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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
commit26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6 (patch)
treef435a8308119effd964b339f76abb83a57c29483 /security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.tar.xz
firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.zip
Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c1795
1 files changed, 1795 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f170c352b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1795 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file PK11Contexts which are used in multipart hashing,
+ * encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations.
+ */
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "nssilock.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+
+static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 };
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Now Deal with Crypto Contexts
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * the monitors...
+ */
+void
+PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+ * the Context */
+ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+ /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+ PZ_Lock(cx->sessionLock);
+ } else {
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+ * the Context */
+ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+ /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+ PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock);
+ } else {
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free up a Cipher Context
+ */
+void
+PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit)
+{
+ pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession);
+ /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+ if (context->savedData != NULL)
+ PORT_Free(context->savedData);
+ if (context->key)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key);
+ if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE);
+ if (context->sessionLock)
+ PZ_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot);
+ if (freeit)
+ PORT_Free(context);
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary.
+ */
+static unsigned char *
+pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer,
+ unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+ if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+ /* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we
+ * have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the
+ * correct length
+ */
+ unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength;
+ buffer = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufLen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+void *
+pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+ return pk11_saveContextHelper(context,
+ (unsigned char *)space, savedLength);
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the current context
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long savedLength)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = context->objectID;
+
+ PORT_Assert(space != NULL);
+ if (space == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context);
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a Message function. Particular function is passed in as a
+ * function pointer. Since all C_Message*Init funcitons have the same
+ * prototype, we just pick one of the the prototypes to declare our init
+ * function.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+pk11_contextInitMessage(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
+ CK_C_MessageEncryptInit initFunc,
+ CK_FLAGS flags, CK_RV scrv)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = context->slot;
+ CK_VERSION version = slot->module->cryptokiVersion;
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+ context->ivCounter = 0;
+ context->ivMaxCount = 0;
+ context->ivFixedBits = 0;
+ context->ivLen = 0;
+ context->ivGen = CKG_NO_GENERATE;
+ context->simulate_mechanism = (mech)->mechanism;
+ context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE;
+ /* check that we can do the Message interface. We need to check
+ * for either 1) are we using a PKCS #11 v3 interface and 2) is the
+ * Message flag set on the mechanism. If either is false we simulate
+ * the message interface for the Encrypt and Decrypt cases using the
+ * PKCS #11 V2 interface.
+ * Sign and verify do not have V2 interfaces, so we go ahead and fail
+ * if those cases */
+ if ((version.major >= 3) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanismFlag(slot, (mech)->mechanism, flags)) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ crv = (*initFunc)((context)->session, (mech), (context)->objectID);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ if ((crv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
+ (crv == CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID)) {
+ /* we have a 3.0 interface, and the flag was set (or ignored)
+ * but the implementation was not there, use the V2 interface */
+ crv = (scrv);
+ context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ crv = (scrv);
+ context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE;
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ CK_ULONG count = 0;
+ /* generate the IV for fortezza */
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+ }
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)
+ ->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
+ NULL, &count);
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ /* NOTE: we previously has this set to C_SignInit for Macing.
+ * It turns out now one could possibly use it that way, though,
+ * because PK11_HashOp() always called C_VerifyUpdate on CKA_VERIFY,
+ * which would have failed. So everyone just calls us with CKA_SIGN
+ * when Macing even when they are verifying, no need to 'do it
+ * for them'. It needs to be VerifyInit now so that we can do
+ * PKCS #11 hash/Verify combo operations. */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session, mech_info);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ break;
+
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptInit,
+ CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT, CKR_OK);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptInit,
+ CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT, CKR_OK);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageSignInit,
+ CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+ PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageVerifyInit,
+ CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* handle the case where the token is using the old NSS mechanism */
+ if (context->simulate_message &&
+ !PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, context->simulate_mechanism)) {
+ if ((context->simulate_mechanism == CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) {
+ context->simulate_mechanism = CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Testing interfaces, not for general use. This function forces
+ * an AEAD context into simulation mode even though the target token
+ * can already do PKCS #11 v3.0 Message (i.e. softoken).
