Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 510 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp b/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3a3aa3cac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 20; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "nsICanvasRenderingContextInternal.h"
+#include "nsIHTMLCollection.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/BrowserChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/HTMLCanvasElement.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/OffscreenCanvas.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/UserActivation.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
+#include "mozilla/gfx/gfxVars.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_gfx.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_privacy.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_webgl.h"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
+
+#include "nsGfxCIID.h"
+
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+
+#include "CanvasUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/gfx/Matrix.h"
+#include "WebGL2Context.h"
+
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsIPermissionManager.h"
+#include "nsIObserverService.h"
+#include "mozilla/Services.h"
+#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
+#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
+#include "jsapi.h"
+
+#define TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT "canvas-permissions-prompt"
+#define TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT_HIDE_DOORHANGER \
+  "canvas-permissions-prompt-hide-doorhanger"
+#define PERMISSION_CANVAS_EXTRACT_DATA "canvas"_ns
+
+using namespace mozilla::gfx;
+
+static bool IsUnrestrictedPrincipal(nsIPrincipal& aPrincipal) {
+  // The system principal can always extract canvas data.
+  if (aPrincipal.IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Allow chrome: and resource: (this especially includes PDF.js)
+  if (aPrincipal.SchemeIs("chrome") || aPrincipal.SchemeIs("resource")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Allow extension principals.
+  return aPrincipal.GetIsAddonOrExpandedAddonPrincipal();
+}
+
+namespace mozilla::CanvasUtils {
+
+bool IsImageExtractionAllowed(dom::Document* aDocument, JSContext* aCx,
+                              nsIPrincipal& aPrincipal) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aDocument)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * There are three RFPTargets that change the behavior here, and they can be
+   * in any combination
+   * - CanvasImageExtractionPrompt - whether or not to prompt the user for
+   * canvas extraction. If enabled, before canvas is extracted we will ensure
+   * the user has granted permission.
+   * - CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked - if enabled, canvas extraction
+   * before user input has occurred is always blocked, regardless of any other
+   * Target behavior
+   * - CanvasExtractionFromThirdPartiesIsBlocked - if enabled, canvas extraction
+   * by third parties is always blocked, regardless of any other Target behavior
+   *
+   * There are two odd cases:
+   * 1) When CanvasImageExtractionPrompt=false but
+   *    CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked=true Conceptually this is
+   *    "Always allow canvas extraction in response to user input, and never
+   *     allow it otherwise"
+   *
+   *    That's fine as a concept, but it might be a little confusing, so we
+   *    still want to show the permission icon in the address bar, but never
+   *    the permission doorhanger.
+   * 2) When CanvasExtractionFromThirdPartiesIsBlocked=false - we will prompt
+   *    the user for permission _for the frame_ (maybe with the doorhanger,
+   *    maybe not).  The prompt shows the frame's origin, but it's easy to
+   *    mistake that for the origin of the top-level page and grant it when you
+   *    don't mean to.  This combination isn't likely to be used by anyone
+   *    except those opting in, so that's alright.
+   */
+
+  // We can improve this mechanism when we have this implemented as a bitset
+  if (!aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasImageExtractionPrompt) &&
+      !aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked) &&
+      !aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionFromThirdPartiesIsBlocked)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // General Exemptions
+
+  // Don't proceed if we don't have a document or JavaScript context.
+  if (!aCx) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The system and extension principals can always extract canvas data.
+  if (IsUnrestrictedPrincipal(aPrincipal)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Get the document URI and its spec.
+  nsIURI* docURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+  nsCString docURISpec;
+  docURI->GetSpec(docURISpec);
+
+  // Allow local files to extract canvas data.
+  if (docURI->SchemeIs("file")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Possibly block third parties
+
+  if (aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionFromThirdPartiesIsBlocked)) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument->GetWindowContext());
+    bool isThirdParty =
+        aDocument->GetWindowContext()
+            ? aDocument->GetWindowContext()->GetIsThirdPartyWindow()
+            : false;
+    if (isThirdParty) {
+      nsAutoString message;
+      message.AppendPrintf(
+          "Blocked third party %s from extracting canvas data.",
+          docURISpec.get());
+      nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
+          message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Security"_ns, aDocument);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Check if we will do any further blocking
+
+  if (!aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasImageExtractionPrompt) &&
+      !aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Check a site's permission
+
+  // If the user has previously granted or not granted permission, we can return
+  // immediately. Load Permission Manager service.
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPermissionManager> permissionManager =
+      do_GetService(NS_PERMISSIONMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  // Check if the site has permission to extract canvas data.
