secure services to the +normal world. However, it may refer to a more abstract Secure-EL1 Payload (SP). +Note that this abbreviation should only be used in systems where there is a +single or primary image executing at Secure-EL1. In systems where there are +potentially multiple SPs and there is no concept of a primary SP, this +abbreviation should be avoided; use the recommended **Other AP 3rd level +images** abbreviation instead. + +AP Normal World Firmware: ``AP_BL33`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For example, UEFI or uboot. Its primary purpose is to boot a normal world OS. + +Other AP 3rd level images: ``AP_BL3_XXX`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The abbreviated names of the existing 3rd level images imply a load/execution +ordering (for example, ``AP_BL31 -> AP_BL32 -> AP_BL33``). Some systems may +have additional images and/or a different load/execution ordering. The +abbreviated names of the existing images are retained for backward compatibility +but new 3rd level images should be suffixed with an underscore followed by text +identifier, not a number. + +In systems where 3rd level images are provided by different vendors, the +abbreviated name should identify the vendor as well as the image +function. For example, ``AP_BL3_ARM_RAS``. + +Realm Monitor Management Firmware: ``RMM`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the Realm-EL2 firmware. It is required if +:ref:`Realm Management Extension (RME)` feature is enabled. If a path to RMM +image is not provided, TF-A builds Test Realm Payload (TRP) image by default +and uses it as the RMM image. + +SCP Boot ROM: ``SCP_BL1`` (previously ``BL0``) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Typically, this is the first code to execute on the SCP and cannot be modified. +Its primary purpose is to perform the minimum initialization necessary to load +and authenticate an updateable SCP firmware image into an executable RAM +location, then hand-off control to that image. This may be performed in +conjunction with other processor firmware (for example, ``AP_BL1`` and +``AP_BL2``). + +This image was previously abbreviated as ``BL0`` but in some systems, the SCP +may directly load/authenticate its own firmware. In these systems, it doesn't +make sense to interleave the image terminology for AP and SCP; both AP and SCP +Boot ROMs are ``BL1`` from their own point of view. + +SCP RAM Firmware: ``SCP_BL2`` (previously ``BL3-0``) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the 2nd stage SCP firmware. It is currently also known as the "SCP +runtime firmware" but it could potentially be an intermediate firmware if the +SCP needs to load/authenticate multiple 3rd level images in future. + +This image was previously abbreviated as BL3-0 but from the SCP's point of view, +this has always been the 2nd stage firmware. The previous name is too +AP-centric. + +Firmware Update (FWU) Images +---------------------------- + +The terminology for these images has not been widely adopted yet but they have +to be considered in a production Trusted Board Boot solution. + +AP Firmware Update Boot ROM: ``AP_NS_BL1U`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Typically, this is the first normal world code to execute on the AP during a +firmware update operation, and cannot be modified. Its primary purpose is to +load subsequent firmware update images from an external interface and communicate +with ``AP_BL1`` to authenticate those images. + +During firmware update, there are (potentially) multiple transitions between the +secure and normal world. The "level" of the BL image is relative to the world +it's in so it makes sense to encode "NS" in the normal world images. The absence +of "NS" implies a secure world image. + +AP Firmware Update Config: ``AP_BL2U`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This image does the minimum necessary AP secure world configuration required to +complete the firmware update operation. It is potentially a subset of ``AP_BL2`` +functionality. + +SCP Firmware Update Config: ``SCP_BL2U`` (previously ``BL2-U0``) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This image does the minimum necessary SCP secure world configuration required to +complete the firmware update operation. It is potentially a subset of +``SCP_BL2`` functionality. + +AP Firmware Updater: ``AP_NS_BL2U`` (previously ``BL3-U``) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the 2nd stage AP normal world firmware updater. Its primary purpose is +to load a new set of firmware images from an external interface and write them +into non-volatile storage. + +Other Processor Firmware Images +------------------------------- + +Some systems may have additional processors to the AP and SCP. For example, a +Management Control Processor (MCP). Images for these processors should follow +the same terminology, with the processor abbreviation prefix, followed by +underscore and the level of the firmware image. + +For example, + +MCP Boot ROM: ``MCP_BL1`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +MCP RAM Firmware: ``MCP_BL2`` +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ diff --git a/docs/getting_started/index.rst b/docs/getting_started/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8180a3f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +Getting Started +=============== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + :caption: Contents + + prerequisites + docs-build + initial-build + tools-build + build-options + build-internals + image-terminology + psci-lib-integration-guide + rt-svc-writers-guide + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* diff --git a/docs/getting_started/initial-build.rst b/docs/getting_started/initial-build.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f41be4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/initial-build.rst @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +Performing an Initial Build +=========================== + +- Before building TF-A, the environment variable ``CROSS_COMPILE`` must point + to your cross compiler. + + For AArch64: + + .. code:: shell + + export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-none-elf- + + For AArch32: + + .. code:: shell + + export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch32-gcc>/bin/arm-none-eabi- + + It is possible to build TF-A using Clang or Arm Compiler 6. To do so + ``CC`` needs to point to the clang or armclang binary, which will + also select the clang or armclang assembler. Arm Compiler 6 will be selected + when the base name of the path assigned to ``CC`` matches the string + 'armclang'. GNU binutils are required since the TF-A build system doesn't + currently support Arm Scatter files. Meaning the GNU linker is used by + default for Arm Compiler 6. Because of this dependency, ``CROSS_COMPILE`` + should be set as described above. + + For AArch64 using Arm Compiler 6: + + .. code:: shell + + export CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-aarch64-gcc>/bin/aarch64-none-elf- + make CC=<path-to-armclang>/bin/armclang PLAT=<platform> all + + On the other hand, Clang uses LLVM linker (LLD) and other LLVM binutils by + default instead of GNU utilities (LLVM linker (LLD) 14.0.0 is known to + work with TF-A). ``CROSS_COMPILE`` need not be set for Clang. Please note, + that the default linker may be manually overridden using the ``LD`` variable. + + Clang will be selected when the base name of the path assigned to ``CC`` + contains the string 'clang'. This is to allow both clang and clang-X.Y + to work. + + For AArch64 using clang: + + .. code:: shell + + make CC=<path-to-clang>/bin/clang PLAT=<platform> all + +- Change to the root directory of the TF-A source tree and build. + + For AArch64: + + .. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> all + + For AArch32: + + .. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min all + + Notes: + + - If ``PLAT`` is not specified, ``fvp`` is assumed by default. See the + :ref:`Build Options` document for more information on available build + options. + + - (AArch32 only) Currently only ``PLAT=fvp`` is supported. + + - (AArch32 only) ``AARCH32_SP`` is the AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software and it + corresponds to the BL32 image. A minimal ``AARCH32_SP``, sp_min, is + provided by TF-A to demonstrate how PSCI Library can be integrated with + an AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software. Some AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software may + include other runtime services, for example Trusted OS services. A guide + to integrate PSCI library with AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software can be found + at :ref:`PSCI Library Integration guide for Armv8-A AArch32 systems`. + + - (AArch64 only) The TSP (Test Secure Payload), corresponding to the BL32 + image, is not compiled in by default. Refer to the + :ref:`Test Secure Payload (TSP) and Dispatcher (TSPD)` document for + details on building the TSP. + + - By default this produces a release version of the build. To produce a + debug version instead, refer to the "Debugging options" section below. + + - The build process creates products in a ``build`` directory tree, building + the objects and binaries for each boot loader stage in separate + sub-directories. The following boot loader binary files are created + from the corresponding ELF files: + + - ``build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl1.bin`` + - ``build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl2.bin`` + - ``build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl31.bin`` (AArch64 only) + - ``build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl32.bin`` (mandatory for AArch32) + + where ``<platform>`` is the name of the chosen platform and ``<build-type>`` + is either ``debug`` or ``release``. The actual number of images might differ + depending on the platform. + +- Build products for a specific build variant can be removed using: + + .. code:: shell + + make DEBUG=<D> PLAT=<platform> clean + + ... where ``<D>`` is ``0`` or ``1``, as specified when building. + + The build tree can be removed completely using: + + .. code:: shell + + make realclean + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2020-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* diff --git a/docs/getting_started/prerequisites.rst b/docs/getting_started/prerequisites.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..573abdf --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/prerequisites.rst @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +Prerequisites +============= + +This document describes the software requirements for building |TF-A| for +AArch32 and AArch64 target platforms. + +It may possible to build |TF-A| with combinations of software packages that are +different from those listed below, however only the software described in this +document can be officially supported. + +Build Host +---------- + +|TF-A| can be built using either a Linux or a Windows machine as the build host. + +A relatively recent Linux distribution is recommended for building |TF-A|. We +have performed tests using Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (64-bit) but other distributions +should also work fine as a base, provided that the necessary tools and libraries +can be installed. + +.. _prerequisites_toolchain: + +Toolchain +--------- + +|TF-A| can be built with any of the following *cross-compiler* toolchains that +target the Armv7-A or Armv8-A architectures: + +- TF-A has been tested with version 12.3.Rel1 (gcc 12.3) from the `Arm Developer website`_ + + You will need the targets ``arm-none-eabi`` and ``aarch64-none-elf`` for + AArch32 and AArch64 builds respectively. + +- Clang == 14.0.0 +- Arm Compiler == 6.18 + +In addition, a native compiler is required to build the supporting tools. + +.. note:: + Versions greater than the ones specified are likely but not guaranteed to + work. This is predominantly because TF-A carries its own copy of compiler-rt, + which may be older than the version expected by the compiler. Fixes and bug + reports are always welcome. + +.. note:: + The software has also been built on Windows 7 Enterprise SP1, using CMD.EXE, + Cygwin, and Msys (MinGW) shells, using version 5.3.1 of the GNU toolchain. + +.. note:: + For instructions on how to select the cross compiler refer to + :ref:`Performing an Initial Build`. + +.. _prerequisites_software_and_libraries: + +Software and Libraries +---------------------- + +The following tools are required to obtain and build |TF-A|: + +- An appropriate toolchain (see :ref:`prerequisites_toolchain`) +- GNU Make +- Git + +The following libraries must be available to build one or more components or +supporting tools: + +- OpenSSL >= 1.1.1 (v3.0.0 to v3.0.6 highly discouraged due to security issues) + + Required to build the cert_create, encrypt_fw, and fiptool tools. + + .. note:: + + If using OpenSSL 3, older Linux versions may require it to be built from + source code, as it may not be available in the default package repositories. + Please refer to the OpenSSL project documentation for more information. + +The following libraries are required for Trusted Board Boot and Measured Boot +support: + +- mbed TLS == 3.4.1 (tag: ``mbedtls-3.4.1``) + +These tools are optional: + +- Device Tree Compiler (DTC) >= 1.4.7 + + Needed if you want to rebuild the provided Flattened Device Tree (FDT) + source files (``.dts`` files). DTC is available for Linux through the package + repositories of most distributions. + +- Arm `Development Studio (Arm-DS)`_ + + The standard software package used for debugging software on Arm development + platforms and |FVP| models. + +- Node.js >= 16 + + Highly recommended, and necessary in order to install and use the packaged + Git hooks and helper tools. Without these tools you will need to rely on the + CI for feedback on commit message conformance. + +- Poetry >= 1.3.2 + + Required for managing Python dependencies, this will allow you to reliably + reproduce a Python environment to build documentation and run analysis tools. + Most importantly, it ensures your system environment will not be affected by + dependencies in the Python scripts. + +Package Installation (Linux) +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +If you are using the recommended Ubuntu distribution then you can install the +required packages with the following command: + +.. code:: shell + + sudo apt install build-essential git + +The optional packages can be installed using: + +.. code:: shell + + sudo apt install device-tree-compiler + +Additionally, to install a version of Node.js compatible with TF-A's repository +scripts, you can use the `Node Version Manager`_. To install both NVM and an +appropriate version of Node.js, run the following **from the root directory of +the repository**: + +.. code:: shell + + curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.1/install.sh | bash + exec "$SHELL" -ic "nvm install; exec $SHELL" + +.. _Node Version Manager: https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm#install--update-script + +Supporting Files +---------------- + +TF-A has been tested with pre-built binaries and file systems from `Linaro +Release 20.01`_. Alternatively, you can build the binaries from source using +instructions in :ref:`Performing an Initial Build`. + +.. _prerequisites_get_source: + +Getting the TF-A Source +----------------------- + +Source code for |TF-A| is maintained in a Git repository hosted on +TrustedFirmware.org. To clone this repository from the server, run the following +in your shell: + +.. code:: shell + + git clone "https://review.