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-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c14398
1 files changed, 14398 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47464303ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14398 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * SSL3 Protocol
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */
+
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "secder.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "ssl3ext.h"
+#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
+#include "tls13ech.h"
+#include "tls13exthandle.h"
+#include "tls13psk.h"
+#include "tls13subcerts.h"
+#include "prtime.h"
+#include "prinrval.h"
+#include "prerror.h"
+#include "pratom.h"
+#include "prthread.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "nssoptions.h"
+
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot);
+static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp);
+static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss,
+ PK11SymKey *masterSecret);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ SECItem *suites,
+ sslSessionID *sid,
+ const PRUint8 *msg,
+ unsigned int len);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ const SECItem *sidBytes,
+ int *retErrCode);
+static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss,
+ PRUint8 *b,
+ PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags);
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType);
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash);
+PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
+PRBool ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
+PRBool ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
+PRBool ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme);
+static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss,
+ const unsigned char *b,
+ unsigned int l);
+const PRUint32 kSSLSigSchemePolicy =
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE;
+
+const PRUint8 ssl_hello_retry_random[] = {
+ 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
+ 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
+ 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E,
+ 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_hello_retry_random) == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of
+ * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement.
+ * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites
+ * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c)
+ *
+ * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher
+ * suites to this list.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = {
+ /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */
+ /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */
+ { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+ { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+ { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around
+ * bug 946147.
+ */
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* RSA */
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+
+ /* ciphersuites with no encryption */
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
+};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+/* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the
+ * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine
+ * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that
+ * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The
+ * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for
+ * cipher suites just for consistency.
+ */
+static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = {
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha256,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha384,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha512,
+ ssl_sig_dsa_sha1
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <=
+ MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES);
+
+/* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+void
+ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency()
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) {
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = {
+ ct_RSA_sign,
+ ct_ECDSA_sign,
+ ct_DSS_sign,
+};
+
+static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats;
+
+static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = {
+ /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */
+ /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */
+ { kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0 },
+ { kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA },
+ { kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS },
+ { kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA },
+ { kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS },
+ { kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA },
+ { kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON },
+ { kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA },
+ { kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA },
+ { kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA },
+ { kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA },
+ { kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON },
+ { kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK },
+ { kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK },
+ { kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY },
+};
+
+/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */
+static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = {
+ /* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */
+ /* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */
+
+ { TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, ssl_mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ /* New TLS cipher suites */
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+ { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+
+ { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none },
+
+ { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 },
+ { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384 },
+};
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = {
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */
+ CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */
+ CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */
+ CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size);
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = {
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */
+ CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid */
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk */
+};
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size);
+
+typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr {
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech;
+} SSLCipher2Mech;
+
+/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */
+static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = {
+ /* calg, cmech */
+ { ssl_calg_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM },
+ { ssl_calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 },
+ { ssl_calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 },
+ { ssl_calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC },
+ { ssl_calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM },
+ { ssl_calg_chacha20, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305 },
+};
+
+const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E,
+ 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 };
+const PRUint8 tls1_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E,
+ 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 };
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random) ==
+ sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random));
+
+/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of
+ * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey
+ * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is
+ * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field
+ * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes.
+ *
+ * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits
+ * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params
+ * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS
+ * supports arbitrary curves.
+ */
+#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504
+
+typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr {
+ PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */
+ PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */
+ PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */
+ PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */
+ PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */
+ /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */
+} ECCWrappedKeyInfo;
+
+CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
+ return alg2Mech[calg].cmech;
+}
+
+#if defined(TRACE)
+
+static char *
+ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType)
+{
+ char *rv;
+ static char line[40];
+
+ switch (msgType) {
+ case ssl_hs_hello_request:
+ rv = "hello_request (0)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_client_hello:
+ rv = "client_hello (1)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_hello:
+ rv = "server_hello (2)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request:
+ rv = "hello_verify_request (3)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket:
+ rv = "new_session_ticket (4)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data:
+ rv = "end_of_early_data (5)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request:
+ rv = "hello_retry_request (6)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions:
+ rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate:
+ rv = "certificate (11)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange:
+ rv = "server_key_exchange (12)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_request:
+ rv = "certificate_request (13)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_hello_done:
+ rv = "server_hello_done (14)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+ rv = "certificate_verify (15)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange:
+ rv = "client_key_exchange (16)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_finished:
+ rv = "finished (20)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_status:
+ rv = "certificate_status (22)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_key_update:
+ rv = "key_update (24)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_compressed_certificate:
+ rv = "compressed certificate (25)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType);
+ rv = line;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static char *
+ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType)
+{
+ char *rv;
+ static char line[40];
+
+ switch (msgType) {
+ case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec:
+ rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_alert:
+ rv = "alert (21)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_handshake:
+ rv = "handshake (22)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_application_data:
+ rv = "application_data (23)";
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_ack:
+ rv = "ack (26)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType);
+ rv = line;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+SSL3Statistics *
+SSL_GetStatistics(void)
+{
+ return &ssl3stats;
+}
+
+typedef struct tooLongStr {
+#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+ PRInt32 low;
+ PRInt32 high;
+#else
+ PRInt32 high;
+ PRInt32 low;
+#endif
+} tooLong;
+
+void
+SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x)
+{
+ if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) {
+ PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x);
+ } else {
+ tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x;
+ if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0)
+ PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high);
+ }
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite,
+ const SSLVersionRange *vrange)
+{
+ switch (cipherSuite) {
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 &&
+ vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and
+ * point formats.*/
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 &&
+ vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+ return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ default:
+ return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */
+/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
+const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite)
+{
+ int cipher_suite_def_len =
+ sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) {
+ if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite)
+ return &cipher_suite_defs[i];
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */
+/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */
+static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite,
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite)
+ return &suites[i];
+ }
+ /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *
+ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites)
+{
+ return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite,
+ CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites));
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
+ if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType)
+{
+ switch (keaType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ case ssl_kea_dh_psk: {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client
+ * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups
+ * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */
+ if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true:
+ * 1. We don't require named groups.
+ * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups.
+ * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3.
+ * 4. The weak group is enabled. */
+ if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups &&
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ss->vrange.min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) {
+ /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups
+ * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups
+ * are not required. */
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk:
+ return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh);
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid:
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid_psk:
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid);
+
+ case ssl_kea_tls13_any:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ case ssl_kea_fortezza:
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 maxVersion, SSLAuthType authType)
+{
+ PRCList *cursor;
+ if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts);
+ cursor != &ss->serverCerts;
+ cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
+ sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor;
+ if (!cert->serverKeyPair ||
+ !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey ||
+ !cert->serverCertChain ||
+ !SSL_CERT_IS(cert, authType)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be
+ * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement
+ * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the
+ * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(),
+ * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve.
+ *
+ * If we might negotiate TLS 1.3, skip this test as group configuration
+ * doesn't affect choices in TLS 1.3.
+ */
+ if (maxVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ (authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) &&
+ !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) {
+ return ssl_HasCert(ss, maxVersion, ssl_auth_rsa_pss);
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* return true if the scheme is allowed by policy, This prevents
+ * failures later when our actual signatures are rejected by
+ * policy by either ssl code, or lower level NSS code */
+static PRBool
+ssl_SchemePolicyOK(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRUint32 require)
+{
+ /* Hash policy. */
+ PRUint32 policy;
+ SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme));
+ SECOidTag sigOID;
+
+ /* policy bits needed to enable a SignatureScheme */
+ SECStatus rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess &&
+ (policy & require) != require) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType reports rsa for rsa_pss_rsae, but we
+ * actually implement pss signatures when we sign, so just use RSA_PSS
+ * for all RSA PSS Siganture schemes */
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ sigOID = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE;
+ } else {
+ sigOID = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme));
+ }
+ /* Signature Policy. */
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(sigOID, &policy);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess &&
+ (policy & require) != require) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Check that a signature scheme is accepted.
+ * Both by policy and by having a token that supports it. */
+static PRBool
+ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(PRUint16 minVersion,
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme,
+ PRBool forCert)
+{
+ /* Disable RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ } else if (!forCert && ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ /* Disable PKCS#1 signatures if we are limited to TLS 1.3.
+ * We still need to advertise PKCS#1 signatures in CH and CR
+ * for certificate signatures.
+ */
+ if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ } else if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ /* DSA: not in TLS 1.3, and check policy. */
+ if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a server using TLS 1.3, we just need to have one signature
+ * scheme for which we have a usable certificate.
+ *
+ * Note: Certificates for earlier TLS versions are checked along with the
+ * cipher suite in ssl3_config_match_init. */
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PRBool foundCert = PR_FALSE;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ SSLAuthType authType =
+ ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]);
+ if (ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType)) {
+ foundCert = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!foundCert) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that there is a signature scheme that can be accepted.*/
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->vrange.min,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i],
+ PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* For a server, check that a signature scheme that can be used with the
+ * provided authType is both enabled and usable. */
+static PRBool
+ssl_HasSignatureScheme(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_version);
+ PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_null);
+ PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any);
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa ||
+ authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i];
+ SSLAuthType schemeAuthType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme);
+ PRBool acceptable = authType == schemeAuthType ||
+ (schemeAuthType == ssl_auth_rsa_pss &&
+ authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign);
+ if (acceptable && ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->version, scheme, PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match
+ * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens,
+ * regardless of policy or user preference.
+ * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3.
+ */
+unsigned int
+ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech;
+ SSLAuthType authType;
+ SSLKEAType keaType;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int numPresent = 0;
+ unsigned int numEnabled = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss);
+ if (!ss) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->psk &&
+ PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->serverCerts) &&
+ (ss->opt.requestCertificate || ss->opt.requireCertificate)) {
+ /* PSK and certificate auth cannot be combined. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(ss) != SECSuccess) {
+ return 0; /* Code already set. */
+ }
+
+ ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss);
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (suite->enabled) {
+ ++numEnabled;
+ /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle
+ * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition.
+ */
+ cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
+ if (!cipher_def) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg;
+ cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg);
+
+ /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */
+ suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE;
+
+ authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType;
+ if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer &&
+ !(ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType) &&
+ ssl_HasSignatureScheme(ss, authType))) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ } else if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType;
+ if (keaType != ssl_kea_null &&
+ keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any &&
+ !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_alg != ssl_calg_null &&
+ !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) {
+ suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (suite->isPresent) {
+ ++numPresent;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_AssertArg(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0);
+ if (numPresent == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED);
+ }
+ return numPresent;
+}
+
+/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy,
+ * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is
+ * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */
+PRBool
+ssl3_config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, PRUint8 policy,
+ const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def;
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+
+ if (!suite) {
+ PORT_Assert(suite);
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) ||
+ (suite->policy > policy))
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss != NULL);
+ cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite);
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL);
+ kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg];
+ PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL);
+ if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, vrange->max, kea_def->authKeyType)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* If a PSK is selected, disable suites that use a different hash than
+ * the PSK. We advertise non-PSK-compatible suites in the CH, as we could
+ * fallback to certificate auth. The client handler will check hash
+ * compatibility before committing to use the PSK. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) {
+ if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash != cipher_def->prf_hash) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange);
+}
+
+/* For TLS 1.3, when resuming, check for a ciphersuite that is both compatible
+ * with the identified ciphersuite and enabled. */
+static PRBool
+tls13_ResumptionCompatible(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite suite)
+{
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 };
+ SSLHashType hash = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(suite);
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); i++) {
+ if (cipher_suite_defs[i].prf_hash == hash) {
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg =
+ ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite,
+ ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (suite && ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Null compression, mac and encryption functions
+ */
+SECStatus
+Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
+{
+ if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) {
+ *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *outputLen = inputLen;
+ if (inputLen > 0 && input != output) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL3 Utility functions
+ */
+
+static void
+ssl_SetSpecVersions(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+ spec->version = ss->version;
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec);
+ } else if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ spec->recordVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version);
+ } else {
+ spec->recordVersion = ss->version;
+ }
+}
+
+/* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the
+ * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the
+ * highest enabled version.
+ *
+ * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest
+ * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion,
+ PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion)
+{
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion negotiated;
+
+ /* Prevent negotiating to a lower version in response to a TLS 1.3 HRR. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
+ (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ negotiated = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max);
+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, negotiated));
+ if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version != negotiated) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->version = negotiated;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Used by the client when the server produces a version number.
+ * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, unsigned int *len,
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion *version)
+{
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion v;
+ PRUint32 temp;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, b, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v);
+ /* Check for failure. */
+ if (!v || v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* You can't negotiate TLS 1.3 this way. */
+ if (v >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *version = v;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random random)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key,
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRBool isTls, SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme);
+ SECItem hashItem;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ doDerEncode = isTls;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+ if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
+ int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key);
+
+ SECItem *params = NULL;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
+ SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
+ sizeof(pssParams) };
+
+ if (signatureLen <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen;
+ buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+ if (!buf->data)
+ goto done; /* error code was set. */
+
+ if (useRsaPss) {
+ pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len;
+ params = &pssParamsItem;
+ mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem);
+ } else {
+ SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg);
+ rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ } else if (doDerEncode) {
+ SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+ rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */
+ *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */
+ } else if (derSig.data) {
+ PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len));
+done:
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data);
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key,
+ SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme;
+
+ rv = ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(hash, key, scheme, isTLS, buf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme;
+ ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_VerifySignedHashes and tls13_HandleCertificateVerify. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *key,
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme,
+ SSL3Hashes *hash, SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECItem *signature = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem hashItem;
+ SECOidTag encAlg;
+ SECOidTag hashAlg;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len));
+
+ hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg);
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5;
+ }
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ||
+ buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) {
+ signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key));
+ if (!signature) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ buf = signature;
+ }
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ecKey:
+ encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash.
+ * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part.
+ * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1
+ * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with
+ * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha);
+ } else {
+ hashItem.data = hash->u.raw;
+ hashItem.len = hash->len;
+ }
+ if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) {
+ scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified",
+ hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+ if (isRsaPssScheme ||
+ hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN ||
+ SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) {
+ /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded.
+ * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code
+ * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when
+ * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify.
+ */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType);
+
+ SECItem *params = NULL;
+ CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams;
+ SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer,
+ (unsigned char *)&pssParams,
+ sizeof(pssParams) };
+
+ if (isRsaPssScheme) {
+ pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg);
+ pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len;
+ params = &pssParamsItem;
+ mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg);
+ } else {
+ rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg,
+ pwArg);
+ }
+ if (signature) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ }
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme;
+ ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme);
+ }
+
+loser:
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ PORT_SetError(0);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash,
+ SECItem *buf)
+{
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey =
+ SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(&ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
+ if (pubKey == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ SECStatus rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, scheme,
+ hash, buf);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
+/* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash
+ * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange.
+ *
+ * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg,
+ PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECOidTag hashOID;
+ PRUint32 policy;
+
+ if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
+ !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg);
+ if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) &&
+ !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID);
+ if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes,
+ SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY)
+{
+ sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int yLen;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PORT_Assert(dh_p.data);
+ PORT_Assert(dh_g.data);
+ PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data);
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* p */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* g */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* y - complicated by padding */
+ yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len;
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, yLen, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */
+ PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len);
+ for (i = dh_Ys.len; i < yLen; ++i) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, 0, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), hashes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf)));
+ if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result",
+ hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result",
+ hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
+ } else {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result",
+ hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
+ }
+
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&buf);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&buf);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction,
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef,
+ ssl3CipherSpec **specp)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec;
+ const ssl3CipherSpec *prev;
+
+ prev = (direction == ssl_secret_write) ? ss->ssl3.cwSpec : ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ if (prev->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction);
+ if (!spec) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef);
+ spec->macDef = ssl_GetMacDef(ss, suiteDef);
+
+ spec->epoch = prev->epoch + 1;
+ spec->nextSeqNum = 0;
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && direction == ssl_secret_read) {
+ dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords);
+ }
+ ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, spec);
+
+ ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec);
+ *specp = spec;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite.
+** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material.
+** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello()
+** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock.
+** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
+ SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea;
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) {
+ /* SSL records are not being MACed. */
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = ss->version;
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite));
+
+ suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite);
+ if (suiteDef == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */
+ PORT_Assert(suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4);
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suiteDef;
+
+ kea = suiteDef->key_exchange_alg;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea];
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea);
+
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read, suiteDef,
+ &ss->ssl3.prSpec);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write, suiteDef,
+ &ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) {
+ ss->ssl3.prSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+ ss->opt.recordSizeLimit);
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
+ ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit);
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data which
+ * is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |buf|. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the definition of the
+ * AEAD additional data.
+ *
+ * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which
+ * pseudo-header definition to use should be decided based on the version of
+ * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT
+ * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed
+ * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version|
+ * argument should be the record's version value.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(DTLSEpoch epoch,
+ sslSequenceNumber seqNum,
+ SSLContentType ct,
+ PRBool includesVersion,
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
+ PRBool isDTLS,
+ int length,
+ sslBuffer *buf, SSL3ProtocolVersion v)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ if (isDTLS && v < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, epoch, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 6);
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 8);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ct, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */
+ if (includesVersion) {
+ /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, version, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, length, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec.
+ * Master Secret already is derived.
+ * Caller holds Spec write lock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode;
+ SECItem macParam;
+ CK_ULONG macLength;
+ SECItem iv;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+
+ calg = spec->cipherDef->calg;
+ PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg);
+
+ if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) {
+ macLength = spec->macDef->mac_size;
+
+ /*
+ ** Now setup the MAC contexts,
+ ** crypto contexts are setup below.
+ */
+ macParam.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength;
+ macParam.len = sizeof(macLength);
+ macParam.type = siBuffer;
+
+ spec->keyMaterial.macContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
+ spec->macDef->mmech, CKA_SIGN, spec->keyMaterial.macKey, &macParam);
+ if (!spec->keyMaterial.macContext) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Now setup the crypto contexts.
+ */
+ if (calg == ssl_calg_null) {
+ spec->cipher = Null_Cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+ encMode = (spec->direction == ssl_secret_write) ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT;
+ if (spec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) {
+ encMode |= CKA_NSS_MESSAGE;
+ iv.data = NULL;
+ iv.len = 0;
+ } else {
+ spec->cipher = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp;
+ iv.data = spec->keyMaterial.iv;
+ iv.len = spec->cipherDef->iv_size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * build the context
+ */
+ spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode,
+ spec->keyMaterial.key,
+ &iv);
+ if (!spec->cipherContext) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts
+ * for the pending Cipher Spec.
+ * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
+ * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate.
+ *
+ * If |secret| is a master secret from a previous connection is reused, |derive|
+ * is PR_FALSE. If the secret is a pre-master secret, then |derive| is PR_TRUE
+ * and the master secret is derived from |secret|.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, PRBool derive)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *masterSecret;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(secret);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch);
+ prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
+ /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many
+ * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The
+ * spec says you should be discarding the connection
+ * and start over, so not much we can do here. */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (derive) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, secret, &masterSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ masterSecret = secret;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(masterSecret);
+ rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss, masterSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (derive) {
+ /* masterSecret was created here. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(masterSecret);
+ }
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Both cipher specs maintain a reference to the master secret, since each
+ * is managed and freed independently. */
+ prSpec->masterSecret = masterSecret;
+ pwSpec->masterSecret = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(masterSecret);
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
+ */
+static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord()
+** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ unsigned int headerLen,
+ const PRUint8 *input,
+ int inputLen,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outLen)
+{
+ PK11Context *context;
+ int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLen));
+
+ if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) {
+ *outLen = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ context = spec->keyMaterial.macContext;
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, header, headerLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, input, inputLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(context, outbuf, outLen, macSize);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)macSize);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLen));
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
+ * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ * originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ unsigned int headerLen,
+ const PRUint8 *input,
+ int inputLen,
+ int originalLen,
+ unsigned char *outbuf,
+ unsigned int *outLen)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType;
+ CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
+ SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem;
+ int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->macDef->mac_size);
+ PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen);
+
+ if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) {
+ *outLen = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
+ if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
+ }
+
+ params.macAlg = spec->macDef->mmech;
+ params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen;
+ params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */
+ params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen;
+
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&params;
+ param.len = sizeof(params);
+ param.type = 0;
+
+ inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input;
+ inputItem.len = inputLen;
+ inputItem.type = 0;
+
+ outputItem.data = outbuf;
+ outputItem.len = *outLen;
+ outputItem.type = 0;
+
+ rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(spec->keyMaterial.macKey, macType, &param,
+ &outputItem, &inputItem);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) {
+ /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed
+ * from the input length already. */
+ return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, header, headerLen,
+ input, inputLen - macSize,
+ outbuf, outLen);
+ }
+
+ *outLen = 0;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)macSize);
+ *outLen = outputItem.len;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /* we only care if we are doing client auth */
+ if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* get the slot */
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID);
+ if (slot == NULL ||
+ !PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) ||
+ (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) {
+ isPresent = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (slot) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ return isPresent;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+ PRBool isServer,
+ PRBool isDTLS,
+ SSLContentType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *pIn,
+ PRUint32 contentLen,
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 macLen = 0;
+ PRUint32 fragLen;
+ PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0;
+ unsigned int ivLen = 0;
+ unsigned char pseudoHeaderBuf[13];
+ sslBuffer pseudoHeader = SSL_BUFFER(pseudoHeaderBuf);
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block &&
+ cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from
+ * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically
+ * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous
+ * record.
+ */
+ ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size;
+ if (ivLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */
+ &len, /* outlen */
+ ivLen, /* max outlen */
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* input */
+ ivLen); /* input len */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || len != ivLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, ct,
+ cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->recordVersion,
+ isDTLS, contentLen, &pseudoHeader, cwSpec->version);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) {
+ const unsigned int nonceLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size;
+ const unsigned int tagLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size;
+ unsigned int ivOffset = 0;
+ CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION gen;
+ /* ivOut includes the iv and the nonce and is the internal iv/nonce
+ * for the AEAD function. On Encrypt, this is an in/out parameter */
+ unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size;
+
+ PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) <= MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) >= sizeof(sslSequenceNumber));
+
+ if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (nonceLen == 0) {
+ ivOffset = ivLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber);
+ gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR;
+ } else {
+ ivOffset = ivLen;
+ gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER;
+ }
+ ivOffset = tls13_SetupAeadIv(isDTLS, cwSpec->version, ivOut, cwSpec->keyMaterial.iv,
+ ivOffset, ivLen, cwSpec->epoch);
+ rv = tls13_AEAD(cwSpec->cipherContext,
+ PR_FALSE,
+ gen, ivOffset * BPB, /* iv generator params */
+ ivOut, /* iv in */
+ ivOut, /* iv out */
+ ivLen + nonceLen, /* full iv length */
+ NULL, 0, /* nonce is generated*/
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), /* aad */
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), /* aadlen */
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + nonceLen, /* output */
+ &len, /* out len */
+ SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf) - nonceLen, /* max out */
+ tagLen,
+ pIn, contentLen); /* input */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ len += nonceLen; /* include the nonce at the beginning */
+ /* copy out the generated iv if we are using explict nonces */
+ if (nonceLen) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivOut + ivLen, nonceLen);
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
+ } else {
+ int blockSize = cwSpec->cipherDef->block_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Add the MAC
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader),
+ pIn, contentLen,
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen, &macLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ p1Len = contentLen;
+ p2Len = macLen;
+ fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */
+ PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024);
+
+ /*
+ * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher)
+ * then Encrypt it
+ */
+ if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block) {
+ unsigned char *pBuf;
+ int padding_length;
+ int i;
+
+ oddLen = contentLen % blockSize;
+ /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */
+ padding_length = blockSize - 1 - ((fragLen) & (blockSize - 1));
+ fragLen += padding_length + 1;
+ PORT_Assert((fragLen % blockSize) == 0);
+
+ /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */
+ pBuf = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + fragLen - 1;
+ for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) {
+ *pBuf-- = padding_length;
+ }
+ /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */
+ p2Len = fragLen - p1Len;
+ }
+ if (p1Len < 256) {
+ oddLen = p1Len;
+ p1Len = 0;
+ } else {
+ p1Len -= oddLen;
+ }
+ if (oddLen) {
+ p2Len += oddLen;
+ PORT_Assert((blockSize < 2) ||
+ (p2Len % blockSize) == 0);
+ memmove(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen);
+ }
+ if (p1Len > 0) {
+ unsigned int cipherBytesPart1 = 0;
+ rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */
+ &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */
+ p1Len, /* max outlen */
+ pIn,
+ p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == p1Len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != p1Len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p1Len, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ }
+ if (p2Len > 0) {
+ unsigned int cipherBytesPart2 = 0;
+ rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext,
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),
+ &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */
+ p2Len, /* max outlen */
+ SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf),
+ p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == p2Len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != p2Len) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p2Len, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Note: though this can report failure, it shouldn't. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec,
+ SSLContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf,
+ PRBool *needsLength)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ cwSpec->epoch > TrafficKeyClearText) {
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(ss, cwSpec, wrBuf,
+ needsLength);
+ }
+ contentType = ssl_ct_application_data;
+ }
+#endif
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, contentType, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->recordVersion, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->epoch, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, 6);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ *needsLength = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSLContentType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+{
+ PRBool needsLength;
+ unsigned int lenOffset;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write);
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0);
+ PORT_Assert(cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX);
+
+ if (cwSpec->nextSeqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
+ SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->nextSeqNum));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, ct, wrBuf, &needsLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (needsLength) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, 2, &lenOffset);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ {
+ unsigned int len;
+ rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), &len,
+ SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error was set */
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */
+ }
+#else
+ if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PRUint8 *cipherText = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf);
+ unsigned int bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf);
+ rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - bufLen;
+ rv = dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, cwSpec,
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf),
+ cipherText, bufLen);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), ct,
+ pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error was set */
+ }
+
+ if (needsLength) {
+ /* Insert the length. */
+ rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(wrBuf, lenOffset, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ++cwSpec->nextSeqNum;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLContentType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *pIn, unsigned int nIn,
+ unsigned int *written)
+{
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf;
+ unsigned int contentLen;
+ unsigned int spaceNeeded;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, spec->recordSizeLimit);
+ spaceNeeded = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE;
+ if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
+ spec->cipherDef->type == type_block) {
+ spaceNeeded += spec->cipherDef->iv_size;
+ }
+ if (spaceNeeded > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: failed to expand write buffer to %d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:",
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf)));
+ *written = contentLen;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Process the plain text before sending it.
+ * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent
+ * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the
+ * output (write) buffer.
+ * Returns -1 on an error. PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR is set if the error is blocking
+ * and not terminal.
+ *
+ * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags:
+ * (no private SSL flags)
+ * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext
+ * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK,
+ * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty,
+ * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf,
+ * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all
+ * bytes are used.
+ * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER
+ * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces
+ * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer.
+ * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS)
+ * Forces the use of the provided epoch
+ */
+PRInt32
+ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */
+ SSLContentType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *pIn, /* input buffer */
+ PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */
+ PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(ct),
+ nIn));
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ if (ct != ssl_ct_alert) {
+ /* If we are sending an alert, then we already have an
+ * error, so don't overwrite. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* check for Token Presence */
+ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->recordWriteCallback) {
+ PRUint16 epoch;
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ epoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ rv = ss->recordWriteCallback(ss->fd, epoch, ct, pIn, nIn,
+ ss->recordWriteCallbackArg);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return nIn;
+ }
+
+ if (cwSpec) {
+ /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of the DTLS handshake. */
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) &&
+ (ct == ssl_ct_handshake ||
+ ct == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec));
+ spec = cwSpec;
+ } else {
+ spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ }
+
+ while (nIn > 0) {
+ unsigned int written = 0;
+ PRInt32 sent;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl_ProtectNextRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, nIn, &written);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(written > 0);
+ /* DTLS should not fragment non-application data here. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ct != ssl_ct_application_data) {
+ PORT_Assert(written == nIn);
+ }
+
+ pIn += written;
+ nIn -= written;
+ PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0);
+
+ /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext,
+ * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet,
+ * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved.
+ */
+ if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) ||
+ (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
+
+ rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) {
+ ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+ sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss);
+ if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > 0);
+ ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+ sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf),
+ flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */
+ sent = 0;
+ }
+ if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > (unsigned int)sent) {
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and
+ * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext.
+ */
+ rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + sent,
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - sent);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ wrBuf->len = 0;
+ totalSent += written;
+ }
+ return totalSent;
+
+loser:
+ /* Don't leave bits of buffer lying around. */
+ wrBuf->len = 0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024
+
+/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record.
+ * Returns "len" or -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in,
+ PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ PRInt32 totalSent = 0;
+ PRInt32 discarded = 0;
+ PRBool splitNeeded = PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ /* These flags for internal use only */
+ PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT));
+ if (len < 0 || !in) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER &&
+ !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) {
+ PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered));
+ if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ in++;
+ len--;
+ discarded = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, as
+ * explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h.
+ */
+ if (len > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV &&
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 &&
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block /* CBC */) {
+ splitNeeded = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ while (len > totalSent) {
+ PRInt32 sent, toSend;
+
+ if (totalSent > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a
+ * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in
+ * the middle of a large application data write. (See
+ * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.)
+ */
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ if (splitNeeded) {
+ toSend = 1;
+ splitNeeded = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require
+ * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above.
+ */
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_application_data,
+ in + totalSent, toSend, flags);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
+ break;
+ }
+ return -1; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
+ }
+ totalSent += sent;
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ /* must be a non-blocking socket */
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ss->pendingBuf.len) {
+ /* Must be non-blocking. */
+ PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss));
+ if (totalSent > 0) {
+ ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1];
+ }
+
+ totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1;
+ if (totalSent <= 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ totalSent = SECFailure;
+ }
+ return totalSent;
+ }
+ ss->appDataBuffered = 0;
+ return totalSent + discarded;
+}
+
+/* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages.
+ * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls
+ *
+ * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS
+ * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS
+ *
+ * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(),
+ * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(),
+ * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(),
+ * ssl3_SendFinished(),
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
+ }
+ return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags);
+}
+
+/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record.
+ * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
+ PRInt32 count = -1;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* only these flags are allowed */
+ PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags));
+ if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_handshake,
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf,
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags);
+ if (count < 0) {
+ int err = PORT_GetError();
+ PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ }
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) {
+ /* short write should never happen */
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */
+ ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when
+ * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request.
+ * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth.
+ * SECSuccess otherwise.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+
+ /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't
+ * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no
+ * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure
+ * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the
+ * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we
+ * know the server is paying attention to the certificate.
+ */
+ if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
+ (!ss->firstHsDone &&
+ (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) {
+ PRFileDesc *lower;
+
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, certificate_required);
+ } else {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate);
+ }
+
+ lower = ss->fd->lower;
+#ifdef _WIN32
+ lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND);
+#else
+ lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH);
+#endif
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * Alerts
+ */
+
+/*
+** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks.
+** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <-
+** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <-
+** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord
+** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <-
+** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <-
+** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <-
+** ssl3_HandleClientHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <-
+** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <-
+** ssl3_HandleCertificate <-
+** ssl3_HandleFinished <-
+** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <-
+** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <-
+** ssl3_HandleRecord <-
+**
+*/
+SECStatus
+SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
+{
+ PRUint8 bytes[2];
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool needHsLock = !ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ /* Check that if I need the HS lock I also need the Xmit lock */
+ PORT_Assert(!needHsLock || !ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
+
+ bytes[0] = level;
+ bytes[1] = desc;
+
+ if (needHsLock) {
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ }
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (needHsLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_alert, bytes, 2,
+ (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0);
+ rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+ }
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (needHsLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && ss->alertSentCallback) {
+ SSLAlert alert = { level, desc };
+ ss->alertSentCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertSentCallbackArg, &alert);
+ }
+ return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode)
+{
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate;
+ PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS;
+
+ switch (errCode) {
+ case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
+ desc = unsupported_certificate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = certificate_expired;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = certificate_revoked;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE:
+ desc = certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+ desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+ case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+ desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown;
+ break;
+ case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
+ desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired;
+ break;
+
+ case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+ default:
+ desc = bad_certificate;
+ break;
+ }
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode));
+
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error
+ : illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT
+ : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ SSL3AlertLevel level;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc;
+ int error;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (buf->len != 2) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0];
+ desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1];
+ buf->len = 0;
+ SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc));
+
+ if (ss->alertReceivedCallback) {
+ SSLAlert alert = { level, desc };
+ ss->alertReceivedCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg, &alert);
+ }
+
+ switch (desc) {
+ case close_notify:
+ ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1;
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unexpected_message:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_record_mac:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decryption_failed_RESERVED:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case record_overflow:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decompression_failure:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case handshake_failure:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case no_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case certificate_required:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_RX_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unsupported_certificate:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_revoked:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_expired:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_unknown:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case illegal_parameter:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case inappropriate_fallback:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ break;
+
+ /* All alerts below are TLS only. */
+ case unknown_ca:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case access_denied:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decode_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case decrypt_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case export_restriction:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case protocol_version:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case insufficient_security:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case internal_error:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case user_canceled:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case no_renegotiation:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT;
+ break;
+
+ /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */
+ case missing_extension:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unsupported_extension:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case certificate_unobtainable:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case unrecognized_name:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate_status_response:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case bad_certificate_hash_value:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT;
+ break;
+ case no_application_protocol:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL;
+ break;
+ case ech_required:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_ECH_REQUIRED_ALERT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) &&
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be
+ * treated as fatal. */
+ switch (desc) {
+ case close_notify:
+ case user_canceled:
+ break;
+ default:
+ level = alert_fatal;
+ }
+ }
+ if (level == alert_fatal) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) &&
+ (desc == handshake_failure)) {
+ /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure
+ * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers.
+ */
+ error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) {
+ /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change Cipher Specs
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone,
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello,
+ * and ssl3_HandleFinished
+ *
+ * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
+ * and pending write spec pointers.
+ */
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ PRInt32 sent;
+ sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec,
+ &change, 1, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ if (sent < 0) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* Error code set. */
+ }
+
+ /* swap the pending and current write specs. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec = NULL;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final
+ * message got lost */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch) {
+ rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord.
+** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks.
+*
+* Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current
+* and pending write spec pointers.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
+ SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* For DTLS: Ignore this if we aren't expecting it. Don't kill a connection
+ * as a result of receiving trash.
+ * For TLS: Maybe ignore, but only after checking format. */
+ if (ws != wait_change_cipher && IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order "
+ "DTLS change_cipher_spec",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ buf->len = 0;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (buf->len != 1) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0];
+ if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+ /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */
+ (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ buf->len = 0;
+ if (ws != wait_change_cipher) {
+ /* Ignore a CCS for TLS 1.3. This only happens if the server sends a
+ * HelloRetryRequest. In other cases, the CCS will fail decryption and
+ * will be discarded by ssl3_HandleRecord(). */
+ if (ws == wait_server_hello &&
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* Note: For a server, we can't test ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry or
+ * ss->version because the server might be stateless (and so it won't
+ * have set either value yet). Set a flag so that at least we will
+ * guarantee that the server will treat any ClientHello properly. */
+ if (ws == wait_client_hello &&
+ ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ !ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec);
+ ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.crSpec);
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash)
+{
+ switch (hash) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
+}
+
+/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType)
+{
+ switch (hashType) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return CKM_SHA512;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return CKM_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ case ssl_hash_none:
+ /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
+ return CKM_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha1:
+ return CKM_SHA_1;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return CKM_SHA256;
+}
+
+/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash);
+}
+
+static SSLHashType
+ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) {
+ return ssl_hash_sha256;
+ }
+ return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash;
+}
+
+/* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS.
+**
+** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error.
+**
+** 2. Check the version if |pms_version| is non-zero and if wrong,
+** return an error.
+**
+** 3. If |msp| is nonzero, return MS in |*msp|.
+
+** Called from:
+** ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt
+** tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(sslSocket *ss,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive,
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version,
+ SECItem *params, CK_FLAGS keyFlags,
+ PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *ms = NULL;
+
+ ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive,
+ params, key_derive,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
+ if (!ms) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (pms_version && ss->opt.detectRollBack) {
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version;
+ client_version = pms_version->major << 8 | pms_version->minor;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version);
+ }
+
+ if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ /* Destroy MS. Version roll-back detected. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ms);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (msp) {
+ *msp = ms;
+ } else {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ms);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Compute the ordinary (pre draft-ietf-tls-session-hash) master
+ ** secret and return it in |*msp|.
+ **
+ ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ PRBool isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ /*
+ * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
+ * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size
+ * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version.
+ */
+ PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid));
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ SECItem params;
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags;
+ CK_VERSION pms_version;
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL;
+ /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */
+ CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
+ unsigned int master_params_len;
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ } else if (isTLS) {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ } else {
+ if (isDH)
+ master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!isDH) {
+ pms_version_ptr = &pms_version;
+ }
+
+ master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ } else {
+ /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */
+ master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ }
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params;
+ params.len = master_params_len;
+
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive,
+ pms_version_ptr, &params,
+ keyFlags, pms, msp);
+}
+
+/* Compute the draft-ietf-tls-session-hash master
+** secret and return it in |*msp|.
+**
+** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+*/
+static SECStatus
+tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS extended_master_params;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ /*
+ * Determine whether to use the DH/ECDH or RSA derivation modes.
