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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 00:47:55 +0000
commit26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6 (patch)
treef435a8308119effd964b339f76abb83a57c29483 /security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.tar.xz
firefox-26a029d407be480d791972afb5975cf62c9360a6.zip
Adding upstream version 124.0.1.upstream/124.0.1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker')
-rw-r--r--security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build21
-rw-r--r--security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp1847
-rw-r--r--security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h132
3 files changed, 2000 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5eaf0de937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+SOURCES += [
+ "sandboxBroker.cpp",
+]
+
+EXPORTS += [
+ "sandboxBroker.h",
+]
+
+for var in ("UNICODE", "_UNICODE"):
+ DEFINES[var] = True
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += ["/security/sandbox/chromium-shim"]
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += ["/security/sandbox/chromium"]
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul"
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b9ed97262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1847 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#define MOZ_USE_LAUNCHER_ERROR
+
+#include "sandboxBroker.h"
+
+#include <aclapi.h>
+#include <shlobj.h>
+#include <string>
+
+#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
+#include "mozilla/ImportDir.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/NSPRLogModulesParser.h"
+#include "mozilla/Omnijar.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/SandboxSettings.h"
+#include "mozilla/SHA1.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_widget.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/WinDllServices.h"
+#include "mozilla/WindowsVersion.h"
+#include "mozilla/WinHeaderOnlyUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/LaunchError.h"
+#include "nsAppDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
+#include "nsIFile.h"
+#include "nsIProperties.h"
+#include "nsIXULRuntime.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsTHashtable.h"
+#include "sandbox/win/src/app_container_profile.h"
+#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
+#include "sandbox/win/src/security_level.h"
+#include "WinUtils.h"
+
+#define SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(x) \
+ do { \
+ sandbox::ResultCode result = (x); \
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(result == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK, #x " failed"); \
+ } while (0)
+
+namespace mozilla {
+
+constexpr wchar_t kLpacFirefoxInstallFiles[] = L"lpacFirefoxInstallFiles";
+
+sandbox::BrokerServices* sBrokerService = nullptr;
+
+// This is set to true in Initialize when our exe file name has a drive type of
+// DRIVE_REMOTE, so that we can tailor the sandbox policy as some settings break
+// fundamental things when running from a network drive. We default to false in
+// case those checks fail as that gives us the strongest policy.
+bool SandboxBroker::sRunningFromNetworkDrive = false;
+
+// Cached special directories used for adding policy rules.
+static StaticAutoPtr<nsString> sBinDir;
+static StaticAutoPtr<nsString> sProfileDir;
+static StaticAutoPtr<nsString> sLocalAppDataDir;
+#ifdef ENABLE_SYSTEM_EXTENSION_DIRS
+static StaticAutoPtr<nsString> sUserExtensionsDir;
+#endif
+
+static LazyLogModule sSandboxBrokerLog("SandboxBroker");
+
+#define LOG_E(...) MOZ_LOG(sSandboxBrokerLog, LogLevel::Error, (__VA_ARGS__))
+#define LOG_W(...) MOZ_LOG(sSandboxBrokerLog, LogLevel::Warning, (__VA_ARGS__))
+#define LOG_D(...) MOZ_LOG(sSandboxBrokerLog, LogLevel::Debug, (__VA_ARGS__))
+
+// Used to store whether we have accumulated an error combination for this
+// session.
+static StaticAutoPtr<nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey>> sLaunchErrors;
+
+// This helper function is our version of SandboxWin::AddWin32kLockdownPolicy
+// of Chromium, making sure the MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE flag is set before
+// adding the SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN rule which is required by
+// PolicyBase::AddRuleInternal.
+static sandbox::ResultCode AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy, bool aEnableOpm) {
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = aPolicy->GetProcessMitigations();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(flags,
+ "Mitigations should be set before AddWin32kLockdownPolicy.");
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!(flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE),
+ "Check not enabling twice. Should not happen.");
+
+ flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
+ sandbox::ResultCode result = aPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(flags);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ result =
+ aPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
+ aEnableOpm ? sandbox::TargetPolicy::IMPLEMENT_OPM_APIS
+ : sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
+ nullptr);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ if (aEnableOpm) {
+ aPolicy->SetEnableOPMRedirection();
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* static */
+void SandboxBroker::Initialize(sandbox::BrokerServices* aBrokerServices) {
+ sBrokerService = aBrokerServices;
+
+ sRunningFromNetworkDrive = widget::WinUtils::RunningFromANetworkDrive();
+}
+
+static void CacheDirAndAutoClear(nsIProperties* aDirSvc, const char* aDirKey,
+ StaticAutoPtr<nsString>* cacheVar) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> dirToCache;
+ nsresult rv =
+ aDirSvc->Get(aDirKey, NS_GET_IID(nsIFile), getter_AddRefs(dirToCache));
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ // This can only be an NS_WARNING, because it can fail for xpcshell tests.
+ NS_WARNING("Failed to get directory to cache.");
+ LOG_E("Failed to get directory to cache, key: %s.", aDirKey);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *cacheVar = new nsString();
+ ClearOnShutdown(cacheVar);
+ MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(dirToCache->GetPath(**cacheVar));
+
+ // Convert network share path to format for sandbox policy.
+ if (Substring(**cacheVar, 0, 2).Equals(u"\\\\"_ns)) {
+ (*cacheVar)->InsertLiteral(u"??\\UNC", 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/* static */
+void SandboxBroker::GeckoDependentInitialize() {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+ bool haveXPCOM = XRE_GetProcessType() != GeckoProcessType_RemoteSandboxBroker;
+ if (haveXPCOM) {
+ // Cache directory paths for use in policy rules, because the directory
+ // service must be called on the main thread.
+ nsresult rv;
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIProperties> dirSvc =
+ do_GetService(NS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+ if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+ "Failed to get directory service, cannot cache directories "
+ "for rules.");
+ LOG_E(
+ "Failed to get directory service, cannot cache directories for "
+ "rules.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ CacheDirAndAutoClear(dirSvc, NS_GRE_DIR, &sBinDir);
+ CacheDirAndAutoClear(dirSvc, NS_APP_USER_PROFILE_50_DIR, &sProfileDir);
+ CacheDirAndAutoClear(dirSvc, NS_WIN_LOCAL_APPDATA_DIR, &sLocalAppDataDir);
+#ifdef ENABLE_SYSTEM_EXTENSION_DIRS
+ CacheDirAndAutoClear(dirSvc, XRE_USER_SYS_EXTENSION_DIR,
+ &sUserExtensionsDir);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ // Create sLaunchErrors up front because ClearOnShutdown must be called on the
+ // main thread.
