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-rw-r--r--src/Makemodule.am118
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup.c3603
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup.h177
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup_arg_list.h232
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup_args.h113
-rw-r--r--src/integritysetup.c767
-rw-r--r--src/integritysetup_arg_list.h100
-rw-r--r--src/integritysetup_args.h61
-rw-r--r--src/utils_arg_macros.h103
-rw-r--r--src/utils_arg_names.h173
-rw-r--r--src/utils_args.c131
-rw-r--r--src/utils_blockdev.c382
-rw-r--r--src/utils_luks.c274
-rw-r--r--src/utils_luks.h52
-rw-r--r--src/utils_password.c331
-rw-r--r--src/utils_progress.c301
-rw-r--r--src/utils_reencrypt.c1560
-rw-r--r--src/utils_reencrypt_luks1.c1354
-rw-r--r--src/utils_tools.c468
-rw-r--r--src/veritysetup.c680
-rw-r--r--src/veritysetup_arg_list.h70
-rw-r--r--src/veritysetup_args.h57
22 files changed, 11107 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/Makemodule.am b/src/Makemodule.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57fff40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Makemodule.am
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+# cryptsetup
+if CRYPTSETUP
+
+cryptsetup_SOURCES = \
+ lib/utils_crypt.c \
+ lib/utils_loop.c \
+ lib/utils_io.c \
+ lib/utils_blkid.c \
+ src/utils_args.c \
+ src/utils_tools.c \
+ src/utils_password.c \
+ src/utils_luks.c \
+ src/utils_luks.h \
+ src/utils_blockdev.c \
+ src/utils_arg_names.h \
+ src/utils_arg_macros.h \
+ src/utils_reencrypt.c \
+ src/utils_reencrypt_luks1.c \
+ src/utils_progress.c \
+ src/cryptsetup.c \
+ src/cryptsetup.h \
+ src/cryptsetup_args.h \
+ src/cryptsetup_arg_list.h
+
+cryptsetup_LDADD = $(LDADD) \
+ libcryptsetup.la \
+ @POPT_LIBS@ \
+ @PWQUALITY_LIBS@ \
+ @PASSWDQC_LIBS@ \
+ @UUID_LIBS@ \
+ @BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += cryptsetup.static
+cryptsetup_static_SOURCES = $(cryptsetup_SOURCES)
+cryptsetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+cryptsetup_static_LDADD = \
+ $(cryptsetup_LDADD) \
+ @CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@ \
+ @PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS@ \
+ @DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
+
+# veritysetup
+if VERITYSETUP
+
+veritysetup_SOURCES = \
+ lib/utils_crypt.c \
+ lib/utils_loop.c \
+ lib/utils_io.c \
+ lib/utils_blkid.c \
+ src/utils_args.c \
+ src/utils_arg_names.h \
+ src/utils_arg_macros.h \
+ src/utils_tools.c \
+ src/veritysetup.c \
+ src/veritysetup_args.h \
+ src/veritysetup_arg_list.h \
+ src/cryptsetup.h
+
+veritysetup_LDADD = $(LDADD) \
+ libcryptsetup.la \
+ @POPT_LIBS@ \
+ @BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += veritysetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += veritysetup.static
+veritysetup_static_SOURCES = $(veritysetup_SOURCES)
+veritysetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+veritysetup_static_LDADD = \
+ $(veritysetup_LDADD) \
+ @CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@ \
+ @DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
+
+# integritysetup
+if INTEGRITYSETUP
+
+integritysetup_SOURCES = \
+ lib/utils_crypt.c \
+ lib/utils_loop.c \
+ lib/utils_io.c \
+ lib/utils_blkid.c \
+ src/utils_args.c \
+ src/utils_arg_names.h \
+ src/utils_arg_macros.h \
+ src/utils_tools.c \
+ src/utils_blockdev.c \
+ src/utils_progress.c \
+ src/integritysetup.c \
+ src/integritysetup_args.h \
+ src/integritysetup_arg_list.h \
+ src/cryptsetup.h
+
+integritysetup_LDADD = $(LDADD) \
+ libcryptsetup.la \
+ @POPT_LIBS@ \
+ @UUID_LIBS@ \
+ @BLKID_LIBS@
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS += integritysetup
+
+if STATIC_TOOLS
+sbin_PROGRAMS += integritysetup.static
+integritysetup_static_SOURCES = $(integritysetup_SOURCES)
+integritysetup_static_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -all-static
+integritysetup_static_LDADD = \
+ $(integritysetup_LDADD) \
+ @CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS@ \
+ @DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS@
+endif
+endif
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e387c1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3603 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "cryptsetup_args.h"
+#include "utils_luks.h"
+
+static char *keyfiles[MAX_KEYFILES];
+static char *keyfile_stdin = NULL;
+
+static int keyfiles_count = 0;
+int64_t data_shift = 0;
+
+const char *device_type = "luks";
+const char *set_pbkdf = NULL;
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL, NULL};
+static int total_keyfiles = 0;
+
+static struct tools_log_params log_parms;
+
+struct tools_arg tool_core_args[] = { { NULL, false, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL }, /* leave unused due to popt library */
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, false, F, G, H },
+#include "cryptsetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+void tools_cleanup(void)
+{
+ tools_args_free(tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args));
+
+ FREE_AND_NULL(keyfile_stdin);
+
+ while (keyfiles_count)
+ free(keyfiles[--keyfiles_count]);
+
+ total_keyfiles = 0;
+}
+
+static const char *uuid_or_device_header(const char **data_device)
+{
+ if (data_device)
+ *data_device = ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) ? action_argv[0] : NULL;
+
+ return uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]);
+}
+
+static bool isLUKS(const char *type)
+{
+ return isLUKS2(type) || isLUKS1(type);
+}
+
+static int _set_keyslot_encryption_params(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ const char *type = crypt_get_type(cd);
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ID))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!isLUKS2(type)) {
+ log_err(_("Keyslot encryption parameters can be set only for LUKS2 device."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, ARG_STR(OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8);
+}
+
+static int _try_token_pin_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int token_id,
+ const char *activated_name,
+ const char *token_type,
+ uint32_t activate_flags,
+ int tries,
+ bool activation)
+{
+ size_t pin_len;
+ char msg[64], *pin = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(tries >= 1);
+ assert(token_id >= 0 || token_id == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN);
+
+ if (token_id == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+ r = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter token PIN: "));
+ else
+ r = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter token %d PIN: "), token_id);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(msg))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ do {
+ r = tools_get_key(msg, &pin, &pin_len, 0, 0, NULL,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (activation)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, activated_name, token_type,
+ token_id, pin, pin_len, NULL,
+ activate_flags);
+ else
+ r = crypt_resume_by_token_pin(cd, activated_name, token_type,
+ token_id, pin, pin_len, NULL);
+ crypt_safe_free(pin);
+ pin = NULL;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ tools_token_error_msg(r, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), token_id, true);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ } while (r == -ENOANO && (--tries > 0));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_plain(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL, *cd1 = NULL;
+ const char *pcipher, *pmode;
+ char *msg, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+ .hash = ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID) ? ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) : DEFAULT_PLAIN_HASH,
+ .skip = ARG_UINT64(OPT_SKIP_ID),
+ .offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID),
+ .sector_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) ?: SECTOR_SIZE
+ };
+ char *password = NULL;
+ const char *activated_name = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen, key_size_max, signatures = 0,
+ key_size = (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) ?: DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS) / 8;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ?: DEFAULT_CIPHER(PLAIN),
+ cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* FIXME: temporary hack, no hashing for keyfiles in plain mode */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) && !tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID))) {
+ params.hash = NULL;
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID))
+ log_std(_("WARNING: The --hash parameter is being ignored "
+ "in plain mode with keyfile specified.\n"));
+ }
+
+ if (params.hash && !strcmp(params.hash, "plain"))
+ params.hash = NULL;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !params.hash && ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) && !tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) && ARG_SET(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID))
+ log_std(_("WARNING: The --keyfile-size option is being ignored, "
+ "the read size is the same as the encryption key size.\n"));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID)) {
+ activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd1, activated_name, NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd1, activated_name, &cad);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* copy known parameters from existing device */
+ params.skip = crypt_get_iv_offset(cd1);
+ params.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd1);
+ params.size = cad.size;
+ params.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd1);
+ key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd1);
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, crypt_get_device_name(cd1))))
+ goto out;
+
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+ pcipher = crypt_get_cipher(cd1);
+ pmode = crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd1);
+ } else {
+ activated_name = action_argv[1];
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Skip blkid scan when activating plain device with offset */
+ if (!ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID)) {
+ /* Print all present signatures in read-only mode */
+ r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], PRB_FILTER_NONE, &signatures, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (signatures && !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("Detected device signature(s) on %s. Proceeding further may damage existing data."), action_argv[0]);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pcipher = cipher;
+ pmode = cipher_mode;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ params.size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_SIZE_ID))
+ params.size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_SIZE_ID);
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN,
+ pcipher, pmode,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ key_size,
+ &params);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SHARED_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED;
+
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ if (!tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID))) {
+ /* If no hash, key is read directly, read size is always key_size
+ * (possible --keyfile_size is ignored.
+ * If hash is specified, --keyfile_size is applied.
+ * The --keyfile_offset is applied always.
+ */
+ key_size_max = params.hash ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID) : key_size;
+ r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, action_argv[1],
+ CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), key_size_max,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), activate_flags);
+ } else {
+ key_size_max = (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) && !params.hash) ? key_size : ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID);
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), key_size_max,
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name,
+ CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_free(cd1);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_loopaes(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_loopaes params = {
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID),
+ .offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID),
+ .skip = ARG_SET(OPT_SKIP_ID) ? ARG_UINT64(OPT_SKIP_ID) : ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID)
+ };
+ unsigned int key_size = (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_KEYBITS) / 8;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ const char *activated_name = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Option --key-file is required."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID)) {
+ activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+ if ((r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, activated_name)))
+ goto out;
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+ } else {
+ activated_name = action_argv[1];
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LOOPAES, ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, key_size, &params);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) ? "/dev/stdin" : ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), activate_flags);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int tcrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+ int r, tries, eperm = 0;
+
+ tries = set_tries_tty();
+ do {
+ /* TCRYPT header is encrypted, get passphrase now */
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, CONST_CAST(char**)&params->passphrase,
+ &params->passphrase_size, 0, 0, keyfile_stdin, ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERACRYPT_QUERY_PIM_ID)) {
+ char *tmp_pim_nptr = NULL;
+ char *tmp_pim_end = NULL;
+ size_t tmp_pim_size = 0;
+ unsigned long long tmp_pim_ull = 0;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter VeraCrypt PIM: "),
+ &tmp_pim_nptr,
+ &tmp_pim_size, 0, 0, keyfile_stdin, ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ tmp_pim_ull = strtoull(tmp_pim_nptr, &tmp_pim_end, 10);
+ if (*tmp_pim_nptr == '\0' || !tmp_pim_end || *tmp_pim_end != '\0') {
+ log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: parse error."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (tmp_pim_ull == 0) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: 0."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (tmp_pim_ull > UINT32_MAX) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid PIM value: outside of range."));
+ r = -ERANGE;
+ }
+ crypt_safe_free(tmp_pim_nptr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ params->veracrypt_pim = (uint32_t)tmp_pim_ull;
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&tmp_pim_ull, sizeof(tmp_pim_ull));
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_ID))
+ params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_ID))
+ params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_ID))
+ params->flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, params);
+
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_err(_("No device header detected with this passphrase."));
+ eperm = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->passphrase);
+ params->passphrase = NULL;
+ params->passphrase_size = 0;
+ }
+ check_signal(&r);
+ } while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+
+ /* Report wrong passphrase if at least one try failed */
+ if (eperm && r == -EPIPE)
+ r = -EPERM;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_tcrypt(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+ .keyfiles = CONST_CAST(const char **)keyfiles,
+ .keyfiles_count = keyfiles_count,
+ .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES |
+ (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ID) ? 0 : CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES),
+ .veracrypt_pim = ARG_UINT32(OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ID),
+ .hash_name = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID),
+ .cipher = ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID),
+ };
+ const char *activated_name;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ activated_name = ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+ r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0], action_argv[0]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = tcrypt_load(cd, &params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ if (activated_name)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name, NULL, 0, activate_flags);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.passphrase);
+ crypt_safe_memzero(&params.veracrypt_pim, sizeof(params.veracrypt_pim));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_bitlk(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ const char *activated_name;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ int r, tries, keysize;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+
+ activated_name = ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid BITLK device."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (!keysize && !ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot determine volume key size for BITLK, please use --key-size option."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (!keysize)
+ keysize = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8;
+
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name,
+ key, keysize, activate_flags);
+ } else {
+ tries = set_tries_tty();
+ do {
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ } while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int tcryptDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *vk = NULL;
+ size_t vk_size;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(
+ _("Header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+ "which allows access to encrypted partition without passphrase.\n"
+ "This dump should be always stored encrypted on safe place."),
+ NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size, NULL, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std("TCRYPT header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher chain: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher mode: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ log_std("Payload offset:\t%d\n", (int)crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+ log_std("MK bits: \t%d\n", (int)vk_size * 8);
+ log_std("MK dump:\t");
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, vk, vk_size, " ", 16, "\n\t\t");
+ log_std("\n");
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_tcryptDump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+ .keyfiles = CONST_CAST(const char **)keyfiles,
+ .keyfiles_count = keyfiles_count,
+ .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES |
+ (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ID) ? 0: CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES),
+ .veracrypt_pim = ARG_UINT32(OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ID),
+ .hash_name = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID),
+ .cipher = ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID),
+ };
+ int r;
+ r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0], action_argv[0]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = tcrypt_load(cd, &params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY_ID))
+ r = tcryptDump_with_volume_key(cd);
+ else
+ r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.passphrase);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int bitlkDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *vk = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen = 0;
+ size_t vk_size;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(
+ _("The header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+ "that allows access to encrypted partition without a passphrase.\n"
+ "This dump should be stored encrypted in a safe place."),
+ NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
+ password, passwordLen);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_write_mk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), vk, vk_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_std("BITLK header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher name: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher mode: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ log_std("UUID: \t%s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+ log_std("MK bits: \t%d\n", (int)vk_size * 8);
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_std("Key stored to file %s.\n", ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ log_std("MK dump:\t");
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, vk, vk_size, " ", 16, "\n\t\t");
+ log_std("\n");
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_bitlkDump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid BITLK device."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY_ID))
+ r = bitlkDump_with_volume_key(cd);
+ else
+ r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int fvault2Dump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *vk = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t vk_size = 0;
+ size_t pass_len = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(
+ _("The header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+ "that allows access to encrypted partition without a passphrase.\n"
+ "This dump should be stored encrypted in a safe place."),
+ NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+ if (vk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &pass_len,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size, password, pass_len);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_write_mk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), vk, vk_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_dump(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std("Volume key: \t");
+ crypt_log_hex(cd, vk, vk_size, " ", 0, NULL);
+ log_std("\n");
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_fvault2Dump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_FVAULT2, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid FVAULT2 device."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY_ID))
+ r = fvault2Dump_with_volume_key(cd);
+ else
+ r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open_fvault2(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ const char *activated_name;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ int r, tries, keysize;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+
+ activated_name = ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_FVAULT2, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid FVAULT2 device."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (!keysize && !ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot determine volume key size for FVAULT2, please use --key-size option."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (!keysize)
+ keysize = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8;
+
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name, key, keysize, activate_flags);
+ } else {
+ tries = set_tries_tty();
+ do {
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ } while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_close(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, action_argv[0], flags);
+
+ if (!r && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID)) {
+ ci = crypt_status(cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (ci == CRYPT_ACTIVE || ci == CRYPT_BUSY)
+ log_std(_("Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"),
+ action_argv[0]);
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_resize(void)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ uint64_t dev_size = 0;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* FIXME: LUKS2 may enforce fixed size and it must not be changed */
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ dev_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_SIZE_ID))
+ dev_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_SIZE_ID);
+
+ if (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_KEYRING_ID)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ log_err(_("Resize of active device requires volume key "
+ "in keyring but --disable-keyring option is set."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* try load VK in kernel keyring using token */
+ r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, NULL, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID),
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL, 0, NULL,
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ tools_token_error_msg(r, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), false);
+
+ /* Token requires PIN. Ask if there is evident preference for tokens */
+ if (r == -ENOANO && (ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID)))
+ r = _try_token_pin_unlock(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY, 1, true);
+
+ if (r >= 0 || quit || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, passwordLen,
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = crypt_resize(cd, action_argv[0], dev_size);
+
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(void)
+{
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity ip = {};
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *backing_file;
+ const char *device;
+ int path = 0, r = 0;
+
+ /* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+ if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/'))
+ path = 1;
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+ switch (ci) {
+ case CRYPT_INVALID:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" type: %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd) ?: "n/a");
+
+ /* Print only CRYPT type devices */
+ if (!crypt_get_cipher(cd))
+ goto out;
+
+ ri = crypt_reencrypt_status(cd, NULL);
+ if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE && ri < CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+ log_std(" reencryption: in-progress\n");
+
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTSUP)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" cipher: %s-%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ log_std(" keysize: %d bits\n", crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd) * 8);
+ log_std(" key location: %s\n", (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) ? "keyring" : "dm-crypt");
+ if (ip.integrity)
+ log_std(" integrity: %s\n", ip.integrity);
+ if (ip.integrity_key_size)
+ log_std(" integrity keysize: %d bits\n", ip.integrity_key_size * 8);
+ device = crypt_get_device_name(cd);
+ log_std(" device: %s\n", device);
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(device))) {
+ log_std(" loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ log_std(" sector size: %d\n", crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+ log_std(" offset: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.offset);
+ log_std(" size: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+ if (cad.iv_offset)
+ log_std(" skipped: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.iv_offset);
+ log_std(" mode: %s%s\n", cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ?
+ "readonly" : "read/write",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED) ? " (suspended)" : "");
+ if (cad.flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE))
+ log_std(" flags: %s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? "discards " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? "same_cpu_crypt " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? "submit_from_crypt_cpus " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE) ? "no_read_workqueue " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE) ? "no_write_workqueue" : "");
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ r = 0;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int benchmark_callback(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr)
+{
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf = usrptr;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(_("Benchmark interrupted."));
+ else
+ log_dbg("PBKDF benchmark: memory cost = %u, iterations = %u, "
+ "threads = %u (took %u ms)", pbkdf->max_memory_kb,
+ pbkdf->iterations, pbkdf->parallel_threads, time_ms);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_benchmark_kdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash, size_t key_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ if (!strcmp(kdf, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+ .type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+ .hash = hash,
+ .time_ms = 1000,
+ };
+
+ r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(NULL, &pbkdf, "foobarfo", 8, "0123456789abcdef", 16, key_size,
+ &benchmark_callback, &pbkdf);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_std(_("PBKDF2-%-9s N/A\n"), hash);
+ else
+ log_std(_("PBKDF2-%-9s %7u iterations per second for %zu-bit key\n"),
+ hash, pbkdf.iterations, key_size * 8);
+ } else {
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+ .type = kdf,
+ .time_ms = ARG_UINT32(OPT_ITER_TIME_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LUKS2_ITER_TIME,
+ .max_memory_kb = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PBKDF_MEMORY_ID),
+ .parallel_threads = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PBKDF_PARALLEL_ID)
+ };
+
+ r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf(NULL, &pbkdf, "foobarfo", 8,
+ "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", 32,
+ key_size, &benchmark_callback, &pbkdf);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_std(_("%-10s N/A\n"), kdf);
+ else
+ log_std(_("%-10s %4u iterations, %5u memory, "
+ "%1u parallel threads (CPUs) for "
+ "%zu-bit key (requested %u ms time)\n"), kdf,
+ pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb, pbkdf.parallel_threads,
+ key_size * 8, pbkdf.time_ms);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int benchmark_cipher_loop(const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+ size_t volume_key_size,
+ double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs)
+{
+ int r, buffer_size = 1024 * 1024;
+
+ do {
+ r = crypt_benchmark(NULL, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ volume_key_size, 0, buffer_size,
+ encryption_mbs, decryption_mbs);
+ if (r == -ERANGE) {
+ if (buffer_size < 1024 * 1024 * 65)
+ buffer_size *= 2;
+ else {
+ log_err(_("Result of benchmark is not reliable."));
+ r = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (r == -ERANGE);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_benchmark(void)
+{
+ static struct {
+ const char *cipher;
+ const char *mode;
+ size_t key_size;
+ } bciphers[] = {
+ { "aes", "cbc", 16 },
+ { "serpent", "cbc", 16 },
+ { "twofish", "cbc", 16 },
+ { "aes", "cbc", 32 },
+ { "serpent", "cbc", 32 },
+ { "twofish", "cbc", 32 },
+ { "aes", "xts", 32 },
+ { "serpent", "xts", 32 },
+ { "twofish", "xts", 32 },
+ { "aes", "xts", 64 },
+ { "serpent", "xts", 64 },
+ { "twofish", "xts", 64 },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ static struct {
+ const char *type;
+ const char *hash;
+ } bkdfs[] = {
+ { CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, "sha1" },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, "sha256" },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, "sha512" },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, "ripemd160" },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, "whirlpool" },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I, NULL },
+ { CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID, NULL },
+ { NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ double enc_mbr = 0, dec_mbr = 0;
+ int key_size = (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) ?: DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS) / 8;
+ int skipped = 0, width;
+ char *c;
+ int i, r;
+
+ log_std(_("# Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).\n"));
+ if (set_pbkdf || ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID)) {
+ if (!set_pbkdf && ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID))
+ set_pbkdf = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+ r = action_benchmark_kdf(set_pbkdf, ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID), key_size);
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ if ((c = strchr(cipher_mode, '-')))
+ *c = '\0';
+
+ r = benchmark_cipher_loop(cipher, cipher_mode, key_size, &enc_mbr, &dec_mbr);
+ if (!r) {
+ width = strlen(cipher) + strlen(cipher_mode) + 1;
+ if (width < 11)
+ width = 11;
+ /* TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned. */
+ log_std(_("#%*s Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption\n"), width - 11, "");
+ log_std("%*s-%s %9db %10.1f MiB/s %10.1f MiB/s\n", width - (int)strlen(cipher_mode) - 1,
+ cipher, cipher_mode, key_size*8, enc_mbr, dec_mbr);
+ } else if (r < 0)
+ log_err(_("Cipher %s (with %i bits key) is not available."), ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID), key_size * 8);
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; bkdfs[i].type; i++) {
+ r = action_benchmark_kdf(bkdfs[i].type, bkdfs[i].hash, key_size);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r == -EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; bciphers[i].cipher; i++) {
+ r = benchmark_cipher_loop(bciphers[i].cipher, bciphers[i].mode,
+ bciphers[i].key_size, &enc_mbr, &dec_mbr);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -EINTR)
+ break;
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ skipped++;
+ if (i == 0)
+ /* TRANSLATORS: The string is header of a table and must be exactly (right side) aligned. */
+ log_std(_("# Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption\n"));
+
+ if (snprintf(cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s-%s",
+ bciphers[i].cipher, bciphers[i].mode) < 0)
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!r)
+ log_std("%15s %9zub %10.1f MiB/s %10.1f MiB/s\n",
+ cipher, bciphers[i].key_size*8, enc_mbr, dec_mbr);
+ else
+ log_std("%15s %9zub %17s %17s\n", cipher,
+ bciphers[i].key_size*8, _("N/A"), _("N/A"));
+ }
+ if (skipped && skipped == i)
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP) {
+ log_err(_("Required kernel crypto interface not available."));
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+ log_err( _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."));
+#endif
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_metadata_repair(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *password;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {
+ .flags = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REPAIR_NEEDED
+ };
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) &&
+ !yesDialog(_("Unprotected LUKS2 reencryption metadata detected. "
+ "Please verify the reencryption operation is desirable (see luksDump output)\n"
+ "and continue (upgrade metadata) only if you acknowledge the operation as genuine."),
+ _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to protect and upgrade reencryption metadata: "),
+ &password, &passwordLen, ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, password, passwordLen,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), NULL, NULL, &params);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = 0;
+
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int luks2_reencrypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ const char *msg;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {};
+
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri = crypt_reencrypt_status(cd, &params);
+
+ if (params.flags & CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REPAIR_NEEDED)
+ return reencrypt_metadata_repair(cd);
+
+ switch (ri) {
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE:
+ return 0;
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN:
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH:
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) &&
+ !yesDialog(_("Really proceed with LUKS2 reencryption recovery?"),
+ _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN)
+ msg = _("Enter passphrase to verify reencryption metadata digest: ");
+ else
+ msg = _("Enter passphrase for reencryption recovery: ");
+
+ r = tools_get_key(msg, &password, &passwordLen, ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, password, passwordLen,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), NULL, NULL,
+ &(struct crypt_params_reencrypt){ .flags = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RECOVERY });
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksRepair(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0],
+ action_argv[0])))
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_set_log_callback(cd, quiet_log, &log_parms);
+ r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL);
+ crypt_set_log_callback(cd, tool_log, &log_parms);
+ if (r == 0 && isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ /*
+ * LUKS2 triggers autorepair in crypt_load() above
+ * LUKS1 need to call crypt_repair() even if crypt_load() is ok
+ */
+ log_verbose(_("No known problems detected for LUKS header."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], PRB_FILTER_LUKS, NULL, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) &&
+ !yesDialog(_("Really try to repair LUKS device header?"),
+ _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ r = crypt_repair(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL);
+out:
+ /* Header is ok, check if reencryption metadata needs repair/recovery. */
+ if (!r && isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd)))
+ r = luks2_reencrypt_repair(cd);
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _wipe_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char tmp_name[64], tmp_path[128], tmp_uuid[40];
+ uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nWipe interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_std(_("Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+ "You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c "
+ "(rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"));
+
+ /* Activate the device a temporary one */
+ uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+ uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+ if (snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (snprintf(tmp_path, sizeof(tmp_path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), tmp_name) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, tmp_name, NULL, 0,
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Wipe the device */
+ set_int_handler(0);
+ r = crypt_wipe(cd, tmp_path, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 0, DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK,
+ 0, &tools_progress, &prog_parms);
+ if (crypt_deactivate(cd, tmp_name))
+ log_err(_("Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."), tmp_path);
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+out:
+ free(backing_file);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int strcmp_or_null(const char *str, const char *expected)
+{
+ return !str ? 0 : strcmp(str, expected);
+}
+
+int luksFormat(struct crypt_device **r_cd, char **r_password, size_t *r_passwordLen)
+{
+ int r = -EINVAL, keysize, integrity_keysize = 0, fd, created = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ const char *header_device, *type;
+ char *msg = NULL, *key = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ size_t passwordLen, signatures;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_luks1 params1 = {
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+ .data_alignment = ARG_UINT32(OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD_ID),
+ .data_device = ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) ? action_argv[0] : NULL,
+ };
+ struct crypt_params_luks2 params2 = {
+ .data_alignment = params1.data_alignment,
+ .data_device = params1.data_device,
+ .sector_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID),
+ .label = ARG_STR(OPT_LABEL_ID),
+ .subsystem = ARG_STR(OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ID)
+ };
+ void *params;
+
+ type = luksType(device_type);
+ if (!type)
+ type = crypt_get_default_type();
+
+ if (isLUKS2(type)) {
+ params = &params2;
+ } else if (isLUKS1(type)) {
+ params = &params1;
+
+ if (ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) > SECTOR_SIZE) {
+ log_err(_("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Integrity option can be used only for LUKS2 format."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Create header file (must contain at least one sector)? */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) && stat(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) &&
+ !yesDialog(_("Header file does not exist, do you want to create it?"),
+ _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ log_dbg("Creating header file.");
+ /* coverity[toctou] */
+ fd = open(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+ if (fd == -1 || posix_fallocate(fd, 0, 4096))
+ log_err(_("Cannot create header file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ else {
+ r = 0;
+ created = 1;
+ }
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ header_device = ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0];
+
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ?: DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1),
+ cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID), integrity, &integrity_keysize);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ params2.integrity = integrity;
+ /* FIXME: we use default integrity_params (set to NULL) */
+ }
+
+ /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher))
+ ARG_SET_TRUE(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID);
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, header_device))) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID))
+ log_err(_("Cannot use %s as on-disk header."), header_device);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_set_metadata_size(cd, ARG_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID), ARG_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Unsupported LUKS2 metadata size options."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_OFFSET_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_set_data_offset(cd, ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Print all present signatures in read-only mode */
+ r = tools_detect_signatures(header_device, PRB_FILTER_NONE, &signatures, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!created && !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."), header_device);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ keysize = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher_mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, integrity_keysize);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_RANDOM_ID))
+ crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_URANDOM_ID))
+ crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM);
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(1), !ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID), cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, type);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Signature candidates found */
+ if (signatures && ((r = tools_wipe_all_signatures(header_device, true, false)) < 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING_ID))
+ crypt_set_compatibility(cd, CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING);
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd, type, cipher, cipher_mode,
+ ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID), key, keysize, params);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ key, keysize,
+ password, passwordLen);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ (void) tools_wipe_all_signatures(header_device, true, false);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE_ID) &&
+ strcmp_or_null(params2.integrity, "none"))
+ r = _wipe_data_device(cd);
+out:
+ if (r >= 0 && r_cd && r_password && r_passwordLen) {
+ *r_cd = cd;
+ *r_password = password;
+ *r_passwordLen = passwordLen;
+ } else {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ }
+
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksFormat(void)
+{
+ return luksFormat(NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int action_open_luks(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ const char *data_device, *header_device, *activated_name;
+ char *key = NULL;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ int r, keysize, tries;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID)) {
+ activated_name = action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : action_argv[0];
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, activated_name, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+ } else {
+ header_device = uuid_or_device_header(&data_device);
+
+ activated_name = ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[1];
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, header_device, data_device)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ header_device);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!data_device && (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) < 8) && !ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Reduced data offset is allowed only for detached LUKS header."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (activated_name && !stat(crypt_get_device_name(cd), &st) && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) &&
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) >= ((uint64_t)st.st_size / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+ log_err(_("LUKS file container %s is too small for activation, there is no remaining space for data."),
+ crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (!keysize && !ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot determine volume key size for LUKS without keyslots, please use --key-size option."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (!keysize)
+ keysize = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8;
+
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name,
+ key, keysize, activate_flags);
+ } else {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, activated_name, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID),
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL, 0, NULL, activate_flags);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ tools_token_error_msg(r, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), false);
+
+ /* Token requires PIN. Ask if there is evident preference for tokens */
+ if (r == -ENOANO && (ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID)))
+ r = _try_token_pin_unlock(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), activated_name, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), activate_flags, set_tries_tty(), true);
+
+ if (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST || quit || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID))
+ goto out;
+
+ tries = set_tries_tty();
+ do {
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ } while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+ }
+out:
+ if (r >= 0 && ARG_SET(OPT_PERSISTENT_ID) &&
+ (crypt_get_active_device(cd, activated_name, &cad) ||
+ crypt_persistent_flags_set(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION, cad.flags & activate_flags)))
+ log_err(_("Device activated but cannot make flags persistent."));
+
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int verify_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int key_slot, crypt_keyslot_info ki,
+ char *msg_last, char *msg_pass, char *msg_fail,
+ const char *key_file, uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+ int keyfile_size)
+{
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ int i, max, r;
+
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST && !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !key_file &&
+ msg_last && !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(msg_last, msg_fail))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(msg_pass, &password, &passwordLen,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, key_file, ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+ /* check the last keyslot */
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, key_slot,
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ } else {
+ /* try all other keyslots */
+ r = crypt_keyslot_max(crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ max = r;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+ if (i == key_slot)
+ continue;
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE || ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, i,
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ if (r == i)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Handle inactive keyslots the same as bad password here */
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ r = -EPERM;
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksKillSlot(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ switch (ki) {
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST:
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND:
+ log_verbose(_("Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
+ log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ /* fall through */
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ r = verify_keyslot(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), ki,
+ _("This is the last keyslot. Device will become unusable after purging this key."),
+ _("Enter any remaining passphrase: "),
+ _("Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID));
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ if (r == -EPIPE && (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) || tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)))) {
+ log_dbg("Failed read from input, ignoring passphrase.");
+ r = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ tools_keyslot_msg(ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), REMOVED);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksRemoveKey(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to be deleted: "),
+ &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0,
+ cd);
+ if(r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ ARG_SET_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID, r);
+ log_verbose(_("Keyslot %d is selected for deletion."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST &&
+ !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) &&
+ !yesDialog(_("This is the last keyslot. "
+ "Device will become unusable after purging this key."),
+ _("Operation aborted, the keyslot was NOT wiped.\n"))) {
+ r = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ tools_keyslot_msg(ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), REMOVED);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int luksAddUnboundKey(void)
+{
+ int r = -EINVAL, keysize = 0;
+ char *key = NULL;
+ const char *new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+ char *password_new = NULL;
+ size_t password_new_size = 0;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS2 device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ ARG_SET_TRUE(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID);
+
+ keysize = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8;
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
+ &password_new, &password_new_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ new_key_file, ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(1), !ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID), cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), key, keysize,
+ password_new, password_new_size, CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _ask_for_pin(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int token_id, char **r_pin, size_t *r_pin_size,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc)
+{
+ int r;
+ char msg[64];
+
+ assert(r_pin);
+ assert(r_pin_size);
+ assert(kc);
+ assert(token_id >= 0 || token_id == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN);
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_context_get_type(kc) != CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (token_id == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+ r = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter token PIN: "));
+ else
+ r = snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter token %d PIN: "), token_id);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(msg))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(msg, r_pin, r_pin_size, 0, 0, NULL,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_set_pin(cd, *r_pin, *r_pin_size, kc);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(*r_pin);
+ *r_pin = NULL;
+ *r_pin_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int try_keyslot_add(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot_existing,
+ int keyslot_new,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc,
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *kc_new,
+ bool pin_provided,
+ bool new_pin_provided)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context(cd, keyslot_existing, kc, keyslot_new, kc_new, 0);
+ if (crypt_keyslot_context_get_type(kc) == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN)
+ tools_token_error_msg(crypt_keyslot_context_get_error(kc), ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID),
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), pin_provided);
+ if (crypt_keyslot_context_get_type(kc_new) == CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN)
+ tools_token_error_msg(crypt_keyslot_context_get_error(kc_new), NULL,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ID), new_pin_provided);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksAddKey(void)
+{
+ int keyslot_old, keyslot_new, keysize = 0, r = -EINVAL;
+ const char *new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+ char *key = NULL, *password = NULL, *password_new = NULL, *pin = NULL, *pin_new = NULL;
+ size_t pin_size, pin_size_new, password_size = 0, password_new_size = 0;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_keyslot_context *p_kc_new = NULL, *kc = NULL, *kc_new = NULL;
+
+ /* Unbound keyslot (no assigned data segment) is special case */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID))
+ return luksAddUnboundKey();
+
+ /* maintain backward compatibility of luksAddKey action positional parameter */
+ if (!new_key_file)
+ new_key_file = ARG_STR(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_ID);
+
+ keyslot_old = ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID);
+ keyslot_new = ARG_INT32(OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT_ID);
+
+ /*
+ * maintain backward compatibility of --key-slot/-S as 'new keyslot number'
+ * unless --new-key-slot is used.
