Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 9085 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..856c98e7cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9085 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
+ *
+ * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
+ *   This implementation has two slots:
+ *      slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
+ *   It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
+ *   It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
+ *   not have any token storage.
+ *      slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
+ *   can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
+ *   keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
+ *
+ *   In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
+ *   that created or generated them.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h> /* for UINT_MAX and ULONG_MAX */
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pkcs11i.h"
+#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+#include "lowkeyi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secdig.h"
+#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "cmac.h"
+#include "alghmac.h"
+#include "softoken.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "kem.h"
+#include "kyber.h"
+
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "prenv.h"
+
+#define __PASTE(x, y) x##y
+#define BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMech, typeSize) (!pMech->pParameter || pMech->ulParameterLen < typeSize)
+/*
+ * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
+ * definitions for them...
+ */
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+
+#define CK_PKCS11_3_0 1
+
+#define CK_EXTERN extern
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
+    CK_RV __PASTE(NS, func)
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
+
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+/* create a definition of SHA1 that's consistent
+ * with the rest of the CKM_SHAxxx hashes*/
+#define CKM_SHA1 CKM_SHA_1
+#define CKM_SHA1_HMAC CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
+#define CKM_SHA1_HMAC_GENERAL CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL
+
+typedef struct {
+    PRUint8 client_version[2];
+    PRUint8 random[46];
+} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
+
+static void
+sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    return;
+}
+
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem)             \
+    printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
+           str1, str2, num, sitem->len);              \
+    for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) {                \
+        printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]);              \
+    }                                                 \
+    printf("\n")
+#else
+#undef EC_DEBUG
+#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * free routines.... Free local type  allocated data, and convert
+ * other free routines to the destroy signature.
+ */
+static void
+sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    PORT_Free(data);
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_ZSpace(void *data, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    size_t len = *(size_t *)data;
+    PORT_ZFree(data, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
+ * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
+{
+    unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
+    unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
+    unsigned char enc_src[8];
+    unsigned char enc_dest[8];
+    unsigned int leng, i;
+    DESContext *descx;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    /* zero the parity bits */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
+    }
+
+    /* encrypt with key 1 */
+    descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+    if (descx == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        goto done;
+    }
+    rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+    DES_DestroyContext(descx, PR_TRUE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        if (i & 1) {
+            enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
+        } else {
+            enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* encrypt with key 2 */
+    descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
+    if (descx == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        goto done;
+    }
+    rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
+    DES_DestroyContext(descx, PR_TRUE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* set the corret parity on our new des key */
+    sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
+done:
+    PORT_Memset(enc_src, 0, sizeof enc_src);
+    PORT_Memset(enc_dest, 0, sizeof enc_dest);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
+{
+    SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKObject *object;
+    SFTKFreeStatus status;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (slot == NULL) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    /*
+     * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
+     * requested object.
+     */
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject, session);
+    if (object == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
+    if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
+        (sftk_isTrue(object, CKA_PRIVATE))) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        sftk_FreeObject(object);
+        return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
+    }
+
+    /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
+
+    if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
+        (sftk_isTrue(object, CKA_TOKEN))) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        sftk_FreeObject(object);
+        return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
+    }
+
+    sftk_DeleteObject(session, object);
+
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+
+    /*
+     * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
+     * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
+     * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
+     * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
+     * be in the data base.
+     */
+    status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
+
+    return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
+ */
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
+{
+    if (!params) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    if (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
+        sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
+ */
+static PRBool
+sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
+{
+    if (!params) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    /* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
+     * state:
+     *   If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
+     *   ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
+     */
+    if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
+        (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+        (sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
+        (params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
+        (params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+ */
+SFTKSessionContext *
+sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+        case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+        case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_DECRYPT:
+            return session->enc_context;
+        case SFTK_HASH:
+            return session->hash_context;
+        case SFTK_SIGN:
+        case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+        case SFTK_VERIFY:
+        case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_SIGN:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_VERIFY:
+            return session->hash_context;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
+ */
+void
+sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
+                      SFTKSessionContext *context)
+{
+    switch (type) {
+        case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
+        case SFTK_DECRYPT:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_DECRYPT:
+            session->enc_context = context;
+            break;
+        case SFTK_HASH:
+            session->hash_context = context;
+            break;
+        case SFTK_SIGN:
+        case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
+        case SFTK_VERIFY:
+        case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_SIGN:
+        case SFTK_MESSAGE_VERIFY:
+            session->hash_context = context;
+            break;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
+ * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
+ * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
+ * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
+ * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+                SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
+    /* make sure the context is valid */
+    if ((context == NULL) || (context->type != type) || (needMulti && !(context->multi))) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+    }
+    *contextPtr = context;
+    if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
+        *sessionPtr = session;
+    } else {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    }
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
+ *  Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
+ */
+void
+sftk_TerminateOp(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
+                 SFTKSessionContext *context)
+{
+    session->lastOpWasFIPS = context->isFIPS;
+    sftk_FreeContext(context);
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, ctype, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Encrypt ************************
+ */
+
+/*
+ * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
+ * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session, CK_MECHANISM *pMechanism,
+                 SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
+                 SFTKContextType ctype, SFTKObject **keyPtr,
+                 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
+                 CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+    SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+    SFTKAttribute *att;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+
+    /* We can only init if there is not current context active */
+    if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, ctype) != NULL) {
+        return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
+    }
+
+    /* find the key */
+    if (keyPtr) {
+        key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+        if (key == NULL) {
+            return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+        }
+
+        /* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
+        if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) &&
+             (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) ||
+            !sftk_isTrue(key, operation)) {
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        }
+        /* get the key type */
+        att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+        if (att == NULL) {
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        }
+        PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+        if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+        }
+        PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+        *keyPtr = key;
+    }
+
+    /* allocate the context structure */
+    context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
+    if (context == NULL) {
+        if (key)
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    context->type = ctype;
+    context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+    context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
+    context->cipherInfo = NULL;
+    context->hashInfo = NULL;
+    context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+    context->padDataLength = 0;
+    context->key = key;
+    context->blockSize = 0;
+    context->maxLen = 0;
+    context->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(session->slot, pMechanism,
+                                           operation, key);
+    *contextPtr = context;
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static int
+sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
+{
+    switch (mechanism) {
+        case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+        case CKM_AES_CBC:
+            return NSS_AES_CBC;
+        case CKM_AES_ECB:
+            return NSS_AES;
+        case CKM_AES_CTS:
+            return NSS_AES_CTS;
+        case CKM_AES_CTR:
+            return NSS_AES_CTR;
+        case CKM_AES_GCM:
+            return NSS_AES_GCM;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+                   unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                   const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+                        inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+                   unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                   const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+                        inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+                unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+                          inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+                unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
+                          inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_freeRSAOAEPInfo(SFTKOAEPInfo *info, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    PORT_ZFree(info->params.pSourceData, info->params.ulSourceDataLen);
+    PORT_ZFree(info, sizeof(SFTKOAEPInfo));
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+                    unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                    const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+    HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+
+    PORT_Assert(info->key.pub->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key.pub->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
+    maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
+
+    return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key.pub->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+                           (const unsigned char *)info->params.pSourceData,
+                           info->params.ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
+                           output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
+                    unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                    const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+    HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+
+    PORT_Assert(info->key.priv->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key.priv->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.hashAlg);
+    maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params.mgf);
+
+    rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key.priv->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+                         (const unsigned char *)info->params.pSourceData,
+                         info->params.ulSourceDataLen,
+                         output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(const unsigned char *key,
+                                    unsigned int keyLen,
+                                    const CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *params)
+{
+    SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx;
+
+    if (params->ulNonceLen != sizeof(ctx->nonce)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ctx = PORT_New(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ChaCha20Poly1305_InitContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, key, keyLen,
+                                     params->ulTagLen) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_Free(ctx);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Memcpy(ctx->nonce, params->pNonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
+
+    /* AAD data and length must both be null, or both non-null. */
+    PORT_Assert((params->pAAD == NULL) == (params->ulAADLen == 0));
+
+    if (params->ulAADLen > sizeof(ctx->ad)) {
+        /* Need to allocate an overflow buffer for the additional data. */
+        ctx->adOverflow = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(params->ulAADLen);
+        if (!ctx->adOverflow) {
+            PORT_Free(ctx);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        PORT_Memcpy(ctx->adOverflow, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+    } else {
+        ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+        if (params->pAAD) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(ctx->ad, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
+        }
+    }
+    ctx->adLen = params->ulAADLen;
+
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+                                     PRBool freeit)
+{
+    ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, PR_FALSE);
+    if (ctx->adOverflow != NULL) {
+        PORT_ZFree(ctx->adOverflow, ctx->adLen);
+        ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
+    } else {
+        PORT_Memset(ctx->ad, 0, ctx->adLen);
+    }
+    ctx->adLen = 0;
+    if (freeit) {
+        PORT_Free(ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+                              unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+                              unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+                              const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+
+    if (ad == NULL) {
+        ad = ctx->ad;
+    }
+
+    return ChaCha20Poly1305_Seal(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+                                 maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+                                 sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
+                              unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+                              unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+                              const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
+
+    if (ad == NULL) {
+        ad = ctx->ad;
+    }
+
+    return ChaCha20Poly1305_Open(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
+                                 maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
+                                 sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_ChaCha20Ctr(const SFTKChaCha20CtrInfo *ctx,
+                 unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+                 unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+                 const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    if (maxOutputLen < inputLen) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    ChaCha20_Xor(output, input, inputLen, ctx->key,
+                 ctx->nonce, ctx->counter);
+    *outputLen = inputLen;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static void
+sftk_ChaCha20Ctr_DestroyContext(SFTKChaCha20CtrInfo *ctx,
+                                PRBool freeit)
+{
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+    if (freeit) {
+        PORT_Free(ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+/** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
+ *
+ * Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
+ * Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
+ *  ciphers MAC'ing.
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+               CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
+               CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+               SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    SFTKAttribute *att;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+    CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
+    unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
+#endif
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+    CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
+    SECItem rc5Key;
+#endif
+    CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS nss_gcm_param;
+    void *aes_param;
+    CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS nss_aead_params;
+    CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *nss_aead_params_ptr = NULL;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    unsigned char newdeskey[24];
+    PRBool useNewKey = PR_FALSE;
+    int t;
+
+    if (!pMechanism) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+    crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, pMechanism, &context, contextType, &key,
+                           hKey, &key_type,
+                           isEncrypt ? CKO_PUBLIC_KEY : CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,
+                           keyUsage);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            if (isEncrypt) {
+                NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+                if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
+                context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey;
+                context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+                                                   ? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw
+                                                   : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
+            } else {
+                NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+                if (privKey == NULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+                context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey;
+                context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+                                                   ? sftk_RSADecryptRaw
+                                                   : sftk_RSADecrypt);
+            }
+            context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+            break;
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
+                !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            {
+                SFTKOAEPInfo *info;
+                CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params =
+                    (CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                /* make a copy of the source data value for future
+                 * use (once the user has reclaimed his data in pParameter)*/
+                void *newSource = NULL;
+                if (params->pSourceData) {
+                    newSource = PORT_Alloc(params->ulSourceDataLen);
+                    if (newSource == NULL) {
+                        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    PORT_Memcpy(newSource, params->pSourceData, params->ulSourceDataLen);
+                }
+                info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPInfo);
+                if (info == NULL) {
+                    PORT_ZFree(newSource, params->ulSourceDataLen);
+                    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                    break;
+                }
+                info->params = *params;
+                info->params.pSourceData = newSource;
+                info->isEncrypt = isEncrypt;
+
+                /* now setup encryption and decryption contexts */
+                if (isEncrypt) {
+                    info->key.pub = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+                    if (info->key.pub == NULL) {
+                        sftk_freeRSAOAEPInfo(info, PR_TRUE);
+                        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
+                    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key.pub);
+                } else {
+                    info->key.priv = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+                    if (info->key.priv == NULL) {
+                        sftk_freeRSAOAEPInfo(info, PR_TRUE);
+                        crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
+                    context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key.priv);
+                }
+                context->cipherInfo = info;
+            }
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_freeRSAOAEPInfo;
+            break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_RC2_ECB:
+        case CKM_RC2_CBC:
+            context->blockSize = 8;
+            if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits + 7) / 8;
+            context->cipherInfo =
+                RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                  att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
+                                  pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : NSS_RC2_CBC, effectiveKeyLength);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC2_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2 */
+
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+        case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_RC5_ECB:
+        case CKM_RC5_CBC:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize * 2;
+            rc5Key.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+            rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+            context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key, rc5_param->ulRounds,
+                                                    rc5_param->ulWordsize, rc5_param->pIv,
+                                                    pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC5_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+#endif
+        case CKM_RC4:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo =
+                RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                  att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)RC4_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+        case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
+        case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
+            if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
+            goto finish_des;
+        case CKM_DES_ECB:
+            if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            t = NSS_DES;
+            goto finish_des;
+        case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_DES_CBC:
+            if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            t = NSS_DES_CBC;
+            goto finish_des;
+        case CKM_DES3_ECB:
+            if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
+            goto finish_des;
+        case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_DES3_CBC:
+            if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+        finish_des:
+            if ((t != NSS_DES && t != NSS_DES_EDE3) && (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+                                                        pMechanism->ulParameterLen < 8)) {
+                crv = CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->blockSize = 8;
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
+                (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
+                /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
+                memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
+                memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
+                useNewKey = PR_TRUE;
+            } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
+                crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue, newdeskey);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+                    break;
+                }
+                useNewKey = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
+                useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter, t, isEncrypt);
+            if (useNewKey)
+                memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)DES_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+        case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_SEED_CBC:
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+                pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_SEED_ECB:
+            context->blockSize = 16;
+            if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
+                (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
+                isEncrypt);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)SEED_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
+                pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
+            context->blockSize = 16;
+            if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
+                (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                pMechanism->mechanism ==
+                        CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB
+                    ? NSS_CAMELLIA
+                    : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
+                isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)Camellia_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_AES_ECB:
+        case CKM_AES_CBC:
+            context->blockSize = 16;
+        case CKM_AES_CTS:
+        case CKM_AES_CTR:
+        case CKM_AES_GCM:
+            aes_param = pMechanism->pParameter;
+            /*
+             *  Due to a mismatch between the documentation and the header
+             *  file, two different definitions for CK_GCM_PARAMS exist.
+             *  The header file is normative according to Oasis, but NSS used
+             *  the documentation. In PKCS #11 v3.0, this was reconciled in
+             *  favor of the header file definition. To maintain binary
+             *  compatibility, NSS now defines CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 as the official
+             *  version v3 (V2.4 header file) and CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS as the
+             *  legacy (V2.4 documentation, NSS version). CK_GCM_PARAMS
+             *  is defined as CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 if NSS_PKCS11_2_0_COMPAT is not
+             *  defined and CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS if it is. Internally
+             *  softoken continues to use the legacy version. The code below
+             *  automatically detects which parameter was passed in and
+             *  converts CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 to the CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS (legacy
+             *  version) on the fly. NSS proper will eventually start
+             *  using the CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 version and fall back to the
+             *  CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS if the CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 version fails with
+             *  CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID.
