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| -rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h | 1608 |
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diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc817a781e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1608 @@ +/* + * This file contains prototypes for the public SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __ssl_h_ +#define __ssl_h_ + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "prio.h" +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "keythi.h" + +#include "sslt.h" /* public ssl data types */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(IN_LIBSSL) && !defined(NSS_USE_STATIC_LIBS) +#define SSL_IMPORT extern __declspec(dllimport) +#else +#define SSL_IMPORT extern +#endif + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +/* constant table enumerating all implemented cipher suites. */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[]; + +/* the same as the above, but is a function */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 *SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void); + +/* number of entries in the above table. */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; + +/* the same as the above, but is a function */ +SSL_IMPORT PRUint16 SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void); + +/* Macro to tell which ciphers in table are SSL2 vs SSL3/TLS. */ +#define SSL_IS_SSL2_CIPHER(which) (((which)&0xfff0) == 0xff00) + +/* +** Imports fd into SSL, returning a new socket. Copies SSL configuration +** from model. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Imports fd into DTLS, returning a new socket. Copies DTLS configuration +** from model. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Enable/disable an ssl mode +** +** SSL_SECURITY: +** enable/disable use of SSL security protocol before connect +** +** SSL_SOCKS: +** enable/disable use of socks before connect +** (No longer supported). +** +** SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: +** require a certificate during secure connect +*/ +/* options */ +#define SSL_SECURITY 1 /* (on by default) */ +#define SSL_SOCKS 2 /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 3 /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT 5 /* force accept to hs as client */ + /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER 6 /* force connect to hs as server */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 is obsolete and may be removed soon. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL2 7 /* enable ssl v2 (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a +** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_SSL3. +*/ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL3 8 /* enable ssl v3 (on by default) */ + +#define SSL_NO_CACHE 9 /* don't use the session cache */ + /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE 10 /* (SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE */ + /* by default) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_FDX 11 /* permit simultaneous read/write */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 compatible hellos are not accepted by some TLS servers +** and cannot negotiate extensions. SSL v2 is obsolete. This option may be +** removed soon. +*/ +#define SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO 12 /* send v3 client hello in v2 fmt */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a +** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_TLS. +*/ +#define SSL_ENABLE_TLS 13 /* enable TLS (on by default) */ + +#define SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION 14 /* for compatibility, default: on */ +#define SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN 15 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11 16 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_NO_LOCKS 17 /* Don't use locks for protection */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS 18 /* Enable TLS SessionTicket */ + /* extension (off by default) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE 19 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION 20 /* Values below (default: never) */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION 21 /* Peer must send Signaling */ + /* Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) or */ + /* Renegotiation Info (RI) */ + /* extension in ALL handshakes. */ + /* default: off */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START 22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */ + /* default, applies only to */ + /* clients). False start is a */ +/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before + * verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up + * sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and + * only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the + * cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that + * it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a + * full handshake. + * + * In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a + * callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function. + */ + +/* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks + * on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting + * non-empty application_data records into two records; the first record has + * only the first byte of plaintext, and the second has the rest. + * + * This only prevents the attack in the sending direction; the connection may + * still be vulnerable to such attacks if the peer does not implement a similar + * countermeasure. + * + * This protection mechanism is on by default; the default can be overridden by + * setting NSS_SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV=0 in the environment prior to execution, + * and/or by the application setting the option SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV to PR_FALSE. + * + * The per-record IV in TLS 1.1 and later adds one block of overhead per + * record, whereas this hack will add at least two blocks of overhead per + * record, so TLS 1.1+ will always be more efficient. + * + * Other implementations (e.g. some versions of OpenSSL, in some + * configurations) prevent the same attack by prepending an empty + * application_data record to every application_data record they send; we do + * not do that because some implementations cannot handle empty + * application_data records. Also, we only split application_data records and + * not other types of records, because some implementations will not accept + * fragmented records of some other types (e.g. some versions of NSS do not + * accept fragmented alerts). + */ +#define SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV 23 +#define SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING 24 /* Request OCSP stapling (client) */ + +/* SSL_ENABLE_NPN is defunct and defaults to false. + * Using this option will not have any effect but won't produce an error. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_NPN 25 + +/* SSL_ENABLE_ALPN controls whether the ALPN extension is enabled for the + * initial handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used. + * SSL_SetNextProtoNego or SSL_SetNextProtoCallback can be used to control + * the application layer protocol negotiation; + * ALPN is not negotiated for renegotiation handshakes, even though the ALPN + * specification defines a way to use ALPN during renegotiations. + * SSL_ENABLE_ALPN is currently enabled by default, but this may change in + * future versions. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_ALPN 26 + +/* SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY controls whether the ECDHE server key is + * reused for multiple handshakes or generated each time. + * SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY is currently disabled by default. + * This socket option is for ECDHE, only. It is unrelated to DHE. + */ +#define SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY 27 + +#define SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV 28 /* Send fallback SCSV in \ + * handshakes. */ + +/* SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE controls whether DHE is enabled for the server socket. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE 29 + +/* Use draft-ietf-tls-session-hash. Controls whether we offer the + * extended_master_secret extension which, when accepted, hashes + * the handshake transcript into the master secret. This option is + * enabled by default. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 30 + +/* Request Signed Certificate Timestamps via TLS extension (client) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS 31 + +/* Ordinarily, when negotiating a TLS_DHE_* cipher suite the server picks the + * group. draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe changes this to use supported_groups + * (formerly supported_curves) to signal which pre-defined groups are OK. + * + * This option causes an NSS client to use this extension and demand that those + * groups be used. A client will signal any enabled DHE groups in the + * supported_groups extension and reject groups that don't match what it has + * enabled. A server will only negotiate TLS_DHE_* cipher suites if the + * client includes the extension. + * + * See SSL_NamedGroupConfig() for how to control which groups are enabled. + * + * This option cannot be enabled if NSS is not compiled with ECC support. + */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_DH_NAMED_GROUPS 32 + +/* Allow 0-RTT data (for TLS 1.3). + * + * When this option is set, the server's session tickets will contain + * a flag indicating that it accepts 0-RTT. When resuming such a + * session, PR_Write() on the client will be allowed immediately after + * starting the handshake and PR_Read() on the server will be allowed + * on the server to read that data. Calls to + * SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo() and SSL_GetNextProto() + * can be made used during this period to learn about the channel + * parameters. + * + * The transition between the 0-RTT and 1-RTT modes is marked by the + * handshake callback. However, it is possible to force the completion + * of the handshake (and cause the handshake callback to be called) + * prior to reading all 0-RTT data using SSL_ForceHandshake(). To + * ensure that all early data is read before the handshake callback, any + * time that SSL_ForceHandshake() returns a PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, use + * PR_Read() to read all available data. If PR_Read() is called + * multiple times, this will result in the handshake completing, but the + * handshake callback will occur after early data has all been read. + * + * WARNING: 0-RTT data has different anti-replay and PFS properties than + * the rest of the TLS data. See [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 8] + * for more details. + * + * Note: when DTLS 1.3 is in use, any 0-RTT data received after EndOfEarlyData + * (e.g., because of reordering) is discarded. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA 33 + +/* Sets a limit to the size of encrypted records (see + * draft-ietf-tls-record-limit). This is the value that is advertised to peers, + * not a limit on the size of records that will be created. Setting this value + * reduces the size of records that will be received (not sent). + * + * This limit applies to the plaintext, but the records that appear on the wire + * will be bigger. This doesn't include record headers, IVs, block cipher + * padding, and authentication tags or MACs. + * + * NSS always advertises the record size limit extension. If this option is not + * set, the extension will contain the maximum allowed size for the selected TLS + * version (currently this is 16384 or 2^14 for TLS 1.2 and lower and 16385 for + * TLS 1.3). + * + * By default, NSS creates records that are the maximum size possible, using all + * the data that was written by the application. Writes larger than the maximum + * are split into maximum sized records, and any remainder (unless + * SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV is enabled and active). If a peer advertises a record size + * limit then that value is used instead. + */ +#define SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 34 + +/* Enables TLS 1.3 compatibility mode. In this mode, the client includes a fake + * session ID in the handshake and sends a ChangeCipherSpec. A server will + * always use the setting chosen by the client, so the value of this option has + * no effect for a server. This setting is ignored for DTLS. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE 35 + +/* Enables the sending of DTLS records using the short (two octet) record + * header. Only do this if there are 2^10 or fewer packets in flight at a time; + * using this with a larger number of packets in flight could mean that packets + * are dropped if there is reordering. + * + * This applies to TLS 1.3 only. This is not a parameter that is negotiated + * during the TLS handshake. Unlike other socket options, this option can be + * changed after a handshake is complete. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER 36 + +/* + * Enables the processing of the downgrade sentinel that can be added to the + * ServerHello.random by a server that supports Section 4.1.3 of TLS 1.3 + * [RFC8446]. This sentinel will always be generated by a server that + * negotiates a version lower than its maximum, this only controls whether a + * client will treat receipt of a value that indicates a downgrade as an error. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK 37 + +/* Enables the SSLv2-compatible ClientHello for servers. NSS does not support + * SSLv2 and will never send an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello as a client. An + * NSS server with this option enabled will accept a ClientHello that is + * v2-compatible as defined in Appendix E.1 of RFC 6101. + * + * This is disabled by default and will be removed in a future version. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO 38 + +/* Enables the post-handshake authentication in TLS 1.3. If it is set + * to PR_TRUE, the client will send the "post_handshake_auth" + * extension to indicate that it will process CertificateRequest + * messages after handshake. + * + * This option applies only to clients. For a server, the + * SSL_SendCertificateRequest can be used to request post-handshake + * authentication. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 39 + +/* Enables the delegated credentials extension (draft-ietf-tls-subcerts). When + * enabled, a client that supports TLS 1.3 will indicate willingness to + * negotiate a delegated credential (DC). Note that client-delegated credentials + * are not currently supported. + * + * If support is indicated, the peer may use a DC to authenticate itself. The DC + * is sent as an extension to the peer's end-entity certificate; the end-entity + * certificate is used to verify the DC, which in turn is used to verify the + * handshake. DCs effectively extend the certificate chain by one, but only + * within the context of TLS. Once issued, DCs can't be revoked; in order to + * mitigate the damage in case the secret key is compromised, the DC is only + * valid for a short time (days, hours, or even minutes). + * + * This library implements draft-07 of the protocol spec. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS 40 + +/* Causes TLS (>=1.3) to suppress the EndOfEarlyData message in stream mode. + * + * This is not advisable in general, but the message only exists to delineate + * early data in a streamed connection. DTLS does not use this message as a + * result. The integration of TLS with QUIC, which uses a record/packet + * protection layer that is unreliable, also does not use this message. + * + * On the server, this requires that SSL_RecordLayerData be used. + * EndOfEarlyData is otherwise needed to drive key changes. Additionally, + * servers that use this API must check that handshake messages (Certificate, + * CertificateVerify, and Finished in particular) are only received in epoch 2 + * (Handshake). SSL_RecordLayerData will accept these handshake messages if + * they are passed as epoch 1 (Early Data) in a single call. + * + * Using this option will cause connections to fail if early data is attempted + * and the peer expects this message. + */ +#define SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 41 + +/* Enables TLS GREASE (specified in RFC8701, following Chrome 55 implementation + * decisions). + * + * If enabled and the client's ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 or + * the server's ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, this adds random + * GREASE values to: + * - ClientHello (Client): + * - A cipher_suite value to the cipher_suites field. + * - An empty and a 1B zeroed payload extension. + * - A named group value to the supported_groups extension and a + * KeyShareEntry value for the added named group. + * - A signature algorithm value to the signature_algorithms extension. + * - A version value to the supported_versions extension. + * - A PskKeyExchangeMode value to the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + * - A alpn value to the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension. + * + * - CertificateRequest (Server): + * - An empty extension. + * - A signature algorithm value to the signature_algorithms extension. + * + * - NewSessionTicket (Server): + * - An empty extension. + * + * GREASE values MUST nerver be negotiated but ignored. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_GREASE 42 + +/* Enables TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation. + * + * On a TLS ClientHello all extensions but the Psk extension + * (which MUST be last) will be sent in randomly shuffeld order. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_CH_EXTENSION_PERMUTATION 43 + +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* Old deprecated function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_Enable(PRFileDesc *fd, int option, PRIntn on); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableDefault(int option, PRIntn on); +#endif + +/* Set (and get) options for sockets and defaults for newly created sockets. + * + * While the |val| parameter of these methods is PRIntn, options only support + * two values by default: PR_TRUE or PR_FALSE. The documentation of specific + * options will explain if other values are permitted. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRIntn val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRIntn *val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn *val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CertDBHandleSet(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle); + +/* SSLNextProtoCallback is called during the handshake for the server, when an + * Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension has been received + * from the client. |protos| and |protosLen| define a buffer which contains the + * client's advertisement. + * |protoOut| is a buffer provided by the caller, of length 255 (the maximum + * allowed by the protocol). On successful return, the protocol to be announced + * to the server will be in |protoOut| and its length in |*protoOutLen|. + * + * The callback must return SECFailure or SECSuccess (not SECWouldBlock). + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLNextProtoCallback)( + void *arg, + PRFileDesc *fd, + const unsigned char *protos, + unsigned int protosLen, + unsigned char *protoOut, + unsigned int *protoOutLen, + unsigned int protoMaxOut); + +/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback sets a callback function to handle ALPN Negotiation. + * It causes a client to advertise ALPN. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLNextProtoCallback callback, + void *arg); + +/* SSL_SetNextProtoNego can be used as an alternative to + * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. + * + * Using this function allows client and server to transparently support ALPN. + * The same set of protocols will be advertised via ALPN and, if the server + * uses ALPN to select a protocol, SSL_GetNextProto will return + * SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED as the state. + * + * Because the predecessor to ALPN, NPN, used the first protocol as the fallback + * protocol, when sending an ALPN extension, the first protocol is moved to the + * end of the list. This indicates that the fallback protocol is the least + * preferred. The other protocols should be in preference order. + * + * The supported protocols are specified in |data| in wire-format (8-bit + * length-prefixed). For example: "\010http/1.1\006spdy/2". + * + * An empty value (i.e., where |length| is 0 and |data| is any value, + * including NULL) forcibly disables ALPN. In this mode, the server will + * reject any ClientHello that includes the ALPN extension. + * + * Calling this function overrides the callback previously set by + * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd, + const unsigned char *data, + unsigned int length); + +typedef enum SSLNextProtoState { + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT = 0, /* No peer support */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED = 1, /* Mutual agreement */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP = 2, /* No protocol overlap found */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED = 3, /* Server selected proto (ALPN) */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE = 4 /* We are in 0-RTT using this value. */ +} SSLNextProtoState; + +/* SSL_GetNextProto can be used in the HandshakeCallback or any time after + * a handshake to retrieve the result of the Next Protocol negotiation. + * + * The length of the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into *bufLen. + * If the negotiated protocol is longer than bufLenMax, then SECFailure is + * returned. Otherwise, the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into buf, + * and SECSuccess is returned. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetNextProto(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLNextProtoState *state, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *bufLen, + unsigned int bufLenMax); + +/* +** Control ciphers that SSL uses. If on is non-zero then the named cipher +** is enabled, otherwise it is disabled. +** The "cipher" values are defined in sslproto.h (the SSL_EN_* values). +** EnableCipher records user preferences. +** SetPolicy sets the policy according to the policy module. +*/ +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* Old deprecated function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableCipher(long which, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPolicy(long which, int policy); +#endif + +/* New function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 policy); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicyGet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 *policy); + +/* +** Control for TLS signature schemes for TLS 1.2 and 1.3. +** +** This governs what signature schemes (or algorithms) are sent by a client in +** the signature_algorithms extension. A client will not accept a signature +** from a server unless it uses an enabled algorithm. +** +** This also governs what the server sends in the supported_signature_algorithms +** field of a CertificateRequest. +** +** This changes what the server uses to sign ServerKeyExchange and +** CertificateVerify messages. An endpoint uses the first entry from this list +** that is compatible with both its certificate and its peer's supported +** values. +** +** This configuration affects TLS 1.2, but the combination of EC group and hash +** algorithm is interpreted loosely to be compatible with other implementations. +** For TLS 1.2, NSS will ignore the curve group when generating or verifying +** ECDSA signatures. For example, a P-384 ECDSA certificate is used with +** SHA-256 if ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 is enabled. +** +** Omitting SHA-256 schemes from this list might be foolish. Support is +** mandatory in TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and there might be interoperability issues. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet( + PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, unsigned int count); + +/* Deprecated, use SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet() instead. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignaturePrefSet( + PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int count); + +/* +** Get the currently configured signature schemes. +** +** The schemes are written to |schemes| but not if there are more than +** |maxCount| values configured. The number of schemes that are in use are +** written to |count|. This fails if |maxCount| is insufficiently large. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *algorithms, unsigned int *count, + unsigned int maxCount); + +/* Deprecated, use SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet() instead. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignaturePrefGet( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, unsigned int *count, + unsigned int maxCount); + +/* +** Returns the maximum number of signature algorithms that are supported and +** can be set or retrieved using SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet or +** SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT unsigned int SSL_SignatureMaxCount(void); + +/* +** Define custom priorities for EC and FF groups used in DH key exchange and EC +** groups for ECDSA. This only changes the order of enabled lists (and thus +** their priorities) and enables all groups in |groups| while disabling all other +** groups. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_NamedGroupConfig(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLNamedGroup *groups, + unsigned int num_groups); + +/* +** Configure the socket to configure additional key shares. Normally when a TLS +** 1.3 ClientHello is sent, just one key share is included using the first +** preference group (as set by SSL_NamedGroupConfig). If the server decides to +** pick a different group for key exchange, it is forced to send a +** HelloRetryRequest, which adds an entire round trip of latency. +** +** This function can be used to configure libssl to generate additional key +** shares when sending a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. If |count| is set to a non-zero +** value, then additional key shares are generated. Shares are added in the +** preference order set in SSL_NamedGroupConfig. |count| can be set to any +** value; NSS limits the number of shares to the number of supported groups. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, + unsigned int count); + +/* Deprecated: use SSL_NamedGroupConfig() instead. +** SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet is used to configure the set of allowed/enabled DHE group +** parameters that can be used by NSS for the given server socket. +** The first item in the array is used as the default group, if no other +** selection criteria can be used by NSS. +** The set is provided as an array of identifiers as defined by SSLDHEGroupType. +** If more than one group identifier is provided, NSS will select the one to use. +** For example, a TLS extension sent by the client might indicate a preference. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLDHEGroupType *groups, + PRUint16 num_groups); + +/* Enable the use of a DHE group that's smaller than the library default, +** for backwards compatibility reasons. The DH parameters will be created +** at the time this function is called, which might take a very long time. +** The function will block until generation is completed. +** The intention is to enforce that fresh and safe parameters are generated +** each time a process is started. +** At the time this API was initially implemented, the API will enable the +** use of 1024 bit DHE parameters. This value might get increased in future +** versions of NSS. +** +** It is allowed to call this API will a NULL value for parameter fd, +** which will prepare the global parameters that NSS will reuse for the remainder +** of the process lifetime. This can be used early after startup of a process, +** to avoid a delay when handling incoming client connections. +** This preparation with a NULL for parameter fd will NOT enable the weak group +** on sockets. The function needs to be called again for every socket that +** should use the weak group. +** +** It is allowed to use this API in combination with the SSL_NamedGroupConfig API. +** If both APIs have been called, the weakest group will be used, unless it is +** certain that the client supports larger group parameters. The weak group will +** be used as the default group for TLS <= 1.2, overriding the preference for +** the first group potentially set with a call to SSL_NamedGroupConfig. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableWeakDHEPrimeGroup(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); + +/* SSL Version Range API +** +** This API should be used to control SSL 3.0 & TLS support instead of the +** older SSL_Option* API; however, the SSL_Option* API MUST still be used to +** control SSL 2.0 support. In this version of libssl, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are +** enabled by default. Future versions of libssl may change which versions of +** the protocol are enabled by default. +** +** The SSLProtocolVariant enum indicates whether the protocol is of type +** stream or datagram. This must be provided to the functions that do not +** take an fd. Functions which take an fd will get the variant from the fd, +** which is typed. +** +** Using the new version range API in conjunction with the older +** SSL_OptionSet-based API for controlling the enabled protocol versions may +** cause unexpected results. Going forward, we guarantee only the following: +** +** SSL_OptionGet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS) will return PR_TRUE if *ANY* versions of TLS +** are enabled. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_FALSE) will disable *ALL* versions of TLS, +** including TLS 1.0 and later. +** +** The above two properties provide compatibility for applications that use +** SSL_OptionSet to implement the insecure fallback from TLS 1.x to SSL 3.0. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) will enable TLS 1.0, and may also +** enable some later versions of TLS, if it is necessary to do so in order to +** keep the set of enabled versions contiguous. For example, if TLS 1.2 is +** enabled, then after SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE), TLS 1.0, +** TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 will be enabled, and the call will have no effect on +** whether SSL 3.0 is enabled. If no later versions of TLS are enabled at the +** time SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) is called, then no later +** versions of TLS will be enabled by the call. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE) will disable SSL 3.0, and will not +** change the set of TLS versions that are enabled. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_TRUE) will enable SSL 3.0, and may also +** enable some versions of TLS if TLS 1.1 or later is enabled at the time of +** the call, the same way SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) works, in +** order to keep the set of enabled versions contiguous. +*/ + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions supported for the +** given protocol variant by the version of libssl linked-to at runtime. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions enabled by default +** for the given protocol variant. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the range of enabled-by-default SSL3/TLS versions for the given +** protocol variant to |*vrange|. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, const SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd|. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGet(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd| to |*vrange|. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSet(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the version to check the server random against for the + * fallback check defined in [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * This function is provided to allow for detection of forced downgrade + * attacks against client-side reconnect-and-fallback outside of TLS + * by setting |version| to be that of the original connection, rather + * than that of the new connection. + * + * The default, which can also be enabled by setting |version| to + * zero, is just to check against the max version in the + * version range (see SSL_VersionRangeSet). */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRUint16 version); + +/* Values for "policy" argument to SSL_CipherPolicySet */ +/* Values returned by SSL_CipherPolicyGet. */ +#define SSL_NOT_ALLOWED 0 /* or invalid or unimplemented */ +#define SSL_ALLOWED 1 +#define SSL_RESTRICTED 2 /* only with "Step-Up" certs. */ + +/* Values for "on" with SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE. */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_NEVER ((PRBool)0) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS ((PRBool)1) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE ((PRBool)2) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR ((PRBool)3) + +/* Values for "on" with SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION */ +/* Never renegotiate at all. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER ((PRBool)0) +/* Renegotiate without restriction, whether or not the peer's client hello */ +/* bears the renegotiation info extension. Vulnerable, as in the past. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED ((PRBool)1) +/* Only renegotiate if the peer's hello bears the TLS renegotiation_info */ +/* extension. This is safe renegotiation. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ((PRBool)2) +/* Disallow unsafe renegotiation in server sockets only, but allow clients */ +/* to continue to renegotiate with vulnerable servers. */ +/* This value should only be used during the transition period when few */ +/* servers have been upgraded. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL ((PRBool)3) + +/* +** Reset the handshake state for fd. This will make the complete SSL +** handshake protocol execute from the ground up on the next i/o +** operation. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool asServer); + +/* +** Force the handshake for fd to complete immediately. This blocks until +** the complete SSL handshake protocol is finished. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRIntervalTime timeout); + +/* +** Query security status of socket. *on is set to one if security is +** enabled. *keySize will contain the stream key size used. *issuer will +** contain the RFC1485 verison of the name of the issuer of the +** certificate at the other end of the connection. For a client, this is +** the issuer of the server's certificate; for a server, this is the +** issuer of the client's certificate (if any). Subject is the subject of +** the other end's certificate. The pointers can be zero if the desired +** data is not needed. All strings returned by this function are owned +** by the caller, and need to be freed with PORT_Free. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *on, char **cipher, + int *keySize, int *secretKeySize, + char **issuer, char **subject); + +/* Values for "on" */ +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_NOOPT -1 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF 0 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_HIGH 1 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_LOW 2 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_FORTEZZA 3 /* NO LONGER SUPPORTED */ + +/* +** Return the certificate for our SSL peer. If the client calls this +** it will always return the server's certificate. If the server calls +** this, it may return NULL if client authentication is not enabled or +** if the client had no certificate when asked. +** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_PeerCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Return the certificates presented by the SSL peer. If the SSL peer +** did not present certificates, return NULL with the +** SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE error. On failure, return NULL with an error +** code other than SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE. +** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertList *SSL_PeerCertificateChain(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns the OCSP responses that were provided + * by the TLS server. The return value is a pointer to an internal SECItemArray + * that contains the returned OCSP responses; it is only valid until the + * callback function that calls SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns. + * + * If no OCSP responses were given by the server then the result will be empty. + * If there was an error, then the result will be NULL. + * + * You must set the SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING option to enable OCSP stapling. + * to be provided by a server. + * + * libssl does not do any validation of the OCSP response itself; the + * authenticate certificate hook is responsible for doing so. The default + * authenticate certificate hook, SSL_AuthCertificate, does not implement + * any OCSP stapling funtionality, but this may change in future versions. + */ +SSL_IMPORT const SECItemArray *SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps returns the signed_certificate_timestamp + * extension data provided by the TLS server. The return value is a pointer + * to an internal SECItem that contains the returned response (as a serialized + * SignedCertificateTimestampList, see RFC 6962). The returned pointer is only + * valid until the callback function that calls SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps + * (e.g. the authenticate certificate hook, or the handshake callback) returns. + * + * If no Signed Certificate Timestamps were given by the server then the result + * will be empty. If there was an error, then the result will be NULL. + * + * You must set the SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS option to indicate support + * for Signed Certificate Timestamps to a server. + * + * libssl does not do any parsing or validation of the response itself. + */ +SSL_IMPORT const SECItem *SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses stores an array of one or multiple OCSP responses + * in the fd's data, which may be sent as part of a server side cert_status + * handshake message. Parameter |responses| is for the server certificate of + * the key exchange type |kea|. + * The function will duplicate the responses array. + * + * Deprecated: see SSL_ConfigSecureServer for details. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItemArray *responses, + SSLKEAType kea); + +/* + * SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps stores serialized signed_certificate_timestamp + * extension data in the fd. The signed_certificate_timestamp data is sent + * during the handshake (if requested by the client). Parameter |scts| + * is for the server certificate of the key exchange type |kea|. + * The function will duplicate the provided data item. To clear previously + * set data for a given key exchange type |kea|, pass NULL to |scts|. + * + * Deprecated: see SSL_ConfigSecureServer for details. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItem *scts, + SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** Authenticate certificate hook. Called when a certificate comes in +** (because of SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE in SSL_Enable) to authenticate the +** certificate. +** +** The authenticate certificate hook must return SECSuccess to indicate the +** certificate is valid, SECFailure to indicate the certificate is invalid, +** or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate the certificate +** asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for non-blocking sockets. +** +** If the authenticate certificate hook returns SECFailure, then the bad cert +** hook will be called. The bad cert handler is NEVER called if the +** authenticate certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock. If the application +** needs to handle and/or override a bad cert, it should do so before it +** calls SSL_AuthCertificateComplete (modifying the error it passes to +** SSL_AuthCertificateComplete as needed). +** +** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information +** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the authenticate +** certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock. +** +** RFC 6066 says that clients should send the bad_certificate_status_response +** alert when they encounter an error processing the stapled OCSP response. +** libssl does not provide a way for the authenticate certificate hook to +** indicate that an OCSP error (SEC_ERROR_OCSP_*) that it returns is an error +** in the stapled OCSP response or an error in some other OCSP response. +** Further, NSS does not provide a convenient way to control or determine +** which OCSP response(s) were used to validate a certificate chain. +** Consequently, the current version of libssl does not ever send the +** bad_certificate_status_response alert. This may change in future releases. +*/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLAuthCertificate)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool checkSig, + PRBool isServer); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLAuthCertificate f, + void *arg); + +/* An implementation of the certificate authentication hook */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificate(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer); + +/* + * Prototype for SSL callback to get client auth data from the application. + * arg - application passed argument + * caNames - pointer to distinguished names of CAs that the server likes + * pRetCert - pointer to pointer to cert, for return of cert + * pRetKey - pointer to key pointer, for return of key + * Return value can be one of {SECSuccess, SECFailure, SECWouldBlock} + * + * If SECSuccess, pRetCert and pRetKey should be set to the selected + * client cert and private key respectively. If SECFailure or SECWouldBlock + * they should not be changed. + * + * Ownership of pRetCert and pRetKey passes to NSS. The application must not + * mutate or free the structures after passing them to NSS. + * + * Returning SECWouldBlock will block the handshake until SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete + * is called. Note that references to *caNames should not be kept after SSLGetClientAuthData + * returns. Instead, take a copy of the data. + * + * See also the comments for SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete. + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLGetClientAuthData)(void *arg, + PRFileDesc *fd, + CERTDistNames *caNames, + CERTCertificate **pRetCert, /*return */ + SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey); /* return */ + +/* + * Set the client side callback for SSL to retrieve user's private key + * and certificate. + * fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question + * f - the application's callback that delivers the key and cert + * a - application specific data + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLGetClientAuthData f, void *a); + +/* +** SNI extension processing callback function. +** It is called when SSL socket receives SNI extension in ClientHello message. +** Upon this callback invocation, application is responsible to reconfigure the +** socket with the data for a particular server name. +** There are three potential outcomes of this function invocation: +** * application does not recognize the name or the type and wants the +** "unrecognized_name" alert be sent to the client. In this case the callback +** function must return SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT status. +** * application does not recognize the name, but wants to continue with +** the handshake using the current socket configuration. In this case, +** no socket reconfiguration is needed and the function should return +** SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED. +** * application recognizes the name and reconfigures the socket with +** appropriate certs, key, etc. There are many ways to reconfigure. NSS +** provides SSL_ReconfigFD function that can be used to update the socket +** data from model socket. To continue with the rest of the handshake, the +** implementation function should return an index of a name it has chosen. +** LibSSL will ignore any SNI extension received in a ClientHello message +** if application does not register a SSLSNISocketConfig callback. +** Each type field of SECItem indicates the name type. +** NOTE: currently RFC3546 defines only one name type: sni_host_name. +** Client is allowed to send only one name per known type. LibSSL will +** send an "unrecognized_name" alert if SNI extension name list contains more +** then one name of a type. +*/ +typedef PRInt32(PR_CALLBACK *SSLSNISocketConfig)(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SECItem *srvNameArr, + PRUint32 srvNameArrSize, + void *arg); + +/* +** SSLSNISocketConfig should return an index within 0 and srvNameArrSize-1 +** when it has reconfigured the socket fd to use certs and keys, etc +** for a specific name. There are two other allowed return values. One +** tells libSSL to use the default cert and key. The other tells libSSL +** to send the "unrecognized_name" alert. These values are: +**/ +#define SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED -1 +#define SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT -2 + +/* +** Set application implemented SNISocketConfig callback. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SNISocketConfigHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLSNISocketConfig f, + void *arg); + +/* +** Reconfigure fd SSL socket with model socket parameters. Sets +** server certs and keys, list of trust anchor, socket options +** and all SSL socket call backs and parameters. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ReconfigFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* + * Set the client side argument for SSL to retrieve PKCS #11 pin. + * fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question + * a - pkcs11 application specific data + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(PRFileDesc *fd, void *a); + +/* +** These are callbacks for dealing with SSL alerts. + */ + +typedef PRUint8 SSLAlertLevel; +typedef PRUint8 SSLAlertDescription; + +typedef struct { + SSLAlertLevel level; + SSLAlertDescription description; +} SSLAlert; + +typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLAlertCallback)(const PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, + const SSLAlert *alert); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AlertReceivedCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, + void *arg); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AlertSentCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, + void *arg); +/* +** This is a callback for dealing with server certs that are not authenticated +** by the client. The client app can decide that it actually likes the +** cert by some external means and restart the connection. +** +** The bad cert hook must return SECSuccess to override the result of the +** authenticate certificate hook, SECFailure if the certificate should still be +** considered invalid, or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate +** the certificate asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for +** non-blocking sockets. +** +** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information +** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the bad cert hook returns +** SECWouldBlock. +*/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLBadCertHandler)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_BadCertHook(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLBadCertHandler f, + void *arg); + +/* +** Configure SSL socket for running a secure server. Needs the +** certificate for the server and the servers private key. The arguments +** are copied. +** +** This method should be used in preference to SSL_ConfigSecureServer, +** SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain, SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses, and +** SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps. +** +** The authentication method is determined from the certificate and private key +** based on how libssl authenticates peers. Primarily, this uses the value of +** the SSLAuthType enum and is derived from the type of public key in the +** certificate. For example, different RSA certificates might be saved for +** signing (ssl_auth_rsa_sign) and key encipherment +** (ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt). Unique to RSA, the same certificate can be used for +** both usages. Additional information about the authentication method is also +** used: EC keys with different curves are separately stored. +** +** Only one certificate is stored for each authentication method. +** +** The optional |data| argument contains additional information about the +** certificate: +** +** - |authType| (with a value other than ssl_auth_null) limits the +** authentication method; this is primarily useful in limiting the use of an +** RSA certificate to one particular key usage (either signing or key +** encipherment) when its key usages indicate support for both. +** +** - |certChain| provides an explicit certificate chain, rather than relying on +** NSS functions for finding a certificate chain. +** +** - |stapledOCSPResponses| provides a response for OCSP stapling. +** +** - |signedCertTimestamps| provides a value for the +** signed_certificate_timestamp extension used in certificate transparency. +** +** The |data_len| argument provides the length of the data. This should be set +** to |sizeof(data)|. +** +** This function allows an application to provide certificates with narrow key +** usages attached to them. For instance, RSA keys can be provided that are +** limited to signing or decryption only. Multiple EC certificates with keys on +** different named curves can be provided. +** +** Unlike SSL_ConfigSecureServer(WithCertChain), this function does not accept +** NULL for the |cert| and |key| arguments. It will replace certificates that +** have the same type, but it cannot be used to remove certificates that have +** already been configured. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerCert( + PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + const SSLExtraServerCertData *data, unsigned int data_len); + +/* +** Deprecated variant of SSL_ConfigServerCert. +** +** This uses values from the SSLKEAType to identify the type of |key| that the +** |cert| contains. This is incorrect, since key exchange and authentication +** are separated in some cipher suites (in particular, ECDHE_RSA_* suites). +** +** Providing a |kea| parameter of ssl_kea_ecdh (or kt_ecdh) is interpreted as +** providing both ECDH and ECDSA certificates. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigSecureServer( + PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** Deprecated variant of SSL_ConfigSecureServerCert. The |data| argument to +** SSL_ConfigSecureServerCert can be used to pass a certificate chain. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + const CERTCertificateList *certChainOpt, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair configures an asymmetric key pair for use in +** wrapping session ticket keys, used by the server. This function currently +** only accepts an RSA public/private key pair. +** +** Prior to the existence of this function, NSS used an RSA private key +** associated with a configured certificate to perform session ticket +** encryption. If this function isn't used, the keys provided with a configured +** RSA certificate are used for wrapping session ticket keys. +** +** NOTE: This key is used for all self-encryption but is named for +** session tickets for historical reasons. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey); + +/* +** Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Define the maximum number +** of entries in the cache, the longevity of the entires, and the directory +** where the cache files will be placed. These values can be zero, and +** if so, the implementation will choose defaults. +** This version of the function is for use in applications that have only one +** process that uses the cache (even if that process has multiple threads). +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory); + +/* Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Depends on value of + * enableMPCache, configures malti-proc or single proc cache. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt( + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, + int maxCacheEntries, + int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries, + PRBool enableMPCache); + +/* +** Like SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache, with one important difference. +** If the application will run multiple processes (as opposed to, or in +** addition to multiple threads), then it must call this function, instead +** of calling SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(). +** This has nothing to do with the number of processORs, only processEs. +** This function sets up a Server Session ID (SID) cache that is safe for +** access by multiple processes on the same system. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory); + +/* Get and set the configured maximum number of mutexes used for the +** server's store of SSL sessions. This value is used by the server +** session ID cache initialization functions shown above. Note that on +** some platforms, these mutexes are actually implemented with POSIX +** semaphores, or with unnamed pipes. The default value varies by platform. +** An attempt to set a too-low maximum will return an error and the +** configured value will not be changed. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRUint32 SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks(void); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks); + +/* environment variable set by SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache, and queried by + * SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache when envString is NULL. + */ +#define SSL_ENV_VAR_NAME "SSL_INHERITANCE" + +/* called in child to inherit SID Cache variables. + * If envString is NULL, this function will use the value of the environment + * variable "SSL_INHERITANCE", otherwise the string value passed in will be + * used. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char *envString); + +/* +** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The +** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and +** before processing incoming application data. +** +** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see +** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent +** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the +** callback will get called before any application data is sent. +*/ +typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd, + void *client_data); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data); + +/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback +** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular +** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the +** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false +** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the +** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by +** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart. +** +** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be +** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled. +**/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)( + PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg); + +/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for +** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend +** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the +** certifciates/keys used on the connection. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool *canFalseStart); + +/* +** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new +** handshake. If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be +** flushed first, ensuring that a full SSL handshake will be done. +** If flushCache is zero, and an SSL connection is established, it will +** do the much faster session restart handshake. This will change the +** session keys without doing another private key operation. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool flushCache); + +/* +** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool flushCache, + PRIntervalTime timeout); + +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* deprecated! +** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new +** handshake. Flushes SSL3 session cache entry first, ensuring that a +** full handshake will be done. +** This call is equivalent to SSL_ReHandshake(fd, PR_TRUE) +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RedoHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd); +#endif + +/* + * Allow the application to pass a URL or hostname into the SSL library. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetURL(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *url); + +/* + * Allow an application to define a set of trust anchors for peer + * cert validation. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetTrustAnchors(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertList *list); + +/* +** Return the number of bytes that SSL has waiting in internal buffers. +** Return 0 if security is not enabled. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT int SSL_DataPending(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Invalidate the SSL session associated with fd. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InvalidateSession(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Return a SECItem containing the SSL session ID associated with the fd. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetSessionID(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Clear out the client's SSL session cache, not the server's session cache. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT void SSL_ClearSessionCache(void); + +/* +** Close the server's SSL session cache. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCache(void); + +/* +** Set peer information so we can correctly look up SSL session later. +** You only have to do this if you're tunneling through a proxy. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSockPeerID(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *peerID); + +/* +** Reveal the security information for the peer. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_RevealCert(PRFileDesc *socket); +SSL_IMPORT void *SSL_RevealPinArg(PRFileDesc *socket); +SSL_IMPORT char *SSL_RevealURL(PRFileDesc *socket); + +/* This callback may be passed to the SSL library via a call to + * SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook() for each SSL client socket. + * It will be invoked when SSL needs to know what certificate and private key + * (if any) to use to respond to a request for client authentication. + * If arg is non-NULL, it is a pointer to a NULL-terminated string containing + * the nickname of the cert/key pair to use. + * If arg is NULL, this function will search the cert and key databases for + * a suitable match and send it if one is found. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg, + PRFileDesc *socket, + struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, + struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert, + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey); + +/* This function can be called by the appliation's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to filter out any certs in the cert list that doesn't match the negotiated + * requirements of the current SSL connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket(PRFileDesc *socket, CERTCertList *certlist); + +/* This function can be called by the application's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to determine if a single certificate matches the negotiated requirements of + * the current SSL connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT PRBool +SSL_CertIsUsable(PRFileDesc *socket, CERTCertificate *cert); + +/* +** Configure DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) cipher suite preferences. +** Input is a list of ciphers in descending preference order and a length +** of the list. As a side effect, this causes the use_srtp extension to be +** negotiated. +** +** Invalid or unimplemented cipher suites in |ciphers| are ignored. If at +** least one cipher suite in |ciphers| is implemented, returns SECSuccess. +** Otherwise returns SECFailure. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSRTPCiphers(PRFileDesc *fd, + const PRUint16 *ciphers, + unsigned int numCiphers); + +/* +** Get the selected DTLS-SRTP cipher suite (if any). +** To be called after the handshake completes. +** Returns SECFailure if not negotiated. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetSRTPCipher(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRUint16 *cipher); + +/* + * Look to see if any of the signers in the cert chain for "cert" are found + * in the list of caNames. + * Returns SECSuccess if so, SECFailure if not. + * Used by NSS_GetClientAuthData. May be used by other callback functions. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames(CERTCertificate *cert, + CERTDistNames *caNames); + +/* Deprecated. This reports a misleading value for certificates that might + * be used for signing rather than key exchange. + * Returns key exchange type of the keys in an SSL server certificate. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SSLKEAType NSS_FindCertKEAType(CERTCertificate *cert); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Domestic (U.S.A.) policy. + * This essentially allows all supported ciphers. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(void); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA + * according to present U.S. policies as we understand them. + * It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetExportPolicy(void); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA + * according to present U.S. policies as we understand them, and that the + * nation of France will permit to be imported into their country. + * It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetFrancePolicy(void); + +SSL_IMPORT SSL3Statistics *SSL_GetStatistics(void); + +/* Report more information than SSL_SecurityStatus. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLChannelInfo) as the |len| argument. + * + * The information here will be zeroed prior to details being confirmed. The + * details are confirmed either when a Finished message is received, or - for a + * client - when the second flight of messages have been sent. This function + * therefore produces unreliable results prior to receiving the + * SSLHandshakeCallback or the SSLCanFalseStartCallback. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, + PRUintn len); +/* Get preliminary information about a channel. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo) as the |len| argument. + * + * This function can be called prior to handshake details being confirmed (see + * SSL_GetChannelInfo above for what that means). Thus, information provided by + * this function is available to SSLAuthCertificate, SSLGetClientAuthData, + * SSLSNISocketConfig, and other callbacks that might be called during the + * processing of the first flight of client of server handshake messages. + * Values are marked as being unavailable when renegotiation is initiated. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo *info, + PRUintn len); +/* Get information about cipher suite with id of |cipherSuite|. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLCipherSuiteInfo) as the |len| argument. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLCipherSuiteInfo *info, PRUintn len); + +/* Returnes negotiated through SNI host info. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* Export keying material according to RFC 5705. +** fd must correspond to a TLS 1.0 or higher socket and out must +** already be allocated. If hasContext is false, it uses the no-context +** construction from the RFC and ignores the context and contextLen +** arguments. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + PRBool hasContext, + const unsigned char *context, + unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned int outLen); + +/* Early exporters are used if 0-RTT is enabled. This is TLS 1.3 only. Note + * that in TLS 1.3, an empty context is equivalent to an absent context. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ExportEarlyKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *context, + unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned int outLen); + +/* +** Return a new reference to the certificate that was most recently sent +** to the peer on this SSL/TLS connection, or NULL if none has been sent. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd); + +#define SSL_CBP_SSL3 0x0001 /* (deprecated) */ +#define SSL_CBP_TLS1_0 0x0002 /* (deprecated) */ + +/* DEPRECATED: The PKCS#11 bypass has been removed. +** This function will now always return false. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CanBypass(CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + PRUint32 protocolmask, + PRUint16 *ciphers, int nciphers, + PRBool *pcanbypass, void *pwArg); + +/* +** Did the handshake with the peer negotiate the given extension? +** Output parameter valid only if function returns SECSuccess +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc *socket, + SSLExtensionType extId, + PRBool *yes); + +/* +** How long should we wait before retransmitting the next flight of +** the DTLS handshake? Returns SECFailure if not DTLS or not in a +** handshake. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket, + PRIntervalTime *timeout); + +/* + * Return a boolean that indicates whether the underlying library + * will perform as the caller expects. + * + * The only argument is a string, which should be the version + * identifier of the NSS library. That string will be compared + * against a string that represents the actual build version of + * the SSL library. + */ +extern PRBool NSSSSL_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion); + +/* + * Returns a const string of the SSL library version. + */ +extern const char *NSSSSL_GetVersion(void); + +/* Restart an SSL connection that was paused to do asynchronous certificate + * chain validation (when the auth certificate hook or bad cert handler + * returned SECWouldBlock). + * + * This function only works for non-blocking sockets; Do not use it for + * blocking sockets. Currently, this function works only for the client role of + * a connection; it does not work for the server role. + * + * The application must call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with 0 as the value of + * the error parameter after it has successfully validated the peer's + * certificate, in order to continue the SSL handshake. + * + * The application may call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with a non-zero value + * for error (e.g. SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) when certificate validation + * fails, before it closes the connection. If the application does so, an + * alert corresponding to the error (e.g. certificate_revoked) will be sent to + * the peer. See the source code of the internal function + * ssl3_SendAlertForCertError for the current mapping of error to alert. This + * mapping may change in future versions of libssl. + * + * This function will not complete the entire handshake. The application must + * call SSL_ForceHandshake, PR_Recv, PR_Send, etc. after calling this function + * to force the handshake to complete. + * + * On the first handshake of a connection, libssl will wait for the peer's + * certificate to be authenticated before calling the handshake callback, + * sending a client certificate, sending any application data, or returning + * any application data to the application. On subsequent (renegotiation) + * handshakes, libssl will block the handshake unconditionally while the + * certificate is being validated. + * + * libssl may send and receive handshake messages while waiting for the + * application to call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete, and it may call other + * callbacks (e.g, the client auth data hook) before + * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called. + * + * An application that uses this asynchronous mechanism will usually have lower + * handshake latency if it has to do public key operations on the certificate + * chain and/or CRL/OCSP/cert fetching during the authentication, especially if + * it does so in parallel on another thread. However, if the application can + * authenticate the peer's certificate quickly then it may be more efficient + * to use the synchronous mechanism (i.e. returning SECFailure/SECSuccess + * instead of SECWouldBlock from the authenticate certificate hook). + * + * Be careful about converting an application from synchronous cert validation + * to asynchronous certificate validation. A naive conversion is likely to + * result in deadlocks; e.g. the application will wait in PR_Poll for network + * I/O on the connection while all network I/O on the connection is blocked + * waiting for this function to be called. + * + * Returns SECFailure on failure, SECSuccess on success. Never returns + * SECWouldBlock. Note that SSL_AuthCertificateComplete will (usually) return + * SECSuccess; do not interpret the return value of SSL_AuthCertificateComplete + * as an indicator of whether it is OK to continue using the connection. For + * example, SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(fd, SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) will + * return SECSuccess (normally), but that does not mean that the application + * should continue using the connection. If the application passes a non-zero + * value for second argument (error), or if SSL_AuthCertificateComplete returns + * anything other than SECSuccess, then the application should close the + * connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRErrorCode error); + +/* Restart an SSL connection which was paused to do asynchronous client + * certificate selection (when the client certificate hook returned SECWouldBlock). + * + * This function only works for non-blocking sockets; Do not use it for + * blocking sockets. This function works only for the client role of + * a connection; it does not work for the server role. + * + * If a certificate has been sucessfully selected, the application must call + * SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete with: + * - SECSuccess (0) as the value of outcome + * - a valid SECKEYPrivateKey located at *clientPrivateKey + * - a valid CERTCertificate located at *clientCertificate + * The ownership of these latter structures will pass to NSS and the application + * MUST not retain any references to them or invalidate them. + * + * If a certificate has not been selected, the application must call + * SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete with: + * - SECFailure (-1) as the value of outcome + * - *clientPrivateKey set to NULL. + * - *clientCertificate set to NULL + * + * Once the application has returned SECWouldBlock to getClientAuthData + * the handshake will not proceed until this function is called. It is an + * error to call this function when the handshake is not waiting on client + * certificate selection, or to call this function more than once. + + * This function will not complete the entire handshake. The application must + * call SSL_ForceHandshake, PR_Recv, PR_Send, etc. after calling this function + * to force the handshake to complete. + * + * Be careful about converting an application from synchronous cert selection + * to asynchronous certificate selection. A naive conversion is likely to + * result in deadlocks; e.g. the application will wait in PR_Poll for network + * I/O on the connection while all network I/O on the connection is blocked + * waiting for this function to be called. + * + * Note that SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete will (usually) return + * SECSuccess; SECFailure indicates that the function was invoked incorrectly or + * an error whilst processing the handshake. The return code does not indicate + * whether or not the provided private key and certificate were sucessfully loaded + * or accepted by the server. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate); + +/* + * This is used to access experimental APIs. Don't call this directly. This is + * used to enable the experimental APIs that are defined in "sslexp.h". + */ +SSL_IMPORT void *SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(const char *name); + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +#endif /* __ssl_h_ */ |