+ */
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) {
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_std(_("WARNING: The --key-slot parameter is used for new keyslot number.\n"));
+ keyslot_old = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+ keyslot_new = ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ ARG_SET_TRUE(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID);
+
+ keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ if (!keysize && !ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot determine volume key size for LUKS without keyslots, please use --key-size option."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (!keysize)
+ keysize = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8;
+
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, keysize);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, key, keysize);
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ log_err(_("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_volume_key(cd, key, keysize, &kc);
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) && !tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)))
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_keyfile(cd,
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID),
+ &kc);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_token(cd,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID),
+ NULL, 0, NULL, &kc);
+ } else {
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter any existing passphrase: "),
+ &password, &password_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check password before asking for new one */
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ password, password_size, 0);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_passphrase(cd, password, password_size, &kc);
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (new_key_file && !tools_is_stdin(new_key_file)) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID) && !strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), new_key_file))
+ p_kc_new = kc;
+ else {
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_keyfile(cd,
+ new_key_file,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID),
+ &kc_new);
+ p_kc_new = kc_new;
+ }
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ID)) {
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ID) == ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID))
+ p_kc_new = kc;
+ else {
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_token(cd,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ID),
+ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, &kc_new);
+ p_kc_new = kc_new;
+ }
+ } else {
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase for key slot: "),
+ &password_new, &password_new_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), new_key_file,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(1), !ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID), cd);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_passphrase(cd, password_new, password_new_size, &kc_new);
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!p_kc_new)
+ p_kc_new = kc_new;
+
+ r = try_keyslot_add(cd, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, kc, p_kc_new, pin, pin_new);
+ if (r >= 0 || r != -ENOANO)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_context_get_error(kc) == -ENOANO) {
+ r = _ask_for_pin(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), &pin, &pin_size, kc);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = try_keyslot_add(cd, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, kc, p_kc_new, pin, pin_new);
+ if (r >= 0 || r != -ENOANO)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_context_get_error(p_kc_new) == -ENOANO) {
+ r = _ask_for_pin(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ID), &pin_new, &pin_size_new, p_kc_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = try_keyslot_add(cd, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, kc, p_kc_new, pin, pin_new);
+ }
+out:
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_free(kc);
+ crypt_keyslot_context_free(kc_new);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+ crypt_safe_free(pin);
+ crypt_safe_free(pin_new);
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksChangeKey(void)
+{
+ const char *new_key_file = (action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL, *password_new = NULL;
+ size_t password_size = 0, password_new_size = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ ARG_SET_TRUE(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID);
+
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to be changed: "),
+ &password, &password_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check password before asking for new one */
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, password_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter new passphrase: "),
+ &password_new, &password_new_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ new_key_file,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(1), !ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD_ID), cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, password_size, password_new, password_new_size);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(password_new);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksConvertKey(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t password_size = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS2 device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = _set_keyslot_encryption_params(cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase for keyslot to be converted: "),
+ &password, &password_size,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, password_size, password, password_size);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_isLuks(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* FIXME: argc > max should be checked for other operations as well */
+ if (action_argc > 1) {
+ log_err(_("Only one device argument for isLuks operation is supported."));
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_set_log_callback(cd, quiet_log, &log_parms);
+ r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksUUID(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ const char *existing_uuid = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, _("Operation aborted.\n"));
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UUID_ID))
+ r = crypt_set_uuid(cd, ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID));
+ else {
+ existing_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+ log_std("%s\n", existing_uuid ?: "");
+ r = existing_uuid ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int luksDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *vk = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen = 0;
+ size_t vk_size;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(
+ _("The header dump with volume key is sensitive information\n"
+ "that allows access to encrypted partition without a passphrase.\n"
+ "This dump should be stored encrypted in a safe place."),
+ NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ vk_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ vk = crypt_safe_alloc(vk_size);
+ if (!vk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
+ password, passwordLen);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_write_mk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), vk, vk_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_std("LUKS header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher name: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+ log_std("Cipher mode: \t%s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+ log_std("Payload offset:\t%d\n", (int)crypt_get_data_offset(cd));
+ log_std("UUID: \t%s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+ log_std("MK bits: \t%d\n", (int)vk_size * 8);
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_std("Key stored to file %s.\n", ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ log_std("MK dump:\t");
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, vk, vk_size, " ", 16, "\n\t\t");
+ log_std("\n");
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int luksDump_with_unbound_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ char *uk = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ size_t uk_size, passwordLen = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (ki != CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND) {
+ log_err(_("Keyslot %d does not contain unbound key."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(
+ _("The header dump with unbound key is sensitive information.\n"
+ "This dump should be stored encrypted in a safe place."),
+ NULL))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ uk_size = r;
+ uk = crypt_safe_alloc(uk_size);
+ if (!uk)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), uk, &uk_size,
+ password, passwordLen);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_write_mk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), uk, uk_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_std("LUKS header information for %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ log_std("UUID: \t%s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+ log_std("Keyslot: \t%d\n", ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ log_std("Key bits:\t%d\n", (int)uk_size * 8);
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_std("Key stored to file %s.\n", ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ log_std("Unbound Key:\t");
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, uk, uk_size, " ", 16, "\n\t\t");
+ log_std("\n");
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_safe_free(uk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksDump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY_ID))
+ r = luksDump_with_volume_key(cd);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID))
+ r = luksDump_with_unbound_key(cd);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_DUMP_JSON_ID))
+ r = crypt_dump_json(cd, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ r = crypt_dump(cd);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksSuspend(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID)));
+ if (!r) {
+ r = crypt_suspend(cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ log_err(_("%s is not active %s device name."), action_argv[0], "LUKS");
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksResume(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ int r, tries;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ const char *req_type = luksType(device_type);
+
+ if (req_type && !isLUKS(req_type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID)))))
+ return r;
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!isLUKS(crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ log_err(_("%s is not active LUKS device name or header is missing."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (req_type && strcmp(req_type, crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ log_err(_("%s is not active %s device name."), action_argv[0], req_type);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!(cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED)) {
+ log_err(_("Volume %s is not suspended."), action_argv[0]);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* try to resume LUKS2 device by token first */
+ r = crypt_resume_by_token_pin(cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID),
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL, 0, NULL);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ tools_token_error_msg(r, ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), false);
+
+ /* Token requires PIN. Ask if there is evident preference for tokens */
+ if (r == -ENOANO && (ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID)))
+ r = _try_token_pin_unlock(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE_ID), 0, set_tries_tty(), false);
+
+ if (r >= 0 || quit || ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY_ID))
+ goto out;
+
+ tries = set_tries_tty();
+ do {
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_resume_by_passphrase(cd, action_argv[0], ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ password, passwordLen);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ } while ((r == -EPERM || r == -ERANGE) && (--tries > 0));
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksBackup(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Option --header-backup-file is required."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_header_backup(cd, NULL, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE_ID));
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksRestore(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Option --header-backup-file is required."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ crypt_set_confirm_callback(cd, yesDialog, NULL);
+ r = crypt_header_restore(cd, NULL, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE_ID));
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static const char *_get_device_type(void)
+{
+ const char *type, *name = NULL;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ if (action_argc > 1)
+ name = action_argv[1];
+ else if (action_argc == 1)
+ name = action_argv[0];
+
+ if (crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, name, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ type = crypt_get_type(cd);
+ if (!type) {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ log_err(_("%s is not cryptsetup managed device."), name);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!strncmp(type, "LUKS", 4))
+ type = "luks";
+ else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_PLAIN))
+ type = "plain";
+ else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_LOOPAES))
+ type = "loopaes";
+ else {
+ log_err(_("Refresh is not supported for device type %s"), type);
+ type = NULL;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+
+ return type;
+}
+
+static int action_open(void)
+{
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID) && !device_type)
+ /* read device type from active mapping */
+ device_type = _get_device_type();
+
+ if (!device_type)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(device_type, "luks") ||
+ !strcmp(device_type, "luks1") ||
+ !strcmp(device_type, "luks2")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && (!ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID)))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_luks();
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "plain")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && !ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_plain();
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "loopaes")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && !ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_loopaes();
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "tcrypt")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && !ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_tcrypt();
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "bitlk")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && !ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_bitlk();
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "fvault2")) {
+ if (action_argc < 2 && !ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ goto out;
+ return action_open_fvault2();
+ } else
+ r = -ENOENT;
+out:
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(_("Unrecognized metadata device type %s."), device_type);
+ else
+ log_err(_("Command requires device and mapped name as arguments."));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksErase(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int i, max, r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, luksType(device_type), NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if(asprintf(&msg, _("This operation will erase all keyslots on device %s.\n"
+ "Device will become unusable after this operation."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL)) == -1) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted, keyslots were NOT wiped.\n"))) {
+ r = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Safety check */
+ max = crypt_keyslot_max(crypt_get_type(cd));
+ if (max <= 0) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE || ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+ r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(i, REMOVED);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ free(msg);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_luksConvert(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ const char *to_type, *from_type;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!strcmp(device_type, "luks2")) {
+ to_type = CRYPT_LUKS2;
+ } else if (!strcmp(device_type, "luks1")) {
+ to_type = CRYPT_LUKS1;
+ } else {
+ log_err(_("Invalid LUKS type, only luks1 and luks2 are supported."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ return r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL)) ||
+ !(from_type = crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(from_type, to_type)) {
+ log_err(_("Device is already %s type."), to_type);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ if (asprintf(&msg, _("This operation will convert %s to %s format.\n"),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL), to_type) == -1)
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ else if (!yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted, device was NOT converted.\n")))
+ r = -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ r = r ?: crypt_convert(cd, to_type, NULL);
+
+ free(msg);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _config_priority(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info cs;
+ crypt_keyslot_priority priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+ if (!strcmp("normal", ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID)))
+ priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+ else if (!strcmp("prefer", ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID)))
+ priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER;
+ else if (!strcmp("ignore", ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID)))
+ priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE;
+
+ cs = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (cs != CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+ return crypt_keyslot_set_priority(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), priority);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int _config_labels(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ return crypt_set_label(cd, ARG_STR(OPT_LABEL_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ID));
+}
+
+static int action_luksConfig(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_PRIORITY_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_LABEL_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Option --priority, --label or --subsystem is missing."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device_header(NULL))))
+ return r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS2 device."),
+ uuid_or_device_header(NULL));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PRIORITY_ID) && (r = _config_priority(cd)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((ARG_SET(OPT_LABEL_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ID)) && (r = _config_labels(cd)))
+ goto out;
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _token_add(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r, token;
+ crypt_token_info token_info;
+ const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring params = {
+ .key_description = ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_DESCRIPTION_ID)
+ };
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+ token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL);
+ if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (token_info > CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE && !ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d in use."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), &params);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to add luks2-keyring token %d."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ token = r;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID))
+ return token;
+
+ r = crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, token, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."), token, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ (void) crypt_token_json_set(cd, token, NULL);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return token;
+}
+
+static int _token_remove(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ crypt_token_info token_info;
+
+ token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL);
+ if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (token_info == CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d is not in use."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return crypt_token_json_set(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL);
+}
+
+static int _token_import(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char *json;
+ size_t json_length;
+ crypt_token_info token_info;
+ int r, token;
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+ token_info = crypt_token_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), NULL);
+ if (token_info < CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d is invalid."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (token_info > CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE && !ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Token %d in use."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Keyslot %d is not active."), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_read_json_file(ARG_STR(OPT_JSON_FILE_ID), &json, &json_length, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_token_json_set(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), json);
+ free(json);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to import token from file."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ token = r;
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ r = crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, token, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to assign token %d to keyslot %d."), token, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ (void) crypt_token_json_set(cd, token, NULL);
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return token;
+}
+
+static int _token_export(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ const char *json;
+ int r;
+
+ r = crypt_token_json_get(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), &json);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to get token %d for export."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return tools_write_json_file(ARG_STR(OPT_JSON_FILE_ID), json);
+}
+
+static int _token_unassign(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r = crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(_("Token %d is not assigned to keyslot %d."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ else
+ log_err(_("Failed to unassign token %d from keyslot %d."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(_("Failed to unassign token %d from keyslot %d."), ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_token(void)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[1]))))
+ return r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL))) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS2 device."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[1]));
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "add")) {
+ r = _token_add(cd); /* adds only luks2-keyring type */
+ tools_token_msg(r, CREATED);
+ } else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "remove")) {
+ r = _token_remove(cd);
+ tools_token_msg(r, REMOVED);
+ } else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "import")) {
+ r = _token_import(cd);
+ tools_token_msg(r, CREATED);
+ } else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "export"))
+ r = _token_export(cd);
+ else if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "unassign"))
+ r = _token_unassign(cd);
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_reencrypt(void)
+{
+ return reencrypt(action_argc, action_argv);
+}
+
+static const char *verify_tcryptdump(void)
+{
+ if ((ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_ID)) && (!device_type || strcmp(device_type, "tcrypt")))
+ return _("Option --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system or --tcrypt-backup is supported only for TCRYPT device.");
+
+ if ((ARG_SET(OPT_VERACRYPT_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ID)) && (!device_type || strcmp(device_type, "tcrypt")))
+ return _("Option --veracrypt or --disable-veracrypt is supported only for TCRYPT device type.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ID))
+ return _("Option --veracrypt-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERACRYPT_QUERY_PIM_ID)) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ID))
+ return _("Option --veracrypt-query-pim is supported only for VeraCrypt compatible devices.");
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ID))
+ return _("The options --veracrypt-pim and --veracrypt-query-pim are mutually exclusive.");
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char * verify_open(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERSISTENT_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ return _("Option --persistent is not allowed with --test-passphrase.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ return _("Options --refresh and --test-passphrase are mutually exclusive.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SHARED_ID) && strcmp_or_null(device_type, "plain"))
+ return _("Option --shared is allowed only for open of plain device.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SKIP_ID) && strcmp_or_null(device_type, "plain") && strcmp(device_type, "loopaes"))
+ return _("Option --skip is supported only for open of plain and loopaes devices.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_OFFSET_ID) && strcmp_or_null(device_type, "plain") && strcmp(device_type, "loopaes"))
+ return _("Option --offset with open action is only supported for plain and loopaes devices.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ID))
+ return _("Option --tcrypt-hidden cannot be combined with --allow-discards.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) &&
+ (!device_type || strcmp(device_type, "plain")))
+ return _("Sector size option with open action is supported only for plain devices.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS_ID) && (!device_type || strcmp(device_type, "plain") ||
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) <= SECTOR_SIZE))
+ return _("Large IV sectors option is supported only for opening plain type device with sector size larger than 512 bytes.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) && (!device_type ||
+ (strncmp(device_type, "luks", 4) && strcmp(device_type, "tcrypt") &&
+ strcmp(device_type, "bitlk") && strcmp(device_type, "fvault2"))))
+ return _("Option --test-passphrase is allowed only for open of LUKS, TCRYPT, BITLK and FVAULT2 devices.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_SIZE_ID))
+ return _("Options --device-size and --size cannot be combined.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID) && device_type && strncmp(device_type, "luks", 4))
+ return _("Option --unbound is allowed only for open of luks device.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ return _("Option --unbound cannot be used without --test-passphrase.");
+
+ /* "open --type tcrypt" and "tcryptDump" checks are identical */
+ return verify_tcryptdump();
+}
+
+static const char *verify_close(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ return _("Options --cancel-deferred and --deferred cannot be used at the same time.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_resize(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_SIZE_ID))
+ return _("Options --device-size and --size cannot be combined.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_reencrypt(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ return _("Options --reduce-device-size and --data-size cannot be combined.");
+
+ if (isLUKS1(luksType(device_type)) && ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID))
+ return _("Option --active-name can be set only for LUKS2 device.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID))
+ return _("Options --active-name and --force-offline-reencrypt cannot be combined.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_config(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PRIORITY_ID) && ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ return _("Keyslot specification is required.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_format(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_OFFSET_ID))
+ return _("Options --align-payload and --offset cannot be combined.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID))
+ return _("Option --integrity-no-wipe can be used only for format action with integrity extension.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_RANDOM_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_USE_URANDOM_ID))
+ return _("Only one of --use-[u]random options is allowed.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_addkey(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID) && !ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ return _("Key size is required with --unbound option.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_luksDump(void)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID) && ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ return _("Keyslot specification is required.");
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *verify_token(void)
+{
+ if (strcmp(action_argv[0], "add") &&
+ strcmp(action_argv[0], "remove") &&
+ strcmp(action_argv[0], "import") &&
+ strcmp(action_argv[0], "export") &&
+ strcmp(action_argv[0], "unassign"))
+ return _("Invalid token action.");
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_DESCRIPTION_ID) && !strcmp(action_argv[0], "add"))
+ return _("--key-description parameter is mandatory for token add action.");
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN &&
+ (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "remove") || !strcmp(action_argv[0], "export")))
+ return _("Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID)) {
+ if (strcmp(action_argv[0], "add"))
+ return _("Option --unbound is valid only with token add action.");
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID))
+ return _("Options --key-slot and --unbound cannot be combined.");
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(action_argv[0], "unassign")) {
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID))
+ return _("Action requires specific keyslot. Use --key-slot parameter.");
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_TOKEN_ID_ID))
+ return _("Action requires specific token. Use --token-id parameter.");
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+ const char *type;
+ int (*handler)(void);
+ const char *(*verify)(void);
+ int required_action_argc;
+ const char *arg_desc;
+ const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+ { OPEN_ACTION, action_open, verify_open, 1, N_("<device> [--type <type>] [<name>]"),N_("open device as <name>") },
+ { CLOSE_ACTION, action_close, verify_close, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("close device (remove mapping)") },
+ { RESIZE_ACTION, action_resize, verify_resize, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("resize active device") },
+ { STATUS_ACTION, action_status, NULL, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("show device status") },
+ { BENCHMARK_ACTION, action_benchmark, NULL, 0, N_("[--cipher <cipher>]"), N_("benchmark cipher") },
+ { REPAIR_ACTION, action_luksRepair, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("try to repair on-disk metadata") },
+ { REENCRYPT_ACTION, action_reencrypt, verify_reencrypt, 0, N_("<device>"), N_("reencrypt LUKS2 device") },
+ { ERASE_ACTION, action_luksErase, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("erase all keyslots (remove encryption key)") },
+ { CONVERT_ACTION, action_luksConvert, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("convert LUKS from/to LUKS2 format") },
+ { CONFIG_ACTION, action_luksConfig, verify_config, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("set permanent configuration options for LUKS2") },
+ { FORMAT_ACTION, action_luksFormat, verify_format, 1, N_("<device> [<new key file>]"), N_("formats a LUKS device") },
+ { ADDKEY_ACTION, action_luksAddKey, verify_addkey, 1, N_("<device> [<new key file>]"), N_("add key to LUKS device") },
+ { REMOVEKEY_ACTION, action_luksRemoveKey, NULL, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("removes supplied key or key file from LUKS device") },
+ { CHANGEKEY_ACTION, action_luksChangeKey, NULL, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("changes supplied key or key file of LUKS device") },
+ { CONVERTKEY_ACTION, action_luksConvertKey, NULL, 1, N_("<device> [<key file>]"), N_("converts a key to new pbkdf parameters") },
+ { KILLKEY_ACTION, action_luksKillSlot, NULL, 2, N_("<device> <key slot>"), N_("wipes key with number <key slot> from LUKS device") },
+ { UUID_ACTION, action_luksUUID, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("print UUID of LUKS device") },
+ { ISLUKS_ACTION, action_isLuks, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("tests <device> for LUKS partition header") },
+ { LUKSDUMP_ACTION, action_luksDump, verify_luksDump, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump LUKS partition information") },
+ { TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION, action_tcryptDump, verify_tcryptdump, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump TCRYPT device information") },
+ { BITLKDUMP_ACTION, action_bitlkDump, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump BITLK device information") },
+ { FVAULT2DUMP_ACTION, action_fvault2Dump, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("dump FVAULT2 device information") },
+ { SUSPEND_ACTION, action_luksSuspend, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Suspend LUKS device and wipe key (all IOs are frozen)") },
+ { RESUME_ACTION, action_luksResume, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Resume suspended LUKS device") },
+ { HEADERBACKUP_ACTION, action_luksBackup, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Backup LUKS device header and keyslots") },
+ { HEADERRESTORE_ACTION, action_luksRestore, NULL, 1, N_("<device>"), N_("Restore LUKS device header and keyslots") },
+ { TOKEN_ACTION, action_token, verify_token, 2, N_("<add|remove|import|export> <device>"), N_("Manipulate LUKS2 tokens") },
+ {}
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ const char *path;
+
+ if (key->shortName == '?') {
+ struct action_type *action;
+ const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_luks1, *pbkdf_luks2;
+
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_NAME, true);
+ poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<action> is one of:\n"));
+
+ for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "You can also use old <action> syntax aliases:\n"
+ "\topen: create (plainOpen), luksOpen, loopaesOpen, tcryptOpen, bitlkOpen, fvault2Open\n"
+ "\tclose: remove (plainClose), luksClose, loopaesClose, tcryptClose, bitlkClose, fvault2Close\n"));
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+ "<device> is the encrypted device\n"
+ "<key slot> is the LUKS key slot number to modify\n"
+ "<key file> optional key file for the new key for luksAddKey action\n"),
+ crypt_get_dir());
+
+ log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in metadata format is %s (for luksFormat action).\n"),
+ crypt_get_default_type());
+
+ path = crypt_token_external_path();
+ if (path) {
+ log_std(_("\nLUKS2 external token plugin support is %s.\n"), _("compiled-in"));
+ log_std(_("LUKS2 external token plugin path: %s.\n"), path);
+ } else
+ log_std(_("\nLUKS2 external token plugin support is %s.\n"), _("disabled"));
+
+ pbkdf_luks1 = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ pbkdf_luks2 = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in key and passphrase parameters:\n"
+ "\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB, "
+ "Maximum interactive passphrase length %d (characters)\n"
+ "Default PBKDF for LUKS1: %s, iteration time: %d (ms)\n"
+ "Default PBKDF for LUKS2: %s\n"
+ "\tIteration time: %d, Memory required: %dkB, Parallel threads: %d\n"),
+ DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB, DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX,
+ pbkdf_luks1->type, pbkdf_luks1->time_ms,
+ pbkdf_luks2->type, pbkdf_luks2->time_ms, pbkdf_luks2->max_memory_kb,
+ pbkdf_luks2->parallel_threads);
+
+ log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in device cipher parameters:\n"
+ "\tloop-AES: %s, Key %d bits\n"
+ "\tplain: %s, Key: %d bits, Password hashing: %s\n"
+ "\tLUKS: %s, Key: %d bits, LUKS header hashing: %s, RNG: %s\n"),
+ DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER, DEFAULT_LOOPAES_KEYBITS,
+ DEFAULT_CIPHER(PLAIN), DEFAULT_PLAIN_KEYBITS, DEFAULT_PLAIN_HASH,
+ DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1), DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
+ DEFAULT_RNG);
+#if defined(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE) && DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS != 512
+ log_std(_("\tLUKS: Default keysize with XTS mode (two internal keys) will be doubled.\n"));
+#endif
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else if (key->shortName == 'V') {
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_NAME, true);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static void help_args(struct action_type *action, poptContext popt_context)
+{
+ char buf[128];
+
+ if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), _("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc) < 0)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf, poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+ set_int_handler(0);
+ r = action->handler();
+
+ /* Some functions returns keyslot # */
+ if (r > 0)
+ r = 0;
+ check_signal(&r);
+
+ show_status(r);
+ return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+static const char *verify_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+ log_dbg("Verifying parameters for command %s.", action->type);
+
+ return action->verify ? action->verify() : NULL;
+}
+
+static bool needs_size_conversion(unsigned arg_id)
+{
+ return (arg_id == OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID || arg_id == OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID ||
+ arg_id == OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID || arg_id == OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID ||
+ arg_id == OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID);
+}
+
+static void check_key_slot_value(poptContext popt_context)
+{
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) < 0)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Key slot is invalid."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+}
+
+static void basic_options_cb(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg,
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ tools_parse_arg_value(popt_context, tool_core_args[key->val].type, tool_core_args + key->val, arg, key->val, needs_size_conversion);
+
+ /* special cases additional handling */
+ switch (key->val) {
+ case OPT_DEBUG_JSON_ID:
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_DEBUG_ID:
+ log_parms.debug = true;
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_VERBOSE_ID:
+ log_parms.verbose = true;
+ break;
+ case OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) == 0)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ if (ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) % SECTOR_SIZE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Device size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ case OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) == 0)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Invalid max reencryption hotzone size specification."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEY_FILE_ID:
+ if (tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID))) {
+ free(keyfile_stdin);
+ keyfile_stdin = strdup(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID));
+ } else if (keyfiles_count < MAX_KEYFILES)
+ keyfiles[keyfiles_count++] = strdup(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID));
+ total_keyfiles++;
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) % 8)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID:
+ check_key_slot_value(popt_context);
+ break;
+ case OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID) == 0)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ if (ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID) % 8)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Key size must be a multiple of 8 bits"),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ case OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT64(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) > 1024 * 1024 * 1024)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Maximum device reduce size is 1 GiB."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ if (ARG_UINT64(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) % SECTOR_SIZE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Reduce size must be multiple of 512 bytes sector."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ data_shift = -(int64_t)ARG_UINT64(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID);
+ break;
+ case OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) < SECTOR_SIZE ||
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+ (ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) & (ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) - 1)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Unsupported encryption sector size."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ case OPT_PRIORITY_ID:
+ if (strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID), "normal") &&
+ strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID), "prefer") &&
+ strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_PRIORITY_ID), "ignore"))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Option --priority can be only ignore/normal/prefer."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void cryptsetup_init_arg_aliases(void)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args); i++)
+ if (tool_core_args[i].type == CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS)
+ ARG_INIT_ALIAS(i);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "help", '?', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+ { "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"), NULL },
+ { "version",'V', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_basic_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, basic_options_cb, 0, NULL, NULL },
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, B, C, NULL, A ## _ID, D, E },
+#include "cryptsetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_basic_options, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ poptContext popt_context;
+ struct action_type *action;
+ const char *aname, *error_message;
+ int r;
+
+ /* initialize aliases */
+ cryptsetup_init_arg_aliases();
+
+ crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, &log_parms);
+
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+ bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+ popt_context = poptGetContext(PACKAGE, argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+ poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+ _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+ while ((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) > 0) {}
