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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 01:47:29 +0000
commit0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d (patch)
treea31f07c9bcca9d56ce61e9a1ffd30ef350d513aa /security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d.tar.xz
firefox-esr-0ebf5bdf043a27fd3dfb7f92e0cb63d88954c44d.zip
Adding upstream version 115.8.0esr.upstream/115.8.0esr
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c1228
1 files changed, 1228 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..35f67a3514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1228 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * This file implements the CLIENT Session ID cache.
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "nssilock.h"
+#include "sslencode.h"
+#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN) || defined(_WINDOWS)
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+static sslSessionID *cache = NULL;
+static PZLock *cacheLock = NULL;
+
+/* sids can be in one of 5 states:
+ *
+ * never_cached, created, but not yet put into cache.
+ * in_client_cache, in the client cache's linked list.
+ * in_server_cache, entry came from the server's cache file.
+ * invalid_cache has been removed from the cache.
+ * in_external_cache sid comes from an external cache.
+ */
+
+#define LOCK_CACHE lock_cache()
+#define UNLOCK_CACHE PZ_Unlock(cacheLock)
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock(void)
+{
+ cacheLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockCache);
+ return cacheLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock(void)
+{
+ if (cacheLock) {
+ PZ_DestroyLock(cacheLock);
+ cacheLock = NULL;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static PRBool LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE;
+
+static SECStatus
+FreeSessionCacheLocks()
+{
+ SECStatus rv1, rv2;
+ rv1 = ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock();
+ rv2 = ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock();
+ if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+InitSessionCacheLocks(void)
+{
+ SECStatus rv1, rv2;
+ PRErrorCode rc;
+ rv1 = ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock();
+ rv2 = ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock();
+ if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ rc = PORT_GetError();
+ FreeSessionCacheLocks();
+ PORT_SetError(rc);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized early */
+SECStatus
+ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks()
+{
+ PORT_Assert(PR_TRUE == LocksInitializedEarly);
+ if (!LocksInitializedEarly) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ FreeSessionCacheLocks();
+ LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static PRCallOnceType lockOnce;
+
+/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized lazily */
+static SECStatus
+ssl_ShutdownLocks(void *appData, void *nssData)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE == LocksInitializedEarly);
+ if (LocksInitializedEarly) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ FreeSessionCacheLocks();
+ memset(&lockOnce, 0, sizeof(lockOnce));
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static PRStatus
+initSessionCacheLocksLazily(void)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = InitSessionCacheLocks();
+ if (SECSuccess != rv) {
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+ }
+ rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_ShutdownLocks, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(SECSuccess == rv);
+ if (SECSuccess != rv) {
+ return PR_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return PR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* lazyInit means that the call is not happening during a 1-time
+ * initialization function, but rather during dynamic, lazy initialization
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PRBool lazyInit)
+{
+ if (LocksInitializedEarly) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (lazyInit) {
+ return (PR_SUCCESS ==
+ PR_CallOnce(&lockOnce, initSessionCacheLocksLazily))
+ ? SECSuccess
+ : SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (SECSuccess == InitSessionCacheLocks()) {
+ LocksInitializedEarly = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static void
+lock_cache(void)
+{
+ ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE);
+ PZ_Lock(cacheLock);
+}
+
+/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !!
+ * If the unreferenced sid is not in the cache, Free sid and its contents.
+ */
+void
+ssl_DestroySID(sslSessionID *sid, PRBool freeIt)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: destroy sid: sid=0x%x cached=%d", sid, sid->cached));
+ PORT_Assert(sid->references == 0);
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached != in_client_cache);
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket,
+ PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_DestroyRWLock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID);
+ PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName);
+
+ if (sid->peerCert) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+ }
+ if (sid->peerCertStatus.items) {
+ SECITEM_FreeArray(&sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ if (sid->localCert) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->localCert);
+ }
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE);
+
+ if (freeIt) {
+ PORT_ZFree(sid, sizeof(sslSessionID));
+ }
+}
+
+/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !!
+ * Decrement reference count, and
+ * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache.
+ * Does NOT remove from the cache first.
+ * If the sid is still in the cache, it is left there until next time
+ * the cache list is traversed.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_FreeLockedSID(sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1);
+ if (--sid->references == 0) {
+ ssl_DestroySID(sid, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+}
+
+/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !!
