diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/TLSClientAuthCertSelection.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/TLSClientAuthCertSelection.cpp | 926 |
1 files changed, 926 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/TLSClientAuthCertSelection.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/TLSClientAuthCertSelection.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a2e7fd8b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/manager/ssl/TLSClientAuthCertSelection.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,926 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +// Implements the client authentication certificate selection callback for NSS. +// nsNSSIOLayer.cpp sets the callback by calling SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook and +// identifying SSLGetClientAuthDataHook as the function to call when a TLS +// server requests a client authentication certificate. +// +// In the general case, SSLGetClientAuthDataHook (running on the socket thread), +// dispatches an event to the main thread to ask the user to select a client +// authentication certificate. Meanwhile, it returns SECWouldBlock so that other +// network I/O can occur. When the user selects a client certificate (or opts +// not to send one), an event is dispatched to the socket thread that gives NSS +// the appropriate information to proceed with the TLS connection. +// +// If networking is being done on the socket process, SSLGetClientAuthDataHook +// sends an IPC call to the parent process to ask the user to select a +// certificate. Meanwhile, it again returns SECWouldBlock so other network I/O +// can occur. When a certificate (or no certificate) has been selected, the +// parent process sends an IPC call back to the socket process, which causes an +// event to be dispatched to the socket thread to continue to the TLS +// connection. + +#include "TLSClientAuthCertSelection.h" +#include "cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h" +#include "mozilla/Logging.h" +#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundChild.h" +#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundParent.h" +#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundChild.h" +#include "mozilla/psm/SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild.h" +#include "mozilla/psm/SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent.h" +#include "nsArray.h" +#include "nsArrayUtils.h" +#include "nsNSSComponent.h" +#include "nsIClientAuthDialogs.h" +#include "nsIMutableArray.h" +#include "nsINSSComponent.h" +#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h" +#include "nsIClientAuthRememberService.h" +#include "nsIX509CertDB.h" +#include "nsNSSHelper.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkix.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "sslerr.h" + +using namespace mozilla; +using namespace mozilla::pkix; +using namespace mozilla::psm; + +extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog; + +// Possible behaviors for choosing a cert for client auth. +enum class UserCertChoice { + // Ask the user to choose a cert. + Ask = 0, + // Automatically choose a cert. + Auto = 1, +}; + +// Returns the most appropriate user cert choice based on the value of the +// security.default_personal_cert preference. +UserCertChoice nsGetUserCertChoice() { + nsAutoCString value; + nsresult rv = + Preferences::GetCString("security.default_personal_cert", value); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return UserCertChoice::Ask; + } + + // There are three cases for what the preference could be set to: + // 1. "Select Automatically" -> Auto. + // 2. "Ask Every Time" -> Ask. + // 3. Something else -> Ask. This might be a nickname from a migrated cert, + // but we no longer support this case. + return value.EqualsLiteral("Select Automatically") ? UserCertChoice::Auto + : UserCertChoice::Ask; +} + +static bool hasExplicitKeyUsageNonRepudiation(CERTCertificate* cert) { + // There is no extension, v1 or v2 certificate + if (!cert->extensions) return false; + + SECStatus srv; + SECItem keyUsageItem; + keyUsageItem.data = nullptr; + + srv = CERT_FindKeyUsageExtension(cert, &keyUsageItem); + if (srv == SECFailure) return false; + + unsigned char keyUsage = keyUsageItem.data[0]; + PORT_Free(keyUsageItem.data); + + return !!(keyUsage & KU_NON_REPUDIATION); +} + +ClientAuthInfo::ClientAuthInfo(const nsACString& hostName, + const OriginAttributes& originAttributes, + int32_t port, uint32_t providerFlags, + uint32_t providerTlsFlags) + : mHostName(hostName), + mOriginAttributes(originAttributes), + mPort(port), + mProviderFlags(providerFlags), + mProviderTlsFlags(providerTlsFlags) {} + +ClientAuthInfo::ClientAuthInfo(ClientAuthInfo&& aOther) noexcept + : mHostName(std::move(aOther.mHostName)), + mOriginAttributes(std::move(aOther.mOriginAttributes)), + mPort(aOther.mPort), + mProviderFlags(aOther.mProviderFlags), + mProviderTlsFlags(aOther.mProviderTlsFlags) {} + +const nsACString& ClientAuthInfo::HostName() const { return mHostName; } + +const OriginAttributes& ClientAuthInfo::OriginAttributesRef() const { + return mOriginAttributes; +} + +int32_t ClientAuthInfo::Port() const { return mPort; } + +uint32_t