+             */
+            if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
+                if (!aes_param) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen == sizeof(CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3)) {
+                    /* convert the true V3 parameters into the old NSS parameters */
+                    CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 *gcm_params = (CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 *)aes_param;
+                    if (gcm_params->ulIvLen * 8 != gcm_params->ulIvBits) {
+                        /* only support byte aligned IV lengths */
+                        crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    aes_param = (void *)&nss_gcm_param;
+                    nss_gcm_param.pIv = gcm_params->pIv;
+                    nss_gcm_param.ulIvLen = gcm_params->ulIvLen;
+                    nss_gcm_param.pAAD = gcm_params->pAAD;
+                    nss_gcm_param.ulAADLen = gcm_params->ulAADLen;
+                    nss_gcm_param.ulTagBits = gcm_params->ulTagBits;
+                } else if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS)) {
+                    /* neither old nor new style params, must be invalid */
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_CTR && BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS))) ||
+                       ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_CBC || pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_CTS) && BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
+                context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            }
+            if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
+                (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                (unsigned char *)aes_param,
+                sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
+                isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)AES_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+        case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+                if (key_type != CKK_NSS_CHACHA20) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if ((pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) ||
+                    (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                nss_aead_params_ptr = (CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            } else {
+                CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS_PTR chacha_poly_params;
+                if (key_type != CKK_CHACHA20) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if ((pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) ||
+                    (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+                     sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                chacha_poly_params = (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS_PTR)
+                                         pMechanism->pParameter;
+                nss_aead_params_ptr = &nss_aead_params;
+                nss_aead_params.pNonce = chacha_poly_params->pNonce;
+                nss_aead_params.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_params->ulNonceLen;
+                nss_aead_params.pAAD = chacha_poly_params->pAAD;
+                nss_aead_params.ulAADLen = chacha_poly_params->ulAADLen;
+                nss_aead_params.ulTagLen = 16; /* Poly1305 is always 16 */
+            }
+
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(
+                (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+                nss_aead_params_ptr);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt : sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt);
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR: /* old NSS private version */
+        case CKM_CHACHA20:         /* PKCS #11 v3 version */
+        {
+            unsigned char *counter;
+            unsigned char *nonce;
+            unsigned long counter_len;
+            unsigned long nonce_len;
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR) {
+                if (key_type != CKK_NSS_CHACHA20) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                counter_len = 4;
+                counter = pMechanism->pParameter;
+                nonce = counter + 4;
+                nonce_len = 12;
+            } else {
+                CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS_PTR chacha20_param_ptr;
+                if (key_type != CKK_CHACHA20) {
+                    crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS)) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                chacha20_param_ptr = (CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS_PTR)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                if ((chacha20_param_ptr->blockCounterBits != 32) &&
+                    (chacha20_param_ptr->blockCounterBits != 64)) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                counter_len = chacha20_param_ptr->blockCounterBits / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+                counter = chacha20_param_ptr->pBlockCounter;
+                nonce = chacha20_param_ptr->pNonce;
+                nonce_len = chacha20_param_ptr->ulNonceBits / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+            }
+
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            SFTKChaCha20CtrInfo *ctx = PORT_ZNew(SFTKChaCha20CtrInfo);
+            if (!ctx) {
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(ctx->key)) {
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+                PORT_Free(ctx);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            memcpy(ctx->key, att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+
+            /* make sure we don't overflow our parameters */
+            if ((sizeof(ctx->counter) < counter_len) ||
+                (sizeof(ctx->nonce) < nonce_len)) {
+                PORT_Free(ctx);
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* The counter is little endian. */
+            int i = 0;
+            for (; i < counter_len; ++i) {
+                ctx->counter |= (PRUint32)counter[i] << (i * 8);
+            }
+            memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, nonce_len);
+            context->cipherInfo = ctx;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_ChaCha20Ctr;
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ChaCha20Ctr_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
+        case CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
+            context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall thru */
+        case CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP:
+        case CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP:
+            context->blockSize = 8;
+        case CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP:
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
+                (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                (unsigned char *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+            if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_KEY_WRAP_KWP) {
+                context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_EncryptKWP
+                                                         : AESKeyWrap_DecryptKWP);
+            } else {
+                context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
+                                                         : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
+            }
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeContext(context);
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+    return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+                          SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+                  CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen, i;
+    unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (!pEncryptedPart) {
+        if (context->doPad) {
+            CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
+            CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable / context->blockSize;
+
+            *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
+            return CKR_OK;
+        }
+        *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
+        return CKR_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* do padding */
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        /* deal with previous buffered data */
+        if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+            /* fill in the padded to a full block size */
+            for (i = context->padDataLength;
+                 (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+                context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
+                ulPartLen--;
+                context->padDataLength++;
+            }
+
+            /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
+            if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
+                *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+                return CKR_OK;
+            }
+            /* encrypt the current padded data */
+            rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
+                                    &padoutlen, maxout, context->padBuf,
+                                    context->blockSize);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+            }
+            pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
+            maxout -= padoutlen;
+        }
+        /* save the residual */
+        context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
+        if (context->padDataLength) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
+                        &pPart[ulPartLen - context->padDataLength],
+                        context->padDataLength);
+            ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+        }
+        /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
+        if (ulPartLen == 0) {
+            *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
+            return CKR_OK;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
+                            &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+    }
+    *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG)(outlen + padoutlen);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                 CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen, i;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
+    if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
+        /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+        if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
+            *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
+            contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
+        }
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    /* do padding */
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char)(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
+        /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
+        for (i = context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
+            context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
+        }
+        rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastEncryptedPart,
+                                &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+        if (rv == SECSuccess)
+            *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+    }
+
+finish:
+    if (contextFinished)
+        sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Encrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+            CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
+            CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_RV crv2;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    SECItem pText;
+
+    pText.type = siBuffer;
+    pText.data = pData;
+    pText.len = ulDataLen;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (!pEncryptedData) {
+        outlen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen : ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        if (context->multi) {
+            CK_ULONG updateLen = maxoutlen;
+            CK_ULONG finalLen;
+            /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+             * code deal with it */
+            sftk_FreeSession(session);
+            crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
+                                    &updateLen);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                updateLen = 0;
+            }
+            maxoutlen -= updateLen;
+            pEncryptedData += updateLen;
+            finalLen = maxoutlen;
+            crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
+            if (crv == CKR_OK && crv2 == CKR_OK) {
+                *pulEncryptedDataLen = updateLen + finalLen;
+            }
+            return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
+        }
+        /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
+        ** and only update.  There will be no final.
+        */
+        PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
+        if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+            CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
+            CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder;
+            pText.len += padding;
+            pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+            if (pText.data) {
+                memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
+                memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
+            } else {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                goto fail;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
+    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
+                            &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
+    crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+    if (pText.data != pData)
+        PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+fail:
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context);
+done:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+        *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Decrypt ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+    return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
+                          SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                  CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
+                  CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
+    PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0) || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
+
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        /* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
+         * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
+         * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
+         * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
+         * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
+         * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
+         */
+        if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
+            (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
+            return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!pPart) {
+        if (context->doPad) {
+            *pulPartLen =
+                ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
+            return CKR_OK;
+        }
+        /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
+         * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
+         * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
+         */
+        *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
+        return CKR_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        /* first decrypt our saved buffer */
+        if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+            rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
+                                    maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess)
+                return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+            pPart += padoutlen;
+            maxout -= padoutlen;
+        }
+        /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
+        PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, &pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen - context->blockSize],
+                    context->blockSize);
+        context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
+        ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
+    }
+
+    /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
+    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &outlen,
+                            maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+    }
+    *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG)(outlen + padoutlen);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                 CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    *pulLastPartLen = 0;
+    if (!pLastPart) {
+        /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
+        if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
+            *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
+        }
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    if (context->doPad) {
+        /* decrypt our saved buffer */
+        if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
+            /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
+             * buffer!!! */
+            rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
+                                    maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+            } else {
+                unsigned int padSize = 0;
+                crv = sftk_CheckCBCPadding(pLastPart, outlen,
+                                           context->blockSize, &padSize);
+                /* Update pulLastPartLen, in constant time, if crv is OK */
+                *pulLastPartLen = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), outlen - padSize, *pulLastPartLen);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context);
+finish:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+            CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+            CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_RV crv2;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (!pData) {
+        *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG)(ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
+        CK_ULONG updateLen = maxoutlen;
+        CK_ULONG finalLen;
+        /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
+         * code deal with it */
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
+                                pData, &updateLen);
+        if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+            maxoutlen -= updateLen;
+            pData += updateLen;
+        }
+        finalLen = maxoutlen;
+        crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
+        if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+            *pulDataLen = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv2), updateLen + finalLen, *pulDataLen);
+            return crv2;
+        } else {
+            return crv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+                            pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
+    /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
+    crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+        if (context->doPad) {
+            unsigned int padSize = 0;
+            crv = sftk_CheckCBCPadding(pData, outlen, context->blockSize,
+                                       &padSize);
+            /* Update pulDataLen, in constant time, if crv is OK */
+            *pulDataLen = PORT_CT_SEL(sftk_CKRVToMask(crv), outlen - padSize, *pulDataLen);
+        } else {
+            *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+        }
+    }
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context);
+done:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Digest (HASH)  ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+               CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, pMechanism, &context, SFTK_HASH,
+                           NULL, 0, NULL, 0, CKA_DIGEST);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+#define INIT_MECH(mmm)                                         \
+    case CKM_##mmm: {                                          \
+        mmm##Context *mmm##_ctx = mmm##_NewContext();          \
+        context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm##_ctx;               \
+        context->cipherInfoLen = mmm##_FlattenSize(mmm##_ctx); \
+        context->currentMech = CKM_##mmm;                      \
+        context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)mmm##_Update;          \
+        context->end = (SFTKEnd)mmm##_End;                     \
+        context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)mmm##_DestroyContext;  \
+        context->maxLen = mmm##_LENGTH;                        \
+        if (mmm##_ctx)                                         \
+            mmm##_Begin(mmm##_ctx);                            \
+        else                                                   \
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;                             \
+        break;                                                 \
+    }
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        INIT_MECH(MD2)
+        INIT_MECH(MD5)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA1)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA224)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA256)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA384)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA512)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA3_224)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA3_256)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA3_384)
+        INIT_MECH(SHA3_512)
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeContext(context);
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+           CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+           CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int digestLen;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (pDigest == NULL) {
+        *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
+    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
+     * length argument, but NSC_Digest takes an unsigned long. */
+    while (ulDataLen > UINT_MAX) {
+        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, UINT_MAX);
+        pData += UINT_MAX;
+        ulDataLen -= UINT_MAX;
+    }
+#endif
+    (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
+
+    /*  NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
+    (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+    *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+finish:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+                 CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
+    /* The context->hashUpdate function takes an unsigned int for its data
+     * length argument, but NSC_DigestUpdate takes an unsigned long. */
+    while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
+        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
+        pPart += UINT_MAX;
+        ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
+    }
+#endif
+    (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
+                CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
+    unsigned int digestLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (pDigest != NULL) {
+        (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
+        *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
+        sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
+    } else {
+        *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
+    }
+
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
+ * that use hashes as part of their operations.