+ * Decrement reference count, and
+ * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache.
+ * Does NOT remove from the cache first.
+ * These locks are necessary because the sid _might_ be in the cache list.
+ */
+void
+ssl_FreeSID(sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ if (sid) {
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid);
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+ }
+}
+
+sslSessionID *
+ssl_ReferenceSID(sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ sid->references++;
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+** Lookup sid entry in cache by Address, port, and peerID string.
+** If found, Increment reference count, and return pointer to caller.
+** If it has timed out or ref count is zero, remove from list and free it.
+*/
+
+sslSessionID *
+ssl_LookupSID(PRTime now, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, PRUint16 port, const char *peerID,
+ const char *urlSvrName)
+{
+ sslSessionID **sidp;
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+
+ if (!urlSvrName)
+ return NULL;
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ sidp = &cache;
+ while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) {
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached == in_client_cache);
+ PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1);
+
+ SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: lookup: sid=0x%x", sid));
+
+ if (sid->expirationTime < now) {
+ /*
+ ** This session-id timed out.
+ ** Don't even care who it belongs to, blow it out of our cache.
+ */
+ SSL_TRC(7, ("SSL: lookup, throwing sid out, age=%d refs=%d",
+ now - sid->creationTime, sid->references));
+
+ *sidp = sid->next; /* delink it from the list. */
+ sid->cached = invalid_cache; /* mark not on list. */
+ ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid); /* drop ref count, free. */
+ } else if (!memcmp(&sid->addr, addr, sizeof(PRIPv6Addr)) && /* server IP addr matches */
+ (sid->port == port) && /* server port matches */
+ /* proxy (peerID) matches */
+ (((peerID == NULL) && (sid->peerID == NULL)) ||
+ ((peerID != NULL) && (sid->peerID != NULL) &&
+ PORT_Strcmp(sid->peerID, peerID) == 0)) &&
+ /* is cacheable */
+ (sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) &&
+ /* server hostname matches. */
+ (sid->urlSvrName != NULL) &&
+ (0 == PORT_Strcmp(urlSvrName, sid->urlSvrName))) {
+ /* Hit */
+ sid->lastAccessTime = now;
+ sid->references++;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ sidp = &sid->next;
+ }
+ }
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/*
+** Add an sid to the cache or return a previously cached entry to the cache.
+** Although this is static, it is called via ss->sec.cache().
+*/
+static void
+CacheSID(sslSessionID *sid, PRTime creationTime)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached);
+
+ SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Cache: sid=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x "
+ "time=%x cached=%d",
+ sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+ sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+ sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime,
+ sid->cached));
+
+ if (!sid->urlSvrName) {
+ /* don't cache this SID because it can never be matched */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0 &&
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Client generates the SessionID if this was a stateless resume. */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0) {
+ SECStatus rv;
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(8, (0, "sessionID:",
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength));
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.lock = PR_NewRWLock(PR_RWLOCK_RANK_NONE, NULL);
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ return;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(sid->creationTime != 0);
+ if (!sid->creationTime) {
+ sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = creationTime;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(sid->expirationTime != 0);
+ if (!sid->expirationTime) {
+ sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) *
+ PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Put sid into the cache. Bump reference count to indicate that
+ * cache is holding a reference. Uncache will reduce the cache
+ * reference.
+ */
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ sid->references++;
+ sid->cached = in_client_cache;
+ sid->next = cache;
+ cache = sid;
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If sid "zap" is in the cache,
+ * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count.
+ * Caller must hold cache lock.
+ */
+static void
+UncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap)
+{
+ sslSessionID **sidp = &cache;
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+
+ if (zap->cached != in_client_cache) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Uncache: zap=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x "
+ "time=%x cipherSuite=%d",
+ zap, zap->cached, zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+ zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+ zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], zap->port, zap->creationTime,
+ zap->u.ssl3.cipherSuite));
+
+ /* See if it's in the cache, if so nuke it */
+ while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) {
+ if (sid == zap) {
+ /*
+ ** Bingo. Reduce reference count by one so that when
+ ** everyone is done with the sid we can free it up.
+ */
+ *sidp = zap->next;
+ zap->cached = invalid_cache;
+ ssl_FreeLockedSID(zap);
+ return;
+ }
+ sidp = &sid->next;
+ }
+}
+
+/* If sid "zap" is in the cache,
+ * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count.
