Adding upstream version 115.8.0esr.upstream/115.8.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

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+## How does aHash prevent DOS attacks
+
+AHash is designed to [prevent an adversary that does not know the key from being able to create hash collisions or partial collisions.](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks)
+
+If you are a cryptographer and would like to help review aHash's algorithm, please post a comment [here](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/issues/11).
+
+In short, this is achieved by ensuring that:
+
+* aHash is designed to [resist differential crypto analysis](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks#differential-analysis). Meaning it should not be possible to devise a scheme to "cancel" out a modification of the internal state from a block of input via some corresponding change in a subsequent block of input.
+  * This is achieved by not performing any "premixing" - This reversible mixing gave previous hashes such as murmurhash confidence in their quality, but could be undone by a deliberate attack.
+  * Before it is used each chunk of input is "masked" such as by xoring it with an unpredictable value.
+* aHash obeys the '[strict avalanche criterion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalanche_effect#Strict_avalanche_criterion)':
+Each bit of input has the potential to flip every bit of the output.
+* Similarly, each bit in the key can affect every bit in the output.
+* Input bits never effect just one, or a very few, bits in intermediate state. This is specifically designed to prevent the sort of 
+[differential attacks launched by the sipHash authors](https://emboss.github.io/blog/2012/12/14/breaking-murmur-hash-flooding-dos-reloaded/) which cancel previous inputs.
+* The `finish` call at the end of the hash is designed to not expose individual bits of the internal state. 
+  * For example in the main algorithm 256bits of state and 256bits of keys are reduced to 64 total bits using 3 rounds of AES encryption. 
+Reversing this is more than non-trivial. Most of the information is by definition gone, and any given bit of the internal state is fully diffused across the output.
+* In both aHash and its fallback the internal state is divided into two halves which are updated by two unrelated techniques using the same input. - This means that if there is a way to attack one of them it likely won't be able to attack both of them at the same time.
+* It is deliberately difficult to 'chain' collisions. (This has been the major technique used to weaponize attacks on other hash functions)
+
+More details are available on [the wiki](https://github.com/tkaitchuck/aHash/wiki/How-aHash-is-resists-DOS-attacks).
+
+## Why not use a cryptographic hash in a hashmap.
+
+Cryptographic hashes are designed to make is nearly impossible to find two items that collide when the attacker has full control
+over the input. This has several implications:
+
+* They are very difficult to construct, and have to go to a lot of effort to ensure that collisions are not possible.
+* They have no notion of a 'key'. Rather, they are fully deterministic and provide exactly one hash for a given input.
+
+For a HashMap the requirements are different.
+
+* Speed is very important, especially for short inputs. Often the key for a HashMap is a single `u32` or similar, and to be effective
+the bucket that it should be hashed to needs to be computed in just a few CPU cycles.
+* A hashmap does not need to provide a hard and fast guarantee that no two inputs will ever collide. Hence, hashCodes are not 256bits 
+but are just 64 or 32 bits in length. Often the first thing done with the hashcode is to truncate it further to compute which among a few buckets should be used for a key. 
+  * Here collisions are expected, and a cheap to deal with provided there is no systematic way to generated huge numbers of values that all
+go to the same bucket.
+  * This also means that unlike a cryptographic hash partial collisions matter. It doesn't do a hashmap any good to produce a unique 256bit hash if
+the lower 12 bits are all the same. This means that even a provably irreversible hash would not offer protection from a DOS attack in a hashmap
+because an attacker can easily just brute force the bottom N bits.
+
+From a cryptography point of view, a hashmap needs something closer to a block cypher.
+Where the input can be quickly mixed in a way that cannot be reversed without knowing a key.
+
+## Why isn't aHash cryptographically secure
+
+It is not designed to be. 
+Attempting to use aHash as a secure hash will likely fail to hold up for several reasons:
+
+1. aHash relies on random keys which are assumed to not be observable by an attacker. For a cryptographic hash all inputs can be seen and controlled by the attacker.
+2. aHash has not yet gone through peer review, which is a pre-requisite for security critical algorithms.
+3. Because aHash uses reduced rounds of AES as opposed to the standard of 10. Things like the SQUARE attack apply to part of the internal state.
+(These are mitigated by other means to prevent producing collections, but would be a problem in other contexts).
+4. Like any cypher based hash, it will show certain statistical deviations from truly random output when comparing a (VERY) large number of hashes. 
+(By definition cyphers have fewer collisions than truly random data.)
+
+There are efforts to build a secure hash function that uses AES-NI for acceleration, but aHash is not one of them.