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a" + +Additional Steps for Contributors +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +If you are planning on contributing back to TF-A, there are some things you'll +want to know. + +TF-A is hosted by a `Gerrit Code Review`_ server. Gerrit requires that all +commits include a ``Change-Id`` footer, and this footer is typically +automatically generated by a Git hook installed by you, the developer. + +If you have Node.js installed already, you can automatically install this hook, +along with any additional hooks and Javascript-based tooling that we use, by +running from within your newly-cloned repository: + +.. code:: shell + + npm install --no-save + +If you have opted **not** to install Node.js, you can install the Gerrit hook +manually by running: + +.. code:: shell + + curl -Lo $(git rev-parse --git-dir)/hooks/commit-msg https://review.trustedfirmware.org/tools/hooks/commit-msg + chmod +x $(git rev-parse --git-dir)/hooks/commit-msg + +You can read more about Git hooks in the *githooks* page of the Git +documentation, available `here <https://git-scm.com/docs/githooks>`_. + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2021-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* + +.. _Arm Developer website: https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/open-source-software/developer-tools/gnu-toolchain/downloads +.. _Gerrit Code Review: https://www.gerritcodereview.com/ +.. _Linaro Release Notes: https://community.arm.com/dev-platforms/w/docs/226/old-release-notes +.. _Linaro instructions: https://community.arm.com/dev-platforms/w/docs/304/arm-reference-platforms-deliverables +.. _Development Studio (Arm-DS): https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Arm%20Development%20Studio +.. _Linaro Release 20.01: http://releases.linaro.org/members/arm/platforms/20.01 diff --git a/docs/getting_started/psci-lib-integration-guide.rst b/docs/getting_started/psci-lib-integration-guide.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e4b0db --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/psci-lib-integration-guide.rst @@ -0,0 +1,534 @@ +PSCI Library Integration guide for Armv8-A AArch32 systems +========================================================== + +This document describes the PSCI library interface with a focus on how to +integrate with a suitable Trusted OS for an Armv8-A AArch32 system. The PSCI +Library implements the PSCI Standard as described in `PSCI`_ and is meant +to be integrated with EL3 Runtime Software which invokes the PSCI Library +interface appropriately. **EL3 Runtime Software** refers to software executing +at the highest secure privileged mode, which is EL3 in AArch64 or Secure SVC/ +Monitor mode in AArch32, and provides runtime services to the non-secure world. +The runtime service request is made via SMC (Secure Monitor Call) and the call +must adhere to `SMCCC`_. In AArch32, EL3 Runtime Software may additionally +include Trusted OS functionality. A minimal AArch32 Secure Payload, SP-MIN, is +provided in Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) to illustrate the usage and integration +of the PSCI library. The description of PSCI library interface and its +integration with EL3 Runtime Software in this document is targeted towards +AArch32 systems. + +Generic call sequence for PSCI Library interface (AArch32) +---------------------------------------------------------- + +The generic call sequence of PSCI Library interfaces (see +`PSCI Library Interface`_) during cold boot in AArch32 +system is described below: + +#. After cold reset, the EL3 Runtime Software performs its cold boot + initialization including the PSCI library pre-requisites mentioned in + `PSCI Library Interface`_, and also the necessary platform + setup. + +#. Call ``psci_setup()`` in Monitor mode. + +#. Optionally call ``psci_register_spd_pm_hook()`` to register callbacks to + do bookkeeping for the EL3 Runtime Software during power management. + +#. Call ``psci_prepare_next_non_secure_ctx()`` to initialize the non-secure CPU + context. + +#. Get the non-secure ``cpu_context_t`` for the current CPU by calling + ``cm_get_context()`` , then programming the registers in the non-secure + context and exiting to non-secure world. If the EL3 Runtime Software needs + additional configuration to be set for non-secure context, like routing + FIQs to the secure world, the values of the registers can be modified prior + to programming. See `PSCI CPU context management`_ for more + details on CPU context management. + +The generic call sequence of PSCI library interfaces during warm boot in +AArch32 systems is described below: + +#. After warm reset, the EL3 Runtime Software performs the necessary warm + boot initialization including the PSCI library pre-requisites mentioned in + `PSCI Library Interface`_ (Note that the Data cache + **must not** be enabled). + +#. Call ``psci_warmboot_entrypoint()`` in Monitor mode. This interface + initializes/restores the non-secure CPU context as well. + +#. Do step 5 of the cold boot call sequence described above. + +The generic call sequence of PSCI library interfaces on receipt of a PSCI SMC +on an AArch32 system is described below: + +#. On receipt of an SMC, save the register context as per `SMCCC`_. + +#. If the SMC function identifier corresponds to a SMC32 PSCI API, construct + the appropriate arguments and call the ``psci_smc_handler()`` interface. + The invocation may or may not return back to the caller depending on + whether the PSCI API resulted in power down of the CPU. + +#. If ``psci_smc_handler()`` returns, populate the return value in R0 (AArch32)/ + X0 (AArch64) and restore other registers as per `SMCCC`_. + +PSCI CPU context management +--------------------------- + +PSCI library is in charge of initializing/restoring the non-secure CPU system +registers according to `PSCI`_ during cold/warm boot. +This is referred to as ``PSCI CPU Context Management``. Registers that need to +be preserved across CPU power down/power up cycles are maintained in +``cpu_context_t`` data structure. The initialization of other non-secure CPU +system registers which do not require coordination with the EL3 Runtime +Software is done directly by the PSCI library (see ``cm_prepare_el3_exit()``). + +The EL3 Runtime Software is responsible for managing register context +during switch between Normal and Secure worlds. The register context to be +saved and restored depends on the mechanism used to trigger the world switch. +For example, if the world switch was triggered by an SMC call, then the +registers need to be saved and restored according to `SMCCC`_. In AArch64, +due to the tight integration with BL31, both BL31 and PSCI library +use the same ``cpu_context_t`` data structure for PSCI CPU context management +and register context management during world switch. This cannot be assumed +for AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software since most AArch32 Trusted OSes already implement +a mechanism for register context management during world switch. Hence, when +the PSCI library is integrated with a AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software, the +``cpu_context_t`` is stripped down for just PSCI CPU context management. + +During cold/warm boot, after invoking appropriate PSCI library interfaces, it +is expected that the EL3 Runtime Software will query the ``cpu_context_t`` and +write appropriate values to the corresponding system