+
+ if (r < -1)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+ poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+ if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ action_argc = 0;
+ action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+ /* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+ if(!action_argv)
+ action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+ /* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+ while(action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+ action_argc++;
+
+ /* Handle aliases */
+ if (!strcmp(aname, "create")) {
+ /* create command had historically switched arguments */
+ if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+ const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+ action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+ action_argv[1] = tmp;
+ }
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "plain";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "plainOpen")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "plain";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksOpen")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "luks";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "loopaesOpen")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "loopaes";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "tcryptOpen")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "tcrypt";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "bitlkOpen")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "bitlk";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "fvault2Open")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ device_type = "fvault2";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "tcryptDump")) {
+ device_type = "tcrypt";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "bitlkDump")) {
+ device_type = "bitlk";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "fvault2Dump")) {
+ device_type = "fvault2";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "plainClose") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "luksClose") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "loopaesClose") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "tcryptClose") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "bitlkClose") ||
+ !strcmp(aname, "fvault2Close")) {
+ aname = CLOSE_ACTION;
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksErase")) {
+ aname = ERASE_ACTION;
+ device_type = "luks";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "luksConfig")) {
+ aname = CONFIG_ACTION;
+ device_type = "luks2";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "refresh")) {
+ aname = OPEN_ACTION;
+ ARG_SET_TRUE(OPT_REFRESH_ID);
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_TYPE_ID))
+ device_type = ARG_STR(OPT_TYPE_ID);
+
+ /* ignore user supplied type and query device type instead */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_REFRESH_ID))
+ device_type = NULL;
+
+ for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (!action->type)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc)
+ help_args(action, popt_context);
+
+ /* this routine short circuits to exit() on error */
+ tools_check_args(action->type, tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args), popt_context);
+
+ if (!strcmp(aname, KILLKEY_ACTION) && action_argc > 1) {
+ ARG_SET_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID, atoi(action_argv[1]));
+ check_key_slot_value(popt_context);
+ }
+
+ if ((!strcmp(aname, REMOVEKEY_ACTION) ||
+ !strcmp(aname, FORMAT_ACTION)) &&
+ action_argc > 1) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID))
+ log_err(_("Option --key-file takes precedence over specified key file argument."));
+ else
+ ARG_SET_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID, strdup(action_argv[1]));
+ }
+
+ if (total_keyfiles > 1 && (strcmp_or_null(device_type, "tcrypt")))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Only one --key-file argument is allowed."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PBKDF_ID) && crypt_parse_pbkdf(ARG_STR(OPT_PBKDF_ID), &set_pbkdf))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) can be only pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_ITER_TIME_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("PBKDF forced iterations cannot be combined with iteration time option."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_JSON_ID)) {
+ crypt_set_debug_level(ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_JSON_ID)? CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON : CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL);
+ dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+ }
+
+ /* reencrypt action specific check */
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ID) != ARG_SET(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Options --keyslot-cipher and --keyslot-key-size must be used together."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ error_message = verify_action(action);
+ if (error_message)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, error_message, poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_ARGS_ID)) {
+ log_std(_("No action taken. Invoked with --test-args option.\n"));
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_KEYRING_ID))
+ (void) crypt_volume_key_keyring(NULL, 0);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS_ID))
+ (void) crypt_token_external_disable();
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DISABLE_LOCKS_ID) && crypt_metadata_locking(NULL, 0)) {
+ log_std(_("Cannot disable metadata locking."));
+ r = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+ r = run_action(action);
+ }
+
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.h b/src/cryptsetup.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..011a669
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CRYPTSETUP_H
+#define CRYPTSETUP_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <popt.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#include "lib/nls.h"
+#include "lib/bitops.h"
+#include "lib/utils_crypt.h"
+#include "lib/utils_loop.h"
+#include "lib/utils_io.h"
+#include "lib/utils_blkid.h"
+#include "lib/libcryptsetup_macros.h"
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER(type) (DEFAULT_##type##_CIPHER "-" DEFAULT_##type##_MODE)
+
+#define DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK 1048576 /* 1 MiB */
+#define MAX_ACTIONS 16
+
+/* Common tools */
+void tool_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)));
+void quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+
+int yesDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+int noDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+void show_status(int errcode);
+const char *uuid_or_device(const char *spec);
+__attribute__ ((noreturn)) \
+void usage(poptContext popt_context, int exitcode, const char *error, const char *more);
+void dbg_version_and_cmd(int argc, const char **argv);
+int translate_errno(int r);
+
+typedef enum { CREATED, UNLOCKED, REMOVED } crypt_object_op;
+void tools_keyslot_msg(int keyslot, crypt_object_op op);
+void tools_token_msg(int token, crypt_object_op op);
+void tools_token_error_msg(int error, const char *type, int token, bool pin_provided);
+void tools_package_version(const char *name, bool use_pwlibs);
+
+extern volatile int quit;
+void set_int_block(int block);
+void set_int_handler(int block);
+void check_signal(int *r);
+int tools_signals_blocked(void);
+
+int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
+ char **key, size_t *key_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max,
+ const char *key_file,
+ int timeout, int verify, int pwquality,
+ struct crypt_device *cd);
+void tools_passphrase_msg(int r);
+int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file);
+int tools_string_to_size(const char *s, uint64_t *size);
+
+struct tools_progress_params {
+ uint32_t frequency;
+ struct timeval start_time;
+ struct timeval end_time;
+ uint64_t start_offset;
+ bool batch_mode;
+ bool json_output;
+ const char *interrupt_message;
+ const char *device;
+};
+
+int tools_progress(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr);
+const char *tools_get_device_name(const char *device, char **r_backing_file);
+
+int tools_read_vk(const char *file, char **key, int keysize);
+int tools_write_mk(const char *file, const char *key, int keysize);
+
+int tools_read_json_file(const char *file, char **json, size_t *json_size, bool batch_mode);
+int tools_write_json_file(const char *file, const char *json);
+
+typedef enum {
+ PRB_FILTER_NONE = 0,
+ PRB_FILTER_LUKS,
+ PRB_ONLY_LUKS
+} tools_probe_filter_info;
+
+int tools_detect_signatures(const char *device, tools_probe_filter_info filter, size_t *count, bool batch_mode);
+int tools_wipe_all_signatures(const char *path, bool exclusive, bool only_luks);
+int tools_superblock_block_size(const char *device, char *sb_name,
+ size_t sb_name_len, unsigned *r_block_size);
+bool tools_blkid_supported(void);
+
+int tools_lookup_crypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type,
+ const char *data_device_path, char **r_name);
+
+
+/* each utility is required to implement it */
+void tools_cleanup(void);
+
+/* Log */
+#define log_dbg(x...) crypt_logf(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, x)
+#define log_std(x...) crypt_logf(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, x)
+#define log_verbose(x...) crypt_logf(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, x)
+#define log_err(x...) crypt_logf(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, x)
+
+typedef enum {
+ CRYPT_ARG_BOOL = 0,
+ CRYPT_ARG_STRING,
+ CRYPT_ARG_INT32,
+ CRYPT_ARG_UINT32,
+ CRYPT_ARG_INT64,
+ CRYPT_ARG_UINT64,
+ CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS
+} crypt_arg_type_info;
+
+struct tools_arg {
+ const char *name;
+ bool set;
+ crypt_arg_type_info type;
+ union {
+ char *str_value;
+ uint64_t u64_value;
+ uint32_t u32_value;
+ int32_t i32_value;
+ int64_t i64_value;
+ union {
+ unsigned id;
+ struct tools_arg *ptr;
+ } o;
+ } u;
+ const char *actions_array[MAX_ACTIONS];
+};
+
+void tools_parse_arg_value(poptContext popt_context, crypt_arg_type_info type, struct tools_arg *arg, const char *popt_arg, int popt_val, bool(*needs_size_conv_fn)(unsigned arg_id));
+
+void tools_args_free(struct tools_arg *args, size_t args_count);
+
+void tools_check_args(const char *action, const struct tools_arg *args, size_t args_size, poptContext popt_context);
+
+struct tools_log_params {
+ bool verbose;
+ bool debug;
+};
+
+#endif /* CRYPTSETUP_H */
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup_arg_list.h b/src/cryptsetup_arg_list.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7e5bb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup_arg_list.h
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/*
+ * Cryptsetup command line arguments list
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+/* long name, short name, popt type, help description, units, internal argument type, default value, allowed actions (empty=global) */
+
+ARG(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Override device autodetection of dm device to be reencrypted"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Align payload at <n> sector boundaries - for luksFormat"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_BATCH_MODE, 'q', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not ask for confirmation"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Cancel a previously set deferred device removal"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_CIPHER, 'c', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The cipher used to encrypt the disk (see /proc/crypto)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEBUG, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEBUG_JSON, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Show debug messages including JSON metadata"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_DECRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Decrypt LUKS2 device (remove encryption)."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DISABLE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable loading of external LUKS2 token plugins"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DISABLE_KEYRING, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable loading volume keys via kernel keyring"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DISABLE_LOCKS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable locking of on-disk metadata"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not scan for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_DUMP_JSON, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Dump info in JSON format (LUKS2 only)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Dump volume key instead of keyslots info"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_ENCRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Encrypt LUKS2 device (in-place encryption)."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable password quality check (if enabled)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Force offline LUKS2 reencryption and bypass active device detection."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_HASH, 'h', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The hash used to create the encryption key from the passphrase"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HEADER, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Device or file with separated LUKS header"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("File with LUKS header and keyslots backup"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Maximal reencryption hotzone size."), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INIT_ONLY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Initialize LUKS2 reencryption in metadata only."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY, 'I', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Data integrity algorithm (LUKS2 only)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_INTEGRITY_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING,'\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inefficient legacy padding (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_JOURNAL, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable journal for integrity device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not wipe device after format"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_ITER_TIME, 'i', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("PBKDF iteration time for LUKS (in ms)"), N_("msecs"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_ITER_TIME_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use IV counted in sector size (not in 512 bytes)"), NULL , CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_JSON_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read or write the json from or to a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_KEEP_KEY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not change volume key."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_KEEP_KEY_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_KEY_DESCRIPTION, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Key description"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_KEY_FILE, 'd', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_KEY_SIZE, 's', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the encryption key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_KEY_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_KEY_SLOT, 'S', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Slot number for new key (default is first free)"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_INT32, { .i32_value = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT }, OPT_KEY_SLOT_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Number of bytes to skip in keyfile"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE, 'l', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Limits the read from keyfile"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("LUKS2 keyslot: The cipher used for keyslot encryption"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("LUKS2 keyslot: The size of the encryption key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_LABEL, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Set label for the LUKS2 device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_LABEL_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("LUKS2 header keyslots area size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("LUKS2 header metadata area size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Use the volume key from file."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the key for a new slot from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Slot number for new key (default is first free)"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_INT32, { .i32_value = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT }, OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET , '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Number of bytes to skip in newly added keyfile"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Limits the read from newly added keyfile"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Token number (default: any)"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_INT32, { .i32_value = CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN }, OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_OFFSET, 'o', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The start offset in the backend device"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_OFFSET_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PBKDF, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("PBKDF algorithm (for LUKS2): argon2i, argon2id, pbkdf2"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_PBKDF_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("PBKDF iterations cost (forced, disables benchmark)"), "LONG", CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PBKDF_MEMORY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("PBKDF memory cost limit"), N_("kilobytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = DEFAULT_LUKS2_MEMORY_KB }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PBKDF_PARALLEL, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("PBKDF parallel cost"), N_("threads"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = DEFAULT_LUKS2_PARALLEL_THREADS }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PERF_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Bypass dm-crypt workqueue and process read requests synchronously"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PERF_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Bypass dm-crypt workqueue and process write requests synchronously"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PERF_SAME_CPU_CRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use dm-crypt same_cpu_crypt performance compatibility option"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PERF_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use dm-crypt submit_from_crypt_cpus performance compatibility option"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PERSISTENT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Set activation flags persistent for device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_PERSISTENT_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PRIORITY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Keyslot priority: ignore, normal, prefer"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_PRIORITY_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Print progress data in json format (suitable for machine processing)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Progress line update (in seconds)"), N_("secs"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_READONLY, 'r', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Create a readonly mapping"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Reduce data device size (move data offset). DANGEROUS!"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_REFRESH, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Refresh (reactivate) device with new parameters"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_REFRESH_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_RESILIENCE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Reencryption hotzone resilience type (checksum,journal,none)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Reencryption hotzone checksums hash"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_RESUME_ONLY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Resume initialized LUKS2 reencryption only."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Encryption sector size (default: 512 bytes)"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use global lock to serialize memory hard PBKDF (OOM workaround)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SHARED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Share device with another non-overlapping crypt segment"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_SHARED_ACTIONS )
+
+ARG(OPT_SIZE, 'b', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the device"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SKIP, 'p', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_SKIP_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SUBSYSTEM, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Set subsystem label for the LUKS2 device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use backup (secondary) TCRYPT header"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use hidden header (hidden TCRYPT device)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Device is system TCRYPT drive (with bootloader)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TEST_ARGS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not run action, just validate all command line parameters"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not activate device, just check passphrase"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TIMEOUT, 't', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Timeout for interactive passphrase prompt (in seconds)"), N_("secs"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TOKEN_ID, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Token number (default: any)"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_INT32, { .i32_value = CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TOKEN_ONLY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not ask for passphrase if activation by token fails"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Replace the current token"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TOKEN_TYPE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Restrict allowed token types used to retrieve LUKS2 key"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TRIES, 'T', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("How often the input of the passphrase can be retried"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = 3 }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_TYPE, 'M', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Type of device metadata: luks, luks1, luks2, plain, loopaes, tcrypt, bitlk"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_UNBOUND, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Create or dump unbound LUKS2 keyslot (unassigned to data segment) or LUKS2 token (unassigned to keyslot)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_UNBOUND_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_USE_RANDOM, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use /dev/random for generating volume key"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_USE_RANDOM_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_USE_URANDOM, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use /dev/urandom for generating volume key"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_USE_URANDOM_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_UUID, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("UUID for device to use"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_UUID_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_VERACRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Scan also for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_VERACRYPT_QUERY_PIM, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Query Personal Iteration Multiplier for VeraCrypt compatible device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_VERBOSE, 'v', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_VERIFY_PASSPHRASE, 'y', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Verifies the passphrase by asking for it twice"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+/* added for reencryption */
+
+ARG(OPT_BLOCK_SIZE, 'B', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Reencryption block size"), N_("MiB"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = 4 }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_NEW, 'N', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Create new header on not encrypted device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS, { .o.id = OPT_ENCRYPT_ID }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_USE_DIRECTIO, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use direct-io when accessing devices"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_USE_FSYNC, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use fsync after each block"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_WRITE_LOG, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Update log file after every block"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+/* aliases */
+
+ARG(OPT_DUMP_MASTER_KEY, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Alias for --dump-volume-key"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS, { .o.id = OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY_ID}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_MASTER_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Alias for --dump-volume-key-file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS, { .o.id = OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID}, {})
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup_args.h b/src/cryptsetup_args.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63604a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup_args.h
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CRYPTSETUP_ARGS_H
+#define CRYPTSETUP_ARGS_H
+
+#include "utils_arg_names.h"
+#include "utils_arg_macros.h"
+
+#define BITLKDUMP_ACTION "bitlkDump"
+#define BENCHMARK_ACTION "benchmark"
+#define CLOSE_ACTION "close"
+#define CONFIG_ACTION "config"
+#define CONVERT_ACTION "convert"
+#define ERASE_ACTION "erase"
+#define FVAULT2DUMP_ACTION "fvault2Dump"
+#define ISLUKS_ACTION "isLuks"
+#define ADDKEY_ACTION "luksAddKey"
+#define CHANGEKEY_ACTION "luksChangeKey"
+#define CONVERTKEY_ACTION "luksConvertKey"
+#define LUKSDUMP_ACTION "luksDump"
+#define FORMAT_ACTION "luksFormat"
+#define HEADERBACKUP_ACTION "luksHeaderBackup"
+#define HEADERRESTORE_ACTION "luksHeaderRestore"
+#define KILLKEY_ACTION "luksKillSlot"
+#define REMOVEKEY_ACTION "luksRemoveKey"
+#define RESUME_ACTION "luksResume"
+#define SUSPEND_ACTION "luksSuspend"
+#define UUID_ACTION "luksUUID"
+#define OPEN_ACTION "open"
+#define REENCRYPT_ACTION "reencrypt"
+#define REPAIR_ACTION "repair"
+#define RESIZE_ACTION "resize"
+#define STATUS_ACTION "status"
+#define TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION "tcryptDump"
+#define TOKEN_ACTION "token"
+
+/* avoid unshielded commas in ARG() macros later */
+#define OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS { CLOSE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, RESIZE_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+#define OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ACTIONS { REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ACTIONS { REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_ITER_TIME_ACTIONS { BENCHMARK_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION, CHANGEKEY_ACTION, CONVERTKEY_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_KEEP_KEY_ACTIONS { REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_KEY_SIZE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, BENCHMARK_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_KEY_SLOT_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION, CONFIG_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION, CHANGEKEY_ACTION, CONVERTKEY_ACTION, LUKSDUMP_ACTION, TOKEN_ACTION, RESUME_ACTION }
+#define OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION, CHANGEKEY_ACTION, CONVERTKEY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE_ACTIONS OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER_ACTIONS
+#define OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_ACTIONS { ADDKEY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT_ACTIONS { ADDKEY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID_ACTIONS { ADDKEY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_LABEL_ACTIONS { CONFIG_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ACTIONS { REENCRYPT_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ACTIONS { REENCRYPT_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_OFFSET_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PBKDF_ACTIONS { BENCHMARK_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION, CHANGEKEY_ACTION, CONVERTKEY_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, ADDKEY_ACTION, CHANGEKEY_ACTION, CONVERTKEY_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PERSISTENT_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PRIORITY_ACTIONS { CONFIG_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_REFRESH_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SHARED_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SIZE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, RESIZE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SKIP_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SUBSYSTEM_ACTIONS { CONFIG_ACTION, FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE_ACTIONS { TOKEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_UNBOUND_ACTIONS { ADDKEY_ACTION, LUKSDUMP_ACTION, OPEN_ACTION, TOKEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_USE_RANDOM_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_USE_URANDOM_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_UUID_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, UUID_ACTION, REENCRYPT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+#define OPT_VERACRYPT_QUERY_PIM_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION, TCRYPTDUMP_ACTION }
+
+enum {
+OPT_UNUSED_ID = 0, /* leave unused due to popt library */
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) A ## _ID,
+#include "cryptsetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+extern struct tools_arg tool_core_args[];
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/integritysetup.c b/src/integritysetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eee6171
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/integritysetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+/*
+ * integritysetup - setup integrity protected volumes for dm-integrity
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#define DEFAULT_ALG_NAME "crc32c"
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "integritysetup_args.h"
+
+#define PACKAGE_INTEGRITY "integritysetup"
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+static struct tools_log_params log_parms;
+
+void tools_cleanup(void)
+{
+ tools_args_free(tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args));
+}
+
+static int _read_keys(char **integrity_key, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+ char *int_key = NULL, *journal_integrity_key = NULL, *journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (integrity_key && ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID), &int_key, ARG_UINT32(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ params->integrity_key_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID);
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID), &journal_integrity_key, ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(int_key);
+ return r;
+ }
+ params->journal_integrity_key = journal_integrity_key;
+ params->journal_integrity_key_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID);
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE_ID), &journal_crypt_key, ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE_ID));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(int_key);
+ crypt_safe_free(journal_integrity_key);
+ return r;
+ }
+ params->journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+ params->journal_crypt_key_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE_ID);
+ }
+
+ if (integrity_key)
+ *integrity_key = int_key;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _wipe_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity_key)
+{
+ char tmp_name[64], tmp_path[128], tmp_uuid[40];
+ uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nWipe interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_std(_("Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+ "You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c "
+ "(rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"));
+
+ /* Activate the device a temporary one */
+ uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+ uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+ if (snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (snprintf(tmp_path, sizeof(tmp_path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), tmp_name) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, tmp_name, integrity_key,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID), CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Wipe the device */
+ set_int_handler(0);
+ r = crypt_wipe(cd, tmp_path, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0, 0, DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK,
+ 0, &tools_progress, &prog_parms);
+ if (crypt_deactivate(cd, tmp_name))
+ log_err(_("Cannot deactivate temporary device %s."), tmp_path);
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+out:
+ free(backing_file);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_format(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {
+ .journal_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ID),
+ .interleave_sectors = ARG_UINT32(OPT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS_ID),
+ /* in bitmap mode we have to overload these values... */
+ .journal_watermark = ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_BITMAP_SECTORS_PER_BIT_ID) : ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK_ID),
+ .journal_commit_time = ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_BITMAP_FLUSH_TIME_ID) : ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME_ID),
+ .buffer_sectors = ARG_UINT32(OPT_BUFFER_SECTORS_ID),
+ .tag_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_TAG_SIZE_ID),
+ .sector_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID),
+ }, params2;
+ char integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_crypt[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ char *integrity_key = NULL, *msg = NULL;
+ int r;
+ size_t signatures;
+
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID), integrity);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ params.integrity = integrity;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_ID), journal_integrity);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID), journal_crypt);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+ }
+
+ r = _read_keys(&integrity_key, &params);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_DATA_DEVICE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DATA_DEVICE_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_NO_WIPE_ID))
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("This will overwrite data on %s and %s irrevocably.\n"
+ "To preserve data device use --no-wipe option (and then activate with --integrity-recalculate)."),
+ action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_DATA_DEVICE_ID));
+ else
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("This will overwrite data on %s irrevocably."), action_argv[0]);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_detect_signatures(action_argv[0], PRB_FILTER_NONE, &signatures, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Signature candidates found */
+ if (signatures && ((r = tools_wipe_all_signatures(action_argv[0], true, false)) < 0))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING_ID))
+ crypt_set_compatibility(cd, CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_HMAC_ID))
+ crypt_set_compatibility(cd, CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params);
+ if (r < 0) /* FIXME: call wipe signatures again */
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &params2))
+ log_std(_("Formatted with tag size %u, internal integrity %s.\n"),
+ params2.tag_size, params2.integrity);
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_NO_WIPE_ID))
+ r = _wipe_data_device(cd, integrity_key);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(integrity_key);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_integrity_key);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_resize(void)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ uint64_t new_dev_size = 0;
+ uint64_t old_dev_size;
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nWipe interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ new_dev_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_SIZE_ID))
+ new_dev_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_SIZE_ID);
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], NULL);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ old_dev_size = cad.size;
+
+ r = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_resize(cd, action_argv[0], new_dev_size);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!new_dev_size) {
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ new_dev_size = cad.size;
+ }
+
+ if (new_dev_size > old_dev_size) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_WIPE_ID)) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_dbg("Wiping the end of the resized device");
+ else
+ log_std(_("Wiping device to initialize integrity checksum.\n"
+ "You can interrupt this by pressing CTRL+c "
+ "(rest of not wiped device will contain invalid checksum).\n"));
+
+ set_int_handler(0);
+ r = crypt_wipe(cd, path, CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, old_dev_size * SECTOR_SIZE,
+ (new_dev_size - old_dev_size) * SECTOR_SIZE, DEFAULT_WIPE_BLOCK,
+ 0, &tools_progress, &prog_parms);
+ set_int_block(0);
+ } else {
+ log_dbg("Setting recalculate flag");
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, action_argv[0], NULL, 0, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE);
+
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(_("Setting recalculate flag is not supported, you may consider using --wipe instead."));
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ if (backing_file)
+ free(backing_file);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {
+ /* in bitmap mode we have to overload these values... */
+ .journal_watermark = ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_BITMAP_SECTORS_PER_BIT_ID) : ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK_ID),
+ .journal_commit_time = ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_BITMAP_FLUSH_TIME_ID) : ARG_UINT32(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME_ID),
+ .buffer_sectors = ARG_UINT32(OPT_BUFFER_SECTORS_ID),
+ };
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ char integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_integrity[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], journal_crypt[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ char *integrity_key = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_INTEGRITY_ID), integrity);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ params.integrity = integrity;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_ID), journal_integrity);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+
+ }
+ params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID), journal_crypt);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known integrity specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+ params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_JOURNAL_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECOVERY_MODE_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_RECALC_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_RESET_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE_RESET;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+ r = _read_keys(&integrity_key, &params);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, action_argv[0], ARG_STR(OPT_DATA_DEVICE_ID))))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid INTEGRITY device."), action_argv[0]);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_RECALC_ID))
+ crypt_set_compatibility(cd, CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC);
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, action_argv[1], integrity_key,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID), activate_flags);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(integrity_key);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_integrity_key);
+ crypt_safe_free(CONST_CAST(void*)params.journal_crypt_key);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_close(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, action_argv[0], flags);
+
+ if (!r && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID)) {
+ ci = crypt_status(cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (ci == CRYPT_ACTIVE || ci == CRYPT_BUSY)
+ log_std(_("Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"),
+ action_argv[0]);
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(void)
+{
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity ip = {};
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char *backing_file;
+ const char *device, *metadata_device;
+ int path = 0, r = 0;
+
+ /* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+ if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/'))
+ path = 1;
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+ switch (ci) {
+ case CRYPT_INVALID:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" type: %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd) ?: "n/a");
+
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Print only INTEGRITY (and LUKS2 with integrity) info */
+ r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" tag size: %u\n", ip.tag_size);
+ log_std(" integrity: %s\n", ip.integrity ?: "(none)");
+ device = crypt_get_device_name(cd);
+ metadata_device = crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd);
+ log_std(" device: %s%s\n", device, metadata_device ? " (detached)" : "");
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(device))) {
+ log_std(" loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ if (metadata_device) {
+ log_std(" metadata device: %s\n", metadata_device);
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(metadata_device))) {
+ log_std(" loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ }
+ log_std(" sector size: %u bytes\n", crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+ log_std(" interleave sectors: %u\n", ip.interleave_sectors);
+ log_std(" size: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+ log_std(" mode: %s%s\n",
+ cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ? "readonly" : "read/write",
+ cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY ? " recovery" : "");
+ log_std(" failures: %" PRIu64 "\n",
+ crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(cd, action_argv[0]));