+ */
+SECStatus
+_PK11_ContextSetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ /* only message encrypt and message decrypt contexts can be simulated */
+ if ((context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT)) &&
+ (context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT))) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* if we are already simulating, return */
+ if (context->simulate_message) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* we need to shutdown the existing AEAD operation */
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+_PK11_ContextGetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ return context->simulate_message;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context.
+ */
+static PK11Context *
+pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID,
+ const SECItem *param, void *pwArg)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+ PK11Context *context;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
+ if (!slot || ((objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) && ((operation != CKA_DIGEST) ||
+ (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)))) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ context = (PK11Context *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context));
+ if (context == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt
+ * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA
+ * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be
+ * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to
+ * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it),
+ * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side
+ * of the connection.*/
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
+ if (symKey && (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack)) {
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+ context->operation = operation;
+ /* If we were given a symKey, keep our own reference to it so
+ * that the key doesn't disappear in the middle of the operation
+ * if the caller frees it. Public and Private keys are not reference
+ * counted, so the caller just has to keep his copies around until
+ * the operation completes */
+ context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL;
+ context->objectID = objectID;
+ context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+ context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &context->ownSession);
+ context->pwArg = pwArg;
+ /* get our session */
+ context->savedData = NULL;
+
+ /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple
+ * begins on a single context */
+ context->type = type;
+ if (param) {
+ if (param->len > 0) {
+ context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param);
+ } else {
+ context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ context->param = NULL;
+ }
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ context->sessionLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockPK11cxt);
+ if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mech_info.mechanism = type;
+ mech_info.pParameter = param->data;
+ mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ rv = pk11_context_init(context, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ context->init = PR_TRUE;
+ return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different
+ * parts of libsec.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+__PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+ SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+ PK11Context *context = NULL;
+
+ /* first get a slot */
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+ }
+
+ /* now import the key */
+ symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param);
+
+loser:
+ if (symKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ }
+ if (slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+
+ return context;
+}
+
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+ SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+ return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation,
+ key, param, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using
+ * the same key in multiple sessions!
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ PK11SymKey *symKey, const SECItem *param)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *newKey;
+ PK11Context *context;
+
+ /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+ newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, type, operation);
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
+ } else {
+ symKey = newKey;
+ }
+
+ /* Context keeps its reference to the symKey, so it's safe to
+ * free our reference we we are through, even though we may have
+ * created the key using pk11_ForceSlot. */
+ context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey,
+ symKey->objectID, param, symKey->cx);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return context;
+}
+
+/* To support multipart public key operations (like hash/verify operations),
+ * we need to create contexts with public keys. */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByPubKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECItem *param,
+ void *pwArg)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
+ SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+ /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+ /* public keys have all their data in the public key data structure,
+ * so there's no need to export the old key, just import this one. The
+ * import manages consistancy of the public key data structure */
+ if (slot == NULL || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type)) {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ objectID = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter
+ * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of
+ * PK11_VerifyWithMechanism */
+ return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, pubKey->pkcs11Slot, operation,
+ NULL, pubKey->pkcs11ID,
+ param ? param : &nullparam, pwArg);
+}
+
+/* To support multipart private key operations (like hash/sign operations),
+ * we need to create contexts with private keys. */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByPrivKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const SECItem *param)
+{
+ SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 };
+ /* Private keys are generally not movable. If the token the
+ * private key lives on can't do the operation, generally we are
+ * stuck anyway. So no need to try to manipulate the key into
+ * another token */
+
+ /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+ /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter
+ * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of
+ * PK11_SignWithMechanism */
+ return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, privKey->pkcs11Slot, operation,
+ NULL, privKey->pkcs11ID,
+ param ? param : &nullparam,
+ privKey->wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot.
+ * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg)
+{
+ /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PK11Context *context;
+ SECItem param;
+
+ type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg);
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */
+ param.data = NULL;
+ param.len = 0;
+ param.type = 0;
+
+ context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL,
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE, &param, NULL);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old)
+{
+ PK11Context *newcx;
+ PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned long len;
+
+ newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation,
+ old->key, old->objectID, old->param,
+ old->pwArg);
+ if (newcx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state
+ * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session,
+ * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */
+ if (old->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old);
+ data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL, &len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old);
+ needFree = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ data = old->savedData;
+ len = old->savedLength;
+ }
+
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different
+ * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we
+ * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the
+ * saveData pointer... */
+ if (newcx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx);
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL);
+ if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len);
+ newcx->savedLength = len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (needFree)
+ PORT_Free(data);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return newcx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA
+ * work.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int *len, int saveLength)
+{
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ CK_ULONG length = saveLength;
+
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ if (data)
+ *len = length;
+ } else if ((unsigned)saveLength >= cx->savedLength) {
+ data = (unsigned char *)cx->savedData;
+ if (cx->savedData) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(save, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+ }
+ *len = cx->savedLength;
+ }
+ if (data != NULL) {
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PORT_ZFree(data, length);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+}
+
+/* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */
+unsigned char *
+PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx,
+ unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen,
+ unsigned int *stateLen)
+{
+ unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen;
+
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ *stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL) ? length : 0;
+ } else {
+ if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) {
+ stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(cx->savedLength);
+ if (!stateBuf) {
+ return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ stateBuf = preAllocBuf;
+ }
+ if (cx->savedData) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+ }
+ *stateLen = cx->savedLength;
+ }
+ return stateBuf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for
+ * FORTEZZA .
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int len)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (cx->ownSession) {
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ pk11_Finalize(cx);
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx, save, len);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL);
+ if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned)len)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData, save, len);
+ cx->savedLength = len;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is to get FIPS compliance until we can convert
+ * libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE
+ * if we can't get a PK11 Context.
+ */
+PRBool
+PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID)
+{
+ PK11Context *cx;
+
+ cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID);
+ if (cx == NULL)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * make sure the old context is clear first
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+ pk11_Finalize(cx);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+
+ mech_info.mechanism = cx->type;
+ mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data;
+ mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len;
+ rv = pk11_context_init(cx, &mech_info);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ cx->init = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ PRInt32 len)
+{
+ PK11Context *context;
+ unsigned int max_length;
+ unsigned int out_length;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */
+ if (len < 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg);
+ if (context == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */
+ max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
+ PORT_Assert(max_length);
+ if (!max_length)
+ max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, out, &out_length, max_length);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a bulk encryption operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_ULONG length = maxout;
+ CK_ULONG offset = 0;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ unsigned char *saveOut = out;
+ unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and
+ * lose them on the first decrypt.
+ */
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ unsigned char random[8];
+ if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random));
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+
+ /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into
+ * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this
+ * call. */
+ allocOut = out = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(maxout);
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, random, sizeof(random), out, &length);
+
+ out += length;
+ maxout -= length;
+ offset = length;
+ } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) {
+ length = sizeof(random);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, sizeof(random), random, &length);
+ inlen -= length;
+ in += length;
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ length += offset;
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ *outlen = 0;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ *outlen = length;
+ }
+
+ if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+ if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+ PORT_Assert(allocOut);
+ PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
+ PORT_Free(allocOut);
+ }
+ context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simulate the IV generation that normally would happen in the token.
+ *
+ * This is a modifed copy of what is in freebl/gcm.c. We can't use the
+ * version in freebl because of layering, since freebl is inside the token
+ * boundary. These issues are traditionally handled by moving them to util,
+ * but we also have two different Random functions we have two switch between.
