diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst | 194 |
1 files changed, 194 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13f0057b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +Security Bug Approval Process +============================= + +How to fix a core-security bug in Firefox - developer guidelines +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +Follow these security guidelines if you’re involved in reviewing, +testing and landing a security patch: +:ref:`Fixing Security Bugs`. + +Purpose: don't 0-day ourselves +------------------------------ + +People watch our check-ins. They may be able to start exploiting our +users before we can get an update out to them if + +- the patch is an obvious security fix (bounds check, kungFuDeathGrip, + etc.) +- the check-in comment says "security fix" or includes trigger words + like "exploitable", "vulnerable", "overflow", "injection", "use after + free", etc. +- comments in the code mention those types of things or how someone + could abuse the bug +- the check-in contains testcases that show exactly how to trigger the + vulnerability + +Principle: assume the worst +--------------------------- + +- If there's no rating we assume it could be critical +- If we don't know the regression range we assume it needs porting to + all supported branches + +Process for Security Bugs (Developer Perspective) +------------------------------------------------- + +Filing / Managing Bugs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- Try whenever possible to file security bugs marked as such when + filing, instead of filing them as open bugs and then closing later. + This is not always possible, but attention to this, especially when + filing from crash-stats, is helpful. +- It is _ok_ to link security bugs to non-security bugs with Blocks, + Depends, Regressions, or See Also. Users with the editbugs permission + will be able to see the reference, but not view a restricted bug. + Users without the permission will not be able to see the link. + +Developing the Patch +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- Comments in the code should not mention a security issue is being + fixed. Don’t paint a picture or an arrow pointing to security issues + any more than the code changes already do. +- Avoid linking it to non-security bugs with Blocks, Depends, or See + Also, especially if those bugs may give a hint to the sort of + security issue involved. Mention the bug in a comment on the security + bug instead. We can always fill in the links later after the fix has + shipped. +- Do not push to Try servers if possible: this exposes the security + issues for these critical and high rated bugs to public viewing. In + an ideal case, testing of patches is done locally before final + check-in to mozilla-central. +- If pushing to Try servers is necessary, **do not include the bug + number in the patch**. Ideally, do not include tests in the push as + the tests can illustrate the exact nature of the security problem + frequently. +- If you must push to Try servers, with or without tests, try to + obfuscate what this patch is for. Try to push it with other, + non-security work, in the same area. + +Request review of the patch in the same process as normal. After the +patch has been reviewed you will request sec-approval as needed. See +:ref:`Fixing Security Bugs` +for more examples/details of these points. + +Preparing the patch for landing +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +See :ref:`Fixing Security Bugs` +for more details. + +On Requesting sec-approval +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For security bugs with no sec- severity rating assume the worst and +follow the rules for sec-critical. During the sec-approval process we +will notice it has not been rated and rate it during the process. + +Core-security bug fixes can be landed by a developer without any +explicit approval if: + +| **A)** The bug has a sec-low, sec-moderate, sec-other, or sec-want + rating. +| **or** +| **B)** The bug is a recent regression on mozilla-central. This means + +- A specific regressing check-in has been identified +- The developer can (**and has**) marked the status flags for ESR and + Beta as "unaffected" +- We have not shipped this vulnerability in anything other than a + nightly build + +If it meets the above criteria, developers do not need to ask for sec-approval. + +In all other cases, developers should ask for sec-approval. +Set the sec-approval flag to '?' on the patch when it is ready to be landed. +You will find these flags in Bugzilla using the "Details" links in the +Bugzilla attachment table (not directly on phabricator at time of writing). + +If developers are unsure about a bug and it has a patch ready, just +request sec-approval anyway and move on. Don't overthink it! + +An automatic nomination comment will be added to bugzilla when +sec-approval is set to '?'. The questions in this need to be filled out +as best as possible when sec-approval is requested for the patch. + +It is as follows (courtesy of Dan Veditz):: + + [Security approval request comment] + How easily can the security issue be deduced from the patch? + Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in + the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem? + Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw? + If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw? + Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how + different, hard to create, and risky will they be? + How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does + it need? + +This is similar to the ESR approval nomination form and is meant to help +us evaluate the risks around approving the patch for checkin. + +When the bug is approved for landing, the sec-approval flag will be set +to '+' with a comment from the approver to land the patch. At that +point, land it according to instructions provided.. + +This will allow us to control when we can land security bugs without +exposing them too early and to make sure they get landed on the various +branches. + +If you have any questions or are unsure about anything in this document +contact us on Slack in the #security channel or the current +sec-approvers Dan Veditz and Tom Ritter. + +Process for Security Bugs (sec-approver Perspective) +---------------------------------------------------- + +The security assurance team and release management will have their own +process for approving bugs: + +#. The Security assurance team goes through sec-approval ? bugs daily + and approves low risk fixes for central (if early in cycle). + Developers can also ping the Security Assurance Team (specifically + Tom Ritter & Dan Veditz) in #security on Slack when important. + + #. If a bug lacks a security-rating one should be assigned - possibly + in coordination with the (other member of) the Security Assurance + Team + +#. Security team marks tracking flags to ? for all affected versions + when approved for central. (This allows release management to decide + whether to uplift to branches just like always.) +#. Weekly security/release management triage meeting goes through + sec-approval + and ? bugs where beta and ESR is affected, ? bugs with + higher risk (sec-high and sec-critical), or ? bugs near end of cycle. + +Options for sec-approval including a logical combination of the +following: + +- Separate out the test and comments in the code into a followup commit + we will commit later. +- Remove the commit message and place it in the bug or comments in a + followup commit. +- Please land it bundled in with another commit +- Land today +- Land today, land the tests after +- Land closer to the release date +- Land in Nightly to assess stability +- Land today and request uplift to all branches +- Request uplift to all branches and we'll land as close to shipping as + permitted +- Chemspill time + +The decision process for which of these to choose is perceived risk on +multiple axes: + +- ease of exploitation +- reverse engineering risk +- stability risk + +The most common choice is: not much stability risk, not an immediate +reverse engineering risk, moderate to high difficulty of exploitation: +"land whenever". |