+ sLaunchErrors = new nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey>();
+ ClearOnShutdown(&sLaunchErrors);
+}
+
+SandboxBroker::SandboxBroker() {
+ if (sBrokerService) {
+ scoped_refptr<sandbox::TargetPolicy> policy =
+ sBrokerService->CreatePolicy();
+ mPolicy = policy.get();
+ mPolicy->AddRef();
+ if (sRunningFromNetworkDrive) {
+ mPolicy->SetDoNotUseRestrictingSIDs();
+ }
+ } else {
+ mPolicy = nullptr;
+ }
+}
+
+#define WSTRING(STRING) L"" STRING
+
+static void AddMozLogRulesToPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy,
+ const base::EnvironmentMap& aEnvironment) {
+ auto it = aEnvironment.find(ENVIRONMENT_LITERAL("MOZ_LOG_FILE"));
+ if (it == aEnvironment.end()) {
+ it = aEnvironment.find(ENVIRONMENT_LITERAL("NSPR_LOG_FILE"));
+ }
+ if (it == aEnvironment.end()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ char const* logFileModules = getenv("MOZ_LOG");
+ if (!logFileModules) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // MOZ_LOG files have a standard file extension appended.
+ std::wstring logFileName(it->second);
+ logFileName.append(WSTRING(MOZ_LOG_FILE_EXTENSION));
+
+ // Allow for rotation number if rotate is on in the MOZ_LOG settings.
+ bool rotate = false;
+ NSPRLogModulesParser(
+ logFileModules,
+ [&rotate](const char* aName, LogLevel aLevel, int32_t aValue) {
+ if (strcmp(aName, "rotate") == 0) {
+ // Less or eq zero means to turn rotate off.
+ rotate = aValue > 0;
+ }
+ });
+ if (rotate) {
+ logFileName.append(L".?");
+ }
+
+ // Allow for %PID token in the filename. We don't allow it in the dir path, if
+ // specified, because we have to use a wildcard as we don't know the PID yet.
+ auto pidPos = logFileName.find(WSTRING(MOZ_LOG_PID_TOKEN));
+ auto lastSlash = logFileName.find_last_of(L"/\\");
+ if (pidPos != std::wstring::npos &&
+ (lastSlash == std::wstring::npos || lastSlash < pidPos)) {
+ logFileName.replace(pidPos, strlen(MOZ_LOG_PID_TOKEN), L"*");
+ }
+
+ aPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, logFileName.c_str());
+}
+
+static void AddDeveloperRepoDirToPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy) {
+ const wchar_t* developer_repo_dir =
+ _wgetenv(WSTRING("MOZ_DEVELOPER_REPO_DIR"));
+ if (!developer_repo_dir) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ std::wstring repoPath(developer_repo_dir);
+ std::replace(repoPath.begin(), repoPath.end(), '/', '\\');
+ repoPath.append(WSTRING("\\*"));
+
+ aPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ repoPath.c_str());
+}
+
+#undef WSTRING
+
+Result<Ok, mozilla::ipc::LaunchError> SandboxBroker::LaunchApp(
+ const wchar_t* aPath, const wchar_t* aArguments,
+ base::EnvironmentMap& aEnvironment, GeckoProcessType aProcessType,
+ const bool aEnableLogging, const IMAGE_THUNK_DATA* aCachedNtdllThunk,
+ void** aProcessHandle) {
+ if (!sBrokerService) {
+ return Err(mozilla::ipc::LaunchError("SB::LA::sBrokerService"));
+ }
+
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return Err(mozilla::ipc::LaunchError("SB::LA::mPolicy"));
+ }
+
+ // Set stdout and stderr, to allow inheritance for logging.
+ mPolicy->SetStdoutHandle(::GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
+ mPolicy->SetStderrHandle(::GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
+
+ // If we're running from a network drive then we can't block loading from
+ // remote locations. Strangely using MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL in
+ // this situation also means the process fails to start (bug 1423296).
+ if (sRunningFromNetworkDrive) {
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = mPolicy->GetProcessMitigations();
+ mitigations &= ~(sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK,
+ "Setting the reduced set of flags should always succeed");
+ }
+
+ // If logging enabled, set up the policy.
+ if (aEnableLogging) {
+ ApplyLoggingPolicy();
+ }
+
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+ // Allow write access to TEMP directory in debug builds for logging purposes.
+ // The path from GetTempPathW can have a length up to MAX_PATH + 1, including
+ // the null, so we need MAX_PATH + 2, so we can add an * to the end.
+ wchar_t tempPath[MAX_PATH + 2];
+ uint32_t pathLen = ::GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH + 1, tempPath);
+ if (pathLen > 0) {
+ // GetTempPath path ends with \ and returns the length without the null.
+ tempPath[pathLen] = L'*';
+ tempPath[pathLen + 1] = L'\0';
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, tempPath);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ // Enable the child process to write log files when setup
+ AddMozLogRulesToPolicy(mPolicy, aEnvironment);
+
+ if (!mozilla::IsPackagedBuild()) {
+ AddDeveloperRepoDirToPolicy(mPolicy);
+ }
+
+ // Create the sandboxed process
+ PROCESS_INFORMATION targetInfo = {0};
+ sandbox::ResultCode result;
+ sandbox::ResultCode last_warning = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
+ DWORD last_error = ERROR_SUCCESS;
+ result = sBrokerService->SpawnTarget(aPath, aArguments, aEnvironment, mPolicy,
+ &last_warning, &last_error, &targetInfo);
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
+ nsAutoCString key;
+ key.AppendASCII(XRE_GeckoProcessTypeToString(aProcessType));
+ key.AppendLiteral("/0x");
+ key.AppendInt(static_cast<uint32_t>(last_error), 16);
+
+ // Only accumulate for each combination once per session.
+ if (sLaunchErrors) {
+ if (!sLaunchErrors->Contains(key)) {
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SANDBOX_FAILED_LAUNCH_KEYED, key,
+ result);
+ sLaunchErrors->PutEntry(key);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If sLaunchErrors not created yet then always accumulate.
+ Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SANDBOX_FAILED_LAUNCH_KEYED, key,
+ result);
+ }
+
+ LOG_E(
+ "Failed (ResultCode %d) to SpawnTarget with last_error=%lu, "
+ "last_warning=%d",
+ result, last_error, last_warning);
+
+ return Err(mozilla::ipc::LaunchError("SB::LA::SpawnTarget", last_error));
+ } else if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != last_warning) {
+ // If there was a warning (but the result was still ok), log it and proceed.
+ LOG_W("Warning on SpawnTarget with last_error=%lu, last_warning=%d",
+ last_error, last_warning);
+ }
+
+#ifdef MOZ_THUNDERBIRD
+ // In Thunderbird, mInitDllBlocklistOOP is null, so InitDllBlocklistOOP would
+ // hit MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT.
+ constexpr bool isThunderbird = true;
+#else
+ constexpr bool isThunderbird = false;
+#endif
+
+ if (!isThunderbird &&
+ XRE_GetChildProcBinPathType(aProcessType) == BinPathType::Self) {
+ RefPtr<DllServices> dllSvc(DllServices::Get());
+ LauncherVoidResultWithLineInfo blocklistInitOk =
+ dllSvc->InitDllBlocklistOOP(aPath, targetInfo.hProcess,
+ aCachedNtdllThunk, aProcessType);
+ if (blocklistInitOk.isErr()) {
+ dllSvc->HandleLauncherError(blocklistInitOk.unwrapErr(),
+ XRE_GeckoProcessTypeToString(aProcessType));
+ LOG_E("InitDllBlocklistOOP failed at %s:%d with HRESULT 0x%08lX",
+ blocklistInitOk.unwrapErr().mFile,
+ blocklistInitOk.unwrapErr().mLine,
+ blocklistInitOk.unwrapErr().mError.AsHResult());
+ TerminateProcess(targetInfo.hProcess, 1);
+ CloseHandle(targetInfo.hThread);
+ CloseHandle(targetInfo.hProcess);
+ return Err(mozilla::ipc::LaunchError(
+ "InitDllBlocklistOOP",
+ blocklistInitOk.unwrapErr().mError.AsHResult()));
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Load the child executable as a datafile so that we can examine its
+ // headers without doing a full load with dependencies and such.