+ */
+ /*
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion
+ * mode. Bug 1198298 */
+ PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh_hybrid));
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ SECItem params;
+ const CK_FLAGS keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ CK_VERSION pms_version;
+ CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (isDH) {
+ master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ } else {
+ master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ pms_version_ptr = &pms_version;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ /* TLS 1.2+ */
+ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ } else {
+ /* TLS < 1.2 */
+ extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ }
+
+ extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr;
+ extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw;
+ extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len;
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params;
+ params.len = sizeof extended_master_params;
+
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive,
+ pms_version_ptr, &params,
+ keyFlags, pms, msp);
+}
+
+/* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|.
+**
+** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
+ PK11SymKey **msp)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(pms != NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp);
+ } else {
+ return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret
+ * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure.
+ *
+ * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(),
+ * which in turn is called from
+ * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake)
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart)
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart)
+ * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock.
+ * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that.
+ *
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *masterSecret)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *clientSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *serverSpec;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ PRBool isTLS12 =
+ (PRBool)(isTLS && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipherDef;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *derivedKeyHandle = NULL;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ int keySize;
+ CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a
+ * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */
+ unsigned int key_material_params_len;
+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism;
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ SECItem params;
+ PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null);
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(masterSecret);
+
+ /* These functions operate in terms of who is writing specs. */
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ clientSpec = prSpec;
+ serverSpec = pwSpec;
+ } else {
+ clientSpec = pwSpec;
+ serverSpec = prSpec;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * generate the key material
+ */
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
+ PORT_Memset(clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
+ PORT_Memset(serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size);
+ }
+
+ key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
+ key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys;
+
+ if (skipKeysAndIVs) {
+ keySize = 0;
+ returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL;
+ returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL;
+ key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0;
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0;
+ } else {
+ keySize = cipher_def->key_size;
+ returnedKeys.pIVClient = clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv;
+ returnedKeys.pIVServer = serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv;
+ key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB;
+ key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB;
+ }
+ key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->macDef->mac_size * BPB;
+
+ calg = cipher_def->calg;
+ bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ } else if (isTLS) {
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ } else {
+ key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
+ }
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params;
+ params.len = key_material_params_len;
+
+ /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and
+ * DERIVE by DEFAULT */
+ derivedKeyHandle = PK11_Derive(masterSecret, key_derive, &params,
+ bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize);
+ if (!derivedKeyHandle) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we
+ * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both
+ * mac's map to the same keytype.
+ */
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(derivedKeyHandle);
+
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */
+ clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret,
+ PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret,
+ PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ if (!skipKeysAndIVs) {
+ clientSpec->keyMaterial.key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey,
+ PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ serverSpec->keyMaterial.key =
+ PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey,
+ PR_TRUE, pwArg);
+ if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* loser sets err */
+ }
+ }
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_CoalesceEchHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* |sha| contains the CHOuter transcript, which is the singular
+ * transcript if not doing ECH. If the server responded with 1.2,
+ * contexts are not yet initialized. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner);
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in
+ * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from
+ * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(),
+ * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown);
+ if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record;
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha);
+ /*
+ * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these
+ * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots
+ * that the master secret will wind up in ...
+ */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* determine the hash from the prf */
+ const SECOidData *hash_oid =
+ SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss));
+
+ /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash)
+ * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our
+ * PK11Context */
+ PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL);
+ if (hash_oid == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Transcript hash used on ECH client. */
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or
+ * created successfully. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo;
+
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) {
+ /* When doing ECH, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes will store outer messages
+ * into the both the outer and inner transcripts.
+ * ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes uses the default context which is
+ * the outer when doing client ECH. For ECH shared-mode or backend
+ * servers only the hs.messages buffer is used. */
+ if (ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* When doing ECH, deriving the accept_confirmation value requires all
+ * messages up to and including the ServerHello
+ * (see draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.2).
+ *
+ * Don't free the transcript buffer until confirmation calculation. */
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages);
+ }
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len > 0) {
+ if (PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+void
+ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len = 0;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Add the provided bytes to the handshake hash context. When doing
+ * TLS 1.3 ECH, |target| may be provided to specify only the inner/outer
+ * transcript, else the input is added to both contexts. This happens
+ * only on the client. On the server, only the default context is used. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b,
+ unsigned int l, sslBuffer *target)
+{
+
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool explicit = (target != NULL);
+ PRBool appendToEchInner = !ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx &&
+ !explicit;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(target != &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages ||
+ !ss->sec.isServer);
+
+ if (target == NULL) {
+ /* Default context. */
+ target = &ss->ssl3.hs.messages;
+ }
+ /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es)
+ * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake
+ * messages, until we know what to do.
+ * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown,
+ * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input),
+ * and we stop appending to the buffer.
+ *
+ * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages,
+ * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for
+ * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use
+ * when signing other handshake hashes. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown ||
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(target, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (appendToEchInner) {
+ return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages, b, l);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "handshake hash input:", b, l));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ if (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.messages) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner &&
+ (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages || !explicit)) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b,
+ unsigned int l)
+{
+ return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.messages);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b,
+ unsigned int l)
+{
+ return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handshake messages
+ */
+/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes()
+** ssl3_AppendHandshake()
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
+** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage()
+** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l)
+{
+ return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, NULL);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "post handshake hash input:", b, l));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, b, l);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* The next two functions serve to append the handshake header.
+ The first one additionally writes to seqNumberBuffer
+ the sequence number of the message we are generating.
+ This function is used when generating the keyUpdate message in dtls13_enqueueKeyUpdateMessage.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length, PRUint64 *sendMessageSeqOut)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(t != ssl_hs_client_hello);
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it.
+ * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call
+ * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary.
+ */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t)));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* RFC 9147. 5.2. DTLS Handshake Message Format.
+ * In DTLS 1.3, the message transcript is computed over the original TLS
+ * 1.3-style Handshake messages without the message_seq,
+ * fragment_offset, and fragment_length values. Note that this is a
+ * change from DTLS 1.2 where those values were included in the transcript. */
+ PRBool suppressHash = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+
+ /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the
+ * transmission code, if necessary */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2, suppressHash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ /* In case if we provide a buffer for the sequence message,
+ we write down sendMessageSeq to the buffer. */
+ if (sendMessageSeqOut != NULL) {
+ *sendMessageSeqOut = ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++;
+
+ /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, 0, 3, suppressHash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+
+ /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumberSuppressHash(ss, length, 3, suppressHash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */
+}
+
+/* The function calls the ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum implemented above.
+ As in the majority of the cases we do not need the last parameter,
+ we separate out this function. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ return ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeaderAndStashSeqNum(ss, t, length, NULL);
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * Consume Handshake functions.
+ *
+ * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks,
+ * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
+ * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v".
+ * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
+ *
+ * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert,
+ * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably
+ * override the generic error code by setting another.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b,
+ PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes);
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
+ *b += bytes;
+ *length -= bytes;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input
+ * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an
+ * integer in network byte order. Sets *num to the received value.
+ * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes.
+ *
+ * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 *num, PRUint32 bytes,
+ PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PRUint8 *buf = *b;
+ PRUint32 i;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ *num = 0;
+ if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (bytes > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+ *num = (*num << 8) + buf[i];
+ }
+ *b += bytes;
+ *length -= bytes;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes,
+ PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PRUint64 num64;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof(*num));
+ if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &num64, bytes, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *num = num64 & 0xffffffff;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is
+ * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes"
+ * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value
+ * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length,
+ * is returned in the SECItem i.
+ *
+ * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure.
+ * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set.
+ *
+ * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies
+ * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here
+ * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to
+ * point to the values in the buffer **b.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRUint32 bytes,
+ PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length)
+{
+ PRUint32 count;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3);
+ i->len = 0;
+ i->data = NULL;
+ i->type = siBuffer;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, bytes, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (count > 0) {
+ if (count > *length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+ i->data = *b;
+ i->len = count;
+ *b += count;
+ *length -= count;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value.
+ * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned.
+ *
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+SECOidTag
+ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType)
+{
+ switch (hashType) {
+ case ssl_hash_sha1:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA1;
+ case ssl_hash_sha256:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA256;
+ case ssl_hash_sha384:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA384;
+ case ssl_hash_sha512:
+ return SEC_OID_SHA512;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+SECOidTag
+ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(SSLAuthType authType)
+{
+ switch (authType) {
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_sign:
+ return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_pss:
+ return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE;
+ case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+ return SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ case ssl_auth_dsa:
+ return SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ /* shouldn't ever get there */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+SSLHashType
+ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return ssl_hash_sha1;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ return ssl_hash_sha256;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ return ssl_hash_sha384;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ return ssl_hash_sha512;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */
+ case ssl_sig_none:
+ case ssl_sig_ed25519:
+ case ssl_sig_ed448:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return ssl_hash_none;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid)
+{
+ SECOidTag authOid = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme));
+
+ if (spkiOid == authOid) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if ((authOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) &&
+ (spkiOid == SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key type. */
+PRBool
+ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid,
+ PRBool isTls13)
+{
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* if we are purposefully passed SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, it means
+ * we not checking the scheme against a potential key, so skip
+ * the call */
+ if ((spkiOid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) &&
+ !ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (isTls13) {
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* With TLS 1.3, EC keys should have been selected based on calling
+ * ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(), reject them otherwise. */
+ return spkiOid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki,
+ SSLSignatureScheme *scheme)
+{
+ SECKEYRSAPSSParams pssParam = { 0 };
+ PORTCheapArenaPool arena;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* The key doesn't have parameters, boo. */
+ if (!spki->algorithm.parameters.len) {
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(&arena.arena, &pssParam,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_RSAPSSParamsTemplate),
+ &spki->algorithm.parameters);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* Not having hashAlg means SHA-1 and we don't accept that. */
+ if (!pssParam.hashAlg) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ switch (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(pssParam.hashAlg)) {
+ case SEC_OID_SHA256:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_SHA384:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_SHA512:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki,
+ SSLSignatureScheme *scheme)
+{
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *group;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+
+ key = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki);
+ if (!key) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key);
+ if (!group) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ switch (group->name) {
+ case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Newer signature schemes are designed so that a single SPKI can be used with
+ * that scheme. This determines that scheme from the SPKI. If the SPKI doesn't
+ * have a single scheme, |*scheme| is set to ssl_sig_none. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki,
+ PRBool isTls13, SSLSignatureScheme *scheme)
+{
+ SECOidTag spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm);
+
+ if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE) {
+ return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(spki, scheme);
+ }
+
+ /* Only do this lookup for TLS 1.3, where the scheme can be determined from
+ * the SPKI alone because the ECDSA key size determines the hash. Earlier
+ * TLS versions allow the same EC key to be used with different hashes. */
+ if (isTls13 && spkiOid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(spki, scheme);
+ }
+
+ *scheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Check that a signature scheme is enabled by configuration. */
+PRBool
+ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(const ssl3KEADef *keaDef, SECOidTag spkiOid)
+{
+ switch (spkiOid) {
+ case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE:
+ return keaDef->signKeyType == rsaKey;
+ case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+ return keaDef->signKeyType == dsaKey;
+ case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ return keaDef->signKeyType == ecKey;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature algorithm
+ * identifier in |scheme| is consistent with the public key in |spki|. It also
+ * checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature algorithms. If
+ * all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, PORT_SetError is
+ * called and SECFailure is returned. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme,
+ CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki)
+{
+ SSLSignatureScheme spkiScheme;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ SECOidTag spkiOid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(spki, isTLS13, &spkiScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (spkiScheme != ssl_sig_none) {
+ /* The SPKI in the certificate can only be used for a single scheme. */
+ if (spkiScheme != scheme ||
+ !ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm);
+
+ /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing
+ * key type of the cipher suite. */
+ if (!isTLS13 && !ss->sec.isServer) {
+ if (!ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def, spkiOid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */
+ if ((spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ||
+ !ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ case ssl_sig_none:
+ case ssl_sig_ed25519:
+ case ssl_sig_ed448:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ return PR_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+SSLAuthType
+ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme)
+{
+ switch (scheme) {
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+ /* We report based on the key type for PSS signatures. */
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512:
+ return ssl_auth_rsa_sign;
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512:
+ return ssl_auth_rsa_pss;
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+ case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+ return ssl_auth_ecdsa;
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384:
+ case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512:
+ return ssl_auth_dsa;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ }
+ return ssl_auth_null;
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value
+ * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly.
+ *
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
+SECStatus
+ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b,
+ PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out)
+{
+ PRUint32 tmp;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* Alert sent, Error code set already. */
+ }
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * end of Consume Handshake functions.
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
+ SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext(
+ ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg));
+
+ if (!hashContext) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len);
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
+ sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ }
+ PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point.
+ * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify
+ * ssl3_SendFinished
+ * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock.
+ * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock.
+ * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.)
