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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
commit0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d (patch)
treea31f07c9bcca9d56ce61e9a1ffd30ef350d513aa /security/ct/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d.tar.xz
firefox-esr-0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d.zip
Adding upstream version 115.8.0esr.upstream/115.8.0esr
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/ct/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp')
-rw-r--r--security/ct/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp194
1 files changed, 194 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/ct/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp b/security/ct/MultiLogCTVerifier.cpp
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+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
+
+#include "CTObjectsExtractor.h"
+#include "CTSerialization.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace ct {
+
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+
+// Note: this moves |verifiedSct| to the target list in |result|.
+static void StoreVerifiedSct(CTVerifyResult& result, VerifiedSCT&& verifiedSct,
+ VerifiedSCT::Status status) {
+ verifiedSct.status = status;
+ result.verifiedScts.push_back(std::move(verifiedSct));
+}
+
+void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLog(CTLogVerifier&& log) {
+ mLogs.push_back(std::move(log));
+}
+
+Result MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify(Input cert, Input issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ Input sctListFromCert,
+ Input sctListFromOCSPResponse,
+ Input sctListFromTLSExtension, Time time,
+ CTVerifyResult& result) {
+ assert(cert.GetLength() > 0);
+ result.Reset();
+
+ Result rv;
+
+ // Verify embedded SCTs
+ if (issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo.GetLength() > 0 &&
+ sctListFromCert.GetLength() > 0) {
+ LogEntry precertEntry;
+ rv = GetPrecertLogEntry(cert, issuerSubjectPublicKeyInfo, precertEntry);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromCert, precertEntry,
+ VerifiedSCT::Origin::Embedded, time, result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ LogEntry x509Entry;
+ GetX509LogEntry(cert, x509Entry);
+
+ // Verify SCTs from a stapled OCSP response
+ if (sctListFromOCSPResponse.GetLength() > 0) {
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromOCSPResponse, x509Entry,
+ VerifiedSCT::Origin::OCSPResponse, time, result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Verify SCTs from a TLS extension
+ if (sctListFromTLSExtension.GetLength() > 0) {
+ rv = VerifySCTs(sctListFromTLSExtension, x509Entry,
+ VerifiedSCT::Origin::TLSExtension, time, result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+void DecodeSCTs(Input encodedSctList,
+ std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp>& decodedSCTs,
+ size_t& decodingErrors) {
+ decodedSCTs.clear();
+
+ Reader listReader;
+ Result rv = DecodeSCTList(encodedSctList, listReader);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ decodingErrors++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (!listReader.AtEnd()) {
+ Input encodedSct;
+ rv = ReadSCTListItem(listReader, encodedSct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ decodingErrors++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ Reader encodedSctReader(encodedSct);
+ SignedCertificateTimestamp sct;
+ rv = DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(encodedSctReader, sct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ decodingErrors++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ decodedSCTs.push_back(std::move(sct));
+ }
+}
+
+Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs(Input encodedSctList,
+ const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
+ VerifiedSCT::Origin origin, Time time,
+ CTVerifyResult& result) {
+ std::vector<SignedCertificateTimestamp> decodedSCTs;
+ DecodeSCTs(encodedSctList, decodedSCTs, result.decodingErrors);
+ for (auto sct : decodedSCTs) {
+ Result rv =
+ VerifySingleSCT(std::move(sct), expectedEntry, origin, time, result);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return Success;
+}
+
+Result MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT(SignedCertificateTimestamp&& sct,
+ const LogEntry& expectedEntry,
+ VerifiedSCT::Origin origin,
+ Time time, CTVerifyResult& result) {
+ VerifiedSCT verifiedSct;
+ verifiedSct.origin = origin;
+ verifiedSct.sct = std::move(sct);
+
+ CTLogVerifier* matchingLog = nullptr;
+ for (auto& log : mLogs) {
+ if (log.keyId() == verifiedSct.sct.logId) {
+ matchingLog = &log;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!matchingLog) {
+ // SCT does not match any known log.
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct),
+ VerifiedSCT::Status::UnknownLog);
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ verifiedSct.logOperatorId = matchingLog->operatorId();
+
+ if (!matchingLog->SignatureParametersMatch(verifiedSct.sct.signature)) {
+ // SCT signature parameters do not match the log's.
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct),
+ VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature);
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ Result rv = matchingLog->Verify(expectedEntry, verifiedSct.sct);
+ if (rv != Success) {
+ if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct),
+ VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature);
+ return Success;
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ // Make sure the timestamp is legitimate (not in the future).
+ // SCT's |timestamp| is measured in milliseconds since the epoch,
+ // ignoring leap seconds. When converting it to a second-level precision
+ // pkix::Time, we need to round it either up or down. In our case, rounding up
+ // (towards the future) is more "secure", although practically
+ // it does not matter.
+ Time sctTime =
+ TimeFromEpochInSeconds((verifiedSct.sct.timestamp + 999u) / 1000u);
+ if (sctTime > time) {
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct),
+ VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidTimestamp);
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ // SCT verified ok, see if the log is qualified. Since SCTs from
+ // disqualified logs are treated as valid under certain circumstances (see
+ // the CT Policy), the log qualification check must be the last one we do.
+ if (matchingLog->isDisqualified()) {
+ verifiedSct.logDisqualificationTime = matchingLog->disqualificationTime();
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct),
+ VerifiedSCT::Status::ValidFromDisqualifiedLog);
+ return Success;
+ }
+
+ StoreVerifiedSct(result, std::move(verifiedSct), VerifiedSCT::Status::Valid);
+ return Success;
+}
+
+} // namespace ct
+} // namespace mozilla