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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
commit0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d (patch)
treea31f07c9bcca9d56ce61e9a1ffd30ef350d513aa /security/manager/ssl/cert_storage
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-upstream/115.8.0esr.tar.xz
firefox-esr-upstream/115.8.0esr.zip
Adding upstream version 115.8.0esr.upstream/115.8.0esr
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/cert_storage')
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/Cargo.toml24
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h24
-rw-r--r--security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/lib.rs1807
3 files changed, 1855 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/Cargo.toml b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8b4690421
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+[package]
+name = "cert_storage"
+version = "0.0.1"
+authors = ["Dana Keeler <dkeeler@mozilla.com>", "Mark Goodwin <mgoodwin@mozilla.com"]
+license = "MPL-2.0"
+
+[dependencies]
+base64 = "0.21.0"
+byteorder = "1.2.7"
+crossbeam-utils = "0.8"
+cstr = "0.2"
+log = "0.4"
+moz_task = { path = "../../../../xpcom/rust/moz_task" }
+nserror = { path = "../../../../xpcom/rust/nserror" }
+nsstring = { path = "../../../../xpcom/rust/nsstring" }
+rkv = { version = "0.18", default-features = false }
+rust_cascade = "1.4.0"
+sha2 = "0.10.2"
+storage_variant = { path = "../../../../storage/variant" }
+tempfile = "3"
+thin-vec = { version = "0.2.1", features = ["gecko-ffi"] }
+time = "0.1"
+xpcom = { path = "../../../../xpcom/rust/xpcom" }
+wr_malloc_size_of = { path = "../../../../gfx/wr/wr_malloc_size_of" }
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e420067b03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef _cert_storage_h_
+#define _cert_storage_h_
+
+#include "nsISupportsUtils.h" // for nsresult, etc.
+
+// {16e5c837-f877-4e23-9c64-eddf905e30e6}
+#define NS_CERT_STORAGE_CID \
+ { \
+ 0x16e5c837, 0xf877, 0x4e23, { \
+ 0x9c, 0x64, 0xed, 0xdf, 0x90, 0x5e, 0x30, 0xe6 \
+ } \
+ }
+
+extern "C" {
+nsresult cert_storage_constructor(REFNSIID iid, void** result);
+};
+
+#endif // _cert_storage_h_
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/lib.rs b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..71c966fa4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/cert_storage/src/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,1807 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+extern crate base64;
+extern crate byteorder;
+extern crate crossbeam_utils;
+#[macro_use]
+extern crate cstr;
+#[macro_use]
+extern crate log;
+extern crate moz_task;
+extern crate nserror;
+extern crate nsstring;
+extern crate rkv;
+extern crate rust_cascade;
+extern crate sha2;
+extern crate thin_vec;
+extern crate time;
+#[macro_use]
+extern crate xpcom;
+extern crate storage_variant;
+extern crate tempfile;
+
+extern crate wr_malloc_size_of;
+use wr_malloc_size_of as malloc_size_of;
+
+use base64::prelude::*;
+use byteorder::{LittleEndian, NetworkEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
+use crossbeam_utils::atomic::AtomicCell;
+use malloc_size_of::{MallocSizeOf, MallocSizeOfOps};
+use moz_task::{create_background_task_queue, is_main_thread, Task, TaskRunnable};
+use nserror::{
+ nsresult, NS_ERROR_FAILURE, NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER,
+ NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED, NS_OK,
+};
+use nsstring::{nsACString, nsCStr, nsCString, nsString};
+use rkv::backend::{BackendEnvironmentBuilder, SafeMode, SafeModeDatabase, SafeModeEnvironment};
+use rkv::{StoreError, StoreOptions, Value};
+use rust_cascade::Cascade;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+use std::ffi::CString;
+use std::fmt::Display;
+use std::fs::{create_dir_all, remove_file, File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write};
+use std::mem::size_of;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::str;
+use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+use storage_variant::VariantType;
+use thin_vec::ThinVec;
+use xpcom::interfaces::{
+ nsICRLiteCoverage, nsICRLiteTimestamp, nsICertInfo, nsICertStorage, nsICertStorageCallback,
+ nsIFile, nsIHandleReportCallback, nsIIssuerAndSerialRevocationState, nsIMemoryReporter,
+ nsIMemoryReporterManager, nsIProperties, nsIRevocationState, nsISerialEventTarget,
+ nsISubjectAndPubKeyRevocationState, nsISupports,
+};
+use xpcom::{nsIID, GetterAddrefs, RefPtr, ThreadBoundRefPtr, XpCom};
+
+const PREFIX_REV_IS: &str = "is";
+const PREFIX_REV_SPK: &str = "spk";
+const PREFIX_SUBJECT: &str = "subject";
+const PREFIX_CERT: &str = "cert";
+const PREFIX_DATA_TYPE: &str = "datatype";
+
+const LAST_CRLITE_UPDATE_KEY: &str = "last_crlite_update";
+
+const COVERAGE_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const COVERAGE_V1_ENTRY_BYTES: usize = 48;
+
+const ENROLLMENT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const ENROLLMENT_V1_ENTRY_BYTES: usize = 32;
+
+type Rkv = rkv::Rkv<SafeModeEnvironment>;
+type SingleStore = rkv::SingleStore<SafeModeDatabase>;
+
+macro_rules! make_key {
+ ( $prefix:expr, $( $part:expr ),+ ) => {
+ {
+ let mut key = $prefix.as_bytes().to_owned();
+ $( key.extend_from_slice($part); )+
+ key
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[allow(non_camel_case_types, non_snake_case)]
+
+/// `SecurityStateError` is a type to represent errors in accessing or
+/// modifying security state.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct SecurityStateError {
+ message: String,
+}
+
+impl<T: Display> From<T> for SecurityStateError {
+ /// Creates a new instance of `SecurityStateError` from something that
+ /// implements the `Display` trait.
+ fn from(err: T) -> SecurityStateError {
+ SecurityStateError {
+ message: format!("{}", err),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct EnvAndStore {
+ env: Rkv,
+ store: SingleStore,
+}
+
+impl MallocSizeOf for EnvAndStore {
+ fn size_of(&self, _ops: &mut MallocSizeOfOps) -> usize {
+ self.env
+ .read()
+ .and_then(|reader| {
+ let iter = self.store.iter_start(&reader)?.into_iter();
+ Ok(iter
+ .map(|r| {
+ r.map(|(k, v)| k.len() + v.serialized_size().unwrap_or(0) as usize)
+ .unwrap_or(0)
+ })
+ .sum())
+ })
+ .unwrap_or(0)
+ }
+}
+
+/// `SecurityState`
+struct SecurityState {
+ profile_path: PathBuf,
+ env_and_store: Option<EnvAndStore>,
+ crlite_filter: Option<Cascade>,
+ /// Maps issuer spki hashes to sets of serial numbers.
+ crlite_stash: Option<HashMap<Vec<u8>, HashSet<Vec<u8>>>>,
+ /// Maps an RFC 6962 LogID to a pair of 64 bit unix timestamps
+ crlite_coverage: Option<HashMap<Vec<u8>, (u64, u64)>>,
+ /// Set of `SHA256(subject || spki)` values for enrolled issuers
+ crlite_enrollment: Option<HashSet<Vec<u8>>>,
+ /// Tracks the number of asynchronous operations which have been dispatched but not completed.
+ remaining_ops: i32,
+}
+
+impl SecurityState {
+ pub fn new(profile_path: PathBuf) -> SecurityState {
+ // Since this gets called on the main thread, we don't actually want to open the DB yet.
+ // We do this on-demand later, when we're probably on a certificate verification thread.