+ * Although this function is static, it is called externally via
+ * ssl_UncacheSessionID.
+ */
+static void
+LockAndUncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap)
+{
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ UncacheSID(zap);
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ReadVariableFromBuffer(sslReader *reader, sslReadBuffer *readerBuffer,
+ uint8_t lenBytes, SECItem *dest)
+{
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, lenBytes, readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer->len) {
+ SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer->buf,
+ readerBuffer->len };
+ SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, dest, &tempItem);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Fill sid with the values from the encoded resumption token.
+ * sid has to be allocated.
+ * We don't care about locks here as this cache entry is externally stored.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, const PRUint8 *encodedToken,
+ PRUint32 encodedTokenLen)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(encodedTokenLen);
+ PORT_Assert(encodedToken);
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ if (!sid || !encodedToken || !encodedTokenLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (encodedToken[0] != SSLResumptionTokenVersion) {
+ /* Unknown token format version. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* These variables are used across macros. Don't use them outside. */
+ sslReader reader = SSL_READER(encodedToken, encodedTokenLen);
+ reader.offset += 1; // We read the version already. Skip the first byte.
+ sslReadBuffer readerBuffer = { 0 };
+ PRUint64 tmpInt = 0;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->lastAccessTime = (PRTime)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->expirationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp = (PRTime)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ PORT_Assert(!sid->peerCert);
+ SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf,
+ readerBuffer.len };
+ sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */
+ &tempItem,
+ NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (!sid->peerCert) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 2, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus, 1);
+ if (!sid->peerCertStatus.items) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf,
+ readerBuffer.len };
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus.items[0], &tempItem);
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
+ if (sid->peerID) {
+ PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID);
+ }
+ sid->peerID = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf);
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ if (sid->urlSvrName) {
+ PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName);
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
+ sid->urlSvrName = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf);
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ PORT_Assert(!sid->localCert);
+ SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf,
+ readerBuffer.len };
+ sid->localCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */
+ &tempItem,
+ NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0]) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1]) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->port = (PRUint16)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->version = (PRUint16)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->creationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->authType = (SSLAuthType)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->keaType = (SSLKEAType)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->keaGroup = (SSLNamedGroup)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->sigScheme = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = (PRUint8)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (readerBuffer.len) {
+ PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len);
+ }
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = (PRUint16)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.policy = (PRUint8)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.len == WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ if (readerBuffer.len != WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, readerBuffer.buf,
+ readerBuffer.len);
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = (PRUint8)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = (PRUint8)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = (unsigned long)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = (unsigned long)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = (unsigned long)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = (PRUint32)tmpInt;
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = (PRUint16)tmpInt;
+
+ if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = (char)tmpInt;
+
+ if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1,
+ &sid->u.ssl3.srvName) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2,
+ &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1,
+ &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2,
+ &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point we must have read everything. */
+ PORT_Assert(reader.offset == reader.buf.len);
+ if (reader.offset != reader.buf.len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsResumptionTokenUsable(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss);
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+
+ // Check that the ticket didn't expire.
+ PRTime endTime = 0;
+ NewSessionTicket *ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
+ if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint != 0) {
+ endTime = ticket->received_timestamp +
+ (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ if (endTime <= ssl_Time(ss)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check that the session entry didn't expire.
+ if (sid->expirationTime < ssl_Time(ss)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ // Check that the server name (SNI) matches the one set for this session.
+ // Don't use the token if there's no server name.
+ if (sid->urlSvrName == NULL || PORT_Strcmp(ss->url, sid->urlSvrName) != 0) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ // This shouldn't be false, but let's check it anyway.
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Encode a session ticket into a byte array that can be handed out to a cache.
+ * Needed memory in encodedToken has to be allocated according to
+ * *encodedTokenLen. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, sslBuffer *encodedTokenBuf)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(encodedTokenBuf);
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len ||
+ !encodedTokenBuf || !sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable || !sid->urlSvrName) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Encoding format:
+ * 0-byte: version
+ * Integers are encoded according to their length.
+ * SECItems are prepended with a 64-bit length field followed by the bytes.
+ * Optional bytes are encoded as a 0-length item if not present.
