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Diffstat (limited to 'security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp | 1134 |
1 files changed, 1134 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a0c669579 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/manager/ssl/SSLServerCertVerification.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,1134 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +// During certificate authentication, we call CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert. +// This function may make zero or more HTTP requests (e.g. to gather revocation +// information). Our fetching logic for these requests processes them on the +// socket transport service thread. +// +// Because the connection for which we are verifying the certificate is +// happening on the socket transport thread, if our cert auth hook were to call +// VerifySSLServerCert directly, there would be a deadlock: VerifySSLServerCert +// would cause an event to be asynchronously posted to the socket transport +// thread, and then it would block the socket transport thread waiting to be +// notified of the HTTP response. However, the HTTP request would never actually +// be processed because the socket transport thread would be blocked and so it +// wouldn't be able process HTTP requests. +// +// Consequently, when we are asked to verify a certificate, we must always call +// VerifySSLServerCert on another thread. To accomplish this, our auth cert hook +// dispatches a SSLServerCertVerificationJob to a pool of background threads, +// and then immediately returns SECWouldBlock to libssl. These jobs are where +// VerifySSLServerCert is actually called. +// +// When our auth cert hook returns SECWouldBlock, libssl will carry on the +// handshake while we validate the certificate. This will free up the socket +// transport thread so that HTTP requests--including the OCSP requests needed +// for cert verification as mentioned above--can be processed. +// +// Once VerifySSLServerCert returns, the cert verification job dispatches a +// SSLServerCertVerificationResult to the socket transport thread; the +// SSLServerCertVerificationResult will notify libssl that the certificate +// authentication is complete. Once libssl is notified that the authentication +// is complete, it will continue the TLS handshake (if it hasn't already +// finished) and it will begin allowing us to send/receive data on the +// connection. +// +// Timeline of events (for connections managed by the socket transport service): +// +// * libssl calls SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch on the socket +// transport thread. +// * SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch queues a job +// (instance of SSLServerCertVerificationJob) to its background thread +// pool and returns. +// * One of the background threads calls CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert, +// which may enqueue some HTTP request(s) onto the socket transport thread, +// and then blocks that background thread waiting for the responses and/or +// timeouts or errors for those requests. +// * Once those HTTP responses have all come back or failed, the +// CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert function returns a result indicating +// that the validation succeeded or failed. +// * If the validation succeeded, then a SSLServerCertVerificationResult +// event is posted to the socket transport thread, and the cert +// verification thread becomes free to verify other certificates. +// * Otherwise, we do cert override processing to see if the validation +// error can be convered by override rules. The result of this processing +// is similarly dispatched in a SSLServerCertVerificationResult. +// * The SSLServerCertVerificationResult event will either wake up the +// socket (using SSL_AuthCertificateComplete) if validation succeeded or +// there was an error override, or it will set an error flag so that the +// next I/O operation on the socket will fail, causing the socket transport +// thread to close the connection. +// +// SSLServerCertVerificationResult must be dispatched to the socket transport +// thread because we must only call SSL_* functions on the socket transport +// thread since they may do I/O, because many parts of NSSSocketControl and the +// PSM NSS I/O layer are not thread-safe, and because we need the event to +// interrupt the PR_Poll that may waiting for I/O on the socket for which we +// are validating the cert. +// +// When socket process is enabled, libssl is running on socket process. To +// perform certificate authentication with CertVerifier, we have to send all +// needed information to parent process and send the result back to socket +// process via IPC. The workflow is described below. +// 1. In AuthCertificateHookInternal(), we call RemoteProcessCertVerification() +// instead of SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch when we are on socket +// process. +// 2. In RemoteProcessCertVerification(), PVerifySSLServerCert actors will be +// created on IPDL background thread for carrying needed information via IPC. +// 3. On parent process, VerifySSLServerCertParent is created and it calls +// SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch for doing certificate verification +// on one of CertVerificationThreads. +// 4. When validation is done, OnVerifiedSSLServerCertSuccess IPC message is +// sent through the IPDL background thread when +// CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert returns Success. Otherwise, +// OnVerifiedSSLServerCertFailure is sent. +// 5. After setp 4, PVerifySSLServerCert actors will be released. The +// verification result will be dispatched via +// SSLServerCertVerificationResult. + +#include "SSLServerCertVerification.h" + +#include <cstring> + +#include "CertVerifier.h" +#include "CryptoTask.h" +#include "ExtendedValidation.h" +#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h" +#include "NSSSocketControl.h" +#include "PSMRunnable.h" +#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h" +#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h" +#include "SharedCertVerifier.h" +#include "SharedSSLState.h" +#include "VerifySSLServerCertChild.