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */
+ PRUint32 sender)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ unsigned int outLength;
+ PRUint8 md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ PRUint8 sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ PK11Context *h;
+ unsigned int stateLen;
+ unsigned char stackBuf[1024];
+ unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
+
+ h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
+ stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf,
+ sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen);
+ if (stateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto tls12_loser;
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len,
+ sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto tls12_loser;
+ }
+
+ hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss);
+
+ tls12_loser:
+ if (stateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (stateBuf != stackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len,
+ ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss),
+ hashes);
+ } else {
+ PK11Context *md5;
+ PK11Context *sha = NULL;
+ unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen;
+ unsigned char md5StackBuf[256];
+ unsigned char shaStackBuf[512];
+ const int md5Pad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_md5)->pad_size;
+ const int shaPad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_sha)->pad_size;
+
+ md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf,
+ sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen);
+ if (md5StateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5;
+
+ shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf,
+ sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen);
+ if (shaStateBuf == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha;
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ /* compute hashes for SSL3. */
+ unsigned char s[4];
+
+ if (!spec->masterSecret) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24);
+ s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16);
+ s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8);
+ s[3] = (unsigned char)sender;
+
+ if (sender != 0) {
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4);
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4));
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, md5Pad));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, md5Pad);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength));
+
+ if (sender != 0) {
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4);
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4));
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, shaPad));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, shaPad);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength));
+
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, md5Pad));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, md5Pad);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH);
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH));
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, shaPad));
+ PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH));
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, shaPad);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ }
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH));
+
+ hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH;
+
+ loser:
+ if (md5StateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ if (shaStateBuf) {
+ if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) !=
+ SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) {
+ PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * end of Handshake Hash functions.
+ * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes.
+ **************************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+#define CHTYPE(t) \
+ case client_hello_##t: \
+ return #t;
+
+static const char *
+ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ CHTYPE(initial);
+ CHTYPE(retry);
+ CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */
+ CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#undef CHTYPE
+#endif
+
+PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+static void
+ssl_MakeFakeSid(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf)
+{
+ PRUint8 x = 0x5a;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; ++i) {
+ x += ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[i];
+ buf[i] = x;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Set the version fields of the cipher spec for a ClientHello. */
+static void
+ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null);
+ /* This is - a best guess - but it doesn't matter here. */
+ spec->version = ss->vrange.max;
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE;
+ } else {
+ /* For new connections, cap the record layer version number of TLS
+ * ClientHello to { 3, 1 } (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem
+ * to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore ClientHello.client_version and use the
+ * record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when
+ * negotiating protocol versions. In addition, if the record layer
+ * version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } (TLS 1.1) or higher, these
+ * servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, some F5 BIG-IP servers
+ * hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a version greater than
+ * { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this flag to work around
+ * such servers.
+ *
+ * The final version is set when a version is negotiated.
+ */
+ spec->recordVersion = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0,
+ ss->vrange.max);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(const sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *preamble, const sslBuffer *extensions)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int msgLen = preamble->len;
+ msgLen += extensions->len ? (2 + extensions->len) : 0;
+ unsigned int headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? 12 : 4;
+
+ /* Record the message length. */
+ rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, 1, msgLen - headerLen, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* code set */
+ }
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Record the (unfragmented) fragment length. */
+ unsigned int offset = 1 /* ch */ + 3 /* len */ +
+ 2 /* seq */ + 3 /* fragment offset */;
+ rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, offset, msgLen - headerLen, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* code set */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(sslSocket *ss, PRBool fallbackSCSV, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int saveLen;
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &offset);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
+ /* Add the actual SCSV */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ if (fallbackSCSV) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ saveLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf);
+ /* CipherSuites are appended to Hello message here */
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, suite->cipher_suite,
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* GREASE CipherSuites:
+ * A client MAY select one or more GREASE cipher suite values and advertise
+ * them in the "cipher_suites" field [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */
+ if (ss->opt.enableGrease && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_cipher],
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange) ||
+ (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf) - saveLen) == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, offset, 2);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid,
+ PRBool realSid, PRUint16 version, PRBool isEchInner,
+ const sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *preamble)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sslBuffer constructed = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+ const PRUint8 *client_random = isEchInner ? ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random : ss->ssl3.hs.client_random;
+ PORT_Assert(sid);
+ PRBool fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && !isEchInner &&
+ (!realSid || version < sid->version);
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_hs_client_hello, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the
+ * transmission code, if necessary */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++;
+
+ /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around
+ * the Windows SChannel bug described in ssl3_SendClientHello. */
+ PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ }
+
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ PRUint16 dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, dtlsVersion, 2);
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&constructed, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && !isEchInner) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
+ } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* We're faking session resumption, so rather than create new
+ * randomness, just mix up the client random a little. */
+ PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES];
+ ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf);
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, buf, SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1);
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 1);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ /* This cookieLen applies to the cookie that appears in the DTLS
+ * ClientHello, which isn't used in DTLS 1.3. */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry ? 0 : ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len,
+ 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(ss, fallbackSCSV, &constructed);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Compression methods: count is always 1, null compression. */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 1, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_compression_null, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &constructed, extensions);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ *preamble = constructed;
+ return SECSuccess;
+loser:
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&constructed);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(),
+ * ssl3_RedoHandshake()
+ * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session)
+ * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE)
+ *
+ * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here:
+ * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello
+ * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving
+ * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3)
+ * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending
+ * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3)
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool unlockNeeded = PR_FALSE;
+ sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+ PRUint16 version = ss->vrange.max;
+ PRInt32 flags;
+ sslBuffer chBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type)));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled");
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need
+ * to maintain the handshake hashes. */
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || type == client_hello_retry);
+
+ if (type == client_hello_initial) {
+ ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+ }
+ /* These must be reset every handshake. */
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+
+ /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */
+ if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) {
+ return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to
+ * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled.
+ */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial);
+ if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min ||
+ ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we have a ss->sec.ci.sid.
+ * Check that it's not expired.
+ * If we have an sid and it comes from an external cache, we use it. */
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+ sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: using external resumption token in ClientHello",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ } else if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->statelessResume && type == client_hello_retry) {
+ /* If we are sending a second ClientHello, reuse the same SID
+ * as the original one. */
+ sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ } else if (!ss->opt.noCache) {
+ /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup
+ * handles expired entries and other details.
+ * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then
+ * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful.
+ */
+ sid = ssl_LookupSID(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer,
+ ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url);
+ } else {
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists,
+ * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ...
+ * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds
+ * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc.
+ */
+ if (sid) {
+ PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (!tls13_ResumptionCompatible(ss, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite =
+ ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite,
+ ss->cipherSuites);
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { sid->version, sid->version };
+ if (!suite || !ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that no (valid) ECHConfigs are setup in combination with a
+ * (resumable) TLS < 1.3 session id. */
+ if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) {
+ /* If there are ECH configs, the client must not resume but
+ * offer ECH. */
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */
+ if (sidOK) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) {
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
+ }
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL;
+ if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) ||
+ ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (wrapKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ slot = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that
+ ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been
+ ** removed, etc.
+ */
+ if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (sidOK) {
+ /* Set version based on the sid. */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /*
+ * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
+ * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
+ * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
+ * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
+ * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
+ * ClientHello when renegotiating.
+ *
+ * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still
+ * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that
+ * sid->version is bounded within
+ * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we
+ * can't use sid.
+ */
+ if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min &&
+ sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
+ } else {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Check sid->version is OK first.
+ * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version,
+ * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the
+ * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback)
+ */
+ if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min ||
+ sid->version > ss->vrange.max) {
+ sidOK = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sidOK) {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sid) {
+ requestingResume = PR_TRUE;
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength));
+
+ ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy;
+ } else {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /*
+ * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA
+ * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the
+ * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the
+ * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we
+ * continue to use the client_version used in the initial
+ * ClientHello when renegotiating.
+ */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ version = ss->clientHelloVersion;
+ }
+
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
+ if (!sid) {
+ return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */
+ }
+ /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */
+ sid->version = version;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) {
+ /* SSL records are not being MACed. */
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = version;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* release the old sid */
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+
+ /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV,
+ * only if TLS is disabled.
+ */
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) {
+ /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders,
+ * to suppress sending of empty RI extension.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to
+ * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a
+ * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced.
+ * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it
+ * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold
+ * the lock across the calls to ssl_ConstructExtensions.
+ */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) {
+ unlockNeeded = PR_TRUE;
+ PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+
+ /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt or renegotiation. */
+ if (type == client_hello_initial ||
+ type == client_hello_renegotiation) {
+ rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss, type);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Setup TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation? */
+ if (type == client_hello_initial &&
+ ss->vrange.max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+ ss->opt.enableChXtnPermutation) {
+ rv = tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationSetup(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) {
+ rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_client_hello);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(ss, sid, requestingResume, version,
+ PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &chBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble. */
+ }
+
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
+ if (extensionBuf.len) {
+ rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by tls13_MaybeGreaseEch. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(ss, chBuf.len, &extensionBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl_InsertPaddingExtension. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize. */
+ }
+
+ /* If we are sending a PSK binder, replace the dummy value. */
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) {
+ rv = tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(ss, &extensionBuf, &chBuf);
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&chBuf, extensionBuf.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(&chBuf, &extensionBuf);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by sslBuffer_Append*. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it.
+ * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call
+ * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* As here the function takes the full message and hashes it in one go,
+ * For DTLS1.3, we skip hashing the unnecessary header fields.
+ * See ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* code set */
+ }
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer.len == 0);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer);
+ /* Here instead of computing the hash, we copy the data to a buffer.*/
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss));
+ rv = tls13_ConstructClientHelloWithEch(ss, sid, !requestingResume, &chBuf, &extensionBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* code set */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* code set */
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ /* By default, all messagess are added to both the inner and
+ * outer transcripts. For CH (or CH2 if HRR), that's problematic. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (unlockNeeded) {
+ /* Note: goto loser can't be used past this point. */
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) {
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) {
+ /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */
+ TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
+ xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
+ ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
+ }
+
+ flags = 0;
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+
+ if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello;
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (unlockNeeded) {
+ PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock);
+ }
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a
+ * complete ssl3 Hello Request.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = {
+ CKM_DES3_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST5_ECB,
+ CKM_DES_ECB,
+ CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS,
+ CKM_IDEA_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST3_ECB,
+ CKM_CAST_ECB,
+ CKM_RC5_ECB,
+ CKM_RC2_ECB,
+ CKM_CDMF_ECB,
+ CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
+ CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
+ CKM_AES_ECB,
+ CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB,
+ CKM_SEED_ECB
+};
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int *wrapMechIndex)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) {
+ if (wrapMechanismList[i] == mech) {
+ *wrapMechIndex = i;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey
+ * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master
+ * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys
+ * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache.
+ */
+const SSLAuthType ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS] = {
+ ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt,
+ ssl_auth_rsa_sign,
+ ssl_auth_rsa_pss,
+ ssl_auth_ecdsa,
+ ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa,
+ ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa
+};
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(const sslServerCert *serverCert, unsigned int *wrapKeyIndex)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++i) {
+ if (SSL_CERT_IS(serverCert, ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[i])) {
+ *wrapKeyIndex = i;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Can't assert here because we still get people using DSA certificates. */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static PK11SymKey *
+ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(
+ SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey,
+ unsigned int wrapKeyIndex,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
+ void *pwArg)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ SECItem wrappedKey;
+ PK11SymKey *Ks;
+ SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey;
+ ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
+
+ /* found the wrapping key on disk. */
+ PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech);
+ PORT_Assert(pWswk->wrapKeyIndex == wrapKeyIndex);
+ if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech ||
+ pWswk->wrapKeyIndex != wrapKeyIndex) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
+ wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+ wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen;
+ PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+
+ switch (ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex]) {
+
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt:
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey,
+ masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa:
+ /*
+ * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on
+ * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next,
+ * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and
+ * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
+ * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e.,
+ * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key.
+ *
+ * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined
+ * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
+ */
+ ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <=
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
+
+ if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen +
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen >
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+ pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var +
+ ecWrapped->encodedParamLen;
+
+ wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen;
+ wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+
+ /* Derive Ks using ECDH */
+ Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
+ NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (Ks == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL,
+ &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_UNWRAP, 0);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+loser:
+ return unwrappedWrappingKey;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS];
+} ssl3SymWrapKey;
+
+static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
+static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS];
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void)
+{
+ if (symWrapKeysLock) {
+ PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ symWrapKeysLock = NULL;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (!symWrapKeysLock)
+ return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */
+ PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) {
+ for (j = 0; j < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++j) {
+ PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey;
+ pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j];
+ if (*pSymWrapKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey);
+ *pSymWrapKey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks();
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void)
+{
+ symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
+ return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array.
+ * If that fails, look for one on disk.
+ * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk,
+ * Put the new key in the in-memory array.