+ if (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) {
+ log_std(" bitmap 512-byte sectors per bit: %u\n", ip.journal_watermark);
+ log_std(" bitmap flush interval: %u ms\n", ip.journal_commit_time);
+ } if (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL) {
+ log_std(" journal: not active\n");
+ } else {
+ log_std(" journal size: %" PRIu64 " bytes\n", ip.journal_size);
+ log_std(" journal watermark: %u%%\n", ip.journal_watermark);
+ log_std(" journal commit time: %u ms\n", ip.journal_commit_time);
+ if (ip.journal_integrity)
+ log_std(" journal integrity MAC: %s\n", ip.journal_integrity);
+ if (ip.journal_crypt)
+ log_std(" journal encryption: %s\n", ip.journal_crypt);
+ }
+ if (cad.flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS))
+ log_std(" flags: %s\n",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? "discards " : "");
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ r = 0;
+ return r;
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int action_dump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &params);
+ if (!r)
+ crypt_dump(cd);
+ else
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid INTEGRITY device."), action_argv[0]);
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+ const char *type;
+ int (*handler)(void);
+ int required_action_argc;
+ const char *arg_desc;
+ const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+ { FORMAT_ACTION,action_format, 1, N_("<integrity_device>"),N_("format device") },
+ { OPEN_ACTION, action_open, 2, N_("<integrity_device> <name>"),N_("open device as <name>") },
+ { CLOSE_ACTION, action_close, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("close device (remove mapping)") },
+ { STATUS_ACTION,action_status, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("show active device status") },
+ { DUMP_ACTION, action_dump, 1, N_("<integrity_device>"),N_("show on-disk information") },
+ { RESIZE_ACTION,action_resize, 1, N_("<name>"), N_("resize active device") },
+ {}
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ struct action_type *action;
+
+ if (key->shortName == '?') {
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_INTEGRITY, false);
+ poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<action> is one of:\n"));
+ for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+ "<integrity_device> is the device containing data with integrity tags\n"),
+ crypt_get_dir());
+
+ log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in dm-integrity parameters:\n"
+ "\tChecksum algorithm: %s\n"
+ "\tMaximum keyfile size: %dkB\n"),
+ DEFAULT_ALG_NAME, DEFAULT_INTEGRITY_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else if (key->shortName == 'V') {
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_INTEGRITY, false);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+ r = action->handler();
+
+ show_status(r);
+ return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+static bool needs_size_conversion(unsigned int arg_id)
+{
+ return (arg_id == OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ID || arg_id == OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID);
+}
+
+static void basic_options_cb(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg,
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ char msg[256];
+
+ tools_parse_arg_value(popt_context, tool_core_args[key->val].type, tool_core_args + key->val, arg, key->val, needs_size_conversion);
+
+ /* special cases additional handling */
+ switch (key->val) {
+ case OPT_DEBUG_ID:
+ log_parms.debug = true;
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_VERBOSE_ID:
+ log_parms.verbose = true;
+ break;
+ case OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID:
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID:
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE_ID:
+ if (ARG_UINT32(key->val) > (DEFAULT_INTEGRITY_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024)) {
+ if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Invalid --%s size. Maximum is %u bytes."),
+ key->longName, DEFAULT_INTEGRITY_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024) < 0)
+ msg[0] = '\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, msg,
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL};
+ static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "help", '?', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+ { "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"), NULL },
+ { "version",'V', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_basic_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, basic_options_cb, 0, NULL, NULL },
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, B, C, NULL, A ## _ID, D, E },
+#include "integritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_basic_options, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ poptContext popt_context;
+ struct action_type *action;
+ const char *aname;
+ int r;
+
+ crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, &log_parms);
+
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+ bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+ popt_context = poptGetContext("integrity", argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+ poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+ _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+
+ while ((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) >= 0) {
+ }
+
+ if (r < -1)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+ poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+ if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ action_argc = 0;
+ action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+ /* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+ if (!action_argv)
+ action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+ /* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+ while (action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+ action_argc++;
+
+ /* Handle aliases */
+ if (!strcmp(aname, "create") && action_argc > 1) {
+ /* create command had historically switched arguments */
+ if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+ const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+ action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+ action_argv[1] = tmp;
+ }
+ aname = "open";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove")) {
+ aname = "close";
+ }
+
+ for (action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (!action->type)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc) {
+ char buf[128];
+ if (snprintf(buf, 128,_("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc) < 0)
+ buf[0] ='\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf,
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ }
+
+ tools_check_args(action->type, tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args), popt_context);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID) != ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both key file and key size options must be specified."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID) != ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both journal integrity key file and key size options must be specified."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Journal integrity algorithm must be specified if journal integrity key is used."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE_ID) != ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Both journal encryption key file and key size options must be specified."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Journal encryption algorithm must be specified if journal encryption key is used."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECOVERY_MODE_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Recovery and bitmap mode options are mutually exclusive."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) &&
+ (ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME_ID)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Journal options cannot be used in bitmap mode."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE_ID) &&
+ (ARG_SET(OPT_BITMAP_FLUSH_TIME_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_BITMAP_SECTORS_PER_BIT_ID)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Bitmap options can be used only in bitmap mode."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Options --cancel-deferred and --deferred cannot be used at the same time."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_ID)) {
+ crypt_set_debug_level(CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL);
+ dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+ }
+
+ r = run_action(action);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/integritysetup_arg_list.h b/src/integritysetup_arg_list.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39f2906
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/integritysetup_arg_list.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Integritysetup command line arguments list
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+/* long name, short name, popt type, help description, units, internal argument type, default value */
+
+ARG(OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Allow discards (aka TRIM) requests for device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_BATCH_MODE, 'q', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not ask for confirmation"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_BUFFER_SECTORS, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Buffers size"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_BITMAP_FLUSH_TIME, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Bitmap mode flush time"), N_("ms"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_BITMAP_SECTORS_PER_BIT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Number of 512-byte sectors per bit (bitmap mode)."), "INT", CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Cancel a previously set deferred device removal"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_DATA_DEVICE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Path to data device (if separated)"), N_("path"), CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEBUG, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY, 'I', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Data integrity algorithm"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, { .str_value = CONST_CAST(void *)DEFAULT_ALG_NAME }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inefficient legacy padding (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_HMAC, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not protect superblock with HMAC (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_RECALC, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_JOURNAL, 'D', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Disable journal for integrity device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Interleave sectors"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal commit time"), N_("ms"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal integrity algorithm"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal encryption algorithm"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal encryption key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING,{}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE, 'j', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal watermark"), N_("percent"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_NO_WIPE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not wipe device after format"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_NO_WIPE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_WIPE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Wipe the end of the device after resize"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_WIPE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Progress line update (in seconds)"), N_("secs"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Print wipe progress data in json format (suitable for machine processing)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE, 'B', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use bitmap to track changes and disable journal for integrity device"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Recalculate initial tags automatically."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_RESET, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Reset automatic recalculate position."), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_RECOVERY_MODE, 'R', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE, 's', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Sector size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = 512 }, OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_TAG_SIZE, 't', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Tag size (per-sector)"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, OPT_TAG_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_VERBOSE, 'v', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Use only specified device size (ignore rest of device). DANGEROUS!"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SIZE, 'b', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the device"), N_("SECTORS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_SIZE_ACTIONS)
diff --git a/src/integritysetup_args.h b/src/integritysetup_args.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8241008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/integritysetup_args.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INTEGRITYSETUP_ARGS_H
+#define INTEGRITYSETUP_ARGS_H
+
+#include "utils_arg_names.h"
+#include "utils_arg_macros.h"
+
+#define FORMAT_ACTION "format"
+#define OPEN_ACTION "open"
+#define CLOSE_ACTION "close"
+#define STATUS_ACTION "status"
+#define DUMP_ACTION "dump"
+#define RESIZE_ACTION "resize"
+
+#define OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS { CLOSE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_NO_WIPE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, RESIZE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_TAG_SIZE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION }
+#define OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ACTIONS { RESIZE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_SIZE_ACTIONS { RESIZE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_WIPE_ACTIONS { RESIZE_ACTION }
+
+enum {
+OPT_UNUSED_ID = 0,
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) A ## _ID,
+#include "integritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+static struct tools_arg tool_core_args[] = { { NULL, false, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL }, // UNUSED
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, false, F, G, H },
+#include "integritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/utils_arg_macros.h b/src/utils_arg_macros.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..901b3f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_arg_macros.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments parsing helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef UTILS_ARG_MACROS_H
+#define UTILS_ARG_MACROS_H
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define ARG_SET(X) !!tool_core_args[(X)].set
+
+#define ARG_STR(X) ({ \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_STRING); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.str_value; \
+})
+
+#define ARG_INT32(X) ({ \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_INT32); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.i32_value; \
+})
+
+#define ARG_UINT32(X) ({ \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_UINT32); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.u32_value; \
+})
+
+#define ARG_INT64(X) ({ \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_INT64); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.i64_value; \
+})
+
+#define ARG_UINT64(X) ({ \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_UINT64); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.u64_value; \
+})
+
+#define ARG_SET_TRUE(X) do { \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ARG_SET_STR(X, Y) \
+do { \
+ char *str; \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].set == false && tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_STRING); \
+ str = (Y); \
+ assert(str != NULL); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.str_value = str; \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ARG_SET_INT32(X, Y) \
+do { \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].set == false && tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_INT32); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.i32_value = (Y); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ARG_SET_UINT32(X, Y) \
+do { \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].set == false && tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_UINT32); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.u32_value = (Y); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ARG_SET_INT64(X, Y) \
+do { \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].set == false && tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_INT64); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.i64_value = (Y); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ARG_SET_UINT64(X, Y) \
+do { \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].set == false && tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_UINT64); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.u64_value = (Y); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].set = true; \
+} while (0)
+
+
+#define ARG_INIT_ALIAS(X) \
+do { \
+ assert(tool_core_args[(X)].type == CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS); \
+ tool_core_args[(X)].u.o.ptr = &tool_core_args[tool_core_args[(X)].u.o.id]; \
+} while (0)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/utils_arg_names.h b/src/utils_arg_names.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66a59e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_arg_names.h
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments name list
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef UTILS_ARG_NAMES_H
+#define UTILS_ARG_NAMES_H
+
+#define OPT_ACTIVE_NAME "active-name"
+#define OPT_ALIGN_PAYLOAD "align-payload"
+#define OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS "allow-discards"
+#define OPT_BATCH_MODE "batch-mode"
+#define OPT_BITMAP_FLUSH_TIME "bitmap-flush-time"
+#define OPT_BITMAP_SECTORS_PER_BIT "bitmap-sectors-per-bit"
+#define OPT_BLOCK_SIZE "block-size"
+#define OPT_BUFFER_SECTORS "buffer-sectors"
+#define OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED "cancel-deferred"
+#define OPT_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE "check-at-most-once"
+#define OPT_CIPHER "cipher"
+#define OPT_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE "data-block-size"
+#define OPT_DATA_BLOCKS "data-blocks"
+#define OPT_DATA_DEVICE "data-device"
+#define OPT_DEBUG "debug"
+#define OPT_DEBUG_JSON "debug-json"
+#define OPT_DEFERRED "deferred"
+#define OPT_DEVICE_SIZE "device-size"
+#define OPT_DECRYPT "decrypt"
+#define OPT_DISABLE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS "disable-external-tokens"
+#define OPT_DISABLE_KEYRING "disable-keyring"
+#define OPT_DISABLE_LOCKS "disable-locks"
+#define OPT_DISABLE_VERACRYPT "disable-veracrypt"
+#define OPT_DUMP_JSON "dump-json-metadata"
+#define OPT_DUMP_MASTER_KEY "dump-master-key"
+#define OPT_DUMP_VOLUME_KEY "dump-volume-key"
+#define OPT_ENCRYPT "encrypt"
+#define OPT_FEC_DEVICE "fec-device"
+#define OPT_FEC_OFFSET "fec-offset"
+#define OPT_FEC_ROOTS "fec-roots"
+#define OPT_FORCE_PASSWORD "force-password"
+#define OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT "force-offline-reencrypt"
+#define OPT_FORMAT "format"
+#define OPT_HASH "hash"
+#define OPT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE "hash-block-size"
+#define OPT_HASH_OFFSET "hash-offset"
+#define OPT_HEADER "header"
+#define OPT_HEADER_BACKUP_FILE "header-backup-file"
+#define OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE "hotzone-size"
+#define OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION "ignore-corruption"
+#define OPT_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS "ignore-zero-blocks"
+#define OPT_INIT_ONLY "init-only"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY "integrity"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_MODE "integrity-bitmap-mode"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE "integrity-key-file"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE "integrity-key-size"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING "integrity-legacy-padding"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_HMAC "integrity-legacy-hmac"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_RECALC "integrity-legacy-recalculate"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_JOURNAL "integrity-no-journal"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_WIPE "integrity-no-wipe"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE "integrity-recalculate"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_RECALCULATE_RESET "integrity-recalculate-reset"
+#define OPT_INTEGRITY_RECOVERY_MODE "integrity-recovery-mode"
+#define OPT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS "interleave-sectors"
+#define OPT_ITER_TIME "iter-time"
+#define OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS "iv-large-sectors"
+#define OPT_JSON_FILE "json-file"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME "journal-commit-time"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT "journal-crypt"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE "journal-crypt-key-file"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE "journal-crypt-key-size"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY "journal-integrity"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE "journal-integrity-key-file"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE "journal-integrity-key-size"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE "journal-size"
+#define OPT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK "journal-watermark"
+#define OPT_KEEP_KEY "keep-key"
+#define OPT_KEY_DESCRIPTION "key-description"
+#define OPT_KEY_FILE "key-file"
+#define OPT_KEY_SIZE "key-size"
+#define OPT_KEY_SLOT "key-slot"
+#define OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET "keyfile-offset"
+#define OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE "keyfile-size"
+#define OPT_KEYSLOT_CIPHER "keyslot-cipher"
+#define OPT_KEYSLOT_KEY_SIZE "keyslot-key-size"
+#define OPT_NO_SUPERBLOCK "no-superblock"
+#define OPT_NO_WIPE "no-wipe"
+#define OPT_WIPE "wipe"
+#define OPT_LABEL "label"
+#define OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE "luks2-keyslots-size"
+#define OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE "luks2-metadata-size"
+#define OPT_MASTER_KEY_FILE "master-key-file"
+#define OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE "volume-key-file"
+#define OPT_NEW "new"
+#define OPT_NEW_KEY_SLOT "new-key-slot"
+#define OPT_NEW_KEYFILE "new-keyfile"
+#define OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_OFFSET "new-keyfile-offset"
+#define OPT_NEW_KEYFILE_SIZE "new-keyfile-size"
+#define OPT_NEW_TOKEN_ID "new-token-id"
+#define OPT_OFFSET "offset"
+#define OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION "panic-on-corruption"
+#define OPT_PBKDF "pbkdf"
+#define OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS "pbkdf-force-iterations"
+#define OPT_PBKDF_MEMORY "pbkdf-memory"
+#define OPT_PBKDF_PARALLEL "pbkdf-parallel"
+#define OPT_PERF_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE "perf-no_read_workqueue"
+#define OPT_PERF_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE "perf-no_write_workqueue"
+#define OPT_PERF_SAME_CPU_CRYPT "perf-same_cpu_crypt"
+#define OPT_PERF_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS "perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus"
+#define OPT_PERSISTENT "persistent"
+#define OPT_PLUGIN "plugin"
+#define OPT_PRIORITY "priority"
+#define OPT_PROGRESS_JSON "progress-json"
+#define OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY "progress-frequency"
+#define OPT_READONLY "readonly"
+#define OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE "reduce-device-size"
+#define OPT_REFRESH "refresh"
+#define OPT_RESILIENCE "resilience"
+#define OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH "resilience-hash"
+#define OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION "restart-on-corruption"
+#define OPT_RESUME_ONLY "resume-only"
+#define OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE "root-hash-file"
+#define OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE "root-hash-signature"
+#define OPT_SALT "salt"
+#define OPT_SECTOR_SIZE "sector-size"
+#define OPT_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF "serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf"
+#define OPT_SHARED "shared"
+#define OPT_SIZE "size"
+#define OPT_SKIP "skip"
+#define OPT_SUBSYSTEM "subsystem"
+#define OPT_TAG_SIZE "tag-size"
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP "tcrypt-backup"
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN "tcrypt-hidden"
+#define OPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM "tcrypt-system"
+#define OPT_TEST_ARGS "test-args"
+#define OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE "test-passphrase"
+#define OPT_TIMEOUT "timeout"
+#define OPT_TOKEN_ID "token-id"
+#define OPT_TOKEN_ONLY "token-only"
+#define OPT_TOKEN_REPLACE "token-replace"
+#define OPT_TOKEN_TYPE "token-type"
+#define OPT_TRIES "tries"
+#define OPT_TYPE "type"
+#define OPT_UNBOUND "unbound"
+#define OPT_USE_DIRECTIO "use-directio"
+#define OPT_USE_FSYNC "use-fsync"
+#define OPT_USE_RANDOM "use-random"
+#define OPT_USE_URANDOM "use-urandom"
+#define OPT_USE_TASKLETS "use-tasklets"
+#define OPT_UUID "uuid"
+#define OPT_VERACRYPT "veracrypt"
+#define OPT_VERACRYPT_PIM "veracrypt-pim"
+#define OPT_VERACRYPT_QUERY_PIM "veracrypt-query-pim"
+#define OPT_VERBOSE "verbose"
+#define OPT_VERIFY_PASSPHRASE "verify-passphrase"
+#define OPT_WRITE_LOG "write-log"
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/utils_args.c b/src/utils_args.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fda2350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_args.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments parsing helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+
+void tools_parse_arg_value(poptContext popt_context, crypt_arg_type_info type, struct tools_arg *arg, const char *popt_arg, int popt_val, bool(*needs_size_conv_fn)(unsigned arg_id))
+{
+ char *end, msg[128];
+ long long int ll;
+ long long unsigned int ull;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case CRYPT_ARG_BOOL:
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_STRING:
+ if (arg->set)
+ free(arg->u.str_value);
+ arg->u.str_value = poptGetOptArg(popt_context);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_INT32:
+ ll = strtoll(popt_arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*end || !*popt_arg || ll > INT32_MAX || ll < INT32_MIN || errno == ERANGE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ arg->u.i32_value = (int32_t)ll;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_UINT32:
+ ull = strtoull(popt_arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*end || !*popt_arg || ull > UINT32_MAX || errno == ERANGE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ arg->u.u32_value = (uint32_t)ull;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_INT64:
+ ll = strtoll(popt_arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*end || !*popt_arg || errno == ERANGE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ arg->u.i64_value = ll;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_UINT64:
+ /* special size strings with units converted to integers */
+ if (needs_size_conv_fn && needs_size_conv_fn(popt_val)) {
+ if (tools_string_to_size(popt_arg, &arg->u.u64_value)) {
+ if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Invalid size specification in parameter --%s."), arg->name) < 0)
+ msg[0] = '\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, msg,
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ }
+ } else {
+ ull = strtoull(popt_arg, &end, 10);
+ if (*end || !*popt_arg || errno == ERANGE)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(POPT_ERROR_BADNUMBER),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ arg->u.u64_value = ull;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ARG_ALIAS:
+ tools_parse_arg_value(popt_context, arg->u.o.ptr->type, arg->u.o.ptr, popt_arg, arg->u.o.id, needs_size_conv_fn);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* this signals internal tools coding mistake */
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ arg->set = true;
+}
+
+void tools_args_free(struct tools_arg *args, size_t args_size)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < args_size; i++) {
+ if (args[i].set && args[i].type == CRYPT_ARG_STRING)
+ free(args[i].u.str_value);
+ args[i].set = false;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool action_allowed(const char *action, const char * const* list, size_t list_size)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (!list[0])
+ return true;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < list_size && list[i]; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(action, list[i]))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+void tools_check_args(const char *action, const struct tools_arg *args, size_t args_size, poptContext popt_context)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ char msg[256];
+
+ for (i = 1; i < args_size; i++) {
+ if (args[i].set) {
+ if (action_allowed(action, args[i].actions_array, MAX_ACTIONS)) {
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Option --%s is not allowed with %s action."), args[i].name, action) < 0)
+ msg[0] = '\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, msg, poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_blockdev.c b/src/utils_blockdev.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae6dec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_blockdev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/*
+ * Linux block devices helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <dirent.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#define UUID_LEN 37 /* 36 + \0, libuuid ... */
+
+static int dm_prepare_uuid(const char *type, const char *uuid, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ char *ptr, uuid2[UUID_LEN] = {0};
+ uuid_t uu;
+ unsigned i = 0;
+
+ /* Remove '-' chars */
+ if (uuid) {
+ if (uuid_parse(uuid, uu) < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Requested UUID %s has invalid format.", uuid);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (ptr = uuid2, i = 0; i < UUID_LEN; i++)
+ if (uuid[i] != '-') {
+ *ptr = uuid[i];
+ ptr++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (snprintf(buf, buflen, DM_UUID_PREFIX "%s%s%s%s",
+ type ?: "", type ? "-" : "",
+ uuid2[0] ? uuid2 : "", uuid2[0] ? "-" : "") < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* return number of holders in general, if matched dm_uuid prefix it's returned via dm_name */
+/* negative value is error */
+static int lookup_holder_dm_name(const char *dm_uuid, dev_t devno, char **r_dm_name)
+{
+ struct dirent *entry;
+ char dm_subpath[PATH_MAX], data_dev_dir[PATH_MAX], uuid[DM_UUID_LEN], dm_name[PATH_MAX] = {};
+ ssize_t s;
+ struct stat st;
+ int dmfd, fd, len, r = 0; /* not found */
+ DIR *dir;
+
+ if (!r_dm_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = snprintf(data_dev_dir, PATH_MAX, "/sys/dev/block/%u:%u/holders", major(devno), minor(devno));
+ if (len < 0 || len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(dir = opendir(data_dev_dir)))
+ /* map ENOTDIR to ENOENT we'll handle both errors same */
+ return errno == ENOTDIR ? -ENOENT : -errno;
+
+ while (r != 1 && (entry = readdir(dir))) {
+ if (entry->d_name[0] == '.' ||
+ !strncmp(entry->d_name, "..", 2))
+ continue;
+
+ /* there's a holder */
+ r++;
+
+ /* we already have a dm_name, just count remaining holders */
+ if (*dm_name != '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ len = snprintf(dm_subpath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", entry->d_name, "dm");
+ if (len < 0 || len >= PATH_MAX) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* looking for dm-X/dm directory, symlinks are fine */
+ dmfd = openat(dirfd(dir), dm_subpath, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
+ if (dmfd < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ fd = openat(dmfd, "uuid", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ close(dmfd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ close(fd);
+ close(dmfd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* reads binary data */
+ s = read_buffer(fd, uuid, sizeof(uuid) - 1);
+ close(fd);
+ uuid[s > 0 ? s : 0] = '\0';
+ if (!strncmp(uuid, dm_uuid, strlen(dm_uuid)))
+ log_dbg("Found candidate device %s", entry->d_name);
+ else {
+ close(dmfd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ fd = openat(dmfd, "name", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ close(dmfd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ close(fd);
+ close(dmfd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* reads binary data */
+ s = read_buffer(fd, dm_name, sizeof(dm_name));
+ close(fd);
+ close(dmfd);
+ if (s > 1) {
+ dm_name[s-1] = '\0';
+ log_dbg("Found dm device %s", dm_name);
+ if (!(*r_dm_name = strdup(dm_name)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ closedir(dir);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int tools_lookup_crypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type,
+ const char *data_device_path, char **r_name)
+{
+ char *c;
+ struct stat st;
+ char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN] = DM_BY_ID_PREFIX;
+
+ if (!dm_prepare_uuid(type, crypt_get_uuid(cd), dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ c = strrchr(dev_uuid, '-');
+ if (!c)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* cut of dm name */
+ *c = '\0';
+
+ log_dbg("Looking for any dm device with prefix: %s", dev_uuid);
+
+ if (stat(data_device_path, &st) < 0)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+
+ return lookup_holder_dm_name(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, st.st_rdev, r_name);
+}
+
+static void report_partition(const char *value, const char *device, bool batch_mode)
+{
+ if (batch_mode)
+ log_dbg("Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.", device, value);
+ else
+ log_std(_("WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' partition signature.\n"), device, value);
+}
+
+static void report_superblock(const char *value, const char *device, bool batch_mode)
+{
+ if (batch_mode)
+ log_dbg("Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.", device, value);
+ else
+ log_std(_("WARNING: Device %s already contains a '%s' superblock signature.\n"), device, value);
+}
+
+int tools_detect_signatures(const char *device, tools_probe_filter_info filter,
+ size_t *count,bool batch_mode)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t tmp_count;
+ struct blkid_handle *h;
+ blk_probe_status pr;
+
+ if (!count)
+ count = &tmp_count;
+
+ *count = 0;
+
+ if (!blk_supported()) {
+ log_dbg("Blkid support disabled.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = blk_init_by_path(&h, device))) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to initialize device signature probes."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ switch (filter) {
+ case PRB_FILTER_LUKS:
+ if (blk_superblocks_filter_luks(h)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* fall-through */
+ case PRB_FILTER_NONE:
+ blk_set_chains_for_full_print(h);
+ break;
+ case PRB_ONLY_LUKS:
+ blk_set_chains_for_fast_detection(h);
+ if (blk_superblocks_only_luks(h)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while ((pr = blk_probe(h)) < PRB_EMPTY) {
+ if (blk_is_partition(h))
+ report_partition(blk_get_partition_type(h), device, batch_mode);
+ else if (blk_is_superblock(h))
+ report_superblock(blk_get_superblock_type(h), device, batch_mode);
+ else {
+ log_dbg("Internal tools_detect_signatures() error.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ (*count)++;
+ }
+
+ if (pr == PRB_FAIL)
+ r = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ blk_free(h);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int tools_wipe_all_signatures(const char *path, bool exclusive, bool only_luks)
+{
+ int fd, flags, r;
+ blk_probe_status pr;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct blkid_handle *h = NULL;
+
+ if (!blk_supported()) {
+ log_dbg("Blkid support disabled.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (stat(path, &st)) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to stat device %s."), path);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ flags = O_RDWR;
+ if (S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) && exclusive)
+ flags |= O_EXCL;
+
+ /* better than opening regular file with O_EXCL (undefined) */
+ /* coverity[toctou] */
+ fd = open(path, flags); /* lgtm[cpp/toctou-race-condition] */
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EBUSY)
+ log_err(_("Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."), path);
+ else
+ log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in read/write mode."), path);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = blk_init_by_fd(&h, fd))) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to initialize device signature probes."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ blk_set_chains_for_wipes(h);
+ if (only_luks && (r = blk_superblocks_only_luks(h))) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while ((pr = blk_probe(h)) < PRB_EMPTY) {
+ if (blk_is_partition(h))
+ log_verbose(_("Existing '%s' partition signature on device %s will be wiped."),
+ blk_get_partition_type(h), path);
+ if (blk_is_superblock(h))
+ log_verbose(_("Existing '%s' superblock signature on device %s will be wiped."),
+ blk_get_superblock_type(h), path);
+ if (blk_do_wipe(h) || fsync(fd)) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to wipe device signature."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pr != PRB_EMPTY) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to probe device %s for a signature."), path);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out:
+ close(fd);
+ blk_free(h);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int tools_superblock_block_size(const char *device, char *sb_name, size_t sb_name_len, unsigned *r_block_size)
+{
+ struct blkid_handle *h;
+ const char *name;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (!r_block_size || !sb_name || sb_name_len < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!blk_supported()) {
+ log_dbg("Blkid support disabled.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = blk_init_by_path(&h, device))) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to initialize device signature probes."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ blk_set_chains_for_superblocks(h);
+
+ switch (blk_probe(h)) {
+ case PRB_OK:
+ *r_block_size = blk_get_block_size(h);
+ if (!*r_block_size) /* same as not-found */
+ break;
+
+ if (!(name = blk_get_superblock_type(h))) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't mind truncating */
+ strncpy(sb_name, name, sb_name_len - 1);
+ sb_name[sb_name_len-1] = '\0';
+
+ log_dbg("Detected superblock %s on device %s (block size: %u).", sb_name, device, *r_block_size);
+ r = 1;
+ /* fall-through */
+ case PRB_EMPTY:
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ blk_free(h);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+bool tools_blkid_supported(void)
+{
+ return blk_supported() != 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_luks.c b/src/utils_luks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a10ab6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_luks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/*
+ * Helper utilities for LUKS2 features
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "cryptsetup_args.h"
+#include "utils_luks.h"
+
+extern const char *set_pbkdf;
+
+const char *luksType(const char *type)
+{
+ if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks2"))
+ return CRYPT_LUKS2;
+
+ if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks1"))
+ return CRYPT_LUKS1;
+
+ if (type && !strcmp(type, "luks"))
+ return CRYPT_LUKS; /* NULL */
+
+ if (type && *type)
+ return type;
+
+ return CRYPT_LUKS; /* NULL */
+}
+
+bool isLUKS1(const char *type)
+{
+ return type && !strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+}
+
+bool isLUKS2(const char *type)
+{
+ return type && !strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+}
+
+int verify_passphrase(int def)
+{
+ /* Batch mode switch off verify - if not overridden by -y */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERIFY_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ def = 1;
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ def = 0;
+
+ /* Non-tty input doesn't allow verify */
+ if (def && !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_VERIFY_PASSPHRASE_ID))
+ log_err(_("Can't do passphrase verification on non-tty inputs."));
+ def = 0;
+ }
+
+ return def;
+}
+
+void set_activation_flags(uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_READONLY_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ALLOW_DISCARDS_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERF_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERF_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERF_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERF_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INTEGRITY_NO_JOURNAL_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+
+ /* In persistent mode, we use what is set on command line */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PERSISTENT_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT;
+
+ /* Only for LUKS2 but ignored elsewhere */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_TEST_PASSPHRASE_ID) &&
+ (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_UNBOUND_ID)))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;
+
+ /* Only for plain */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS;
+}
+
+int set_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dev_type)
+{
+ const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_default;
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {};
+
+ pbkdf_default = crypt_get_pbkdf_default(dev_type);
+ if (!pbkdf_default)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ pbkdf.type = set_pbkdf ?: pbkdf_default->type;
+ pbkdf.hash = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) ?: pbkdf_default->hash;
+ pbkdf.time_ms = ARG_UINT32(OPT_ITER_TIME_ID) ?: pbkdf_default->time_ms;
+ if (strcmp(pbkdf.type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+ pbkdf.max_memory_kb = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PBKDF_MEMORY_ID) ?: pbkdf_default->max_memory_kb;
+ pbkdf.parallel_threads = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PBKDF_PARALLEL_ID) ?: pbkdf_default->parallel_threads;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ID)) {
+ pbkdf.iterations = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ID);
+ pbkdf.time_ms = 0;
+ pbkdf.flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+ }
+
+ return crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf);
+}
+
+int set_tries_tty(void)
+{
+ return (tools_is_stdin(ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_TRIES_ID) : 1;
+}
+
+int get_adjusted_key_size(const char *cipher_mode, uint32_t default_size_bits, int integrity_keysize)
+{
+ uint32_t keysize_bits = ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
+ if (default_size_bits == 128)
+ keysize_bits = 256;
+ else if (default_size_bits == 256)
+ keysize_bits = 512;
+ }
+#endif
+ return (keysize_bits ?: default_size_bits) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: 4MiBs is max LUKS2 mda length (including binary header).