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "mozilla/Assertions.h" +#include "mozilla/Casting.h" +#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" +#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" +#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" +#include "mozilla/Unused.h" +#include "mozilla/glean/GleanMetrics.h" +#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" +#include "nsICertOverrideService.h" +#include "nsIPublicKeyPinningService.h" +#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h" +#include "nsISocketProvider.h" +#include "nsThreadPool.h" +#include "nsNetUtil.h" +#include "nsNSSCertificate.h" +#include "nsNSSComponent.h" +#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h" +#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" +#include "nsString.h" +#include "nsURLHelper.h" +#include "nsXPCOMCIDInternal.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkix.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixcheck.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h" +#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "secport.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "sslexp.h" + +extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog; + +using namespace mozilla::pkix; + +namespace mozilla { +namespace psm { + +// do not use a nsCOMPtr to avoid static initializer/destructor +nsIThreadPool* gCertVerificationThreadPool = nullptr; + +// Called when the socket transport thread starts, to initialize the SSL cert +// verification thread pool. By tying the thread pool startup/shutdown directly +// to the STS thread's lifetime, we ensure that they are *always* available for +// SSL connections and that there are no races during startup and especially +// shutdown. (Previously, we have had multiple problems with races in PSM +// background threads, and the race-prevention/shutdown logic used there is +// brittle. Since this service is critical to things like downloading updates, +// we take no chances.) Also, by doing things this way, we avoid the need for +// locks, since gCertVerificationThreadPool is only ever accessed on the socket +// transport thread. +void InitializeSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() { + // TODO: tuning, make parameters preferences + gCertVerificationThreadPool = new nsThreadPool(); + NS_ADDREF(gCertVerificationThreadPool); + + (void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetIdleThreadLimit(5); + (void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetIdleThreadTimeout(30 * 1000); + (void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetThreadLimit(5); + (void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetName("SSL Cert"_ns); +} + +// Called when the socket transport thread finishes, to destroy the thread +// pool. Since the socket transport service has stopped processing events, it +// will not attempt any more SSL I/O operations, so it is clearly safe to shut +// down the SSL cert verification infrastructure. Also, the STS will not +// dispatch many SSL verification result events at this point, so any pending +// cert verifications will (correctly) fail at the point they are dispatched. +// +// The other shutdown race condition that is possible is a race condition with +// shutdown of the nsNSSComponent service. We use the +// nsNSSShutdownPreventionLock where needed (not here) to prevent that. +void StopSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() { + if (gCertVerificationThreadPool) { + gCertVerificationThreadPool->Shutdown(); + NS_RELEASE(gCertVerificationThreadPool); + } +} + +// A probe value of 1 means "no error". +uint32_t MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) { + switch (errorCode) { + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + return 2; + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + return 3; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + return 4; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + return 5; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + return 6; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + return 7; + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: + return 8; + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: + return 9; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + return 10; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY: + return 11; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: + return 12; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE: + return 13; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE: + return 14; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + return 15; + case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: + return 16; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: + return 17; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED: + return 18; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + return 19; + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_MITM_DETECTED: + return 20; + } + NS_WARNING( + "Unknown certificate error code. Does MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue " + "handle everything in CategorizeCertificateError?"); + return 0; +} + +static uint32_t MapCertErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) { + uint32_t probeValue; + switch (errorCode) { + // see security/pkix/include/pkix/Result.h +#define MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(name, value, nss_name) \ + case nss_name: \ + probeValue = value; \ + break; + MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP_LIST +#undef MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP + default: + return 