+ *
+ * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with
+ * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA
+ * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss,
+ PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech,
+ void *pwArg)
+{
+ SSLAuthType authType;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+ int length;
+ unsigned int wrapMechIndex;
+ unsigned int wrapKeyIndex;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem wrappedKey;
+ SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk;
+ PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL;
+ ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped;
+ const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
+
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey);
+ PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair ||
+ !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey ||
+ !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL; /* hmm */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(serverCert, &wrapKeyIndex);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL; /* unusable wrapping key. */
+
+ rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech, &wrapMechIndex);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */
+
+ authType = ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex];
+ svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey;
+ pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[wrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[wrapKeyIndex];
+
+ ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE);
+
+ PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock);
+
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey;
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) {
+ if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) {
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */
+ /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */
+ rv = ssl_GetWrappingKey(wrapMechIndex, wrapKeyIndex, &wswk);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex,
+ masterWrapMech, pwArg);
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ goto install;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */
+ goto loser;
+
+ length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech);
+ /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
+ * It's ambiguous.
+ */
+ unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL,
+ length, pwArg);
+ if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey,
+ * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key.
+ */
+ PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */
+
+ svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey;
+ wrappedKey.type = siBuffer;
+ wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey);
+ wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey;
+
+ PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+ if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */
+ switch (authType) {
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt:
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */
+ case ssl_auth_rsa_pss:
+ asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey,
+ unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
+ case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa:
+ /*
+ * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH
+ * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and
+ * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting
+ * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks,
+ * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate
+ * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all
+ * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in
+ * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as
+ * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey);
+ if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) {
+ /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(
+ &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL);
+ if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the key size in bits */
+ if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) {
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len <
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN);
+ if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len +
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >=
+ MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Derive Ks using ECDH */
+ Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL,
+ NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (Ks == NULL) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey);
+ ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size;
+ ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
+
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
+ pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
+
+ wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN -
+ (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen);
+ wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen +
+ ecWrapped->pubValueLen;
+
+ /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */
+ rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks,
+ unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto ec_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer
+ * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset
+ */
+ ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
+
+ ec_cleanup:
+ if (privWrapKey)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey);
+ if (pubWrapKey)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey);
+ if (Ks)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks);
+ asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM);
+
+ wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech;
+ wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism;
+ wswk.wrapMechIndex = wrapMechIndex;
+ wswk.wrapKeyIndex = wrapKeyIndex;
+ wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len;
+
+ /* put it on disk. */
+ /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set,
+ * then abandon the value we just computed and
+ * use the one we got from the disk.
+ */
+ rv = ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk
+ * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard
+ * the key we just created and unwrap this new one.
+ */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+
+ unwrappedWrappingKey =
+ ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex,
+ masterWrapMech, pwArg);
+ }
+
+install:
+ if (unwrappedWrappingKey) {
+ *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey);
+ }
+
+loser:
+done:
+ PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock);
+ return unwrappedWrappingKey;
+}
+
+#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE
+/* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2|
+ * bytes to |out|. */
+static void
+hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length)
+{
+ static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+ *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4];
+ *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15];
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */
+ unsigned int svrPubKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey);
+ enc_pms.len = (svrPubKeyBits + 7) / 8;
+ /* Check that the RSA key isn't larger than 8k bit. */
+ if (svrPubKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
+ if (enc_pms.data == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */
+ }
+
+ /* Wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */
+ rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+ if (ssl_trace >= 100) {
+ SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms);
+ if (extractRV == SECSuccess) {
+ SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms);
+ if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) {
+ ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret",
+ keyData->data, keyData->len);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange,
+ isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2
+ : enc_pms.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ if (isTLS) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ pms = NULL;
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (enc_pms.data != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(enc_pms.data);
+ }
+ if (pms != NULL) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations
+ * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(sslBuffer *buf, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PRBool appendLength)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len;
+
+ if (appendLength) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ while (pad) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ --pad;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+
+ const ssl3DHParams *params;
+ ssl3DHParams customParams;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
+ static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = {
+ ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE
+ };
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+ PRUint8 dhData[SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS / 8 + 2];
+ sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER(dhData);
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ /* Copy DH parameters from server key */
+
+ if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Work out the parameters. */
+ rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &svrPubKey->u.dh.base,
+ &groupDef, &params);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group
+ * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups &&
+ !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups);
+
+ customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom;
+ customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
+ customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
+ customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data;
+ customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len;
+ params = &customParams;
+ groupDef = &customGroupDef;
+ }
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef;
+
+ rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
+
+ if (isTLS)
+ target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+
+ /* Determine the PMS */
+ pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey,
+ PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
+ target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange,
+ params->prime.len + 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (pms)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ if (keyPair)
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) {
+ serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (serverKey == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey;
+ ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey);
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey);
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+}
+
+/* Used by ssl_PickSignatureScheme(). */
+PRBool
+ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes,
+ unsigned int peerSchemeCount,
+ PRBool requireSha1,
+ PRBool slotDoesPss)
+{
+ SSLHashType hashType;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does
+ * not support this signature mechanism. */
+ if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme) && !slotDoesPss) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme);
+ if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < peerSchemeCount; i++) {
+ if (peerSchemes[i] == scheme) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, CERTCertificate *cert,
+ void *pwarg, PRBool *supportsRsaPss)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+ if (privKey) {
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey);
+ } else {
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certID = PK11_FindObjectForCert(cert, pwarg, &slot);
+ if (certID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *supportsRsaPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss,
+ CERTCertificate *cert,
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes,
+ unsigned int peerSchemeCount,
+ PRBool requireSha1,
+ SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ PRBool doesRsaPss;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSLSignatureScheme scheme;
+ SECOidTag spkiOid;
+
+ /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */
+ PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13));
+ if (!pubKey || !cert) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(privKey, cert, ss->pkcs11PinArg,
+ &doesRsaPss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* If the certificate SPKI indicates a single scheme, don't search. */
+ rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ isTLS13, &scheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (scheme != ssl_sig_none) {
+ if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme) ||
+ !ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount,
+ requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *schemePtr = scheme;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm);
+ if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we have to search based on the key type. Go through our preferred
+ * schemes in order and find the first that can be used. */
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i];
+
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13) &&
+ ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount,
+ requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) {
+ *schemePtr = scheme;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+ PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1;
+ } else {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ecKey:
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1;
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the
+ * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using.
+ * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a
+ * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert;
+ PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+
+ if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) {
+ /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then
+ * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */
+ return ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ }
+
+ /* Sets error code, if needed. */
+ return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverCert,
+ cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey,
+ cert->serverKeyPair->privKey,
+ ss->xtnData.sigSchemes,
+ ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes,
+ PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int numSchemes,
+ SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(clientCertificate);
+
+ PORT_Assert(pubKey);
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ /* We should have already checked that a signature scheme was
+ * listed in the request. */
+ PORT_Assert(schemes && numSchemes > 0);
+ }
+
+ if (!isTLS13 &&
+ (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey ||
+ SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) &&
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) {
+ /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that
+ * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older
+ * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and
+ * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must
+ * be SHA-1.
+ */
+ rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate,
+ pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes,
+ PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1,
+ * so fall back to the full negotiation. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate,
+ pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes,
+ PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isTLS12;
+ SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ unsigned int len;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) {
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record &&
+ hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len,
+ hashAlg, &hashes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */
+ }
+
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing.
+ ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this.
+ ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail.
+ */
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */
+ }
+
+ len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0);
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (buf.data)
+ PORT_Free(buf.data);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary
+ * information is properly set. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes)
+{
+ ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg];
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
+
+ if (!initHashes) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* Now we have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */
+ return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
+ ssl3CipherSuite suite, PRBool initHashes)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) {
+ PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (suite == suiteCfg->cipher_suite) {
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version };
+ if (!ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is
+ * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here
+ * in order to give a more precise error code. */
+ if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite, &vrange)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i >= ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't let the server change its mind. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && suite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)suite;
+ return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes);
+}
+
+/* Check that session ID we received from the server, if any, matches our
+ * expectations, depending on whether we're in compat mode and whether we
+ * negotiated TLS 1.3+ or TLS 1.2-.
+ */
+static PRBool
+ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *sidBytes)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ PRBool sidMatch = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool sentFakeSid = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool sentRealSid = sid && sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+
+ /* If attempting to resume a TLS 1.2 connection, the session ID won't be a
+ * fake. Check for the real value. */
+ if (sentRealSid) {
+ sidMatch = (sidBytes->len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) &&
+ (!sidBytes->len || PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, the session ID was a fake if TLS 1.3 compat mode is
+ * enabled. If so, check for the fake value. */
+ sentFakeSid = ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss);
+ if (sentFakeSid && sidBytes->len == SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES];
+ ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf);
+ sidMatch = PORT_Memcmp(buf, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.2: Session ID shouldn't match if we sent a fake. */
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (sentFakeSid) {
+ return !sidMatch;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) {
+ return sidMatch;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */
+ return sidBytes->len == 0;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_CheckServerRandom(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* Check the ServerHello.random per [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3].
+ *
+ * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below
+ * MUST check that the last 8 bytes are not equal to either of these
+ * values. TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last 8 bytes are
+ * not equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or
+ * below. If a match is found, the client MUST abort the handshake with
+ * an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+ */
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion checkVersion =
+ ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion
+ : ss->vrange.max;
+
+ if (checkVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 &&
+ checkVersion > ss->version) {
+ /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */
+ PRUint8 *downgrade_sentinel =
+ ss->ssl3.hs.server_random +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random);
+
+ if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls12_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)) ||
+ !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel,
+ tls1_downgrade_random,
+ sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random))) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * ssl3 ServerHello message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PRUint32 cipher;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ PRUint32 compression;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PRBool isHelloRetry;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b;
+ const PRUint32 savedLength = length;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ }
+ // TODO(djackson) - Bob removed this. Why?
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) {
+ PR_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that if the server selects TLS 1.3, this will set the version to TLS
+ * 1.2. We will amend that once all other fields have been read. */
+ rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
+ ss, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ isHelloRetry = !PORT_Memcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random,
+ ssl_hello_retry_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0)
+ desc = decode_error;
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ /* Read the cipher suite. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &cipher, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+
+ /* Compression method. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compression, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert has been sent */
+ }
+ if (compression != ssl_compression_null) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse extensions. */
+ if (length != 0) {
+ PRUint32 extensionLength;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert already sent */
+ }
+ if (extensionLength != length) {
+ desc = decode_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Read supported_versions if present. */
+ rv = tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 9147. 5.2.
+ * DTLS Handshake Message Format states the difference between the computation
+ * of the transcript if the version is DTLS1.2 or DTLS1.3.
+ *
+ * At this moment we are sure which version
+ * we are planning to use during the connection, so we can compute the hash. */
+ rv = ssl3_MaybeUpdateHashWithSavedRecord(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange));
+ /* Check that the version is within the configured range. */
+ if (ss->vrange.min > ss->version || ss->vrange.max < ss->version) {
+ desc = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)
+ ? protocol_version
+ : handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (isHelloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: received a second hello_retry_request",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* There are three situations in which the server must pick
+ * TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * 1. We received HRR
+ * 2. We sent early app data
+ * 3. ECH was accepted (checked in MaybeHandleEchSignal)
+ *
+ * If we offered ECH and the server negotiated a lower version,
+ * authenticate to the public name for secure disablement.
+ *
+ */
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (isHelloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) {
+ /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did
+ * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for
+ * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have.
+ * (1294697). */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) {
+ desc = protocol_version;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableHelloDowngradeCheck) {
+ rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Finally, now all the version-related checks have passed. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+ /* Update the write cipher spec to match the version. But not after
+ * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec,
+ * in which case this is a no-op. */
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isHelloRetry) {
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the session ID is as expected. */
+ if (!ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(ss, &sidBytes)) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Only initialize hashes if this isn't a Hello Retry. */
+ rv = ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(ss, ss->version, cipher,
+ !isHelloRetry);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss);
+
+ if (isHelloRetry) {
+ rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, savedMsg, savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello);
+ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello,
+ savedMsg, savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, savedMsg, savedLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */
+ ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey;
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
+ SECItem wrappedMS = {
+ siBuffer,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len
+ };
+
+ /* unwrap master secret */
+ slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (wrapKey == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ }
+
+ *ms = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, keyFlags);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ if (!*ms) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes,
+ int *retErrCode)
+{
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool sid_match;
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+ if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
+ (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection ||
+ ss->opt.enableRenegotiation ==
+ SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED
+ : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+
+ /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the
+ * key exchange algorithm. */
+ rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or
+ * not and if so it may match the one we sent.
+ * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so...
+ * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error.