+ */
+ SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ SSLResumptionTokenVersion, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->lastAccessTime, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->expirationTime, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ // session ticket
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp,
+ 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint,
+ 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags,
+ 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add,
+ 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size,
+ 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->peerCert->derCert.data,
+ sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->peerCertStatus.len > 1) {
+ /* This is not implemented so it shouldn't happen.
+ * If it gets implemented, this has to change.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->peerCertStatus.len == 1 && sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data,
+ sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PRUint64 len = sid->peerID ? strlen(sid->peerID) : 0;
+ if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) {
+ // This string really shouldn't be that long.
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ (const unsigned char *)sid->peerID, len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ len = sid->urlSvrName ? strlen(sid->urlSvrName) : 0;
+ if (!len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) {
+ // This string really shouldn't be that long.
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ (const unsigned char *)sid->urlSvrName,
+ len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->localCert) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->localCert->derCert.data,
+ sid->localCert->derCert.len, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0], 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1], 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->port, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->version, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->creationTime, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authType, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authKeyBits, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaType, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaKeyBits, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaGroup, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->sigScheme, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.policy, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
+ WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len,
+ 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed,
+ 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID, 8);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterValid, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data,
+ sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data,
+ sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data,
+ sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len > 1);
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len,
+ 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_CacheExternalToken(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss);
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->resumptionTokenCallback);
+
+ SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL [%d]: Cache External: sid=0x%x cached=%d "
+ "addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x time=%x cached=%d",
+ ss->fd,
+ sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+ sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+ sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime,
+ sid->cached));
+
+ /* This is only available for stateless resumption. */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't export token if the session used client authentication. */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!sid->creationTime) {
+ sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss);
+ }
+ if (!sid->expirationTime) {
+ sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime,
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) *
+ PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ }
+
+ sslBuffer encodedToken = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+
+ if (ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sid, &encodedToken) != SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("SSL [%d]: encoding resumption token failed", ss->fd));
+ return;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken) > 0);
+ PRINT_BUF(40, (ss, "SSL: encoded resumption token",
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken)));
+ SECStatus rv = ss->resumptionTokenCallback(
+ ss->fd, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken),
+ ss->resumptionTokenContext);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ sid->cached = in_external_cache;
+ }
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedToken);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_CacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec;
+ PORT_Assert(sec);
+ PORT_Assert(sec->ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
+
+ if (sec->ci.sid && !sec->ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!sec->isServer && ss->resumptionTokenCallback) {
+ ssl_CacheExternalToken(ss);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->resumptionTokenCallback);
+ if (sec->isServer) {
+ ssl_ServerCacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ CacheSID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss));
+}
+
+void
+ssl_UncacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ if (ss->opt.noCache) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec;
+ PORT_Assert(sec);
+
+ if (sec->ci.sid) {
+ if (sec->isServer) {
+ ssl_ServerUncacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid);
+ } else if (!ss->resumptionTokenCallback) {
+ LockAndUncacheSID(sec->ci.sid);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* wipe out the entire client session cache. */
+void
+SSL_ClearSessionCache(void)
+{
+ LOCK_CACHE;
+ while (cache != NULL)
+ UncacheSID(cache);
+ UNLOCK_CACHE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_TicketTimeValid(const sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket)
+{
+ PRTime endTime;
+
+ if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ endTime = ticket->received_timestamp +
+ (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ return endTime > ssl_Time(ss);
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(sslSessionID *sid,
+ /*in/out*/ NewSessionTicket *newSessionTicket)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket);
+ PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.data);
+ PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.len != 0);
+
+ /* If this is in the client cache, we are updating an existing entry that is
+ * already cached or was once cached, so we need to acquire and release the
+ * write lock. Otherwise, this is a new session that isn't shared with
+ * anything yet, so no locking is needed.
+ */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Wlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ /* Another thread may have evicted, or it may be in external cache. */
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached);
+ }
+ /* If this was in the client cache, then we might have to free the old
+ * ticket. In TLS 1.3, we might get a replacement ticket if the server
+ * sends more than one ticket. */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) {
+ PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached ||
+ sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket,
+ PR_FALSE);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data);
+
+ /* Do a shallow copy, moving the ticket data. */
+ sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket = *newSessionTicket;
+ newSessionTicket->ticket.data = NULL;
+ newSessionTicket->ticket.len = 0;
+
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+}