+ SecurityState {
+ profile_path,
+ env_and_store: None,
+ crlite_filter: None,
+ crlite_stash: None,
+ crlite_coverage: None,
+ crlite_enrollment: None,
+ remaining_ops: 0,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn db_needs_opening(&self) -> bool {
+ self.env_and_store.is_none()
+ }
+
+ pub fn open_db(&mut self) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ if self.env_and_store.is_some() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ let store_path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+
+ // Open the store in read-write mode to create it (if needed) and migrate data from the old
+ // store (if any).
+ // If opening initially fails, try to remove and recreate the database. Consumers will
+ // repopulate the database as necessary if this happens (see bug 1546361).
+ let env = make_env(store_path.as_path()).or_else(|_| {
+ remove_db(store_path.as_path())?;
+ make_env(store_path.as_path())
+ })?;
+ let store = env.open_single("cert_storage", StoreOptions::create())?;
+
+ // if the profile has a revocations.txt, migrate it and remove the file
+ let mut revocations_path = self.profile_path.clone();
+ revocations_path.push("revocations.txt");
+ if revocations_path.exists() {
+ SecurityState::migrate(&revocations_path, &env, &store)?;
+ remove_file(revocations_path)?;
+ }
+
+ // We already returned early if env_and_store was Some, so this should take the None branch.
+ match self.env_and_store.replace(EnvAndStore { env, store }) {
+ Some(_) => Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "env and store already initialized? (did we mess up our threading model?)",
+ )),
+ None => Ok(()),
+ }?;
+ self.load_crlite_filter()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn migrate(
+ revocations_path: &PathBuf,
+ env: &Rkv,
+ store: &SingleStore,
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let f = File::open(revocations_path)?;
+ let file = BufReader::new(f);
+ let value = Value::I64(nsICertStorage::STATE_ENFORCE as i64);
+ let mut writer = env.write()?;
+
+ // Add the data from revocations.txt
+ let mut dn: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+ for line in file.lines() {
+ let l = match line.map_err(|_| SecurityStateError::from("io error reading line data")) {
+ Ok(data) => data,
+ Err(e) => return Err(e),
+ };
+ if l.len() == 0 || l.starts_with("#") {
+ continue;
+ }
+ let leading_char = match l.chars().next() {
+ Some(c) => c,
+ None => {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "couldn't get char from non-empty str?",
+ ));
+ }
+ };
+ // In future, we can maybe log migration failures. For now, ignore decoding and storage
+ // errors and attempt to continue.
+ // Check if we have a new DN
+ if leading_char != '\t' && leading_char != ' ' {
+ if let Ok(decoded_dn) = BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&l) {
+ dn = Some(decoded_dn);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ let l_sans_prefix = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&l[1..]) {
+ Ok(decoded) => decoded,
+ Err(_) => continue,
+ };
+ if let Some(name) = &dn {
+ if leading_char == '\t' {
+ let _ = store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &make_key!(PREFIX_REV_SPK, name, &l_sans_prefix),
+ &value,
+ );
+ } else {
+ let _ = store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &make_key!(PREFIX_REV_IS, name, &l_sans_prefix),
+ &value,
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.commit()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn read_entry(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Result<Option<i16>, SecurityStateError> {
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_ref() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let reader = env_and_store.env.read()?;
+ match env_and_store.store.get(&reader, key) {
+ Ok(Some(Value::I64(i)))
+ if i <= (std::i16::MAX as i64) && i >= (std::i16::MIN as i64) =>
+ {
+ Ok(Some(i as i16))
+ }
+ Ok(None) => Ok(None),
+ Ok(_) => Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "Unexpected type when trying to get a Value::I64",
+ )),
+ Err(_) => Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "There was a problem getting the value",
+ )),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_has_prior_data(&self, data_type: u8) -> Result<bool, SecurityStateError> {
+ if data_type == nsICertStorage::DATA_TYPE_CRLITE_FILTER_FULL {
+ return Ok(self.crlite_filter.is_some()
+ && self.crlite_coverage.is_some()
+ && self.crlite_enrollment.is_some());
+ }
+ if data_type == nsICertStorage::DATA_TYPE_CRLITE_FILTER_INCREMENTAL {
+ return Ok(self.crlite_stash.is_some());
+ }
+
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_ref() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let reader = env_and_store.env.read()?;
+ match env_and_store
+ .store
+ .get(&reader, &make_key!(PREFIX_DATA_TYPE, &[data_type]))
+ {
+ Ok(Some(Value::Bool(true))) => Ok(true),
+ Ok(None) => Ok(false),
+ Ok(_) => Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "Unexpected type when trying to get a Value::Bool",
+ )),
+ Err(_) => Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "There was a problem getting the value",
+ )),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn set_batch_state(
+ &mut self,
+ entries: &[EncodedSecurityState],
+ typ: u8,
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_mut() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let mut writer = env_and_store.env.write()?;
+ // Make a note that we have prior data of the given type now.
+ env_and_store.store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &make_key!(PREFIX_DATA_TYPE, &[typ]),
+ &Value::Bool(true),
+ )?;
+
+ for entry in entries {
+ let key = match entry.key() {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(e) => {
+ warn!("error base64-decoding key parts - ignoring: {}", e.message);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ env_and_store
+ .store
+ .put(&mut writer, &key, &Value::I64(entry.state() as i64))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.commit()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_revocation_state(
+ &self,
+ issuer: &[u8],
+ serial: &[u8],
+ subject: &[u8],
+ pub_key: &[u8],
+ ) -> Result<i16, SecurityStateError> {
+ let mut digest = Sha256::default();
+ digest.update(pub_key);
+ let pub_key_hash = digest.finalize();
+
+ let subject_pubkey = make_key!(PREFIX_REV_SPK, subject, &pub_key_hash);
+ let issuer_serial = make_key!(PREFIX_REV_IS, issuer, serial);
+
+ let st: i16 = match self.read_entry(&issuer_serial) {
+ Ok(Some(value)) => value,
+ Ok(None) => nsICertStorage::STATE_UNSET,
+ Err(_) => {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "problem reading revocation state (from issuer / serial)",
+ ));
+ }
+ };
+
+ if st != nsICertStorage::STATE_UNSET {
+ return Ok(st);
+ }
+
+ match self.read_entry(&subject_pubkey) {
+ Ok(Some(value)) => Ok(value),
+ Ok(None) => Ok(nsICertStorage::STATE_UNSET),
+ Err(_) => {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "problem reading revocation state (from subject / pubkey)",
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn issuer_is_enrolled(&self, subject: &[u8], pub_key: &[u8]) -> bool {
+ if let Some(crlite_enrollment) = self.crlite_enrollment.as_ref() {
+ let mut digest = Sha256::default();
+ digest.update(subject);
+ digest.update(pub_key);
+ let issuer_id = digest.finalize();
+ return crlite_enrollment.contains(&issuer_id.to_vec());
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ fn filter_covers_some_timestamp(&self, timestamps: &[CRLiteTimestamp]) -> bool {
+ if let Some(crlite_coverage) = self.crlite_coverage.as_ref() {
+ for entry in timestamps {
+ if let Some(&(low, high)) = crlite_coverage.get(entry.log_id.as_ref()) {
+ if low <= entry.timestamp && entry.timestamp <= high {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ fn note_crlite_update_time(&mut self) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let seconds_since_epoch = Value::U64(
+ SystemTime::now()
+ .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+ .map_err(|_| SecurityStateError::from("could not get current time"))?