+ * In future, read max allowed JSON size from config section.
+ */
+#define LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE 0x400000
+int tools_read_json_file(const char *file, char **json, size_t *json_size, bool batch_mode)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int fd, block, r;
+ void *buf = NULL;
+
+ block = tools_signals_blocked();
+ if (block)
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+ if (tools_is_stdin(file)) {
+ fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ log_dbg("STDIN descriptor JSON read requested.");
+ } else {
+ log_dbg("File descriptor JSON read requested.");
+ fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in read-only mode."), file);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf = malloc(LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE);
+ if (!buf) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (isatty(fd) && !batch_mode)
+ log_std(_("Provide valid LUKS2 token JSON:\n"));
+
+ /* we expect JSON (string) */
+ r = 0;
+ ret = read_buffer_intr(fd, buf, LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE - 1, &quit);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ r = -EIO;
+ log_err(_("Failed to read JSON file."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("\nRead interrupted."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *json_size = (size_t)ret;
+ *json = buf;
+ *(*json + ret) = '\0';
+out:
+ if (block && !quit)
+ set_int_block(1);
+ if (fd >= 0 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ if (r && buf) {
+ memset(buf, 0, LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE);
+ free(buf);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+int tools_write_json_file(const char *file, const char *json)
+{
+ int block, fd, r;
+ size_t json_len;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (!json || !(json_len = strlen(json)) || json_len >= LUKS2_MAX_MDA_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ block = tools_signals_blocked();
+ if (block)
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+ if (tools_is_stdin(file)) {
+ fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+ log_dbg("STDOUT descriptor JSON write requested.");
+ } else {
+ log_dbg("File descriptor JSON write requested.");
+ fd = open(file, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ }
+
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to open file %s in write mode."), file ?: "");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+ ret = write_buffer_intr(fd, json, json_len, &quit);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("\nWrite interrupted."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret != json_len) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to write JSON file."));
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (isatty(fd))
+ (void) write_buffer_intr(fd, "\n", 1, &quit);
+out:
+ if (block && !quit)
+ set_int_block(1);
+ if (fd >=0 && fd != STDOUT_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_luks.h b/src/utils_luks.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28220ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_luks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Helper utilities for LUKS in cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef UTILS_LUKS_H
+#define UTILS_LUKS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+const char *luksType(const char *type);
+
+bool isLUKS1(const char *type);
+
+bool isLUKS2(const char *type);
+
+int verify_passphrase(int def);
+
+void set_activation_flags(uint32_t *flags);
+
+int set_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dev_type);
+
+int set_tries_tty(void);
+
+int get_adjusted_key_size(const char *cipher_mode, uint32_t default_size_bits, int integrity_keysize);
+
+int luksFormat(struct crypt_device **r_cd, char **r_password, size_t *r_passwordLen);
+
+int reencrypt(int action_argc, const char **action_argv);
+
+int reencrypt_luks1(const char *device);
+
+int reencrypt_luks1_in_progress(const char *device);
+
+#endif /* UTILS_LUKS_H */
diff --git a/src/utils_password.c b/src/utils_password.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3374e18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_password.c
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+/*
+ * Password quality check wrapper
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <termios.h>
+
+#if defined ENABLE_PWQUALITY
+#include <pwquality.h>
+
+static int tools_check_pwquality(const char *password)
+{
+ int r;
+ void *auxerror;
+ pwquality_settings_t *pwq;
+
+ log_dbg("Checking new password using default pwquality settings.");
+ pwq = pwquality_default_settings();
+ if (!pwq)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = pwquality_read_config(pwq, NULL, &auxerror);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"),
+ pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror));
+ pwquality_free_settings(pwq);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = pwquality_check(pwq, password, NULL, NULL, &auxerror);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Password quality check failed:\n %s"),
+ pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror));
+ r = -EPERM;
+ } else
+ r = 0;
+
+ pwquality_free_settings(pwq);
+ return r;
+}
+#elif defined ENABLE_PASSWDQC
+#include <passwdqc.h>
+
+static int tools_check_passwdqc(const char *password)
+{
+ passwdqc_params_t params;
+ char *parse_reason = NULL;
+ const char *check_reason;
+ const char *config = PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ passwdqc_params_reset(&params);
+
+ if (*config && passwdqc_params_load(&params, &parse_reason, config)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"),
+ (parse_reason ? parse_reason : "Out of memory"));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ check_reason = passwdqc_check(&params.qc, password, NULL, NULL);
+ if (check_reason) {
+ log_err(_("Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"),
+ check_reason);
+ r = -EPERM;
+ } else
+ r = 0;
+out:
+#if HAVE_PASSWDQC_PARAMS_FREE
+ passwdqc_params_free(&params);
+#endif
+ free(parse_reason);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PWQUALITY || ENABLE_PASSWDQC */
+
+/* coverity[ +tainted_string_sanitize_content : arg-0 ] */
+static int tools_check_password(const char *password)
+{
+#if defined ENABLE_PWQUALITY
+ return tools_check_pwquality(password);
+#elif defined ENABLE_PASSWDQC
+ return tools_check_passwdqc(password);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Password reading helpers */
+
+/* coverity[ -taint_source : arg-1 ] */
+static ssize_t read_tty_eol(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen)
+{
+ bool eol = false;
+ size_t read_size = 0;
+ ssize_t r;
+
+ do {
+ r = read(fd, pass, maxlen - read_size);
+ if ((r == -1 && errno != EINTR) || quit)
+ return -1;
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ if (!r || pass[r-1] == '\n')
+ eol = true;
+ read_size += (size_t)r;
+ pass = pass + r;
+ }
+ } while (!eol && read_size != maxlen);
+
+ return (ssize_t)read_size;
+}
+
+/* The pass buffer is zeroed and has trailing \0 already " */
+static int untimed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, size_t *realsize)
+{
+ ssize_t i;
+
+ i = read_tty_eol(fd, pass, maxlen);
+ if (i > 0) {
+ if (pass[i-1] == '\n') {
+ pass[i-1] = '\0';
+ *realsize = i - 1;
+ } else
+ *realsize = i;
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 0) /* empty input */
+ i = -1;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+static int timed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, size_t *realsize, long timeout)
+{
+ struct timeval t;
+ fd_set fds = {}; /* Just to avoid scan-build false report for FD_SET */
+ int failed = -1;
+
+ FD_ZERO(&fds);
+ FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+ t.tv_sec = timeout;
+ t.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ if (select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &t) > 0)
+ failed = untimed_read(fd, pass, maxlen, realsize);
+
+ return failed;
+}
+
+static int interactive_pass(const char *prompt, char *pass, size_t maxlen,
+ long timeout)
+{
+ struct termios orig, tmp;
+ int failed = -1;
+ int infd, outfd;
+ size_t realsize = 0;
+
+ if (maxlen < 1)
+ return failed;
+
+ /* Read and write to /dev/tty if available */
+ infd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+ if (infd == -1) {
+ infd = STDIN_FILENO;
+ outfd = STDERR_FILENO;
+ } else
+ outfd = infd;
+
+ if (tcgetattr(infd, &orig))
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(&tmp, &orig, sizeof(tmp));
+ tmp.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
+
+ if (prompt && write(outfd, prompt, strlen(prompt)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &tmp);
+ if (timeout)
+ failed = timed_read(infd, pass, maxlen, &realsize, timeout);
+ else
+ failed = untimed_read(infd, pass, maxlen, &realsize);
+ tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &orig);
+out:
+ if (!failed && write(outfd, "\n", 1)) {};
+
+ if (realsize == maxlen)
+ log_dbg("Read stopped at maximal interactive input length, passphrase can be trimmed.");
+
+ if (infd != STDIN_FILENO)
+ close(infd);
+ return failed;
+}
+
+static int crypt_get_key_tty(const char *prompt,
+ char **key, size_t *key_size,
+ int timeout, int verify)
+{
+ int key_size_max = DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ char *pass = NULL, *pass_verify = NULL;
+
+ *key = NULL;
+ *key_size = 0;
+
+ log_dbg("Interactive passphrase entry requested.");
+
+ pass = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max + 1);
+ if (!pass) {
+ log_err( _("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (interactive_pass(prompt, pass, key_size_max, timeout)) {
+ log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (verify) {
+ pass_verify = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max + 1);
+ if (!pass_verify) {
+ log_err(_("Out of memory while reading passphrase."));
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (interactive_pass(_("Verify passphrase: "),
+ pass_verify, key_size_max, timeout)) {
+ log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(pass, pass_verify, key_size_max)) {
+ log_err(_("Passphrases do not match."));
+ r = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *key = pass;
+ /* coverity[string_null] (crypt_safe_alloc wipes string with additional \0) */
+ *key_size = strlen(pass);
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(pass_verify);
+ if (r)
+ crypt_safe_free(pass);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: --key-file=- is interpreted as a read from a binary file (stdin)
+ * key_size_max == 0 means detect maximum according to input type (tty/file)
+ */
+int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
+ char **key, size_t *key_size,
+ uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max,
+ const char *key_file,
+ int timeout, int verify, int pwquality,
+ struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ char tmp[PATH_MAX], *backing_file;
+ int r = -EINVAL, block;
+
+ block = tools_signals_blocked();
+ if (block)
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+ if (tools_is_stdin(key_file)) {
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ if (keyfile_offset) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot use offset with terminal input."));
+ } else {
+ r = 0;
+ if (!prompt && !crypt_get_device_name(cd))
+ r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase: "));
+ else if (!prompt) {
+ backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase for %s: "), backing_file ?: crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = crypt_get_key_tty(prompt ?: tmp, key, key_size, timeout, verify);
+ else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_dbg("STDIN descriptor passphrase entry requested.");
+ /* No keyfile means STDIN with EOL handling (\n will end input)). */
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, NULL, key, key_size,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max,
+ key_file ? 0 : CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL);
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_dbg("File descriptor passphrase entry requested.");
+ r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, key_file, key, key_size,
+ keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (block && !quit)
+ set_int_block(1);
+
+ /* Check pwquality for password (not keyfile) */
+ if (pwquality && !key_file && !r)
+ r = tools_check_password(*key);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+void tools_passphrase_msg(int r)
+{
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ log_err(_("No key available with this passphrase."));
+ else if (r == -ENOENT)
+ log_err(_("No usable keyslot is available."));
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_progress.c b/src/utils_progress.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76b1818
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_progress.c
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - progress output utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+
+#define MINUTES_90 UINT64_C(5400000000) /* 90 minutes in microseconds */
+#define HOURS_36 UINT64_C(129600000000) /* 36 hours in microseconds */
+
+#define MINUTES(A) (A) / UINT64_C(60000000) /* microseconds to minutes */
+#define SECONDS(A) (A) / UINT64_C(1000000) /* microseconds to seconds */
+#define HOURS(A) (A) / UINT64_C(3600000000) /* microseconds to hours */
+#define DAYS(A) (A) / UINT64_C(86400000000) /* microseconds to days */
+
+#define REMAIN_SECONDS(A) (SECONDS((A))) % 60
+#define REMAIN_MINUTES(A) (MINUTES((A))) % 60
+
+/* The difference in microseconds between two times in "timeval" format. */
+static uint64_t time_diff(struct timeval *start, struct timeval *end)
+{
+ return (end->tv_sec - start->tv_sec) * UINT64_C(1000000)
+ + (end->tv_usec - start->tv_usec);
+}
+
+static void tools_clear_line(void)
+{
+ /* vt100 code clear line */
+ log_std("\33[2K\r");
+}
+
+static void bytes_to_units(uint64_t *bytes, const char **units)
+{
+ if (*bytes < (UINT64_C(1) << 32)) { /* less than 4 GiBs */
+ *units = "MiB";
+ *bytes >>= 20;
+ } else if (*bytes < (UINT64_C(1) << 42)) { /* less than 4 TiBs */
+ *units = "GiB";
+ *bytes >>= 30;
+ } else if (*bytes < (UINT64_C(1) << 52)) { /* less than 4 PiBs */
+ *units = "TiB";
+ *bytes >>= 40;
+ } else if (*bytes < (UINT64_C(1) << 62)) { /* less than 4 EiBs */
+ *units = "PiB";
+ *bytes >>= 50;
+ } else {
+ *units = "EiB";
+ *bytes >>= 60;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool time_to_human_string(uint64_t usecs, char *buf, size_t buf_len)
+{
+ ssize_t r;
+
+ if (usecs < MINUTES_90)
+ r = snprintf(buf, buf_len, _("%02" PRIu64 "m%02" PRIu64 "s"), MINUTES(usecs), REMAIN_SECONDS(usecs));
+ else if (usecs < HOURS_36)
+ r = snprintf(buf, buf_len, _("%02" PRIu64 "h%02" PRIu64 "m%02" PRIu64 "s"), HOURS(usecs), REMAIN_MINUTES(usecs), REMAIN_SECONDS(usecs));
+ else
+ r = snprintf(buf, buf_len, _("%02" PRIu64 " days"), DAYS(usecs));
+
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= buf_len)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void log_progress(uint64_t bytes, uint64_t device_size, uint64_t eta, double uib, const char *ustr, const char *eol)
+{
+ double progress;
+ int r;
+ const char *units;
+ char time[128], written[128], speed[128];
+
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: 'time' string with examples:
+ * "12m44s" : meaning 12 minutes 44 seconds
+ * "26h12m44s" : meaning 26 hours 12 minutes 44 seconds
+ * "3 days"
+ */
+ if (!time_to_human_string(eta, time, sizeof(time)))
+ return;
+
+ progress = (double)bytes / device_size * 100.0;
+
+ bytes_to_units(&bytes, &units);
+ r = snprintf(written, sizeof(written), _("%4" PRIu64 " %s written"), bytes, units);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(written))
+ return;
+
+ r = snprintf(speed, sizeof(speed), _("speed %5.1f %s/s"), uib, ustr);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(speed))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: 'time', 'written' and 'speed' string are supposed
+ * to get translated as well. 'eol' is always new-line or empty.
+ * See above.
+ */
+ log_std(_("Progress: %5.1f%%, ETA %s, %s, %s%s"),
+ progress, time, written, speed, eol);
+}
+
+static void log_progress_final(uint64_t time_spent, uint64_t bytes, double uib, const char *ustr)
+{
+ int r;
+ const char *units;
+ char time[128], written[128], speed[128];
+
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: 'time' string with examples:
+ * "12m44s" : meaning 12 minutes 44 seconds
+ * "26h12m44s" : meaning 26 hours 12 minutes 44 seconds
+ * "3 days"
+ */
+ if (!time_to_human_string(time_spent, time, sizeof(time)))
+ return;
+
+ bytes_to_units(&bytes, &units);
+ r = snprintf(written, sizeof(written) - 1, _("%4" PRIu64 " %s written"), bytes, units);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(written))
+ return;
+
+ r = snprintf(speed, sizeof(speed) - 1, _("speed %5.1f %s/s"), uib, ustr);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(speed))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * TRANSLATORS: 'time', 'written' and 'speed' string are supposed
+ * to get translated as well. See above
+ */
+ log_std(_("Finished, time %s, %s, %s\n"), time, written, speed);
+}
+
+static bool calculate_tdiff(bool final, uint64_t bytes, struct tools_progress_params *parms, double *r_tdiff)
+{
+ uint64_t frequency;
+ struct timeval now_time;
+
+ assert(r_tdiff);
+
+ gettimeofday(&now_time, NULL);
+ if (parms->start_time.tv_sec == 0 && parms->start_time.tv_usec == 0) {
+ parms->start_time = now_time;
+ parms->end_time = now_time;
+ parms->start_offset = bytes;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (parms->frequency)
+ frequency = parms->frequency * UINT64_C(1000000);
+ else
+ frequency = 500000;
+
+ if (!final && time_diff(&parms->end_time, &now_time) < frequency)
+ return false;
+
+ parms->end_time = now_time;
+
+ *r_tdiff = time_diff(&parms->start_time, &parms->end_time) / 1E6;
+ if (!*r_tdiff)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void tools_time_progress(uint64_t device_size, uint64_t bytes, struct tools_progress_params *parms)
+{
+ uint64_t eta;
+ double tdiff, uib;
+ const char *eol, *ustr;
+ bool final = (bytes == device_size);
+
+ if (!calculate_tdiff(final, bytes, parms, &tdiff))
+ return;
+
+ if (parms->frequency)
+ eol = "\n";
+ else
+ eol = "";
+
+ uib = (double)(bytes - parms->start_offset) / tdiff;
+
+ eta = (uint64_t)((device_size / uib - tdiff) * 1E6);
+
+ if (uib > 1073741824.0f) {
+ uib /= 1073741824.0f;
+ ustr = "GiB";
+ } else if (uib > 1048576.0f) {
+ uib /= 1048576.0f;
+ ustr = "MiB";
+ } else if (uib > 1024.0f) {
+ uib /= 1024.0f;
+ ustr = "KiB";
+ } else
+ ustr = "B";
+
+ if (!parms->frequency)
+ tools_clear_line();
+
+ if (final)
+ log_progress_final((uint64_t)(tdiff * 1E6), bytes, uib, ustr);
+ else
+ log_progress(bytes, device_size, eta, uib, ustr, eol);
+
+ fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static void log_progress_json(const char *device, uint64_t bytes, uint64_t device_size, uint64_t eta, uint64_t uib, uint64_t time_spent)
+{
+ int r;
+ char json[PATH_MAX+256];
+
+ r = snprintf(json, sizeof(json) - 1,
+ "{\"device\":\"%s\","
+ "\"device_bytes\":\"%" PRIu64 "\"," /* in bytes */
+ "\"device_size\":\"%" PRIu64 "\"," /* in bytes */
+ "\"speed\":\"%" PRIu64 "\"," /* in bytes per second */
+ "\"eta_ms\":\"%" PRIu64 "\"," /* in milliseconds */
+ "\"time_ms\":\"%" PRIu64 "\"}\n", /* in milliseconds */
+ device, bytes, device_size, uib, eta, time_spent);
+
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(json) - 1)
+ return;
+
+ log_std("%s", json);
+}
+
+static void tools_time_progress_json(uint64_t device_size, uint64_t bytes, struct tools_progress_params *parms)
+{
+ double tdiff, uib;
+ bool final = (bytes == device_size);
+
+ if (!calculate_tdiff(final, bytes, parms, &tdiff))
+ return;
+
+ uib = (double)(bytes - parms->start_offset) / tdiff;
+
+ log_progress_json(parms->device,
+ bytes,
+ device_size,
+ final ? UINT64_C(0) : (uint64_t)((device_size / uib - tdiff) * 1E3),
+ (uint64_t)uib,
+ (uint64_t)(tdiff * 1E3));
+
+ fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+int tools_progress(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ struct tools_progress_params *parms = (struct tools_progress_params *)usrptr;
+
+ if (parms && parms->json_output)
+ tools_time_progress_json(size, offset, parms);
+ else if (parms && !parms->batch_mode)
+ tools_time_progress(size, offset, parms);
+
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r) {
+ if (!parms || (!parms->frequency && !parms->json_output))
+ tools_clear_line();
+ if (parms && parms->interrupt_message)
+ log_err("%s", parms->interrupt_message);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+const char *tools_get_device_name(const char *device, char **r_backing_file)
+{
+ char *bfile;
+
+ assert(r_backing_file);
+
+ bfile = crypt_loop_backing_file(device);
+ if (bfile) {
+ *r_backing_file = bfile;
+ return bfile;
+ }
+
+ return device;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_reencrypt.c b/src/utils_reencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a78557c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_reencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1560 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - action re-encryption utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "cryptsetup_args.h"
+#include "utils_luks.h"
+
+extern int64_t data_shift;
+extern const char *device_type;
+extern const char *set_pbkdf;
+
+enum device_status_info {
+ DEVICE_LUKS2 = 0, /* LUKS2 device */
+ DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT, /* LUKS2 device in reencryption */
+ DEVICE_LUKS1, /* LUKS1 device */
+ DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE, /* LUKS1 device in reencryption (legacy) */
+ DEVICE_NOT_LUKS, /* device is not LUKS type */
+ DEVICE_INVALID /* device is invalid */
+};
+
+static void _set_reencryption_flags(uint32_t *flags)
+{
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_RESUME_ONLY_ID))
+ *flags |= CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RESUME_ONLY;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_check_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int keyslot,
+ const char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_len)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ assert(cd);
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, keyslot,
+ passphrase, passphrase_len, 0);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int set_keyslot_params(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+ const char *cipher;
+ struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+ size_t key_size;
+
+ cipher = crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, keyslot, &key_size);
+ if (!cipher)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher)) {
+ log_dbg("Keyslot %d uses cipher_null. "
+ "Replacing with default encryption in new keyslot.", keyslot);
+ cipher = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
+ key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher, key_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* if requested any of those just reinitialize context pbkdf */
+ if (set_pbkdf || ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_PBKDF_FORCE_ITERATIONS_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_ITER_TIME_ID))
+ return set_pbkdf_params(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+ if (crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(cd, keyslot, &pbkdf))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ pbkdf.flags |= CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK;
+
+ return crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &pbkdf);
+}
+
+static int get_active_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *data_device,
+ char **r_active_name)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(data_device);
+
+ r = tools_lookup_crypt_device(cd, crypt_get_type(cd), data_device, r_active_name);
+ if (r > 0) {
+ log_dbg("Device %s has %d active holders.", data_device, r);
+
+ if (!*r_active_name) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is still in use."), data_device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_std(_("Auto-detected active dm device '%s' for data device %s.\n"),
+ *r_active_name, data_device);
+ } else if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENOTBLK) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to auto-detect device %s holders."), data_device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ log_std(_("Device %s is not a block device.\n"), data_device);
+
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("Unable to decide if device %s is activated or not.\n"
+ "Are you sure you want to proceed with reencryption in offline mode?\n"
+ "It may lead to data corruption if the device is actually activated.\n"
+ "To run reencryption in online mode, use --active-name parameter instead.\n"), data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = noDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ } else {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a block device. Can not auto-detect if it is active or not.\n"
+ "Use --force-offline-reencrypt to bypass the check and run in offline mode (dangerous!)."), data_device);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *r_active_name = NULL;
+ log_dbg("Device %s is unused. Proceeding with offline reencryption.", data_device);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_get_active_name(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *data_device,
+ char **r_active_name)
+{
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(r_active_name);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID))
+ return (*r_active_name = strdup(ARG_STR(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID))) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+
+ return get_active_device_name(cd, data_device, r_active_name);
+}
+
+static int decrypt_verify_and_set_params(struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+{
+ const char *resilience;
+
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID))
+ return 0;
+
+ resilience = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID);
+
+ if (!strcmp(resilience, "datashift") ||
+ !strcmp(resilience, "none")) {
+ log_err(_("Requested --resilience option cannot be applied "
+ "to current reencryption operation."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (!strcmp(resilience, "journal"))
+ params->resilience = "datashift-journal";
+ else if (!strcmp(resilience, "checksum"))
+ params->resilience = "datashift-checksum";
+ else if (!strcmp(resilience, "datashift-checksum") ||
+ !strcmp(resilience, "datashift-journal"))
+ params->resilience = resilience;
+ else {
+ log_err(_("Unsupported resilience mode %s"), resilience);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_verify_and_update_params(struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+ char **r_hash)
+{
+ assert(params);
+ assert(r_hash);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID) && params->mode != CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
+ log_err(_("Device is not in LUKS2 encryption. Conflicting option --encrypt."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DECRYPT_ID) && params->mode != CRYPT_REENCRYPT_DECRYPT) {
+ log_err(_("Device is not in LUKS2 decryption. Conflicting option --decrypt."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID)) {
+ if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift") &&
+ strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID), "datashift")) {
+ log_err(_("Device is in reencryption using datashift resilience. "
+ "Requested --resilience option cannot be applied."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift") &&
+ !strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID), "datashift")) {
+ log_err(_("Requested --resilience option cannot be applied "
+ "to current reencryption operation."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!strncmp(params->resilience, "datashift-", 10)) {
+ /* decryption with datashift in progress */
+ if (decrypt_verify_and_set_params(params))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (!strncmp(ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID), "datashift-", 10)) {
+ log_err(_("Requested --resilience option cannot be applied "
+ "to current reencryption operation."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ params->resilience = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID);
+
+ /* we have to copy hash string returned by API */
+ if (params->hash && !ARG_SET(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID)) {
+ /* r_hash owns the memory. Freed by caller */
+ *r_hash = strdup(params->hash);
+ if (!*r_hash)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ params->hash = *r_hash;
+ }
+
+ /* Add default hash when switching to checksum based resilience */
+ if (!params->hash && !ARG_SET(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID) &&
+ (!strcmp(params->resilience, "checksum") ||
+ !strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift-checksum")))
+ params->hash = "sha256";
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID))
+ params->hash = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID);
+ } else
+ params->resilience = NULL;
+
+ params->max_hotzone_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ params->device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ params->flags = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RESUME_ONLY;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_hint_force_offline_reencrypt(const char *data_device)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID) ||
+ !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) ||
+ ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (stat(data_device, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a block device. Can not auto-detect if it is active or not.\n"
+ "Use --force-offline-reencrypt to bypass the check and run in offline mode (dangerous!)."), data_device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_luks2_load(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data_device)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+ int r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ char *active_name = NULL, *hash = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {};
+
+ ri = crypt_reencrypt_status(cd, &params);
+ if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH)
+ log_err(_("Device requires reencryption recovery. Run repair first."));
+
+ if (ri != CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = reencrypt_verify_and_update_params(&params, &hash);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = reencrypt_hint_force_offline_reencrypt(data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_RESUME_ONLY_ID)) {
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("Device %s is already in LUKS2 reencryption. "
+ "Do you wish to resume previously initialised operation?"),
+ crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd) ?: data_device);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID))
+ r = reencrypt_get_active_name(cd, data_device, &active_name);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, active_name, password,
+ passwordLen, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID),
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), NULL, NULL, &params);
+out:
+ free(hash);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ free(active_name);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 1: in-progress
+ * 0: clean luks2 device
+ * < 0: error
+ */
+static int luks2_reencrypt_in_progress(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ uint32_t flags;
+
+ if (crypt_persistent_flags_get(cd, CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS, &flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (flags & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT) {
+ log_err(_("Legacy LUKS2 reencryption is no longer supported."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return flags & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns crypt context for:
+ * DEVICE_LUKS2
+ * DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT
+ * DEVICE_LUKS1
+ */
+static enum device_status_info load_luks(struct crypt_device **r_cd,
+ const char *header_device,
+ const char *data_device)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_device *cd;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ assert(r_cd);
+ assert(data_device);
+
+ if (header_device && stat(header_device, &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ return DEVICE_NOT_LUKS;
+
+ if (crypt_init_data_device(&cd, uuid_or_device(header_device ?: data_device), data_device))
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS, NULL))) {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+
+ if (r == -EBUSY) /* luks2 locking error (message printed by libcryptsetup) */
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+
+ r = reencrypt_luks1_in_progress(uuid_or_device(header_device ?: data_device));
+ if (!r)
+ return DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE;
+
+ return DEVICE_NOT_LUKS;
+ }
+
+ if (isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ r = luks2_reencrypt_in_progress(cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *r_cd = cd;
+
+ if (r > 0)
+ return DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT;
+
+ return isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd)) ? DEVICE_LUKS2 : DEVICE_LUKS1;
+}
+
+static bool luks2_reencrypt_eligible(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ struct crypt_params_integrity ip = { 0 };
+
+ /* raw integrity info is available since 2.0 */
+ if (crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &ip) || ip.tag_size) {
+ log_err(_("Reencryption of device with integrity profile is not supported."));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static enum device_status_info check_luks_device(const char *device)
+{
+ enum device_status_info dev_st;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ dev_st = load_luks(&cd, NULL, device);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+
+ return dev_st;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_check_data_sb_block_size(const char *data_device, uint32_t new_sector_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ char sb_name[32];
+ unsigned block_size;
+
+ assert(data_device);
+
+ r = tools_superblock_block_size(data_device, sb_name, sizeof(sb_name), &block_size);
+ if (r <= 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (new_sector_size > block_size) {
+ log_err(_("Requested --sector-size %" PRIu32 " is incompatible with %s superblock\n"
+ "(block size: %" PRIu32 " bytes) detected on device %s."),
+ new_sector_size, sb_name, block_size, data_device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_check_active_device_sb_block_size(const char *active_device, uint32_t new_sector_size)
+{
+ int r;
+ char dm_device[PATH_MAX];
+
+ r = snprintf(dm_device, sizeof(dm_device), "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), active_device);
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(dm_device))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return reencrypt_check_data_sb_block_size(dm_device, new_sector_size);
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_is_header_detached(const char *header_device, const char *data_device)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct crypt_device *cd;
+
+ if (!header_device)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (header_device && stat(header_device, &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, header_device, data_device)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_header_is_detached(cd);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int encrypt_luks2_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *data_device, const char *device_name)
+{
+ int keyslot, r, fd;
+ uuid_t uuid;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ char *tmp, uuid_str[37], header_file[PATH_MAX] = { 0 }, *password = NULL;
+ uint32_t activate_flags = 0;
+ const struct crypt_params_luks2 luks2_params = {
+ .sector_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) ?: SECTOR_SIZE
+ };
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {
+ .mode = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT,
+ .direction = data_shift < 0 ? CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD : CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD,
+ .resilience = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID) ?: "checksum",
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID) ?: "sha256",
+ .max_hotzone_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .luks2 = &luks2_params,
+ .flags = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY
+ };
+
+ _set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
+
+ if (!data_shift) {
+ r = reencrypt_is_header_detached(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!r) {
+ log_err(_("Encryption without detached header (--header) is not possible without data device size reduction (--reduce-device-size)."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) && ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) &&
+ data_shift && (ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) > (uint64_t)(imaxabs(data_shift) / (2 * SECTOR_SIZE)))) {
+ log_err(_("Requested data offset must be less than or equal to half of --reduce-device-size parameter."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: ask user to confirm. It's useless to do data device reduction and than use smaller value */
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) && ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) &&
+ data_shift && (ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) < (uint64_t)(imaxabs(data_shift) / (2 * SECTOR_SIZE)))) {
+ data_shift = -(ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) * 2 * SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (data_shift >= 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ log_std(_("Adjusting --reduce-device-size value to twice the --offset %" PRIu64 " (sectors).\n"), ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID) * 2);
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UUID_ID) && uuid_parse(ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID), uuid) == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID)) {
+ r = reencrypt_check_data_sb_block_size(data_device, ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_UUID_ID)) {
+ uuid_generate(uuid);
+ uuid_unparse(uuid, uuid_str);
+ if (!(tmp = strdup(uuid_str)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ARG_SET_STR(OPT_UUID_ID, tmp);
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID)) {
+ r = snprintf(header_file, sizeof(header_file), "LUKS2-temp-%s.new", ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID));
+ if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(header_file))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fd = open(header_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ if (errno == EEXIST)
+ log_err(_("Temporary header file %s already exists. Aborting."), header_file);
+ else
+ log_err(_("Cannot create temporary header file %s."), header_file);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = posix_fallocate(fd, 0, 4096);
+ close(fd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot create temporary header file %s."), header_file);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(tmp = strdup(header_file))) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ARG_SET_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID, tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: just override offset here, but we should support both.