+
+## How is aHash so fast
+
+AHash uses a number of tricks. 
+
+One trick is taking advantage of specialization. If aHash is compiled on nightly it will take
+advantage of specialized hash implementations for strings, slices, and primitives. 
+
+Another is taking advantage of hardware instructions.
+When it is available aHash uses AES rounds using the AES-NI instruction. AES-NI is very fast (on an intel i7-6700 it 
+is as fast as a 64 bit multiplication.) and handles 16 bytes of input at a time, while being a very strong permutation.
+
+This is obviously much faster than most standard approaches to hashing, and does a better job of scrambling data than most non-secure hashes.
+
+On an intel i7-6700 compiled on nightly Rust with flags `-C opt-level=3 -C target-cpu=native -C codegen-units=1`:
+
+| Input   | SipHash 1-3 time | FnvHash time|FxHash time| aHash time| aHash Fallback* |
+|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|
+| u8             | 9.3271 ns | 0.808 ns  | **0.594 ns**  | 0.7704 ns | 0.7664 ns |
+| u16            | 9.5139 ns | 0.803 ns  | **0.594 ns**  | 0.7653 ns | 0.7704 ns |
+| u32            | 9.1196 ns | 1.4424 ns | **0.594 ns**  | 0.7637 ns | 0.7712 ns |
+| u64            | 10.854 ns | 3.0484 ns | **0.628 ns**  | 0.7788 ns | 0.7888 ns |
+| u128           | 12.465 ns | 7.0728 ns | 0.799 ns  | **0.6174 ns** | 0.6250 ns |
+| 1 byte string  | 11.745 ns | 2.4743 ns | 2.4000 ns | **1.4921 ns** | 1.5861 ns |
+| 3 byte string  | 12.066 ns | 3.5221 ns | 2.9253 ns | **1.4745 ns** | 1.8518 ns |
+| 4 byte string  | 11.634 ns | 4.0770 ns | 1.8818 ns | **1.5206 ns** | 1.8924 ns |
+| 7 byte string  | 14.762 ns | 5.9780 ns | 3.2282 ns | **1.5207 ns** | 1.8933 ns |
+| 8 byte string  | 13.442 ns | 4.0535 ns | 2.9422 ns | **1.6262 ns** | 1.8929 ns |
+| 15 byte string | 16.880 ns | 8.3434 ns | 4.6070 ns | **1.6265 ns** | 1.7965 ns |
+| 16 byte string | 15.155 ns | 7.5796 ns | 3.2619 ns | **1.6262 ns** | 1.8011 ns |
+| 24 byte string | 16.521 ns | 12.492 ns | 3.5424 ns | **1.6266 ns** | 2.8311 ns |
+| 68 byte string | 24.598 ns | 50.715 ns | 5.8312 ns | **4.8282 ns** | 5.4824 ns |
+| 132 byte string| 39.224 ns | 119.96 ns | 11.777 ns | **6.5087 ns** | 9.1459 ns |
+|1024 byte string| 254.00 ns | 1087.3 ns | 156.41 ns | **25.402 ns** | 54.566 ns |
+
+* Fallback refers to the algorithm aHash would use if AES instructions are unavailable.
+For reference a hash that does nothing (not even reads the input data takes) **0.520 ns**. So that represents the fastest
+possible time.
+
+As you can see above aHash like `FxHash` provides a large speedup over `SipHash-1-3` which is already nearly twice as fast as `SipHash-2-4`.
+
+Rust's HashMap by default uses `SipHash-1-3` because faster hash functions such as `FxHash` are predictable and vulnerable to denial of
+service attacks. While `aHash` has both very strong scrambling and very high performance.
+
+AHash performs well when dealing with large inputs because aHash reads 8 or 16 bytes at a time. (depending on availability of AES-NI)
+
+Because of this, and its optimized logic, `aHash` is able to outperform `FxHash` with strings.
+It also provides especially good performance dealing with unaligned input.
+(Notice the big performance gaps between 3 vs 4, 7 vs 8 and 15 vs 16 in `FxHash` above)
+
+### Which CPUs can use the hardware acceleration
+
+Hardware AES instructions are built into Intel processors built after 2010 and AMD processors after 2012.
+It is also available on [many other CPUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES_instruction_set) should in eventually
+be able to get aHash to work. However, only X86 and X86-64 are the only supported architectures at the moment, as currently
+they are the only architectures for which Rust provides an intrinsic.
+
+aHash also uses `sse2` and `sse3` instructions. X86 processors that have `aesni` also have these instruction sets.