+ .as_secs(),
+ );
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_mut() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let mut writer = env_and_store.env.write()?;
+ env_and_store
+ .store
+ .put(&mut writer, LAST_CRLITE_UPDATE_KEY, &seconds_since_epoch)
+ .map_err(|_| SecurityStateError::from("could not store timestamp"))?;
+ writer.commit()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn is_crlite_fresh(&self) -> bool {
+ let now = match SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) {
+ Ok(t) => t.as_secs(),
+ _ => return false,
+ };
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_ref() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return false,
+ };
+ let reader = match env_and_store.env.read() {
+ Ok(reader) => reader,
+ _ => return false,
+ };
+ match env_and_store.store.get(&reader, LAST_CRLITE_UPDATE_KEY) {
+ Ok(Some(Value::U64(last_update))) if last_update < u64::MAX / 2 => {
+ now < last_update + 60 * 60 * 24 * 10
+ }
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn set_full_crlite_filter(
+ &mut self,
+ filter: Vec<u8>,
+ enrolled_issuers: Vec<nsCString>,
+ coverage_entries: &[(nsCString, u64, u64)],
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ // First drop any existing crlite filter and clear the accumulated stash.
+ {
+ let _ = self.crlite_filter.take();
+ let _ = self.crlite_stash.take();
+ let _ = self.crlite_coverage.take();
+ let _ = self.crlite_enrollment.take();
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.stash");
+ // Truncate the stash file if it exists.
+ if path.exists() {
+ File::create(path).map_err(|e| {
+ SecurityStateError::from(format!("couldn't truncate stash file: {}", e))
+ })?;
+ }
+ }
+ // Write the new full filter.
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.filter");
+ {
+ let mut filter_file = File::create(&path)?;
+ filter_file.write_all(&filter)?;
+ }
+
+ // Serialize the coverage metadata as a 1 byte version number followed by any number of 48
+ // byte entries. Each entry is a 32 byte (opaque) log id, followed by two 8 byte
+ // timestamps. Each timestamp is an 8 byte unsigned integer in little endian.
+ let mut coverage_bytes =
+ Vec::with_capacity(size_of::<u8>() + coverage_entries.len() * COVERAGE_V1_ENTRY_BYTES);
+ coverage_bytes.push(COVERAGE_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ for (b64_log_id, min_t, max_t) in coverage_entries {
+ let log_id = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&b64_log_id) {
+ Ok(log_id) if log_id.len() == 32 => log_id,
+ _ => {
+ warn!("malformed log ID - skipping: {}", b64_log_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ coverage_bytes.extend_from_slice(&log_id);
+ coverage_bytes.extend_from_slice(&min_t.to_le_bytes());
+ coverage_bytes.extend_from_slice(&max_t.to_le_bytes());
+ }
+ // Write the coverage file for the new filter
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.coverage");
+ {
+ let mut coverage_file = File::create(&path)?;
+ coverage_file.write_all(&coverage_bytes)?;
+ }
+
+ // Serialize the enrollment list as a 1 byte version number followed by:
+ // Version 1: any number of 32 byte values of the form `SHA256(subject || spki)`.
+ let mut enrollment_bytes = Vec::with_capacity(
+ size_of::<u8>() + enrolled_issuers.len() * ENROLLMENT_V1_ENTRY_BYTES,
+ );
+ enrollment_bytes.push(ENROLLMENT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ for b64_issuer_id in enrolled_issuers {
+ let issuer_id = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&b64_issuer_id) {
+ Ok(issuer_id) if issuer_id.len() == 32 => issuer_id,
+ _ => {
+ warn!("malformed issuer ID - skipping: {}", b64_issuer_id);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ enrollment_bytes.extend_from_slice(&issuer_id);
+ }
+ // Write the enrollment file for the new filter
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.enrollment");
+ {
+ let mut enrollment_file = File::create(&path)?;
+ enrollment_file.write_all(&enrollment_bytes)?;
+ }
+
+ self.note_crlite_update_time()?;
+ self.load_crlite_filter()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn load_crlite_filter(&mut self) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ if self.crlite_filter.is_some() || self.crlite_coverage.is_some() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "Both crlite_filter and crlite_coverage should be None here",
+ ));
+ }
+
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.filter");
+ // Before we've downloaded any filters, this file won't exist.
+ if !path.exists() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ let mut filter_file = File::open(path)?;
+ let mut filter_bytes = Vec::new();
+ let _ = filter_file.read_to_end(&mut filter_bytes)?;
+ let crlite_filter = Cascade::from_bytes(filter_bytes)
+ .map_err(|_| SecurityStateError::from("invalid CRLite filter"))?
+ .ok_or(SecurityStateError::from("expecting non-empty filter"))?;
+
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.coverage");
+ if !path.exists() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Deserialize the coverage metadata.
+ // The format is described in `set_full_crlite_filter`.
+ let coverage_file = File::open(path)?;
+ let coverage_file_len = coverage_file.metadata()?.len() as usize;
+ let mut coverage_reader = BufReader::new(coverage_file);
+ match coverage_reader.read_u8() {
+ Ok(COVERAGE_SERIALIZATION_VERSION) => (),
+ _ => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("unknown CRLite coverage version")),
+ }
+ if (coverage_file_len - 1) % COVERAGE_V1_ENTRY_BYTES != 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite coverage file"));
+ }
+ let coverage_count = (coverage_file_len - 1) / COVERAGE_V1_ENTRY_BYTES;
+ let mut crlite_coverage: HashMap<Vec<u8>, (u64, u64)> = HashMap::new();
+ for _ in 0..coverage_count {
+ let mut coverage_entry = [0u8; COVERAGE_V1_ENTRY_BYTES];
+ match coverage_reader.read_exact(&mut coverage_entry) {
+ Ok(()) => (),
+ _ => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite coverage file")),
+ };
+ let log_id = &coverage_entry[0..32];
+ let min_timestamp: u64;
+ let max_timestamp: u64;
+ match (&coverage_entry[32..40]).read_u64::<LittleEndian>() {
+ Ok(value) => min_timestamp = value,
+ _ => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite coverage file")),
+ }
+ match (&coverage_entry[40..48]).read_u64::<LittleEndian>() {
+ Ok(value) => max_timestamp = value,
+ _ => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite coverage file")),
+ }
+ crlite_coverage.insert(log_id.to_vec(), (min_timestamp, max_timestamp));
+ }
+
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.enrollment");
+ if !path.exists() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Deserialize the enrollment metadata.
+ // The format is described in `set_full_crlite_filter`.
+ let enrollment_file = File::open(path)?;
+ let enrollment_file_len = enrollment_file.metadata()?.len() as usize;
+ let mut enrollment_reader = BufReader::new(enrollment_file);
+ match enrollment_reader.read_u8() {
+ Ok(ENROLLMENT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION) => (),
+ _ => {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "unknown CRLite enrollment version",
+ ))
+ }
+ }
+ if (enrollment_file_len - 1) % ENROLLMENT_V1_ENTRY_BYTES != 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite enrollment file"));
+ }
+ let enrollment_count = (enrollment_file_len - 1) / ENROLLMENT_V1_ENTRY_BYTES;
+ let mut crlite_enrollment: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
+ for _ in 0..enrollment_count {
+ let mut enrollment_entry = [0u8; ENROLLMENT_V1_ENTRY_BYTES];
+ match enrollment_reader.read_exact(&mut enrollment_entry) {
+ Ok(()) => (),
+ _ => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("truncated CRLite enrollment file")),
+ };
+ let issuer_id = &enrollment_entry[..];
+ crlite_enrollment.insert(issuer_id.to_vec());
+ }
+
+ let old_crlite_filter_should_be_none = self.crlite_filter.replace(crlite_filter);
+ assert!(old_crlite_filter_should_be_none.is_none());
+ let old_crlite_coverage_should_be_none = self.crlite_coverage.replace(crlite_coverage);
+ assert!(old_crlite_coverage_should_be_none.is_none());
+ let old_crlite_enrollment_should_be_none =
+ self.crlite_enrollment.replace(crlite_enrollment);
+ assert!(old_crlite_enrollment_should_be_none.is_none());
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn add_crlite_stash(&mut self, stash: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ // Append the update to the previously-seen stashes.