registers. This mechanism +resolves 2 additional problems for AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software: + +#. Values for certain system registers like SCR and SCTLR cannot be + unilaterally determined by PSCI library and need inputs from the EL3 + Runtime Software. Using ``cpu_context_t`` as an intermediary data store + allows EL3 Runtime Software to modify the register values appropriately + before programming them. + +#. The PSCI library provides appropriate LR and SPSR values (entrypoint + information) for exit into non-secure world. Using ``cpu_context_t`` as an + intermediary data store allows the EL3 Runtime Software to store these + values safely until it is ready for exit to non-secure world. + +Currently the ``cpu_context_t`` data structure for AArch32 stores the following +registers: R0 - R3, LR (R14), SCR, SPSR, SCTLR. + +The EL3 Runtime Software must implement accessors to get/set pointers +to CPU context ``cpu_context_t`` data and these are described in +`CPU Context management API`_. + +PSCI Library Interface +---------------------- + +The PSCI library implements the `PSCI`_. The interfaces to this library are +declared in ``psci_lib.h`` and are as listed below: + +.. code:: c + + u_register_t psci_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, void *cookie, + void *handle, u_register_t flags); + int psci_setup(const psci_lib_args_t *lib_args); + void psci_warmboot_entrypoint(void); + void psci_register_spd_pm_hook(const spd_pm_ops_t *pm); + void psci_prepare_next_non_secure_ctx(entry_point_info_t *next_image_info); + +The CPU context data 'cpu_context_t' is programmed to the registers differently +when PSCI is integrated with an AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software compared to +when the PSCI is integrated with an AArch64 EL3 Runtime Software (BL31). For +example, in the case of AArch64, there is no need to retrieve ``cpu_context_t`` +data and program the registers as it will done implicitly as part of +``el3_exit``. The description below of the PSCI interfaces is targeted at +integration with an AArch32 EL3 Runtime Software. + +The PSCI library is responsible for initializing/restoring the non-secure world +to an appropriate state after boot and may choose to directly program the +non-secure system registers. The PSCI generic code takes care not to directly +modify any of the system registers affecting the secure world and instead +returns the values to be programmed to these registers via ``cpu_context_t``. +The EL3 Runtime Software is responsible for programming those registers and +can use the proposed values provided in the ``cpu_context_t``, modifying the +values if required. + +PSCI library needs the flexibility to access both secure and non-secure +copies of banked registers. Hence it needs to be invoked in Monitor mode +for AArch32 and in EL3 for AArch64. The NS bit in SCR (in AArch32) or SCR_EL3 +(in AArch64) must be set to 0. Additional requirements for the PSCI library +interfaces are: + +- Instruction cache must be enabled +- Both IRQ and FIQ must be masked for the current CPU +- The page tables must be setup and the MMU enabled +- The C runtime environment must be setup and stack initialized +- The Data cache must be enabled prior to invoking any of the PSCI library + interfaces except for ``psci_warmboot_entrypoint()``. For + ``psci_warmboot_entrypoint()``, if the build option ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY`` + is enabled however, data caches are expected to be enabled. + +Further requirements for each interface can be found in the interface +description. + +Interface : psci_setup() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + Argument : const psci_lib_args_t *lib_args + Return : void + +This function is to be called by the primary CPU during cold boot before +any other interface to the PSCI library. It takes ``lib_args``, a const pointer +to ``psci_lib_args_t``, as the argument. The ``psci_lib_args_t`` is a versioned +structure and is declared in ``psci_lib.h`` header as follows: + +.. code:: c + + typedef struct psci_lib_args { + /* The version information of PSCI Library Interface */ + param_header_t h; + /* The warm boot entrypoint function */ + mailbox_entrypoint_t mailbox_ep; + } psci_lib_args_t; + +The first field ``h``, of ``param_header_t`` type, provides the version +information. The second field ``mailbox_ep`` is the warm boot entrypoint address +and is used to configure the platform mailbox. Helper macros are provided in +``psci_lib.h`` to construct the ``lib_args`` argument statically or during +runtime. Prior to calling the ``psci_setup()`` interface, the platform setup for +cold boot must have completed. Major actions performed by this interface are: + +- Initializes architecture. +- Initializes PSCI power domain and state coordination data structures. +- Calls ``plat_setup_psci_ops()`` with warm boot entrypoint ``mailbox_ep`` as + argument. +- Calls ``cm_set_context_by_index()`` (see + `CPU Context management API`_) for all the CPUs in the + platform + +Interface : psci_prepare_next_non_secure_ctx() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + Argument : entry_point_info_t *next_image_info + Return : void + +After ``psci_setup()`` and prior to exit to the non-secure world, this function +must be called by the EL3 Runtime Software to initialize the non-secure world +context. The non-secure world entrypoint information ``next_image_info`` (first +argument) will be used to determine the non-secure context. After this function +returns, the EL3 Runtime Software must retrieve the ``cpu_context_t`` (using +cm_get_context()) for the current CPU and program the registers prior to exit +to the non-secure world. + +Interface : psci_register_spd_pm_hook() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + Argument : const spd_pm_ops_t * + Return : void + +As explained in `Secure payload power management callback`_, +the EL3 Runtime Software may want to perform some bookkeeping during power +management operations. This function is used to register the ``spd_pm_ops_t`` +(first argument) callbacks with the PSCI library which will be called +appropriately during power management. Calling this function is optional and +need to be called by the primary CPU during the cold boot sequence after +``psci_setup()`` has completed. + +Interface : psci_smc_handler() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + Argument : uint32_t smc_fid, u_register_t x1, + u_register_t x2, u_register_t x3, + u_register_t x4, void *cookie, + void *handle, u_register_t flags + Return : u_register_t + +This function is the top level handler for SMCs which fall within the +PSCI service range specified in `SMCCC`_. The function ID ``smc_fid`` (first +argument) determines the PSCI API to be called. The ``x1`` to ``x4`` (2nd to 5th +arguments), are the values of the registers r1 - r4 (in AArch32) or x1 - x4 +(in AArch64) when the SMC is received. These are the arguments to PSCI API as +described in `PSCI`_. The 'flags' (8th argument) is a bit field parameter +and is detailed in 'smccc.h' header. It includes whether the call is from the +secure or non-secure world. The ``cookie`` (6th argument) and the ``handle`` +(7th argument) are not used and are reserved for future use. + +The return value from this interface is the return value from the underlying +PSCI API corresponding to ``smc_fid``. This function may not return back to the +caller if PSCI API causes power down of the CPU. In this case, when the CPU +wakes up, it will start execution from the warm reset address. + +Interface : psci_warmboot_entrypoint() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + Argument : void + Return : void + +This function performs the