+ */
+#define DOSUB(mmm)                                                \
+    static CK_RV                                                  \
+        sftk_doSub##mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context)              \
+    {                                                             \
+        mmm##Context *mmm##_ctx = mmm##_NewContext();             \
+        context->hashInfo = (void *)mmm##_ctx;                    \
+        context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)mmm##_Update;             \
+        context->end = (SFTKEnd)mmm##_End;                        \
+        context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy)mmm##_DestroyContext; \
+        if (!context->hashInfo) {                                 \
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;                               \
+        }                                                         \
+        mmm##_Begin(mmm##_ctx);                                   \
+        return CKR_OK;                                            \
+    }
+
+DOSUB(MD2)
+DOSUB(MD5)
+DOSUB(SHA1)
+DOSUB(SHA224)
+DOSUB(SHA256)
+DOSUB(SHA384)
+DOSUB(SHA512)
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SignCopy(
+    CK_ULONG *copyLen,
+    void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
+    unsigned int maxLength,
+    const unsigned char *hashResult,
+    unsigned int hashResultLength)
+{
+    unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
+    if (toCopy > maxLength) {
+        toCopy = maxLength;
+    }
+    if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
+        toCopy = hashResultLength;
+    }
+    memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
+    if (outLength) {
+        *outLength = toCopy;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+             unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(sig, hash, *copyLen) == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * common HMAC + CMAC initialization routine
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doMACInit(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, SFTKSessionContext *session,
+               SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+    sftk_MACCtx *context;
+    CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+    PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(key->slot->slotID);
+
+    /* Set up the initial context. */
+    crv = sftk_MAC_Create(mech, key, &context);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    session->hashInfo = context;
+    session->multi = PR_TRUE;
+
+    /* Required by FIPS 198 Section 4. Delay this check until after the MAC
+     * has been initialized to steal the output size of the MAC. */
+    if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < context->mac_size / 2)) {
+        sftk_MAC_Destroy(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+
+    /* Configure our helper functions appropriately. Note that these casts
+     * ignore the return values. */
+    session->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash)sftk_MAC_Update;
+    session->end = (SFTKEnd)sftk_MAC_Finish;
+    session->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_MAC_Destroy;
+
+    intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+    if (intpointer == NULL) {
+        sftk_MAC_Destroy(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    *intpointer = mac_size;
+    session->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+
+    /* Since we're only "hashing", copy the result from session->end to the
+     * caller using sftk_SignCopy. */
+    session->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+    session->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_HMACCmp;
+    session->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+
+    session->maxLen = context->mac_size;
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
+ * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
+ */
+
+/*
+ * FROM SSL:
+ * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
+ * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
+ * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
+ */
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_1[60] = {
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+static unsigned char ssl_pad_2[60] = {
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen,
+                unsigned int maxLen, unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+    unsigned int out;
+
+    info->begin(info->hashContext);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, info->key, info->keySize);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, ssl_pad_2, info->padSize);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, hash, hashLen);
+    info->end(info->hashContext, tmpBuf, &out, SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+    PORT_Memcpy(sig, tmpBuf, info->macSize);
+    PORT_Memset(tmpBuf, 0, info->macSize);
+    *sigLen = info->macSize;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+                  unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+    unsigned int out;
+    int cmp;
+
+    info->begin(info->hashContext);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, info->key, info->keySize);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, ssl_pad_2, info->padSize);
+    info->update(info->hashContext, hash, hashLen);
+    info->end(info->hashContext, tmpBuf, &out, SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
+    cmp = NSS_SecureMemcmp(sig, tmpBuf, info->macSize);
+    PORT_Memset(tmpBuf, 0, info->macSize);
+    return (cmp == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * common HMAC initalization routine
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context, SECOidTag oid,
+                  SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
+{
+    SFTKAttribute *keyval;
+    SFTKBegin begin;
+    int padSize;
+    SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+
+    if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
+        crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+        begin = (SFTKBegin)SHA1_Begin;
+        padSize = 40;
+    } else {
+        crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+        begin = (SFTKBegin)MD5_Begin;
+        padSize = 48;
+    }
+    context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+
+    keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+    if (keyval == NULL)
+        return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+
+    context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, keyval->attrib.pValue,
+                        keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+    context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, ssl_pad_1, padSize);
+    sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
+    if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    sslmacinfo->size = sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo);
+    sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
+    sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
+    PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key, keyval->attrib.pValue,
+                keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
+    sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
+    sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
+    sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
+    sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
+    sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
+    sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
+    context->cipherInfo = (void *)sslmacinfo;
+    context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ZSpace;
+    context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SSLMACSign;
+    context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_SSLMACVerify;
+    context->maxLen = mac_size;
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Sign  ************************
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
+ *  @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
+ *  @param keyUsage    check whether key allows this usage
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+                CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
+                SFTKContextType contextType)
+
+{
+    CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
+    CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+    CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
+#endif
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+    CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
+    CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
+#endif
+    unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char k2[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned char k3[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    unsigned int blockSize;
+    PRBool isXCBC = PR_FALSE;
+
+    if (!pMechanism) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS))) {
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            }
+            mac_bytes =
+                ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_RC2_MAC:
+            /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+             * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
+            rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
+                                              pMechanism->pParameter)
+                                             ->ulEffectiveBits;
+            PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv, 0, sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
+            blockSize = 8;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2 */
+
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+        case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS))) {
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            }
+            mac_bytes =
+                ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_RC5_MAC:
+            /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
+             * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS))) {
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            }
+            rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
+            rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
+            rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
+            if ((blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize * 2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
+            break;
+#endif
+        /* add cast and idea later */
+        case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_DES_MAC:
+            blockSize = 8;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_DES3_MAC:
+            blockSize = 8;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+        case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
+            blockSize = 8;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+        case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_SEED_MAC:
+            blockSize = 16;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
+            blockSize = 16;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
+            mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_AES_MAC:
+            blockSize = 16;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96:
+        case CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC:
+            /* The only difference between CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC
+             * and CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 is the size of the returned mac. */
+            mac_bytes = pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 ? 12 : 16;
+            blockSize = 16;
+            PORT_Memset(ivBlock, 0, blockSize);
+            cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
+            cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
+            cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
+            /* is XCBC requires extra processing at the end of the operation */
+            isXCBC = PR_TRUE;
+            /* The input key is used to generate k1, k2, and k3. k2 and k3
+             * are used at the end in the pad step. k1 replaces the input
+             * key in the aes cbc mac */
+            crv = sftk_aes_xcbc_new_keys(hSession, hKey, &hKey, k2, k3);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                return crv;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
+    /* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
+     */
+    if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
+        mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
+    else {
+        if (mac_bytes > blockSize) {
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
+                         CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
+                         keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto fail;
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, contextType, PR_TRUE, NULL);
+
+    /* this shouldn't happen! */
+    PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto fail;
+    context->blockSize = blockSize;
+    context->macSize = mac_bytes;
+    context->isXCBC = isXCBC;
+    if (isXCBC) {
+        /* save the xcbc specific parameters */
+        PORT_Memcpy(context->k2, k2, blockSize);
+        PORT_Memcpy(context->k3, k3, blockSize);
+        PORT_Memset(k2, 0, blockSize);
+        PORT_Memset(k3, 0, blockSize);
+        /* get rid of the temp key now that the context has been created */
+        NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, hKey);
+    }
+    return CKR_OK;
+fail:
+    if (isXCBC) {
+        PORT_Memset(k2, 0, blockSize);
+        PORT_Memset(k3, 0, blockSize);
+        NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, hKey); /* get rid of our temp key */
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+                 unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                 const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
+                        hash, hashLen);
+}
+
+/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
+static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
+    { DER_SEQUENCE,
+      0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
+    { DER_OBJECT_ID,
+      offsetof(SECAlgorithmID, algorithm) },
+    { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
+      offsetof(SECAlgorithmID, parameters) },
+    { 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * XXX OLD Template.  Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
+ * remove this.
+ */
+static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
+    { DER_SEQUENCE,
+      0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
+    { DER_INLINE,
+      offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digestAlgorithm),
+      SECAlgorithmIDTemplate },
+    { DER_OCTET_STRING,
+      offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digest) },
+    { 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
+ */
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
+             unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+             const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    SECItem digder;
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+
+    digder.data = NULL;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (!arena) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Construct digest info */
+    di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
+    if (!di) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
+    rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
+    ** block
+    */
+    rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
+                  digder.len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+loser:
+    SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+    if (arena != NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+             unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+             const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+                  inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
+                unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+                const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
+                     inputLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKPSSSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+                unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
+                const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+    HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+    CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = &info->params;
+
+    PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+    maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+
+    rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
+                     params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+                    void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+    SECItem signature, digest;
+    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+
+    signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+    signature.len = sigLen;
+    digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+    digest.len = dataLen;
+    return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+                  unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+                  void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+    SECItem signature, digest;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+
+    signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+    signature.len = maxSigLen;
+    digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+    digest.len = dataLen;
+    rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    *sigLen = signature.len;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
+                    void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+    SECItem signature, digest;
+    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
+
+    signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+    signature.len = sigLen;
+    digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+    digest.len = dataLen;
+    return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
+                  unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
+                  void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
+{
+    SECItem signature, digest;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
+
+    signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
+    signature.len = maxSigLen;
+    digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
+    digest.len = dataLen;
+    rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+        sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    *sigLen = signature.len;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
+ * types of signing:
+ *      (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
+ *  to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
+ *  encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
+ *      (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
+ *  some sort of signature to the end.
+ *      (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
+ *  and only the final block is part of the mac.
+ *
+ *  For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
+ *  (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
+ *  C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
+ *  have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
+ *
+ *  For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
+ *  multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
+ *  calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
+ *  operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
+ *  opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
+ *  copy (as is the case with HMAC).
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+             CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+    SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
+    SFTKPSSSignInfo *pinfo = NULL;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+    crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
+    if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+        return crv;
+
+    /* we're not using a block cipher mac */
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, pMechanism, &context, SFTK_SIGN, &key,
+                           hKey, &key_type, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, CKA_SIGN);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+
+#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm)                         \
+    case CKM_##mmm##_RSA_PKCS:                          \
+        context->multi = PR_TRUE;                       \
+        crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context);                 \
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)                              \
+            break;                                      \
+        context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSAHashSign; \
+        info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);              \
+        if (info == NULL) {                             \
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;                      \
+            break;                                      \
+        }                                               \
+        info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm;                  \
+        goto finish_rsa;
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
+        INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
+
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASign;
+            goto finish_rsa;
+        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASignRaw;
+        finish_rsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+            if (privKey == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
+             * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
+             * signature.
+             */
+            if (info) {
+                info->key = privKey;
+                context->cipherInfo = info;
+                context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
+            } else {
+                context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+                context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
+            }
+            context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
+            break;
+
+#define INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(mmm)                                                            \
+    case CKM_##mmm##_RSA_PKCS_PSS:                                                            \
+        context->multi = PR_TRUE;                                                             \
+        crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context);                                                       \
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)                                                                    \
+            break;                                                                            \
+        if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS)) {                   \
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;                                                \
+            break;                                                                            \
+        }                                                                                     \
+        if (((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->hashAlg != CKM_##mmm) { \
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;                                                \
+            break;                                                                            \
+        }                                                                                     \
+        goto finish_rsa_pss;
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+        finish_rsa_pss:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+                !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            pinfo = PORT_New(SFTKPSSSignInfo);
+            if (pinfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            pinfo->size = sizeof(SFTKPSSSignInfo);
+            pinfo->params = *(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            pinfo->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+            if (pinfo->key == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = pinfo;
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ZSpace;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_RSASignPSS;
+            context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(pinfo->key);
+            break;
+
+#define INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(mmm)          \
+    case CKM_DSA_##mmm:                 \
+        context->multi = PR_TRUE;       \
+        crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)              \
+            break;                      \
+        goto finish_dsa;
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_DSA:
+        finish_dsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_DSA, &crv);
+            if (privKey == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
+            context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+            context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+
+            break;
+
+#define INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(mmm)        \
+    case CKM_ECDSA_##mmm:               \
+        context->multi = PR_TRUE;       \
+        crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context); \
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)              \
+            break;                      \
+        goto finish_ecdsa;
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_ECDSA:
+        finish_ecdsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_EC, &crv);
+            if (privKey == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = privKey;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)nsc_ECDSASignStub;
+            context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null : (SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
+            context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+
+            break;
+
+#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm)                                        \
+    case CKM_##mmm##_HMAC_GENERAL:                                 \
+        PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);                       \
+        if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {                             \
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;                     \
+            break;                                                 \
+        }                                                          \
+        crv = sftk_doMACInit(pMechanism->mechanism, context, key,  \
+                             *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
+        break;                                                     \
+    case CKM_##mmm##_HMAC:                                         \
+        crv = sftk_doMACInit(pMechanism->mechanism, context, key,  \
+                             mmm##_LENGTH);                        \
+        break;
+
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_224)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_256)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_384)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_512)
+
+        case CKM_AES_CMAC_GENERAL:
+            PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_doMACInit(pMechanism->mechanism, context, key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_CMAC:
+            crv = sftk_doMACInit(pMechanism->mechanism, context, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            break;
+        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+            PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_MD5, key,
+                                    *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+            break;
+        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+            PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_SHA1, key,
+                                    *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+            break;
+        case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+            crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
+            break;
+        case CKM_TLS_MAC: {
+            CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *tls12_mac_params;
+            HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash;
+            const char *label;
+
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            tls12_mac_params = (CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            if (tls12_mac_params->prfHashMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
+                /* The TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF */
+                tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
+                if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */
+                tlsPrfHash =
+                    sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfHashMechanism);
+                if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL ||
+                    tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) {
+                label = "server finished";
+            } else if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 2) {
+                label = "client finished";
+            } else {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, tlsPrfHash,
+                                  tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength);
+            if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+                context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, label, 15);
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+            crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+            sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+                sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism, key);
+            CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+
+            if (ctx == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                break;
+            }
+            intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+            if (intpointer == NULL) {
+                PORT_Free(ctx);
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+
+            context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+            context->hashInfo = ctx;
+            context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
+            context->hashUpdate = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
+            context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+            context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+            context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+            context->maxLen = 64;
+            context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+            sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+                sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism, key);
+            CK_ULONG *intpointer;
+
+            if (ctx == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                break;
+            }
+            intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
+            if (intpointer == NULL) {
+                PORT_Free(ctx);
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
+
+            context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
+            context->hashInfo = ctx;
+            context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
+            context->hashUpdate = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
+            context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
+            context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)sftk_SignCopy;
+            context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+            context->maxLen = 64;
+            context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (info)
+            PORT_Free(info);
+        if (pinfo)
+            PORT_ZFree(pinfo, pinfo->size);
+        sftk_FreeContext(context);
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** MAC one block of data by block cipher
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACBlock(SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk)
+{
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    return (SECSuccess == (ctx->update)(ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
+                                        SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize))
+               ? CKR_OK
+               : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
+ *
+ *  Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACFinal(SFTKSessionContext *ctx)
+{
+    unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
+    /* pad and proceed the residual */
+    if (ctx->isXCBC) {
+        CK_RV crv = sftk_xcbc_mac_pad(ctx->padBuf, padLen, ctx->blockSize,
+                                      ctx->k2, ctx->k3);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+        return sftk_MACBlock(ctx, ctx->padBuf);
+    }
+    if (padLen) {
+        /* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
+        PORT_Memset(ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen);
+        return sftk_MACBlock(ctx, ctx->padBuf);
+    } else
+        return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
+ * setup and final operations).
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+               CK_ULONG ulPartLen, SFTKContextType type)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, type, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (context->hashInfo) {
+#if (ULONG_MAX > UINT_MAX)
+        while (ulPartLen > UINT_MAX) {
+            (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, UINT_MAX);
+            pPart += UINT_MAX;
+            ulPartLen -= UINT_MAX;
+        }
+#endif
+        (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
+    } else {
+        /* must be block cipher MACing */
+
+        unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
+        unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
+            context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
+        unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
+            blkSize - context->padDataLength;
+
+        /* not enough data even for one block */
+        if (ulPartLen <= minInput) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, ulPartLen);
+            context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+        /* MACing residual */
+        if (context->padDataLength) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(residual, pPart, minInput);
+            ulPartLen -= minInput;
+            pPart += minInput;
+            if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, context->padBuf)))
+                goto terminate;
+        }
+        /* MACing full blocks */
+        while (ulPartLen > blkSize) {
+            if (CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock(context, pPart)))
+                goto terminate;
+            ulPartLen -= blkSize;
+            pPart += blkSize;
+        }
+        /* save the residual */
+        if ((context->padDataLength = ulPartLen))
+            PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen);
+    } /* blk cipher MACing */
+
+    goto cleanup;
+
+terminate:
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, type, context);
+cleanup:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+               CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+    return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
+}
+
+struct SFTK_SESSION_FLAGS {
+    CK_FLAGS flag;
+    SFTKContextType type;
+};
+
+const static struct SFTK_SESSION_FLAGS sftk_session_flags[] = {
+    { CKF_ENCRYPT, SFTK_ENCRYPT },
+    { CKF_DECRYPT, SFTK_DECRYPT },
+    { CKF_DIGEST, SFTK_HASH },
+    { CKF_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN },
+    { CKF_SIGN_RECOVER, SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER },
+    { CKF_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY },
+    { CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER },
+    { CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT, SFTK_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT },
+    { CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT, SFTK_MESSAGE_DECRYPT },
+    { CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN, SFTK_MESSAGE_SIGN },
+    { CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY, SFTK_MESSAGE_VERIFY },
+};
+const static int sftk_flag_count = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sftk_session_flags);
+
+/*
+ * Cancel one or more operations running on the existing session.