+ let mut path = get_store_path(&self.profile_path)?;
+ path.push("crlite.stash");
+ let mut stash_file = OpenOptions::new().append(true).create(true).open(path)?;
+ stash_file.write_all(&stash)?;
+ let crlite_stash = self.crlite_stash.get_or_insert(HashMap::new());
+ load_crlite_stash_from_reader_into_map(&mut stash.as_slice(), crlite_stash)?;
+ self.note_crlite_update_time()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_cert_revoked_by_stash(
+ &self,
+ issuer_spki: &[u8],
+ serial: &[u8],
+ ) -> Result<bool, SecurityStateError> {
+ let crlite_stash = match self.crlite_stash.as_ref() {
+ Some(crlite_stash) => crlite_stash,
+ None => return Ok(false),
+ };
+ let mut digest = Sha256::default();
+ digest.update(issuer_spki);
+ let lookup_key = digest.finalize().to_vec();
+ let serials = match crlite_stash.get(&lookup_key) {
+ Some(serials) => serials,
+ None => return Ok(false),
+ };
+ Ok(serials.contains(&serial.to_vec()))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_crlite_revocation_state(
+ &self,
+ issuer: &[u8],
+ issuer_spki: &[u8],
+ serial_number: &[u8],
+ timestamps: &[CRLiteTimestamp],
+ ) -> i16 {
+ if !self.is_crlite_fresh() {
+ return nsICertStorage::STATE_NO_FILTER;
+ }
+ if !self.issuer_is_enrolled(issuer, issuer_spki) {
+ return nsICertStorage::STATE_NOT_ENROLLED;
+ }
+ if !self.filter_covers_some_timestamp(timestamps) {
+ return nsICertStorage::STATE_NOT_COVERED;
+ }
+ let mut digest = Sha256::default();
+ digest.update(issuer_spki);
+ let mut lookup_key = digest.finalize().to_vec();
+ lookup_key.extend_from_slice(serial_number);
+ debug!("CRLite lookup key: {:?}", lookup_key);
+ let result = match &self.crlite_filter {
+ Some(crlite_filter) => crlite_filter.has(lookup_key),
+ // This can only happen if the backing file was deleted or if it or our database has
+ // become corrupted. In any case, we have no information.
+ None => return nsICertStorage::STATE_NO_FILTER,
+ };
+ match result {
+ true => nsICertStorage::STATE_ENFORCE,
+ false => nsICertStorage::STATE_UNSET,
+ }
+ }
+
+ // To store certificates, we create a Cert out of each given cert, subject, and trust tuple. We
+ // hash each certificate with sha-256 to obtain a unique* key for that certificate, and we store
+ // the Cert in the database. We also look up or create a CertHashList for the given subject and
+ // add the new certificate's hash if it isn't present in the list. If it wasn't present, we
+ // write out the updated CertHashList.
+ // *By the pigeon-hole principle, there exist collisions for sha-256, so this key is not
+ // actually unique. We rely on the assumption that sha-256 is a cryptographically strong hash.
+ // If an adversary can find two different certificates with the same sha-256 hash, they can
+ // probably forge a sha-256-based signature, so assuming the keys we create here are unique is
+ // not a security issue.
+ pub fn add_certs(
+ &mut self,
+ certs: &[(nsCString, nsCString, i16)],
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_mut() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let mut writer = env_and_store.env.write()?;
+ // Make a note that we have prior cert data now.
+ env_and_store.store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &make_key!(PREFIX_DATA_TYPE, &[nsICertStorage::DATA_TYPE_CERTIFICATE]),
+ &Value::Bool(true),
+ )?;
+
+ for (cert_der_base64, subject_base64, trust) in certs {
+ let cert_der = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&cert_der_base64) {
+ Ok(cert_der) => cert_der,
+ Err(e) => {
+ warn!("error base64-decoding cert - skipping: {}", e);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ let subject = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&subject_base64) {
+ Ok(subject) => subject,
+ Err(e) => {
+ warn!("error base64-decoding subject - skipping: {}", e);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ let mut digest = Sha256::default();
+ digest.update(&cert_der);
+ let cert_hash = digest.finalize();
+ let cert_key = make_key!(PREFIX_CERT, &cert_hash);
+ let cert = Cert::new(&cert_der, &subject, *trust)?;
+ env_and_store
+ .store
+ .put(&mut writer, &cert_key, &Value::Blob(&cert.to_bytes()?))?;
+ let subject_key = make_key!(PREFIX_SUBJECT, &subject);
+ let empty_vec = Vec::new();
+ let old_cert_hash_list = match env_and_store.store.get(&writer, &subject_key)? {
+ Some(Value::Blob(hashes)) => hashes.to_owned(),
+ Some(_) => empty_vec,
+ None => empty_vec,
+ };
+ let new_cert_hash_list = CertHashList::add(&old_cert_hash_list, &cert_hash)?;
+ if new_cert_hash_list.len() != old_cert_hash_list.len() {
+ env_and_store.store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &subject_key,
+ &Value::Blob(&new_cert_hash_list),
+ )?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.commit()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ // Given a list of certificate sha-256 hashes, we can look up each Cert entry in the database.
+ // We use this to find the corresponding subject so we can look up the CertHashList it should
+ // appear in. If that list contains the given hash, we remove it and update the CertHashList.
+ // Finally we delete the Cert entry.
+ pub fn remove_certs_by_hashes(
+ &mut self,
+ hashes_base64: &[nsCString],
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_mut() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let mut writer = env_and_store.env.write()?;
+ let reader = env_and_store.env.read()?;
+
+ for hash in hashes_base64 {
+ let hash = match BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&hash) {
+ Ok(hash) => hash,
+ Err(e) => {
+ warn!("error decoding hash - ignoring: {}", e);
+ continue;
+ }
+ };
+ let cert_key = make_key!(PREFIX_CERT, &hash);
+ if let Some(Value::Blob(cert_bytes)) = env_and_store.store.get(&reader, &cert_key)? {
+ if let Ok(cert) = Cert::from_bytes(cert_bytes) {
+ let subject_key = make_key!(PREFIX_SUBJECT, &cert.subject);
+ let empty_vec = Vec::new();
+ // We have to use the writer here to make sure we have an up-to-date view of
+ // the cert hash list.
+ let old_cert_hash_list = match env_and_store.store.get(&writer, &subject_key)? {
+ Some(Value::Blob(hashes)) => hashes.to_owned(),
+ Some(_) => empty_vec,
+ None => empty_vec,
+ };
+ let new_cert_hash_list = CertHashList::remove(&old_cert_hash_list, &hash)?;
+ if new_cert_hash_list.len() != old_cert_hash_list.len() {
+ env_and_store.store.put(
+ &mut writer,
+ &subject_key,
+ &Value::Blob(&new_cert_hash_list),
+ )?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ match env_and_store.store.delete(&mut writer, &cert_key) {
+ Ok(()) => {}
+ Err(StoreError::KeyValuePairNotFound) => {}
+ Err(e) => return Err(SecurityStateError::from(e)),
+ };
+ }
+ writer.commit()?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ // Given a certificate's subject, we look up the corresponding CertHashList. In theory, each
+ // hash in that list corresponds to a certificate with the given subject, so we look up each of
+ // these (assuming the database is consistent and contains them) and add them to the given list.
+ // If we encounter an inconsistency, we continue looking as best we can.