ClientAuthInfo::ProviderFlags() const { return mProviderFlags; } + +uint32_t ClientAuthInfo::ProviderTlsFlags() const { return mProviderTlsFlags; } + +nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> CollectCANames(CERTDistNames* caNames) { + MOZ_ASSERT(caNames); + + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> collectedCANames; + if (!caNames) { + return collectedCANames; + } + + for (int i = 0; i < caNames->nnames; i++) { + nsTArray<uint8_t> caName; + caName.AppendElements(caNames->names[i].data, caNames->names[i].len); + collectedCANames.AppendElement(std::move(caName)); + } + return collectedCANames; +} + +// This TrustDomain only exists to facilitate the mozilla::pkix path building +// algorithm. It considers any certificate with an issuer distinguished name in +// the set of given CA names to be a trust anchor. It does essentially no +// validation or verification (in particular, the signature checking function +// always returns "Success"). +class ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain final : public TrustDomain { + public: + ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain( + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& caNames, + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& thirdPartyCertificates) + : mCANames(caNames), + mCertStorage(do_GetService(NS_CERT_STORAGE_CID)), + mThirdPartyCertificates(thirdPartyCertificates) {} + + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result GetCertTrust( + pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const pkix::CertPolicyId& policy, + pkix::Input candidateCertDER, + /*out*/ pkix::TrustLevel& trustLevel) override; + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result FindIssuer(pkix::Input encodedIssuerName, + IssuerChecker& checker, + pkix::Time time) override; + + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result CheckRevocation( + EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const pkix::CertID& certID, Time time, + mozilla::pkix::Duration validityDuration, + /*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPresponse, + /*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension, + /*optional*/ const Input* sctExtension) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result IsChainValid( + const pkix::DERArray& certChain, pkix::Time time, + const pkix::CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy) override; + + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm( + pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg, pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, + pkix::Time notBefore) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits( + pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, + unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedData( + pkix::Input data, pkix::DigestAlgorithm, pkix::Input signature, + pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result VerifyRSAPSSSignedData( + pkix::Input data, pkix::DigestAlgorithm, pkix::Input signature, + pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable( + pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, pkix::NamedCurve curve) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result VerifyECDSASignedData( + pkix::Input data, pkix::DigestAlgorithm, pkix::Input signature, + pkix::Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result CheckValidityIsAcceptable( + pkix::Time notBefore, pkix::Time notAfter, + pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, + pkix::KeyPurposeId keyPurpose) override { + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth( + pkix::Time notBefore, + /*out*/ bool& matches) override { + matches = true; + return pkix::Success; + } + virtual void NoteAuxiliaryExtension(pkix::AuxiliaryExtension extension, + pkix::Input extensionData) override {} + virtual mozilla::pkix::Result DigestBuf(pkix::Input item, + pkix::DigestAlgorithm digestAlg, + /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf, + size_t digestBufLen) override { + return pkix::DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen); + } + + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> TakeBuiltChain() { + return std::move(mBuiltChain); + } + + private: + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& mCANames; // non-owning + nsCOMPtr<nsICertStorage> mCertStorage; + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& mThirdPartyCertificates; // non-owning + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> mBuiltChain; +}; + +mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::GetCertTrust( + pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const pkix::CertPolicyId& policy, + pkix::Input candidateCertDER, + /*out*/ pkix::TrustLevel& trustLevel) { + // If the server did not specify any CA names, all client certificates are + // acceptable. + if (mCANames.Length() == 0) { + trustLevel = pkix::TrustLevel::TrustAnchor; + return pkix::Success; + } + BackCert cert(candidateCertDER, endEntityOrCA, nullptr); + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = cert.Init(); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + return rv; + } + // If this certificate's issuer distinguished name is in the set of acceptable + // CA names, we say this is a trust