+ */
+ sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 &&
+ sidBytes->len ==
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength &&
+ !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len));
+
+ if (sid_match) {
+ if (sid->version != ss->version ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ do {
+ PK11SymKey *masterSecret;
+
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3]
+ *
+ * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the
+ * client MUST abort the handshake.
+ */
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new
+ * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake.
+ *
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not
+ * used at all (bug 1176526).
+ */
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.authType = sid->authType;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup);
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme;
+
+ rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(ss, sid, &masterSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break; /* not considered an error */
+ }
+
+ /* Got a Match */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits);
+
+ /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes);
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /* copy the peer cert from the SID */
+ if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+ }
+
+ /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } while (0);
+ }
+
+ if (sid_match)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ else
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /* We tried to resume a 1.3 session but the server negotiated 1.2. */
+ if (ss->statelessResume) {
+ PORT_Assert(sid->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
+
+ /* Reset resumption state, only used by 1.3 code. */
+ ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
+
+ /* Clear TLS 1.3 early data traffic key. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* throw the old one away */
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE;
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+
+ /* get a new sid */
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len;
+ if (sidBytes->len > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len);
+ }
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed =
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn);
+
+ /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps,
+ &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps);
+ ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) {
+ /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e.,
+ * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert;
+ } else {
+ /* All the remaining cipher suites must be (EC)DH_anon_* and so
+ * must be ephemeral. Note, if we ever add PSK this might
+ * change. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ *retErrCode = errCode;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+ PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+ SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme;
+
+ SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned dh_p_bits;
+ unsigned dh_g_bits;
+ PRInt32 minDH = 0;
+ PRInt32 optval;
+
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG)) {
+ (void)NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH);
+ }
+
+ if (minDH <= 0) {
+ minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p);
+ if (dh_p_bits < (unsigned)minDH) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (dh_p_bits > SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */
+ dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g);
+ if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) {
+ /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */
+ rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert already sent */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(
+ ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ sigScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+ if (length != 0) {
+ if (isTLS) {
+ desc = decode_error;
+ }
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len));
+
+ /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */
+ /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */
+ desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes,
+ dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode =
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode =
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer
+ * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate
+ * pkcs11 slots and ID's.
+ */
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
+ if (peerKey == NULL) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ peerKey->arena = arena;
+ peerKey->keyType = dhKey;
+ peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
+ peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) ||
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) ||
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode));
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a
+ * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
+ }
+ /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */
+ return rv;
+}
+
+typedef struct dnameNode {
+ struct dnameNode *next;
+ SECItem name;
+} dnameNode;
+
+/*
+ * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest.
+ *
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest
+ * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length,
+ CERTDistNames *ca_list)
+{
+ PRUint32 remaining;
+ int nnames = 0;
+ dnameNode *node;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 2, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+
+ if (remaining > *length)
+ goto alert_loser;
+
+ ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode);
+ if (node == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ while (remaining > 0) {
+ PRUint32 len;
+
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 2, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+ if (len == 0 || remaining < len + 2)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ remaining -= 2;
+ if (SECITEM_MakeItem(ca_list->arena, &node->name, *b, len) != SECSuccess) {
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+ node->name.len = len;
+ *b += len;
+ *length -= len;
+ remaining -= len;
+ nnames++;
+ if (remaining <= 0)
+ break; /* success */
+
+ node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode);
+ node = node->next;
+ if (node == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ }
+
+ ca_list->nnames = nnames;
+ ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(ca_list->arena, SECItem, nnames);
+ if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head;
+ i < nnames;
+ i++, node = node->next) {
+ ca_list->names[i] = node->name;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+no_mem:
+ return SECFailure;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal,
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter
+ : decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena,
+ SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut,
+ unsigned int *numSchemesOut,
+ unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem buf;
+ SSLSignatureScheme *schemes = NULL;
+ unsigned int numSupported = 0;
+ unsigned int numRemaining = 0;
+ unsigned int max;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* An odd-length value is invalid. */
+ if ((buf.len & 1) != 0) {
+ ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Let the caller decide whether to alert here. */
+ if (buf.len == 0) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */
+ numRemaining = buf.len / 2;
+ max = PR_MIN(numRemaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES);
+
+ if (arena) {
+ schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max);
+ } else {
+ schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max);
+ }
+ if (!schemes) {
+ ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (; numRemaining && numSupported < MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; --numRemaining) {
+ PRUint32 tmp;
+ rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
+ (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
+ ;
+ schemes[numSupported++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!numSupported) {
+ if (!arena) {
+ PORT_Free(schemes);
+ }
+ schemes = NULL;
+ }
+
+done:
+ *schemesOut = schemes;
+ *numSchemesOut = numSupported;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL;
+ unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0;
+ CERTDistNames ca_list;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+
+ arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (arena == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena,
+ &signatureSchemes,
+ &signatureSchemeCount,
+ &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */
+ }
+ if (signatureSchemeCount == 0) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, &ca_list);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */
+
+ if (length != 0)
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done;
+
+ rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes,
+ signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto done;
+
+no_mem:
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ goto done;
+
+alert_loser:
+ if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter)
+ desc = decode_error;
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+done:
+ if (arena != NULL)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static void
+ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ switch (outcome) {
+ case SECSuccess:
+ /* check what the callback function returned */
+ if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) {
+ /* we are missing either the key or cert */
+ goto send_no_certificate;
+ }
+ /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert(
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
+ certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE);
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) {
+ goto send_no_certificate;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record ||
+ ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) {
+ rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss,
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* This should only happen if our schemes changed or
+ * if an RSA-PSS cert was selected, but the token
+ * does not support PSS schemes.
+ */
+ goto send_no_certificate;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECFailure:
+ default:
+ send_no_certificate:
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Release the cached parameters */
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss,
+ const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes,
+ unsigned int signatureSchemeCount,
+ CERTDistNames *ca_list)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending);
+
+ /* Should not send a client cert when (non-GREASE) ECH is rejected. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) {
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
+
+ /* Previously cached parameters should be empty */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0);
+ /*
+ * Peer signatures are only available while in the context of
+ * of a getClientAuthData callback. It is required for proper
+ * functioning of SSL_CertIsUsable and SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket
+ * Calling these functions outside the context of a getClientAuthData
+ * callback will result in no filtering.*/
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, signatureSchemeCount);
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, signatureSchemes, signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = signatureSchemeCount;
+
+ rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg,
+ ss->fd, ca_list,
+ &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate,
+ &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+ /* getClientAuthData needs more time (e.g. for user interaction) */
+
+ /* The out parameters should not have changed. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
+
+ /* Mark the handshake as blocked */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ /* getClientAuthData returned SECSuccess or SECFailure immediately, handle accordingly */
+ ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, rv);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Invoked by the application when client certificate selection is complete */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ClientCertCallbackComplete(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
+
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = clientCertificate;
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = clientPrivateKey;
+
+ ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, outcome);
+
+ /* Continue the handshake */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget);
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
+ return target(ss);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending);
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+
+ if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ } else {
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to possible downgrade",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ goto no_false_start;
+ }
+
+ /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
+ * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
+ * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
+ * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ PRBool weakCipher = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->secret_key_size < 10;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (weakCipher) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ goto no_false_start;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to lower version after ECH",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ goto no_false_start;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+ rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
+ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE"
+ : "FALSE"));
+ } else {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+no_false_start:
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRBool result;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
+ case wait_new_session_ticket:
+ case wait_change_cipher:
+ case wait_finished:
+ result = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ result = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */
+ if (ws != wait_hello_done &&
+ ws != wait_cert_request) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool sendClientCert;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL;
+
+ /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before
+ * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client
+ * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the
+ * domain we are connecting to.
+ *
+ * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive
+ * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate;
+ * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher
+ * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may
+ * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake
+ * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's
+ * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was
+ * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point
+ * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting
+ * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during
+ * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property
+ * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake
+ * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for
+ * application data.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* Check whether waiting for client certificate selection OR
+ waiting on server certificate verification AND
+ going to send client cert */
+ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone))) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) {
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss);
+ /* Don't send verify */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ } else if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+
+ if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+ /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
+ * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
+ * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
+ * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
+ * the functions that depend on this being set.
+ */
+ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
+ * false starting before we try to flush the client second
+ * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
+ * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
+ * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
+ * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
+ * done before its false start callback is called.
+ */
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
+ * message are racing each other. If the certificate
+ * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
+ * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
+ */
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn))
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss));
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines used by servers
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_hello_request, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello()
+ */
+static SECComparison
+ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2)
+{
+ if (!name1 != !name2) {
+ return SECLessThan;
+ }
+ if (!name1) {
+ return SECEqual;
+ }
+ if (name1->type != name2->type) {
+ return SECLessThan;
+ }
+ return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2);
+}
+
+/* Sets memory error when returning NULL.
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_SendClientHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleServerHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello()
+ * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello()
+ */
+sslSessionID *
+ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid;
+
+ sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID);
+ if (sid == NULL)
+ return sid;
+
+ if (is_server) {
+ const SECItem *srvName;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/
+ srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (srvName->len && srvName->data) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(sid);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID);
+ sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url);
+ sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer;
+ sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port;
+ sid->references = 1;
+ sid->cached = never_cached;
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+ sid->sigScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
+ sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (is_server) {
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int pid = SSL_GETPID();
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff;
+ rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2,
+ SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello,
+ * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello().
+ */
+ kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ if (kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert
+ : wait_client_key;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */
+static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 };
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def)
+{
+ if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) {
+ /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the
+ * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+static PRBool
+ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(const SECItem *peerSuites, uint16_t suite)
+{
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i + 1 < peerSuites->len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (peerSuites->data[i] << 8) | peerSuites->data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == suite) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites,
+ PRUint16 version, PRUint16 *suitep)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version };
+
+ /* If we negotiated an External PSK and that PSK has a ciphersuite
+ * configured, we need to constrain our choice. If the client does
+ * not support it, negotiate a certificate auth suite and fall back.
+ */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->xtnData.selectedPsk &&
+ ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type == ssl_psk_external &&
+ ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) {
+ PRUint16 pskSuite = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite;
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *pskSuiteCfg = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(pskSuite,
+ ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (ssl3_config_match(pskSuiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss) &&
+ ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, pskSuite)) {
+ *suitep = pskSuite;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i];
+ if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, suite->cipher_suite)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ *suitep = suite->cipher_suite;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Select a cipher suite.
+**
+** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
+** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello().
+**
+** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client
+** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS
+** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure
+** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all,
+** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export
+** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites
+** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we
+** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites,
+ PRBool initHashes)
+{
+ PRUint16 selected;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* Ensure that only valid cipher suites are enabled. */
+ if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) {
+ /* No configured cipher is both supported by PK11 and allowed.
+ * This is a configuration error, so report handshake failure.*/
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(ss, suites, ss->version, &selected);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = selected;
+ return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call the SNI config hook.
+ *
+ * Called from:
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello
+ * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS
+#error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS")
+#endif
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec
+ * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */
+ PRBool passed = PR_TRUE;
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) {
+ passed = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
+ if (!passed) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sniSocketConfig)
+ do { /* not a loop */
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */
+ if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
+ /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */
+ ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd,
+ ss->xtnData.sniNameArr,
+ ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize,
+ ss->sniSocketConfigArg);
+ }
+ if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
+ /* Application does not know the name or was not able to
+ * properly reconfigure the socket. */
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = unrecognized_name;
+ break;
+ } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) {
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf;
+ SECItem *cwsName;
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ if (cwsName->data) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) {
+ /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it
+ * and save the name. */
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret];
+ SECItem *pwsName;
+
+ /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */
+ /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT;
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Need to tell the client that application has picked
+ * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket.
+ */
+ ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn,
+ ssl_SendEmptyExtension);
+ } else {
+ /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */
+ PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize);
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (0);
+ ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData);
+ if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) {
+ /* desc and errCode should be set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+ PRCList *cursor;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* If the client didn't include the supported groups extension, assume just
+ * P-256 support and disable all the other ECDHE groups. This also affects
+ * ECDHE group selection, but this function is called first. */
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
+ if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh &&
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->name != ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1) {
+ ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This picks the first certificate that has:
+ * a) the right authentication method, and
+ * b) the right named curve (EC only)
+ *
+ * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all
+ * based on what order they are configured in. */
+ for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts);
+ cursor != &ss->serverCerts;
+ cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
+ sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor;
+ if (kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) {
+ /* We consider PSS certificates here as well for TLS 1.2. */
+ if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_sign) &&
+ (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_pss) ||
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, kea_def->authKeyType)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(cert) &&
+ !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Found one. */
+ ss->sec.serverCert = cert;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits;
+
+ /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */
+ if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) {
+ ss->sec.authType = kea_def->authKeyType;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->sec.authType =
+ ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_GenerateServerRandom(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint8 *downgradeSentinel;
+
+ rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version == ss->vrange.max) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3].