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SessionCancel(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_FLAGS flags)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV gcrv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sftk_flag_count; i++) {
+        if (flags & sftk_session_flags[i].flag) {
+            flags &= ~sftk_session_flags[i].flag;
+            crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, sftk_session_flags[i].type, PR_TRUE, &session);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                gcrv = CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED;
+                continue;
+            }
+            sftk_TerminateOp(session, sftk_session_flags[i].type, context);
+        }
+    }
+    if (flags & CKF_FIND_OBJECTS) {
+        flags &= ~CKF_FIND_OBJECTS;
+        crv = NSC_FindObjectsFinal(hSession);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            gcrv = CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED;
+        }
+    }
+    if (flags) {
+        gcrv = CKR_OPERATION_CANCEL_FAILED;
+    }
+    return gcrv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * returning the signature. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+              CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_SIGN, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (context->hashInfo) {
+        unsigned int digestLen;
+        unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+        if (!pSignature) {
+            outlen = context->maxLen;
+            goto finish;
+        }
+        (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+        if (SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+                                            &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+            crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        /* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
+         * Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
+         * application read EXACT signature length */
+        PORT_Memset(tmpbuf, 0, sizeof tmpbuf);
+    } else {
+        /* must be block cipher MACing */
+        outlen = context->macSize;
+        /* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
+        if (!pSignature || maxoutlen < outlen) {
+            if (pSignature)
+                crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+            goto finish;
+        }
+        if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context)))
+            PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen);
+    }
+
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+finish:
+    *pulSignatureLen = outlen;
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+         CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
+         CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_SIGN, PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (!pSignature) {
+        /* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
+        *pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
+                               ? context->maxLen
+                               : context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
+     * sign Final */
+    if (context->multi) {
+        /* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
+        if (CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
+            crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
+    } else {
+        /* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
+        unsigned int outlen;
+        unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
+        if (SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+                                             &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
+            crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+        /*  "too small" here is certainly continuable */
+        if (crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+            sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
+    } /* single-part */
+
+finish:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Sign Recover  ************************
+ */
+/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
+ * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+            return NSC_SignInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey);
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
+ * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+                CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    return NSC_Sign(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     verify  ************************
+ */
+
+/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+                   unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+                   unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
+                             digestLen);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
+                  const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+                  const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+    unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
+    SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
+    SECItem digest;
+    unsigned int bufferSize;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
+    bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
+    pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
+    if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
+    pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
+
+    /* decrypt the block */
+    rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
+                              &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
+                              sig, sigLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    } else {
+        digest.data = (PRUint8 *)digestData;
+        digest.len = digestLen;
+        rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
+            digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
+            PR_FALSE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
+    }
+
+    PORT_ZFree(pkcs1DigestInfoData, bufferSize);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+                  unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+                  unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
+                     unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+                     unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKPSSVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
+                     unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
+                     unsigned int digestLen)
+{
+    HASH_HashType hashAlg;
+    HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
+    CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = &info->params;
+
+    PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    hashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
+    maskHashAlg = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
+
+    return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
+                            params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+               CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+    SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
+    SFTKPSSVerifyInfo *pinfo = NULL;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
+    crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
+    if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+        return crv;
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, pMechanism, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, &key,
+                           hKey, &key_type, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKA_VERIFY);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+
+#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm)                            \
+    case CKM_##mmm##_RSA_PKCS:                            \
+        context->multi = PR_TRUE;                         \
+        crv = sftk_doSub##mmm(context);                   \
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)                                \
+            break;                                        \
+        context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_hashCheckSign; \
+        info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);              \
+        if (info == NULL) {                               \
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;                        \
+            break;                                        \
+        }                                                 \
+        info->hashOid = SEC_OID_##mmm;                    \
+        goto finish_rsa;
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
+        INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
+
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+            context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSign;
+            goto finish_rsa;
+        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+            context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
+        finish_rsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+            if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (info) {
+                info->key = pubKey;
+                context->cipherInfo = info;
+                context->destroy = sftk_Space;
+            } else {
+                context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+                context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+            }
+            break;
+
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_RSA_PSS_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
+        finish_rsa_pss:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
+                !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            pinfo = PORT_New(SFTKPSSVerifyInfo);
+            if (pinfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            pinfo->size = sizeof(SFTKPSSVerifyInfo);
+            pinfo->params = *(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            pinfo->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+            if (pinfo->key == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = pinfo;
+            context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_ZSpace;
+            context->verify = (SFTKVerify)sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
+            break;
+
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_DSA_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_DSA:
+        finish_dsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_DSA, &crv);
+            if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+            context->verify = (SFTKVerify)nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
+            context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+            break;
+
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_ECDSA_SIG_MECH(SHA512)
+        case CKM_ECDSA:
+        finish_ecdsa:
+            if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_EC, &crv);
+            if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+            context->verify = (SFTKVerify)nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
+            context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+            break;
+
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA1)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_224)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_256)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_384)
+            INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA3_512)
+
+        case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
+            PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_MD5, key,
+                                    *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+            break;
+        case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
+            PORT_Assert(pMechanism->pParameter);
+            if (!pMechanism->pParameter) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context, SEC_OID_SHA1, key,
+                                    *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
+            break;
+        case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
+            crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
+            crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (info)
+            PORT_Free(info);
+        if (pinfo)
+            PORT_ZFree(pinfo, pinfo->size);
+        sftk_FreeContext(context);
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
+CK_RV
+NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+           CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
+     * VerifyFinal */
+    if (context->multi) {
+        /* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
+        if (CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
+            crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+    } else {
+        if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+                                             ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
+            crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+
+        sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+    }
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
+ *
+ * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+                 CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+    return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
+ * checking the signature. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (!pSignature)
+        return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    if (context->hashInfo) {
+        unsigned int digestLen;
+        unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+        (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+        if (SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
+                                            ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
+            crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        PORT_Memset(tmpbuf, 0, sizeof tmpbuf);
+    } else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
+        /* must be block cipher MACing */
+        crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
+    } else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
+        if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
+            crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ ************** Crypto Functions:     Verify  Recover ************************
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+                         unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+                         const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+                                sig, sigLen);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
+                            unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
+                            const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
+    if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
+                                   sig, sigLen);
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
+ * where the data is recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                      CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session, pMechanism, &context, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+                           &key, hKey, &key_type, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    context->multi = PR_TRUE;
+
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
+            if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            context->multi = PR_FALSE;
+            context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
+            pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
+            if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+            context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
+            context->update = (SFTKCipher)(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
+                                               ? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw
+                                               : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
+            context->destroy = sftk_Null;
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_Free(context);
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
+ * where the data is recovered from the signature.
+ * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
+CK_RV
+NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                  CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
+                  CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    unsigned int outlen;
+    unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+                          PR_FALSE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+    if (pData == NULL) {
+        /* to return the actual size, we need  to do the decrypt, just return
+         * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
+        *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
+        rv = SECSuccess;
+        goto finish;
+    }
+
+    rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
+                            pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
+    *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+
+    sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
+finish:
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/*
+ **************************** Random Functions:  ************************
+ */
+
+/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
+ * generator. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
+               CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
+    return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                   CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
+    /*
+     * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
+     * seeded with enough entropy.
+     */
+    return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+}
+
+/*
+ **************************** Key Functions:  ************************
+ */
+
+/*
+ * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
+ * PKCS5 to do the work.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
+                void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
+{
+    SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
+    CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+    CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+
+    *key_length = 0;
+    iv.data = NULL;
+    iv.len = 0;
+
+    if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+        if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS))) {
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
+        /* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
+        pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
+    } else {
+        if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_PBE_PARAMS))) {
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
+        pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
+    }
+    pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
+    if (pbe_key == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
+    *key_length = pbe_key->len;
+    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
+    pbe_key = NULL;
+
+    if (iv.data) {
+        if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
+        }
+        PORT_Free(iv.data);
+    }
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
+ * the official subset by freebl.
+ */
+static unsigned int
+sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
+{
+    if (primeBits <= 1024) {
+        return 160;
+    } else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
+        return 224;
+    } else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
+        return 256;
+    } else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
+        return 384;
+    } else {
+        return 512;
+    }
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+    SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+    CK_ULONG counter;
+    unsigned int seedBits = 0;
+    unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
+    unsigned int primeBits;
+    unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    PQGParams *params = NULL;
+    PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+    if (attribute == NULL) {
+        attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME);
+        if (attribute == NULL) {
+            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+        } else {
+            primeBits = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+        }
+    } else {
+        primeBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    }
+    if (primeBits < 1024) {
+        j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
+        if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
+            return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+        }
+    }
+
+    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+    if (attribute != NULL) {
+        seedBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    }
+
+    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+    if (attribute != NULL) {
+        subprimeBits = (unsigned int)*(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    }
+
+    /* if P and Q are supplied, we want to generate a new G */
+    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME);
+    if (attribute != NULL) {
+        PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+        arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
+        if (arena == NULL) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        params = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(*params));
+        if (params == NULL) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        params->arena = arena;
+        crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &params->prime, key, CKA_PRIME);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &params->subPrime,
+                                      key, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
+        if (arena == NULL) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        vfy = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(*vfy));
+        if (vfy == NULL) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        vfy->arena = arena;
+        crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &vfy->seed, key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(arena, &vfy->h, key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME);
+        sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+        sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED);
+        sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H);
+    }
+
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS);
+
+    /* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
+    if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
+        if (seedBits == 0) {
+            rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, &params, &vfy);
+        } else {
+            rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j, seedBits / 8, &params, &vfy);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (subprimeBits == 0) {
+            subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
+        }
+        if (seedBits == 0) {
+            seedBits = primeBits;
+        }
+        rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits / 8, &params, &vfy);
+    }
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+            sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+        return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+    }
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
+                                params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+                                params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
+                                params->base.data, params->base.len);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+    counter = vfy->counter;
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER,
+                                &counter, sizeof(counter));
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED,
+                                vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_PQG_H,
+                                vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+
+loser:
+    if (params) {
+        PQG_DestroyParams(params);
+    }
+
+    if (vfy) {
+        PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
+                    CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    switch (mechanism) {
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_RC2;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2 */
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+        case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_RC5;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+#endif
+        case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_RC4;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+        case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+        case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_CDMF;
+            *key_length = 8;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_DES;
+            *key_length = 8;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_DES2;
+            *key_length = 16;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_DES3;
+            *key_length = 24;
+            break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+        case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_SEED;
+            *key_length = 16;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED */
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_AES;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_NSS_CHACHA20;
+            *key_length = 32;
+            break;
+        case CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_CHACHA20;
+            *key_length = 32;
+            break;
+        case CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN:
+            *key_type = CKK_HKDF;
+            if (*key_length == 0)
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+CK_RV
+nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
+{
+    SECItem salt;
+    CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    *pbe = NULL;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+                                                      sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_PBE_PARAMS))) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    params->poolp = arena;
+    params->ivLen = 0;
+    params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
+    params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+    params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
+    params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
+    params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
+    pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+    params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+
+    salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+    salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+    salt.type = siBuffer;
+    rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &params->salt, &salt);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+            params->keyLen = 20;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
+            params->keyLen = 16;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
+            params->keyLen = 16;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA224;
+            params->keyLen = 28;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            params->keyLen = 32;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+            params->keyLen = 48;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+            params->keyLen = 64;
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+    *pbe = params;
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* maybe this should be table driven? */
+static CK_RV
+nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe,
+                   CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    SECOidData *oid;
+    CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
+    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
+    HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+    CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
+    SECItem salt;
+    CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
+
+    *pbe = NULL;
+
+    oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
+    if (oid == NULL) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
+        if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS))) {
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        switch (pbkd2_params->prf) {
+            case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1:
+                hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+                break;
+            case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224:
+                hashType = HASH_AlgSHA224;
+                break;
+            case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256:
+                hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+                break;
+            case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384:
+                hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+                break;
+            case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512:
+                hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+                break;
+            default:
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
+        salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+        iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
+    } else {
+        if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_PBE_PARAMS))) {
+            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+        }
+        pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+        salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
+        salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
+        iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
+    }
+    params = nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, hashType, &salt, iteration);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    switch (params->encAlg) {
+        case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
+            *key_type = CKK_DES;
+            *key_length = params->keyLen;
+            break;
+        case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
+            *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
+            *key_length = params->keyLen;
+            break;
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
+            *key_type = CKK_RC2;
+            *key_length = params->keyLen;
+            break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2 */
+        case SEC_OID_RC4:
+            *key_type = CKK_RC4;
+            *key_length = params->keyLen;
+            break;
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
+            /* key type must already be set */
+            if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                break;
+            }
+            /* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
+             */
+            if (*key_length == 0) {
+                *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
+            }
+            if (*key_length == 0) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                break;
+            }
+            params->keyLen = *key_length;
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+        *pbe = params;
+    } else {
+        nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount,
+                CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
+    CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param = NULL;
+    int i;
+    SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+    unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+    enum { nsc_pbe,
+           nsc_ssl,
+           nsc_bulk,
+           nsc_param,
+           nsc_jpake } key_gen_type;
+    SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+    CK_VERSION *version;
+    /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
+     * generation methods.  We want to beable to read these, but not
+     * produce them any more.  The affected algorithm was 3DES.
+     */
+    PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
+    HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (!slot) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    /*
+     * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+     */
+    key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * load the template values into the object
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)ulCount; i++) {
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+            key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+            continue;
+        }
+        /* some algorithms need keytype specified */
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+            key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
+    /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+    key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
+            checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
+/* fall through */
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
+#endif
+        case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+        case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
+#endif
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
+#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
+        case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
+#endif
+            crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism, &key_type, &key_length);
+            break;
+        case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
+            key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+            key_length = 48;
+            key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
+            break;
+        case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+        case CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
+            key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+            key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+            crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
+            faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
+        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_RC2
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
+#endif
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
+        case CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
+        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
+        case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
+        case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
+        case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
+            key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
+            crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
+            break;
+        case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
+            key_gen_type = nsc_param;
+            key_type = CKK_DSA;
+            objclass = CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
+            crv = CKR_OK;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+            goto jpake1;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            goto jpake1;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+            goto jpake1;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+            goto jpake1;
+        jpake1:
+            key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
+            key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
+            objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+            if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+                pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = CKR_OK;
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
+    if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
+        /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
+         * be... */
+        crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (pbe_param) {
+            nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
+        }
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* if there was no error,
+     * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
+    PORT_Assert(key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE);
+
+    /*
+     * now to the actual key gen.
+     */
+    switch (key_gen_type) {
+        case nsc_pbe:
+            crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
+                                  faultyPBE3DES);
+            nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
+            break;
+        case nsc_ssl:
+            rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_VERSION))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
+            rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
+            crv =
+                NSC_GenerateRandom(0, &rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
+            break;
+        case nsc_bulk:
+            /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
+            do {
+                crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
+            } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf, key_type));
+            break;
+        case nsc_param:
+            /* generate parameters */
+            *buf = 0;
+            crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type, key);
+            break;
+        case nsc_jpake:
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
+                               (CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                               key);
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Add the class, key_type, and value */
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_CLASS, &objclass, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    if (key_length != 0) {
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, key_length);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* get the session */
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle the base object stuff
+     */
+    crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+        *phKey = key->handle;
+    }
+loser:
+    PORT_Memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
+    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
+#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20         /* 160-bits */
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
+ *
+ * This function returns
+ *   CKR_OK               if pairwise consistency check passed
+ *   CKR_GENERAL_ERROR    if pairwise consistency check failed
+ *   other error codes    if paiswise consistency check could not be
+ *                        performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKSlot *slot,
+                              SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+    /*
+     *                      Key type    Mechanism type
+     *                      --------------------------------
+     * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+     *                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+     *
+     * For sign/verify:     CKK_RSA  => CKM_RSA_PKCS
+     *                      CKK_DSA  => CKM_DSA
+     *                      CKK_EC   => CKM_ECDSA
+     *                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+     *
+     * None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
+     *
+     * For derive           CKK_DH   => CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE
+     *                      CKK_EC   => CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE
+     *                      others   => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
+     *
+     * The parameters for these mechanisms is the public key.