+ nsModuleHandle moduleHandle(
+ ::LoadLibraryExW(aPath, nullptr, LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE));
+ if (moduleHandle) {
+ nt::CrossExecTransferManager transferMgr(targetInfo.hProcess,
+ moduleHandle);
+ if (!!transferMgr) {
+ LauncherVoidResult importsRestored =
+ RestoreImportDirectory(aPath, transferMgr);
+ if (importsRestored.isErr()) {
+ RefPtr<DllServices> dllSvc(DllServices::Get());
+ dllSvc->HandleLauncherError(
+ importsRestored.unwrapErr(),
+ XRE_GeckoProcessTypeToString(aProcessType));
+ LOG_E("Failed to restore import directory with HRESULT 0x%08lX",
+ importsRestored.unwrapErr().mError.AsHResult());
+ TerminateProcess(targetInfo.hProcess, 1);
+ CloseHandle(targetInfo.hThread);
+ CloseHandle(targetInfo.hProcess);
+ return Err(mozilla::ipc::LaunchError(
+ "RestoreImportDirectory",
+ importsRestored.unwrapErr().mError.AsHResult()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // The sandboxed process is started in a suspended state, resume it now that
+ // we've set things up.
+ ResumeThread(targetInfo.hThread);
+ CloseHandle(targetInfo.hThread);
+
+ // Return the process handle to the caller
+ *aProcessHandle = targetInfo.hProcess;
+
+ return Ok();
+}
+
+static void AddCachedDirRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics aAccess,
+ const StaticAutoPtr<nsString>& aBaseDir,
+ const nsLiteralString& aRelativePath) {
+ if (!aBaseDir) {
+ // This can only be an NS_WARNING, because it can null for xpcshell tests.
+ NS_WARNING("Tried to add rule with null base dir.");
+ LOG_E("Tried to add rule with null base dir. Relative path: %S, Access: %d",
+ static_cast<const wchar_t*>(aRelativePath.get()), aAccess);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoString rulePath(*aBaseDir);
+ rulePath.Append(aRelativePath);
+
+ sandbox::ResultCode result = aPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, aAccess, rulePath.get());
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
+ NS_ERROR("Failed to add file policy rule.");
+ LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add %d access to: %S", result, aAccess,
+ static_cast<const wchar_t*>(rulePath.get()));
+ }
+}
+
+// This function caches and returns an array of NT paths of the executable's
+// dependent modules.
+// If this returns Nothing(), it means the retrieval of the modules failed
+// (e.g. when the launcher process is disabled), so the process should not
+// enable pre-spawn CIG.
+static const Maybe<Vector<const wchar_t*>>& GetPrespawnCigExceptionModules() {
+ // We enable pre-spawn CIG only in Nightly for now
+ // because it caused a compat issue (bug 1682304 and 1704373).
+#if defined(NIGHTLY_BUILD)
+ // The shared section contains a list of dependent modules as a
+ // null-delimited string. We convert it to a string vector and
+ // cache it to avoid converting the same data every time.
+ static Maybe<Vector<const wchar_t*>> sDependentModules =
+ []() -> Maybe<Vector<const wchar_t*>> {
+ RefPtr<DllServices> dllSvc(DllServices::Get());
+ auto sharedSection = dllSvc->GetSharedSection();
+ if (!sharedSection) {
+ return Nothing();
+ }
+
+ return sharedSection->GetDependentModules();
+ }();
+
+ return sDependentModules;
+#else
+ static const Maybe<Vector<const wchar_t*>> sNothing = Nothing();
+ return sNothing;
+#endif
+}
+
+static sandbox::ResultCode AllowProxyLoadFromBinDir(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy) {
+ // Allow modules in the directory containing the executable such as
+ // mozglue.dll, nss3.dll, etc.
+ static UniquePtr<nsString> sInstallDir;
+ if (!sInstallDir) {
+ // Since this function can be called before sBinDir is initialized,
+ // we cache the install path by ourselves.
+ UniquePtr<wchar_t[]> appDirStr;
+ if (GetInstallDirectory(appDirStr)) {
+ sInstallDir = MakeUnique<nsString>(appDirStr.get());
+ sInstallDir->Append(u"\\*");
+
+ auto setClearOnShutdown = [ptr = &sInstallDir]() -> void {
+ ClearOnShutdown(ptr);
+ };
+ if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+ setClearOnShutdown();
+ } else {
+ SchedulerGroup::Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
+ "InitSignedPolicyRulesToBypassCig", std::move(setClearOnShutdown)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sInstallDir) {
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
+ }
+ }
+ return aPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SIGNED_BINARY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SIGNED_ALLOW_LOAD,
+ sInstallDir->get());
+}
+
+static sandbox::ResultCode AddCigToPolicy(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy, bool aAlwaysProxyBinDirLoading = false) {
+ const Maybe<Vector<const wchar_t*>>& exceptionModules =
+ GetPrespawnCigExceptionModules();
+ if (exceptionModules.isNothing()) {
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags delayedMitigations =
+ aPolicy->GetDelayedProcessMitigations();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(delayedMitigations,
+ "Delayed mitigations should be set before AddCigToPolicy.");
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!(delayedMitigations & sandbox::MITIGATION_FORCE_MS_SIGNED_BINS),
+ "AddCigToPolicy should not be called twice.");
+
+ delayedMitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_FORCE_MS_SIGNED_BINS;
+ sandbox::ResultCode result =
+ aPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(delayedMitigations);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if (aAlwaysProxyBinDirLoading) {
+ result = AllowProxyLoadFromBinDir(aPolicy);
+ }
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = aPolicy->GetProcessMitigations();
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mitigations, "Mitigations should be set before AddCigToPolicy.");
+ MOZ_ASSERT(!(mitigations & sandbox::MITIGATION_FORCE_MS_SIGNED_BINS),
+ "AddCigToPolicy should not be called twice.");
+
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_FORCE_MS_SIGNED_BINS;
+ sandbox::ResultCode result = aPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ result = AllowProxyLoadFromBinDir(aPolicy);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ for (const wchar_t* path : exceptionModules.ref()) {
+ result = aPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SIGNED_BINARY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SIGNED_ALLOW_LOAD, path);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
+}
+
+// Returns the most strict dynamic code mitigation flag that is compatible with
+// system libraries MSAudDecMFT.dll and msmpeg2vdec.dll. This depends on the
+// Windows version and the architecture. See bug 1783223 comment 27.
