Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 664 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/shvfy.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..15fde72b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/shvfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,664 @@
+
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
+#include "stubs.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "shsign.h"
+#include "prlink.h"
+#include "prio.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "stdio.h"
+#include "prmem.h"
+#include "hasht.h"
+#include "pqg.h"
+#include "blapii.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#ifndef NSS_FIPS_DISABLED
+
+/*
+ * Most modern version of Linux support a speed optimization scheme where an
+ * application called prelink modifies programs and shared libraries to quickly
+ * load if they fit into an already designed address space. In short, prelink
+ * scans the list of programs and libraries on your system, assigns them a
+ * predefined space in the the address space, then provides the fixups to the
+ * library.
+
+ * The modification of the shared library is correctly detected by the freebl
+ * FIPS checksum scheme where we check a signed hash of the library against the
+ * library itself.
+ *
+ * The prelink command itself can reverse the process of modification and
+ * output the prestine shared library as it was before prelink made it's
+ * changes. If FREEBL_USE_PRELINK is set Freebl uses prelink to output the
+ * original copy of the shared library before prelink modified it.
+ */
+#ifdef FREEBL_USE_PRELINK
+#ifndef FREELB_PRELINK_COMMAND
+#define FREEBL_PRELINK_COMMAND "/usr/sbin/prelink -u -o -"
+#endif
+#include "private/pprio.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * This function returns an NSPR PRFileDesc * which the caller can read to
+ * obtain the prestine value of the shared library, before any OS related
+ * changes to it (usually address fixups).
+ *
+ * If prelink is installed, this
+ * file descriptor is a pipe connecting the output of
+ *            /usr/sbin/prelink -u -o - {Library}
+ * and *pid returns the process id of the prelink child.
+ *
+ * If prelink is not installed, it returns a normal readonly handle to the
+ * library itself and *pid is set to '0'.
+ */
+PRFileDesc *
+bl_OpenUnPrelink(const char *shName, int *pid)
+{
+    char *command = strdup(FREEBL_PRELINK_COMMAND);
+    char *argString = NULL;
+    char **argv = NULL;
+    char *shNameArg = NULL;
+    char *cp;
+    pid_t child;
+    int argc = 0, argNext = 0;
+    struct stat statBuf;
+    int pipefd[2] = { -1, -1 };
+    int ret;
+
+    *pid = 0;
+
+    /* make sure the prelink command exists first. If not, fall back to
+     * just reading the file */
+    for (cp = command; *cp; cp++) {
+        if (*cp == ' ') {
+            *cp++ = 0;
+            argString = cp;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    memset(&statBuf, 0, sizeof(statBuf));
+    /* stat the file, follow the link */
+    ret = stat(command, &statBuf);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        free(command);
+        return PR_Open(shName, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+    }
+    /* file exits, make sure it's an executable */
+    if (!S_ISREG(statBuf.st_mode) ||
+        ((statBuf.st_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0)) {
+        free(command);
+        return PR_Open(shName, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+    }
+
+    /* OK, the prelink command exists and looks correct, use it */
+    /* build the arglist while we can still malloc */
+    /* count the args if any */
+    if (argString && *argString) {
+        /* argString may have leading spaces, strip them off*/
+        for (cp = argString; *cp && *cp == ' '; cp++)
+            ;
+        argString = cp;
+        if (*cp) {
+            /* there is at least one arg.. */
+            argc = 1;
+        }
+
+        /* count the rest: Note there is no provision for escaped
+         * spaces here */
+        for (cp = argString; *cp; cp++) {
+            if (*cp == ' ') {
+                while (*cp && *cp == ' ')
+                    cp++;
+                if (*cp)
+                    argc++;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* add the additional args: argv[0] (command), shName, NULL*/
+    argc += 3;
+    argv = PORT_NewArray(char *, argc);
+    if (argv == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* fill in the arglist */
+    argv[argNext++] = command;
+    if (argString && *argString) {
+        argv[argNext++] = argString;
+        for (cp = argString; *cp; cp++) {
+            if (*cp == ' ') {
+                *cp++ = 0;
+                while (*cp && *cp == ' ')
+                    cp++;
+                if (*cp)
+                    argv[argNext++] = cp;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* exec doesn't advertise taking const char **argv, do the paranoid
+     * copy */
+    shNameArg = strdup(shName);