warm boot initialization/restoration as mandated by +`PSCI`_. For AArch32, on wakeup from power down the CPU resets to secure SVC +mode and the EL3 Runtime Software must perform the prerequisite initializations +mentioned at top of this section. This function must be called with Data cache +disabled (unless build option ``HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY`` is enabled) but with MMU +initialized and enabled. The major actions performed by this function are: + +- Invalidates the stack and enables the data cache. +- Initializes architecture and PSCI state coordination. +- Restores/Initializes the peripheral drivers to the required state via + appropriate ``plat_psci_ops_t`` hooks +- Restores the EL3 Runtime Software context via appropriate ``spd_pm_ops_t`` + callbacks. +- Restores/Initializes the non-secure context and populates the + ``cpu_context_t`` for the current CPU. + +Upon the return of this function, the EL3 Runtime Software must retrieve the +non-secure ``cpu_context_t`` using ``cm_get_context()`` and program the registers +prior to exit to the non-secure world. + +EL3 Runtime Software dependencies +--------------------------------- + +The PSCI Library includes supporting frameworks like context management, +cpu operations (cpu_ops) and per-cpu data framework. Other helper library +functions like bakery locks and spin locks are also included in the library. +The dependencies which must be fulfilled by the EL3 Runtime Software +for integration with PSCI library are described below. + +General dependencies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The PSCI library being a Multiprocessor (MP) implementation, EL3 Runtime +Software must provide an SMC handling framework capable of MP adhering to +`SMCCC`_ specification. + +The EL3 Runtime Software must also export cache maintenance primitives +and some helper utilities for assert, print and memory operations as listed +below. The TF-A source tree provides implementations for all +these functions but the EL3 Runtime Software may use its own implementation. + +**Functions : assert(), memcpy(), memset(), printf()** + +These must be implemented as described in ISO C Standard. + +**Function : flush_dcache_range()** + +:: + + Argument : uintptr_t addr, size_t size + Return : void + +This function cleans and invalidates (flushes) the data cache for memory +at address ``addr`` (first argument) address and of size ``size`` (second argument). + +**Function : inv_dcache_range()** + +:: + + Argument : uintptr_t addr, size_t size + Return : void + +This function invalidates (flushes) the data cache for memory at address +``addr`` (first argument) address and of size ``size`` (second argument). + +CPU Context management API +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The CPU context management data memory is statically allocated by PSCI library +in BSS section. The PSCI library requires the EL3 Runtime Software to implement +APIs to store and retrieve pointers to this CPU context data. SP-MIN +demonstrates how these APIs can be implemented but the EL3 Runtime Software can +choose a more optimal implementation (like dedicating the secure TPIDRPRW +system register (in AArch32) for storing these pointers). + +**Function : cm_set_context_by_index()** + +:: + + Argument : unsigned int cpu_idx, void *context, unsigned int security_state + Return : void + +This function is called during cold boot when the ``psci_setup()`` PSCI library +interface is called. + +This function must store the pointer to the CPU context data, ``context`` (2nd +argument), for the specified ``security_state`` (3rd argument) and CPU identified +by ``cpu_idx`` (first argument). The ``security_state`` will always be non-secure +when called by PSCI library and this argument is retained for compatibility +with BL31. The ``cpu_idx`` will correspond to the index returned by the +``plat_core_pos_by_mpidr()`` for ``mpidr`` of the CPU. + +The actual method of storing the ``context`` pointers is implementation specific. +For example, SP-MIN stores the pointers in the array ``sp_min_cpu_ctx_ptr`` +declared in ``sp_min_main.c``. + +**Function : cm_get_context()** + +:: + + Argument : uint32_t security_state + Return : void * + +This function must return the pointer to the ``cpu_context_t`` structure for +the specified ``security_state`` (first argument) for the current CPU. The caller +must ensure that ``cm_set_context_by_index`` is called first and the appropriate +context pointers are stored prior to invoking this API. The ``security_state`` +will always be non-secure when called by PSCI library and this argument +is retained for compatibility with BL31. + +**Function : cm_get_context_by_index()** + +:: + + Argument : unsigned int cpu_idx, unsigned int security_state + Return : void * + +This function must return the pointer to the ``cpu_context_t`` structure for +the specified ``security_state`` (second argument) for the CPU identified by +``cpu_idx`` (first argument). The caller must ensure that +``cm_set_context_by_index`` is called first and the appropriate context +pointers are stored prior to invoking this API. The ``security_state`` will +always be non-secure when called by PSCI library and this argument is +retained for compatibility with BL31. The ``cpu_idx`` will correspond to the +index returned by the ``plat_core_pos_by_mpidr()`` for ``mpidr`` of the CPU. + +Platform API +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The platform layer abstracts the platform-specific details from the generic +PSCI library. The following platform APIs/macros must be defined by the EL3 +Runtime Software for integration with the PSCI library. + +The mandatory platform APIs are: + +- plat_my_core_pos +- plat_core_pos_by_mpidr +- plat_get_syscnt_freq2 +- plat_get_power_domain_tree_desc +- plat_setup_psci_ops +- plat_reset_handler +- plat_panic_handler +- plat_get_my_stack + +The mandatory platform macros are: + +- PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT +- PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL +- PLAT_NUM_PWR_DOMAINS +- CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE +- PLAT_MAX_OFF_STATE +- PLAT_MAX_RET_STATE +- PLAT_MAX_PWR_LVL_STATES (optional) +- PLAT_PCPU_DATA_SIZE (optional) + +The details of these APIs/macros can be found in the :ref:`Porting Guide`. + +All platform specific operations for power management are done via +``plat_psci_ops_t`` callbacks registered by the platform when +``plat_setup_psci_ops()`` API is called. The description of each of +the callbacks in ``plat_psci_ops_t`` can be found in PSCI section of the +:ref:`Porting Guide`. If any these callbacks are not registered, then the +PSCI API associated with that callback will not be supported by PSCI +library. + +Secure payload power management callback +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +During PSCI power management operations, the EL3 Runtime Software may +need to perform some bookkeeping, and PSCI library provides +``spd_pm_ops_t`` callbacks for this purpose. These hooks must be +populated and registered by using ``psci_register_spd_pm_hook()`` PSCI +library interface. + +Typical bookkeeping during PSCI power management calls include save/restore +of the EL3 Runtime Software context. Also if the EL3 Runtime Software makes +use of secure interrupts, then these interrupts must also be managed +appropriately during CPU power down/power up. Any secure interrupt targeted +to the current CPU must be disabled or re-targeted to other running CPU prior +to power down of the current CPU. During power up, these interrupt can be +enabled/re-targeted back to the current CPU. + +.. code:: c + + typedef struct spd_pm_ops { + void (*svc_on)(u_register_t target_cpu); + int32_t (*svc_off)(u_register_t __unused); + void (*svc_suspend)(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl); + void (*svc_on_finish)(u_register_t __unused); + void (*svc_suspend_finish)(u_register_t max_off_pwrlvl); + int32_t (*svc_migrate)(u_register_t from_cpu, u_register_t to_cpu); + int32_t (*svc_migrate_info)(u_register_t *resident_cpu); + void (*svc_system_off)(void); + void (*svc_system_reset)(void); + } spd_pm_ops_t; + +A brief description of each callback is given below: + +- svc_on, svc_off, svc_on_finish + + The ``svc_on``, ``svc_off`` callbacks are called during PSCI_CPU_ON, + PSCI_CPU_OFF APIs respectively. The ``svc_on_finish`` is called when the + target CPU of PSCI_CPU_ON API powers up and executes the + ``psci_warmboot_entrypoint()`` PSCI library interface. + +- svc_suspend, svc_suspend_finish + + The ``svc_suspend`` callback is called during power down bu either + PSCI_SUSPEND or PSCI_SYSTEM_SUSPEND APIs. The ``svc_suspend_finish`` is + called when the CPU wakes up from suspend and executes the + ``psci_warmboot_entrypoint()`` PSCI library interface. The ``max_off_pwrlvl`` + (first parameter) denotes the highest power domain level being powered down + to or woken up from suspend. + +- svc_system_off, svc_system_reset + + These callbacks are called during PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF and PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET + PSCI APIs respectively. + +- svc_migrate_info + + This callback is called in response to PSCI_MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE or + PSCI_MIGRATE_INFO_UP_CPU APIs. The return value of this callback must + correspond to the return value of PSCI_MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE API as described + in `PSCI`_. If the secure payload is a Uniprocessor (UP) + implementation, then it must update the mpidr of the CPU it is resident in + via ``resident_cpu`` (first argument). The updates to ``resident_cpu`` is + ignored if the secure payload is a multiprocessor (MP) implementation. + +- svc_migrate + + This callback is only relevant if the secure payload in EL3 Runtime + Software is a Uniprocessor (UP) implementation and supports migration from + the current CPU ``from_cpu`` (first argument) to another CPU ``to_cpu`` + (second argument). This callback is called in response to PSCI_MIGRATE + API. This callback is never called if the secure payload is a + Multiprocessor (MP) implementation. + +CPU operations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The CPU operations (cpu_ops) framework implement power down sequence specific +to the CPU and the details of which can be found at +:ref:`firmware_design_cpu_ops_fwk`. The TF-A tree implements the ``cpu_ops`` +for various supported CPUs and the EL3 Runtime Software needs to include the +required ``cpu_ops`` in its build. The start and end of the ``cpu_ops`` +descriptors must be exported by the EL3 Runtime Software via the +``__CPU_OPS_START__`` and ``__CPU_OPS_END__`` linker symbols. + +The ``cpu_ops`` descriptors also include reset sequences and may include errata +workarounds for the CPU. The EL3 Runtime Software can choose to call this +during cold/warm reset if it does not implement its own reset sequence/errata +workarounds. + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2016-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.* + +.. _PSCI: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/latest/ +.. _SMCCC: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0028/latest diff --git a/docs/getting_started/rt-svc-writers-guide.rst b/docs/getting_started/rt-svc-writers-guide.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe64558 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/rt-svc-writers-guide.rst @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +EL3 Runtime Service Writer's Guide +===================================================== + +Introduction +------------ + +This document describes how to add a runtime service to the EL3 Runtime +Firmware component of Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A), BL31. + +Software executing in the normal world and in the trusted world at exception +levels lower than EL3 will request runtime services using the Secure Monitor +Call (SMC) instruction. These requests will follow the convention described in +the SMC Calling Convention PDD (`SMCCC`_). The `SMCCC`_ assigns function +identifiers to each SMC request and describes how arguments are passed and +results are returned. + +SMC Functions are grouped together based on the implementor of the service, for +example a subset of the Function IDs are designated as "OEM Calls" (see `SMCCC`_ +for full details). The EL3 runtime services framework in BL31 enables the +independent implementation of services for each group, which are then compiled +into the BL31 image. This simplifies the integration of common software from +Arm to support `PSCI`_, Secure Monitor for a Trusted OS and SoC specific +software. The common runtime services framework ensures that SMC Functions are +dispatched to their respective service implementation - the +:ref:`Firmware Design` document provides details of how this is achieved. + +The interface and operation of the runtime services depends heavily on the +concepts and definitions described in the `SMCCC`_, in particular SMC Function +IDs, Owning Entity Numbers (OEN), Fast and Standard calls, and the SMC32 and +SMC64 calling conventions. Please refer to that document for a full explanation +of these terms. + +Owning Entities, Call Types and Function IDs +-------------------------------------------- + +The SMC Function Identifier includes a OEN field. These values and their +meaning are described in `SMCCC`_ and summarized in table 1 below. Some entities +are allocated a range of of OENs. The OEN must be interpreted in conjunction +with the SMC call type, which is either *Fast* or *Yielding*. Fast calls are +uninterruptible whereas Yielding calls can be pre-empted. The majority of +Owning Entities only have allocated ranges for Fast calls: Yielding calls are +reserved exclusively for Trusted OS providers or for interoperability with +legacy 32-bit software that predates the `SMCCC`_. + +:: + + Type OEN Service + Fast 0 Arm Architecture calls + Fast 1 CPU Service calls + Fast 2 SiP Service calls + Fast 3 OEM Service calls + Fast 4 Standard Service calls + Fast 5-47 Reserved for future use + Fast 48-49 Trusted Application calls + Fast 50-63 Trusted OS calls + + Yielding 0- 1 Reserved for existing Armv7-A calls + Yielding 2-63 Trusted OS Standard Calls + +*Table 1: Service types and their corresponding Owning Entity Numbers* + +Each individual entity can allocate the valid identifiers within the entity +range as they need - it is not necessary to coordinate with other entities of +the same type. For example, two SoC providers can use the same Function ID +within the SiP Service calls OEN range to mean different things - as these +calls should be specific to the SoC. The Standard Runtime Calls OEN is used for +services defined by Arm standards, such as `PSCI`_. + +The SMC Function ID also indicates whether the call has followed the SMC32 +calling convention, where all parameters are 32-bit, or the SMC64 calling +convention, where the parameters are 64-bit. The framework identifies and +rejects invalid calls that use the SMC64 calling convention but that originate +from an AArch32 caller. + +The EL3 runtime services framework uses the call type and OEN to identify a +specific handler for each SMC call, but it is expected that an individual +handler will be responsible for all SMC Functions within a given service type. + +Getting started +--------------- + +TF-A has a ``services`` directory in