summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
commit26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6 (patch)
treef435a8308119effd964b339f76abb83a57c29483 /security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.tar.xz
firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.zip
Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c305
1 files changed, 305 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed6cdd559f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 Protocol
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslt.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+
+/* This table contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the
+ * PKCS#11 identifiers */
+static const struct {
+ SSLHashType hash;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pkcs11Mech;
+ unsigned int hashSize;
+} kTlsHkdfInfo[] = {
+ { ssl_hash_none, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_md5, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha1, 0, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha224, 0 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha256, CKM_SHA256, 32 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha384, CKM_SHA384, 48 },
+ { ssl_hash_sha512, CKM_SHA512, 64 }
+};
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ PK11SymKey **prkp)
+{
+ CK_HKDF_PARAMS params;
+ SECItem paramsi;
+ PK11SymKey *prk;
+ static const PRUint8 zeroKeyBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ SECItem zeroKeyItem = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, zeroKeyBuf), kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize };
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *newIkm2 = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *newIkm1 = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ params.bExtract = CK_TRUE;
+ params.bExpand = CK_FALSE;
+ params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech;
+ params.pInfo = NULL;
+ params.ulInfoLen = 0UL;
+ params.pSalt = NULL;
+ params.ulSaltLen = 0UL;
+ params.hSaltKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ if (!ikm1) {
+ /* PKCS #11 v3.0 has and explict NULL value, which equates to
+ * a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC. */
+ params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* PKCS #11 v3.0 can take the salt as a key handle */
+ params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(ikm1);
+ params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_KEY;
+
+ /* if we have both keys, make sure they are in the same slot */
+ if (ikm2) {
+ rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
+ ikm2, ikm1, &newIkm2, &newIkm1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECItem *salt;
+ /* couldn't move the keys, try extracting the salt */
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ikm1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+ salt = PK11_GetKeyData(ikm1);
+ if (!salt)
+ return SECFailure;
+ PORT_Assert(salt->len > 0);
+ /* Set up for Salt as Data instead of Salt as key */
+ params.pSalt = salt->data;
+ params.ulSaltLen = salt->len;
+ params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA;
+ }
+ /* use the new keys */
+ if (newIkm1) {
+ /* we've moved the key, get the handle for the new key */
+ params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(newIkm1);
+ /* we don't use ikm1 after this, so don't bother setting it */
+ }
+ if (newIkm2) {
+ /* new ikm2 key, use the new key */
+ ikm2 = newIkm2;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
+
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech);
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize);
+ PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hash == baseHash);
+
+ /* A zero ikm2 is a key of hash-length 0s. */
+ if (!ikm2) {
+ /* if we have ikm1, put the zero key in the same slot */
+ slot = ikm1 ? PK11_GetSlotFromKey(ikm1) : PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL);
+ if (!slot) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ newIkm2 = PK11_ImportDataKey(slot, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ CKA_DERIVE, &zeroKeyItem, NULL);
+ if (!newIkm2) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ikm2 = newIkm2;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(ikm2);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM1/Salt", params.pSalt, params.ulSaltLen));
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM2", ikm2));
+
+ prk = PK11_Derive(ikm2, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, &paramsi, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm2);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm1);
+ if (slot)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (!prk) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract", prk));
+ *prkp = prk;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE deriveMech, PK11SymKey *prk,
+ SSLHashType baseHash,
+ const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
+ SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp)
+{
+ CK_HKDF_PARAMS params;
+ SECItem paramsi = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ /* Size of info array needs to be big enough to hold the maximum Prefix,
+ * Label, plus HandshakeHash. If it's ever to small, the code will abort.
+ */
+ PRUint8 info[256];
+ sslBuffer infoBuf = SSL_BUFFER(info);
+ PK11SymKey *derived;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ const char *kLabelPrefixTls = "tls13 ";
+ const char *kLabelPrefixDtls = "dtls13";
+ const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen =
+ (variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? strlen(kLabelPrefixTls) : strlen(kLabelPrefixDtls);
+ const char *kLabelPrefix =
+ (variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? kLabelPrefixTls : kLabelPrefixDtls;
+
+ PORT_Assert(prk);
+ PORT_Assert(keyp);
+ if ((handshakeHashLen > 255) ||
+ (handshakeHash == NULL && handshakeHashLen > 0) ||
+ (labelLen + kLabelPrefixLen > 255)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 7.1:
+ *
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) =
+ * HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
+ *
+ * Where HkdfLabel is specified as:
+ *
+ * struct HkdfLabel {
+ * uint16 length;
+ * opaque label<9..255>;
+ * opaque hash_value<0..255>;
+ * };
+ *
+ * Where:
+ * - HkdfLabel.length is Length
+ * - HkdfLabel.hash_value is HashValue.
+ * - HkdfLabel.label is "TLS 1.3, " + Label
+ *
+ */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&infoBuf, keySize, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&infoBuf, labelLen + kLabelPrefixLen, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&infoBuf, kLabelPrefix, kLabelPrefixLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&infoBuf, label, labelLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&infoBuf, handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ params.bExtract = CK_FALSE;
+ params.bExpand = CK_TRUE;
+ params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech;
+ params.pInfo = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&infoBuf);
+ params.ulInfoLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&infoBuf);
+ paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
+ derived = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(prk, deriveMech,
+ &paramsi, algorithm,
+ CKA_DERIVE, keySize,
+ CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY);
+ if (!derived) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *keyp = derived;
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+ if (ssl_trace >= 50) {
+ /* Make sure the label is null terminated. */
+ char labelStr[100];
+ PORT_Memcpy(labelStr, label, labelLen);
+ labelStr[labelLen] = 0;
+ SSL_TRC(50, ("HKDF Expand: label='tls13 %s',requested length=%d",
+ labelStr, keySize));
+ }
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "PRK", prk));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Hash", handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Info", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&infoBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&infoBuf)));
+ PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "Derived key", derived));
+#endif
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
+ SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp)
+{
+ return tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, prk, baseHash,
+ handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
+ label, labelLen, algorithm, keySize,
+ variant, keyp);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
+ const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ SSLProtocolVariant variant, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned int outputLen)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *derived = NULL;
+ SECItem *rawkey;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* the result is not really a key, it's a data object */
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DATA, prk, baseHash,
+ handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
+ label, labelLen, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, outputLen,
+ variant, &derived);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || !derived) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(derived);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ rawkey = PK11_GetKeyData(derived);
+ if (!rawkey) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(rawkey->len == outputLen);
+ memcpy(output, rawkey->data, outputLen);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derived);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+abort:
+ if (derived) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derived);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}