+ * Since this is primarily here for tokens that don't support the PKCS #11
+ * Message Interface, it's OK if they diverge a bit. Slight semantic
+ * differences from the freebl/gcm.c version shouldn't be much more than the
+ * sematic differences between freebl and other tokens which do implement the
+ * Message Interface. */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_GenerateIV(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen,
+ int fixedBits, unsigned char *iv, int ivLen)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int flexBits;
+ unsigned int ivOffset;
+ unsigned int ivNewCount;
+ unsigned char ivMask;
+ unsigned char ivSave;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (context->ivCounter != 0) {
+ /* If we've already generated a message, make sure all subsequent
+ * messages are using the same generator */
+ if ((context->ivGen != ivgen) ||
+ (context->ivFixedBits != fixedBits) ||
+ (context->ivLen != ivLen)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* remember these values */
+ context->ivGen = ivgen;
+ context->ivFixedBits = fixedBits;
+ context->ivLen = ivLen;
+ /* now calculate how may bits of IV we have to supply */
+ flexBits = ivLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ /* first make sure we aren't going to overflow */
+ if (flexBits < fixedBits) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ flexBits -= fixedBits;
+ /* if we are generating a random number reduce the acceptable bits to
+ * avoid birthday attacks */
+ if (ivgen == CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM) {
+ if (flexBits <= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* see freebl/blapit.h for how GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS is
+ * calculated. */
+ flexBits -= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS;
+ flexBits = flexBits >> 1;
+ }
+ if (flexBits == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* Turn those bits into the number of IV's we can safely return */
+ if (flexBits >= sizeof(context->ivMaxCount) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
+ context->ivMaxCount = PR_UINT64(0xffffffffffffffff);
+ } else {
+ context->ivMaxCount = (PR_UINT64(1) << flexBits);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* no generate, accept the IV from the source */
+ if (ivgen == CKG_NO_GENERATE) {
+ context->ivCounter = 1;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we haven't exceeded the number of IVs we can return
+ * for this key, generator, and IV size */
+ if (context->ivCounter >= context->ivMaxCount) {
+ /* use a unique error from just bad user input */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXTRA_INPUT);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* build to mask to handle the first byte of the IV */
+ ivOffset = fixedBits / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ ivMask = 0xff >> ((PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - (fixedBits & 7)) & 7);
+ ivNewCount = ivLen - ivOffset;
+
+ /* finally generate the IV */
+ switch (ivgen) {
+ case CKG_GENERATE: /* default to counter */
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
+ iv[ivOffset] = (iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask) |
+ (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount) & ivMask);
+ for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) {
+ iv[ivOffset + i] =
+ PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
+ iv[ivOffset] ^=
+ (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount) & ivMask);
+ for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) {
+ iv[ivOffset + i] ^=
+ PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
+ ivSave = iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask;
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv + ivOffset, ivNewCount);
+ iv[ivOffset] = ivSave | (iv[ivOffset] & ivMask);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ context->ivCounter++;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 v2.40 did not have a message interface. If our module can't
+ * do the message interface use the old method of doing AEAD */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_AEADSimulateOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen,
+ const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ unsigned int length = maxout;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ unsigned char *saveOut = out;
+ unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * first we need to convert the single shot (v2.40) parameters into
+ * the message version of the parameters. This usually involves
+ * copying the Nonce or IV, setting the AAD from our parameter list
+ * and handling the tag differences */
+ CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 gcm;
+ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *gcm_message;
+ CK_CCM_PARAMS ccm;
+ CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *ccm_message;
+ CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS chacha_poly;
+ CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *chacha_poly_message;
+ CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS nss_chacha_poly;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = context->simulate_mechanism;
+ SECItem sim_params = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned char *tag = NULL;
+ unsigned int taglen;
+ PRBool encrypt;
+
+ *outlen = 0;
+ /* figure out if we are encrypting or decrypting, as tags are
+ * handled differently in both */
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ encrypt = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+ encrypt = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ switch (mechanism) {
+ case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ case CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305:
+ if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ chacha_poly_message =
+ (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params;
+ chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce;
+ chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen;
+ chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+ chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+ tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag;
+ taglen = 16;
+ sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&chacha_poly;
+ sim_params.len = sizeof(chacha_poly);
+ /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv
+ * internally, don't simulate it either */
+ break;
+ case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ chacha_poly_message =
+ (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params;
+ tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag;
+ taglen = 16;
+ nss_chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce;