the source tree under which +each owning entity can place the implementation of its runtime service. The +`PSCI`_ implementation is located here in the ``lib/psci`` directory. + +Runtime service sources will need to include the ``runtime_svc.h`` header file. + +Registering a runtime service +----------------------------- + +A runtime service is registered using the ``DECLARE_RT_SVC()`` macro, specifying +the name of the service, the range of OENs covered, the type of service and +initialization and call handler functions. + +.. code:: c + + #define DECLARE_RT_SVC(_name, _start, _end, _type, _setup, _smch) + +- ``_name`` is used to identify the data structure declared by this macro, and + is also used for diagnostic purposes + +- ``_start`` and ``_end`` values must be based on the ``OEN_*`` values defined in + ``smccc.h`` + +- ``_type`` must be one of ``SMC_TYPE_FAST`` or ``SMC_TYPE_YIELD`` + +- ``_setup`` is the initialization function with the ``rt_svc_init`` signature: + + .. code:: c + + typedef int32_t (*rt_svc_init)(void); + +- ``_smch`` is the SMC handler function with the ``rt_svc_handle`` signature: + + .. code:: c + + typedef uintptr_t (*rt_svc_handle_t)(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags); + +Details of the requirements and behavior of the two callbacks is provided in +the following sections. + +During initialization the services framework validates each declared service +to ensure that the following conditions are met: + +#. The ``_start`` OEN is not greater than the ``_end`` OEN +#. The ``_end`` OEN does not exceed the maximum OEN value (63) +#. The ``_type`` is one of ``SMC_TYPE_FAST`` or ``SMC_TYPE_YIELD`` +#. ``_setup`` and ``_smch`` routines have been specified + +``std_svc_setup.c`` provides an example of registering a runtime service: + +.. code:: c + + /* Register Standard Service Calls as runtime service */ + DECLARE_RT_SVC( + std_svc, + OEN_STD_START, + OEN_STD_END, + SMC_TYPE_FAST, + std_svc_setup, + std_svc_smc_handler + ); + +Initializing a runtime service +------------------------------ + +Runtime services are initialized once, during cold boot, by the primary CPU +after platform and architectural initialization is complete. The framework +performs basic validation of the declared service before calling +the service initialization function (``_setup`` in the declaration). This +function must carry out any essential EL3 initialization prior to receiving a +SMC Function call via the handler function. + +On success, the initialization function must return ``0``. Any other return value +will cause the framework to issue a diagnostic: + +:: + + Error initializing runtime service <name of the service> + +and then ignore the service - the system will continue to boot but SMC calls +will not be passed to the service handler and instead return the *Unknown SMC +Function ID* result ``0xFFFFFFFF``. + +If the system must not be allowed to proceed without the service, the +initialization function must itself cause the firmware boot to be halted. + +If the service uses per-CPU data this must either be initialized for all CPUs +during this call, or be done lazily when a CPU first issues an SMC call to that +service. + +Handling runtime service requests +--------------------------------- + +SMC calls for a service are forwarded by the framework to the service's SMC +handler function (``_smch`` in the service declaration). This function must have +the following signature: + +.. code:: c + + typedef uintptr_t (*rt_svc_handle_t)(uint32_t smc_fid, + u_register_t x1, u_register_t x2, + u_register_t x3, u_register_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + u_register_t flags); + +The handler is responsible for: + +#. Determining that ``smc_fid`` is a valid and supported SMC Function ID, + otherwise completing the request with the *Unknown SMC Function ID*: + + .. code:: c + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + +#. Determining if the requested function is valid for the calling security + state. SMC Calls can be made from Non-secure, Secure or Realm worlds and + the framework will forward all calls to the service handler. + + The ``flags`` parameter to this function indicates the caller security state + in bits 0 and 5. The ``is_caller_secure(flags)``, ``is_caller_non_secure(flags)`` + and ``is_caller_realm(flags)`` helper functions can be used to determine whether + the caller's security state is Secure, Non-secure or Realm respectively. + + If invalid, the request should be completed with: + + .. code:: c + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + +#. Truncating parameters for calls made using the SMC32 calling convention. + Such calls can be determined by checking the CC field in bit[30] of the + ``smc_fid`` parameter, for example by using: + + :: + + if (GET_SMC_CC(smc_fid) == SMC_32) ... + + For such calls, the upper bits of the parameters x1-x4 and the saved + parameters X5-X7 are UNDEFINED and must be explicitly ignored by the + handler. This can be done by truncating the values to a suitable 32-bit + integer type before use, for example by ensuring that functions defined + to handle individual SMC Functions use appropriate 32-bit parameters. + +#. Providing the service requested by the SMC Function, utilizing the + immediate parameters x1-x4 and/or the additional saved parameters X5-X7. + The latter can be retrieved using the ``SMC_GET_GP(handle, ref)`` function, + supplying the appropriate ``CTX_GPREG_Xn`` reference, e.g. + + .. code:: c + + uint64_t x6 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X6); + +#. Implementing the standard SMC32 Functions that provide information about + the implementation of the service. These are the Call Count, Implementor + UID and Revision Details for each service documented in section 6 of the + `SMCCC`_. + + TF-A expects owning entities to follow this recommendation. + +#. Returning the result to the caller. Based on `SMCCC`_ spec, results are + returned in W0-W7(X0-X7) registers for SMC32(SMC64) calls from AArch64 + state. Results are returned in R0-R7 registers for SMC32 calls from AArch32 + state. The framework provides a family of macros to set the multi-register + return value and complete the handler: + + .. code:: c + + AArch64 state: + + SMC_RET1(handle, x0); + SMC_RET2(handle, x0, x1); + SMC_RET3(handle, x0, x1, x2); + SMC_RET4(handle, x0, x1, x2, x3); + SMC_RET5(handle, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4); + SMC_RET6(handle, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5); + SMC_RET7(handle, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6); + SMC_RET8(handle, x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7); + + AArch32 state: + + SMC_RET1(handle, r0); + SMC_RET2(handle, r0, r1); + SMC_RET3(handle, r0, r1, r2); + SMC_RET4(handle, r0, r1, r2, r3); + SMC_RET5(handle, r0, r1, r2, r3, r4); + SMC_RET6(handle, r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5); + SMC_RET7(handle, r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6); + SMC_RET8(handle, r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7); + +The ``cookie`` parameter to the handler is reserved for future use and can be +ignored. The ``handle`` is returned by the SMC handler - completion of the +handler function must always be via one of the ``SMC_RETn()`` macros. + +.. note:: + The PSCI and Test Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher services do not follow + all of the above requirements yet. + +Services that contain multiple sub-services +------------------------------------------- + +It is possible that a single owning entity implements multiple sub-services. For +example, the Standard calls service handles ``0x84000000``-``0x8400FFFF`` and +``0xC4000000``-``0xC400FFFF`` functions. Within