diff options
author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000 |
commit | 26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6 (patch) | |
tree | f435a8308119effd964b339f76abb83a57c29483 /security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.tar.xz firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.zip |
Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c | 1228 |
1 files changed, 1228 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35f67a3514 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c @@ -0,0 +1,1228 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file implements the CLIENT Session ID cache. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "nss.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "nssilock.h" +#include "sslencode.h" +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN) || defined(_WINDOWS) +#include <time.h> +#endif + +static sslSessionID *cache = NULL; +static PZLock *cacheLock = NULL; + +/* sids can be in one of 5 states: + * + * never_cached, created, but not yet put into cache. + * in_client_cache, in the client cache's linked list. + * in_server_cache, entry came from the server's cache file. + * invalid_cache has been removed from the cache. + * in_external_cache sid comes from an external cache. + */ + +#define LOCK_CACHE lock_cache() +#define UNLOCK_CACHE PZ_Unlock(cacheLock) + +static SECStatus +ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock(void) +{ + cacheLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockCache); + return cacheLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock(void) +{ + if (cacheLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(cacheLock); + cacheLock = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRBool LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE; + +static SECStatus +FreeSessionCacheLocks() +{ + SECStatus rv1, rv2; + rv1 = ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(); + rv2 = ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock(); + if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +InitSessionCacheLocks(void) +{ + SECStatus rv1, rv2; + PRErrorCode rc; + rv1 = ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(); + rv2 = ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock(); + if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + rc = PORT_GetError(); + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + PORT_SetError(rc); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized early */ +SECStatus +ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks() +{ + PORT_Assert(PR_TRUE == LocksInitializedEarly); + if (!LocksInitializedEarly) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; + } + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRCallOnceType lockOnce; + +/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized lazily */ +static SECStatus +ssl_ShutdownLocks(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE == LocksInitializedEarly); + if (LocksInitializedEarly) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + memset(&lockOnce, 0, sizeof(lockOnce)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +initSessionCacheLocksLazily(void) +{ + SECStatus rv = InitSessionCacheLocks(); + if (SECSuccess != rv) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_ShutdownLocks, NULL); + PORT_Assert(SECSuccess == rv); + if (SECSuccess != rv) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* lazyInit means that the call is not happening during a 1-time + * initialization function, but rather during dynamic, lazy initialization + */ +SECStatus +ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PRBool lazyInit) +{ + if (LocksInitializedEarly) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (lazyInit) { + return (PR_SUCCESS == + PR_CallOnce(&lockOnce, initSessionCacheLocksLazily)) + ? SECSuccess + : SECFailure; + } + + if (SECSuccess == InitSessionCacheLocks()) { + LocksInitializedEarly = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +static void +lock_cache(void) +{ + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); + PZ_Lock(cacheLock); +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * If the unreferenced sid is not in the cache, Free sid and its contents. + */ +void +ssl_DestroySID(sslSessionID *sid, PRBool freeIt) +{ + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: destroy sid: sid=0x%x cached=%d", sid, sid->cached)); + PORT_Assert(sid->references == 0); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != in_client_cache); + + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket, + PR_FALSE); + } + if (sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE); + } + if (sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_DestroyRWLock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID); + PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName); + + if (sid->peerCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + if (sid->peerCertStatus.items) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(&sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (sid->localCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->localCert); + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE); + + if (freeIt) { + PORT_ZFree(sid, sizeof(sslSessionID)); + } +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * Decrement reference count, and + * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache. + * Does NOT remove from the cache first. + * If the sid is still in the cache, it is left there until next time + * the cache list is traversed. + */ +static void +ssl_FreeLockedSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1); + if (--sid->references == 0) { + ssl_DestroySID(sid, PR_TRUE); + } +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * Decrement reference count, and + * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache. + * Does NOT remove from the cache first. + * These locks are necessary because the sid _might_ be in the cache list. + */ +void +ssl_FreeSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + if (sid) { + LOCK_CACHE; + ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid); + UNLOCK_CACHE; + } +} + +sslSessionID * +ssl_ReferenceSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + sid->references++; + UNLOCK_CACHE; + return sid; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* +** Lookup sid entry in cache by Address, port, and peerID string. +** If found, Increment reference count, and return pointer to caller. +** If it has timed out or ref count is zero, remove from list and free it. +*/ + +sslSessionID * +ssl_LookupSID(PRTime now, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, PRUint16 port, const char *peerID, + const char *urlSvrName) +{ + sslSessionID **sidp; + sslSessionID *sid; + + if (!urlSvrName) + return NULL; + LOCK_CACHE; + sidp = &cache; + while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) { + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == in_client_cache); + PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: lookup: sid=0x%x", sid)); + + if (sid->expirationTime < now) { + /* + ** This session-id timed out. + ** Don't even care who it belongs to, blow it out of our cache. + */ + SSL_TRC(7, ("SSL: lookup, throwing sid out, age=%d refs=%d", + now - sid->creationTime, sid->references)); + + *sidp = sid->next; /* delink it from the list. */ + sid->cached = invalid_cache; /* mark not on list. */ + ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid); /* drop ref count, free. */ + } else if (!memcmp(&sid->addr, addr, sizeof(PRIPv6Addr)) && /* server IP addr matches */ + (sid->port == port) && /* server port matches */ + /* proxy (peerID) matches */ + (((peerID == NULL) && (sid->peerID == NULL)) || + ((peerID != NULL) && (sid->peerID != NULL) && + PORT_Strcmp(sid->peerID, peerID) == 0)) && + /* is cacheable */ + (sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) && + /* server hostname matches. */ + (sid->urlSvrName != NULL) && + (0 == PORT_Strcmp(urlSvrName, sid->urlSvrName))) { + /* Hit */ + sid->lastAccessTime = now; + sid->references++; + break; + } else { + sidp = &sid->next; + } + } + UNLOCK_CACHE; + return sid; +} + +/* +** Add an sid to the cache or return a previously cached entry to the cache. +** Although this is static, it is called via ss->sec.cache(). +*/ +static void +CacheSID(sslSessionID *sid, PRTime creationTime) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Cache: sid=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x " + "time=%x cached=%d", + sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime, + sid->cached)); + + if (!sid->urlSvrName) { + /* don't cache this SID because it can never be matched */ + return; + } + + if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0 && + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL) + return; + + /* Client generates the SessionID if this was a stateless resume. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + } + PRINT_BUF(8, (0, "sessionID:", + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + sid->u.ssl3.lock = PR_NewRWLock(PR_RWLOCK_RANK_NONE, NULL); + if (!sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + return; + } + PORT_Assert(sid->creationTime != 0); + if (!sid->creationTime) { + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = creationTime; + } + PORT_Assert(sid->expirationTime != 0); + if (!sid->expirationTime) { + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) * + PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + } + + /* + * Put sid into the cache. Bump reference count to indicate that + * cache is holding a reference. Uncache will reduce the cache + * reference. + */ + LOCK_CACHE; + sid->references++; + sid->cached = in_client_cache; + sid->next = cache; + cache = sid; + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +/* + * If sid "zap" is in the cache, + * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count. + * Caller must hold cache lock. + */ +static void +UncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap) +{ + sslSessionID **sidp = &cache; + sslSessionID *sid; + + if (zap->cached != in_client_cache) { + return; + } + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Uncache: zap=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x " + "time=%x cipherSuite=%d", + zap, zap->cached, zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], zap->port, zap->creationTime, + zap->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)); + + /* See if it's in the cache, if so nuke it */ + while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) { + if (sid == zap) { + /* + ** Bingo. Reduce reference count by one so that when + ** everyone is done with the sid we can free it up. + */ + *sidp = zap->next; + zap->cached = invalid_cache; + ssl_FreeLockedSID(zap); + return; + } + sidp = &sid->next; + } +} + +/* If sid "zap" is in the cache, + * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count. + * Although this function is static, it is called externally via + * ssl_UncacheSessionID. + */ +static void +LockAndUncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + UncacheSID(zap); + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +SECStatus +ReadVariableFromBuffer(sslReader *reader, sslReadBuffer *readerBuffer, + uint8_t lenBytes, SECItem *dest) +{ + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, lenBytes, readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer->len) { + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer->buf, + readerBuffer->len }; + SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, dest, &tempItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Fill sid with the values from the encoded resumption token. + * sid has to be allocated. + * We don't care about locks here as this cache entry is externally stored. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, const PRUint8 *encodedToken, + PRUint32 encodedTokenLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(encodedTokenLen); + PORT_Assert(encodedToken); + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid || !encodedToken || !encodedTokenLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (encodedToken[0] != SSLResumptionTokenVersion) { + /* Unknown token format version. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* These variables are used across macros. Don't use them outside. */ + sslReader reader = SSL_READER(encodedToken, encodedTokenLen); + reader.offset += 1; // We read the version already. Skip the first byte. + sslReadBuffer readerBuffer = { 0 }; + PRUint64 tmpInt = 0; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->lastAccessTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->expirationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp = (PRTime)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(!sid->peerCert); + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */ + &tempItem, + NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (!sid->peerCert) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 2, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus, 1); + if (!sid->peerCertStatus.items) { + return SECFailure; + } + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus.items[0], &tempItem); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + if (sid->peerID) { + PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID); + } + sid->peerID = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + if (sid->urlSvrName) { + PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName); + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + sid->urlSvrName = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(!sid->localCert); + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + sid->localCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */ + &tempItem, + NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0]) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1]) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->port = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->version = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->creationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->authType = (SSLAuthType)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaType = (SSLKEAType)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaGroup = (SSLNamedGroup)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->sigScheme = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.policy = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.len == WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); + if (readerBuffer.len != WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len); + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = (char)tmpInt; + + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1, + &sid->u.ssl3.srvName) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2, + &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1, + &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2, + &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* At this point we must have read everything. */ + PORT_Assert(reader.offset == reader.buf.len); + if (reader.offset != reader.buf.len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsResumptionTokenUsable(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss); + PORT_Assert(sid); + + // Check that the ticket didn't expire. + PRTime endTime = 0; + NewSessionTicket *ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint != 0) { + endTime = ticket->received_timestamp + + (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + if (endTime <= ssl_Time(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } + + // Check that the session entry didn't expire. + if (sid->expirationTime < ssl_Time(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + // Check that the server name (SNI) matches the one set for this session. + // Don't use the token if there's no server name. + if (sid->urlSvrName == NULL || PORT_Strcmp(ss->url, sid->urlSvrName) != 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + // This shouldn't be false, but let's check it anyway. + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Encode a session ticket into a byte array that can be handed out to a cache. + * Needed memory in encodedToken has to be allocated according to + * *encodedTokenLen. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, sslBuffer *encodedTokenBuf) +{ + PORT_Assert(encodedTokenBuf); + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len || + !encodedTokenBuf || !sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable || !sid->urlSvrName) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Encoding format: + * 0-byte: version + * Integers are encoded according to their length. + * SECItems are prepended with a 64-bit length field followed by the bytes. + * Optional bytes are encoded as a 0-length item if not present. + */ + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + SSLResumptionTokenVersion, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->lastAccessTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->expirationTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + // session ticket + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp, + 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->peerCert->derCert.data, + sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->peerCertStatus.len > 1) { + /* This is not implemented so it shouldn't happen. + * If it gets implemented, this has to change. + */ + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->peerCertStatus.len == 1 && sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, + sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + PRUint64 len = sid->peerID ? strlen(sid->peerID) : 0; + if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) { + // This string really shouldn't be that long. + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + (const unsigned char *)sid->peerID, len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + len = sid->urlSvrName ? strlen(sid->urlSvrName) : 0; + if (!len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) { + // This string really shouldn't be that long. + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + (const unsigned char *)sid->urlSvrName, + len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->localCert) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->localCert->derCert.data, + sid->localCert->derCert.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0], 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1], 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->port, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->creationTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaGroup, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->sigScheme, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.policy, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterValid, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data, + sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data, + sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data, + sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len > 1); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len, + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +ssl_CacheExternalToken(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss); + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached); + PORT_Assert(ss->resumptionTokenCallback); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL [%d]: Cache External: sid=0x%x cached=%d " + "addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x time=%x cached=%d", + ss->fd, + sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime, + sid->cached)); + + /* This is only available for stateless resumption. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* Don't export token if the session used client authentication. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + return; + } + + if (!sid->creationTime) { + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss); + } + if (!sid->expirationTime) { + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) * + PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + } + + sslBuffer encodedToken = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + if (ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sid, &encodedToken) != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("SSL [%d]: encoding resumption token failed", ss->fd)); + return; + } + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken) > 0); + PRINT_BUF(40, (ss, "SSL: encoded resumption token", + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken))); + SECStatus rv = ss->resumptionTokenCallback( + ss->fd, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken), + ss->resumptionTokenContext); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + sid->cached = in_external_cache; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedToken); +} + +void +ssl_CacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec; + PORT_Assert(sec); + PORT_Assert(sec->ci.sid->cached == never_cached); + + if (sec->ci.sid && !sec->ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) { + return; + } + + if (!sec->isServer && ss->resumptionTokenCallback) { + ssl_CacheExternalToken(ss); + return; + } + + PORT_Assert(!ss->resumptionTokenCallback); + if (sec->isServer) { + ssl_ServerCacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss)); + return; + } + + CacheSID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss)); +} + +void +ssl_UncacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->opt.noCache) { + return; + } + + sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec; + PORT_Assert(sec); + + if (sec->ci.sid) { + if (sec->isServer) { + ssl_ServerUncacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid); + } else if (!ss->resumptionTokenCallback) { + LockAndUncacheSID(sec->ci.sid); + } + } +} + +/* wipe out the entire client session cache. */ +void +SSL_ClearSessionCache(void) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + while (cache != NULL) + UncacheSID(cache); + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_TicketTimeValid(const sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket) +{ + PRTime endTime; + + if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + endTime = ticket->received_timestamp + + (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + return endTime > ssl_Time(ss); +} + +void +ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(sslSessionID *sid, + /*in/out*/ NewSessionTicket *newSessionTicket) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.data); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.len != 0); + + /* If this is in the client cache, we are updating an existing entry that is + * already cached or was once cached, so we need to acquire and release the + * write lock. Otherwise, this is a new session that isn't shared with + * anything yet, so no locking is needed. + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Wlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + /* Another thread may have evicted, or it may be in external cache. */ + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached); + } + /* If this was in the client cache, then we might have to free the old + * ticket. In TLS 1.3, we might get a replacement ticket if the server + * sends more than one ticket. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) { + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached || + sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket, + PR_FALSE); + } + + PORT_Assert(!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data); + + /* Do a shallow copy, moving the ticket data. */ + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket = *newSessionTicket; + newSessionTicket->ticket.data = NULL; + newSessionTicket->ticket.len = 0; + + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } +} |