0; + } + + // Since FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is 0x800, fatal error values are much larger than + // non-fatal error values. To conserve space, we remap these so they start at + // (decimal) 90 instead of 0x800. Currently there are ~50 non-fatal errors + // mozilla::pkix might return, so saving space for 90 should be sufficient + // (similarly, there are 4 fatal errors, so saving space for 10 should also + // be sufficient). + static_assert( + FATAL_ERROR_FLAG == 0x800, + "mozilla::pkix::FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is not what we were expecting"); + if (probeValue & FATAL_ERROR_FLAG) { + probeValue ^= FATAL_ERROR_FLAG; + probeValue += 90; + } + return probeValue; +} + +// If the given PRErrorCode is an overridable certificate error, return which +// category (trust, time, domain mismatch) it falls in. If it is not +// overridable, return Nothing. +Maybe<nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory> +CategorizeCertificateError(PRErrorCode certificateError) { + switch (certificateError) { + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_MITM_DETECTED: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: + return Some( + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TRUST); + + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: + return Some( + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_DOMAIN); + + case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE: + return Some( + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_TIME); + + default: + break; + } + return Nothing(); +} + +// Helper function to determine if overrides are allowed for this host. +// Overrides are not allowed for known HSTS hosts or hosts with pinning +// information. However, IP addresses can never be HSTS hosts and don't have +// pinning information. +static nsresult OverrideAllowedForHost( + uint64_t aPtrForLog, const nsACString& aHostname, + const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, /*out*/ bool& aOverrideAllowed) { + aOverrideAllowed = false; + + // If this is an IP address, overrides are allowed, because an IP address is + // never an HSTS host. nsISiteSecurityService takes this into account + // already, but the real problem here is that calling NS_NewURI with an IPv6 + // address fails. We do this to avoid that. A more comprehensive fix would be + // to have Necko provide an nsIURI to PSM and to use that here (and + // everywhere). However, that would be a wide-spanning change. + if (net_IsValidIPv6Addr(aHostname)) { + aOverrideAllowed = true; + return NS_OK; + } + + // If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host or a pinned host and the + // certificate is bad, don't allow overrides (RFC 6797 section 12.1). + bool strictTransportSecurityEnabled = false; + bool isStaticallyPinned = false; + nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss(do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID)); + if (!sss) { + MOZ_LOG( + gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] Couldn't get nsISiteSecurityService to check HSTS", + aPtrForLog)); + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), "https://"_ns + aHostname); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] Creating new URI failed", aPtrForLog)); + return rv; + } + + rv = + sss->IsSecureURI(uri, aOriginAttributes, &strictTransportSecurityEnabled); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] checking for HSTS failed", aPtrForLog)); + return rv; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIPublicKeyPinningService> pkps = + do_GetService(NS_PKPSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + if (!pkps) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 + "] Couldn't get nsIPublicKeyPinningService to check pinning", + aPtrForLog)); + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + rv = pkps->HostHasPins(uri, &isStaticallyPinned); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] checking for static pin failed", aPtrForLog)); + return rv; + } + + aOverrideAllowed = !strictTransportSecurityEnabled && !isStaticallyPinned; + return NS_OK; +} + +// This function assumes that we will only use the SPDY connection coalescing +// feature on connections where we have negotiated SPDY using NPN. If we ever +// talk SPDY without having negotiated it with SPDY, this code will give wrong +// and perhaps unsafe results. +// +// Returns SECSuccess on the initial handshake of all connections, on +// renegotiations for any connections where we did not negotiate SPDY, or on any +// SPDY connection where the server's certificate did not change. +// +// Prohibit changing the server cert only if we negotiated SPDY, +// in order to support SPDY's cross-origin connection pooling. +static SECStatus BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy( + NSSSocketControl* socketControl, const UniqueCERTCertificate& serverCert) { + if (!socketControl->IsHandshakeCompleted()) { + // first handshake on this connection, not a + // renegotiation. + return SECSuccess; + } + + // Filter out sockets that did not neogtiate SPDY via NPN + nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo; + nsresult rv = socketControl->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(securityInfo)); + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), "GetSecurityInfo() failed during renegotiation"); + if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !securityInfo) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + nsAutoCString negotiatedNPN; + rv = securityInfo->GetNegotiatedNPN(negotiatedNPN); + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), + "GetNegotiatedNPN() failed during renegotiation"); + + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !StringBeginsWith(negotiatedNPN, "spdy/"_ns)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + // If GetNegotiatedNPN() failed we will assume spdy for safety's safe + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy failed GetNegotiatedNPN() call." + " Assuming spdy.")); + } + + // Check to see if the cert has actually changed + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(socketControl->GetServerCert()); + if (!cert) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + nsTArray<uint8_t> certDER; + if (NS_FAILED(cert->GetRawDER(certDER))) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + if (certDER.Length() == serverCert->derCert.len && + memcmp(certDER.Elements(), serverCert->derCert.data, certDER.Length()) == + 0) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + // Report an error - changed cert is confirmed + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("SPDY refused to allow new cert during renegotiation")); + PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED, 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +void GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(const ct::VerifiedSCT& verifiedSct) { + // See SSL_SCTS_ORIGIN in Histograms.json. + uint32_t origin = 0; + switch (verifiedSct.origin) { + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::Embedded: + origin = 1; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::TLSExtension: + origin = 2; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::OCSPResponse: + origin = 3; + break; + default: + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected VerifiedSCT::Origin type"); + } + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_ORIGIN, origin); + + // See SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS in Histograms.json. + uint32_t verificationStatus = 0; + switch (verifiedSct.status) { + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::Valid: + verificationStatus = 1; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::UnknownLog: + verificationStatus = 2; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature: + verificationStatus = 3; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidTimestamp: + verificationStatus = 4; + break; + case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::ValidFromDisqualifiedLog: + verificationStatus = 5; + break; + default: + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected VerifiedSCT::Status type"); + } + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS, + verificationStatus); +} + +void GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry( + const nsTArray<uint8_t>& rootCert, bool isEV, + const CertificateTransparencyInfo& info) { + if (!info.enabled) { + // No telemetry is gathered when CT is disabled. + return; + } + + for (const ct::VerifiedSCT& sct : info.verifyResult.verifiedScts) { + GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(sct); + } + + // Decoding errors are reported to the 0th bucket + // of the SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS enumerated probe. + for (size_t i = 0; i < info.verifyResult.decodingErrors; ++i) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS, 0); + } + + // Handle the histogram of SCTs counts. + uint32_t sctsCount = + static_cast<uint32_t>(info.verifyResult.verifiedScts.size()); + // Note that sctsCount can also be 0 in case we've received SCT binary data, + // but it failed to parse (e.g. due to unsupported CT protocol version). + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_PER_CONNECTION, sctsCount); + + // Report CT Policy compliance by CA. + switch (info.policyCompliance) { + case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Compliant: + AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA( + Telemetry::SSL_CT_POLICY_COMPLIANT_CONNECTIONS_BY_CA, rootCert); + break; + case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotEnoughScts: + case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotDiverseScts: + AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA( + Telemetry::SSL_CT_POLICY_NON_COMPLIANT_CONNECTIONS_BY_CA, rootCert); + break; + case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Unknown: + default: + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected CTPolicyCompliance type"); + } +} + +// This function collects telemetry about certs. It will be called on one of +// CertVerificationThread. When the socket process is used this will be called +// on the parent process. +static void CollectCertTelemetry( + mozilla::pkix::Result aCertVerificationResult, EVStatus aEVStatus, + CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus aOcspStaplingStatus, + KeySizeStatus aKeySizeStatus, + const PinningTelemetryInfo& aPinningTelemetryInfo, + const nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& aBuiltCertChain, + const CertificateTransparencyInfo& aCertificateTransparencyInfo, + const IssuerSources& issuerSources) { + uint32_t evStatus = (aCertVerificationResult != Success) ? 0 // 0 = Failure + : (aEVStatus != EVStatus::EV) ? 1 // 1 = DV + : 2; // 2 = EV + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_EV_STATUS, evStatus); + + if (aOcspStaplingStatus != CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, aOcspStaplingStatus); + } + + if (aKeySizeStatus != KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_CHAIN_KEY_SIZE_STATUS, + static_cast<uint32_t>(aKeySizeStatus)); + } + + if (aPinningTelemetryInfo.accumulateForRoot) { + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_FAILURES_BY_CA, + aPinningTelemetryInfo.rootBucket); + } + + if (aPinningTelemetryInfo.accumulateResult) { + MOZ_ASSERT(aPinningTelemetryInfo.certPinningResultHistogram.isSome()); + Telemetry::Accumulate( + aPinningTelemetryInfo.certPinningResultHistogram.value(), + aPinningTelemetryInfo.certPinningResultBucket); + } + + if (aCertVerificationResult == Success && aBuiltCertChain.Length() > 0) { + const nsTArray<uint8_t>& rootCert = aBuiltCertChain.LastElement(); + AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_SUCCESS_BY_CA, + rootCert); + GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(rootCert, aEVStatus == EVStatus::EV, + aCertificateTransparencyInfo); + + mozilla::glean::tls::certificate_verifications.Add(1); + if (issuerSources.contains(IssuerSource::TLSHandshake)) { + mozilla::glean::verification_used_cert_from::tls_handshake.AddToNumerator( + 1); + } + if (issuerSources.contains(IssuerSource::PreloadedIntermediates)) { + mozilla::glean::verification_used_cert_from::preloaded_intermediates + .AddToNumerator(1); + } + if (issuerSources.contains(IssuerSource::ThirdPartyCertificates)) { + mozilla::glean::verification_used_cert_from::third_party_certificates + .AddToNumerator(1); + } + if (issuerSources.contains(IssuerSource::NSSCertDB)) { + mozilla::glean::verification_used_cert_from::nss_cert_db.AddToNumerator( + 1); + } + if (issuerSources.contains(IssuerSource::BuiltInRootsModule)) { + mozilla::glean::verification_used_cert_from::built_in_roots_module + .AddToNumerator(1); + } + } +} + +// Note: Takes ownership of |peerCertChain| if SECSuccess is not returned. +Result AuthCertificate( + CertVerifier& certVerifier, void* aPinArg, + const nsTArray<uint8_t>& certBytes, + const nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& peerCertChain, + const nsACString& aHostName, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, + const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& stapledOCSPResponse, + const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLSExtension, + const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo>& dcInfo, uint32_t providerFlags, + Time time, uint32_t certVerifierFlags, + /*out*/ nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& builtCertChain, + /*out*/ EVStatus& evStatus, + /*out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo& certificateTransparencyInfo, + /*out*/ bool& aIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot, + /*out*/ bool& aMadeOCSPRequests) { + CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus ocspStaplingStatus = + CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED; + KeySizeStatus keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked; + PinningTelemetryInfo pinningTelemetryInfo; + + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> peerCertsBytes; + // Don't include the end-entity certificate. + if (!peerCertChain.IsEmpty()) { + std::transform( + peerCertChain.cbegin() + 1, peerCertChain.cend(), + MakeBackInserter(peerCertsBytes), + [](const auto& elementArray) { return elementArray.Clone(); }); + } + + IssuerSources issuerSources; + Result rv = certVerifier.VerifySSLServerCert( + certBytes, time, aPinArg, aHostName, builtCertChain, certVerifierFlags, + Some(std::move(peerCertsBytes)), stapledOCSPResponse, + sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo, aOriginAttributes, &evStatus, + &ocspStaplingStatus, &keySizeStatus, &pinningTelemetryInfo, + &certificateTransparencyInfo, &aIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot, + &aMadeOCSPRequests, &issuerSources); + + CollectCertTelemetry(rv, evStatus, ocspStaplingStatus, keySizeStatus, + pinningTelemetryInfo, builtCertChain, + certificateTransparencyInfo, issuerSources); + + return rv; +} + +PRErrorCode AuthCertificateParseResults( + uint64_t aPtrForLog, const nsACString& aHostName, int32_t aPort, + const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, + const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& aCert, mozilla::pkix::Time aTime, + PRErrorCode aCertVerificationError, + /* out */ + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory& + aOverridableErrorCategory) { + uint32_t probeValue = MapCertErrorToProbeValue(aCertVerificationError); + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION_ERRORS, probeValue); + + Maybe<nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory> + maybeOverridableErrorCategory = + CategorizeCertificateError(aCertVerificationError); + // If this isn't an overridable error, return it now. This will stop the + // connection and report the given error. + if (!maybeOverridableErrorCategory.isSome()) { + return aCertVerificationError; + } + aOverridableErrorCategory = *maybeOverridableErrorCategory; + + bool overrideAllowed = false; + nsresult rv = OverrideAllowedForHost(aPtrForLog, aHostName, aOriginAttributes, + overrideAllowed); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return aCertVerificationError; + } + + if (!overrideAllowed) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] HSTS or pinned host - no overrides allowed", + aPtrForLog)); + return aCertVerificationError; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsICertOverrideService> overrideService = + do_GetService(NS_CERTOVERRIDE_CONTRACTID); + if (!overrideService) { + return aCertVerificationError; + } + bool haveOverride; + bool isTemporaryOverride; + rv = overrideService->HasMatchingOverride(aHostName, aPort, aOriginAttributes, + aCert, &isTemporaryOverride, + &haveOverride); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return aCertVerificationError; + } + Unused << isTemporaryOverride; + if (haveOverride) { + uint32_t probeValue = + MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(aCertVerificationError); + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, probeValue); + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[0x%" PRIx64 "] certificate error overridden", aPtrForLog)); + return 0; + } + + return aCertVerificationError; +} + +static nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> CreateCertBytesArray( + const UniqueCERTCertList& aCertChain) { + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certsBytes; + for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(aCertChain); + !CERT_LIST_END(n, aCertChain); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) { + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes; + certBytes.AppendElements(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len); + certsBytes.AppendElement(std::move(certBytes)); + } + return certsBytes; +} + +/*static*/ +SECStatus SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch( + uint64_t addrForLogging, void* aPinArg, + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& peerCertChain, const nsACString& aHostName, + int32_t aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& stapledOCSPResponse, + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLSExtension, + Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo>& dcInfo, uint32_t providerFlags, Time time, + uint32_t certVerifierFlags, + BaseSSLServerCertVerificationResult* aResultTask) { + // Runs on the socket transport thread + if (!aResultTask || peerCertChain.IsEmpty()) { + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE( + "must have result task and non-empty peer cert chain"); + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!gCertVerificationThreadPool) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationJob> job(new SSLServerCertVerificationJob( + addrForLogging, aPinArg, std::move(peerCertChain), aHostName, aPort, + aOriginAttributes, stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo, + providerFlags, time, certVerifierFlags, aResultTask)); + + nsresult nrv = gCertVerificationThreadPool->Dispatch(job, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); + if (NS_FAILED(nrv)) { + // We can't call SetCertVerificationResult here to change + // mCertVerificationState because SetCertVerificationResult will call + // libssl functions that acquire SSL locks that are already being held at + // this point. However, we can set an error with PR_SetError and return + // SECFailure, and the correct thing will happen (the error will be + // propagated and this connection will be terminated). + PRErrorCode error = nrv == NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ? PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR + : PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; + PR_SetError(error, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0); + return SECWouldBlock; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run() { + // Runs on a cert verification thread and only on parent process. + MOZ_ASSERT(XRE_IsParentProcess()); + + MOZ_LOG( + gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%" PRIx64 "] SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run\n", mAddrForLogging)); + + RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier()); + if (!certVerifier) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED, 0); + return NS_OK; + } + + TimeStamp jobStartTime = TimeStamp::Now(); + EVStatus evStatus; + CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo; + bool isCertChainRootBuiltInRoot = false; + bool madeOCSPRequests = false; + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> builtChainBytesArray; + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes(mPeerCertChain.ElementAt(0).Clone()); + Result rv = AuthCertificate( + *certVerifier, mPinArg, certBytes, mPeerCertChain, mHostName, + mOriginAttributes, mStapledOCSPResponse, mSCTsFromTLSExtension, mDCInfo, + mProviderFlags, mTime, mCertVerifierFlags, builtChainBytesArray, evStatus, + certificateTransparencyInfo, isCertChainRootBuiltInRoot, + madeOCSPRequests); + + if (rv == Success) { + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX, jobStartTime, + TimeStamp::Now()); + Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, 1); + + mResultTask->Dispatch( + std::move(builtChainBytesArray), std::move(mPeerCertChain), + TransportSecurityInfo::ConvertCertificateTransparencyInfoToStatus( + certificateTransparencyInfo), + evStatus, true, 0, + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET, + isCertChainRootBuiltInRoot, mProviderFlags, madeOCSPRequests); + return NS_OK; + } + + Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta( + Telemetry::SSL_INITIAL_FAILED_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX, + jobStartTime, TimeStamp::Now()); + + PRErrorCode error = MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv); + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory overridableErrorCategory = + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET; + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(certBytes))); + PRErrorCode finalError = AuthCertificateParseResults( + mAddrForLogging, mHostName, mPort, mOriginAttributes, cert, mTime, error, + overridableErrorCategory); + + // NB: finalError may be 0 here, in which the connection will continue. + mResultTask->Dispatch( + std::move(builtChainBytesArray), std::move(mPeerCertChain), + nsITransportSecurityInfo::CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_NOT_APPLICABLE, + EVStatus::NotEV, false, finalError, overridableErrorCategory, false, + mProviderFlags, madeOCSPRequests); + return NS_OK; +} + +// Takes information needed for cert verification, does some consistency +// checks and calls SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch. +SECStatus AuthCertificateHookInternal( + CommonSocketControl* socketControl, const void* aPtrForLogging, + const nsACString& hostName, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& peerCertChain, + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& stapledOCSPResponse, + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLSExtension, + Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo>& dcInfo, uint32_t providerFlags, + uint32_t certVerifierFlags) { + // Runs on the socket transport thread + + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] starting AuthCertificateHookInternal\n", aPtrForLogging)); + + if (!socketControl || peerCertChain.IsEmpty()) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + bool onSTSThread; + nsresult nrv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &nrv); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nrv)) { + nrv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread); + } + + if (NS_FAILED(nrv)) { + NS_ERROR("Could not get STS service or IsOnCurrentThread failed"); + PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + MOZ_ASSERT(onSTSThread); + + if (!onSTSThread) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + uint64_t addr = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(aPtrForLogging); + RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> resultTask = + new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(socketControl); + + if (XRE_IsSocketProcess()) { + return RemoteProcessCertVerification( + std::move(peerCertChain), hostName, socketControl->GetPort(), + socketControl->GetOriginAttributes(), stapledOCSPResponse, + sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo, providerFlags, certVerifierFlags, + resultTask); + } + + // We *must* do certificate verification on a background thread because + // we need the socket transport thread to be free for our OCSP requests, + // and we *want* to do certificate verification on a background thread + // because of the performance benefits of doing so. + return SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch( + addr, socketControl, std::move(peerCertChain), hostName, + socketControl->GetPort(), socketControl->GetOriginAttributes(), + stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo, providerFlags, Now(), + certVerifierFlags, resultTask); +} + +// Extracts whatever information we need out of fd (using SSL_*) and passes it +// to AuthCertificateHookInternal. AuthCertificateHookInternal will call +// SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch. SSLServerCertVerificationJob +// should never do anything with fd except logging. +SECStatus AuthCertificateHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* fd, PRBool checkSig, + PRBool isServer) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("[%p] starting AuthCertificateHook\n", fd)); + + // Modern libssl always passes PR_TRUE for checkSig, and we have no means of + // doing verification without checking signatures. + MOZ_ASSERT(checkSig, "AuthCertificateHook: checkSig unexpectedly false"); + + // PSM never causes libssl to call this function with PR_TRUE for isServer, + // and many things in PSM assume that we are a client. + MOZ_ASSERT(!isServer, "AuthCertificateHook: isServer unexpectedly true"); + + NSSSocketControl* socketInfo = static_cast<NSSSocketControl*>(arg); + + UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(SSL_PeerCertificate(fd)); + + if (!checkSig || isServer || !socketInfo || !serverCert) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + socketInfo->SetFullHandshake(); + + if (BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(socketInfo, serverCert) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChain(SSL_PeerCertificateChain(fd)); + if (!peerCertChain) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> peerCertsBytes = + CreateCertBytesArray(peerCertChain); + + // SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses will never return a non-empty response if + // OCSP stapling wasn't enabled because libssl wouldn't have let the server + // return a stapled OCSP response. + // We don't own these pointers. + const SECItemArray* csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd); + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> stapledOCSPResponse; + // we currently only support single stapled responses + if (csa && csa->len == 1) { + stapledOCSPResponse.emplace(); + stapledOCSPResponse->SetCapacity(csa->items[0].len); + stapledOCSPResponse->AppendElements(csa->items[0].data, csa->items[0].len); + } + + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> sctsFromTLSExtension; + const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem = SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(fd); + if (sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem) { + sctsFromTLSExtension.emplace(); + sctsFromTLSExtension->SetCapacity(sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->len); + sctsFromTLSExtension->AppendElements(sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->data, + sctsFromTLSExtensionSECItem->len); + } + + uint32_t providerFlags = 0; + socketInfo->GetProviderFlags(&providerFlags); + + uint32_t certVerifierFlags = 0; + if (!socketInfo->SharedState().IsOCSPStaplingEnabled() || + !socketInfo->SharedState().IsOCSPMustStapleEnabled()) { + certVerifierFlags |= CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST; + } + + // Get DC information + Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo> dcInfo; + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo channelPreInfo; + SECStatus rv = SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(fd, &channelPreInfo, + sizeof(channelPreInfo)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + if (channelPreInfo.peerDelegCred) { + dcInfo.emplace(DelegatedCredentialInfo(channelPreInfo.signatureScheme, + channelPreInfo.authKeyBits)); + } + + // If we configured an ECHConfig and NSS returned the public name + // for verification, ECH was rejected. Proceed, verifying to the + // public name. The result determines how NSS will fail (i.e. with + // any provided retry_configs if successful). See draft-ietf-tls-esni-08. + nsCString echConfig; + nsresult nsrv = socketInfo->GetEchConfig(echConfig); + bool verifyToEchPublicName = + NS_SUCCEEDED(nsrv) && echConfig.Length() && channelPreInfo.echPublicName; + + const nsCString echPublicName(channelPreInfo.echPublicName); + const nsACString& hostname = + verifyToEchPublicName ? echPublicName : socketInfo->GetHostName(); + socketInfo->SetCertVerificationWaiting(); + rv = AuthCertificateHookInternal(socketInfo, static_cast<const void*>(fd), + hostname, std::move(peerCertsBytes), + stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, + dcInfo, providerFlags, certVerifierFlags); + return rv; +} + +// Takes information needed for cert verification, does some consistency +// checks and calls SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch. +// This function is used for Quic. +SECStatus AuthCertificateHookWithInfo( + CommonSocketControl* socketControl, const