+ pub fn find_certs_by_subject(
+ &self,
+ subject: &[u8],
+ certs: &mut ThinVec<ThinVec<u8>>,
+ ) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ let env_and_store = match self.env_and_store.as_ref() {
+ Some(env_and_store) => env_and_store,
+ None => return Err(SecurityStateError::from("env and store not initialized?")),
+ };
+ let reader = env_and_store.env.read()?;
+ certs.clear();
+ let subject_key = make_key!(PREFIX_SUBJECT, subject);
+ let empty_vec = Vec::new();
+ let cert_hash_list_bytes = match env_and_store.store.get(&reader, &subject_key)? {
+ Some(Value::Blob(hashes)) => hashes,
+ Some(_) => &empty_vec,
+ None => &empty_vec,
+ };
+ let cert_hash_list = CertHashList::new(cert_hash_list_bytes)?;
+ for cert_hash in cert_hash_list.into_iter() {
+ let cert_key = make_key!(PREFIX_CERT, cert_hash);
+ // If there's some inconsistency, we don't want to fail the whole operation - just go
+ // for best effort and find as many certificates as we can.
+ if let Some(Value::Blob(cert_bytes)) = env_and_store.store.get(&reader, &cert_key)? {
+ if let Ok(cert) = Cert::from_bytes(cert_bytes) {
+ let mut thin_vec_cert = ThinVec::with_capacity(cert.der.len());
+ thin_vec_cert.extend_from_slice(&cert.der);
+ certs.push(thin_vec_cert);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl MallocSizeOf for SecurityState {
+ fn size_of(&self, ops: &mut MallocSizeOfOps) -> usize {
+ self.profile_path.size_of(ops)
+ + self.env_and_store.size_of(ops)
+ + self
+ .crlite_filter
+ .as_ref()
+ .map_or(0, |crlite_filter| crlite_filter.approximate_size_of())
+ + self.crlite_stash.size_of(ops)
+ + self.crlite_coverage.size_of(ops)
+ + self.remaining_ops.size_of(ops)
+ }
+}
+
+const CERT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION_1: u8 = 1;
+
+// A Cert consists of its DER encoding, its DER-encoded subject, and its trust (currently
+// nsICertStorage::TRUST_INHERIT, but in the future nsICertStorage::TRUST_ANCHOR may also be used).
+// The length of each encoding must be representable by a u16 (so 65535 bytes is the longest a
+// certificate can be).
+struct Cert<'a> {
+ der: &'a [u8],
+ subject: &'a [u8],
+ trust: i16,
+}
+
+impl<'a> Cert<'a> {
+ fn new(der: &'a [u8], subject: &'a [u8], trust: i16) -> Result<Cert<'a>, SecurityStateError> {
+ if der.len() > u16::max as usize {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("certificate is too long"));
+ }
+ if subject.len() > u16::max as usize {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("subject is too long"));
+ }
+ Ok(Cert {
+ der,
+ subject,
+ trust,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn from_bytes(encoded: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Cert<'a>, SecurityStateError> {
+ if encoded.len() < size_of::<u8>() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no version?"));
+ }
+ let (mut version, rest) = encoded.split_at(size_of::<u8>());
+ let version = version.read_u8()?;
+ if version != CERT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION_1 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: unexpected version"));
+ }
+
+ if rest.len() < size_of::<u16>() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no der len?"));
+ }
+ let (mut der_len, rest) = rest.split_at(size_of::<u16>());
+ let der_len = der_len.read_u16::<NetworkEndian>()? as usize;
+ if rest.len() < der_len {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no der?"));
+ }
+ let (der, rest) = rest.split_at(der_len);
+
+ if rest.len() < size_of::<u16>() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no subject len?"));
+ }
+ let (mut subject_len, rest) = rest.split_at(size_of::<u16>());
+ let subject_len = subject_len.read_u16::<NetworkEndian>()? as usize;
+ if rest.len() < subject_len {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no subject?"));
+ }
+ let (subject, mut rest) = rest.split_at(subject_len);
+
+ if rest.len() < size_of::<i16>() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: no trust?"));
+ }
+ let trust = rest.read_i16::<NetworkEndian>()?;
+ if rest.len() > 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("invalid Cert: trailing data?"));
+ }
+
+ Ok(Cert {
+ der,
+ subject,
+ trust,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SecurityStateError> {
+ let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(
+ size_of::<u8>()
+ + size_of::<u16>()
+ + self.der.len()
+ + size_of::<u16>()
+ + self.subject.len()
+ + size_of::<i16>(),
+ );
+ bytes.write_u8(CERT_SERIALIZATION_VERSION_1)?;
+ if self.der.len() > u16::max as usize {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("certificate is too long"));
+ }
+ bytes.write_u16::<NetworkEndian>(self.der.len() as u16)?;
+ bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.der);
+ if self.subject.len() > u16::max as usize {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("subject is too long"));
+ }
+ bytes.write_u16::<NetworkEndian>(self.subject.len() as u16)?;
+ bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.subject);
+ bytes.write_i16::<NetworkEndian>(self.trust)?;
+ Ok(bytes)
+ }
+}
+
+// A CertHashList is a list of sha-256 hashes of DER-encoded certificates.
+struct CertHashList<'a> {
+ hashes: Vec<&'a [u8]>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> CertHashList<'a> {
+ fn new(hashes_bytes: &'a [u8]) -> Result<CertHashList<'a>, SecurityStateError> {
+ if hashes_bytes.len() % Sha256::output_size() != 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "unexpected length for cert hash list",
+ ));
+ }
+ let mut hashes = Vec::with_capacity(hashes_bytes.len() / Sha256::output_size());
+ for hash in hashes_bytes.chunks_exact(Sha256::output_size()) {
+ hashes.push(hash);
+ }
+ Ok(CertHashList { hashes })
+ }
+
+ fn add(hashes_bytes: &[u8], new_hash: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SecurityStateError> {
+ if hashes_bytes.len() % Sha256::output_size() != 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "unexpected length for cert hash list",
+ ));
+ }
+ if new_hash.len() != Sha256::output_size() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("unexpected cert hash length"));
+ }
+ for hash in hashes_bytes.chunks_exact(Sha256::output_size()) {
+ if hash == new_hash {
+ return Ok(hashes_bytes.to_owned());
+ }
+ }
+ let mut combined = hashes_bytes.to_owned();
+ combined.extend_from_slice(new_hash);
+ Ok(combined)
+ }
+
+ fn remove(hashes_bytes: &[u8], cert_hash: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SecurityStateError> {
+ if hashes_bytes.len() % Sha256::output_size() != 0 {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from(
+ "unexpected length for cert hash list",
+ ));
+ }
+ if cert_hash.len() != Sha256::output_size() {
+ return Err(SecurityStateError::from("unexpected cert hash length"));
+ }
+ let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(hashes_bytes.len());
+ for hash in hashes_bytes.chunks_exact(Sha256::output_size()) {
+ if hash != cert_hash {
+ result.extend_from_slice(hash);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(result)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a> IntoIterator for CertHashList<'a> {
+ type Item = &'a [u8];
+ type IntoIter = std::vec::IntoIter<&'a [u8]>;
+
+ fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter {
+ self.hashes.into_iter()
+ }
+}
+
+// Helper struct for get_crlite_revocation_state.
+struct CRLiteTimestamp {
+ log_id: ThinVec<u8>,
+ timestamp: u64,
+}
+
+// Helper struct for set_batch_state. Takes a prefix, two base64-encoded key
+// parts, and a security state value.