+     */
+    CK_MECHANISM mech = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+
+    CK_ULONG modulusLen = 0;
+    CK_ULONG subPrimeLen = 0;
+    PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
+    unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
+    unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
+    CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
+    unsigned char *ciphertext;
+    unsigned char *text_compared;
+    CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
+    CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
+    CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+    /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
+    /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
+    unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
+    unsigned char *signature;
+    CK_ULONG signature_length;
+
+    if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
+        SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+
+        /* Get modulus length of private key. */
+        attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+        if (attribute == NULL) {
+            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+        modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+        if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+            modulusLen--;
+        }
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    } else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
+        SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+
+        /* Get subprime length of private key. */
+        attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+        if (attribute == NULL) {
+            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+        subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+        if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
+            subPrimeLen--;
+        }
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    }
+
+    /**************************************************/
+    /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
+    /**************************************************/
+
+    isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
+
+    /*
+     * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
+     * with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
+     */
+    if (isEncryptable) {
+        if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
+            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+        bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
+        mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+
+        /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
+        ciphertext = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
+        if (ciphertext == NULL) {
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
+        crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        /* Encrypt using the public key. */
+        crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
+                          known_message,
+                          PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
+                          ciphertext,
+                          &bytes_encrypted);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
+        bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+
+        /*
+         * If there was a failure, the plaintext
+         * goes at the end, therefore . . .
+         */
+        text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
+
+        /*
+         * Check to ensure that ciphertext does
+         * NOT EQUAL known input message text
+         * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
+         */
+        if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
+                        bytes_compared) == 0) {
+            /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+            PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
+        crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+
+        /*
+         * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
+         * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
+         */
+        bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
+
+        /*
+         * Decrypt using the private key.
+         * NOTE:  No need to reset the
+         *        value of bytes_encrypted.
+         */
+        crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
+                          ciphertext,
+                          bytes_encrypted,
+                          plaintext,
+                          &bytes_decrypted);
+
+        /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
+        PORT_Free(ciphertext);
+
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check to ensure that the output plaintext
+         * does EQUAL known input message text.
+         */
+        if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
+            (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
+                         PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
+            /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**********************************************/
+    /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
+    /**********************************************/
+
+    canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
+    /* Unfortunately CKA_SIGN is always true in lg dbs. We have to check the
+     * actual curve to determine if we can do sign/verify. */
+    if (canSignVerify && keyType == CKK_EC) {
+        NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(privateKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
+        if (privKey && privKey->u.ec.ecParams.name == ECCurve25519) {
+            canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (canSignVerify) {
+        /* Determine length of signature. */
+        switch (keyType) {
+            case CKK_RSA:
+                signature_length = modulusLen;
+                mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+                break;
+            case CKK_DSA:
+                signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+                pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
+                mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
+                break;
+            case CKK_EC:
+                signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
+                mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+                break;
+            default:
+                return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* Allocate space for signature data. */
+        signature = (unsigned char *)PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
+        if (signature == NULL) {
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
+        crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(signature);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
+                       known_digest,
+                       pairwise_digest_length,
+                       signature,
+                       &signature_length);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(signature);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        /* detect trivial signing transforms */
+        if ((signature_length >= pairwise_digest_length) &&
+            (PORT_Memcmp(known_digest, signature + (signature_length - pairwise_digest_length), pairwise_digest_length) == 0)) {
+            PORT_Free(signature);
+            return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
+        crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_Free(signature);
+            return crv;
+        }
+
+        crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
+                         known_digest,
+                         pairwise_digest_length,
+                         signature,
+                         signature_length);
+
+        /* Free signature data. */
+        PORT_Free(signature);
+
+        if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
+            (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
+            return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+        }
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**********************************************/
+    /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation  */
+    /**********************************************/
+
+    isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
+
+    if (isDerivable) {
+        SFTKAttribute *pubAttribute = NULL;
+        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKey;
+        PRBool isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+        CK_RV crv2;
+        CK_OBJECT_CLASS secret = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+        CK_KEY_TYPE generic = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+        CK_ULONG keyLen = 128;
+        CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+        CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
+            { CKA_CLASS, &secret, sizeof(secret) },
+            { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &generic, sizeof(generic) },
+            { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &keyLen, sizeof(keyLen) },
+            { CKA_DERIVE, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue) }
+        };
+        CK_ULONG templateCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template);
+        CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS ecParams;
+
+        crv = CKR_OK; /*paranoia, already get's set before we drop to the end */
+        /* FIPS 140-2 requires we verify that the resulting key is a valid key.
+         * The easiest way to do this is to do a derive operation, which checks
+         * the validity of the key */
+
+        switch (keyType) {
+            case CKK_DH:
+                mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
+                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
+                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+                }
+                mech.pParameter = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+                mech.ulParameterLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+                break;
+            case CKK_EC:
+                mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
+                pubAttribute = sftk_FindAttribute(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT);
+                if (pubAttribute == NULL) {
+                    return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+                }
+                ecParams.kdf = CKD_NULL;
+                ecParams.ulSharedDataLen = 0;
+                ecParams.pSharedData = NULL;
+                ecParams.ulPublicDataLen = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+                ecParams.pPublicData = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+                mech.pParameter = &ecParams;
+                mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(ecParams);
+                break;
+            default:
+                return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        crv = NSC_DeriveKey(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle, template, templateCount, &newKey);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+            return crv;
+        }
+        /* FIPS requires full validation, but in fipx mode NSC_Derive
+         * only does partial validation with approved primes, now handle
+         * full validation */
+        if (isFIPS && keyType == CKK_DH) {
+            SECItem pubKey;
+            SECItem prime;
+            SECItem subPrime;
+            const SECItem *subPrimePtr = &subPrime;
+
+            pubKey.data = pubAttribute->attrib.pValue;
+            pubKey.len = pubAttribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+            prime.data = subPrime.data = NULL;
+            prime.len = subPrime.len = 0;
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto done;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &prime, privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            /* we ignore the return code an only look at the length */
+            if (subPrime.len == 0) {
+                /* subprime not supplied, In this case look it up.
+                 * This only works with approved primes, but in FIPS mode
+                 * that's the only kine of prime that will get here */
+                subPrimePtr = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&prime, isFIPS);
+                if (subPrimePtr == NULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+                    goto done;
+                }
+            }
+            if (!KEA_Verify(&pubKey, &prime, (SECItem *)subPrimePtr)) {
+                crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+            }
+        done:
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&prime, PR_FALSE);
+        }
+        /* clean up before we return */
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(pubAttribute);
+        crv2 = NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, newKey);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv;
+        }
+        if (crv2 != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv2;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
+ * creating new key objects. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GenerateKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
+                    CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
+                    CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
+                    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
+{
+    SFTKObject *publicKey, *privateKey;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+    int i;
+    SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+    unsigned int bitSize;
+
+    /* RSA */
+    int public_modulus_bits = 0;
+    SECItem pubExp;
+    RSAPrivateKey *rsaPriv;
+
+    /* DSA */
+    PQGParams pqgParam;
+    DHParams dhParam;
+    DSAPrivateKey *dsaPriv;
+
+    /* Diffie Hellman */
+    DHPrivateKey *dhPriv;
+
+    /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
+    SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */
+    ECPrivateKey *ecPriv;
+    ECParams *ecParams;
+
+    /* Kyber */
+    CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE ckKyberParamSet;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (!slot) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    /*
+     * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+     */
+    publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+    if (publicKey == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * load the template values into the publicKey
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+        if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
+            public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET) {
+            ckKyberParamSet = *(CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
+                                    sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+    if (privateKey == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    /*
+     * now load the private key template
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
+        if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
+                                    sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_CLASS);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+    sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+
+    /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
+    switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            /* format the keys */
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_1);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_2);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_1);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_2);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_COEFFICIENT);
+            key_type = CKK_RSA;
+            if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
+                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* extract the exponent */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pubExp, publicKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
+            if (bitSize < 2) {
+                crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pubExp, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pubExp, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pubExp, PR_FALSE);
+            if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
+                if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+                    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+            /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_MODULUS,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_1,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME_2,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto kpg_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
+        kpg_done:
+            /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
+            PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+            key_type = CKK_DSA;
+
+            /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.prime, publicKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.subPrime, publicKey,
+                                          CKA_SUBPRIME);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &pqgParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * these are checked by DSA_NewKey
+             */
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
+                                           pqgParam.subPrime.len);
+            if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data, pqgParam.prime.len);
+            if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data, pqgParam.base.len);
+            if ((bitSize < 2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Generate the key */
+            rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
+
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.subPrime, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&pqgParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+                    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* store the generated key into the attributes */
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto dsagn_done;
+
+            /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto dsagn_done;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
+
+        dsagn_done:
+            /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+            PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            key_type = CKK_DH;
+
+            /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
+                                          CKA_PRIME);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data, dhParam.prime.len);
+            if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+            bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data, dhParam.base.len);
+            if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.prime, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhParam.base, PR_FALSE);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+                    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto dhgn_done;
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto dhgn_done;
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
+
+        dhgn_done:
+            /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+            PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE);
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            key_type = CKK_EC;
+
+            /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
+                                          CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&ecEncodedParams, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
+            rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&ecEncodedParams, PR_FALSE);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+            rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
+                    sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT") ||
+                ecParams->type != ec_params_named) {
+                PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+                crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                            sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+            } else {
+                PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
+                SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+                                                       &ecPriv->publicValue,
+                                                       SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+                if (!pubValue) {
+                    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                    goto ecgn_done;
+                }
+                crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                            sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+            }
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto ecgn_done;
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto ecgn_done;
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
+        ecgn_done:
+            /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
+            PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_KYBER_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            key_type = CKK_NSS_KYBER;
+
+            SECItem privKey = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+            SECItem pubKey = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+            KyberParams kyberParams = sftk_kyber_PK11ParamToInternal(ckKyberParamSet);
+            if (!sftk_kyber_AllocPrivKeyItem(kyberParams, &privKey)) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            if (!sftk_kyber_AllocPubKeyItem(kyberParams, &pubKey)) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            rv = Kyber_NewKey(kyberParams, NULL, &privKey, &pubKey);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&pubKey));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET,
+                                        &ckKyberParamSet, sizeof(CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&privKey));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET,
+                                        &ckKyberParamSet, sizeof(CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto kyber_done;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_NSS_DB,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&pubKey));
+        kyber_done:
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&privKey, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_FreeItem(&pubKey, PR_FALSE);
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
+     *  on errors and clean up at the bottom */
+    session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
+                    /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
+    do {
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_CLASS, &privClass,
+                                    sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_CLASS, &pubClass,
+                                    sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+                                    sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+                                    sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+        session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+        if (session == NULL)
+            crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    } while (0);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
+     */
+    crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey, session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
+     * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
+     * created and linked.
+     */
+    crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey, session);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        return crv;
+    }
+    if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+                                  &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(publicKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
+                                  &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+                                  &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(publicKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+                                  &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    }
+
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && key_type != CKK_NSS_KYBER) {
+        /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
+        crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession, slot,
+                                            publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
+                char msg[128];
+                PR_snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+                            "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
+                            "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
+                            "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
+                            (PRUint32)hSession, (PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
+                            (PRUint32)crv);
+                sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, publicKey->handle);
+        sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+        NSC_DestroyObject(hSession, privateKey->handle);
+        sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
+    *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
+    sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
+    sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static SECItem *
+sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
+{
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+    SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+    void *dummy, *param = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+    SECItem *fordebug;
+#endif
+    int savelen;
+
+    if (!key) {
+        *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+    if (!attribute) {
+        *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
+    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+    if (!lk) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */
+    if (!arena) {
+        *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+                                                      sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+    if (!pki) {
+        *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    pki->arena = arena;
+
+    param = NULL;
+    switch (lk->keyType) {
+        case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+            prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+            dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+                                       nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
+
+            /* determine RSA key type from the CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO if present */
+            attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO);
+            if (attribute) {
+                NSSLOWKEYSubjectPublicKeyInfo *publicKeyInfo;
+                SECItem spki;
+
+                spki.data = attribute->attrib.pValue;
+                spki.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+                publicKeyInfo = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+                                                 sizeof(NSSLOWKEYSubjectPublicKeyInfo));
+                if (!publicKeyInfo) {
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+                    *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                    rv = SECFailure;
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, publicKeyInfo,
+                                            nsslowkey_SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate,
+                                            &spki);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+                    *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                algorithm = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&publicKeyInfo->algorithm);
+                if (algorithm != SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION &&
+                    algorithm != SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE) {
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+                    rv = SECFailure;
+                    *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                param = SECITEM_DupItem(&publicKeyInfo->algorithm.parameters);
+                if (!param) {
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+                    rv = SECFailure;
+                    *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+            } else {
+                /* default to PKCS #1 */
+                algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+            }
+            break;
+        case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+            prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
+            dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+                                       nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
+            prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
+            param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
+                                       nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
+            algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+            break;
+        case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+            prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
+            /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
+             * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
+             * immediately after.
+             *
+             * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
+             * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
+             * length before encoding and restore it later.
+             */
+            lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
+            savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
+            lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
+            dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
+                                       nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
+            lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
+            lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+            fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
+            SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
+                      fordebug);
+#endif
+
+            param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+
+            algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+            break;
+        case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+        default:
+            dummy = NULL;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
+        *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
+                               (SECItem *)param);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
+                                  NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
+    if (!dummy) {
+        *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
+                                    nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
+    *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef EC_DEBUG
+    fordebug = encodedKey;
+    SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
+              fordebug);
+#endif
+loser:
+    if (arena) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+
+    if (lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
+        nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
+    }
+
+    if (param) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem *)param, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return encodedKey;
+}
+
+/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
+ * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
+{
+    switch (crv) {
+        case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID:
+            crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+            CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
+            CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
+            CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKAttribute *attribute;
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    switch (key->objclass) {
+        case CKO_SECRET_KEY: {
+            SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+            SECItem pText;
+
+            attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+
+            if (attribute == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+                                 CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            pText.type = siBuffer;
+            pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
+            pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+            /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
+            crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
+                break;
+            if (context->blockSize > 1) {
+                unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
+                if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
+                    /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
+                    ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
+                    ** a full block.
+                    */
+                    pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
+                    pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
+                    if (pText.data)
+                        memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
+                               attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
+                    else {
+                        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
+                              pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+            /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
+             * we are just getting the size */
+            if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+                CK_RV lcrv;
+                lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context,
+                                       SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+                sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+                if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
+                    sftk_FreeContext(context);
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
+                PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: {
+            SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
+            SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
+
+            if (!bpki) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
+                                 CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
+                              pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
+            /* always force a finalize */
+            if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
+                CK_RV lcrv;
+                lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context,
+                                       SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_FALSE, NULL);
+                sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
+                if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
+                    sftk_FreeContext(context);
+                }
+            }
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+            break;
+    }
+    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
+ */
+static SECStatus
+sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
+{
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
+    void *paramDest = NULL;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
+    NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
+    if (!arena) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+                                                      sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
+    if (!pki) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
+                                                  sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
+    if (lpk == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    lpk->arena = arena;
+
+    switch (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE:
+            keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
+            paramTemplate = NULL;
+            paramDest = NULL;
+            lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
+            prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+            break;
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+            keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
+            paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
+            paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
+            lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
+            prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
+            prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
+            break;
+        /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+            keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
+            paramTemplate = NULL;
+            paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
+            lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
+            prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
+            prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
+            break;
+        default:
+            keyTemplate = NULL;
+            paramTemplate = NULL;
+            paramDest = NULL;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (!keyTemplate) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
+    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
+
+    if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
+        /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
+        lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
+        rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
+                              &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
+                              &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    if (paramDest && paramTemplate) {
+        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
+                                    &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+    switch (lpk->keyType) {
+        case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
+            keyType = CKK_RSA;
+            if (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NSS_DB)) {
+                sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NSS_DB);
+            }
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+                                        sizeof(keyType));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
+            break;
+        case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
+            keyType = CKK_DSA;
+            crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NSS_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+                                        sizeof(keyType));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            break;
+#ifdef notdef
+        case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
+            template = dhTemplate;
+            templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+            keyType = CKK_DH;
+            break;
+#endif
+        /* what about fortezza??? */
+        case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
+            keyType = CKK_EC;
+            crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NSS_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
+                                        sizeof(keyType));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
+                                        sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
+                                        sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* For RSA-PSS, record the original algorithm parameters so
+     * they can be encrypted altoghether when wrapping */
+    if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm) == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE) {
+        NSSLOWKEYSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
+        NSSLOWKEYPublicKey pubk;
+        SECItem *publicKeyInfo;
+
+        memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(NSSLOWKEYSubjectPublicKeyInfo));
+        rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(arena, &spki.algorithm, &pki->algorithm);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        prepare_low_rsa_pub_key_for_asn1(&pubk);
+
+        rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk.u.rsa.modulus, &lpk->u.rsa.modulus);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk.u.rsa.publicExponent, &lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        if (SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &spki.subjectPublicKey,
+                               &pubk, nsslowkey_RSAPublicKeyTemplate) == NULL) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        publicKeyInfo = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL,
+                                           &spki, nsslowkey_SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate);
+        if (!publicKeyInfo) {
+            crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO,
+                                    sftk_item_expand(publicKeyInfo));
+    }
+
+loser:
+    if (lpk) {
+        nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+              CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
+              CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
+              CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+              CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+    SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    int i;
+    CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+    SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+    SECItem bpki;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (!slot) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    /*
+     * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+     */
+    key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * load the template values into the object
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+            key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
+            target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+        }
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hUnwrappingKey, CKA_UNWRAP,
+                         CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+    }
+
+    /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
+     * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
+     * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
+    buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(ulWrappedKeyLen);
+    bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
+
+    crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        PORT_Free(buf);
+        return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
+    }
+
+    switch (target_type) {
+        case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
+            if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
+                key_length = bsize;
+            }
+            if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* add the value */
+            crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, key_length);
+            break;
+        case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
+            bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
+            bpki.len = bsize;
+            crv = CKR_OK;
+            if (sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* get the session */
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    /* mark the key as FIPS if the previous operation was all FIPS */
+    key->isFIPS = session->lastOpWasFIPS;
+
+    /*
+     * handle the base object stuff
+     */
+    crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+    *phKey = key->handle;
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
+ * details of each of these key creation.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
+                 PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
+                 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
+{
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+
+    /*
+     * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+     */
+    *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+    key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+
+    crv = sftk_CopyObject(key, baseKey);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+    if (isMacKey) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_ENCRYPT, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_WRAP, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            goto loser;
+    }
+    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, keyBlock, keySize);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* get the session */
+    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    *keyHandle = key->handle;
+loser:
+    if (key)
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
+ * This is the routine that will do it..
+ */
+static void
+sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
+                 CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial)
+{
+    if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
+    }
+    if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
+    }
+    if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
+    }
+    if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
+ * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
+ * semantics.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey, SFTKObject *destKey,
+                          PRBool canBeData)
+{
+    PRBool hasSensitive;
+    PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
+    CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE;
+    PRBool hasExtractable;
+    PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
+    CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    SFTKAttribute *att;
+    PRBool isData = PR_TRUE;
+
+    if (canBeData) {
+        CK_OBJECT_CLASS objClass;
+
+        /* if the target key is actually data, don't set the unexpected
+         * attributes */
+        crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(destKey, CKA_CLASS, &objClass);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv;
+        }
+        if (objClass == CKO_DATA) {
+            return CKR_OK;
+        }
+
+        /* if the base key is data, it doesn't have sensitive attributes,
+         * allow the destKey to get it's own */
+        crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(baseKey, CKA_CLASS, &objClass);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            return crv;
+        }
+        if (objClass == CKO_DATA) {
+            isData = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
+    att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey, CKA_SENSITIVE);
+    if (att) {
+        hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
+        sensitive = (PRBool) * (CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+    }
+
+    hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
+    att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+    if (att) {
+        hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
+        extractable = (PRBool) * (CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+    }
+
+    /* don't make a key more accessible */
+    if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey, CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
+        (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
+        return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+    }
+    if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
+        (extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
+        return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+    }
+
+    /* inherit parent's sensitivity */
+    if (!hasSensitive) {
+        att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey, CKA_SENSITIVE);
+        if (att != NULL) {
+            crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,
+                                        sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+        } else if (isData) {
+            crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey, CKA_SENSITIVE,
+                                        &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse));
+        } else {
+            return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        }
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+    }
+    if (!hasExtractable) {
+        att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
+        if (att != NULL) {
+            crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,
+                                        sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+        } else if (isData) {
+            crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE,
+                                        &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue));
+        } else {
+            return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        }
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
+     * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
+     * something special. */
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
+ */
+unsigned long
+sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+    switch (keyType) {
+        case CKK_CDMF:
+            return 8;
+        case CKK_DES:
+            return 8;
+        case CKK_DES2:
+            return 16;
+        case CKK_DES3:
+            return 24;
+        /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Inputs:
+ *  key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
+ *  SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
+ *  SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
+ *  SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
+ *  Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
+ *  HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
+ * Output:
+ *  key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
+                            CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+                            SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
+                            CK_ULONG HashLen)
+{
+    unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
+    PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    /* Check that key_len isn't too long.  The maximum key length could be
+     * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
+     * to a maximum value of 255. */
+    if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
+        return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+    if (SharedInfo == NULL)
+        SharedInfoLen = 0;
+
+    buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
+    buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
+    if (buffer == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    max_counter = key_len / HashLen;
+    if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
+        max_counter++;
+
+    output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
+    if (output_buffer == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
+     * where Counter is 0x00000001 */
+    PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
+    buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
+    buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
+    buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
+    buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
+    if (SharedInfo) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < max_counter; i++) {
+        rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            /* 'Hash' should not fail. */
+            crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        /* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
+        buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
+    }
+
+    PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+    if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
+        PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
+    }
+    *key = output_buffer;
+
+    return CKR_OK;
+
+loser:
+    if (buffer) {
+        PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
+    }
+    if (output_buffer) {
+        PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
+                    SECItem *SharedSecret,
+                    CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
+                    CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
+{
+    if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
+        return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+                                           SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
+    else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
+        return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+                                           SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
+    else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
+        return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+                                           SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
+    else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
+        return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+                                           SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
+    else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
+        return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
+                                           SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
+    else
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Handle the derive from a block encryption cipher
+ */
+CK_RV
+sftk_DeriveEncrypt(SFTKCipher encrypt, void *cipherInfo,
+                   int blockSize, SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG keySize,
+                   unsigned char *data, CK_ULONG len)
+{
+    /* large enough for a 512-bit key */
+    unsigned char tmpdata[SFTK_MAX_DERIVE_KEY_SIZE];
+    SECStatus rv;
+    unsigned int outLen;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    if ((len % blockSize) != 0) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+    if (len > SFTK_MAX_DERIVE_KEY_SIZE) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+    if (keySize && (len < keySize)) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+    if (keySize == 0) {
+        keySize = len;
+    }
+
+    rv = (*encrypt)(cipherInfo, &tmpdata, &outLen, len, data, len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, tmpdata, keySize);
+    PORT_Memset(tmpdata, 0, sizeof tmpdata);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+CK_RV
+sftk_HKDF(CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR params, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+          SFTKObject *sourceKey, const unsigned char *sourceKeyBytes,
+          int sourceKeyLen, SFTKObject *key, unsigned char *outKeyBytes,
+          int keySize, PRBool canBeData, PRBool isFIPS)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKAttribute *saltKey_att = NULL;
+    const SECHashObject *rawHash;
+    unsigned hashLen;
+    unsigned genLen = 0;
+    unsigned char hashbuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+    unsigned char keyBlock[9 * SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *keyBlockAlloc = NULL;    /* allocated keyBlock */
+    unsigned char *keyBlockData = keyBlock; /* pointer to current keyBlock */
+    const unsigned char *prk;               /* psuedo-random key */
+    CK_ULONG prkLen;
+    const unsigned char *okm; /* output keying material */
+    HASH_HashType hashType = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->prfHashMechanism);
+    SFTKObject *saltKey = NULL;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    /* Spec says it should be the base hash, but also accept the HMAC */
+    if (hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+        hashType = sftk_HMACMechanismToHash(params->prfHashMechanism);
+    }
+    rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
+    if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof(hashbuf)) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+    hashLen = rawHash->length;
+
+    if ((!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
+        (params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
+        (params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+    if ((params->bExpand && keySize == 0) ||
+        (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
+        (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
+        return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+    }
+
+    /* sourceKey is NULL if we are called from the POST, skip the
+     * sensitiveCheck */
+    if (sourceKey != NULL) {
+        crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, canBeData);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
+    if (params->bExtract) {
+        CK_BYTE *salt;
+        CK_ULONG saltLen;
+        HMACContext *hmac;
+        unsigned int bufLen;
+
+        switch (params->ulSaltType) {
+            case CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL:
+                saltLen = hashLen;
+                salt = hashbuf;
+                memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
+                break;
+            case CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA:
+                salt = params->pSalt;
+                saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
+                if ((salt == NULL) || (params->ulSaltLen == 0)) {
+                    return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                }
+                break;
+            case CKF_HKDF_SALT_KEY:
+                /* lookup key */
+                session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+                if (session == NULL) {
+                    return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                }
+
+                saltKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(params->hSaltKey, session);
+                sftk_FreeSession(session);
+                if (saltKey == NULL) {
+                    return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                }
+                /* if the base key is not fips, but the salt key is, the
+                 * resulting key can be fips */
+                if (isFIPS && (key->isFIPS == 0) && (saltKey->isFIPS == 1)) {
+                    CK_MECHANISM mech;
+                    mech.mechanism = CKM_HKDF_DERIVE;
+                    mech.pParameter = params;
+                    mech.ulParameterLen = sizeof(*params);
+                    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(saltKey->slot, &mech,
+                                                       CKA_DERIVE, saltKey);
+                }
+                saltKey_att = sftk_FindAttribute(saltKey, CKA_VALUE);
+                if (saltKey_att == NULL) {
+                    sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+                    return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                }
+                /* save the resulting salt */
+                salt = saltKey_att->attrib.pValue;
+                saltLen = saltKey_att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+                break;
+            default:
+                return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+        }
+
+        hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
+        if (saltKey_att) {
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(saltKey_att);
+        }
+        if (saltKey) {
+            sftk_FreeObject(saltKey);
+        }
+        if (!hmac) {
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        }
+        HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+        HMAC_Update(hmac, sourceKeyBytes, sourceKeyLen);
+        HMAC_Finish(hmac, hashbuf, &bufLen, sizeof(hashbuf));
+        HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+        PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
+        prk = hashbuf;
+        prkLen = bufLen;
+    } else {
+        /* PRK = base key value */
+        prk = sourceKeyBytes;
+        prkLen = sourceKeyLen;
+    }
+
+    /* HKDF-Expand */
+    if (!params->bExpand) {
+        okm = prk;
+        keySize = genLen = hashLen;
+    } else {
+        /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
+         * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
+         * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
+         */
+        HMACContext *hmac;
+        CK_BYTE bi;
+        unsigned iterations;
+
+        genLen = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen);
+        iterations = genLen / hashLen;
+
+        if (genLen > sizeof(keyBlock)) {
+            keyBlockAlloc = PORT_Alloc(genLen);
+            if (keyBlockAlloc == NULL) {
+                return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+            }
+            keyBlockData = keyBlockAlloc;
+        }
+        hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
+        if (hmac == NULL) {
+            PORT_Free(keyBlockAlloc);
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        }
+        for (bi = 1; bi <= iterations && bi > 0; ++bi) {
+            unsigned len;
+            HMAC_Begin(hmac);
+            if (bi > 1) {
+                HMAC_Update(hmac, &keyBlockData[(bi - 2) * hashLen], hashLen);
+            }
+            if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
+                HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
+            }
+            HMAC_Update(hmac, &bi, 1);
+            HMAC_Finish(hmac, &keyBlockData[(bi - 1) * hashLen], &len,
+                        hashLen);
+            PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
+        }
+        HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
+        okm = &keyBlockData[0];
+    }
+    /* key material = okm */
+    crv = CKR_OK;
+    if (key) {
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
+    } else {
+        PORT_Assert(outKeyBytes != NULL);
+        PORT_Memcpy(outKeyBytes, okm, keySize);
+    }
+    PORT_Memset(keyBlockData, 0, genLen);
+    PORT_Memset(hashbuf, 0, sizeof(hashbuf));
+    PORT_Free(keyBlockAlloc);
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL Key generation given pre master secret
+ */
+#define NUM_MIXERS 9
+static const char *const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
+    "A",
+    "BB",
+    "CCC",
+    "DDDD",
+    "EEEEE",
+    "FFFFFF",
+    "GGGGGGG",
+    "HHHHHHHH",
+    "IIIIIIIII"
+};
+#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
+#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
+
+/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DeriveKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+              CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
+              CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
+              CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
+    SFTKObject *key;
+    SFTKObject *sourceKey;
+    SFTKAttribute *att = NULL;
+    SFTKAttribute *att2 = NULL;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    SHA1Context *sha;
+    MD5Context *md5;
+    MD2Context *md2;
+    CK_ULONG macSize;
+    CK_ULONG tmpKeySize;
+    CK_ULONG IVSize;
+    CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+    CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
+    PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE;
+    HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    int i;
+    unsigned int outLen;
+    unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+    PRBool isFIPS;
+    HASH_HashType hashType;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMech;
+    PRBool extractValue = PR_TRUE;
+    CK_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS ikeAppB;
+    CK_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *pIkeAppB;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    if (!slot) {
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    if (!pMechanism) {
+        return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+    }
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = pMechanism->mechanism;
+
+    /*
+     * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
+     */
+    if (phKey)
+        *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+    key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    isFIPS = sftk_isFIPS(slot->slotID);
+
+    /*
+     * load the template values into the object
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)ulAttributeCount; i++) {
+        crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
+            keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+        }
+        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+            keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
+        }
+    }
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    if (keySize == 0) {
+        keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
+    }
+
+    switch (mechanism) {
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1:   /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
+            extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+            classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV:
+            extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+            classType = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+            break;
+        case CKM_HKDF_DATA:                              /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA:  /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA:
+            classType = CKO_DATA;
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1:   /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
+            extractValue = PR_FALSE;
+        /* fall through */
+        default:
+            classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+    }
+
+    crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_CLASS, &classType, sizeof(classType));
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* look up the base key we're deriving with */
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey, session);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    /* is this eventually succeeds, lastOpWasFIPS will be set the resulting key's
+     * FIPS state below. */
+    session->lastOpWasFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+    if (sourceKey == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    if (extractValue) {
+        /* get the value of the base key */
+        att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+        if (att == NULL) {
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+            return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+        }
+    }
+    key->isFIPS = sftk_operationIsFIPS(slot, pMechanism, CKA_DERIVE, sourceKey);
+
+    switch (mechanism) {
+        /* get a public key from a private key. nsslowkey_ConvertToPublickey()
+         * will generate the public portion if it doesn't already exist. */
+        case CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV: {
+            NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+            NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+            int error;
+
+            crv = sftk_GetULongAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* privKey is stored in sourceKey and will be destroyed when
+             * the sourceKey is freed. */
+            privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, keyType, &crv);
+            if (privKey == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+            pubKey = nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(privKey);
+            if (pubKey == NULL) {
+                error = PORT_GetError();
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_PutPubKey(key, sourceKey, keyType, pubKey);
+            nsslowkey_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+            break;
+        }
+        case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE:
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+                sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_ike_prf(hSession, att,
+                               (CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter, key);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE:
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+                sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_ike1_prf(hSession, att,
+                                (CK_NSS_IKE1_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                                key, keySize);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE:
+            pIkeAppB = (CK_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen ==
+                sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)) {
+                ikeAppB.prfMechanism = *(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                ikeAppB.bHasKeygxy = PR_FALSE;
+                ikeAppB.hKeygxy = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+                ikeAppB.pExtraData = NULL;
+                ikeAppB.ulExtraDataLen = 0;
+                pIkeAppB = &ikeAppB;
+            } else if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+                       sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE1_APP_B_PRF_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_ike1_appendix_b_prf(hSession, att, pIkeAppB, key,
+                                           keySize);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE:
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
+                sizeof(CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_ike_prf_plus(hSession, att,
+                                    (CK_NSS_IKE_PRF_PLUS_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                                    key, keySize);
+            break;
+        /*
+         * generate the master secret
+         */
+        case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
+        case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
+        case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: {
+            CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
+            SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+            unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+
+            if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) ||
+                (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master =
+                    (CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
+                if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) ||
+                       (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) {
+                tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            }
+
+            if ((mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
+                (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+                isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+            if ((mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+                (mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
+                (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256) ||
+                (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
+                isDH = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+
+            /* first do the consistency checks */
+            if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+            if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+                                   CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+                if (att2)
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+            if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* finally do the key gen */
+            ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
+                              pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+            if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
+                SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+                rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)att->attrib.pValue;
+                /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
+                if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
+                    ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
+                    ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
+                } else {
+                    ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
+                    ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
+                }
+            }
+            if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
+                        ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+            PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+                        ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+            if (isTLS) {
+                SECStatus status;
+                SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+                SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+                SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+                crsr.data = crsrdata;
+                crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
+                master.data = key_block;
+                master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+                pms.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+                pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+                if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
+                    status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "master secret",
+                                        &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+                } else {
+                    status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+                }
+                if (status != SECSuccess) {
+                    PORT_Memset(crsrdata, 0, sizeof crsrdata);
+                    crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* now allocate the hash contexts */
+                md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+                if (md5 == NULL) {
+                    PORT_Memset(crsrdata, 0, sizeof crsrdata);
+                    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                    break;
+                }
+                sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+                if (sha == NULL) {
+                    PORT_Memset(crsrdata, 0, sizeof crsrdata);
+                    PORT_Free(md5);
+                    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                    break;
+                }
+                for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+                    SHA1_Begin(sha);
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char *)mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
+                    SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+                    PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+
+                    MD5_Begin(md5);
+                    MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                               att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+                    MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+                    MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i * MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+                    PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+                }
+                PORT_Free(md5);
+                PORT_Free(sha);
+                PORT_Memset(crsrdata, 0, sizeof crsrdata);
+                PORT_Memset(sha_out, 0, sizeof sha_out);
+            }
+
+            /* store the results */
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+            PORT_Memset(key_block, 0, sizeof key_block);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+            if (isTLS) {
+                /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
+                /* XXX This seems like a hack.   But SFTK_Derive only accepts
+                 * one "operation" argument. */
+                crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                    break;
+                crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                    break;
+                /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
+                crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                    break;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /* Extended master key derivation [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash] */
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: {
+            CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ems_params;
+            SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
+            SECStatus status;
+            SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+            SECItem seed = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+            SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+            ems_params = (CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
+                             pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+            /* First do the consistency checks */
+            if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
+                (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+            if ((att2 == NULL) ||
+                (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+                if (att2)
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+            if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Do the key derivation */
+            pms.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+            pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+            seed.data = ems_params->pSessionHash;
+            seed.len = ems_params->ulSessionHashLen;
+            master.data = key_block;
+            master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+            if (ems_params->prfHashMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
+                /*
+                 * In this case, the session hash is the concatenation of SHA-1
+                 * and MD5, so it should be 36 bytes long.
+                 */
+                if (seed.len != MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH) {
+                    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "extended master secret",
+                                 &seed, &master, isFIPS);
+            } else {
+                const SECHashObject *hashObj;
+
+                tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism);
+                if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(tlsPrfHash);
+                if (seed.len != hashObj->length) {
+                    crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "extended master secret",
+                                    &seed, &master, isFIPS);
+            }
+            if (status != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Reflect the version if required */
+            if (ems_params->pVersion) {
+                SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+                rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)att->attrib.pValue;
+                /* don't leak more key material than necessary for SSL to work */
+                if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
+                    ems_params->pVersion->major = 0xff;
+                    ems_params->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
+                } else {
+                    ems_params->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
+                    ems_params->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Store the results */
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block,
+                                      SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+            PORT_Memset(key_block, 0, sizeof key_block);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
+        case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: {
+            CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
+            CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *ssl3_keys_out;
+            CK_ULONG effKeySize;
+            unsigned int block_needed;
+            unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys =
+                    (CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                tlsPrfHash = sftk_GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
+                if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+            } else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
+                tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            }
+
+            if (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
+                isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+            if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
+                                   CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
+                if (att2)
+                    sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
+                break;
+            }
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+            md5 = MD5_NewContext();
+            if (md5 == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            sha = SHA1_NewContext();
+            if (sha == NULL) {
+                MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS))) {
+                MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+                SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
+                        ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+            PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
+                        ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+            /*
+             * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
+             */
+            ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+            ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+            ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+            ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+            ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+            /*
+             * How much key material do we need?
+             */
+            macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits / 8;
+            effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits / 8;
+            IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits / 8;
+            if (keySize == 0) {
+                effKeySize = keySize;
+            }
+
+            /* bIsExport must be false. */
+            if (ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
+                MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+                SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+                PORT_Memset(srcrdata, 0, sizeof srcrdata);
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + IVSize);
+            PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
+            if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
+                block_needed = sizeof key_block;
+
+            /*
+             * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
+             * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
+             */
+            if (isTLS) {
+                SECStatus status;
+                SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+                SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+                SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+                srcr.data = srcrdata;
+                srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
+                keyblk.data = key_block;
+                keyblk.len = block_needed;
+                master.data = (unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue;
+                master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
+
+                if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
+                    status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &master, "key expansion",
+                                        &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+                } else {
+                    status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
+                                     isFIPS);
+                }
+                if (status != SECSuccess) {
+                    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+                }
+            } else {
+                unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
+                /* key_block =
+                 *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
+                 *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+                 *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
+                 *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+                 *     MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
+                 *                      ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+                 *     [...];
+                 */
+                for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
+                    SHA1_Begin(sha);
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char *)mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+                    SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
+                    SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+                    PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+                    MD5_Begin(md5);
+                    MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                               att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+                    MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
+                    MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i * MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+                    PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+                    block_bytes += outLen;
+                }
+                PORT_Memset(sha_out, 0, sizeof sha_out);
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * Put the key material where it goes.
+             */
+            i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
+
+            /*
+             * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
+             * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+             */
+            crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_TRUE, &key_block[i], macSize,
+                                   &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+
+            i += macSize;
+
+            /*
+             * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+             */
+            crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_TRUE, &key_block[i], macSize,
+                                   &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+            }
+            i += macSize;
+
+            if (keySize) {
+                /*
+                ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
+                ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+                */
+                crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, &key_block[i],
+                                       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+                }
+                i += keySize;
+
+                /*
+                ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+                */
+                crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, &key_block[i],
+                                       keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+                }
+                i += keySize;
+
+                /*
+                ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+                */
+                if (IVSize > 0) {
+                    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
+                                &key_block[i], IVSize);
+                    i += IVSize;
+                }
+
+                /*
+                ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+                */
+                if (IVSize > 0) {
+                    PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
+                                &key_block[i], IVSize);
+                    i += IVSize;
+                }
+                PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
+            }
+
+            crv = CKR_OK;
+
+            if (0) {
+            key_and_mac_derive_fail:
+                if (crv == CKR_OK)
+                    crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+                sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
+            }
+            PORT_Memset(srcrdata, 0, sizeof srcrdata);
+            PORT_Memset(key_block, 0, sizeof key_block);
+            MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
+            SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            key = NULL;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA:
+        case CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: {
+            void *cipherInfo;
+            unsigned char des3key[MAX_DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+            CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *desEncryptPtr;
+            int mode;
+            unsigned char *iv;
+            unsigned char *data;
+            CK_ULONG len;
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA) {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)
+                                pMechanism->pParameter;
+                mode = NSS_DES_EDE3;
+                iv = NULL;
+                data = stringPtr->pData;
+                len = stringPtr->ulLen;
+            } else {
+                mode = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+                desEncryptPtr =
+                    (CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *)
+                        pMechanism->pParameter;
+                iv = desEncryptPtr->iv;
+                data = desEncryptPtr->pData;
+                len = desEncryptPtr->length;
+            }
+            if (att->attrib.ulValueLen == 16) {
+                PORT_Memcpy(des3key, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
+                PORT_Memcpy(des3key + 16, des3key, 8);
+            } else if (att->attrib.ulValueLen == 24) {
+                PORT_Memcpy(des3key, att->attrib.pValue, 24);
+            } else {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
+                break;
+            }
+            cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(des3key, iv, mode, PR_TRUE);
+            PORT_Memset(des3key, 0, 24);
+            if (cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_DeriveEncrypt((SFTKCipher)DES_Encrypt,
+                                     cipherInfo, 8, key, keySize,
+                                     data, len);
+            DES_DestroyContext(cipherInfo, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA:
+        case CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: {
+            void *cipherInfo;
+            CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *aesEncryptPtr;
+            int mode;
+            unsigned char *iv;
+            unsigned char *data;
+            CK_ULONG len;
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA) {
+                mode = NSS_AES;
+                iv = NULL;
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                data = stringPtr->pData;
+                len = stringPtr->ulLen;
+            } else {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                aesEncryptPtr =
+                    (CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+                mode = NSS_AES_CBC;
+                iv = aesEncryptPtr->iv;
+                data = aesEncryptPtr->pData;
+                len = aesEncryptPtr->length;
+            }
+
+            cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                           iv, mode, PR_TRUE,
+                                           att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
+            if (cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_DeriveEncrypt((SFTKCipher)AES_Encrypt,
+                                     cipherInfo, 16, key, keySize,
+                                     data, len);
+            AES_DestroyContext(cipherInfo, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA:
+        case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: {
+            void *cipherInfo;
+            CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *aesEncryptPtr;
+            int mode;
+            unsigned char *iv;
+            unsigned char *data;
+            CK_ULONG len;
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA) {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)
+                                pMechanism->pParameter;
+                aesEncryptPtr = NULL;
+                mode = NSS_CAMELLIA;
+                data = stringPtr->pData;
+                len = stringPtr->ulLen;
+                iv = NULL;
+            } else {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                stringPtr = NULL;
+                aesEncryptPtr = (CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *)
+                                    pMechanism->pParameter;
+                mode = NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC;
+                iv = aesEncryptPtr->iv;
+                data = aesEncryptPtr->pData;
+                len = aesEncryptPtr->length;
+            }
+
+            cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                                iv, mode, PR_TRUE,
+                                                att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            if (cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_DeriveEncrypt((SFTKCipher)Camellia_Encrypt,
+                                     cipherInfo, 16, key, keySize,
+                                     data, len);
+            Camellia_DestroyContext(cipherInfo, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        }
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED
+        case CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA:
+        case CKM_SEED_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: {
+            void *cipherInfo;
+            CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *aesEncryptPtr;
+            int mode;
+            unsigned char *iv;
+            unsigned char *data;
+            CK_ULONG len;
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA) {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                mode = NSS_SEED;
+                stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)
+                                pMechanism->pParameter;
+                aesEncryptPtr = NULL;
+                data = stringPtr->pData;
+                len = stringPtr->ulLen;
+                iv = NULL;
+            } else {
+                if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS))) {
+                    crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                mode = NSS_SEED_CBC;
+                aesEncryptPtr = (CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS *)
+                                    pMechanism->pParameter;
+                iv = aesEncryptPtr->iv;
+                data = aesEncryptPtr->pData;
+                len = aesEncryptPtr->length;
+            }
+
+            cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                                            iv, mode, PR_TRUE);
+            if (cipherInfo == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_DeriveEncrypt((SFTKCipher)SEED_Encrypt,
