Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 319 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/AppTrustDomain.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/AppTrustDomain.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2cdf275ade
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/AppTrustDomain.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
+
+#include "MainThreadUtils.h"
+#include "cert_storage/src/cert_storage.h"
+// FIXME: these two must be included before certdb.h {
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "certt.h"
+// }
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsDirectoryServiceUtils.h"
+#include "nsIContentSignatureVerifier.h"
+#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+
+// Generated by gen_cert_header.py, which gets called by the build system.
+#include "xpcshell.inc"
+// Add-on signing Certificates
+#include "addons-public.inc"
+#include "addons-public-intermediate.inc"
+#include "addons-stage.inc"
+// Content signature root certificates
+#include "content-signature-dev.inc"
+#include "content-signature-local.inc"
+#include "content-signature-prod.inc"
+#include "content-signature-stage.inc"
+
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+
+extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace psm {
+
+AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(nsTArray<Span<const uint8_t>>&& collectedCerts)
+    : mIntermediates(std::move(collectedCerts)),
+      mCertBlocklist(do_GetService(NS_CERT_STORAGE_CID)) {}
+
+nsresult AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot) {
+  switch (trustedRoot) {
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {xpcshellRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsPublicRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {addonsPublicRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIX509CertDB::AddonsStageRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {addonsStageRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIContentSignatureVerifier::ContentSignatureLocalRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {contentSignatureLocalRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIContentSignatureVerifier::ContentSignatureProdRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {contentSignatureProdRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIContentSignatureVerifier::ContentSignatureStageRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {contentSignatureStageRoot};
+      break;
+
+    case nsIContentSignatureVerifier::ContentSignatureDevRoot:
+      mTrustedRoot = {contentSignatureDevRoot};
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  // If we're verifying add-ons signed by our production root, we want to make
+  // sure a valid intermediate certificate is available for path building.
+  if (trustedRoot == nsIX509CertDB::AddonsPublicRoot) {
+    mAddonsIntermediate = {addonsPublicIntermediate};
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName,
+                                        IssuerChecker& checker, Time) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mTrustedRoot.IsEmpty());
+  if (mTrustedRoot.IsEmpty()) {
+    return pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+
+  nsTArray<Input> candidates;
+  Input rootInput;
+  pkix::Result rv =
+      rootInput.Init(mTrustedRoot.Elements(), mTrustedRoot.Length());
+  // This should never fail, since the possible roots are all hard-coded and
+  // they should never be too long.
+  if (rv != Success) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  candidates.AppendElement(std::move(rootInput));
+  if (!mAddonsIntermediate.IsEmpty()) {
+    Input intermediateInput;
+    rv = intermediateInput.Init(mAddonsIntermediate.Elements(),
+                                mAddonsIntermediate.Length());
+    // Again, this should never fail for the same reason as above.
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    candidates.AppendElement(std::move(intermediateInput));
+  }
+  for (const auto& intermediate : mIntermediates) {
+    Input intermediateInput;
+    rv = intermediateInput.Init(intermediate.Elements(), intermediate.Length());
+    // This is untrusted input, so skip any intermediates that are too large.
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    candidates.AppendElement(std::move(intermediateInput));
+  }
+
+  for (const auto& candidate : candidates) {
+    bool keepGoing;
+    rv = checker.Check(candidate, nullptr /*additionalNameConstraints*/,
+                       keepGoing);
+    if (rv != Success) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    if (!keepGoing) {
+      return Success;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If the above did not succeed in building a verified certificate chain,
+  // fall back to searching for candidates in NSS. This is important in case an
+  // intermediate involved in add-on signing expires before it is replaced. See
+  // bug 1548973.
+  SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
+  UniqueCERTCertList nssCandidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(
+      nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0, false));
+  if (nssCandidates) {
+    for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(nssCandidates);
+         !CERT_LIST_END(n, nssCandidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
+      Input certDER;
+      pkix::Result rv =
+          certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        continue;  // probably too big
+      }
+
+      bool keepGoing;
+      rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr /*additionalNameConstraints*/,
+                         keepGoing);
+      if (rv != Success) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+      if (!keepGoing) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
+                                          const CertPolicyId& policy,
+                                          Input candidateCertDER,
+                                          /*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mTrustedRoot.IsEmpty());
+  if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
+    return pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  if (mTrustedRoot.IsEmpty()) {
+    return pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+
+  nsTArray<uint8_t> issuerBytes;
+  nsTArray<uint8_t> serialBytes;
+  nsTArray<uint8_t> subjectBytes;
+  nsTArray<uint8_t> pubKeyBytes;
+
+  pkix::Result result =
+      BuildRevocationCheckArrays(candidateCertDER, endEntityOrCA, issuerBytes,
+                                 serialBytes, subjectBytes, pubKeyBytes);
+  if (result != Success) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  int16_t revocationState;
+  nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->GetRevocationState(
+      issuerBytes, serialBytes, subjectBytes, pubKeyBytes, &revocationState);
+  if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
+    return pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  if (revocationState == nsICertStorage::STATE_ENFORCE) {
+    return pkix::Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+  }
+
+  // mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
+  Span<const uint8_t> candidateCertDERSpan = {candidateCertDER.UnsafeGetData(),
+                                              candidateCertDER.GetLength()};
+  if (mTrustedRoot == candidateCertDERSpan) {
+    trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
+    return Success;
+  }
+
+  trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item, DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
+                                       /*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
+                                       size_t digestBufLen) {
+  return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time,
+                                             Duration,
+                                             /*optional*/ const Input*,
+                                             /*optional*/ const Input*,
+                                             /*optional*/ const Input*) {
+  // We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
+  // certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time,
+                                          const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(requiredPolicy.IsAnyPolicy());
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(
+    DigestAlgorithm digestAlg, EndEntityOrCA, Time) {
+  switch (digestAlg) {
+    case DigestAlgorithm::sha256:  // fall through
+    case DigestAlgorithm::sha384:  // fall through
+    case DigestAlgorithm::sha512:
+      return Success;
+    case DigestAlgorithm::sha1:
+      return pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
+  }
+  return pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
+    EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) {
+  if (modulusSizeInBits < 2048u) {
+    return pkix::Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedData(
+    Input data, DigestAlgorithm digestAlgorithm, Input signature,
+    Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) {
+  // TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
+  return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDataNSS(data, digestAlgorithm, signature,
+                                     subjectPublicKeyInfo, nullptr);
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPSSSignedData(
+    Input data, DigestAlgorithm digestAlgorithm, Input signature,
+    Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) {
+  return VerifyRSAPSSSignedDataNSS(data, digestAlgorithm, signature,
+                                   subjectPublicKeyInfo, nullptr);
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
+    EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, NamedCurve curve) {
+  switch (curve) {
+    case NamedCurve::secp256r1:  // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp384r1:  // fall through
+    case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
+      return Success;
+  }
+
+  return pkix::Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedData(
+    Input data, DigestAlgorithm digestAlgorithm, Input signature,
+    Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) {
+  return VerifyECDSASignedDataNSS(data, digestAlgorithm, signature,
+                                  subjectPublicKeyInfo, nullptr);
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(
+    Time /*notBefore*/, Time /*notAfter*/, EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
+    KeyPurposeId /*keyPurpose*/) {
+  return Success;
+}
+
+pkix::Result AppTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(
+    Time /*notBefore*/,
+    /*out*/ bool& matches) {
+  matches = false;
+  return Success;
+}
+
+void AppTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension /*extension*/,
+                                            Input /*extensionData*/) {}
+
+}  // namespace psm
+}  // namespace mozilla