+struct EncodedSecurityState {
+ prefix: &'static str,
+ key_part_1_base64: nsCString,
+ key_part_2_base64: nsCString,
+ state: i16,
+}
+
+impl EncodedSecurityState {
+ fn new(
+ prefix: &'static str,
+ key_part_1_base64: nsCString,
+ key_part_2_base64: nsCString,
+ state: i16,
+ ) -> EncodedSecurityState {
+ EncodedSecurityState {
+ prefix,
+ key_part_1_base64,
+ key_part_2_base64,
+ state,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn key(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SecurityStateError> {
+ let key_part_1 = BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&self.key_part_1_base64)?;
+ let key_part_2 = BASE64_STANDARD.decode(&self.key_part_2_base64)?;
+ Ok(make_key!(self.prefix, &key_part_1, &key_part_2))
+ }
+
+ fn state(&self) -> i16 {
+ self.state
+ }
+}
+
+fn get_path_from_directory_service(key: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, nserror::nsresult> {
+ let directory_service: RefPtr<nsIProperties> =
+ xpcom::components::Directory::service().map_err(|_| NS_ERROR_FAILURE)?;
+ let cs_key = CString::new(key).map_err(|_| NS_ERROR_FAILURE)?;
+
+ let mut requested_dir = GetterAddrefs::<nsIFile>::new();
+ unsafe {
+ (*directory_service)
+ .Get(
+ (&cs_key).as_ptr(),
+ &nsIFile::IID as *const nsIID,
+ requested_dir.void_ptr(),
+ )
+ .to_result()
+ }?;
+
+ let dir_path = requested_dir.refptr().ok_or(NS_ERROR_FAILURE)?;
+ let mut path = nsString::new();
+ unsafe { (*dir_path).GetPath(&mut *path).to_result() }?;
+ Ok(PathBuf::from(format!("{}", path)))
+}
+
+fn get_profile_path() -> Result<PathBuf, nserror::nsresult> {
+ get_path_from_directory_service("ProfD").or_else(|_| get_path_from_directory_service("TmpD"))
+}
+
+fn get_store_path(profile_path: &PathBuf) -> Result<PathBuf, SecurityStateError> {
+ let mut store_path = profile_path.clone();
+ store_path.push("security_state");
+ create_dir_all(store_path.as_path())?;
+ Ok(store_path)
+}
+
+fn make_env(path: &Path) -> Result<Rkv, SecurityStateError> {
+ let mut builder = Rkv::environment_builder::<SafeMode>();
+ builder.set_max_dbs(2);
+
+ // 16MB is a little over twice the size of the current dataset. When we
+ // eventually switch to the LMDB backend to create the builder above,
+ // we should set this as the map size, since it cannot currently resize.
+ // (The SafeMode backend warns when a map size is specified, so we skip it
+ // for now to avoid console spam.)
+
+ // builder.set_map_size(16777216);
+
+ // Bug 1595004: Migrate databases between backends in the future,
+ // and handle 32 and 64 bit architectures in case of LMDB.
+ Rkv::from_builder(path, builder).map_err(SecurityStateError::from)
+}
+
+fn unconditionally_remove_file(path: &Path) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ match remove_file(path) {
+ Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+ Err(e) => match e.kind() {
+ std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(()),
+ _ => Err(SecurityStateError::from(e)),
+ },
+ }
+}
+
+fn remove_db(path: &Path) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ // Remove LMDB-related files.
+ let db = path.join("data.mdb");
+ unconditionally_remove_file(&db)?;
+ let lock = path.join("lock.mdb");
+ unconditionally_remove_file(&lock)?;
+
+ // Remove SafeMode-related files.
+ let db = path.join("data.safe.bin");
+ unconditionally_remove_file(&db)?;
+
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+// Helper function to read stash information from the given reader and insert the results into the
+// given stash map.
+fn load_crlite_stash_from_reader_into_map(
+ reader: &mut dyn Read,
+ dest: &mut HashMap<Vec<u8>, HashSet<Vec<u8>>>,
+) -> Result<(), SecurityStateError> {
+ // The basic unit of the stash file is an issuer subject public key info
+ // hash (sha-256) followed by a number of serial numbers corresponding
+ // to revoked certificates issued by that issuer. More specifically,
+ // each unit consists of:
+ // 4 bytes little-endian: the number of serial numbers following the issuer spki hash
+ // 1 byte: the length of the issuer spki hash
+ // issuer spki hash length bytes: the issuer spki hash
+ // as many times as the indicated serial numbers:
+ // 1 byte: the length of the serial number
+ // serial number length bytes: the serial number
+ // The stash file consists of any number of these units concatenated
+ // together.
+ loop {
+ let num_serials = match reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>() {
+ Ok(num_serials) => num_serials,
+ Err(_) => break, // end of input, presumably
+ };
+ let issuer_spki_hash_len = reader.read_u8().map_err(|e| {
+ SecurityStateError::from(format!("error reading stash issuer_spki_hash_len: {}", e))
+ })?;
+ let mut issuer_spki_hash = vec![0; issuer_spki_hash_len as usize];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut issuer_spki_hash).map_err(|e| {
+ SecurityStateError::from(format!("error reading stash issuer_spki_hash: {}", e))
+ })?;
+ let serials = dest.entry(issuer_spki_hash).or_insert(HashSet::new());
+ for _ in 0..num_serials {
+ let serial_len = reader.read_u8().map_err(|e| {
+ SecurityStateError::from(format!("error reading stash serial_len: {}", e))
+ })?;
+ let mut serial = vec![0; serial_len as usize];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut serial).map_err(|e| {
+ SecurityStateError::from(format!("error reading stash serial: {}", e))
+ })?;
+ let _ = serials.insert(serial);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+// This is a helper struct that implements the task that asynchronously reads the CRLite stash on a
+// background thread.
+struct BackgroundReadStashTask {
+ profile_path: PathBuf,
+ security_state: Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+}
+
+impl BackgroundReadStashTask {
+ fn new(
+ profile_path: PathBuf,
+ security_state: &Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+ ) -> BackgroundReadStashTask {
+ BackgroundReadStashTask {
+ profile_path,
+ security_state: Arc::clone(security_state),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Task for BackgroundReadStashTask {
+ fn run(&self) {
+ let mut path = match get_store_path(&self.profile_path) {
+ Ok(path) => path,
+ Err(e) => {
+ error!("error getting security_state path: {}", e.message);
+ return;
+ }
+ };
+ path.push("crlite.stash");
+ // Before we've downloaded any stashes, this file won't exist.
+ if !path.exists() {
+ return;
+ }
+ let stash_file = match File::open(path) {
+ Ok(file) => file,
+ Err(e) => {
+ error!("error opening stash file: {}", e);
+ return;
+ }
+ };
+ let mut stash_reader = BufReader::new(stash_file);
+ let mut crlite_stash = HashMap::new();
+ match load_crlite_stash_from_reader_into_map(&mut stash_reader, &mut crlite_stash) {
+ Ok(()) => {}
+ Err(e) => {
+ error!("error loading crlite stash: {}", e.message);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ let mut ss = match self.security_state.write() {
+ Ok(ss) => ss,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ match ss.crlite_stash.replace(crlite_stash) {
+ Some(_) => {
+ error!("replacing existing crlite stash when reading for the first time?");
+ return;
+ }
+ None => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn done(&self) -> Result<(), nsresult> {
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+fn do_construct_cert_storage(
+ iid: *const xpcom::nsIID,
+ result: *mut *mut xpcom::reexports::libc::c_void,
+) -> Result<(), nserror::nsresult> {
+ let path_buf = get_profile_path()?;
+ let security_state = Arc::new(RwLock::new(SecurityState::new(path_buf.clone())));
+ let cert_storage = CertStorage::allocate(InitCertStorage {
+ security_state: security_state.clone(),
+ queue: create_background_task_queue(cstr!("cert_storage"))?,
+ });
+ let memory_reporter = MemoryReporter::allocate(InitMemoryReporter { security_state });
+
+ // Dispatch a task to the background task queue to asynchronously read the CRLite stash file (if
+ // present) and load it into cert_storage. This task does not hold the
+ // cert_storage.security_state mutex for the majority of its operation, which allows certificate
+ // verification threads to query cert_storage without blocking. This is important for
+ // performance, but it means that certificate verifications that happen before the task has
+ // completed will not have stash information, and thus may not know of revocations that have
+ // occurred since the last full CRLite filter was downloaded. As long as the last full filter
+ // was downloaded no more than 10 days ago, this is no worse than relying on OCSP responses,
+ // which have a maximum validity of 10 days.
