1 files changed, 173 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/build/build-clang/revert-llvmorg-14-init-11890-gf86deb18cab6.patch b/build/build-clang/revert-llvmorg-14-init-11890-gf86deb18cab6.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d61910705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/build-clang/revert-llvmorg-14-init-11890-gf86deb18cab6.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+From c8a5013045b5aff8e45418925688ca670545980f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org>
+Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 17:58:28 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "[lsan] Move out suppression of invalid PCs from
+ StopTheWorld"
+
+This reverts commit f86deb18cab6479a0961ade3807e4729f3a27bdf
+because of permafail for a sizable amount of ASan test jobs, where the
+worker would die without even leaving any logs.
+
+---
+ compiler-rt/lib/lsan/lsan_common.cpp | 108 +++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/compiler-rt/lib/lsan/lsan_common.cpp b/compiler-rt/lib/lsan/lsan_common.cpp
+index fd7aa38d99db..658415bce507 100644
+--- a/compiler-rt/lib/lsan/lsan_common.cpp
++++ b/compiler-rt/lib/lsan/lsan_common.cpp
+@@ -71,11 +71,9 @@ class LeakSuppressionContext {
+   SuppressionContext context;
+   bool suppressed_stacks_sorted = true;
+   InternalMmapVector<u32> suppressed_stacks;
+-  const LoadedModule *suppress_module = nullptr;
+ 
+-  void LazyInit();
+   Suppression *GetSuppressionForAddr(uptr addr);
+-  bool SuppressInvalid(const StackTrace &stack);
++  void LazyInit();
+   bool SuppressByRule(const StackTrace &stack, uptr hit_count, uptr total_size);
+ 
+  public:
+@@ -126,8 +124,6 @@ void LeakSuppressionContext::LazyInit() {
+     if (&__lsan_default_suppressions)
+       context.Parse(__lsan_default_suppressions());
+     context.Parse(kStdSuppressions);
+-    if (flags()->use_tls && flags()->use_ld_allocations)
+-      suppress_module = GetLinker();
+   }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -152,41 +148,6 @@ Suppression *LeakSuppressionContext::GetSuppressionForAddr(uptr addr) {
+   return s;
+ }
+ 
+-static uptr GetCallerPC(const StackTrace &stack) {
+-  // The top frame is our malloc/calloc/etc. The next frame is the caller.
+-  if (stack.size >= 2)
+-    return stack.trace[1];
+-  return 0;
+-}
+-
+-// On Linux, treats all chunks allocated from ld-linux.so as reachable, which
+-// covers dynamically allocated TLS blocks, internal dynamic loader's loaded
+-// modules accounting etc.
+-// Dynamic TLS blocks contain the TLS variables of dynamically loaded modules.
+-// They are allocated with a __libc_memalign() call in allocate_and_init()
+-// (elf/dl-tls.c). Glibc won't tell us the address ranges occupied by those
+-// blocks, but we can make sure they come from our own allocator by intercepting
+-// __libc_memalign(). On top of that, there is no easy way to reach them. Their
+-// addresses are stored in a dynamically allocated array (the DTV) which is
+-// referenced from the static TLS. Unfortunately, we can't just rely on the DTV
+-// being reachable from the static TLS, and the dynamic TLS being reachable from
+-// the DTV. This is because the initial DTV is allocated before our interception
+-// mechanism kicks in, and thus we don't recognize it as allocated memory. We
+-// can't special-case it either, since we don't know its size.
+-// Our solution is to include in the root set all allocations made from
+-// ld-linux.so (which is where allocate_and_init() is implemented). This is
+-// guaranteed to include all dynamic TLS blocks (and possibly other allocations
+-// which we don't care about).
+-// On all other platforms, this simply checks to ensure that the caller pc is
+-// valid before reporting chunks as leaked.
+-bool LeakSuppressionContext::SuppressInvalid(const StackTrace &stack) {
+-  uptr caller_pc = GetCallerPC(stack);
+-  // If caller_pc is unknown, this chunk may be allocated in a coroutine. Mark
+-  // it as reachable, as we can't properly report its allocation stack anyway.