+ * offset and implicit offset via data shift (lvprepend?)
+ */
+ if (!ARG_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID))
+ ARG_SET_UINT64(OPT_OFFSET_ID, imaxabs(data_shift) / (2 * SECTOR_SIZE));
+ data_shift >>= 1;
+ params.flags |= CRYPT_REENCRYPT_MOVE_FIRST_SEGMENT;
+ } else if (data_shift < 0) {
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID))
+ ARG_SET_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID, 0x4000); /* missing default here */
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID))
+ ARG_SET_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID, -data_shift - 2 * ARG_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID));
+ if (2 * ARG_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE_ID) + ARG_UINT64(OPT_LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_SIZE_ID) > (uint64_t)-data_shift) {
+ log_err(_("LUKS2 metadata size is larger than data shift value."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = luksFormat(cd, &password, &passwordLen);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!luks2_reencrypt_eligible(*cd)) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (data_shift) {
+ params.data_shift = imaxabs(data_shift) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ params.resilience = "datashift";
+ }
+ keyslot = !ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) ? 0 : ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID);
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(*cd, NULL, password, passwordLen,
+ CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, keyslot, crypt_get_cipher(*cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher_mode(*cd), &params);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_keyslot_destroy(*cd, keyslot);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Restore temporary header in head of data device */
+ if (*header_file) {
+ crypt_free(*cd);
+ *cd = NULL;
+
+ r = crypt_init(cd, data_device);
+ if (!r)
+ r = crypt_header_restore(*cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, header_file);
+
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to place new header at head of device %s."), data_device);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* activate device */
+ if (device_name) {
+ set_activation_flags(&activate_flags);
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(*cd, device_name, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), password, passwordLen, activate_flags);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ log_std(_("%s/%s is now active and ready for online encryption.\n"), crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* just load reencryption context to continue reencryption */
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID)) {
+ params.flags &= ~CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY;
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(*cd, device_name, password, passwordLen,
+ CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, keyslot, NULL, NULL, &params);
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ if (*header_file)
+ unlink(header_file);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static enum device_status_info load_luks2_by_name(struct crypt_device **r_cd, const char *active_name, const char *header_device)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct crypt_device *cd;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ assert(r_cd);
+ assert(active_name);
+
+ if (header_device && stat(header_device, &st) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ return DEVICE_NOT_LUKS;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, active_name, header_device);
+ if (r)
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+
+ if (!isLUKS2(crypt_get_type(cd))) {
+ log_err(_("Active device %s is not LUKS2."), active_name);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ r = luks2_reencrypt_in_progress(cd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return DEVICE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ *r_cd = cd;
+
+ return !r ? DEVICE_LUKS2 : DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_restore_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
+ const char *data_device, const char *header)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(data_device);
+ assert(header);
+
+ crypt_free(*cd);
+ *cd = NULL;
+
+ log_verbose(_("Restoring original LUKS2 header."));
+
+ r = crypt_init(cd, data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_header_restore(*cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, header);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(_("Original LUKS2 header restore failed."));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_luks2_datashift_init(struct crypt_device **cd,
+ const char *data_device,
+ const char *expheader)
+{
+ int fd, r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ struct stat hdr_st;
+ bool remove_header = false;
+ char *msg, *active_name = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {
+ .mode = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_DECRYPT,
+ .direction = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD,
+ .resilience = "datashift-checksum",
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID) ?: "sha256",
+ .data_shift = crypt_get_data_offset(*cd),
+ .device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .max_hotzone_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .flags = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_MOVE_FIRST_SEGMENT
+ };
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID)) {
+ r = asprintf(&msg, _("Header file %s does not exist. Do you want to initialize LUKS2 "
+ "decryption of device %s and export LUKS2 header to file %s?"),
+ expheader, data_device, expheader);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = yesDialog(msg, _("Operation aborted.\n")) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ free(msg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = decrypt_verify_and_set_params(&params)))
+ return r;
+
+ r = reencrypt_hint_force_offline_reencrypt(data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID),
+ verify_passphrase(0), 0, *cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = reencrypt_check_passphrase(*cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), password, passwordLen);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_header_backup(*cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, expheader);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ remove_header = true;
+
+ fd = open(expheader, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &hdr_st)) {
+ close(fd);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = fchmod(fd, hdr_st.st_mode | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ close(fd);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to add read/write permissions to exported header file."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(*cd);
+ *cd = NULL;
+
+ /* reload with exported header */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID)) {
+ if (load_luks2_by_name(cd, ARG_STR(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID), expheader) != DEVICE_LUKS2) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(cd, expheader, data_device)))
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = crypt_load(*cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ _set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID))
+ r = reencrypt_get_active_name(*cd, data_device, &active_name);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = tools_wipe_all_signatures(data_device, active_name == NULL, true);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ /* if header restore fails keep original header backup */
+ if (reencrypt_restore_header(cd, data_device, expheader) < 0)
+ remove_header = false;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ remove_header = false;
+
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(*cd, active_name, password,
+ passwordLen, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
+ NULL, NULL, &params);
+
+ if (r < 0 && crypt_reencrypt_status(*cd, NULL) == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+ /* if restore is successful we can remove header backup */
+ if (!reencrypt_restore_header(cd, data_device, expheader))
+ remove_header = true;
+ }
+out:
+ free(active_name);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+
+ if (r < 0 && !remove_header && !stat(expheader, &hdr_st) && S_ISREG(hdr_st.st_mode))
+ log_err(_("Reencryption initialization failed. Header backup is available in %s."),
+ expheader);
+ if (remove_header)
+ unlink(expheader);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_luks2_init(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data_device)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ char *active_name = NULL, *password = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {
+ .mode = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_DECRYPT,
+ .direction = data_shift > 0 ? CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD : CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD,
+ .resilience = data_shift ? "datashift" : (ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID) ?: "checksum"),
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID) ?: "sha256",
+ .data_shift = imaxabs(data_shift) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .max_hotzone_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ };
+
+ if (!luks2_reencrypt_eligible(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((!crypt_get_metadata_device_name(cd) || crypt_header_is_detached(cd) <= 0 ||
+ crypt_get_data_offset(cd) > 0)) {
+ log_err(_("LUKS2 decryption is supported with detached header device only (with data offset set to 0)."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ r = reencrypt_hint_force_offline_reencrypt(data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ _set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+ ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = reencrypt_check_passphrase(cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), password, passwordLen);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID))
+ r = reencrypt_get_active_name(cd, data_device, &active_name);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, active_name, password,
+ passwordLen, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, NULL, NULL, &params);
+
+out:
+ free(active_name);
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ return r;
+}
+
+struct keyslot_passwords {
+ char *password;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ int new;
+};
+
+static struct keyslot_passwords *init_keyslot_passwords(size_t count)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ struct keyslot_passwords *tmp = calloc(count, sizeof(struct keyslot_passwords));
+
+ if (!tmp)
+ return tmp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ tmp[i].new = -1;
+
+ return tmp;
+}
+
+static int init_passphrase(struct keyslot_passwords *kp, size_t keyslot_passwords_length,
+ struct crypt_device *cd, const char *msg, int slot_to_check)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ char *password;
+ int r = -EINVAL, retry_count;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+
+ if (slot_to_check != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot_to_check);
+ if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE || ki == CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ retry_count = set_tries_tty();
+
+ while (retry_count--) {
+ r = tools_get_key(msg, &password, &passwordLen, 0, 0,
+ ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), 0, 0, 0 /*pwquality*/, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (quit) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, slot_to_check,
+ password, passwordLen, 0);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+ }
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EPERM)
+ return r;
+
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ if ((size_t)r >= keyslot_passwords_length) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ kp[r].password = password;
+ kp[r].passwordLen = passwordLen;
+ break;
+ }
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ }
+
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _check_luks2_keyslots(struct crypt_device *cd, bool vk_change)
+{
+ int i, new_vk_slot = (vk_change ? 1 : 0), max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2), active = 0, unbound = 0;
+
+ if (max < 0)
+ return max;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+ switch (crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i)) {
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE:
+ /* fall-through */
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST:
+ active++;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND:
+ unbound++;
+ /* fall-through */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* at least one keyslot for reencryption plus new volume key (if needed) */
+ if (active + unbound + new_vk_slot + 1 > max) {
+ log_err(_("Not enough free keyslots for reencryption."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!vk_change)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) &&
+ (2 * active + unbound + 1 > max)) {
+ log_err(_("Not enough free keyslots for reencryption."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fill_keyslot_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct keyslot_passwords *kp, size_t kp_size,
+ bool vk_change)
+{
+ char msg[128];
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ int i, r = 0;
+
+ if (vk_change && ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ for (i = 0; (size_t)i < kp_size; i++) {
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, i);
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE) {
+ log_err(_("Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with "
+ "exactly one key slot active."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ for (i = 0; (size_t)i < kp_size; i++) {
+ if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter passphrase for key slot %d: "), i) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ r = init_passphrase(kp, kp_size, cd, msg, i);
+ /* no need to initialize all keyslots with --keep-key */
+ if (r >= 0 && !vk_change)
+ break;
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ r = 0;
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter passphrase for key slot %u: "), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID)) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ r = init_passphrase(kp, kp_size, cd, msg, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ }
+
+ return r < 0 ? r : 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_tokens(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot_old, int keyslot_new)
+{
+ int token = 0, r = crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, token, keyslot_old);
+
+ while (r != -EINVAL) {
+ if (!r && (token != crypt_token_assign_keyslot(cd, token, keyslot_new)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ token++;
+ r = crypt_token_is_assigned(cd, token, keyslot_old);
+ }
+
+ /* we reached max token number, exit */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_luks2_init(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data_device)
+{
+ bool vk_size_change, sector_size_change, sector_size_increase, vk_change;
+ size_t i, vk_size, kp_size;
+ int r, keyslot_old = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, keyslot_new = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key_size;
+ char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], *vk = NULL, *active_name = NULL;
+ const char *new_cipher = NULL;
+ struct keyslot_passwords *kp = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_luks2 luks2_params = {};
+ struct crypt_params_reencrypt params = {
+ .mode = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REENCRYPT,
+ .direction = data_shift < 0 ? CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD : CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD,
+ .resilience = data_shift ? "datashift" : (ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_ID) ?: "checksum"),
+ .hash = ARG_STR(OPT_RESILIENCE_HASH_ID) ?: "sha256",
+ .data_shift = imaxabs(data_shift) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .max_hotzone_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HOTZONE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID) / SECTOR_SIZE,
+ .luks2 = &luks2_params,
+ };
+
+ if (!luks2_reencrypt_eligible(cd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ _set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
+
+ /* cipher */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID))
+ new_cipher = ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID);
+ else if (!ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) && crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) {
+ log_std(_("Switching data encryption cipher to %s.\n"), DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1));
+ new_cipher = DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1);
+ }
+
+ if (!new_cipher) {
+ strncpy(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
+ strncpy(mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
+ cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN-1] = '\0';
+ mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN-1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ if ((r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(new_cipher, cipher, NULL, mode))) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* the segment cipher is identical with existing one */
+ if (!strcmp(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd)) && !strcmp(mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)))
+ new_cipher = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* sector size */
+ luks2_params.sector_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_SECTOR_SIZE_ID) ?: (uint32_t)crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+ sector_size_change = luks2_params.sector_size != (uint32_t)crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+ sector_size_increase = luks2_params.sector_size > (uint32_t)crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+
+ /* key size */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) || new_cipher)
+ key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0);
+ else
+ key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+ if (!key_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ vk_size = key_size;
+
+ vk_size_change = key_size != crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+ /* volume key */
+ vk_change = !ARG_SET(OPT_KEEP_KEY_ID);
+
+ if (vk_change && ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &vk, key_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!crypt_volume_key_verify(cd, vk, key_size)) {
+ /* passed key was valid volume key */
+ vk_change = false;
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ vk = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!vk_change && !vk_size_change && !new_cipher && !sector_size_change) {
+ log_err(_("No data segment parameters changed. Reencryption aborted."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID) || (tools_blkid_supported() && sector_size_increase)) {
+ r = reencrypt_hint_force_offline_reencrypt(data_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = _check_luks2_keyslots(cd, vk_change);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ kp_size = r;
+
+ kp = init_keyslot_passwords(kp_size);
+ if (!kp) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* coverity[overrun-call] */
+ r = fill_keyslot_passwords(cd, kp, kp_size, vk_change);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = -ENOENT;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kp_size; i++) {
+ if (!vk_change) {
+ if (kp[i].password) {
+ r = keyslot_old = kp[i].new = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (kp[i].password && keyslot_new < 0) {
+ r = set_keyslot_params(cd, i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, key_size,
+ kp[i].password, kp[i].passwordLen, CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+
+ kp[i].new = r;
+ keyslot_new = r;
+ keyslot_old = i;
+ if (!vk) {
+ /* key generated in crypt_keyslot_add_by_key() call above */
+ vk = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
+ if (!vk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot_new, vk, &vk_size, kp[i].password, kp[i].passwordLen);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ r = assign_tokens(cd, i, r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ } else if (kp[i].password) {
+ r = set_keyslot_params(cd, i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, key_size,
+ kp[i].password, kp[i].passwordLen, CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE);
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ kp[i].new = r;
+ r = assign_tokens(cd, i, r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * with --init-only lookup active device only if
+ * blkid probes are allowed and sector size increase
+ * is requested.
+ */
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID) &&
+ (!ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID) || (tools_blkid_supported() && sector_size_increase))) {
+ r = reencrypt_get_active_name(cd, data_device, &active_name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sector_size_increase && !active_name && tools_blkid_supported() &&
+ !ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Encryption sector size increase on offline device is not supported.\n"
+ "Activate the device first or use --force-offline-reencrypt option (dangerous!)."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (sector_size_increase && active_name) {
+ r = reencrypt_check_active_device_sb_block_size(active_name, luks2_params.sector_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd,
+ ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID) ? NULL : active_name,
+ kp[keyslot_old].password, kp[keyslot_old].passwordLen,
+ keyslot_old, kp[keyslot_old].new, cipher, mode, &params);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(vk);
+ if (kp) {
+ for (i = 0; i < kp_size; i++) {
+ crypt_safe_free(kp[i].password);
+ if (r < 0 && kp[i].new >= 0 && kp[i].new != (int)i &&
+ crypt_reencrypt_status(cd, NULL) == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE &&
+ crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, kp[i].new))
+ log_dbg("Failed to remove keyslot %d with unbound key.", kp[i].new);
+ }
+ free(kp);
+ }
+ free(active_name);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_luks2_resume(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nReencryption interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_FORCE_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT_ID) && !ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_std(_("Resuming LUKS reencryption in forced offline mode.\n"));
+
+ set_int_handler(0);
+ r = crypt_reencrypt_run(cd, tools_progress, &prog_parms);
+ free(backing_file);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int check_broken_luks_signature(const char *device)
+{
+ int r;
+ size_t count;
+
+ r = tools_detect_signatures(device, PRB_ONLY_LUKS, &count, ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s contains broken LUKS metadata. Aborting operation."), device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int _encrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type, enum device_status_info dev_st, int action_argc, const char **action_argv)
+{
+ const char *device_ptr;
+ enum device_status_info data_dev_st;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct crypt_device *encrypt_cd = NULL;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2 || dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is already LUKS device. Aborting operation."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_NOT_LUKS &&
+ (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) || !stat(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), &st))) {
+ device_ptr = ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) ? ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) : action_argv[0];
+ r = check_broken_luks_signature(device_ptr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* check data device type/state */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID)) {
+ device_ptr = cd ? crypt_get_device_name(cd) : action_argv[0];
+ data_dev_st = check_luks_device(device_ptr);
+
+ if (data_dev_st == DEVICE_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (data_dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2 || data_dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is already LUKS device. Aborting operation."),
+ device_ptr);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (data_dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT || data_dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is already in LUKS reencryption. Aborting operation."),
+ device_ptr);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = check_broken_luks_signature(device_ptr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!type)
+ type = crypt_get_default_type();
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE || isLUKS1(type)) {
+ r = reencrypt_is_header_detached(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), action_argv[0]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (!r && !ARG_SET(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Encryption without detached header (--header) is not possible without data device size reduction (--reduce-device-size)."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ return reencrypt_luks1(action_argv[0]);
+ } else if (dev_st == DEVICE_NOT_LUKS) {
+ r = encrypt_luks2_init(&encrypt_cd, action_argv[0], action_argc > 1 ? action_argv[1] : NULL);
+ if (r < 0 || ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID)) {
+ crypt_free(encrypt_cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+ cd = encrypt_cd;
+ dev_st = DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT;
+ } else if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT &&
+ (r = reencrypt_luks2_load(cd, action_argv[0])) < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (dev_st != DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = reencrypt_luks2_resume(cd);
+
+ crypt_free(encrypt_cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _decrypt(struct crypt_device **cd, enum device_status_info dev_st, const char *data_device)
+{
+ int r;
+ struct stat st;
+ bool export_header = false;
+
+ assert(cd);
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1 || dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE)
+ return reencrypt_luks1(data_device);
+
+ /* header file does not exist, try loading device type from data device */
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_NOT_LUKS && ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) &&
+ (stat(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), &st) < 0) && errno == ENOENT) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID))
+ dev_st = load_luks2_by_name(cd, ARG_STR(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID), NULL);
+ else
+ dev_st = load_luks(cd, NULL, uuid_or_device(data_device));
+
+ /*
+ * If data device is not LUKS2 report 'header is missing' error
+ * message user would get originally.