that range, the `PSCI`_ service +handles the ``0x84000000``-``0x8400001F`` and ``0xC4000000``-``0xC400001F`` functions. +In that respect, `PSCI`_ is a 'sub-service' of the Standard calls service. In +future, there could be additional such sub-services in the Standard calls +service which perform independent functions. + +In this situation it may be valuable to introduce a second level framework to +enable independent implementation of sub-services. Such a framework might look +very similar to the current runtime services framework, but using a different +part of the SMC Function ID to identify the sub-service. TF-A does not provide +such a framework at present. + +Secure-EL1 Payload Dispatcher service (SPD) +------------------------------------------- + +Services that handle SMC Functions targeting a Trusted OS, Trusted Application, +or other Secure-EL1 Payload are special. These services need to manage the +Secure-EL1 context, provide the *Secure Monitor* functionality of switching +between the normal and secure worlds, deliver SMC Calls through to Secure-EL1 +and generally manage the Secure-EL1 Payload through CPU power-state transitions. + +TODO: Provide details of the additional work required to implement a SPD and +the BL31 support for these services. Or a reference to the document that will +provide this information.... + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2014-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.* + +.. _SMCCC: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0028/latest +.. _PSCI: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/latest/ diff --git a/docs/getting_started/tools-build.rst b/docs/getting_started/tools-build.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..166b527 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/getting_started/tools-build.rst @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +Building Supporting Tools +========================= + +.. note:: + + OpenSSL 3.0 is needed in order to build the tools. A custom installation + can be used if not updating the OpenSSL version on the OS. In order to do + this, use the ``OPENSSL_DIR`` variable after the ``make`` command to + indicate the location of the custom OpenSSL build. Then, to run the tools, + use the ``LD_LIBRARY_PATH`` to indicate the location of the built + libraries. More info about ``OPENSSL_DIR`` can be found at + :ref:`Build Options`. + +Building and using the FIP tool +------------------------------- + +The following snippets build a :ref:`FIP<Image Terminology>` for the FVP +platform. While it is not an intrinsic part of the FIP format, a BL33 image is +required for these examples. For the purposes of experimentation, `Trusted +Firmware-A Tests`_ (`tftf.bin``) may be used. Refer to to the `TFTF +documentation`_ for instructions on building a TFTF binary. + +The TF-A build system provides the make target ``fip`` to create a FIP file +for the specified platform using the FIP creation tool included in the TF-A +project. Examples below show how to build a FIP file for FVP, packaging TF-A +and BL33 images. + +For AArch64: + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=fvp BL33=<path-to>/bl33.bin fip + +For AArch32: + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=fvp ARCH=aarch32 AARCH32_SP=sp_min BL33=<path-to>/bl33.bin fip + +The resulting FIP may be found in: + +:: + + build/fvp/<build-type>/fip.bin + +For advanced operations on FIP files, it is also possible to independently build +the tool and create or modify FIPs using this tool. To do this, follow these +steps: + +It is recommended to remove old artifacts before building the tool: + +.. code:: shell + + make -C tools/fiptool clean + +Build the tool: + +.. code:: shell + + make [DEBUG=1] [V=1] fiptool + +The tool binary can be located in: + +:: + + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool + +Invoking the tool with ``help`` will print a help message with all available +options. + +Example 1: create a new Firmware package ``fip.bin`` that contains BL2 and BL31: + +.. code:: shell + + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool create \ + --tb-fw build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl2.bin \ + --soc-fw build/<platform>/<build-type>/bl31.bin \ + fip.bin + +Example 2: view the contents of an existing Firmware package: + +.. code:: shell + + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool info <path-to>/fip.bin + +Example 3: update the entries of an existing Firmware package: + +.. code:: shell + + # Change the BL2 from Debug to Release version + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool update \ + --tb-fw build/<platform>/release/bl2.bin \ + build/<platform>/debug/fip.bin + +Example 4: unpack all entries from an existing Firmware package: + +.. code:: shell + + # Images will be unpacked to the working directory + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool unpack <path-to>/fip.bin + +Example 5: remove an entry from an existing Firmware package: + +.. code:: shell + + ./tools/fiptool/fiptool remove \ + --tb-fw build/<platform>/debug/fip.bin + +Note that if the destination FIP file exists, the create, update and +remove operations will automatically overwrite it. + +The unpack operation will fail if the images already exist at the +destination. In that case, use -f or --force to continue. + +More information about FIP can be found in the :ref:`Firmware Design` document. + +.. _tools_build_cert_create: + +Building the Certificate Generation Tool +---------------------------------------- + +The ``cert_create`` tool is built as part of the TF-A build process when the +``fip`` make target is specified and TBB is enabled (as described in the +previous section), but it can also be built separately with the following +command: + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> [DEBUG=1] [V=1] certtool + +For platforms that require their own IDs in certificate files, the generic +'cert_create' tool can be built with the following command. Note that the target +platform must define its IDs within a ``platform_oid.h`` header file for the +build to succeed. + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> USE_TBBR_DEFS=0 [DEBUG=1] [V=1] certtool + +``DEBUG=1`` builds the tool in debug mode. ``V=1`` makes the build process more +verbose. The following command should be used to obtain help about the tool: + +.. code:: shell + + ./tools/cert_create/cert_create -h + +.. _tools_build_enctool: + +Building the Firmware Encryption Tool +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The ``encrypt_fw`` tool is built as part of the TF-A build process when the +``fip`` make target is specified, DECRYPTION_SUPPORT and TBB are enabled, but +it can also be built separately with the following command: + +.. code:: shell + + make PLAT=<platform> [DEBUG=1] [V=1] enctool + +``DEBUG=1`` builds the tool in debug mode. ``V=1`` makes the build process more +verbose. The following command should be used to obtain help about the tool: + +.. code:: shell + + ./tools/encrypt_fw/encrypt_fw -h + +Note that the enctool in its current implementation only supports encryption +key to be provided in plain format. A typical implementation can very well +extend this tool to support custom techniques to protect encryption key. + +Also, a user may choose to provide encryption key or nonce as an input file +via using ``cat <filename>`` instead of a hex string. + +-------------- + +*Copyright (c) 2019-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.* + +.. _Trusted Firmware-A Tests: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/ +.. _TFTF documentation: https://trustedfirmware-a-tests.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ |