Adding upstream version 4.5.upstream/4.5

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 441 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/keys.c b/keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9225e6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+/*
+  chronyd/chronyc - Programs for keeping computer clocks accurate.
+
+ **********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (C) Richard P. Curnow  1997-2003
+ * Copyright (C) Miroslav Lichvar  2012-2016, 2019-2020
+ * 
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * 
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ * 
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA.
+ * 
+ **********************************************************************
+
+  =======================================================================
+
+  Module for managing keys used for authenticating NTP packets and commands
+
+  */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "sysincl.h"
+
+#include "array.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
+#include "cmdparse.h"
+#include "conf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "local.h"
+#include "logging.h"
+
+/* Consider 80 bits as the absolute minimum for a secure key */
+#define MIN_SECURE_KEY_LENGTH 10
+
+typedef enum {
+  NTP_MAC,
+  CMAC,
+} KeyClass;
+
+typedef struct {
+  uint32_t id;
+  int type;
+  int length;
+  KeyClass class;
+  union {
+    struct {
+      unsigned char *value;
+      int hash_id;
+    } ntp_mac;
+    CMC_Instance cmac;
+  } data;
+} Key;
+
+static ARR_Instance keys;
+
+static int cache_valid;
+static uint32_t cache_key_id;
+static int cache_key_pos;
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static void
+free_keys(void)
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  Key *key;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < ARR_GetSize(keys); i++) {
+    key = ARR_GetElement(keys, i);
+    switch (key->class) {
+      case NTP_MAC:
+        Free(key->data.ntp_mac.value);
+        break;
+      case CMAC:
+        CMC_DestroyInstance(key->data.cmac);
+        break;
+      default:
+        assert(0);
+    }
+  }
+
+  ARR_SetSize(keys, 0);
+  cache_valid = 0;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+void
+KEY_Initialise(void)
+{
+  keys = ARR_CreateInstance(sizeof (Key));
+  cache_valid = 0;
+  KEY_Reload();
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+void
+KEY_Finalise(void)
+{
+  free_keys();
+  ARR_DestroyInstance(keys);
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static Key *
+get_key(unsigned int index)
+{
+  return ((Key *)ARR_GetElements(keys)) + index;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+/* Decode key encoded in ASCII or HEX */
+
+static int
+decode_key(char *key)
+{
+  int len = strlen(key);
+
+  if (!strncmp(key, "ASCII:", 6)) {
+    memmove(key, key + 6, len - 6);
+    return len - 6;
+  } else if (!strncmp(key, "HEX:", 4)) {
+    return UTI_HexToBytes(key + 4, key, len);
+  } else {
+    /* assume ASCII */
+    return len;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+/* Compare two keys */
+
+static int
+compare_keys_by_id(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+  const Key *c = (const Key *) a;
+  const Key *d = (const Key *) b;
+
+  if (c->id < d->id) {
+    return -1;
+  } else if (c->id > d->id) {
+    return +1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+void
+KEY_Reload(void)
+{
+  unsigned int i, line_number, key_length, cmac_key_length;
+  FILE *in;
+  char line[2048], *key_file, *key_value;
+  const char *key_type;
+  HSH_Algorithm hash_algorithm;
+  CMC_Algorithm cmac_algorithm;
+  int hash_id;
+  Key key;
+
+  free_keys();
+
+  key_file = CNF_GetKeysFile();
+  line_number = 0;
+
+  if (!key_file)
+    return;
+
+  if (!UTI_CheckFilePermissions(key_file, 0771))
+    ;
+
+  in = UTI_OpenFile(NULL, key_file, NULL, 'r', 0);
+  if (!in) {
+    LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Could not open keyfile %s", key_file);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  while (fgets(line, sizeof (line), in)) {
+    line_number++;
+
+    CPS_NormalizeLine(line);
+    if (!*line)
+      continue;
+
+    memset(&key, 0, sizeof (key));
+
+    if (!CPS_ParseKey(line, &key.id, &key_type, &key_value)) {
+      LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Could not parse key at line %u in file %s", line_number, key_file);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    key_length = decode_key(key_value);
+    if (key_length == 0) {
+      LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Could not decode key %"PRIu32, key.id);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    hash_algorithm = UTI_HashNameToAlgorithm(key_type);
+    cmac_algorithm = UTI_CmacNameToAlgorithm(key_type);
+
+    if (hash_algorithm != 0) {
+      hash_id = HSH_GetHashId(hash_algorithm);
+      if (hash_id < 0) {
+        LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Unsupported %s in key %"PRIu32, "hash function", key.id);
+        continue;
+      }
+      key.class = NTP_MAC;
+      key.type = hash_algorithm;