+ */
+ if (dev_st != DEVICE_LUKS2) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s does not exist or access denied."),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ export_header = true;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT) {
+ if ((r = reencrypt_luks2_load(*cd, data_device)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2) {
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("LUKS2 decryption requires --header option."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (export_header)
+ r = decrypt_luks2_datashift_init(cd, data_device, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ else
+ r = decrypt_luks2_init(*cd, data_device);
+
+ if (r < 0 || ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID))
+ return r;
+ } else if (dev_st == DEVICE_NOT_LUKS) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."),
+ ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: uuid_or_device(data_device));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = reencrypt_luks2_resume(*cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, enum device_status_info dev_st, const char *data_device)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1 || dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE)
+ return reencrypt_luks1(data_device);
+ else if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT) {
+ if ((r = reencrypt_luks2_load(cd, data_device)) < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2) {
+ r = reencrypt_luks2_init(cd, data_device);
+ if (r < 0|| ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID))
+ return r;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return reencrypt_luks2_resume(cd);
+}
+
+int reencrypt(int action_argc, const char **action_argv)
+{
+ enum device_status_info dev_st;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ const char *type = luksType(device_type);
+
+ if (action_argc < 1 && (!ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID) || ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID))) {
+ log_err(_("Command requires device as argument."));
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID))
+ dev_st = load_luks2_by_name(&cd, ARG_STR(OPT_ACTIVE_NAME_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID));
+ else
+ dev_st = load_luks(&cd, ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), uuid_or_device(action_argv[0]));
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_INVALID)
+ return r;
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1 && isLUKS2(type)) {
+ log_err(_("Conflicting versions. Device %s is LUKS1."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1_UNUSABLE && isLUKS2(type)) {
+ log_err(_("Conflicting versions. Device %s is in LUKS1 reencryption."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2 && isLUKS1(type)) {
+ log_err(_("Conflicting versions. Device %s is LUKS2."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT && isLUKS1(type)) {
+ log_err(_("Conflicting versions. Device %s is in LUKS2 reencryption."),
+ uuid_or_device(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID) ?: action_argv[0]));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2_REENCRYPT && ARG_SET(OPT_INIT_ONLY_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("LUKS2 reencryption already initialized. Aborting operation."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_RESUME_ONLY_ID) &&
+ (dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS2 || dev_st == DEVICE_LUKS1 || dev_st == DEVICE_NOT_LUKS)) {
+ log_err(_("Device reencryption not in progress."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID))
+ r = _encrypt(cd, type, dev_st, action_argc, action_argv);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_DECRYPT_ID))
+ r = _decrypt(&cd, dev_st, action_argv[0]);
+ else
+ r = _reencrypt(cd, dev_st, action_argv[0]);
+
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_reencrypt_luks1.c b/src/utils_reencrypt_luks1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae849c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_reencrypt_luks1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1354 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - LUKS1 utility for offline re-encryption
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "cryptsetup_args.h"
+#include "utils_luks.h"
+
+#define NO_UUID "cafecafe-cafe-cafe-cafe-cafecafeeeee"
+
+extern int64_t data_shift;
+
+#define MAX_SLOT 8
+
+struct reenc_ctx {
+ char *device;
+ char *device_header;
+ char *device_uuid;
+ const char *type;
+ uint64_t device_size; /* overridden by parameter */
+ uint64_t device_size_new_real;
+ uint64_t device_size_org_real;
+ uint64_t device_offset;
+ uint64_t device_shift;
+ uint64_t data_offset;
+
+ bool stained;
+ bool in_progress;
+ enum { FORWARD = 0, BACKWARD = 1 } reencrypt_direction;
+ enum { REENCRYPT = 0, ENCRYPT = 1, DECRYPT = 2 } reencrypt_mode;
+
+ char header_file_org[PATH_MAX];
+ char header_file_new[PATH_MAX];
+ char log_file[PATH_MAX];
+
+ char crypt_path_org[PATH_MAX];
+ char crypt_path_new[PATH_MAX];
+ int log_fd;
+ char log_buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
+
+ struct {
+ char *password;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+ } p[MAX_SLOT];
+ int keyslot;
+
+ uint64_t resume_bytes;
+};
+
+char MAGIC[] = {'L','U','K','S', 0xba, 0xbe};
+char NOMAGIC[] = {'L','U','K','S', 0xde, 0xad};
+int MAGIC_L = 6;
+
+typedef enum {
+ MAKE_UNUSABLE,
+ MAKE_USABLE,
+ CHECK_UNUSABLE,
+ CHECK_OPEN,
+} header_magic;
+
+static void _quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_ID))
+ return;
+ tool_log(level, msg, usrptr);
+}
+
+static int alignment(int fd)
+{
+ int alignment;
+
+ alignment = fpathconf(fd, _PC_REC_XFER_ALIGN);
+ if (alignment < 0)
+ alignment = 4096;
+ return alignment;
+}
+
+static size_t pagesize(void)
+{
+ long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+ return r < 0 ? 4096 : (size_t)r;
+}
+
+static const char *hdr_device(const struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ return rc->device_header ?: rc->device;
+}
+
+/* Depends on the first two fields of LUKS1 header format, magic and version */
+static int device_check(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device, header_magic set_magic, bool exclusive)
+{
+ char *buf = NULL;
+ int r, devfd;
+ ssize_t s;
+ uint16_t version;
+ size_t buf_size = pagesize();
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(device, &st)) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot open device %s."), device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* coverity[toctou] */
+ devfd = open(device, O_RDWR | ((S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) && exclusive) ? O_EXCL : 0)); /* lgtm[cpp/toctou-race-condition] */
+ if (devfd == -1) {
+ if (errno == EBUSY) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot exclusively open %s, device in use."),
+ device);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ log_err(_("Cannot open device %s."), device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (set_magic == CHECK_OPEN) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (posix_memalign((void *)&buf, alignment(devfd), buf_size)) {
+ log_err(_("Allocation of aligned memory failed."));
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ s = read(devfd, buf, buf_size);
+ if (s < 0 || s != (ssize_t)buf_size) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read device %s."), device);
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Be sure that we do not process new version of header */
+ memcpy((void*)&version, &buf[MAGIC_L], sizeof(uint16_t));
+ version = be16_to_cpu(version);
+
+ if (set_magic == MAKE_UNUSABLE && !memcmp(buf, MAGIC, MAGIC_L) &&
+ version == 1) {
+ log_verbose(_("Marking LUKS1 device %s unusable."), device);
+ memcpy(buf, NOMAGIC, MAGIC_L);
+ r = 0;
+ } else if (set_magic == CHECK_UNUSABLE && version == 1) {
+ r = memcmp(buf, NOMAGIC, MAGIC_L) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ if (rc && !r)
+ rc->device_uuid = strndup(&buf[0xa8], 40);
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!r && version == 1) {
+ if (lseek(devfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+ goto out;
+ s = write(devfd, buf, buf_size);
+ if (s < 0 || s != (ssize_t)buf_size || fsync(devfd) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot write device %s."), device);
+ r = -EIO;
+ }
+ if (rc && s > 0 && set_magic == MAKE_UNUSABLE)
+ rc->stained = true;
+ }
+ if (r)
+ log_dbg("LUKS signature check failed for %s.", device);
+out:
+ if (buf)
+ memset(buf, 0, buf_size);
+ free(buf);
+ close(devfd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int create_empty_header(const char *new_file)
+{
+ int fd, r = 0;
+
+ log_dbg("Creating empty file %s of size 4096.", new_file);
+
+ /* coverity[toctou] */
+ fd = open(new_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+ if (fd == -1 || posix_fallocate(fd, 0, 4096))
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int write_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ ssize_t r;
+
+ memset(rc->log_buf, 0, SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (snprintf(rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE, "# LUKS reencryption log, DO NOT EDIT OR DELETE.\n"
+ "version = %d\nUUID = %s\ndirection = %d\nmode = %d\n"
+ "offset = %" PRIu64 "\nshift = %" PRIu64 "\n# EOF\n",
+ 2, rc->device_uuid, rc->reencrypt_direction, rc->reencrypt_mode,
+ rc->device_offset, rc->device_shift) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (lseek(rc->log_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ r = write(rc->log_fd, rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (r < 0 || r != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot write reencryption log file."));
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_line_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *line)
+{
+ uint64_t u64;
+ int i;
+ char s[64];
+
+ /* whole line is comment */
+ if (*line == '#')
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sscanf(line, "version = %d", &i) == 1) {
+ if (i < 1 || i > 2) {
+ log_dbg("Log: Unexpected version = %i", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (sscanf(line, "UUID = %40s", s) == 1) {
+ if (!rc->device_uuid || strcmp(rc->device_uuid, s)) {
+ log_dbg("Log: Unexpected UUID %s", s);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (sscanf(line, "direction = %d", &i) == 1) {
+ log_dbg("Log: direction = %i", i);
+ rc->reencrypt_direction = i;
+ } else if (sscanf(line, "offset = %" PRIu64, &u64) == 1) {
+ log_dbg("Log: offset = %" PRIu64, u64);
+ rc->device_offset = u64;
+ } else if (sscanf(line, "shift = %" PRIu64, &u64) == 1) {
+ log_dbg("Log: shift = %" PRIu64, u64);
+ rc->device_shift = u64;
+ } else if (sscanf(line, "mode = %d", &i) == 1) { /* added in v2 */
+ log_dbg("Log: mode = %i", i);
+ rc->reencrypt_mode = i;
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode != REENCRYPT &&
+ rc->reencrypt_mode != ENCRYPT &&
+ rc->reencrypt_mode != DECRYPT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ char *start, *end;
+ ssize_t s;
+
+ s = read(rc->log_fd, rc->log_buf, SECTOR_SIZE);
+ if (s == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read reencryption log file."));
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ rc->log_buf[SECTOR_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
+ start = rc->log_buf;
+ do {
+ end = strchr(start, '\n');
+ if (end) {
+ *end++ = '\0';
+ if (parse_line_log(rc, start)) {
+ log_err(_("Wrong log format."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start = end;
+ } while (start);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void close_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ log_dbg("Closing LUKS reencryption log file %s.", rc->log_file);
+ if (rc->log_fd != -1)
+ close(rc->log_fd);
+}
+
+static int open_log(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ int flags = ARG_SET(OPT_USE_FSYNC_ID) ? O_SYNC : 0;
+
+ rc->log_fd = open(rc->log_file, O_RDWR|O_EXCL|O_CREAT|flags, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+ if (rc->log_fd != -1) {
+ log_dbg("Created LUKS reencryption log file %s.", rc->log_file);
+ rc->stained = 0;
+ } else if (errno == EEXIST) {
+ log_std(_("Log file %s exists, resuming reencryption.\n"), rc->log_file);
+ rc->log_fd = open(rc->log_file, O_RDWR|flags);
+ rc->in_progress = true;
+ }
+
+ if (rc->log_fd == -1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!rc->in_progress && write_log(rc) < 0) {
+ close_log(rc);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* Be sure it is correct format */
+ return parse_log(rc);
+}
+
+static int activate_luks_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL, *cd_new = NULL;
+ const char *pwd_old, *pwd_new, pwd_empty[] = "";
+ size_t pwd_old_len, pwd_new_len;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Activating LUKS devices from headers.");
+
+ /* Never use real password for empty header processing */
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == REENCRYPT) {
+ pwd_old = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+ pwd_old_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+ pwd_new = pwd_old;
+ pwd_new_len = pwd_old_len;
+ } else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) {
+ pwd_old = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+ pwd_old_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+ pwd_new = pwd_empty;
+ pwd_new_len = 0;
+ } else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT) {
+ pwd_old = pwd_empty;
+ pwd_old_len = 0;
+ pwd_new = rc->p[rc->keyslot].password;
+ pwd_new_len = rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen;
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, rc->header_file_org, rc->device)) ||
+ (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ log_verbose(_("Activating temporary device using old LUKS header."));
+ if ((r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, rc->header_file_org,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), pwd_old, pwd_old_len,
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd_new, rc->header_file_new, rc->device)) ||
+ (r = crypt_load(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ log_verbose(_("Activating temporary device using new LUKS header."));
+ if ((r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd_new, rc->header_file_new,
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), pwd_new, pwd_new_len,
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_free(cd_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_err(_("Activation of temporary devices failed."));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int create_new_keyslot(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int keyslot,
+ struct crypt_device *cd_old,
+ struct crypt_device *cd_new)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t key_size;
+
+ if (cd_old && crypt_keyslot_status(cd_old, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND) {
+ key_size = 4096;
+ key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
+ if (!key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd_old, keyslot, key, &key_size,
+ rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen);
+ if (r == keyslot) {
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd_new, keyslot, key, key_size,
+ rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen,
+ CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT);
+ } else
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ } else
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd_new, keyslot, NULL, 0,
+ rc->p[keyslot].password, rc->p[keyslot].passwordLen);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int create_new_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd_old,
+ const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+ const char *uuid,
+ const char *key, int key_size,
+ uint64_t metadata_size,
+ uint64_t keyslots_size,
+ void *params)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd_new = NULL;
+ int i, r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd_new, rc->header_file_new)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_RANDOM_ID))
+ crypt_set_rng_type(cd_new, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_URANDOM_ID))
+ crypt_set_rng_type(cd_new, CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM);
+
+ r = set_pbkdf_params(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set pbkdf parameters."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_set_data_offset(cd_new, rc->data_offset);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set data offset."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_set_metadata_size(cd_new, metadata_size, keyslots_size);
+ if (r) {
+ log_err(_("Failed to set metadata size."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, uuid, key, key_size, params);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ log_verbose(_("New LUKS header for device %s created."), rc->device);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS1); i++) {
+ if (!rc->p[i].password)
+ continue;
+
+ r = create_new_keyslot(rc, i, cd_old, cd_new);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, CREATED);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd_new);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int backup_luks_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {0};
+ char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t key_size;
+ uint64_t mdata_size = 0, keyslots_size = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Creating LUKS header backup for device %s.", hdr_device(rc));
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc))) ||
+ (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_header_backup(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, rc->header_file_org)))
+ goto out;
+
+ log_verbose(_("%s header backup of device %s created."), "LUKS1", rc->device);
+
+ /* For decrypt, new header will be fake one, so we are done here. */
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc->data_offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) + ROUND_SECTOR(ARG_UINT64(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID));
+
+ if ((r = create_empty_header(rc->header_file_new)))
+ goto out;
+
+ params.hash = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+ params.data_device = rc->device;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ key_size = ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) ? ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8 : (uint32_t)crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEEP_KEY_ID)) {
+ log_dbg("Keeping key from old header.");
+ key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
+ if (!key) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, key, &key_size,
+ rc->p[rc->keyslot].password, rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen);
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_dbg("Loading new key from file.");
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_VOLUME_KEY_FILE_ID), &key, key_size);
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = create_new_header(rc, cd,
+ ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ? cipher : crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+ ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ? cipher_mode : crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
+ crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+ key,
+ key_size,
+ mdata_size,
+ keyslots_size,
+ (void*)&params);
+
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ crypt_safe_free(key);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(_("Creation of LUKS backup headers failed."));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* Create fake header for original device */
+static int backup_fake_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd_new = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_luks1 params = {0};
+ char cipher [MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ const char *header_file_fake;
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Creating fake (cipher_null) header for %s device.",
+ (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) ? "new" : "original");
+
+ header_file_fake = (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) ? rc->header_file_new : rc->header_file_org;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID))
+ ARG_SET_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID)) {
+ r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("No known cipher specification pattern detected."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = create_empty_header(header_file_fake);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ params.hash = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+ params.data_alignment = 0;
+ params.data_device = rc->device;
+
+ r = crypt_init(&cd_new, header_file_fake);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd_new, CRYPT_LUKS1, "cipher_null", "ecb",
+ NO_UUID, NULL, ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8, &params);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd_new, rc->keyslot, NULL, 0,
+ rc->p[rc->keyslot].password, rc->p[rc->keyslot].passwordLen);
+ check_signal(&r);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* The real header is backup header created in backup_luks_headers() */
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) {
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = create_empty_header(rc->header_file_new);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ params.data_alignment = ROUND_SECTOR(ARG_UINT64(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID));
+ r = create_new_header(rc, NULL,
+ ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ? cipher : DEFAULT_LUKS1_CIPHER,
+ ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ? cipher_mode : DEFAULT_LUKS1_MODE,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEY_SIZE_ID) / 8,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ (void*)&params);
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd_new);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void remove_headers(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+
+ log_dbg("Removing headers.");
+
+ if (crypt_init(&cd, NULL))
+ return;
+ crypt_set_log_callback(cd, _quiet_log, NULL);
+ if (*rc->header_file_org)
+ (void)crypt_deactivate(cd, rc->header_file_org);
+ if (*rc->header_file_new)
+ (void)crypt_deactivate(cd, rc->header_file_new);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+}
+
+static int restore_luks_header(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int fd, r;
+
+ log_dbg("Restoring header for %s from %s.", hdr_device(rc), rc->header_file_new);
+
+ /*
+ * For new encryption and new detached header in file just move it.
+ * For existing file try to ensure we have preallocated space for restore.
+ */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID) && rc->device_header) {
+ r = stat(rc->device_header, &st);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ r = rename(rc->header_file_new, rc->device_header);
+ goto out;
+ } else if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG &&
+ stat(rc->header_file_new, &st) != -1) {
+ /* coverity[toctou] */
+ fd = open(rc->device_header, O_WRONLY);
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ if (posix_fallocate(fd, 0, st.st_size)) {};
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc));
+ if (r == 0) {
+ r = crypt_header_restore(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, rc->header_file_new);
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+out:
+ if (r)
+ log_err(_("Cannot restore %s header on device %s."), "LUKS1", hdr_device(rc));
+ else {
+ log_verbose(_("%s header on device %s restored."), "LUKS1", hdr_device(rc));
+ rc->stained = false;
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static ssize_t read_buf(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t read_size = 0;
+ ssize_t s;
+
+ do {
+ /* This expects that partial read is aligned in buffer */
+ s = read(fd, buf, count - read_size);
+ if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+ return s;
+ if (s == 0)
+ return (ssize_t)read_size;
+ if (s > 0) {
+ if (s != (ssize_t)count)
+ log_dbg("Partial read %zd / %zu.", s, count);
+ read_size += (size_t)s;
+ buf = (uint8_t*)buf + s;
+ }
+ } while (read_size != count);
+
+ return (ssize_t)count;
+}
+
+static int copy_data_forward(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int fd_old, int fd_new,
+ size_t block_size, void *buf, uint64_t *bytes)
+{
+ ssize_t s1, s2;
+ int r = -EIO;
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nReencryption interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(rc->device, &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ log_dbg("Reencrypting in forward direction.");
+
+ if (lseek(fd_old, rc->device_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
+ lseek(fd_new, rc->device_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot seek to device offset."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc->resume_bytes = *bytes = rc->device_offset;
+
+ tools_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes, &prog_parms);
+
+ if (write_log(rc) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ while (!quit && rc->device_offset < rc->device_size) {
+ if ((rc->device_size - rc->device_offset) < (uint64_t)block_size)
+ block_size = rc->device_size - rc->device_offset;
+ s1 = read_buf(fd_old, buf, block_size);
+ if (s1 < 0 || ((size_t)s1 != block_size &&
+ (rc->device_offset + s1) != rc->device_size)) {
+ log_dbg("Read error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+ block_size, s1);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* If device_size is forced, never write more than limit */
+ if ((s1 + rc->device_offset) > rc->device_size)
+ s1 = rc->device_size - rc->device_offset;
+
+ s2 = write(fd_new, buf, s1);
+ if (s2 < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+ block_size, s2);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc->device_offset += s1;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_WRITE_LOG_ID) && write_log(rc) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_FSYNC_ID) && fsync(fd_new) < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *bytes += (uint64_t)s2;
+
+ tools_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes, &prog_parms);
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ free(backing_file);
+ return quit ? -EAGAIN : r;
+}
+
+static int copy_data_backward(struct reenc_ctx *rc, int fd_old, int fd_new,
+ size_t block_size, void *buf, uint64_t *bytes)
+{
+ ssize_t s1, s2, working_block;
+ off_t working_offset;
+ int r = -EIO;
+ char *backing_file = NULL;
+ struct tools_progress_params prog_parms = {
+ .frequency = ARG_UINT32(OPT_PROGRESS_FREQUENCY_ID),
+ .batch_mode = ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID),
+ .json_output = ARG_SET(OPT_PROGRESS_JSON_ID),
+ .interrupt_message = _("\nReencryption interrupted."),
+ .device = tools_get_device_name(rc->device, &backing_file)
+ };
+
+ log_dbg("Reencrypting in backward direction.");
+
+ if (!rc->in_progress) {
+ rc->device_offset = rc->device_size;
+ rc->resume_bytes = 0;
+ *bytes = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc->resume_bytes = rc->device_size - rc->device_offset;
+ *bytes = rc->resume_bytes;
+ }
+
+ tools_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes, &prog_parms);
+
+ if (write_log(rc) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* dirty the device during ENCRYPT mode */
+ rc->stained = true;
+
+ while (!quit && rc->device_offset) {
+ if (rc->device_offset < block_size) {
+ working_offset = 0;
+ working_block = rc->device_offset;
+ } else {
+ working_offset = rc->device_offset - block_size;
+ working_block = block_size;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek(fd_old, working_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0 ||
+ lseek(fd_new, working_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot seek to device offset."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ s1 = read_buf(fd_old, buf, working_block);
+ if (s1 < 0 || (s1 != working_block)) {
+ log_dbg("Read error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+ block_size, s1);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ s2 = write(fd_new, buf, working_block);
+ if (s2 < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zu, got %zd.",
+ block_size, s2);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc->device_offset -= s1;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_WRITE_LOG_ID) && write_log(rc) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_FSYNC_ID) && fsync(fd_new) < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *bytes += (uint64_t)s2;
+
+ tools_progress(rc->device_size, *bytes, &prog_parms);
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ free(backing_file);
+ return quit ? -EAGAIN : r;
+}
+
+static void zero_rest_of_device(int fd, size_t block_size, void *buf,
+ uint64_t *bytes, uint64_t offset)
+{
+ ssize_t s1, s2;
+
+ log_dbg("Zeroing rest of device.");
+
+ if (lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Cannot seek to device offset.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0, block_size);
+ s1 = block_size;
+
+ while (!quit && *bytes) {
+ if (*bytes < (uint64_t)s1)
+ s1 = *bytes;
+
+ s2 = write(fd, buf, s1);
+ if (s2 != s1) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, expecting %zd, got %zd.",
+ s1, s2);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_FSYNC_ID) && fsync(fd) < 0) {
+ log_dbg("Write error, fsync.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *bytes -= s2;
+ }
+}
+
+static int copy_data(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ size_t block_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_BLOCK_SIZE_ID) * 1024 * 1024;
+ int fd_old = -1, fd_new = -1;
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ void *buf = NULL;
+ uint64_t bytes = 0;
+
+ log_dbg("Data copy preparation.");
+
+ fd_old = open(rc->crypt_path_org, O_RDONLY | (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_DIRECTIO_ID) ? O_DIRECT : 0));
+ if (fd_old == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot open temporary LUKS device."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ fd_new = open(rc->crypt_path_new, O_WRONLY | (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_DIRECTIO_ID) ? O_DIRECT : 0));
+ if (fd_new == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot open temporary LUKS device."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd_old, BLKGETSIZE64, &rc->device_size_org_real) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot get device size."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd_new, BLKGETSIZE64, &rc->device_size_new_real) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot get device size."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ rc->device_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DEVICE_SIZE_ID);
+ else if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT)
+ rc->device_size = rc->device_size_org_real;
+ else
+ rc->device_size = rc->device_size_new_real;
+
+ if (posix_memalign((void *)&buf, alignment(fd_new), block_size)) {
+ log_err(_("Allocation of aligned memory failed."));
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ set_int_handler(0);
+
+ if (rc->reencrypt_direction == FORWARD)
+ r = copy_data_forward(rc, fd_old, fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes);
+ else
+ r = copy_data_backward(rc, fd_old, fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes);
+
+ /* Zero (wipe) rest of now plain-only device when decrypting.
+ * (To not leave any sign of encryption here.) */
+ if (!r && rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT &&
+ rc->device_size_new_real > rc->device_size_org_real) {
+ bytes = rc->device_size_new_real - rc->device_size_org_real;
+ zero_rest_of_device(fd_new, block_size, buf, &bytes, rc->device_size_org_real);
+ }
+
+ set_int_block(1);
+
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EAGAIN)
+ log_err(_("IO error during reencryption."));
+
+ (void)write_log(rc);
+out:
+ if (fd_old != -1)
+ close(fd_old);
+ if (fd_new != -1)
+ close(fd_new);
+ free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_uuid(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+ uuid_t device_uuid;
+
+ log_dbg("Initialising UUID.");
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID)) {
+ rc->device_uuid = strdup(NO_UUID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DECRYPT_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_UUID_ID)) {
+ r = uuid_parse(ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID), device_uuid);
+ if (!r)
+ rc->device_uuid = strdup(ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID));
+ else
+ log_err(_("Provided UUID is invalid."));
+
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to load LUKS from device */
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, hdr_device(rc))))
+ return r;
+ crypt_set_log_callback(cd, _quiet_log, NULL);
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL);
+ if (!r)
+ rc->device_uuid = strdup(crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+ else
+ /* Reencryption already in progress - magic header? */
+ r = device_check(rc, hdr_device(rc), CHECK_UNUSABLE, true);
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int init_passphrase1(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *msg, int slot_to_check, int check, int verify)
+{
+ crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+ char *password;
+ int r = -EINVAL, retry_count;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+
+ /* mode ENCRYPT call this without header */
+ if (cd && slot_to_check != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+ ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot_to_check);
+ if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ } else
+ ki = CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+
+ retry_count = ARG_UINT32(OPT_TRIES_ID) ?: 1;
+ while (retry_count--) {
+ r = tools_get_key(msg, &password, &passwordLen, 0, 0,
+ NULL /*opt_key_file*/, 0, verify, 0 /*pwquality*/, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (quit) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+
+ if (check)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, slot_to_check,
+ password, passwordLen, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY);
+ else
+ r = (slot_to_check == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) ? 0 : slot_to_check;
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+ }
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EPERM)
+ return r;
+
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ tools_keyslot_msg(r, UNLOCKED);
+ rc->p[r].password = password;
+ rc->p[r].passwordLen = passwordLen;
+ if (ki != CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND)
+ rc->keyslot = r;
+ break;
+ }
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ }
+
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int init_keyfile(struct reenc_ctx *rc, struct crypt_device *cd, int slot_check)
+{
+ char *password;
+ int r;
+ size_t passwordLen;
+
+ r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen, ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID),
+ ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID), 0, 0, 0, cd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* mode ENCRYPT call this without header */
+ if (cd) {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, NULL, slot_check, password,
+ passwordLen, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow keyslot only if it is last slot or if user explicitly
+ * specify which slot to use (IOW others will be disabled).