+  // Either permit or block extraction if a stored permission setting exists.
+  uint32_t permission;
+  rv = permissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(
+      &aPrincipal, PERMISSION_CANVAS_EXTRACT_DATA, &permission);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  switch (permission) {
+    case nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION:
+      return true;
+    case nsIPermissionManager::DENY_ACTION:
+      return false;
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // At this point, there's only one way to return true: if we are always
+  // allowing canvas in response to user input, and not prompting
+  bool hidePermissionDoorhanger = false;
+  if (!aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasImageExtractionPrompt) &&
+      StaticPrefs::
+          privacy_resistFingerprinting_autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts() &&
+      aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked)) {
+    // If so, see if this is in response to user input.
+    if (dom::UserActivation::IsHandlingUserInput()) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    hidePermissionDoorhanger = true;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Now we know we're going to block it, and log something to the console,
+  // and show some sort of prompt maybe with the doorhanger, maybe not
+
+  hidePermissionDoorhanger |=
+      StaticPrefs::
+          privacy_resistFingerprinting_autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts() &&
+      aDocument->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasExtractionBeforeUserInputIsBlocked) &&
+      !dom::UserActivation::IsHandlingUserInput();
+
+  if (hidePermissionDoorhanger) {
+    nsAutoString message;
+    message.AppendPrintf(
+        "Blocked %s from extracting canvas data because no user input was "
+        "detected.",
+        docURISpec.get());
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
+        message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Security"_ns, aDocument);
+  } else {
+    // It was in response to user input, so log and display the prompt.
+    nsAutoString message;
+    message.AppendPrintf(
+        "Blocked %s from extracting canvas data, but prompting the user.",
+        docURISpec.get());
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleNonLocalized(
+        message, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Security"_ns, aDocument);
+  }
+
+  // Show the prompt to the user (asynchronous) - maybe with the doorhanger,
+  // maybe not
+  nsPIDOMWindowOuter* win = aDocument->GetWindow();
+  nsAutoCString origin;
+  rv = aPrincipal.GetOrigin(origin);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
+    dom::BrowserChild* browserChild = dom::BrowserChild::GetFrom(win);
+    if (browserChild) {
+      browserChild->SendShowCanvasPermissionPrompt(origin,
+                                                   hidePermissionDoorhanger);
+    }
+  } else {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs = mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+    if (obs) {
+      obs->NotifyObservers(win,
+                           hidePermissionDoorhanger
+                               ? TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT_HIDE_DOORHANGER
+                               : TOPIC_CANVAS_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT,
+                           NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(origin).get());
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We don't extract the image for now -- user may override at prompt.
+  return false;
+}
+
+ImageExtraction ImageExtractionResult(dom::HTMLCanvasElement* aCanvasElement,
+                                      JSContext* aCx,
+                                      nsIPrincipal& aPrincipal) {
+  if (IsUnrestrictedPrincipal(aPrincipal)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Unrestricted;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<dom::Document> ownerDoc = aCanvasElement->OwnerDoc();
+  if (!IsImageExtractionAllowed(ownerDoc, aCx, aPrincipal)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Placeholder;
+  }
+
+  if (ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(RFPTarget::CanvasRandomization)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Randomize;
+  }
+
+  return ImageExtraction::Unrestricted;
+}
+
+ImageExtraction ImageExtractionResult(dom::OffscreenCanvas* aOffscreenCanvas,
+                                      JSContext* aCx,
+                                      nsIPrincipal& aPrincipal) {
+  if (IsUnrestrictedPrincipal(aPrincipal)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Unrestricted;
+  }
+
+  if (aOffscreenCanvas->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasImageExtractionPrompt)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Placeholder;
+  }
+
+  if (aOffscreenCanvas->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
+          RFPTarget::CanvasRandomization)) {
+    return ImageExtraction::Randomize;
+  }
+
+  return ImageExtraction::Unrestricted;
+}
+
+bool GetCanvasContextType(const nsAString& str,
+                          dom::CanvasContextType* const out_type) {
+  if (str.EqualsLiteral("2d")) {
+    *out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::Canvas2D;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (str.EqualsLiteral("webgl") || str.EqualsLiteral("experimental-webgl")) {
+    *out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::WebGL1;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::webgl_enable_webgl2()) {
+    if (str.EqualsLiteral("webgl2")) {
+      *out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::WebGL2;
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (gfxVars::AllowWebGPU()) {
+    if (str.EqualsLiteral("webgpu")) {
+      *out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::WebGPU;
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (str.EqualsLiteral("bitmaprenderer")) {
+    *out_type = dom::CanvasContextType::ImageBitmap;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This security check utility might be called from an source that never taints
+ * others. For example, while painting a CanvasPattern, which is created from an
+ * ImageBitmap, onto a canvas. In this case, the caller could set the CORSUsed
+ * true in order to pass this check and leave the aPrincipal to be a nullptr
+ * since the aPrincipal is not going to be used.