+-  return !caller_pc ||
+-         (suppress_module && suppress_module->containsAddress(caller_pc));
+-}
+-
+ bool LeakSuppressionContext::SuppressByRule(const StackTrace &stack,
+                                             uptr hit_count, uptr total_size) {
+   for (uptr i = 0; i < stack.size; i++) {
+@@ -205,7 +166,7 @@ bool LeakSuppressionContext::Suppress(u32 stack_trace_id, uptr hit_count,
+                                       uptr total_size) {
+   LazyInit();
+   StackTrace stack = StackDepotGet(stack_trace_id);
+-  if (!SuppressInvalid(stack) && !SuppressByRule(stack, hit_count, total_size))
++  if (!SuppressByRule(stack, hit_count, total_size))
+     return false;
+   suppressed_stacks_sorted = false;
+   suppressed_stacks.push_back(stack_trace_id);
+@@ -569,6 +530,68 @@ static void CollectIgnoredCb(uptr chunk, void *arg) {
+   }
+ }
+ 
++static uptr GetCallerPC(const StackTrace &stack) {
++  // The top frame is our malloc/calloc/etc. The next frame is the caller.
++  if (stack.size >= 2)
++    return stack.trace[1];
++  return 0;
++}
++
++struct InvalidPCParam {
++  Frontier *frontier;
++  bool skip_linker_allocations;
++};
++
++// ForEachChunk callback. If the caller pc is invalid or is within the linker,
++// mark as reachable. Called by ProcessPlatformSpecificAllocations.
++static void MarkInvalidPCCb(uptr chunk, void *arg) {
++  CHECK(arg);
++  InvalidPCParam *param = reinterpret_cast<InvalidPCParam *>(arg);
++  chunk = GetUserBegin(chunk);
++  LsanMetadata m(chunk);
++  if (m.allocated() && m.tag() != kReachable && m.tag() != kIgnored) {
++    u32 stack_id = m.stack_trace_id();
++    uptr caller_pc = 0;
++    if (stack_id > 0)
++      caller_pc = GetCallerPC(StackDepotGet(stack_id));
++    // If caller_pc is unknown, this chunk may be allocated in a coroutine. Mark
++    // it as reachable, as we can't properly report its allocation stack anyway.
++    if (caller_pc == 0 || (param->skip_linker_allocations &&
++                           GetLinker()->containsAddress(caller_pc))) {
++      m.set_tag(kIgnored);
++      param->frontier->push_back(chunk);
++    }
++  }
++}
++
++// On Linux, treats all chunks allocated from ld-linux.so as reachable, which
++// covers dynamically allocated TLS blocks, internal dynamic loader's loaded
++// modules accounting etc.
++// Dynamic TLS blocks contain the TLS variables of dynamically loaded modules.
++// They are allocated with a __libc_memalign() call in allocate_and_init()
++// (elf/dl-tls.c). Glibc won't tell us the address ranges occupied by those
++// blocks, but we can make sure they come from our own allocator by intercepting
++// __libc_memalign(). On top of that, there is no easy way to reach them. Their
++// addresses are stored in a dynamically allocated array (the DTV) which is
++// referenced from the static TLS. Unfortunately, we can't just rely on the DTV
++// being reachable from the static TLS, and the dynamic TLS being reachable from
++// the DTV. This is because the initial DTV is allocated before our interception
++// mechanism kicks in, and thus we don't recognize it as allocated memory. We
++// can't special-case it either, since we don't know its size.
++// Our solution is to include in the root set all allocations made from
++// ld-linux.so (which is where allocate_and_init() is implemented). This is
++// guaranteed to include all dynamic TLS blocks (and possibly other allocations
++// which we don't care about).
++// On all other platforms, this simply checks to ensure that the caller pc is
++// valid before reporting chunks as leaked.
++static void ProcessPC(Frontier *frontier) {
++  InvalidPCParam arg;
++  arg.frontier = frontier;
++  arg.skip_linker_allocations =
++      flags()->use_tls && flags()->use_ld_allocations && GetLinker() != nullptr;
++  ForEachChunk(MarkInvalidPCCb, &arg);
++}
++
+ // Sets the appropriate tag on each chunk.
+ static void ClassifyAllChunks(SuspendedThreadsList const &suspended_threads,
+                               Frontier *frontier) {
+@@ -584,6 +607,9 @@ static void ClassifyAllChunks(SuspendedThreadsList const &suspended_threads,
+   ProcessRootRegions(frontier);
+   FloodFillTag(frontier, kReachable);
+ 
++  CHECK_EQ(0, frontier->size());
++  ProcessPC(frontier);
++
+   // The check here is relatively expensive, so we do this in a separate flood
+   // fill. That way we can skip the check for chunks that are reachable
+   // otherwise.
+-- 
+2.35.0.1.g829a698654
+