anchor so that the client certificate + // issued from this certificate will be presented as an option for the user. + // We also check the certificate's subject distinguished name to account for + // the case where client certificates that have the id-kp-OCSPSigning EKU + // can't be trust anchors according to mozilla::pkix, and thus we may be + // looking directly at the issuer. + pkix::Input issuer(cert.GetIssuer()); + pkix::Input subject(cert.GetSubject()); + for (const auto& caName : mCANames) { + pkix::Input caNameInput; + rv = caNameInput.Init(caName.Elements(), caName.Length()); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + continue; // probably too big + } + if (InputsAreEqual(issuer, caNameInput) || + InputsAreEqual(subject, caNameInput)) { + trustLevel = pkix::TrustLevel::TrustAnchor; + return pkix::Success; + } + } + trustLevel = pkix::TrustLevel::InheritsTrust; + return pkix::Success; +} + +// In theory this implementation should only need to consider intermediate +// certificates, since in theory it should only need to look at the issuer +// distinguished name of each certificate to determine if the client +// certificate is considered acceptable to the server. +// However, because we need to account for client certificates with the +// id-kp-OCSPSigning EKU, and because mozilla::pkix doesn't allow such +// certificates to be trust anchors, we need to consider the issuers of such +// certificates directly. These issuers could be roots, so we have to consider +// roots here. +mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::FindIssuer( + pkix::Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker, pkix::Time time) { + // First try all relevant certificates known to Gecko, which avoids calling + // CERT_CreateSubjectCertList, because that can be expensive. + Vector<pkix::Input> geckoCandidates; + if (!mCertStorage) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + nsTArray<uint8_t> subject; + subject.AppendElements(encodedIssuerName.UnsafeGetData(), + encodedIssuerName.GetLength()); + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certs; + nsresult rv = mCertStorage->FindCertsBySubject(subject, certs); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + for (auto& cert : certs) { + pkix::Input certDER; + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = certDER.Init(cert.Elements(), cert.Length()); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + continue; // probably too big + } + if (!geckoCandidates.append(certDER)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + for (const auto& thirdPartyCertificate : mThirdPartyCertificates) { + pkix::Input thirdPartyCertificateInput; + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = thirdPartyCertificateInput.Init( + thirdPartyCertificate.Elements(), thirdPartyCertificate.Length()); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + continue; // probably too big + } + if (!geckoCandidates.append(thirdPartyCertificateInput)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + + bool keepGoing = true; + for (pkix::Input candidate : geckoCandidates) { + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = checker.Check(candidate, nullptr, keepGoing); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + return rv; + } + if (!keepGoing) { + return pkix::Success; + } + } + + SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = + pkix::UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName); + // NSS seems not to differentiate between "no potential issuers found" and + // "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers." We assume + // there was no error if CERT_CreateSubjectCertList returns nullptr. + UniqueCERTCertList candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList( + nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &encodedIssuerNameItem, 0, false)); + Vector<pkix::Input> nssCandidates; + if (candidates) { + for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates); + !CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) { + pkix::Input certDER; + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = + certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + continue; // probably too big + } + if (!nssCandidates.append(certDER)) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + } + + for (pkix::Input candidate : nssCandidates) { + mozilla::pkix::Result rv = checker.Check(candidate, nullptr, keepGoing); + if (rv != pkix::Success) { + return rv; + } + if (!keepGoing) { + return pkix::Success; + } + } + return pkix::Success; +} + +mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::IsChainValid( + const pkix::DERArray& certArray, pkix::Time, const pkix::CertPolicyId&) { + mBuiltChain.Clear(); + + size_t numCerts = certArray.GetLength(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < numCerts; ++i) { + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes; + const pkix::Input* certInput = certArray.GetDER(i); + MOZ_ASSERT(certInput != nullptr); + if (!certInput) { + return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + certBytes.AppendElements(certInput->UnsafeGetData(), + certInput->GetLength()); + mBuiltChain.AppendElement(std::move(certBytes)); + } + + return pkix::Success; +} + +void