+ */
+void DoDrawImageSecurityCheck(dom::HTMLCanvasElement* aCanvasElement,
+                              nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool forceWriteOnly,
+                              bool CORSUsed) {
+  // Callers should ensure that mCanvasElement is non-null before calling this
+  if (!aCanvasElement) {
+    NS_WARNING("DoDrawImageSecurityCheck called without canvas element!");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (aCanvasElement->IsWriteOnly() && !aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we explicitly set WriteOnly just do it and get out
+  if (forceWriteOnly) {
+    aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // No need to do a security check if the image used CORS for the load
+  if (CORSUsed) return;
+
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aPrincipal)) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Must have a principal here");
+    aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (aCanvasElement->NodePrincipal()->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
+    // This canvas has access to that image anyway
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+    // This is a resource from an extension content script principal.
+
+    if (aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader &&
+        aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
+      // This canvas already allows reading from this principal.
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (!aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
+      // Allow future reads from this same princial only.
+      aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly(aPrincipal);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // If we got here, this must be the *second* extension tainting
+    // the canvas.  Fall through to mark it WriteOnly for everyone.
+  }
+
+  aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
+}
+
+/**
+ * This security check utility might be called from an source that never taints
+ * others. For example, while painting a CanvasPattern, which is created from an
+ * ImageBitmap, onto a canvas. In this case, the caller could set the aCORSUsed
+ * true in order to pass this check and leave the aPrincipal to be a nullptr
+ * since the aPrincipal is not going to be used.
+ */
+void DoDrawImageSecurityCheck(dom::OffscreenCanvas* aOffscreenCanvas,
+                              nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool aForceWriteOnly,
+                              bool aCORSUsed) {
+  // Callers should ensure that mCanvasElement is non-null before calling this
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aOffscreenCanvas)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsIPrincipal* expandedReader = aOffscreenCanvas->GetExpandedReader();
+  if (aOffscreenCanvas->IsWriteOnly() && !expandedReader) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we explicitly set WriteOnly just do it and get out
+  if (aForceWriteOnly) {
+    aOffscreenCanvas->SetWriteOnly();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // No need to do a security check if the image used CORS for the load
+  if (aCORSUsed) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we are on a worker thread, we might not have any principals at all.
+  nsIGlobalObject* global = aOffscreenCanvas->GetOwnerGlobal();
+  nsIPrincipal* canvasPrincipal = global ? global->PrincipalOrNull() : nullptr;
+  if (!aPrincipal || !canvasPrincipal) {
+    aOffscreenCanvas->SetWriteOnly();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (canvasPrincipal->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
+    // This canvas has access to that image anyway
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+    // This is a resource from an extension content script principal.
+
+    if (expandedReader && expandedReader->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
+      // This canvas already allows reading from this principal.
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (!expandedReader) {
+      // Allow future reads from this same princial only.
+      aOffscreenCanvas->SetWriteOnly(aPrincipal);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // If we got here, this must be the *second* extension tainting
+    // the canvas.  Fall through to mark it WriteOnly for everyone.
+  }
+
+  aOffscreenCanvas->SetWriteOnly();
+}
+
+bool CoerceDouble(const JS::Value& v, double* d) {
+  if (v.isDouble()) {
+    *d = v.toDouble();
+  } else if (v.isInt32()) {
+    *d = double(v.toInt32());
+  } else if (v.isUndefined()) {
+    *d = 0.0;
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool HasDrawWindowPrivilege(JSContext* aCx, JSObject* /* unused */) {
+  return nsContentUtils::CallerHasPermission(aCx,
+                                             nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission);
+}
+
+bool CheckWriteOnlySecurity(bool aCORSUsed, nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                            bool aHadCrossOriginRedirects) {
+  if (!aPrincipal) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!aCORSUsed) {
+    if (aHadCrossOriginRedirects) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    nsIGlobalObject* incumbentSettingsObject = dom::GetIncumbentGlobal();
+    if (!incumbentSettingsObject) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    nsIPrincipal* principal = incumbentSettingsObject->PrincipalOrNull();
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(!principal) || !(principal->Subsumes(aPrincipal))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::CanvasUtils