+//
+// Use the result with SetDelayedProcessMitigations. Using non-delayed ACG
+// results in incompatibility with third-party antivirus software, the Windows
+// internal Shim Engine mechanism, parts of our own DLL blocklist code, and
+// AddressSanitizer initialization code. See bug 1783223.
+static sandbox::MitigationFlags DynamicCodeFlagForSystemMediaLibraries() {
+ static auto dynamicCodeFlag = []() {
+#ifdef _M_X64
+ if (IsWin10CreatorsUpdateOrLater()) {
+ return sandbox::MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE;
+ }
+#endif // _M_X64
+
+ if (IsWin10AnniversaryUpdateOrLater()) {
+ return sandbox::MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE_WITH_OPT_OUT;
+ }
+
+ return sandbox::MitigationFlags{};
+ }();
+ return dynamicCodeFlag;
+}
+
+// Process fails to start in LPAC with ASan build
+#if !defined(MOZ_ASAN)
+static void HexEncode(const Span<const uint8_t>& aBytes, nsACString& aEncoded) {
+ static const char kHexChars[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+ // Each input byte creates two output hex characters.
+ char* encodedPtr;
+ aEncoded.GetMutableData(&encodedPtr, aBytes.size() * 2);
+
+ for (auto byte : aBytes) {
+ *(encodedPtr++) = kHexChars[byte >> 4];
+ *(encodedPtr++) = kHexChars[byte & 0xf];
+ }
+}
+
+// This is left as a void because we might fail to set the permission for some
+// reason and yet the LPAC permission is already granted. So returning success
+// or failure isn't really that useful.
+/* static */
+void SandboxBroker::EnsureLpacPermsissionsOnDir(const nsString& aDir) {
+ // For MSIX packages we get access through the packageContents capability and
+ // we probably won't have access to add the permission either way.
+ if (widget::WinUtils::HasPackageIdentity()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ BYTE sidBytes[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
+ PSID lpacFirefoxInstallFilesSid = static_cast<PSID>(sidBytes);
+ if (!sBrokerService->DeriveCapabilitySidFromName(kLpacFirefoxInstallFiles,
+ lpacFirefoxInstallFilesSid,
+ sizeof(sidBytes))) {
+ LOG_E("Failed to derive Firefox install files capability SID.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ HANDLE hDir = ::CreateFileW(aDir.get(), WRITE_DAC | READ_CONTROL, 0, NULL,
+ OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, NULL);
+ if (hDir == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ LOG_W("Unable to get directory handle for %s",
+ NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<HANDLE, CloseHandleDeleter> autoHandleCloser(hDir);
+ PACL pBinDirAcl = nullptr;
+ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD = nullptr;
+ DWORD result =
+ ::GetSecurityInfo(hDir, SE_FILE_OBJECT, DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
+ nullptr, nullptr, &pBinDirAcl, nullptr, &pSD);
+ if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ LOG_E("Failed to get DACL for %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<VOID, LocalFreeDeleter> autoFreeSecDesc(pSD);
+ if (!pBinDirAcl) {
+ LOG_E("DACL was null for %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (DWORD i = 0; i < pBinDirAcl->AceCount; ++i) {
+ VOID* pAce = nullptr;
+ if (!::GetAce(pBinDirAcl, i, &pAce) ||
+ static_cast<PACE_HEADER>(pAce)->AceType != ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ auto* pAllowedAce = static_cast<ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE*>(pAce);
+ if ((pAllowedAce->Mask & (GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE)) !=
+ (GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ PSID aceSID = reinterpret_cast<PSID>(&(pAllowedAce->SidStart));
+ if (::EqualSid(aceSID, lpacFirefoxInstallFilesSid)) {
+ LOG_D("Firefox install files permission found on %s",
+ NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EXPLICIT_ACCESS_W newAccess = {0};
+ newAccess.grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
+ newAccess.grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_EXECUTE;
+ newAccess.grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
+ ::BuildTrusteeWithSidW(&newAccess.Trustee, lpacFirefoxInstallFilesSid);
+ PACL newDacl = nullptr;
+ if (ERROR_SUCCESS !=
+ ::SetEntriesInAclW(1, &newAccess, pBinDirAcl, &newDacl)) {
+ LOG_E("Failed to create new DACL with Firefox install files SID.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ UniquePtr<ACL, LocalFreeDeleter> autoFreeAcl(newDacl);
+ if (ERROR_SUCCESS != ::SetSecurityInfo(hDir, SE_FILE_OBJECT,
+ DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, nullptr,
+ nullptr, newDacl, nullptr)) {
+ LOG_E("Failed to set new DACL on %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+ }
+
+ LOG_D("Firefox install files permission granted on %s",
+ NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aDir).get());
+}
+
+static bool IsLowPrivilegedAppContainerSupported() {
+ // Chromium doesn't support adding an LPAC before this version due to
+ // incompatibility with some process mitigations.
+ return IsWin10Sep2018UpdateOrLater();
+}
+
+// AddAndConfigureAppContainerProfile deliberately fails if it is called on an
+// unsupported version. This is because for some process types the LPAC is
+// required to provide a sufficiently strong sandbox. Processes where the use of
+// an LPAC is an optional extra should use IsLowPrivilegedAppContainerSupported
+// to check support first.
+static sandbox::ResultCode AddAndConfigureAppContainerProfile(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy* aPolicy, const nsAString& aPackagePrefix,
+ const nsTArray<sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities>& aWellKnownCapabilites,
+ const nsTArray<const wchar_t*>& aNamedCapabilites) {
+ // CreateAppContainerProfile requires that the profile name is at most 64
+ // characters but 50 on WCOS systems. The size of sha1 is a constant 40,
+ // so validate that the base names are sufficiently short that the total
+ // length is valid on all systems.
+ MOZ_ASSERT(aPackagePrefix.Length() <= 10U,
+ "AppContainer Package prefix too long.");
+
+ if (!IsLowPrivilegedAppContainerSupported()) {
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ static nsAutoString uniquePackageStr = []() {
+ // userenv.dll may not have been loaded and some of the chromium sandbox
+ // AppContainer code assumes that it is. Done here to load once.
+ ::LoadLibraryW(L"userenv.dll");
+
+ // Done during the package string initialization so we only do it once.
+ SandboxBroker::EnsureLpacPermsissionsOnDir(*sBinDir.get());
+
+ // This mirrors Edge's use of the exe path for the SHA1 hash to give a
+ // machine unique name per install.
+ nsAutoString ret;
+ char exePathBuf[MAX_PATH];
+ DWORD pathSize = ::GetModuleFileNameA(nullptr, exePathBuf, MAX_PATH);
+ if (!pathSize) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ SHA1Sum sha1Sum;
+ SHA1Sum::Hash sha1Hash;
+ sha1Sum.update(exePathBuf, pathSize);
+ sha1Sum.finish(sha1Hash);
+
+ nsAutoCString hexEncoded;
+ HexEncode(sha1Hash, hexEncoded);
+ ret = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(hexEncoded);
+ return ret;
+ }();
+
+ if (uniquePackageStr.IsEmpty()) {
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_PROFILE;
+ }
+
+ // The bool parameter is called create_profile, but in fact it tries to create
+ // and then opens if it already exists. So always passing true is fine.
+ bool createOrOpenProfile = true;
+ nsAutoString packageName = aPackagePrefix + uniquePackageStr;
+ sandbox::ResultCode result =
+ aPolicy->AddAppContainerProfile(packageName.get(), createOrOpenProfile);
+ if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ // This looks odd, but unfortunately holding a scoped_refptr and
+ // dereferencing has DCHECKs that cause a linking problem.
+ sandbox::AppContainerProfile* profile =
+ aPolicy->GetAppContainerProfile().get();
+ profile->SetEnableLowPrivilegeAppContainer(true);
+
+ for (auto wkCap : aWellKnownCapabilites) {
+ if (!profile->AddCapability(wkCap)) {
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_PROFILE_CAPABILITY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (auto namedCap : aNamedCapabilites) {
+ if (!profile->AddCapability(namedCap)) {
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_APPCONTAINER_PROFILE_CAPABILITY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForContentProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel,
+ bool aIsFileProcess) {
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(mPolicy, "mPolicy must be set before this call.");
+
+ sandbox::JobLevel jobLevel;
+ sandbox::TokenLevel accessTokenLevel;
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel initialIntegrityLevel;
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel delayedIntegrityLevel;
+
+ // The setting of these levels is pretty arbitrary, but they are a useful (if
+ // crude) tool while we are tightening the policy. Gaps are left to try and
+ // avoid changing their meaning.
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aSandboxLevel >= 1,
+ "Should not be called with aSandboxLevel < 1");
+ if (aSandboxLevel >= 20) {
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED;
+ } else if (aSandboxLevel >= 7) {
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LIMITED;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED;
+ } else if (aSandboxLevel >= 4) {
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LIMITED;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ } else if (aSandboxLevel >= 3) {
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_RESTRICTED;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LIMITED;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ } else if (aSandboxLevel == 2) {
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_INTERACTIVE;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ } else {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(aSandboxLevel == 1);
+
+ jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_NONE;
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_NON_ADMIN;
+ initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ }
+
+ // If the process will handle file: URLs, don't allow settings that
+ // block reads.
+ if (aIsFileProcess) {
+ if (accessTokenLevel < sandbox::USER_NON_ADMIN) {
+ accessTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_NON_ADMIN;
+ }
+ if (delayedIntegrityLevel > sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW) {
+ delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+ // This is required for a MOZ_ASSERT check in WindowsMessageLoop.cpp
+ // WinEventHook, see bug 1366694 for details.
+ DWORD uiExceptions = JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES;
+#else
+ DWORD uiExceptions = 0;
+#endif
+ sandbox::ResultCode result = mPolicy->SetJobLevel(jobLevel, uiExceptions);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "Setting job level failed, have you set memory limit when "
+ "jobLevel == JOB_NONE?");
+
+ // If the delayed access token is not restricted we don't want the initial one
+ // to be either, because it can interfere with running from a network drive.
+ sandbox::TokenLevel initialAccessTokenLevel =
+ (accessTokenLevel == sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED ||
+ accessTokenLevel == sandbox::USER_NON_ADMIN)
+ ? sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED
+ : sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(initialAccessTokenLevel, accessTokenLevel);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "Lockdown level cannot be USER_UNPROTECTED or USER_LAST "
+ "if initial level was USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(initialIntegrityLevel);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail, what happened?");
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(delayedIntegrityLevel);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "SetDelayedIntegrityLevel should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ if (aSandboxLevel > 5) {
+ mPolicy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ mPolicy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+ }
+
+ if (aSandboxLevel > 4) {
+ // Alternate winstation breaks native theming.
+ bool useAlternateWinstation =
+ StaticPrefs::widget_non_native_theme_enabled();
+ result = mPolicy->SetAlternateDesktop(useAlternateWinstation);
+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)) {
+ LOG_W("SetAlternateDesktop failed, result: %i, last error: %lx", result,
+ ::GetLastError());
+ }
+ }
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP | sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_PREFER_SYS32;
+
+#if defined(_M_ARM64)
+ // Disable CFG on older versions of ARM64 Windows to avoid a crash in COM.
+ if (!IsWin10Sep2018UpdateOrLater()) {
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CONTROL_FLOW_GUARD_DISABLE;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_content_shadow_stack_enabled()) {
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
+
+ nsIXULRuntime::ContentWin32kLockdownState win32kLockdownState =
+ GetContentWin32kLockdownState();
+
+ LOG_W("Win32k Lockdown State: '%s'",
+ ContentWin32kLockdownStateToString(win32kLockdownState));
+
+ if (GetContentWin32kLockdownEnabled()) {
+ result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(mPolicy, false);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(result == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK,
+ "Failed to add the win32k lockdown policy");
+ }
+
+ mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
+
+ // We still have edge cases where the child at low integrity can't read some
+ // files, so add a rule to allow read access to everything when required.
+ if (aSandboxLevel == 1 || aIsFileProcess) {
+ result =
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, L"*");
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, "
+ "what happened?");
+ } else {
+ // Add rule to allow access to user specific fonts.
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ sLocalAppDataDir, u"\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Fonts\\*"_ns);
+
+ // Add rule to allow read access to installation directory.
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ sBinDir, u"\\*"_ns);
+
+ // Add rule to allow read access to the chrome directory within profile.
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ sProfileDir, u"\\chrome\\*"_ns);
+
+ // Add rule to allow read access to the extensions directory within profile.
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ sProfileDir, u"\\extensions\\*"_ns);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SYSTEM_EXTENSION_DIRS
+ // Add rule to allow read access to the per-user extensions directory.
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ sUserExtensionsDir, u"\\*"_ns);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Allow content processes to use complex line breaking brokering.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_LINE_BREAK,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::LINE_BREAK_ALLOW, nullptr);
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ if (aSandboxLevel >= 20) {
+ // Content process still needs to be able to read fonts.
+ wchar_t* fontsPath;
+ if (SUCCEEDED(
+ ::SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Fonts, 0, nullptr, &fontsPath))) {
+ std::wstring fontsStr = fontsPath;
+ ::CoTaskMemFree(fontsPath);
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ fontsStr.c_str());
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
+ NS_ERROR("Failed to add fonts dir read access policy rule.");
+ LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add read access to: %S", result,
+ fontsStr.c_str());
+ }
+
+ fontsStr += L"\\*";
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ fontsStr.c_str());
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
+ NS_ERROR("Failed to add fonts read access policy rule.");
+ LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add read access to: %S", result,
+ fontsStr.c_str());
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We still currently create IPC named pipes in the content process.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(
+ sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail.");
+ }
+}
+
+void SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForGPUProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel) {
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(mPolicy, "mPolicy must be set before this call.");
+ MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aSandboxLevel >= 1);
+
+ sandbox::TokenLevel initialTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
+ sandbox::TokenLevel lockdownTokenLevel =
+ (aSandboxLevel >= 2) ? sandbox::USER_LIMITED
+ : sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_NON_ADMIN;
+
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel initialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel delayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+
+ sandbox::JobLevel jobLevel = sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER;
+
+ uint32_t uiExceptions =
+ JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS | JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
+ JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS | JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS;
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags initialMitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_gpu_shadow_stack_enabled()) {
+ initialMitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+ }
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags delayedMitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(mPolicy->SetJobLevel(jobLevel, uiExceptions));
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(
+ mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(initialTokenLevel, lockdownTokenLevel));
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(initialIntegrityLevel));
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(
+ mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(delayedIntegrityLevel));
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(initialMitigations));
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(
+ mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(delayedMitigations));
+
+ mPolicy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ mPolicy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"));
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ SANDBOX_SUCCEED_OR_CRASH(
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*"));
+
+ // The GPU process needs to write to a shader cache for performance reasons
+ if (sProfileDir) {
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY,
+ sProfileDir, u"\\shader-cache"_ns);
+
+ AddCachedDirRule(mPolicy, sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ sProfileDir, u"\\shader-cache\\*"_ns);
+ }
+}
+
+#define SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, message) \
+ do { \
+ MOZ_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result, message); \
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) return false; \
+ } while (0)
+
+bool SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForRDDProcess() {
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ auto result =
+ mPolicy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0 /* ui_exceptions */);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetJobLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
+ sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetTokenLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)) {
+ LOG_W("SetAlternateDesktop failed, result: %i, last error: %lx", result,
+ ::GetLastError());
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these "
+ "arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetDelayedIntegrityLevel should never fail with "
+ "these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ mPolicy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ mPolicy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_PREFER_SYS32;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_rdd_shadow_stack_enabled()) {
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
+
+ mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_rdd_acg_enabled()) {
+ // The RDD process depends on msmpeg2vdec.dll.
+ mitigations |= DynamicCodeFlagForSystemMediaLibraries();
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
+
+ result = AddCigToPolicy(mPolicy);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to initialize signed policy rules.");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForSocketProcess() {
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ auto result =
+ mPolicy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0 /* ui_exceptions */);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetJobLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
+ sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetTokenLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)) {
+ LOG_W("SetAlternateDesktop failed, result: %i, last error: %lx", result,
+ ::GetLastError());
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these "
+ "arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result =
+ mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetDelayedIntegrityLevel should never fail with "
+ "these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ mPolicy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ mPolicy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_PREFER_SYS32;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_socket_shadow_stack_enabled()) {
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_socket_win32k_disable()) {
+ result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(mPolicy, false);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to add the win32k lockdown policy");
+ }
+
+ mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE;
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
+
+ result = AddCigToPolicy(mPolicy);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to initialize signed policy rules.");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+// A strict base sandbox for utility sandboxes to adapt.
+struct UtilitySandboxProps {
+ sandbox::JobLevel mJobLevel = sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN;
+
+ sandbox::TokenLevel mInitialTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
+ sandbox::TokenLevel mDelayedTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN;
+
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel mInitialIntegrityLevel = // before lockdown
+ sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW;
+ sandbox::IntegrityLevel mDelayedIntegrityLevel = // after lockdown
+ sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ bool mUseAlternateWindowStation = true;
+ bool mUseAlternateDesktop = true;
+ bool mLockdownDefaultDacl = true;
+ bool mAddRestrictingRandomSid = true;
+ bool mUseWin32kLockdown = true;
+ bool mUseCig = true;
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mInitialMitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_PREFER_SYS32 |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mDelayedMitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE;
+
+ // Low Privileged Application Container settings;
+ nsString mPackagePrefix;
+ nsTArray<sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities> mWellKnownCapabilites;
+ nsTArray<const wchar_t*> mNamedCapabilites;
+};
+
+struct GenericUtilitySandboxProps : public UtilitySandboxProps {};
+
+struct UtilityAudioDecodingWmfSandboxProps : public UtilitySandboxProps {
+ UtilityAudioDecodingWmfSandboxProps() {
+ mDelayedTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_LIMITED;
+ mDelayedMitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+#ifdef MOZ_WMF
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_utility_wmf_acg_enabled()) {
+ mDelayedMitigations |= DynamicCodeFlagForSystemMediaLibraries();
+ }
+#else
+ mDelayedMitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_DYNAMIC_CODE_DISABLE;
+#endif // MOZ_WMF
+ }
+};
+
+#ifdef MOZ_WMF_MEDIA_ENGINE
+struct UtilityMfMediaEngineCdmSandboxProps : public UtilitySandboxProps {
+ UtilityMfMediaEngineCdmSandboxProps() {
+ mJobLevel = sandbox::JOB_INTERACTIVE;
+ mInitialTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
+ mDelayedTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
+ mUseAlternateDesktop = false;
+ mUseAlternateWindowStation = false;
+ mLockdownDefaultDacl = false;
+ mAddRestrictingRandomSid = false;
+ mUseCig = false;
+
+ // When we have an LPAC we can't set an integrity level and the process will
+ // default to low integrity anyway. Without an LPAC using low integrity
+ // causes problems with the CDMs.
+ mInitialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST;
+ mDelayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_utility_wmf_cdm_lpac_enabled()) {
+ mPackagePrefix = u"fx.sb.cdm"_ns;
+ mWellKnownCapabilites = {
+ sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kPrivateNetworkClientServer,
+ sandbox::WellKnownCapabilities::kInternetClient,
+ };
+ mNamedCapabilites = {
+ L"lpacCom",
+ L"lpacIdentityServices",
+ L"lpacMedia",
+ L"lpacPnPNotifications",
+ L"lpacServicesManagement",
+ L"lpacSessionManagement",
+ L"lpacAppExperience",
+ L"lpacInstrumentation",
+ L"lpacCryptoServices",
+ L"lpacEnterprisePolicyChangeNotifications",
+ L"mediaFoundationCdmFiles",
+ L"lpacMediaFoundationCdmData",
+ L"registryRead",
+ kLpacFirefoxInstallFiles,
+ L"lpacDeviceAccess",
+ };
+
+ // For MSIX packages we need access to the package contents.