ClientAuthCertificateSelectedBase::SetSelectedClientAuthData( + nsTArray<uint8_t>&& selectedCertBytes, + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& selectedCertChainBytes) { + mSelectedCertBytes = std::move(selectedCertBytes); + mSelectedCertChainBytes = std::move(selectedCertChainBytes); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +ClientAuthCertificateSelected::Run() { + mSocketInfo->ClientAuthCertificateSelected(mSelectedCertBytes, + mSelectedCertChainBytes); + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +SelectClientAuthCertificate::Run() { + DoSelectClientAuthCertificate(); + if (mSelectedCertBytes.Length() > 0) { + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> selectedCertChainBytes; + if (BuildChainForCertificate(mSelectedCertBytes, selectedCertChainBytes) != + pkix::Success) { + selectedCertChainBytes.Clear(); + } + mContinuation->SetSelectedClientAuthData(std::move(mSelectedCertBytes), + std::move(selectedCertChainBytes)); + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> socketThread = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!socketThread)) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + nsresult rv = socketThread->Dispatch(mContinuation, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return rv; + } + return NS_OK; +} + +// Helper function to build a certificate chain from the given certificate to a +// trust anchor in the set indicated by the peer (mCANames). This is essentially +// best-effort, so no signature verification occurs. +mozilla::pkix::Result SelectClientAuthCertificate::BuildChainForCertificate( + nsTArray<uint8_t>& certBytes, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& certChainBytes) { + ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain trustDomain(mCANames, + mEnterpriseCertificates); + pkix::Input certDER; + mozilla::pkix::Result result = + certDER.Init(certBytes.Elements(), certBytes.Length()); + if (result != pkix::Success) { + return result; + } + // Client certificates shouldn't be CAs, but for interoperability reasons we + // attempt to build a path with each certificate as an end entity and then as + // a CA if that fails. + const pkix::EndEntityOrCA kEndEntityOrCAParams[] = { + pkix::EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, pkix::EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA}; + // mozilla::pkix rejects certificates with id-kp-OCSPSigning unless it is + // specifically required. A client certificate should never have this EKU. + // Unfortunately, there are some client certificates in private PKIs that + // have this EKU. For interoperability, we attempt to work around this + // restriction in mozilla::pkix by first building the certificate chain with + // no particular EKU required and then again with id-kp-OCSPSigning required + // if that fails. + const pkix::KeyPurposeId kKeyPurposeIdParams[] = { + pkix::KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage, + pkix::KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning}; + for (const auto& endEntityOrCAParam : kEndEntityOrCAParams) { + for (const auto& keyPurposeIdParam : kKeyPurposeIdParams) { + mozilla::pkix::Result result = BuildCertChain( + trustDomain, certDER, Now(), endEntityOrCAParam, + KeyUsage::noParticularKeyUsageRequired, keyPurposeIdParam, + pkix::CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr); + if (result == pkix::Success) { + certChainBytes = trustDomain.TakeBuiltChain(); + return pkix::Success; + } + } + } + return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER; +} + +void SelectClientAuthCertificate::DoSelectClientAuthCertificate() { + // We check the value of a pref, so this should only be run on the main + // thread. + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); + + nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> component(do_GetService(PSM_COMPONENT_CONTRACTID)); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!component)) { + return; + } + nsresult rv = component->GetEnterpriseIntermediates(mEnterpriseCertificates); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> enterpriseRoots; + rv = component->GetEnterpriseRoots(enterpriseRoots); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + mEnterpriseCertificates.AppendElements(std::move(enterpriseRoots)); + + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(CheckForSmartCardChanges()))) { + return; + } + + if (!mPotentialClientCertificates) { + return; + } + + CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(mPotentialClientCertificates); + while (!CERT_LIST_END(n, mPotentialClientCertificates)) { + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> unusedBuiltChain; + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes; + certBytes.AppendElements(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len); + mozilla::pkix::Result result = + BuildChainForCertificate(certBytes, unusedBuiltChain); + if (result != pkix::Success) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("removing cert '%s'", n->cert->subjectName)); + CERTCertListNode* toRemove = n; + n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n); + CERT_RemoveCertListNode(toRemove); + continue; + } + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("keeping cert '%s'\n", n->cert->subjectName)); + n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n); + } + + if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(mPotentialClientCertificates)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("no client certificates available after filtering by CA")); + return; + } + + // find valid user cert and key pair + if (nsGetUserCertChoice() == UserCertChoice::Auto) { + // automatically find the right cert + UniqueCERTCertificate lowPrioNonrepCert; + // loop through the list until we find a cert with a key + for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(mPotentialClientCertificates); + !CERT_LIST_END(node, mPotentialClientCertificates); + node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { + UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey tmpKey(PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(node->cert, nullptr)); + if (tmpKey) { + if (hasExplicitKeyUsageNonRepudiation(node->cert)) { + // Not a preferred cert + if (!lowPrioNonrepCert) { // did not yet find a low prio cert + lowPrioNonrepCert.reset(CERT_DupCertificate(node->cert)); + } + } else { + // this is a good cert to present + mSelectedCertBytes.AppendElements(node->cert->derCert.data, + node->cert->derCert.len); + return; + } + } + if (PR_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD) { + // problem with password: bail + break; + } + } + + if (lowPrioNonrepCert) { + mSelectedCertBytes.AppendElements(lowPrioNonrepCert->derCert.data, + lowPrioNonrepCert->derCert.len); + } + return; + } + + // Not Auto => ask + // Get the SSL Certificate + const nsACString& hostname = mInfo.HostName(); + nsCOMPtr<nsIClientAuthRememberService> cars = nullptr; + + if (mInfo.ProviderTlsFlags() == 0) { + cars = do_GetService(NS_CLIENTAUTHREMEMBERSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + } + + if (cars) { + nsCString rememberedDBKey; + bool found; + nsresult rv = cars->HasRememberedDecision( + hostname, mInfo.OriginAttributesRef(), rememberedDBKey, &found); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + if (found) { + // An empty dbKey indicates that the user chose not to use a certificate + // and chose to remember this decision + if (rememberedDBKey.IsEmpty()) { + return; + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertDB> certdb = do_GetService(NS_X509CERTDB_CONTRACTID); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!certdb)) { + return; + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> foundCert; + nsresult rv = + certdb->FindCertByDBKey(rememberedDBKey, getter_AddRefs(foundCert)); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + if (foundCert) { + Unused << NS_WARN_IF( + NS_FAILED(foundCert->GetRawDER(mSelectedCertBytes))); + return; + } + } + } + + // ask the user to select a certificate + nsCOMPtr<nsIClientAuthDialogs> dialogs; + UniquePORTString corg(CERT_GetOrgName(&mServerCert->subject)); + nsAutoCString org(corg.get()); + + UniquePORTString cissuer(CERT_GetOrgName(&mServerCert->issuer)); + nsAutoCString issuer(cissuer.get()); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIMutableArray> certArray = nsArrayBase::Create(); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!certArray)) { + return; + } + + for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(mPotentialClientCertificates); + !CERT_LIST_END(node, mPotentialClientCertificates); + node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> tempCert = new nsNSSCertificate(node->cert); + nsresult rv = certArray->AppendElement(tempCert); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + } + + // Throw up the client auth dialog and get back the index of the selected + // cert + rv = getNSSDialogs(getter_AddRefs(dialogs), NS_GET_IID(nsIClientAuthDialogs), + NS_CLIENTAUTHDIALOGS_CONTRACTID); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + + uint32_t selectedIndex = 0; + bool certChosen = false; + + // even if the user has canceled, we want to remember that, to avoid + // repeating prompts + bool wantRemember = false; + rv = + dialogs->ChooseCertificate(hostname, mInfo.Port(), org, issuer, certArray, + &selectedIndex, &wantRemember, &certChosen); + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { + return; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> selectedCert; + if (certChosen) { + selectedCert = do_QueryElementAt(certArray, selectedIndex); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!selectedCert)) { + return; + } + if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(selectedCert->GetRawDER(mSelectedCertBytes)))) { + return; + } + } + + if (cars && wantRemember) { + rv = cars->RememberDecision(hostname, mInfo.OriginAttributesRef(), + selectedCert); + Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)); + } +} + +SECStatus SSLGetClientAuthDataHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* socket, + CERTDistNames* caNamesDecoded, + CERTCertificate** pRetCert, + SECKEYPrivateKey** pRetKey) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] SSLGetClientAuthDataHook", socket)); + + if (!arg || !socket || !caNamesDecoded || !pRetCert || !pRetKey) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + *pRetCert = nullptr; + *pRetKey = nullptr; + + RefPtr<NSSSocketControl> info(static_cast<NSSSocketControl*>(arg)); + Telemetry::ScalarAdd(Telemetry::ScalarID::SECURITY_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_USAGE, + u"requested"_ns, 1); + + if (info->GetDenyClientCert()) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] Not returning client cert due to denyClientCert attribute", + socket)); + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (info->GetJoined()) { + // We refuse to send a client certificate when there are multiple hostnames + // joined on this connection, because we only show the user one hostname + // (mHostName) in the client certificate UI. + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] Not returning client cert due to previous join", socket)); + return SECSuccess; + } + + UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(SSL_PeerCertificate(socket)); + if (!serverCert) { + PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> caNames(CollectCANames(caNamesDecoded)); + + // Currently, the IPC client certs module only refreshes its view of + // available certificates and keys if the platform issues a search for all + // certificates or keys. In the socket process, such a search may not have + // happened, so this ensures it has. + // Additionally, instantiating certificates in NSS is not thread-safe and has + // performance implications, so search for them here (on the socket thread) + // when not in the socket process. + UniqueCERTCertList potentialClientCertificates( + FindClientCertificatesWithPrivateKeys()); + + RefPtr<ClientAuthCertificateSelected> continuation( + new ClientAuthCertificateSelected(info)); + // If this is the socket process, dispatch an IPC call to select a client + // authentication certificate in the parent process. + // Otherwise, dispatch an event to the main thread to do the selection. + // When those events finish, they will run the continuation, which gives the + // appropriate information to the NSSSocketControl, which then calls + // SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete to continue the connection. + if (XRE_IsSocketProcess()) { + RefPtr<SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild> selectClientAuthCertificate( + new SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild(continuation)); + nsAutoCString hostname(info->GetHostName()); + nsTArray<uint8_t> serverCertBytes; + nsTArray<ByteArray> caNamesBytes; + for (const auto& caName : caNames) { + caNamesBytes.AppendElement(ByteArray(std::move(caName))); + } + serverCertBytes.AppendElements(serverCert->derCert.data, + serverCert->derCert.len); + OriginAttributes originAttributes(info->GetOriginAttributes()); + int32_t port(info->GetPort()); + uint32_t providerFlags(info->GetProviderFlags()); + uint32_t providerTlsFlags(info->GetProviderTlsFlags()); + nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> remoteSelectClientAuthCertificate( + NS_NewRunnableFunction( + "RemoteSelectClientAuthCertificate", + [selectClientAuthCertificate( + std::move(selectClientAuthCertificate)), + hostname(std::move(hostname)), + originAttributes(std::move(originAttributes)), port, providerFlags, + providerTlsFlags, serverCertBytes(std::move(serverCertBytes)), + caNamesBytes(std::move(caNamesBytes))]() { + mozilla::ipc::PBackgroundChild* actorChild = + mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild:: + GetOrCreateForSocketParentBridgeForCurrentThread(); + if (actorChild) { + Unused << actorChild->SendPSelectTLSClientAuthCertConstructor( + selectClientAuthCertificate, hostname, originAttributes, + port, providerFlags, providerTlsFlags, + ByteArray(serverCertBytes), caNamesBytes); + } + })); + info->SetPendingSelectClientAuthCertificate( + std::move(remoteSelectClientAuthCertificate)); + } else { + ClientAuthInfo authInfo(info->GetHostName(), info->GetOriginAttributes(), + info->GetPort(), info->GetProviderFlags(), + info->GetProviderTlsFlags()); + nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> selectClientAuthCertificate( + new SelectClientAuthCertificate( + std::move(authInfo), std::move(serverCert), std::move(caNames), + std::move(potentialClientCertificates), continuation)); + info->SetPendingSelectClientAuthCertificate( + std::move(selectClientAuthCertificate)); + } + + // Meanwhile, tell NSS this connection is blocking for now. + PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); + return SECWouldBlock; +} + +using mozilla::ipc::AssertIsOnBackgroundThread; +using mozilla::ipc::IsOnBackgroundThread; + +// Helper continuation for when a client authentication certificate has been +// selected in the parent process and the information needs to be sent to the +// socket process. +class RemoteClientAuthCertificateSelected + : public ClientAuthCertificateSelectedBase { + public: + explicit RemoteClientAuthCertificateSelected( + SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent* selectTLSClientAuthCertParent) + : mSelectTLSClientAuthCertParent(selectTLSClientAuthCertParent), + mEventTarget(NS_GetCurrentThread()) {} + + NS_IMETHOD Run() override; + + private: + RefPtr<SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent> mSelectTLSClientAuthCertParent; + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> mEventTarget; +}; + +NS_IMETHODIMP +RemoteClientAuthCertificateSelected::Run() { + // When this runs, it dispatches an event to the IPC thread it originally came + // from in order to send the IPC call to the socket process that a client + // authentication certificate has been selected. + return mEventTarget->Dispatch( + NS_NewRunnableFunction( + "psm::RemoteClientAuthCertificateSelected::Run", + [parent(mSelectTLSClientAuthCertParent), + certBytes(std::move(mSelectedCertBytes)), + builtCertChain(std::move(mSelectedCertChainBytes))]() mutable { + parent->TLSClientAuthCertSelected(certBytes, + std::move(builtCertChain)); + }), + NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); +} + +namespace mozilla::psm { + +// Given some information from the socket process about a connection that +// requested a client authentication certificate, this function dispatches an +// event to the main thread to ask the user to select one. When the user does so +// (or selects no certificate), the continuation runs and sends the information +// back via IPC. +bool SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent::Dispatch( + const nsACString& aHostName, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, + const int32_t& aPort, const uint32_t& aProviderFlags, + const uint32_t& aProviderTlsFlags, const ByteArray& aServerCertBytes, + nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aCANames) { + RefPtr<ClientAuthCertificateSelectedBase> continuation( + new RemoteClientAuthCertificateSelected(this)); + ClientAuthInfo authInfo(aHostName, aOriginAttributes, aPort, aProviderFlags, + aProviderTlsFlags); + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> socketThread = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!socketThread)) { + return false; + } + // Dispatch the work of instantiating a CERTCertificate and searching for + // client certificates to the socket thread. + nsresult rv = socketThread->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction( + "SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent::Dispatch", + [authInfo(std::move(authInfo)), continuation(std::move(continuation)), + serverCertBytes(aServerCertBytes), + caNames(std::move(aCANames))]() mutable { + SECItem serverCertItem{ + siBuffer, + const_cast<uint8_t*>(serverCertBytes.data().Elements()), + static_cast<unsigned int>(serverCertBytes.data().Length()), + }; + UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(CERT_NewTempCertificate( + CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &serverCertItem, nullptr, false, true)); + if (!serverCert) { + return; + } + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> caNamesArray; + for (auto& caName : caNames) { + caNamesArray.AppendElement(std::move(caName.data())); + } + UniqueCERTCertList potentialClientCertificates( + FindClientCertificatesWithPrivateKeys()); + RefPtr<SelectClientAuthCertificate> selectClientAuthCertificate( + new SelectClientAuthCertificate( + std::move(authInfo), std::move(serverCert), + std::move(caNamesArray), std::move(potentialClientCertificates), + continuation)); + Unused << NS_DispatchToMainThread(selectClientAuthCertificate); + })); + return NS_SUCCEEDED(rv); +} + +void SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent::TLSClientAuthCertSelected( + const nsTArray<uint8_t>& aSelectedCertBytes, + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aSelectedCertChainBytes) { + AssertIsOnBackgroundThread(); + + if (!CanSend()) { + return; + } + + nsTArray<ByteArray> selectedCertChainBytes; + for (auto& certBytes : aSelectedCertChainBytes) { + selectedCertChainBytes.AppendElement(ByteArray(certBytes)); + } + + Unused << SendTLSClientAuthCertSelected(aSelectedCertBytes, + selectedCertChainBytes); + Unused << Send__delete__(this); +} + +void SelectTLSClientAuthCertParent::ActorDestroy( + mozilla::ipc::IProtocol::ActorDestroyReason aWhy) {} + +SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild::SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild( + ClientAuthCertificateSelected* continuation) + : mContinuation(continuation) {} + +// When the user has selected (or not) a client authentication certificate in +// the parent, this function receives that information in the socket process and +// dispatches a continuation to the socket process to continue the connection. +ipc::IPCResult SelectTLSClientAuthCertChild::RecvTLSClientAuthCertSelected( + ByteArray&& aSelectedCertBytes, + nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aSelectedCertChainBytes) { + nsTArray<uint8_t> selectedCertBytes(std::move(aSelectedCertBytes.data())); + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> selectedCertChainBytes; + for (auto& certBytes : aSelectedCertChainBytes) { + selectedCertChainBytes.AppendElement(std::move(certBytes.data())); + } + mContinuation->SetSelectedClientAuthData(std::move(selectedCertBytes), + std::move(selectedCertChainBytes)); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> socketThread = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (NS_WARN_IF(!socketThread)) { + return IPC_OK(); + } + nsresult rv = socketThread->Dispatch(mContinuation, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); + Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)); + + return IPC_OK(); +} + +} // namespace mozilla::psm |