+ nss_chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen;
+ nss_chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+ nss_chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+ nss_chacha_poly.ulTagLen = taglen;
+ sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&nss_chacha_poly;
+ sim_params.len = sizeof(nss_chacha_poly);
+ /* CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 does not generate the iv
+ * internally, don't simulate it either */
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_CCM:
+ if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ccm_message = (CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+ ccm.ulDataLen = ccm_message->ulDataLen;
+ ccm.pNonce = ccm_message->pNonce;
+ ccm.ulNonceLen = ccm_message->ulNonceLen;
+ ccm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+ ccm.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+ ccm.ulMACLen = ccm_message->ulMACLen;
+ tag = ccm_message->pMAC;
+ taglen = ccm_message->ulMACLen;
+ sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&ccm;
+ sim_params.len = sizeof(ccm);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ /* simulate generating the IV */
+ rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ccm_message->nonceGenerator,
+ ccm_message->ulNonceFixedBits,
+ ccm_message->pNonce,
+ ccm_message->ulNonceLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_GCM:
+ if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+ gcm.pIv = gcm_message->pIv;
+ gcm.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen;
+ gcm.ulIvBits = gcm.ulIvLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ gcm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+ gcm.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+ gcm.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits;
+ tag = gcm_message->pTag;
+ taglen = (gcm_message->ulTagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm;
+ sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ /* simulate generating the IV */
+ rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, gcm_message->ivGenerator,
+ gcm_message->ulIvFixedBits,
+ gcm_message->pIv, gcm_message->ulIvLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* now handle the tag. The message interface separates the tag from
+ * the data, while the single shot gets and puts the tag at the end of
+ * the encrypted data. */
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ /* In the decrypt case, if the tag is already at the end of the
+ * input buffer we are golden, otherwise we'll need a new input
+ * buffer and copy the tag at the end of it */
+ if (tag != in + inlen) {
+ allocOut = PORT_Alloc(inlen + taglen);
+ if (allocOut == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(allocOut, in, inlen);
+ PORT_Memcpy(allocOut + inlen, tag, taglen);
+ in = allocOut;
+ }
+ inlen = inlen + taglen;
+ } else {
+ /* if we end up allocating, we don't want to overrun this buffer,
+ * so we fail early here */
+ if (maxout < inlen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* in the encrypt case, we are fine if maxout is big enough to hold
+ * the tag. We'll copy the tag after the operation */
+ if (maxout < inlen + taglen) {
+ allocOut = PORT_Alloc(inlen + taglen);
+ if (allocOut == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ out = allocOut;
+ length = maxout = inlen + taglen;
+ }
+ }
+ /* now do the operation */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ } else {
+ rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* If the mechanism was CKM_AES_GCM, the module may have been
+ * following the same error as old versions of NSS. Retry with
+ * the CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS */
+ if ((mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) &&
+ (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA)) {
+ CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS gcm_nss;
+ gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+ gcm_nss.pIv = gcm_message->pIv;
+ gcm_nss.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen;
+ gcm_nss.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+ gcm_nss.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+ gcm_nss.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits;
+ sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm_nss;
+ sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm_nss);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out,
+ &length, maxout, in, inlen);
+ } else {
+ rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out,
+ &length, maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* on encrypt, separate the output buffer from the tag */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ if ((length < taglen) || (length > inlen + taglen)) {
+ /* PKCS #11 module should not return a length smaller than
+ * taglen, or bigger than inlen+taglen */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ length = length - taglen;
+ if (allocOut) {
+ /*
+ * If we used a temporary buffer, copy it out to the original
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
+ }
+ /* if the tag isn't in the right place, copy it out */
+ if (tag != out + length) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(tag, out + length, taglen);
+ }
+ }
+ *outlen = length;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+fail:
+ if (allocOut) {
+ PORT_Free(allocOut);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do an AEAD operation. This function optionally returns
+ * and IV on Encrypt for all mechanism. NSS knows which mechanisms
+ * generate IV's in the token and which don't. This allows the
+ * applications to make a single call without special handling for
+ * each AEAD mechanism (the special handling is all contained here.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_AEADOp(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen,
+ int fixedbits, unsigned char *iv, int ivlen,
+ const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+ int maxout, unsigned char *tag, int taglen,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcm_message;
+ CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS ccm_message;
+ CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS chacha_poly_message;
+ void *params;
+ int paramslen;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ switch (context->simulate_mechanism) {
+ case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ case CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305:
+ case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ chacha_poly_message.pNonce = iv;
+ chacha_poly_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen;
+ chacha_poly_message.pTag = tag;
+ params = &chacha_poly_message;
+ paramslen = sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS);