+ // NB: because the background task queue is serial, this task will complete before other tasks
+ // later dispatched to the queue run. This means that other tasks that interact with the stash
+ // will do so with the correct set of preconditions.
+ let load_crlite_stash_task = Box::new(BackgroundReadStashTask::new(
+ path_buf,
+ &cert_storage.security_state,
+ ));
+ let runnable = TaskRunnable::new("LoadCrliteStash", load_crlite_stash_task)?;
+ TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, cert_storage.queue.coerce())?;
+
+ if let Some(reporter) = memory_reporter.query_interface::<nsIMemoryReporter>() {
+ if let Some(reporter_manager) = xpcom::get_service::<nsIMemoryReporterManager>(cstr!(
+ "@mozilla.org/memory-reporter-manager;1"
+ )) {
+ unsafe { reporter_manager.RegisterStrongReporter(&*reporter) };
+ }
+ }
+
+ unsafe { cert_storage.QueryInterface(iid, result).to_result() }
+}
+
+// This is a helper for creating a task that will perform a specific action on a background thread.
+struct SecurityStateTask<
+ T: Default + VariantType,
+ F: FnOnce(&mut SecurityState) -> Result<T, SecurityStateError>,
+> {
+ callback: AtomicCell<Option<ThreadBoundRefPtr<nsICertStorageCallback>>>,
+ security_state: Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+ result: AtomicCell<(nserror::nsresult, T)>,
+ task_action: AtomicCell<Option<F>>,
+}
+
+impl<T: Default + VariantType, F: FnOnce(&mut SecurityState) -> Result<T, SecurityStateError>>
+ SecurityStateTask<T, F>
+{
+ fn new(
+ callback: &nsICertStorageCallback,
+ security_state: &Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+ task_action: F,
+ ) -> Result<SecurityStateTask<T, F>, nsresult> {
+ let mut ss = security_state.write().or(Err(NS_ERROR_FAILURE))?;
+ ss.remaining_ops = ss.remaining_ops.wrapping_add(1);
+
+ Ok(SecurityStateTask {
+ callback: AtomicCell::new(Some(ThreadBoundRefPtr::new(RefPtr::new(callback)))),
+ security_state: Arc::clone(security_state),
+ result: AtomicCell::new((NS_ERROR_FAILURE, T::default())),
+ task_action: AtomicCell::new(Some(task_action)),
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: Default + VariantType, F: FnOnce(&mut SecurityState) -> Result<T, SecurityStateError>> Task
+ for SecurityStateTask<T, F>
+{
+ fn run(&self) {
+ let mut ss = match self.security_state.write() {
+ Ok(ss) => ss,
+ Err(_) => return,
+ };
+ // this is a no-op if the DB is already open
+ if ss.open_db().is_err() {
+ return;
+ }
+ if let Some(task_action) = self.task_action.swap(None) {
+ let rv = task_action(&mut ss)
+ .and_then(|v| Ok((NS_OK, v)))
+ .unwrap_or((NS_ERROR_FAILURE, T::default()));
+ self.result.store(rv);
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn done(&self) -> Result<(), nsresult> {
+ let threadbound = self.callback.swap(None).ok_or(NS_ERROR_FAILURE)?;
+ let callback = threadbound.get_ref().ok_or(NS_ERROR_FAILURE)?;
+ let result = self.result.swap((NS_ERROR_FAILURE, T::default()));
+ let variant = result.1.into_variant();
+ let nsrv = unsafe { callback.Done(result.0, &*variant) };
+
+ let mut ss = self.security_state.write().or(Err(NS_ERROR_FAILURE))?;
+ ss.remaining_ops = ss.remaining_ops.wrapping_sub(1);
+
+ match nsrv {
+ NS_OK => Ok(()),
+ e => Err(e),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn cert_storage_constructor(
+ iid: *const xpcom::nsIID,
+ result: *mut *mut xpcom::reexports::libc::c_void,
+) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ match do_construct_cert_storage(iid, result) {
+ Ok(()) => NS_OK,
+ Err(e) => e,
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! try_ns {
+ ($e:expr) => {
+ match $e {
+ Ok(value) => value,
+ Err(_) => return NS_ERROR_FAILURE,
+ }
+ };
+ ($e:expr, or continue) => {
+ match $e {
+ Ok(value) => value,
+ Err(err) => {
+ error!("{}", err);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+// This macro is a way to ensure the DB has been opened while minimizing lock acquisitions in the
+// common (read-only) case. First we acquire a read lock and see if we even need to open the DB. If
+// not, we can continue with the read lock we already have. Otherwise, we drop the read lock,
+// acquire the write lock, open the DB, drop the write lock, and re-acquire the read lock. While it
+// is possible for two or more threads to all come to the conclusion that they need to open the DB,
+// this isn't ultimately an issue - `open_db` will exit early if another thread has already done the
+// work.
+macro_rules! get_security_state {
+ ($self:expr) => {{
+ let ss_read_only = try_ns!($self.security_state.read());
+ if !ss_read_only.db_needs_opening() {
+ ss_read_only
+ } else {
+ drop(ss_read_only);
+ {
+ let mut ss_write = try_ns!($self.security_state.write());
+ try_ns!(ss_write.open_db());
+ }
+ try_ns!($self.security_state.read())
+ }
+ }};
+}
+
+#[xpcom(implement(nsICertStorage), atomic)]
+struct CertStorage {
+ security_state: Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+ queue: RefPtr<nsISerialEventTarget>,
+}
+
+/// CertStorage implements the nsICertStorage interface. The actual work is done by the
+/// SecurityState. To handle any threading issues, we have an atomic-refcounted read/write lock on
+/// the one and only SecurityState. So, only one thread can use SecurityState's &mut self functions
+/// at a time, while multiple threads can use &self functions simultaneously (as long as there are
+/// no threads using an &mut self function). The Arc is to allow for the creation of background
+/// tasks that use the SecurityState on the queue owned by CertStorage. This allows us to not block
+/// the main thread.
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+impl CertStorage {
+ unsafe fn HasPriorData(
+ &self,
+ data_type: u8,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if callback.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.get_has_prior_data(data_type),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("HasPriorData", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn GetRemainingOperationCount(&self, state: *mut i32) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if state.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let ss = try_ns!(self.security_state.read());
+ *state = ss.remaining_ops;
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn SetRevocations(
+ &self,
+ revocations: *const ThinVec<Option<RefPtr<nsIRevocationState>>>,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if revocations.is_null() || callback.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ let revocations = &*revocations;
+ let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(revocations.len());
+
+ // By continuing when an nsIRevocationState attribute value is invalid,
+ // we prevent errors relating to individual blocklist entries from
+ // causing sync to fail. We will accumulate telemetry on these failures
+ // in bug 1254099.
+
+ for revocation in revocations.iter().flatten() {
+ let mut state: i16 = 0;
+ try_ns!(revocation.GetState(&mut state).to_result(), or continue);
+
+ if let Some(revocation) =
+ (*revocation).query_interface::<nsIIssuerAndSerialRevocationState>()
+ {
+ let mut issuer = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!(revocation.GetIssuer(&mut *issuer).to_result(), or continue);
+
+ let mut serial = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!(revocation.GetSerial(&mut *serial).to_result(), or continue);
+
+ entries.push(EncodedSecurityState::new(
+ PREFIX_REV_IS,
+ issuer,
+ serial,
+ state,
+ ));
+ } else if let Some(revocation) =
+ (*revocation).query_interface::<nsISubjectAndPubKeyRevocationState>()
+ {
+ let mut subject = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!(revocation.GetSubject(&mut *subject).to_result(), or continue);
+
+ let mut pub_key_hash = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!(revocation.GetPubKey(&mut *pub_key_hash).to_result(), or continue);
+
+ entries.push(EncodedSecurityState::new(
+ PREFIX_REV_SPK,
+ subject,
+ pub_key_hash,
+ state,
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.set_batch_state(&entries, nsICertStorage::DATA_TYPE_REVOCATION),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("SetRevocations", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn GetRevocationState(
+ &self,
+ issuer: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ serial: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ subject: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ pub_key: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ state: *mut i16,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ // TODO (bug 1541212): We really want to restrict this to non-main-threads only in non-test
+ // contexts, but we can't do so until bug 1406854 is fixed.