+ */
+ if (r >= 0 && ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+ crypt_keyslot_status(cd, r) != CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST) {
+ log_err(_("Key file can be used only with --key-slot or with "
+ "exactly one key slot active."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ r = slot_check == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? 0 : slot_check;
+ }
+
+ if (r < 0) {
+ crypt_safe_free(password);
+ tools_passphrase_msg(r);
+ } else {
+ rc->keyslot = r;
+ rc->p[r].password = password;
+ rc->p[r].passwordLen = passwordLen;
+ }
+
+ password = NULL;
+ passwordLen = 0;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_passphrase(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ char msg[256];
+ int i, r;
+
+ log_dbg("Passphrases initialization.");
+
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT && !rc->in_progress) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID))
+ r = init_keyfile(rc, NULL, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ else
+ r = init_passphrase1(rc, NULL, _("Enter new passphrase: "), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), 0, 1);
+ return r > 0 ? 0 : r;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, device, rc->device)) ||
+ (r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, NULL))) {
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ _("Enter passphrase for key slot %d: "), ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ else
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter any existing passphrase: "));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID)) {
+ r = init_keyfile(rc, cd, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID));
+ } else if (rc->in_progress ||
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ||
+ rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT) {
+ r = init_passphrase1(rc, cd, msg, ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID), 1, 0);
+ } else for (i = 0; i < crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS1); i++) {
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Enter passphrase for key slot %d: "), i);
+ r = init_passphrase1(rc, cd, msg, i, 1, 0);
+ if (r == -ENOENT) {
+ r = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r > 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int initialize_context(struct reenc_ctx *rc, const char *device)
+{
+ log_dbg("Initialising reencryption context.");
+
+ memset(rc, 0, sizeof(*rc));
+
+ rc->in_progress = false;
+ rc->stained = true;
+ rc->log_fd = -1;
+
+ if (!(rc->device = strndup(device, PATH_MAX)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_HEADER_ID) && !(rc->device_header = strndup(ARG_STR(OPT_HEADER_ID), PATH_MAX)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (device_check(rc, rc->device, CHECK_OPEN, true) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (initialize_uuid(rc)) {
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+ ARG_INT32(OPT_KEY_SLOT_ID) >= crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS1)) {
+ log_err(_("Key slot is invalid."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare device names */
+ if (snprintf(rc->log_file, PATH_MAX,
+ "LUKS-%s.log", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (snprintf(rc->header_file_org, PATH_MAX,
+ "LUKS-%s.org", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (snprintf(rc->header_file_new, PATH_MAX,
+ "LUKS-%s.new", rc->device_uuid) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Paths to encrypted devices */
+ if (snprintf(rc->crypt_path_org, PATH_MAX,
+ "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), rc->header_file_org) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (snprintf(rc->crypt_path_new, PATH_MAX,
+ "%s/%s", crypt_get_dir(), rc->header_file_new) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ remove_headers(rc);
+
+ if (open_log(rc) < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot open reencryption log file."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!rc->in_progress) {
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_UUID_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("No decryption in progress, provided UUID can "
+ "be used only to resume suspended decryption process."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_REDUCE_DEVICE_SIZE_ID))
+ rc->reencrypt_direction = FORWARD;
+ else {
+ rc->reencrypt_direction = BACKWARD;
+ rc->device_offset = (uint64_t)~0;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ENCRYPT_ID))
+ rc->reencrypt_mode = ENCRYPT;
+ else if (ARG_SET(OPT_DECRYPT_ID))
+ rc->reencrypt_mode = DECRYPT;
+ else
+ rc->reencrypt_mode = REENCRYPT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void destroy_context(struct reenc_ctx *rc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ log_dbg("Destroying reencryption context.");
+
+ close_log(rc);
+ remove_headers(rc);
+
+ if (!rc->stained) {
+ unlink(rc->log_file);
+ unlink(rc->header_file_org);
+ unlink(rc->header_file_new);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLOT; i++)
+ crypt_safe_free(rc->p[i].password);
+
+ free(rc->device);
+ free(rc->device_header);
+ free(rc->device_uuid);
+}
+
+int reencrypt_luks1(const char *device)
+{
+ int r = -EINVAL;
+ struct reenc_ctx *rc;
+
+ rc = malloc(sizeof(*rc));
+ if (!rc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_BATCH_MODE_ID))
+ log_verbose(_("Reencryption will change: %s%s%s%s%s%s."),
+ ARG_SET(OPT_KEEP_KEY_ID) ? "" : _("volume key"),
+ (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEEP_KEY_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID)) ? ", " : "",
+ ARG_SET(OPT_HASH_ID) ? _("set hash to ") : "", ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID) ?: "",
+ ARG_SET(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ? _(", set cipher to "): "", ARG_STR(OPT_CIPHER_ID) ?: "");
+ /* FIXME: block all non pbkdf2 pkdfs */
+
+ set_int_handler(0);
+
+ if (initialize_context(rc, device))
+ goto out;
+
+ log_dbg("Running reencryption.");
+
+ if (!rc->in_progress) {
+ if ((r = initialize_passphrase(rc, hdr_device(rc))))
+ goto out;
+
+ log_dbg("Storing backup of LUKS headers.");
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == ENCRYPT) {
+ /* Create fake header for existing device */
+ if ((r = backup_fake_header(rc)))
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ if ((r = backup_luks_headers(rc)))
+ goto out;
+ /* Create fake header for decrypted device */
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode == DECRYPT &&
+ (r = backup_fake_header(rc)))
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = device_check(rc, hdr_device(rc), MAKE_UNUSABLE, true)))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((r = initialize_passphrase(rc, ARG_SET(OPT_DECRYPT_ID) ? rc->header_file_org : rc->header_file_new)))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_KEEP_KEY_ID)) {
+ log_dbg("Running data area reencryption.");
+ if ((r = activate_luks_headers(rc)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = copy_data(rc)))
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ log_dbg("Keeping existing key, skipping data area reencryption.");
+
+ // FIXME: fix error path above to not skip this
+ if (rc->reencrypt_mode != DECRYPT)
+ r = restore_luks_header(rc);
+ else
+ rc->stained = false;
+out:
+ destroy_context(rc);
+ free(rc);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int reencrypt_luks1_in_progress(const char *device)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(device, &st) || (size_t)st.st_size < pagesize())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return device_check(NULL, device, CHECK_UNUSABLE, false);
+}
diff --git a/src/utils_tools.c b/src/utils_tools.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0e2ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils_tools.c
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+
+/* interrupt handling */
+volatile int quit = 0;
+static int signals_blocked = 0;
+
+static void int_handler(int sig __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+ quit++;
+}
+
+int tools_signals_blocked(void)
+{
+ return signals_blocked;
+}
+
+void set_int_block(int block)
+{
+ sigset_t signals_open;
+
+ log_dbg("%slocking interruption on signal.", block ? "B" : "Unb");
+
+ sigemptyset(&signals_open);
+ sigaddset(&signals_open, SIGINT);
+ sigaddset(&signals_open, SIGTERM);
+ sigprocmask(block ? SIG_SETMASK : SIG_UNBLOCK, &signals_open, NULL);
+ signals_blocked = block;
+ quit = 0;
+}
+
+void set_int_handler(int block)
+{
+ struct sigaction sigaction_open;
+
+ log_dbg("Installing SIGINT/SIGTERM handler.");
+ memset(&sigaction_open, 0, sizeof(struct sigaction));
+ sigaction_open.sa_handler = int_handler;
+ sigaction(SIGINT, &sigaction_open, 0);
+ sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigaction_open, 0);
+ set_int_block(block);
+}
+
+void check_signal(int *r)
+{
+ if (quit && !*r)
+ *r = -EINTR;
+}
+
+void tool_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+ struct tools_log_params *params = (struct tools_log_params *)usrptr;
+
+ switch (level) {
+
+ case CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL:
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s", msg);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE:
+ if (params && params->verbose)
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s", msg);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_LOG_ERROR:
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON:
+ case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG:
+ if (params && params->debug)
+ fprintf(stdout, "# %s", msg);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void quiet_log(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+ struct tools_log_params *params = (struct tools_log_params *)usrptr;
+
+ if ((!params || !params->verbose) && (level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR || level == CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL))
+ return;
+ tool_log(level, msg, usrptr);
+}
+
+static int _dialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr, int default_answer)
+{
+ const char *fail_msg = (const char *)usrptr;
+ char *answer = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ int r = default_answer, block;
+
+ block = tools_signals_blocked();
+ if (block)
+ set_int_block(0);
+
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+ log_std(_("\nWARNING!\n========\n"));
+ /* TRANSLATORS: User must type "YES" (in capital letters), do not translate this word. */
+ log_std(_("%s\n\nAre you sure? (Type 'yes' in capital letters): "), msg);
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if(getline(&answer, &size, stdin) == -1) {
+ r = 0;
+ /* Aborted by signal */
+ if (!quit)
+ log_err(_("Error reading response from terminal."));
+ else
+ log_dbg("Query interrupted on signal.");
+ } else {
+ r = !strcmp(answer, "YES\n");
+ if (!r && fail_msg)
+ log_err("%s", fail_msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (block && !quit)
+ set_int_block(1);
+
+ free(answer);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int yesDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+ return _dialog(msg, usrptr, 1);
+}
+
+int noDialog(const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+ return _dialog(msg, usrptr, 0);
+}
+
+void show_status(int errcode)
+{
+ char *crypt_error;
+
+ if (!errcode) {
+ log_verbose(_("Command successful."));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (errcode < 0)
+ errcode = translate_errno(errcode);
+
+ if (errcode == 1)
+ crypt_error = _("wrong or missing parameters");
+ else if (errcode == 2)
+ crypt_error = _("no permission or bad passphrase");
+ else if (errcode == 3)
+ crypt_error = _("out of memory");
+ else if (errcode == 4)
+ crypt_error = _("wrong device or file specified");
+ else if (errcode == 5)
+ crypt_error = _("device already exists or device is busy");
+ else
+ crypt_error = _("unknown error");
+
+ log_verbose(_("Command failed with code %i (%s)."), -errcode, crypt_error);
+}
+
+const char *uuid_or_device(const char *spec)
+{
+ static char device[PATH_MAX];
+ char s, *ptr;
+ int i = 0, uuid_len = 5;
+
+ /* Check if it is correct UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format */
+ if (spec && !strncmp(spec, "UUID=", uuid_len)) {
+ strcpy(device, "/dev/disk/by-uuid/");
+ ptr = &device[strlen(device)];
+ i = uuid_len;
+ while ((s = spec[i++]) && i < (PATH_MAX - 13)) {
+ if (!isxdigit(s) && s != '-')
+ return spec; /* Bail it out */
+ if (isalpha(s))
+ s = tolower(s);
+ *ptr++ = s;
+ }
+ *ptr = '\0';
+ return device;
+ }
+
+ return spec;
+}
+
+__attribute__ ((noreturn)) void usage(poptContext popt_context,
+ int exitcode, const char *error,
+ const char *more)
+{
+ poptPrintUsage(popt_context, stderr, 0);
+ if (error)
+ log_err("%s: %s", more, error);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(exitcode);
+}
+
+void dbg_version_and_cmd(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ log_std("# %s %s processing \"", PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_VERSION);
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (i)
+ log_std(" ");
+ log_std("%s", argv[i]);
+ }
+ log_std("\"\n");
+}
+
+/* Translate exit code to simple codes */
+int translate_errno(int r)
+{
+ switch (r) {
+ case 0: r = EXIT_SUCCESS; break;
+ case -EEXIST:
+ case -EBUSY: r = 5; break;
+ case -ENOTBLK:
+ case -ENODEV: r = 4; break;
+ case -ENOMEM: r = 3; break;
+ case -EPERM: r = 2; break;
+ case -EINVAL:
+ case -ENOENT:
+ case -ENOSYS:
+ default: r = EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+void tools_keyslot_msg(int keyslot, crypt_object_op op)
+{
+ if (keyslot < 0)
+ return;
+
+ if (op == CREATED)
+ log_verbose(_("Key slot %i created."), keyslot);
+ else if (op == UNLOCKED)
+ log_verbose(_("Key slot %i unlocked."), keyslot);
+ else if (op == REMOVED)
+ log_verbose(_("Key slot %i removed."), keyslot);
+}
+
+void tools_token_msg(int token, crypt_object_op op)
+{
+ if (token < 0)
+ return;
+
+ if (op == CREATED)
+ log_verbose(_("Token %i created."), token);
+ else if (op == REMOVED)
+ log_verbose(_("Token %i removed."), token);
+}
+
+void tools_token_error_msg(int error, const char *type, int token, bool pin_provided)
+{
+ if (error >= 0)
+ return;
+
+ if (error == -ENOANO) {
+ if (pin_provided)
+ log_verbose(_("No token could be unlocked with this PIN."));
+ else if (token != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+ log_verbose(_("Token %i requires PIN."), token);
+ else if (type)
+ log_verbose(_("Token (type %s) requires PIN."), type);
+ } else if (error == -EPERM) {
+ if (token != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+ log_verbose(_("Token %i cannot unlock assigned keyslot(s) (wrong keyslot passphrase)."), token);
+ else if (type)
+ log_verbose(_("Token (type %s) cannot unlock assigned keyslot(s) (wrong keyslot passphrase)."), type);
+ } if (error == -EAGAIN) {
+ if (token != CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+ log_verbose(_("Token %i requires additional missing resource."), token);
+ else if (type)
+ log_verbose(_("Token (type %s) requires additional missing resource."), type);
+ } if (error == -ENOENT) {
+ if (type)
+ log_verbose(_("No usable token (type %s) is available."), type);
+ else
+ log_verbose(_("No usable token is available."));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Device size string parsing, suffixes:
+ * s|S - 512 bytes sectors
+ * k |K |m |M |g |G |t |T - 1024 base
+ * kiB|KiB|miB|MiB|giB|GiB|tiB|TiB - 1024 base
+ * kb |KB |mM |MB |gB |GB |tB |TB - 1000 base
+ */
+int tools_string_to_size(const char *s, uint64_t *size)
+{
+ char *endp = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ uint64_t mult_base, mult, tmp;
+
+ *size = strtoull(s, &endp, 10);
+ if (!isdigit(s[0]) ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && *size == ULLONG_MAX) ||
+ (errno != 0 && *size == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!endp || !*endp)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = strlen(endp);
+ /* Allow "B" and "iB" suffixes */
+ if (len > 3 ||
+ (len == 3 && (endp[1] != 'i' || endp[2] != 'B')) ||
+ (len == 2 && endp[1] != 'B'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len == 1 || len == 3)
+ mult_base = 1024;
+ else
+ mult_base = 1000;
+
+ mult = 1;
+ switch (endp[0]) {
+ case 's':
+ case 'S': mult = 512;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ case 'T': mult *= mult_base;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case 'g':
+ case 'G': mult *= mult_base;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case 'm':
+ case 'M': mult *= mult_base;
+ /* Fall through */
+ case 'k':
+ case 'K': mult *= mult_base;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tmp = *size * mult;
+ if (*size && (tmp / *size) != mult) {
+ log_dbg("Device size overflow.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *size = tmp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyfile - is standard input treated as a binary file (no EOL handling).
+ */
+int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file)
+{
+ if (!key_file)
+ return 1;
+
+ return strcmp(key_file, "-") ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+int tools_read_vk(const char *file, char **key, int keysize)
+{
+ int fd = -1, r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keysize <= 0 || !key)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *key = crypt_safe_alloc(keysize);
+ if (!*key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read keyfile %s."), file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (read_buffer(fd, *key, keysize) != keysize) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read %d bytes from keyfile %s."), keysize, file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (r) {
+ crypt_safe_free(*key);
+ *key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int tools_write_mk(const char *file, const char *key, int keysize)
+{
+ int fd, r = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (keysize <= 0 || !key)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ fd = open(file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot open keyfile %s for write."), file);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (write_buffer(fd, key, keysize) == keysize)
+ r = 0;
+ else
+ log_err(_("Cannot write to keyfile %s."), file);
+
+ close(fd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+void tools_package_version(const char *name, bool use_pwlibs)
+{
+ bool udev = false, blkid = false, keyring = false, fips = false;
+ bool kernel_capi = false, pwquality = false, passwdqc = false;
+#ifdef USE_UDEV
+ udev = true;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
+ blkid = true;
+#endif
+#ifdef KERNEL_KEYRING
+ keyring = true;
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_FIPS
+ fips = true;
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+ kernel_capi = true;
+#endif
+#if defined(ENABLE_PWQUALITY)
+ pwquality = true;
+#elif defined(ENABLE_PASSWDQC)
+ passwdqc = true;
+#endif
+ log_std("%s %s flags: %s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", name, PACKAGE_VERSION,
+ udev ? "UDEV " : "",
+ blkid ? "BLKID " : "",
+ keyring ? "KEYRING " : "",
+ fips ? "FIPS " : "",
+ kernel_capi ? "KERNEL_CAPI " : "",
+ pwquality && use_pwlibs ? "PWQUALITY " : "",
+ passwdqc && use_pwlibs ? "PASSWDQC " : "");
+}
diff --git a/src/veritysetup.c b/src/veritysetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be81cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/veritysetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+/*
+ * veritysetup - setup cryptographic volumes for dm-verity
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptsetup.h"
+#include "veritysetup_args.h"
+
+#define PACKAGE_VERITY "veritysetup"
+
+static const char **action_argv;
+static int action_argc;
+static struct tools_log_params log_parms;
+
+void tools_cleanup(void)
+{
+ tools_args_free(tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args));
+}
+
+static int _prepare_format(struct crypt_params_verity *params,
+ const char *data_device,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ char *salt = NULL;
+ int len;
+
+ params->hash_name = ARG_STR(OPT_HASH_ID);
+ params->data_device = data_device;
+ params->fec_device = ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID);
+ params->fec_roots = ARG_UINT32(OPT_FEC_ROOTS_ID);
+
+ if (ARG_STR(OPT_SALT_ID) && !strcmp(ARG_STR(OPT_SALT_ID), "-")) {
+ params->salt_size = 0;
+ params->salt = NULL;
+ } else if (ARG_SET(OPT_SALT_ID)) {
+ len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(ARG_STR(OPT_SALT_ID), &salt, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid salt string specified."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ params->salt_size = len;
+ params->salt = salt;
+ } else {
+ params->salt_size = DEFAULT_VERITY_SALT_SIZE;
+ params->salt = NULL;
+ }
+
+ params->data_block_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE_ID);
+ params->hash_block_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE_ID);
+ params->data_size = ARG_UINT64(OPT_DATA_BLOCKS_ID);
+ params->hash_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HASH_OFFSET_ID);
+ params->fec_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_FEC_OFFSET_ID);
+ params->hash_type = ARG_UINT32(OPT_FORMAT_ID);
+ params->flags = flags;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int action_format(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+ uint32_t flags = CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH;
+ char *root_hash_bytes = NULL;
+ size_t root_hash_size;
+ int root_hash_fd = -1, i, r;
+
+ /* Try to create hash image if doesn't exist */
+ r = open(action_argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot create hash image %s for writing."), action_argv[1]);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (r >= 0) {
+ log_dbg("Created hash image %s.", action_argv[1]);
+ close(r);
+ }
+ /* Try to create FEC image if doesn't exist */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID)) {
+ r = open(ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID), O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot create FEC image %s for writing."), ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (r >= 0) {
+ log_dbg("Created FEC image %s.", ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID));
+ close(r);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[1])))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_NO_SUPERBLOCK_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER;
+
+ r = _prepare_format(&params, action_argv[0], flags);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, ARG_STR(OPT_UUID_ID), NULL, 0, &params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_dump(cd);
+
+ /* Create or overwrite the root hash file */
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID)) {
+ root_hash_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ root_hash_bytes = malloc(root_hash_size);
+ if (!root_hash_bytes) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, root_hash_bytes, &root_hash_size, NULL, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ root_hash_fd = open(ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID), O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ if (root_hash_fd == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot create root hash file %s for writing."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)root_hash_size; i++)
+ if (dprintf(root_hash_fd, "%02hhx", root_hash_bytes[i]) != 2) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot write to root hash file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID));
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg("Created root hash file %s.", ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID));
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.salt);
+ free(root_hash_bytes);
+ if (root_hash_fd != -1)
+ close(root_hash_fd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate(const char *dm_device,
+ const char *data_device,
+ const char *hash_device,
+ const char *root_hash,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+ uint32_t activate_flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+ char *root_hash_bytes = NULL, *root_hash_from_file = NULL;
+ ssize_t hash_size, hash_size_hex;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *signature = NULL;
+ int signature_size = 0, root_hash_fd = -1, r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, hash_device, data_device)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_USE_TASKLETS_ID))
+ activate_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_TASKLETS;
+
+ if (!ARG_SET(OPT_NO_SUPERBLOCK_ID)) {
+ params.flags = flags;
+ params.hash_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HASH_OFFSET_ID);
+ params.fec_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_FEC_OFFSET_ID);
+ params.fec_device = ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID);
+ params.fec_roots = ARG_UINT32(OPT_FEC_ROOTS_ID);
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, &params);
+ if (r)
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."), hash_device);
+
+ } else {
+ r = _prepare_format(&params, data_device, flags | CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, &params);
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ hash_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ hash_size_hex = 2 * hash_size;
+
+ if (!root_hash) {
+ root_hash_fd = open(ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID), O_RDONLY);
+ if (root_hash_fd == -1) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read root hash file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(root_hash_fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size < hash_size_hex) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid root hash file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ root_hash_from_file = malloc(hash_size_hex + 1);
+ if (!root_hash_from_file) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (read_buffer(root_hash_fd, root_hash_from_file, hash_size_hex) != hash_size_hex) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read root hash file %s."), root_hash_from_file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ root_hash_from_file[hash_size_hex] = '\0';
+ root_hash = root_hash_from_file;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_hex_to_bytes(root_hash, &root_hash_bytes, 0) != hash_size) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid root hash string specified."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID)) {
+ // FIXME: check max file size
+ if (stat(ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID), &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || !st.st_size) {
+ log_err(_("Invalid signature file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ signature_size = st.st_size;
+ r = tools_read_vk(ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID), &signature, signature_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_err(_("Cannot read signature file %s."), ARG_STR(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, dm_device,
+ root_hash_bytes,
+ hash_size,
+ signature, signature_size,
+ activate_flags);
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(signature);
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ free(root_hash_from_file);
+ free(root_hash_bytes);
+ free(CONST_CAST(char*)params.salt);
+ if (root_hash_fd != -1)
+ close(root_hash_fd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_open(void)
+{
+ if (action_argc < 4 && !ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Command requires <root_hash> or --root-hash-file option as argument."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return _activate(action_argv[1],
+ action_argv[0],
+ action_argv[2],
+ ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[3],
+ ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ID) ? CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE : 0);
+}
+
+static int action_verify(void)
+{
+ if (action_argc < 3 && !ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID)) {
+ log_err(_("Command requires <root_hash> or --root-hash-file option as argument."));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return _activate(NULL,
+ action_argv[0],
+ action_argv[1],
+ ARG_SET(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ID) ? NULL : action_argv[2],
+ CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH);
+}
+
+static int action_close(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED;
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID))
+ flags |= CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL;
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, action_argv[0], flags);
+
+ if (!r && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID)) {
+ ci = crypt_status(cd, action_argv[0]);
+ if (ci == CRYPT_ACTIVE || ci == CRYPT_BUSY)
+ log_std(_("Device %s is still active and scheduled for deferred removal.\n"),
+ action_argv[0]);
+ }
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_status(void)
+{
+ crypt_status_info ci;
+ struct crypt_active_device cad;
+ struct crypt_params_verity vp = {};
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *backing_file, *root_hash;
+ size_t root_hash_size;
+ unsigned path = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ /* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
+ if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/') && !stat(action_argv[0], &st))
+ path = 1;
+
+ ci = crypt_status(NULL, action_argv[0]);
+ switch (ci) {
+ case CRYPT_INVALID:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is inactive.\n", action_argv[0]);
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is inactive.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0]);
+ r = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+ case CRYPT_BUSY:
+ if (path)
+ log_std("%s is active%s.\n", action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+ else
+ log_std("%s/%s is active%s.\n", crypt_get_dir(), action_argv[0],
+ ci == CRYPT_BUSY ? " and is in use" : "");
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name_and_header(&cd, action_argv[0], NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" type: %s\n", crypt_get_type(cd) ?: "n/a");
+
+ r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, action_argv[0], &cad);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Print only VERITY type devices */
+ r = crypt_get_verity_info(cd, &vp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ log_std(" status: %s%s\n",
+ cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED ? "corrupted" : "verified",
+ vp.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE ? " (with signature)" : "");
+
+ log_std(" hash type: %u\n", vp.hash_type);
+ log_std(" data block: %u\n", vp.data_block_size);
+ log_std(" hash block: %u\n", vp.hash_block_size);
+ log_std(" hash name: %s\n", vp.hash_name);
+ log_std(" salt: ");
+ if (vp.salt_size)
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, vp.salt, vp.salt_size, "", 0, NULL);
+ else
+ log_std("-");
+ log_std("\n");
+
+ log_std(" data device: %s\n", vp.data_device);
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(vp.data_device))) {
+ log_std(" data loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ log_std(" size: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n", cad.size);
+ log_std(" mode: %s\n", cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ?
+ "readonly" : "read/write");
+
+ log_std(" hash device: %s\n", vp.hash_device);
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(vp.hash_device))) {
+ log_std(" hash loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ log_std(" hash offset: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n",
+ vp.hash_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size / 512);
+
+ if (vp.fec_device) {
+ log_std(" FEC device: %s\n", vp.fec_device);
+ if ((backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID)))) {
+ log_std(" FEC loop: %s\n", backing_file);
+ free(backing_file);
+ }
+ log_std(" FEC offset: %" PRIu64 " sectors\n",
+ vp.fec_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size / 512);
+ log_std(" FEC roots: %u\n", vp.fec_roots);
+ }
+
+ root_hash_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ if (root_hash_size > 0 && (root_hash = malloc(root_hash_size))) {
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, root_hash, &root_hash_size, NULL, 0);
+ if (!r) {
+ log_std(" root hash: ");
+ crypt_log_hex(NULL, root_hash, root_hash_size, "", 0, NULL);
+ log_std("\n");
+ }
+ free(root_hash);
+ }
+
+ if (cad.flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE|
+ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_TASKLETS))
+ log_std(" flags: %s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? "ignore_corruption " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? "restart_on_corruption " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION) ? "panic_on_corruption " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? "ignore_zero_blocks " : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? "check_at_most_once" : "",
+ (cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_TASKLETS) ? "try_verify_in_tasklet" : "");
+ }
+out:
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ r = 0;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int action_dump(void)
+{
+ struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_verity params = {};
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, action_argv[0])))
+ return r;
+
+ params.hash_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_HASH_OFFSET_ID);
+ params.fec_area_offset = ARG_UINT64(OPT_FEC_OFFSET_ID);
+ params.fec_device = ARG_STR(OPT_FEC_DEVICE_ID);
+ params.fec_roots = ARG_UINT32(OPT_FEC_ROOTS_ID);
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_VERITY, &params);
+ if (!r)
+ crypt_dump(cd);
+ else
+ log_err(_("Device %s is not a valid VERITY device."), action_argv[0]);
+
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static struct action_type {
+ const char *type;
+ int (*handler)(void);
+ int required_action_argc;
+ const char *arg_desc;
+ const char *desc;
+} action_types[] = {
+ { "format", action_format, 2, N_("<data_device> <hash_device>"),N_("format device") },
+ { "verify", action_verify, 2, N_("<data_device> <hash_device> [<root_hash>]"),N_("verify device") },
+ { "open", action_open, 3, N_("<data_device> <name> <hash_device> [<root_hash>]"),N_("open device as <name>") },
+ { "close", action_close, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("close device (remove mapping)") },
+ { "status", action_status, 1, N_("<name>"),N_("show active device status") },
+ { "dump", action_dump, 1, N_("<hash_device>"),N_("show on-disk information") },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static void help(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg __attribute__((unused)),
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ struct action_type *action;
+
+ if (key->shortName == '?') {
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_VERITY, false);
+ poptPrintHelp(popt_context, stdout, 0);
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<action> is one of:\n"));
+ for(action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ log_std("\t%s %s - %s\n", action->type, _(action->arg_desc), _(action->desc));
+ log_std(_("\n"
+ "<name> is the device to create under %s\n"
+ "<data_device> is the data device\n"
+ "<hash_device> is the device containing verification data\n"
+ "<root_hash> hash of the root node on <hash_device>\n"),
+ crypt_get_dir());
+
+ log_std(_("\nDefault compiled-in dm-verity parameters:\n"
+ "\tHash: %s, Data block (bytes): %u, "
+ "Hash block (bytes): %u, Salt size: %u, Hash format: %u\n"),
+ DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH, DEFAULT_VERITY_DATA_BLOCK,
+ DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH_BLOCK, DEFAULT_VERITY_SALT_SIZE,
+ 1);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else if (key->shortName == 'V') {
+ tools_package_version(PACKAGE_VERITY, false);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ } else
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_SUCCESS, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int run_action(struct action_type *action)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ log_dbg("Running command %s.", action->type);
+
+ r = action->handler();
+
+ show_status(r);
+ return translate_errno(r);
+}
+
+static void basic_options_cb(poptContext popt_context,
+ enum poptCallbackReason reason __attribute__((unused)),
+ struct poptOption *key,
+ const char *arg,
+ void *data __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+ tools_parse_arg_value(popt_context, tool_core_args[key->val].type, tool_core_args + key->val, arg, key->val, NULL);
+
+ switch (key->val) {
+ case OPT_DEBUG_ID:
+ log_parms.debug = true;
+ /* fall through */
+ case OPT_VERBOSE_ID:
+ log_parms.verbose = true;
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ static const char *null_action_argv[] = {NULL};
+ static struct poptOption popt_help_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, help, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "help", '?', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Show this help message"), NULL },
+ { "usage", '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Display brief usage"), NULL },
+ { "version",'V', POPT_ARG_NONE, NULL, 0, N_("Print package version"), NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_basic_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_CALLBACK, basic_options_cb, 0, NULL, NULL },
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, B, C, NULL, A ## _ID, D, E },
+#include "veritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+ static struct poptOption popt_options[] = {
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_help_options, 0, N_("Help options:"), NULL },
+ { NULL, '\0', POPT_ARG_INCLUDE_TABLE, popt_basic_options, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+
+ poptContext popt_context;
+ struct action_type *action;
+ const char *aname;
+ int r;
+
+ crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, tool_log, &log_parms);
+
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+ bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ textdomain(PACKAGE);
+
+ popt_context = poptGetContext("verity", argc, argv, popt_options, 0);
+ poptSetOtherOptionHelp(popt_context,
+ _("[OPTION...] <action> <action-specific>"));
+
+ while((r = poptGetNextOpt(popt_context)) > 0) {}
+
+ if (r < -1)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, poptStrerror(r),
+ poptBadOption(popt_context, POPT_BADOPTION_NOALIAS));
+
+ if (!(aname = poptGetArg(popt_context)))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Argument <action> missing."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ action_argc = 0;
+ action_argv = poptGetArgs(popt_context);
+ /* Make return values of poptGetArgs more consistent in case of remaining argc = 0 */
+ if(!action_argv)
+ action_argv = null_action_argv;
+
+ /* Count args, somewhat unnice, change? */
+ while(action_argv[action_argc] != NULL)
+ action_argc++;
+
+ /* Handle aliases */
+ if (!strcmp(aname, "create") && action_argc > 1) {
+ /* create command had historically switched arguments */
+ if (action_argv[0] && action_argv[1]) {
+ const char *tmp = action_argv[0];
+ action_argv[0] = action_argv[1];
+ action_argv[1] = tmp;
+ }
+ aname = "open";
+ } else if (!strcmp(aname, "remove")) {
+ aname = "close";
+ }
+
+ for (action = action_types; action->type; action++)
+ if (strcmp(action->type, aname) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ if (!action->type)
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, _("Unknown action."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (action_argc < action->required_action_argc) {
+ char buf[128];
+ if (snprintf(buf, 128,_("%s: requires %s as arguments"), action->type, action->arg_desc) < 0)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE, buf,
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+ }
+
+ tools_check_args(action->type, tool_core_args, ARRAY_SIZE(tool_core_args), popt_context);
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Option --ignore-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Option --panic-on-corruption and --restart-on-corruption cannot be used together."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED_ID) && ARG_SET(OPT_DEFERRED_ID))
+ usage(popt_context, EXIT_FAILURE,
+ _("Options --cancel-deferred and --deferred cannot be used at the same time."),
+ poptGetInvocationName(popt_context));
+
+ if (ARG_SET(OPT_DEBUG_ID)) {
+ crypt_set_debug_level(CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL);
+ dbg_version_and_cmd(argc, argv);
+ }
+
+ r = run_action(action);
+ tools_cleanup();
+ poptFreeContext(popt_context);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/src/veritysetup_arg_list.h b/src/veritysetup_arg_list.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..014273e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/veritysetup_arg_list.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Veritysetup command line arguments list
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+/* long name, short name, popt type, help description, units, internal argument type, default value, allowed actions (empty=global) */
+
+ARG(OPT_CANCEL_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Cancel a previously set deferred device removal"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Verify data block only the first time it is read"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DATA_BLOCK_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Block size on the data device"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = DEFAULT_VERITY_DATA_BLOCK }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DATA_BLOCKS, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The number of blocks in the data file"), N_("blocks"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEBUG, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Show debug messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_DEFERRED, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Device removal is deferred until the last user closes it"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_FEC_DEVICE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Path to device with error correction data"), N_("path"), CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_FEC_OFFSET, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Starting offset on the FEC device"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_FEC_ROOTS, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("FEC parity bytes"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = DEFAULT_VERITY_FEC_ROOTS }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_FORMAT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Format type (1 - normal, 0 - original Chrome OS)"), N_("number"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = 1 }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HASH, 'h', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Hash algorithm"), N_("string"), CRYPT_ARG_STRING, { .str_value = CONST_CAST(void *)DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Block size on the hash device"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, { .u32_value = DEFAULT_VERITY_HASH_BLOCK }, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_HASH_OFFSET, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Starting offset on the hash device"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Ignore corruption, log it only"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not verify zeroed blocks"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_NO_SUPERBLOCK, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Do not use verity superblock"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Panic kernel if corruption is detected"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Restart kernel if corruption is detected"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Path to root hash file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Path to root hash signature file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_SALT, 's', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Salt"), N_("hex string"), CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_USE_TASKLETS, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use kernel tasklets for performance"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, OPT_USE_TASKLETS_ACTIONS)
+
+ARG(OPT_UUID, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("UUID for device to use"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
+
+ARG(OPT_VERBOSE, 'v', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Shows more detailed error messages"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
diff --git a/src/veritysetup_args.h b/src/veritysetup_args.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d47813d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/veritysetup_args.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Command line arguments helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef VERITYSETUP_ARGS_H
+#define VERITYSETUP_ARGS_H
+
+#include "utils_arg_names.h"
+#include "utils_arg_macros.h"
+
+#define CLOSE_ACTION "close"
+#define DUMP_ACTION "dump"
+#define FORMAT_ACTION "format"
+#define OPEN_ACTION "open"
+#define STATUS_ACTION "status"
+#define VERIFY_ACTION "verify"
+
+#define OPT_DEFERRED_ACTIONS { CLOSE_ACTION }
+#define OPT_IGNORE_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_ROOT_HASH_FILE_ACTIONS { FORMAT_ACTION, OPEN_ACTION, VERIFY_ACTION }
+#define OPT_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+#define OPT_USE_TASKLETS_ACTIONS { OPEN_ACTION }
+
+enum {
+OPT_UNUSED_ID = 0,
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) A ## _ID,
+#include "veritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+static struct tools_arg tool_core_args[] = { { NULL, false, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL }, // UNUSED
+#define ARG(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) { A, false, F, G, H },
+#include "veritysetup_arg_list.h"
+#undef ARG
+};
+
+#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-15 02:03:59 +0000