+ if (widget::WinUtils::HasPackageIdentity()) {
+ mNamedCapabilites.AppendElement(L"packageContents");
+ }
+ }
+ mUseWin32kLockdown = false;
+ mDelayedMitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+ }
+};
+#endif
+
+struct WindowsUtilitySandboxProps : public UtilitySandboxProps {
+ WindowsUtilitySandboxProps() {
+ mJobLevel = sandbox::JOB_INTERACTIVE;
+ mDelayedTokenLevel = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
+ mUseAlternateWindowStation = false;
+ mInitialIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM;
+ mDelayedIntegrityLevel = sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_MEDIUM;
+ mUseWin32kLockdown = false;
+ mUseCig = false;
+ mDelayedMitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+ }
+};
+
+static const char* WellKnownCapabilityNames[] = {
+ "InternetClient",
+ "InternetClientServer",
+ "PrivateNetworkClientServer",
+ "PicturesLibrary",
+ "VideosLibrary",
+ "MusicLibrary",
+ "DocumentsLibrary",
+ "EnterpriseAuthentication",
+ "SharedUserCertificates",
+ "RemovableStorage",
+ "Appointments",
+ "Contacts",
+};
+
+void LogUtilitySandboxProps(const UtilitySandboxProps& us) {
+ if (!static_cast<LogModule*>(sSandboxBrokerLog)->ShouldLog(LogLevel::Debug)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString logMsg;
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("Building sandbox for utility process:\n");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tJob Level: %d\n", static_cast<int>(us.mJobLevel));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tInitial Token Level: %d\n",
+ static_cast<int>(us.mInitialTokenLevel));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tDelayed Token Level: %d\n",
+ static_cast<int>(us.mDelayedTokenLevel));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tInitial Integrity Level: %d\n",
+ static_cast<int>(us.mInitialIntegrityLevel));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tDelayed Integrity Level: %d\n",
+ static_cast<int>(us.mDelayedIntegrityLevel));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tUse Alternate Window Station: %s\n",
+ us.mUseAlternateWindowStation ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tUse Alternate Desktop: %s\n",
+ us.mUseAlternateDesktop ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tLockdown Default Dacl: %s\n",
+ us.mLockdownDefaultDacl ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tAdd Random Restricting SID: %s\n",
+ us.mAddRestrictingRandomSid ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tUse Win32k Lockdown: %s\n",
+ us.mUseWin32kLockdown ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tUse CIG: %s\n", us.mUseCig ? "yes" : "no");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tInitial mitigations: %016llx\n",
+ static_cast<uint64_t>(us.mInitialMitigations));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tDelayed mitigations: %016llx\n",
+ static_cast<uint64_t>(us.mDelayedMitigations));
+ if (us.mPackagePrefix.IsEmpty()) {
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tNo Low Privileged Application Container\n");
+ } else {
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\tLow Privileged Application Container Settings:\n");
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\t\tPackage Name Prefix: %S\n",
+ static_cast<wchar_t*>(us.mPackagePrefix.get()));
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\t\tWell Known Capabilities:\n");
+ for (auto wkCap : us.mWellKnownCapabilites) {
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\t\t\t%s\n", WellKnownCapabilityNames[wkCap]);
+ }
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\t\tNamed Capabilities:\n");
+ for (auto namedCap : us.mNamedCapabilites) {
+ logMsg.AppendPrintf("\t\t\t%S\n", namedCap);
+ }
+ }
+
+ LOG_D("%s", logMsg.get());
+}
+
+bool BuildUtilitySandbox(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy,
+ const UtilitySandboxProps& us) {
+ LogUtilitySandboxProps(us);
+
+ auto result = policy->SetJobLevel(us.mJobLevel, 0 /* ui_exceptions */);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetJobLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = policy->SetTokenLevel(us.mInitialTokenLevel, us.mDelayedTokenLevel);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetTokenLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ if (us.mInitialIntegrityLevel != sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST) {
+ result = policy->SetIntegrityLevel(us.mInitialIntegrityLevel);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these "
+ "arguments, what happened?");
+ }
+
+ if (us.mDelayedIntegrityLevel != sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST) {
+ result = policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(us.mDelayedIntegrityLevel);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these "
+ "arguments, what happened?");
+ }
+
+ if (us.mUseAlternateDesktop) {
+ result = policy->SetAlternateDesktop(us.mUseAlternateWindowStation);
+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)) {
+ LOG_W("SetAlternateDesktop failed, result: %i, last error: %lx", result,
+ ::GetLastError());
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (us.mLockdownDefaultDacl) {
+ policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ }
+ if (us.mAddRestrictingRandomSid) {
+ policy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+ }
+
+ result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(us.mInitialMitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
+
+ result = policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(us.mDelayedMitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
+
+ // Win32k lockdown might not work on earlier versions
+ // Bug 1719212, 1769992
+ if (us.mUseWin32kLockdown && IsWin10FallCreatorsUpdateOrLater()) {
+ result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy, false);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to add the win32k lockdown policy");
+ }
+
+ if (us.mUseCig) {
+ bool alwaysProxyBinDirLoading = mozilla::HasPackageIdentity();
+ result = AddCigToPolicy(policy, alwaysProxyBinDirLoading);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to initialize signed policy rules.");
+ }
+
+ // Process fails to start in LPAC with ASan build
+#if !defined(MOZ_ASAN)
+ if (!us.mPackagePrefix.IsEmpty()) {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(us.mInitialIntegrityLevel == sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LAST,
+ "Initial integrity level cannot be specified if using an LPAC.");
+
+ result = AddAndConfigureAppContainerProfile(policy, us.mPackagePrefix,
+ us.mWellKnownCapabilites,
+ us.mNamedCapabilites);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to configure AppContainer profile.");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess(
+ mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind aSandbox) {
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ switch (aSandbox) {
+ case mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind::GENERIC_UTILITY:
+ return BuildUtilitySandbox(mPolicy, GenericUtilitySandboxProps());
+ case mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind::UTILITY_AUDIO_DECODING_WMF:
+ return BuildUtilitySandbox(mPolicy,
+ UtilityAudioDecodingWmfSandboxProps());
+#ifdef MOZ_WMF_MEDIA_ENGINE
+ case mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind::MF_MEDIA_ENGINE_CDM:
+ return BuildUtilitySandbox(mPolicy,
+ UtilityMfMediaEngineCdmSandboxProps());
+#endif
+ case mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind::WINDOWS_UTILS:
+ return BuildUtilitySandbox(mPolicy, WindowsUtilitySandboxProps());
+ case mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind::WINDOWS_FILE_DIALOG:
+ // This process type is not sandboxed. (See commentary in
+ // `ipc::IsUtilitySandboxEnabled()`.)
+ MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("No sandboxing for this process type");
+ return false;
+ default:
+ MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unknown sandboxing value");
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+bool SandboxBroker::SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel,
+ bool aIsRemoteLaunch) {
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ auto result =
+ mPolicy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0 /* ui_exceptions */);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetJobLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+ auto level = (aLevel == Restricted) ? sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED
+ : sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN;
+ result = mPolicy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, level);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "SetTokenLevel should never fail with these arguments, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)) {
+ LOG_W("SetAlternateDesktop failed, result: %i, last error: %lx", result,
+ ::GetLastError());
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
+ MOZ_ASSERT(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these arguments, what "
+ "happened?");
+
+ result =
+ mPolicy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "SetIntegrityLevel should never fail with these "
+ "arguments, what happened?");
+
+ mPolicy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
+ mPolicy->AddRestrictingRandomSid();
+
+ sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP;
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_gmp_shadow_stack_enabled()) {
+ mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_CET_COMPAT_MODE;
+ }
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Invalid flags for SetProcessMitigations.");
+
+ if (StaticPrefs::security_sandbox_gmp_win32k_disable()) {
+ result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(mPolicy, true);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, "Failed to add the win32k lockdown policy");
+ }
+
+ mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
+ sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
+
+ result = mPolicy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result,
+ "Invalid flags for SetDelayedProcessMitigations.");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
+ // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
+ // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // Add the policy for the client side of the crash server pipe.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"\\??\\pipe\\gecko-crash-server-pipe.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ // The plugin process can't create named events, but we'll
+ // make an exception for the events used in logging. Removing
+ // this will break EME in debug builds.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY,
+ L"ChromeIPCLog.*");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+#endif
+
+ // The following rules were added because, during analysis of an EME
+ // plugin during development, these registry keys were accessed when
+ // loading the plugin. Commenting out these policy exceptions caused
+ // plugin loading to fail, so they are necessary for proper functioning
+ // of at least one EME plugin.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\LanguageConfiguration");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_LOCAL_"
+ L"MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SideBySide");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // The following rules were added because, during analysis of an EME
+ // plugin during development, these registry keys were accessed when
+ // loading the plugin. Commenting out these policy exceptions did not
+ // cause anything to break during initial testing, but might cause
+ // unforeseen issues down the road.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\MUI\\Settings");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Control "
+ L"Panel\\Desktop");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\PreferredUILanguages");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_LOCAL_"
+ L"MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVer"
+ L"sion\\SideBySide\\PreferExternalManifest");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ // The following rules were added to allow a GMP to be loaded when any
+ // AppLocker DLL rules are specified. If the rules specifically block the DLL
+ // then it will not load.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"\\Device\\SrpDevice");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Srp\\GP\\");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+ // On certain Windows versions there is a double slash before GP in the path.