+ /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv
+ * internally, Do it here. */
+ if (context->operation == (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT)) {
+ /* simulate generating the IV */
+ rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ivgen, fixedbits, iv, ivlen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_GCM:
+ gcm_message.pIv = iv;
+ gcm_message.ulIvLen = ivlen;
+ gcm_message.ivGenerator = ivgen;
+ gcm_message.ulIvFixedBits = fixedbits;
+ gcm_message.pTag = tag;
+ gcm_message.ulTagBits = taglen * 8;
+ params = &gcm_message;
+ paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS);
+ /* GCM generates IV internally */
+ break;
+ case CKM_AES_CCM:
+ ccm_message.ulDataLen = inlen;
+ ccm_message.pNonce = iv;
+ ccm_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen;
+ ccm_message.nonceGenerator = ivgen;
+ ccm_message.ulNonceFixedBits = fixedbits;
+ ccm_message.pMAC = tag;
+ ccm_message.ulMACLen = taglen;
+ params = &ccm_message;
+ paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS);
+ /* CCM generates IV internally */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return PK11_AEADRawOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen, out, outlen,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+}
+
+/* Do and AED operation. The application builds the params on it's own
+ * and passes them in. This allows applications direct access to the params
+ * so they can use mechanisms not yet understood by, NSS, or get semantics
+ * not suppied by PK11_AEAD. */
+SECStatus
+PK11_AEADRawOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen,
+ const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+ int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ CK_ULONG length = maxout;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ PORT_Assert(outlen != NULL);
+ *outlen = 0;
+ if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) != CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The PKCS 11 module does not support the message interface, fall
+ * back to using single shot operation */
+ if (context->simulate_message) {
+ return pk11_AEADSimulateOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen,
+ out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+ length = maxout;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+ length = maxout; /* sig length */
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out /* sig */, length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ *outlen = length;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a digest/signature operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char *in, unsigned inLen)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ if (inLen == 0) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (!in) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ /* also for MAC'ing */
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest a key if possible./
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+
+ if (!context || !key) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ if (context->slot != key->slot) {
+ newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, CKA_SIGN, key);
+ } else {
+ newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key);
+ }
+
+ context->init = PR_FALSE;
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ if (key->data.data) {
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, key->data.data, key->data.len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session, newKey->objectID);
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+ */
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+ &context->savedLength);
+ if (context->savedData == NULL)
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* clear out out session for others to use */
+ pk11_Finalize(context);
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ if (newKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize().
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ rv = pk11_Finalize(context);
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by
+ * someone new.
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ CK_ULONG count = 0;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ unsigned char stackBuf[256];
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+finalize:
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, buffer, count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageSignFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageVerifyFinal(context->session);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_Free(buffer);
+ }
+ if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED) {
+ /* if there's no operation, it is finalized */
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Message interface does not need to allocate a final buffer */
+ if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* try to finalize the session with a buffer */
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) {
+ buffer = stackBuf;
+ } else {
+ buffer = PORT_Alloc(count);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ goto finalize;
+ }
+ if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_Free(buffer);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the final digested or signed data...
+ * this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data
+ * either out of an arena or out of the standard heap.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length)
+{
+ CK_ULONG len;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* message interface returns no data on Final, Should not use DigestFinal
+ * in this case */
+ if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+ * state.
+ */
+ PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+ if (!context->ownSession) {
+ rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+ context->savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ len = length;
+ switch (context->operation) {
+ case CKA_SIGN:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_VERIFY:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, data, len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DIGEST:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ case CKA_DECRYPT:
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+ break;
+ }
+ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+
+ context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *outLen = (unsigned int)len;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(PK11Context *context)
+{
+ if (context->slot == NULL) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return pk11slot_GetFIPSStatus(context->slot, context->session,
+ CK_INVALID_HANDLE, context->init ? CKT_NSS_SESSION_CHECK : CKT_NSS_SESSION_LAST_CHECK);
+}