Adding upstream version 1:2.3.21+dfsg1.upstream/1%2.3.21+dfsg1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 110 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/auth/checkpassword-reply.c b/src/auth/checkpassword-reply.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71f231a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/auth/checkpassword-reply.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* simple checkpassword wrapper to send userdb data back to dovecot-auth */
+
+#include "lib.h"
+#include "str.h"
+#include "strescape.h"
+#include "write-full.h"
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	string_t *str;
+	const char *user, *home, *authorized, *orig_uid_env;
+	const char *extra_env, *key, *value, *const *tmp;
+	bool uid_found = FALSE, gid_found = FALSE;
+	uid_t orig_uid;
+
+	lib_init();
+	str = t_str_new(1024);
+
+	orig_uid_env = getenv("ORIG_UID");
+	if (orig_uid_env == NULL || str_to_uid(orig_uid_env, &orig_uid) < 0)
+		orig_uid = (uid_t)-1;
+
+	/* ORIG_UID should have the auth process's UID that forked us.
+	   if the checkpassword changed the UID, this could be a security hole
+	   because the UID's other processes can ptrace this process and write
+	   any kind of a reply to fd 4. so we can run only if:
+
+	   a) INSECURE_SETUID environment is set.
+	   b) process isn't ptraceable (this binary is setuid/setgid)
+	   c) checkpassword didn't actually change the UID (but used
+	      userdb_uid instead)
+	   */
+	if (getenv("INSECURE_SETUID") == NULL &&
+	    (orig_uid == (uid_t)-1 || orig_uid != getuid()) &&
+	    getuid() == geteuid() && getgid() == getegid()) {
+		if (orig_uid_env == NULL) {
+			i_error("checkpassword: ORIG_UID environment was dropped by checkpassword. "
+				"Can't verify if we're safe to run. See "
+				"http://wiki2.dovecot.org/AuthDatabase/CheckPassword#Security");
+		} else {
+			i_error("checkpassword: The checkpassword couldn't be run securely. See "
+				"http://wiki2.dovecot.org/AuthDatabase/CheckPassword#Security");
+		}
+		return 111;
+	}
+
+	user = getenv("USER");
+	if (user != NULL) {
+		if (strchr(user, '\t') != NULL) {
+			i_error("checkpassword: USER contains TAB");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		str_printfa(str, "user=");
+		str_append_tabescaped(str, user);
+		str_append_c(str, '\t');
+	}
+
+	home = getenv("HOME");
+	if (home != NULL) {
+		if (strchr(home, '\t') != NULL) {
+			i_error("checkpassword: HOME contains TAB");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		str_printfa(str, "userdb_home=");
+		str_append_tabescaped(str, home);
+		str_append_c(str, '\t');
+	}
+
+	extra_env = getenv("EXTRA");
+	if (extra_env != NULL) {
+		for (tmp = t_strsplit(extra_env, " "); *tmp != NULL; tmp++) {
+			value = getenv(*tmp);
+			if (value != NULL) {
+				key = t_str_lcase(*tmp);
+				if (strcmp(key, "userdb_uid") == 0)
+					uid_found = TRUE;
+				else if (strcmp(key, "userdb_gid") == 0)
+					gid_found = TRUE;
+				str_append_tabescaped(str, key);
+				str_append_c(str, '=');
+				str_append_tabescaped(str, value);
+				str_append_c(str, '\t');
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (!uid_found)
+		str_printfa(str, "userdb_uid=%s\t",  dec2str(getuid()));
+	if (!gid_found)
+		str_printfa(str, "userdb_gid=%s\t",  dec2str(getgid()));
+
+	i_assert(str_len(str) > 0);
+
+	if (write_full(4, str_data(str), str_len(str)) < 0) {
+		i_error("checkpassword: write_full() failed: %m");
+		lib_exit(111);
+	}
+	authorized = getenv("AUTHORIZED");
+	if (authorized == NULL) {
+		/* authentication */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (strcmp(authorized, "2") == 0) {
+		/* successful passdb/userdb lookup */
+		return 2;
+	} else {
+		i_error("checkpassword: Script doesn't support passdb/userdb lookup");
+		return 111;
+	}
+}