+      key.length = key_length;
+      key.data.ntp_mac.value = MallocArray(unsigned char, key_length);
+      memcpy(key.data.ntp_mac.value, key_value, key_length);
+      key.data.ntp_mac.hash_id = hash_id;
+    } else if (cmac_algorithm != 0) {
+      cmac_key_length = CMC_GetKeyLength(cmac_algorithm);
+      if (cmac_key_length == 0) {
+        LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Unsupported %s in key %"PRIu32, "cipher", key.id);
+        continue;
+      } else if (cmac_key_length != key_length) {
+        LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Invalid length of %s key %"PRIu32" (expected %u bits)",
+            key_type, key.id, 8 * cmac_key_length);
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      key.class = CMAC;
+      key.type = cmac_algorithm;
+      key.length = key_length;
+      key.data.cmac = CMC_CreateInstance(cmac_algorithm, (unsigned char *)key_value,
+                                         key_length);
+      assert(key.data.cmac);
+    } else {
+      LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Invalid type in key %"PRIu32, key.id);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    ARR_AppendElement(keys, &key);
+  }
+
+  fclose(in);
+
+  /* Sort keys into order.  Note, if there's a duplicate, it is
+     arbitrary which one we use later - the user should have been
+     more careful! */
+  qsort(ARR_GetElements(keys), ARR_GetSize(keys), sizeof (Key), compare_keys_by_id);
+
+  LOG(LOGS_INFO, "Loaded %u symmetric keys", ARR_GetSize(keys));
+
+  /* Check for duplicates */
+  for (i = 1; i < ARR_GetSize(keys); i++) {
+    if (get_key(i - 1)->id == get_key(i)->id)
+      LOG(LOGS_WARN, "Detected duplicate key %"PRIu32, get_key(i - 1)->id);
+  }
+
+  /* Erase any passwords from stack */
+  memset(line, 0, sizeof (line));
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static int
+lookup_key(uint32_t id)
+{
+  Key specimen, *where, *keys_ptr;
+  int pos;
+
+  keys_ptr = ARR_GetElements(keys);
+  specimen.id = id;
+  where = (Key *)bsearch((void *)&specimen, keys_ptr, ARR_GetSize(keys),
+                         sizeof (Key), compare_keys_by_id);
+  if (!where) {
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    pos = where - keys_ptr;
+    return pos;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static Key *
+get_key_by_id(uint32_t key_id)
+{
+  int position;
+
+  if (cache_valid && key_id == cache_key_id)
+    return get_key(cache_key_pos);
+
+  position = lookup_key(key_id);
+
+  if (position >= 0) {
+    cache_valid = 1;
+    cache_key_pos = position;
+    cache_key_id = key_id;
+
+    return get_key(position);
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_KeyKnown(uint32_t key_id)
+{
+  return get_key_by_id(key_id) != NULL;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_GetAuthLength(uint32_t key_id)
+{
+  unsigned char buf[MAX_HASH_LENGTH];
+  Key *key;
+
+  key = get_key_by_id(key_id);
+
+  if (!key)
+    return 0;
+
+  switch (key->class) {
+    case NTP_MAC:
+      return HSH_Hash(key->data.ntp_mac.hash_id, buf, 0, buf, 0, buf, sizeof (buf));
+    case CMAC:
+      return CMC_Hash(key->data.cmac, buf, 0, buf, sizeof (buf));
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_CheckKeyLength(uint32_t key_id)
+{
+  Key *key;
+
+  key = get_key_by_id(key_id);
+
+  if (!key)
+    return 0;
+
+  return key->length >= MIN_SECURE_KEY_LENGTH;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_GetKeyInfo(uint32_t key_id, int *type, int *bits)
+{
+  Key *key;
+
+  key = get_key_by_id(key_id);
+
+  if (!key)
+    return 0;
+
+  *type = key->type;
+  *bits = 8 * key->length;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static int
+generate_auth(Key *key, const void *data, int data_len, unsigned char *auth, int auth_len)
+{
+  switch (key->class) {
+    case NTP_MAC:
+      return HSH_Hash(key->data.ntp_mac.hash_id, key->data.ntp_mac.value,
+                      key->length, data, data_len, auth, auth_len);
+    case CMAC:
+      return CMC_Hash(key->data.cmac, data, data_len, auth, auth_len);
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+static int
+check_auth(Key *key, const void *data, int data_len,
+           const unsigned char *auth, int auth_len, int trunc_len)
+{
+  unsigned char buf[MAX_HASH_LENGTH];
+  int hash_len;
+
+  hash_len = generate_auth(key, data, data_len, buf, sizeof (buf));
+
+  return MIN(hash_len, trunc_len) == auth_len && !memcmp(buf, auth, auth_len);
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_GenerateAuth(uint32_t key_id, const void *data, int data_len,
+                 unsigned char *auth, int auth_len)
+{
+  Key *key;
+
+  key = get_key_by_id(key_id);
+
+  if (!key)
+    return 0;
+
+  return generate_auth(key, data, data_len, auth, auth_len);
+}
+
+/* ================================================== */
+
+int
+KEY_CheckAuth(uint32_t key_id, const void *data, int data_len,
+              const unsigned char *auth, int auth_len, int trunc_len)
+{
+  Key *key;
+
+  key = get_key_by_id(key_id);
+
+  if (!key)
+    return 0;
+
+  return check_auth(key, data, data_len, auth, auth_len, trunc_len);
+}