+ result = mPolicy->AddRule(
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Srp\\\\GP\\");
+ SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS(
+ result,
+ "With these static arguments AddRule should never fail, what happened?");
+
+ return true;
+}
+#undef SANDBOX_ENSURE_SUCCESS
+
+bool SandboxBroker::AllowReadFile(wchar_t const* file) {
+ if (!mPolicy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ auto result =
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, file);
+ if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
+ LOG_E("Failed (ResultCode %d) to add read access to: %S", result, file);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+void SandboxBroker::AddHandleToShare(HANDLE aHandle) {
+ mPolicy->AddHandleToShare(aHandle);
+}
+
+bool SandboxBroker::IsWin32kLockedDown() {
+ return mPolicy->GetProcessMitigations() & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
+}
+
+void SandboxBroker::ApplyLoggingPolicy() {
+ MOZ_ASSERT(mPolicy);
+
+ // Add dummy rules, so that we can log in the interception code.
+ // We already have a file interception set up for the client side of pipes.
+ // Also, passing just "dummy" for file system policy causes win_utils.cc
+ // IsReparsePoint() to loop.
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, L"dummy");
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, L"dummy");
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
+ L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\dummy");
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_SYNC,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, L"dummy");
+ mPolicy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, L"dummy");
+}
+
+SandboxBroker::~SandboxBroker() {
+ if (mPolicy) {
+ mPolicy->Release();
+ mPolicy = nullptr;
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace mozilla
diff --git a/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45a0cbb38b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/sandbox/win/src/sandboxbroker/sandboxBroker.h
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXBROKER_H__
+#define __SECURITY_SANDBOX_SANDBOXBROKER_H__
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <windows.h>
+
+#include "mozilla/ipc/EnvironmentMap.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
+#include "nsISupportsImpl.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/ipc/UtilityProcessSandboxing.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/LaunchError.h"
+#include "mozilla/Result.h"
+
+namespace sandbox {
+class BrokerServices;
+class TargetPolicy;
+} // namespace sandbox
+
+namespace mozilla {
+
+class AbstractSandboxBroker {
+ public:
+ NS_INLINE_DECL_THREADSAFE_REFCOUNTING(AbstractSandboxBroker)
+
+ virtual void Shutdown() = 0;
+ virtual Result<Ok, mozilla::ipc::LaunchError> LaunchApp(
+ const wchar_t* aPath, const wchar_t* aArguments,
+ base::EnvironmentMap& aEnvironment, GeckoProcessType aProcessType,
+ const bool aEnableLogging, const IMAGE_THUNK_DATA* aCachedNtdllThunk,
+ void** aProcessHandle) = 0;
+
+ // Security levels for different types of processes
+ virtual void SetSecurityLevelForContentProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel,
+ bool aIsFileProcess) = 0;
+
+ virtual void SetSecurityLevelForGPUProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel) = 0;
+ virtual bool SetSecurityLevelForRDDProcess() = 0;
+ virtual bool SetSecurityLevelForSocketProcess() = 0;
+ virtual bool SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess(
+ mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind aSandbox) = 0;
+
+ enum SandboxLevel { LockDown, Restricted };
+ virtual bool SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel,
+ bool aIsRemoteLaunch = false) = 0;
+
+ // File system permissions
+ virtual bool AllowReadFile(wchar_t const* file) = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * Share a HANDLE with the child process. The HANDLE will be made available
+ * in the child process at the memory address
+ * |reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(aHandle)|. It is the caller's responsibility
+ * to communicate this address to the child.
+ */
+ virtual void AddHandleToShare(HANDLE aHandle) = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * @return true if policy has win32k locked down, otherwise false
+ */
+ virtual bool IsWin32kLockedDown() = 0;
+
+ protected:
+ virtual ~AbstractSandboxBroker() {}
+};
+
+class SandboxBroker : public AbstractSandboxBroker {
+ public:
+ SandboxBroker();
+
+ static void Initialize(sandbox::BrokerServices* aBrokerServices);
+
+ static void EnsureLpacPermsissionsOnDir(const nsString& aDir);
+
+ void Shutdown() override {}
+
+ /**
+ * Do initialization that depends on parts of the Gecko machinery having been
+ * created first.
+ */
+ static void GeckoDependentInitialize();
+
+ Result<Ok, mozilla::ipc::LaunchError> LaunchApp(
+ const wchar_t* aPath, const wchar_t* aArguments,
+ base::EnvironmentMap& aEnvironment, GeckoProcessType aProcessType,
+ const bool aEnableLogging, const IMAGE_THUNK_DATA* aCachedNtdllThunk,
+ void** aProcessHandle) override;
+ virtual ~SandboxBroker();
+
+ // Security levels for different types of processes
+ void SetSecurityLevelForContentProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel,
+ bool aIsFileProcess) override;
+
+ void SetSecurityLevelForGPUProcess(int32_t aSandboxLevel) override;
+ bool SetSecurityLevelForRDDProcess() override;
+ bool SetSecurityLevelForSocketProcess() override;
+ bool SetSecurityLevelForGMPlugin(SandboxLevel aLevel,
+ bool aIsRemoteLaunch = false) override;
+ bool SetSecurityLevelForUtilityProcess(
+ mozilla::ipc::SandboxingKind aSandbox) override;
+
+ // File system permissions
+ bool AllowReadFile(wchar_t const* file) override;
+
+ /**
+ * Share a HANDLE with the child process. The HANDLE will be made available
+ * in the child process at the memory address
+ * |reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(aHandle)|. It is the caller's responsibility
+ * to communicate this address to the child.
+ */
+ void AddHandleToShare(HANDLE aHandle) override;
+
+ bool IsWin32kLockedDown() final;
+
+ // Set up dummy interceptions via the broker, so we can log calls.
+ void ApplyLoggingPolicy();
+
+ private:
+ static bool sRunningFromNetworkDrive;
+ sandbox::TargetPolicy* mPolicy;
+};
+
+} // namespace mozilla
+
+#endif