+                                     cipherInfo, 16, key, keySize,
+                                     data, len);
+            SEED_DestroyContext(cipherInfo, PR_TRUE);
+            break;
+        }
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_SEED */
+
+        case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: {
+            SFTKObject *paramKey;
+
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+            if (session == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            paramKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
+                                                  pMechanism->pParameter,
+                                             session);
+            sftk_FreeSession(session);
+            if (paramKey == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if (sftk_isTrue(paramKey, CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
+                crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_SENSITIVE, &cktrue,
+                                          sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (sftk_hasAttribute(paramKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && !sftk_isTrue(paramKey, CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
+                crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(paramKey, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (att2 == NULL) {
+                sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+                crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
+            if (keySize == 0)
+                keySize = tmpKeySize;
+            if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+                sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+            if (buf == NULL) {
+                sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+                sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf + att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+                        att2->attrib.pValue, att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+            PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+            sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
+            sftk_FreeObject(paramKey);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + stringPtr->ulLen;
+            if (keySize == 0)
+                keySize = tmpKeySize;
+            if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+            if (buf == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf + att->attrib.ulValueLen, stringPtr->pData,
+                        stringPtr->ulLen);
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+            PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+            break;
+        case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen + stringPtr->ulLen;
+            if (keySize == 0)
+                keySize = tmpKeySize;
+            if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
+            if (buf == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf, stringPtr->pData, stringPtr->ulLen);
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf + stringPtr->ulLen, att->attrib.pValue,
+                        att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+            PORT_ZFree(buf, tmpKeySize);
+            break;
+        case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen, stringPtr->ulLen);
+            if (keySize == 0)
+                keySize = tmpKeySize;
+            if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+            if (buf == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(buf, att->attrib.pValue, keySize);
+            for (i = 0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+                buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+            PORT_ZFree(buf, keySize);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: {
+            if (BAD_PARAM_CAST(pMechanism, sizeof(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
+            CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
+            CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */
+
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if (keySize == 0) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
+                break;
+            }
+            /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
+            if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
+                (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0) ? 1 : 0))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
+            if (buf == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* copy the bits we need into the new key */
+            for (i = 0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
+                unsigned char *value =
+                    ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue) + offset + i;
+                if (shift) {
+                    buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
+                } else {
+                    buf[i] = value[0];
+                }
+            }
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, buf, keySize);
+            PORT_ZFree(buf, keySize);
+            break;
+        }
+        case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
+            if (keySize == 0)
+                keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
+            if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+                break;
+            }
+            /* now allocate the hash contexts */
+            md2 = MD2_NewContext();
+            if (md2 == NULL) {
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                break;
+            }
+            MD2_Begin(md2);
+            MD2_Update(md2, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue,
+                       att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+            MD2_End(md2, key_block, &outLen, MD2_LENGTH);
+            MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
+
+            crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);
+            PORT_Memset(key_block, 0, MD2_LENGTH);
+            break;
+#define DERIVE_KEY_HASH(hash)                                                \
+    case CKM_##hash##_KEY_DERIVATION:                                        \
+        if (keySize == 0)                                                    \
+            keySize = hash##_LENGTH;                                         \
+        if (keySize > hash##_LENGTH) {                                       \
+            crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;                                 \
+            break;                                                           \
+        }                                                                    \
+        hash##_HashBuf(key_block, (const unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue, \
+                       att->attrib.ulValueLen);                              \
+        crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, keySize);       \
+        PORT_Memset(key_block, 0, hash##_LENGTH);                            \
+        break;
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(MD5)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA1)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA224)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA256)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA384)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA512)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA3_224)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA3_256)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA3_384)
+            DERIVE_KEY_HASH(SHA3_512)
+
+        case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: {
+            SECItem derived, dhPublic;
+            SECItem dhPrime, dhValue;
+            const SECItem *subPrime;
+            /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
+            /* get prime and value attributes */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
+            dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
+
+            /* if the prime is an approved prime, we can skip all the other
+             * checks. */
+            subPrime = sftk_VerifyDH_Prime(&dhPrime, isFIPS);
+            if (subPrime == NULL) {
+                SECItem dhSubPrime;
+                /* If the caller set the subprime value, it means that
+                 * either the caller knows the subprime value and wants us
+                 * to validate the key against the subprime, or that the
+                 * caller wants us to verify that the prime is a safe prime
+                 * by passing in subprime = (prime-1)/2 */
+                dhSubPrime.data = NULL;
+                dhSubPrime.len = 0;
+                crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhSubPrime,
+                                             sourceKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
+                /* we ignore the value of crv here, We treat a valid
+                * return of len = 0 and a failure to find a subrime the same
+                * NOTE: we free the subprime in both cases depending on
+                * PORT_Free of NULL to be a noop */
+                if (dhSubPrime.len != 0) {
+                    PRBool isSafe = PR_FALSE;
+
+                    /* Callers can set dhSubPrime to q=(p-1)/2 to force
+                     * checks for safe primes. If so we only need to check
+                     * q and p for primality and skip the group test.  */
+                    rv = sftk_IsSafePrime(&dhPrime, &dhSubPrime, &isSafe);
+                    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                        /* either p or q was even and therefore not prime,
+                         * we can stop processing here and fail now */
+                        crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhSubPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        break;
+                    }
+
+                    /* first make sure the primes are really prime */
+                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&dhPrime)) {
+                        crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhSubPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    if (!KEA_PrimeCheck(&dhSubPrime)) {
+                        crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhSubPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    if (isFIPS || !isSafe) {
+                        /* With safe primes, there is only one other small
+                         * subgroup. As long as y isn't 0, 1, or -1 mod p,
+                         * any other y is safe. Only do the full check for
+                         * non-safe primes, except in FIPS mode we need
+                         * to do this check on all primes in which
+                         * we receive the subprime value */
+                        if (!KEA_Verify(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhSubPrime)) {
+                            crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhSubPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                } else if (isFIPS) {
+                    /* In FIPS mode we only accept approved primes, or
+                     * primes with the full subprime value */
+                    crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+                    SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                    break;
+                }
+                /* checks are complete, no need for the subPrime any longer */
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhSubPrime, PR_FALSE);
+            }
+
+            /* now that the prime is validated, get the private value */
+            crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* calculate private value - oct */
+            rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
+
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhPrime, PR_FALSE);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&dhValue, PR_FALSE);
+
+            if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+                sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
+                SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&derived, PR_FALSE);
+                crv = CKR_OK;
+            } else
+                crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+
+            break;
+        }
+
+        case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: {
+            SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint;
+            SECItem tmp;
+            PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
+            unsigned char *secret;
+            unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
+            unsigned int secretlen, pubKeyLen;
+            CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
+            NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+            PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+
+            /* Check mechanism parameters */
+            mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
+                ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
+                 ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
+                  (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
+            if (privKey == NULL) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
+            SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
+
+            ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
+            ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
+
+            pubKeyLen = EC_GetPointSize(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams);
+
+            /* if the len is too large, might be an encoded point */
+            if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
+                SECItem newPoint;
+
+                arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+                if (arena == NULL) {
+                    goto ec_loser;
+                }
+
+                rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
+                                            SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
+                                            &ecPoint);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    goto ec_loser;
+                }
+                ecPoint = newPoint;
+            }
+
+            if (mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
+                withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+
+            rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
+                             withCofactor, &tmp);
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&ecScalar, PR_FALSE);
+            ecScalar.data = NULL;
+            if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
+                nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+                privKey = NULL;
+            }
+            if (arena) {
+                PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+                arena = NULL;
+            }
+
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * apply the kdf function.
+             */
+            if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
+                /*
+             * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
+             * secret and secretlen are the values we will
+             * eventually pass as our generated key.
+             */
+                secret = tmp.data;
+                secretlen = tmp.len;
+            } else {
+                secretlen = keySize;
+                crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
+                                          &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
+                                          mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
+                PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    break;
+                }
+                tmp.data = secret;
+                tmp.len = secretlen;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
+             * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
+             * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
+             * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
+             * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
+             */
+            if (keySize) {
+                if (secretlen < keySize) {
+                    keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
+                    if (!keyData) {
+                        PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+                        crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize - secretlen], secret, secretlen);
+                    secret = keyData;
+                } else {
+                    secret += (secretlen - keySize);
+                }
+                secretlen = keySize;
+            }
+
+            sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
+            PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
+            if (keyData) {
+                PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
+            }
+            break;
+
+        ec_loser:
+            crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&ecScalar, PR_FALSE);
+            if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
+                nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+            if (arena) {
+                PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+        /* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
+        case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1:
+            hashMech = CKM_SHA_1;
+            goto hkdf;
+        case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256:
+            hashMech = CKM_SHA256;
+            goto hkdf;
+        case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384:
+            hashMech = CKM_SHA384;
+            goto hkdf;
+        case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512:
+            hashMech = CKM_SHA512;
+            goto hkdf;
+        hkdf : {
+            const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *params =
+                (const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *)pMechanism->pParameter;
+            CK_HKDF_PARAMS hkdfParams;
+
+            if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams)) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            hkdfParams.bExtract = params->bExtract;
+            hkdfParams.bExpand = params->bExpand;
+            if (params->pSalt) {
+                hkdfParams.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA;
+            } else {
+                hkdfParams.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL;
+            }
+            hkdfParams.pSalt = params->pSalt;
+            hkdfParams.ulSaltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
+            hkdfParams.hSaltKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+            hkdfParams.pInfo = params->pInfo;
+            hkdfParams.ulInfoLen = params->ulInfoLen;
+            hkdfParams.prfHashMechanism = hashMech;
+
+            crv = sftk_HKDF(&hkdfParams, hSession, sourceKey,
+                            att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen,
+                            key, NULL, keySize, PR_FALSE, isFIPS);
+        } break;
+        case CKM_HKDF_DERIVE:
+        case CKM_HKDF_DATA: /* only difference is the class of key */
+            if ((pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) ||
+                (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_HKDF_PARAMS))) {
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = sftk_HKDF((CK_HKDF_PARAMS_PTR)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                            hSession, sourceKey, att->attrib.pValue,
+                            att->attrib.ulValueLen, key, NULL, keySize, PR_TRUE,
+                            isFIPS);
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+            goto jpake2;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            goto jpake2;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+            goto jpake2;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+            goto jpake2;
+        jpake2:
+            if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+                pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
+                crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
+            if (crv == CKR_OK)
+                crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv == CKR_OK)
+                crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
+                                   (CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                                   sourceKey, key);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
+            goto jpakeFinal;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
+            goto jpakeFinal;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
+            goto jpakeFinal;
+        case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
+            hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
+            goto jpakeFinal;
+        jpakeFinal:
+            if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
+                pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
+                crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
+            /* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
+               able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
+               ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
+               in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
+               in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
+               sensitive.
+             */
+            if (crv == CKR_OK)
+                crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
+                                  (CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *)pMechanism->pParameter,
+                                  sourceKey, key);
+            break;
+
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF_DERIVE_DATA:         /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF_DERIVE_DATA:        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_NSS_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF_DERIVE_DATA: /* fall through */
+        case CKM_SP800_108_COUNTER_KDF:                         /* fall through */
+        case CKM_SP800_108_FEEDBACK_KDF:                        /* fall through */
+        case CKM_SP800_108_DOUBLE_PIPELINE_KDF:
+            crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key, PR_FALSE);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            crv = kbkdf_Dispatch(mechanism, hSession, pMechanism, sourceKey, key, keySize);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
+    }
+    if (att) {
+        sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+    }
+    sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (key)
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return crv;
+    }
+
+    /* link the key object into the list */
+    if (key) {
+        SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
+        PORT_Assert(sessKey);
+        /* get the session */
+        sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
+        session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+        if (session == NULL) {
+            sftk_FreeObject(key);
+            return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        crv = sftk_handleObject(key, session);
+        session->lastOpWasFIPS = key->isFIPS;
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        *phKey = key->handle;
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
+ * in parallel with an application. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
+CK_RV
+NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
+{
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
+}
+
+/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session.
+ * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
+ * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
+ * can be saved */
+CK_RV
+NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                      CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
+{
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    /* make sure we're legal */
+    crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+
+    /* a zero cipherInfoLen signals that this context cannot be serialized */
+    if (context->cipherInfoLen == 0) {
+        return CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE;
+    }
+
+    *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE) + sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+    if (pOperationState == NULL) {
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        return CKR_OK;
+    } else {
+        if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
+            return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, &context->type, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+    pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+    PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, &context->currentMech,
+                sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+    pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+    PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState, context->cipherInfo, context->cipherInfoLen);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize, len) \
+    stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
+
+/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
+ * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                      CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
+                      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
+{
+    SFTKSessionContext *context;
+    SFTKSession *session;
+    SFTKContextType type;
+    CK_MECHANISM mech;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
+        /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
+        PORT_Memcpy(&type, pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+
+        /* fix up session contexts based on type */
+        session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+        if (session == NULL)
+            return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+        context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
+        sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
+        if (context) {
+            sftk_FreeContext(context);
+        }
+        pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
+        sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
+
+        /* get the mechanism structure */
+        PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism, pOperationState, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+        pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
+        sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
+        /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
+        mech.pParameter = NULL;
+        mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+        switch (type) {
+            case SFTK_HASH:
+                crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession, &mech);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                    break;
+                crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
+                                      NULL);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                    break;
+                if (context->cipherInfoLen == 0) {
+                    crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
+                    break;
+                }
+                PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo, pOperationState,
+                            context->cipherInfoLen);
+                pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
+                sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, context->cipherInfoLen);
+                break;
+            default:
+                /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
+                crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
+        }
+        sftk_FreeSession(session);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK)
+            break;
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+
+/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+                        CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+                        CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+                            pulEncryptedPartLen);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+    crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen);
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * digesting operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                        CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
+                        CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
+                            pPart, pulPartLen);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+    crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, pPart, *pulPartLen);
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+ * encryption operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
+                      CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
+                      CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
+                            pulEncryptedPartLen);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+    crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen);
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+ * and verify operation. */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                        CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
+                        CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
+                            pData, pulDataLen);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK)
+        return crv;
+    crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
+
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
+ * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
+ */
+CK_RV
+NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
+{
+    SFTKSession *session = NULL;
+    SFTKObject *key = NULL;
+    SFTKAttribute *att;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    CHECK_FORK();
+
+    session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
+    if (session == NULL)
+        return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+    key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey, session);
+    sftk_FreeSession(session);
+    if (key == NULL)
+        return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+
+    /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
+
+    /* make sure it's a valid  key for this operation */
+    if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
+        sftk_FreeObject(key);
+        return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+    }
+    /* get the key value */
+    att = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE);
+    sftk_FreeObject(key);
+    if (!att) {
+        return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
+    }
+    crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
+                           att->attrib.ulValueLen);
+    sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
+    return crv;
+}