+ if issuer.is_null() || serial.is_null() || subject.is_null() || pub_key.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ *state = nsICertStorage::STATE_UNSET;
+ let ss = get_security_state!(self);
+ match ss.get_revocation_state(&*issuer, &*serial, &*subject, &*pub_key) {
+ Ok(st) => {
+ *state = st;
+ NS_OK
+ }
+ _ => NS_ERROR_FAILURE,
+ }
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn SetFullCRLiteFilter(
+ &self,
+ filter: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ enrolled_issuers: *const ThinVec<nsCString>,
+ coverage: *const ThinVec<Option<RefPtr<nsICRLiteCoverage>>>,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if filter.is_null()
+ || coverage.is_null()
+ || callback.is_null()
+ || enrolled_issuers.is_null()
+ {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+
+ let filter_owned = (*filter).to_vec();
+ let enrolled_issuers_owned = (*enrolled_issuers).to_vec();
+
+ let coverage = &*coverage;
+ let mut coverage_entries = Vec::with_capacity(coverage.len());
+ for entry in coverage.iter().flatten() {
+ let mut b64_log_id = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!((*entry).GetB64LogID(&mut *b64_log_id).to_result(), or continue);
+ let mut min_timestamp: u64 = 0;
+ try_ns!((*entry).GetMinTimestamp(&mut min_timestamp).to_result(), or continue);
+ let mut max_timestamp: u64 = 0;
+ try_ns!((*entry).GetMaxTimestamp(&mut max_timestamp).to_result(), or continue);
+ coverage_entries.push((b64_log_id, min_timestamp, max_timestamp));
+ }
+
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.set_full_crlite_filter(
+ filter_owned,
+ enrolled_issuers_owned,
+ &coverage_entries
+ ),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("SetFullCRLiteFilter", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn AddCRLiteStash(
+ &self,
+ stash: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if stash.is_null() || callback.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let stash_owned = (*stash).to_vec();
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.add_crlite_stash(stash_owned),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("AddCRLiteStash", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn IsCertRevokedByStash(
+ &self,
+ issuer_spki: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ serial_number: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ is_revoked: *mut bool,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if issuer_spki.is_null() || serial_number.is_null() || is_revoked.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let ss = get_security_state!(self);
+ *is_revoked = match ss.is_cert_revoked_by_stash(&*issuer_spki, &*serial_number) {
+ Ok(is_revoked) => is_revoked,
+ Err(_) => return NS_ERROR_FAILURE,
+ };
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn GetCRLiteRevocationState(
+ &self,
+ issuer: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ issuerSPKI: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ serialNumber: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ timestamps: *const ThinVec<Option<RefPtr<nsICRLiteTimestamp>>>,
+ state: *mut i16,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ // TODO (bug 1541212): We really want to restrict this to non-main-threads only, but we
+ // can't do so until bug 1406854 is fixed.
+ if issuer.is_null()
+ || issuerSPKI.is_null()
+ || serialNumber.is_null()
+ || state.is_null()
+ || timestamps.is_null()
+ {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let timestamps = &*timestamps;
+ let mut timestamp_entries = Vec::with_capacity(timestamps.len());
+ for timestamp_entry in timestamps.iter().flatten() {
+ let mut log_id = ThinVec::with_capacity(32);
+ try_ns!(timestamp_entry.GetLogID(&mut log_id).to_result(), or continue);
+ let mut timestamp: u64 = 0;
+ try_ns!(timestamp_entry.GetTimestamp(&mut timestamp).to_result(), or continue);
+ timestamp_entries.push(CRLiteTimestamp { log_id, timestamp });
+ }
+ let ss = get_security_state!(self);
+ *state = ss.get_crlite_revocation_state(
+ &*issuer,
+ &*issuerSPKI,
+ &*serialNumber,
+ &timestamp_entries,
+ );
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn AddCerts(
+ &self,
+ certs: *const ThinVec<Option<RefPtr<nsICertInfo>>>,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if certs.is_null() || callback.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let certs = &*certs;
+ let mut cert_entries = Vec::with_capacity(certs.len());
+ for cert in certs.iter().flatten() {
+ let mut der = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!((*cert).GetCert(&mut *der).to_result(), or continue);
+ let mut subject = nsCString::new();
+ try_ns!((*cert).GetSubject(&mut *subject).to_result(), or continue);
+ let mut trust: i16 = 0;
+ try_ns!((*cert).GetTrust(&mut trust).to_result(), or continue);
+ cert_entries.push((der, subject, trust));
+ }
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.add_certs(&cert_entries),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("AddCerts", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn RemoveCertsByHashes(
+ &self,
+ hashes: *const ThinVec<nsCString>,
+ callback: *const nsICertStorageCallback,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ if !is_main_thread() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NOT_SAME_THREAD;
+ }
+ if hashes.is_null() || callback.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let hashes = (*hashes).to_vec();
+ let task = Box::new(try_ns!(SecurityStateTask::new(
+ &*callback,
+ &self.security_state,
+ move |ss| ss.remove_certs_by_hashes(&hashes),
+ )));
+ let runnable = try_ns!(TaskRunnable::new("RemoveCertsByHashes", task));
+ try_ns!(TaskRunnable::dispatch(runnable, self.queue.coerce()));
+ NS_OK
+ }
+
+ unsafe fn FindCertsBySubject(
+ &self,
+ subject: *const ThinVec<u8>,
+ certs: *mut ThinVec<ThinVec<u8>>,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ // TODO (bug 1541212): We really want to restrict this to non-main-threads only, but we
+ // can't do so until bug 1406854 is fixed.
+ if subject.is_null() || certs.is_null() {
+ return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+ }
+ let ss = get_security_state!(self);
+ match ss.find_certs_by_subject(&*subject, &mut *certs) {
+ Ok(()) => NS_OK,
+ Err(_) => NS_ERROR_FAILURE,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+extern "C" {
+ fn cert_storage_malloc_size_of(ptr: *const xpcom::reexports::libc::c_void) -> usize;
+}
+
+#[xpcom(implement(nsIMemoryReporter), atomic)]
+struct MemoryReporter {
+ security_state: Arc<RwLock<SecurityState>>,
+}
+
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+impl MemoryReporter {
+ unsafe fn CollectReports(
+ &self,
+ callback: *const nsIHandleReportCallback,
+ data: *const nsISupports,
+ _anonymize: bool,
+ ) -> nserror::nsresult {
+ let ss = try_ns!(self.security_state.read());
+ let mut ops = MallocSizeOfOps::new(cert_storage_malloc_size_of, None);
+ let size = ss.size_of(&mut ops);
+ let callback = match RefPtr::from_raw(callback) {
+ Some(ptr) => ptr,
+ None => return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED,
+ };
+ // This does the same as MOZ_COLLECT_REPORT
+ callback.Callback(
+ &nsCStr::new() as &nsACString,
+ &nsCStr::from("explicit/cert-storage/storage") as &nsACString,
+ nsIMemoryReporter::KIND_HEAP,
+ nsIMemoryReporter::UNITS_BYTES,
+ size as i64,
+ &nsCStr::from("Memory used by certificate storage") as &nsACString,
+ data,
+ );
+ NS_OK
+ }
+}