+    if (shNameArg == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    argv[argNext++] = shNameArg;
+    argv[argNext++] = 0;
+
+    ret = pipe(pipefd);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* use vfork() so we don't trigger the pthread_at_fork() handlers */
+    child = vfork();
+    if (child < 0)
+        goto loser;
+    if (child == 0) {
+        /* set up the file descriptors */
+        /* if we need to support BSD, this will need to be an open of
+         * /dev/null and dup2(nullFD, 0)*/
+        close(0);
+        /* associate pipefd[1] with stdout */
+        if (pipefd[1] != 1)
+            dup2(pipefd[1], 1);
+        close(2);
+        close(pipefd[0]);
+        /* should probably close the other file descriptors? */
+
+        execv(command, argv);
+        /* avoid at_exit() handlers */
+        _exit(1); /* shouldn't reach here except on an error */
+    }
+    close(pipefd[1]);
+    pipefd[1] = -1;
+
+    /* this is safe because either vfork() as full fork() semantics, and thus
+     * already has it's own address space, or because vfork() has paused
+     * the parent util the exec or exit */
+    free(command);
+    free(shNameArg);
+    PORT_Free(argv);
+
+    *pid = child;
+
+    return PR_ImportPipe(pipefd[0]);
+
+loser:
+    if (pipefd[0] != -1) {
+        close(pipefd[0]);
+    }
+    if (pipefd[1] != -1) {
+        close(pipefd[1]);
+    }
+    free(command);
+    free(shNameArg);
+    PORT_Free(argv);
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * bl_CloseUnPrelink -
+ *
+ * This closes the file descripter and reaps and children openned and crated by
+ * b;_OpenUnprelink. It's primary difference between it and just close is
+ * that it calls wait on the pid if one is supplied, preventing zombie children
+ * from hanging around.
+ */
+void
+bl_CloseUnPrelink(PRFileDesc *file, int pid)
+{
+    /* close the file descriptor */
+    PR_Close(file);
+    /* reap the child */
+    if (pid) {
+        waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SHVERIFY 1 */
+
+static char *
+mkCheckFileName(const char *libName)
+{
+    int ln_len = PORT_Strlen(libName);
+    int index = ln_len + 1 - sizeof("." SHLIB_SUFFIX);
+    char *output = PORT_Alloc(ln_len + sizeof(SGN_SUFFIX));
+    if (!output) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((index > 0) &&
+        (PORT_Strncmp(&libName[index],
+                      "." SHLIB_SUFFIX, sizeof("." SHLIB_SUFFIX)) == 0)) {
+        ln_len = index;
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(output, libName, ln_len);
+    PORT_Memcpy(&output[ln_len], SGN_SUFFIX, sizeof(SGN_SUFFIX));
+    return output;
+}
+
+static int
+decodeInt(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+    return (buf[3]) | (buf[2] << 8) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[0] << 24);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+readItem(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *item)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[4];
+    int bytesRead;
+
+    bytesRead = PR_Read(fd, buf, 4);
+    if (bytesRead != 4) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    item->len = decodeInt(buf);
+
+    item->data = PORT_Alloc(item->len);
+    if (item->data == NULL) {
+        item->len = 0;
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    bytesRead = PR_Read(fd, item->data, item->len);
+    if (bytesRead != item->len) {
+        PORT_Free(item->data);
+        item->data = NULL;
+        item->len = 0;
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static PRBool blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun);
+
+static PRBool
+blapi_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
+{
+    PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
+                   * the signature does not verify */
+    /* find our shared library name */
+    char *shName = PR_GetLibraryFilePathname(name, addr);
+    if (!shName) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    result = blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, self, rerun);
+
+loser:
+    if (shName != NULL) {
+        PR_Free(shName);
+    }
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+PRBool
+BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
+{
+    PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+    if (name && *name == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+        name++;
+        rerun = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return blapi_SHVerify(name, addr, PR_FALSE, rerun);
+}
+
+PRBool
+BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
+{
+    PRBool rerun = PR_FALSE;
+    if (shName && *shName == BLAPI_FIPS_RERUN_FLAG) {
+        shName++;
+        rerun = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return blapi_SHVerifyFile(shName, PR_FALSE, rerun);
+}
+
+#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+/* This allows checks with old shlibsign .chk files. If NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+ * is set, we don't accept DSA */
+static PRBool
+blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(PRFileDesc *shFD, const SECHashObject *hashObj,
+                       DSAPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature)
+{
+    void *hashcx = NULL;
+    SECItem hash;
+    int bytesRead;
+    unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+    unsigned char buf[4096];
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    hash.type = siBuffer;
+    hash.data = hashBuf;
+    hash.len = sizeof(hashBuf);
+
+    /* hash our library file */
+    hashcx = hashObj->create();
+    if (hashcx == NULL) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    hashObj->begin(hashcx);
+
+    while ((bytesRead = PR_Read(shFD, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
+        hashObj->update(hashcx, buf, bytesRead);
+    }
+    hashObj->end(hashcx, hash.data, &hash.len, hash.len);
+    hashObj->destroy(hashcx, PR_TRUE);
+
+    /* verify the hash against the check file */
+    rv = DSA_VerifyDigest(key, signature, &hash);
+    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
+    return (rv == SECSuccess) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+/* don't allow MD2, MD5, SHA1 or SHA224 as your integrity hash */
+static PRBool
+blapi_HashAllowed(SECHashObject *hashObj)
+{
+    switch (hashObj->type) {
+        case HASH_AlgSHA256:
+        case HASH_AlgSHA384:
+        case HASH_AlgSHA512:
+            return PR_TRUE;
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static PRBool
+blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(PRFileDesc *shFD, const SECHashObject *hashObj,
+                        const SECItem *key, const SECItem *signature)
+{
+    HMACContext *hmaccx = NULL;
+    SECItem hash;
+    int bytesRead;
+    unsigned char hashBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+    unsigned char buf[4096];
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRBool result = PR_FALSE;
+
+#ifdef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+    if (!blapi_HashAllowed(hashObj)) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    hash.type = siBuffer;
+    hash.data = hashBuf;
+    hash.len = hashObj->length;
+
+    /* create an hmac for the library file */
+    hmaccx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, key->data, key->len, PR_TRUE);
+    if (hmaccx == NULL) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    HMAC_Begin(hmaccx);
+
+    while ((bytesRead = PR_Read(shFD, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
+        HMAC_Update(hmaccx, buf, bytesRead);
+    }
+    rv = HMAC_Finish(hmaccx, hash.data, &hash.len, hash.len);
+
+    HMAC_Destroy(hmaccx, PR_TRUE);
+
+    /* verify the hmac against the check file */
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+        result = SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(signature, &hash);
+    }
+    PORT_Memset(hashBuf, 0, sizeof hashBuf);
+    return result;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+blapi_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName, PRBool self, PRBool rerun)
+{
+    char *checkName = NULL;
+    PRFileDesc *checkFD = NULL;
+    PRFileDesc *shFD = NULL;
+    const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
+    SECItem signature = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+    int bytesRead, offset, type;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECItem hmacKey = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+#ifdef FREEBL_USE_PRELINK
+    int pid = 0;
+#endif
+    PRBool result = PR_FALSE; /* if anything goes wrong,
+               * the signature does not verify */
+    NSSSignChkHeader header;
+#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+    DSAPublicKey key;
+
+    PORT_Memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
+#endif
+
+    /* If our integrity check was never ran or failed, fail any other
+     * integrity checks to prevent any token going into FIPS mode. */
+    if (!self && (BL_FIPSEntryOK(PR_FALSE, rerun) != SECSuccess)) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!shName) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* figure out the name of our check file */
+    checkName = mkCheckFileName(shName);
+    if (!checkName) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* open the check File */
+    checkFD = PR_Open(checkName, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+    if (checkFD == NULL) {
+#ifdef DEBUG_SHVERIFY
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open the check file %s: (%d, %d)\n",
+                checkName, (int)PR_GetError(), (int)PR_GetOSError());
+#endif /* DEBUG_SHVERIFY */
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* read and Verify the headerthe header */
+    bytesRead = PR_Read(checkFD, &header, sizeof(header));
+    if (bytesRead != sizeof(header)) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    if ((header.magic1 != NSS_SIGN_CHK_MAGIC1) ||
+        (header.magic2 != NSS_SIGN_CHK_MAGIC2)) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    /* we've bumped the version number so that newly signed .check
+     * files will fail nicely on old version of nss */
+    if (header.majorVersion > NSS_SIGN_CHK_MAJOR_VERSION) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    if (header.minorVersion < NSS_SIGN_CHK_MINOR_VERSION) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    type = decodeInt(header.type);
+
+    /* seek past any future header extensions */
+    offset = decodeInt(header.offset);
+    if (PR_Seek(checkFD, offset, PR_SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    switch (type) {
+        case CKK_DSA:
+#ifdef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+            goto loser;
+#else
+            /* accept old dsa check files if NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY is not set*/
+            /* read the key */
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &key.params.prime);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &key.params.subPrime);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &key.params.base);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &key.publicValue);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            /* read the signature */
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &signature);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(PQG_GetHashType(&key.params));
+            break;
+#endif
+        default:
+            if ((type & NSS_SIGN_CHK_TYPE_FLAGS) != NSS_SIGN_CHK_FLAG_HMAC) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            /* read the HMAC Key */
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &hmacKey);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            /* read the siganture */
+            rv = readItem(checkFD, &signature);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(type & ~NSS_SIGN_CHK_TYPE_FLAGS);
+    }
+
+    /* done with the check file */
+    PR_Close(checkFD);
+    checkFD = NULL;
+
+    if (hashObj == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+/* open our library file */
+#ifdef FREEBL_USE_PRELINK
+    shFD = bl_OpenUnPrelink(shName, &pid);
+#else
+    shFD = PR_Open(shName, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+#endif
+    if (shFD == NULL) {
+#ifdef DEBUG_SHVERIFY
+        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open the library file %s: (%d, %d)\n",
+                shName, (int)PR_GetError(), (int)PR_GetOSError());
+#endif /* DEBUG_SHVERIFY */
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    switch (type) {
+        case CKK_DSA:
+#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+            result = blapi_SHVerifyDSACheck(shFD, hashObj, &key, &signature);
+#endif
+            break;
+        default:
+            if ((type & NSS_SIGN_CHK_TYPE_FLAGS) != NSS_SIGN_CHK_FLAG_HMAC) {
+                break;
+            }
+            result = blapi_SHVerifyHMACCheck(shFD, hashObj, &hmacKey, &signature);
+            break;
+    }
+
+#ifdef FREEBL_USE_PRELINK
+    bl_CloseUnPrelink(shFD, pid);
+#else
+    PR_Close(shFD);
+#endif
+    shFD = NULL;
+
+loser:
+    PORT_Memset(&header, 0, sizeof header);
+    if (checkName != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(checkName);
+    }
+    if (checkFD != NULL) {
+        PR_Close(checkFD);
+    }
+    if (shFD != NULL) {
+        PR_Close(shFD);
+    }
+    if (hmacKey.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&hmacKey, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    if (signature.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+#ifndef NSS_STRICT_INTEGRITY
+    if (key.params.prime.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&key.params.prime, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    if (key.params.subPrime.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&key.params.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    if (key.params.base.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&key.params.base, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    if (key.publicValue.data != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&key.publicValue, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+#endif
+    return result;
+}
+
+PRBool
+BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
+{
+    if (name == NULL) {
+        /*
+     * If name is NULL, freebl is statically linked into softoken.
+     * softoken will call BLAPI_SHVerify next to verify itself.
+     */
+        return PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return blapi_SHVerify(name, (PRFuncPtr)decodeInt, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+#else /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */
+
+PRBool
+BLAPI_SHVerifyFile(const char *shName)
+{
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+PRBool
+BLAPI_SHVerify(const char *name, PRFuncPtr addr)
+{
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+PRBool
+BLAPI_VerifySelf(const char *name)
+{
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+#endif /* NSS_FIPS_DISABLED */