nsACString& aHostName, + const void* aPtrForLogging, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& peerCertChain, + Maybe<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>>& stapledOCSPResponses, + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLSExtension, uint32_t providerFlags) { + if (peerCertChain.IsEmpty()) { + PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + + // we currently only support single stapled responses + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> stapledOCSPResponse; + if (stapledOCSPResponses && (stapledOCSPResponses->Length() == 1)) { + stapledOCSPResponse.emplace(stapledOCSPResponses->ElementAt(0).Clone()); + } + + uint32_t certVerifierFlags = 0; + // QuicSocketControl does not have a SharedState as NSSSocketControl. + // Here we need prefs for ocsp. This are prefs they are the same for + // PublicSSLState and PrivateSSLState, just take them from one of them. + if (!PublicSSLState()->IsOCSPStaplingEnabled() || + !PublicSSLState()->IsOCSPMustStapleEnabled()) { + certVerifierFlags |= CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST; + } + + // Need to update Quic stack to reflect the PreliminaryInfo fields + // for Delegated Credentials. + Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo> dcInfo; + + return AuthCertificateHookInternal(socketControl, aPtrForLogging, aHostName, + std::move(peerCertChain), + stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, + dcInfo, providerFlags, certVerifierFlags); +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED0(SSLServerCertVerificationResult, Runnable) + +SSLServerCertVerificationResult::SSLServerCertVerificationResult( + CommonSocketControl* socketControl) + : Runnable("psm::SSLServerCertVerificationResult"), + mSocketControl(socketControl), + mCertificateTransparencyStatus(0), + mEVStatus(EVStatus::NotEV), + mSucceeded(false), + mFinalError(0), + mOverridableErrorCategory( + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET), + mProviderFlags(0) {} + +void SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Dispatch( + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain, + nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aPeerCertChain, + uint16_t aCertificateTransparencyStatus, EVStatus aEVStatus, + bool aSucceeded, PRErrorCode aFinalError, + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory + aOverridableErrorCategory, + bool aIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot, uint32_t aProviderFlags, + bool aMadeOCSPRequests) { + mBuiltChain = std::move(aBuiltChain); + mPeerCertChain = std::move(aPeerCertChain); + mCertificateTransparencyStatus = aCertificateTransparencyStatus; + mEVStatus = aEVStatus; + mSucceeded = aSucceeded; + mFinalError = aFinalError; + mOverridableErrorCategory = aOverridableErrorCategory; + mIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot = aIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot; + mProviderFlags = aProviderFlags; + mMadeOCSPRequests = aMadeOCSPRequests; + + if (mSucceeded && mBuiltChain.IsEmpty()) { + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE( + "if the handshake succeeded, the built chain shouldn't be empty"); + mSucceeded = false; + mFinalError = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + if (!mSucceeded && mPeerCertChain.IsEmpty()) { + MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE( + "if the handshake failed, the peer chain shouldn't be empty"); + mFinalError = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + } + + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> stsTarget = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + MOZ_ASSERT(stsTarget, "Failed to get socket transport service event target"); + rv = stsTarget->Dispatch(this, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); + MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv), + "Failed to dispatch SSLServerCertVerificationResult"); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Run() { +#ifdef DEBUG + bool onSTSThread = false; + nsresult nrv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts = + do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &nrv); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nrv)) { + nrv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread); + } + + MOZ_ASSERT(onSTSThread); +#endif + + if (mSucceeded && !XRE_IsSocketProcess() && + !(mProviderFlags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE)) { + // This dispatches an event that will run when the socket thread is idle. + SaveIntermediateCerts(mBuiltChain); + } + + mSocketControl->SetMadeOCSPRequests(mMadeOCSPRequests); + + if (mSucceeded) { + MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, + ("SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Run setting NEW cert")); + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes(mBuiltChain.ElementAt(0).Clone()); + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(certBytes))); + mSocketControl->SetServerCert(cert, mEVStatus); + mSocketControl->SetSucceededCertChain(std::move(mBuiltChain)); + + mSocketControl->SetIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot( + mIsBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot); + mSocketControl->SetCertificateTransparencyStatus( + mCertificateTransparencyStatus); + } else { + nsTArray<uint8_t> certBytes(mPeerCertChain.ElementAt(0).Clone()); + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(certBytes))); + // Certificate validation failed; store the peer certificate chain on + // mSocketControl so it can be used for error reporting. + mSocketControl->SetFailedCertChain(std::move(mPeerCertChain)); + if (mOverridableErrorCategory != + nsITransportSecurityInfo::OverridableErrorCategory::ERROR_UNSET) { + mSocketControl->SetStatusErrorBits(cert, mOverridableErrorCategory); + } + } + + mSocketControl->SetCertVerificationResult(mFinalError); + return NS_OK; +} + +} // namespace psm +} // namespace mozilla |