+ *
+ * TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in response to a
+ * ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random value specially in
+ * their ServerHello.
+ *
+ * If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last 8 bytes of
+ * their Random value to the bytes:
+ *
+ * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01
+ *
+ * If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST, and TLS 1.2
+ * servers SHOULD, set the last 8 bytes of their ServerHello.Random value to
+ * the bytes:
+ *
+ * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00
+ */
+ downgradeSentinel =
+ ss->ssl3.hs.server_random +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random);
+ if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ switch (ss->version) {
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+ /* vrange.max > 1.2, since we didn't early exit above. */
+ PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel,
+ tls12_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random));
+ break;
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+ case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+ PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel,
+ tls1_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random));
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Do not change random. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, SECItem *sidBytes,
+ SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem *comps)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 tmp;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert already sent */
+ }
+
+ /* Translate the version. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp);
+ } else {
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client random data. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
+ ss, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, sidBytes, 1, b, length);
+ /* Check that the SID has the format: opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>, as
+ * specified in RFC8446, Section 4.1.2. */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || sidBytes->len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. It is checked after version negotiation. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, cookieBytes, 1, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, suites, 2, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the list of compression methods. */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, comps, 1, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const SECItem *comps,
+ const SECItem *cookieBytes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (sidBytes->len > 0 && !IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE);
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, sidBytes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */
+ if (comps->len != 1 || comps->data[0] != ssl_compression_null) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* A DTLS 1.3-only client MUST set the legacy_cookie field to zero length.
+ * If a DTLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field,
+ * the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* ECH not possible here. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech;
+
+ /* HRR and ECH are TLS1.3-only. We ignore the Cookie extension here. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS versions prior to 1.3 must include null somewhere. */
+ if (comps->len < 1 ||
+ !memchr(comps->data, ssl_compression_null, comps->len)) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* We never send cookies in DTLS 1.2. */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * ssl3 Client Hello message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 extensionLength;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal;
+ TLSExtension *versionExtension;
+ SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem *echInner = NULL;
+ PRBool isTLS13;
+ const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b;
+ const PRUint32 savedLen = length;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
+ /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) {
+ desc = no_renegotiation;
+ level = alert_warning;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We should always be in a fresh state. */
+ SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss);
+
+ /* Get peer name of client */
+ rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should
+ * clear previous state.
+ */
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss);
+ ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(ss, &b, &length, &sidBytes,
+ &cookieBytes, &suites, &comps);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if
+ * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been
+ * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension.
+ * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake
+ * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility).
+ */
+ if (length) {
+ /* Get length of hello extensions */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* alert already sent */
+ }
+ if (extensionLength != length) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ desc = decode_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+ }
+
+ versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
+ if (versionExtension) {
+ rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the
+ * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss,
+ PR_MIN(ss->clientHelloVersion,
+ SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2),
+ PR_TRUE);
+ /* Send protocol version alert if the ClientHello.legacy_version is not
+ * supported by the server.
+ *
+ * If the "supported_versions" extension is absent and the server only
+ * supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version, the
+ * server MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert
+ * [RFC8446, Appendix D.2]. */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = protocol_version;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+
+ /* Update the write spec to match the selected version. */
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* If there is a cookie, then this is a second ClientHello (TLS 1.3). */
+ if (ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn)) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEch(ss, savedMsg, savedLen, &sidBytes,
+ &comps, &cookieBytes, &suites, &echInner);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(ss, &sidBytes, &comps, &cookieBytes);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */
+ }
+
+ /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello);
+ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ goto loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
+ * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
+ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) {
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ continue;
+ desc = inappropriate_fallback;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV,
+ * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension
+ * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
+ PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext;
+ PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
+ (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The check for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 is earlier. */
+ if (!isTLS13) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone &&
+ (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ||
+ ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = no_renegotiation;
+ level = alert_warning;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation ||
+ (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and
+ * either of the following conditions are satisfied:
+ * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or
+ * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an
+ * empty ticket.
+ */
+ if (!isTLS13 &&
+ (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) ||
+ ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) {
+ if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) {
+ SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+ ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3]));
+ if (ssl_sid_lookup) {
+ sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer,
+ sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle);
+ } else {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ss->statelessResume) {
+ /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume.
+ * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.)
+ * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK.
+ */
+ sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/
+
+ if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
+ PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data,
+ sidBytes.len);
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len;
+ } else {
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0;
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sid != NULL) {
+ /* We've found a session cache entry for this client.
+ * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert,
+ * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache,
+ * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo),
+ * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session.
+ */
+ if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate &&
+ ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) ||
+ (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) ||
+ ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) &&
+ !ss->firstHsDone))) {
+
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss);
+ dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss);
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->data : savedMsg,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->len : savedLen);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE);
+ echInner = NULL;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid,
+ savedMsg, savedLen);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc);
+/* FALLTHRU */
+loser:
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* unwrap helper function to handle the case where the wrapKey doesn't wind
+ * up in the correct token for the master secret */
+PK11SymKey *
+ssl_unwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrapKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param,
+ SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, void *pinArg)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *unwrappedKey;
+
+ /* unwrap the master secret. */
+ unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, wrapType, param,
+ wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ keyFlags);
+ if (!unwrappedKey) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *targetSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, pinArg);
+ PK11SymKey *newWrapKey;
+
+ /* it's possible that we failed to unwrap because the wrapKey is in
+ * a slot that can't handle target. Move the wrapKey to a slot that
+ * can handle this mechanism and retry the operation */
+ if (targetSlot == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ newWrapKey = PK11_MoveSymKey(targetSlot, CKA_UNWRAP, 0,
+ PR_FALSE, wrapKey);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(targetSlot);
+ if (newWrapKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(newWrapKey, wrapType, param,
+ wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ keyFlags);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrapKey);
+ }
+ return unwrappedKey;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *wrapKey;
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0;
+ SECItem wrappedMS = {
+ siBuffer,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len
+ };
+
+ wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ if (!wrapKey) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ }
+
+ *ms = ssl_unwrapSymKey(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, NULL,
+ &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
+ CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ keyFlags, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
+ if (!*ms) {
+ SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server wrapping key found, but couldn't unwrap MasterSecret. wrapMech=0x%0lx",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss,
+ SECItem *suites,
+ sslSessionID *sid,
+ const PRUint8 *msg,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the same
+ ** cipher suite we picked before. This is not a loop, despite appearances.
+ */
+ if (sid)
+ do {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+
+ suite = ss->cipherSuites;
+ /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */
+ for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) {
+ if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(j > 0);
+ if (j == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled,
+ * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled.
+ */
+ if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss))
+ break;
+
+ /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's
+ * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */
+ for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1];
+ if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i;
+ rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ goto cipher_found;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (0);
+ /* START A NEW SESSION */
+
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+cipher_found:
+ suites->data = NULL;
+
+ /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid,
+ * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave
+ * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one.
+ * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret
+ * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert.
+ */
+ if (sid != NULL)
+ do {
+ PK11SymKey *masterSecret;
+
+ if (sid->version != ss->version ||
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+
+ /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent,
+ ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we
+ ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket
+ ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one.
+ */
+ ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve);
+ if (!ss->sec.serverCert || !ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert) {
+ /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It
+ * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out
+ * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3]
+ * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the
+ * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it
+ * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in
+ * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session.
+ *
+ * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret"
+ * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension,
+ * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake.
+ */
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) {
+ if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) {
+ /* Note: we do not destroy the session */
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) {
+ ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */
+ rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(ss, sid, &masterSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ break; /* not an error */
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+ if (sid->peerCert != NULL) {
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session.
+ */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits);
+ if (ss->statelessResume)
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE;
+
+ ss->sec.authType = sid->authType;
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup);
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme;
+
+ ss->sec.localCert =
+ CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert);
+
+ /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */
+ if (sid != NULL &&
+ sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+ sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
+ /* Set server name from sid */
+ SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
+ SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName;
+ if (pwsName->data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clean up sni name array */
+ ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } while (0);
+
+ if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */
+ ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE;
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok);
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ sid = NULL;
+ }
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses);
+
+ /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports
+ * the extension and we are unable to resume.
+ *
+ * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful
+ * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session
+ * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume,
+ * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while
+ * resuming.)
+ */
+ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) &&
+ ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) {
+ ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_session_ticket_xtn,
+ ssl_SendEmptyExtension);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* The alert has already been sent. */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed =
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE;
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+/* FALLTHRU */
+loser:
+ if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss);
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+ }
+
+ if (haveXmitBufLock) {
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes
+ * in asking to use the V3 handshake.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length,
+ PRUint8 padding)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
+ unsigned char *suites;
+ unsigned char *random;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int j;
+ unsigned int sid_length;
+ unsigned int suite_length;
+ unsigned int rand_length;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2];
+ if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
+ total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6];
+ total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8];
+ total += padding;
+ ss->clientHelloVersion = version;
+
+ if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3
+ * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */
+ desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version
+ : handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ /* ECH not possible here. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */
+ if (length != total) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total));
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+ random = suites + suite_length + sid_length;
+
+ if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES ||
+ rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) {
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length],
+ random, rand_length);
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", ss->ssl3.hs.client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH));
+
+ if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Select a cipher suite.
+ **
+ ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in
+ ** ssl3_HandleClientHello().
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) {
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j];
+ SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version };
+ if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i;
+ rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto suite_found;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+ goto alert_loser;
+
+suite_found:
+
+ /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a
+ * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */
+ if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) {
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ desc = inappropriate_fallback;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI
+ * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
+ PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2];
+ if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
+ PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext;
+ PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext;
+ (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation &&
+ !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) {
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */
+ SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses);
+ sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser; /* memory error is set. */
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+ /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */
+
+ /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */
+ rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry,
+ const sslBuffer *extensionBuf, sslBuffer *messageBuf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version;
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ const PRUint8 *random;
+
+ version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version);
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, version, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (helloRetry) {
+ random = ssl_hello_retry_random;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl_GenerateServerRandom(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ random = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_Append(messageBuf, random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ if (sid) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID,
+ sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1);
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, 0, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.data,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len, 1);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ssl_compression_null, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(extensionBuf)) {
+ /* Directly copy the extensions */
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(messageBuf, extensionBuf, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) {
+ /* Signal ECH acceptance if we handled handled both CHOuter/CHInner (i.e.
+ * in shared mode), or if we received a CHInner in split/backend mode. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
+ if (helloRetry) {
+ return tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));
+ } else {
+ return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version.
+**
+** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session),
+** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session),
+** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session)
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+ sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
+ if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_server_hello);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &messageBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello,
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set */
+ }
+ }
+
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef,
+ const ssl3DHParams *params,
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair)
+{
+ SECKEYDHParams dhParam;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair;
+
+ dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data;
+ dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len;
+ dhParam.base.data = params->base.data;
+ dhParam.base.len = params->base.len;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data,
+ dhParam.prime.len));
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dhParam.base.data,
+ dhParam.base.len));
+
+ /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */
+ privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL);
+ if (!privKey || !pubKey) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey);
+ if (!pair) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *keyPair = pair;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ int length;
+ SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ SSLHashType hashAlg;
+
+ const ssl3DHParams *params;
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey;
+ const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
+ /* Do this on the heap, this could be over 2k long. */
+ sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
+
+ if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) {
+ /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature.
+ See bug 1170510. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef;
+
+ params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef);
+ rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+
+ if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme);
+ } else {
+ /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */
+ hashAlg = ssl_hash_none;
+ }
+
+ pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:",
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len));
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes,
+ pubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ pubKey->u.dh.base,
+ pubKey->u.dh.publicValue,
+ PR_TRUE /* padY */);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey;
+ rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */
+ }
+
+ length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len +
+ 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len +
+ 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len +
+ 2 + signed_hash.len;
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ length += 2;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_key_exchange, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data,
+ pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendPaddedDHKeyShare. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data,
+ signed_hash.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf);
+ PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (signed_hash.data)
+ PORT_Free(signed_hash.data);
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_dh: {
+ return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh: {
+ return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss);
+ }
+
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ case ssl_kea_null:
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool forCert,
+ PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 };
+ unsigned int filteredCount = 0;
+
+ SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, minVersion, PR_FALSE, forCert,
+ PR_ARRAY_SIZE(filtered),
+ filtered, &filteredCount);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount, grease, buf);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ PRUint32 numSchemes, PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf)
+{
+ if (!numSchemes) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ unsigned int lengthOffset;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < numSchemes; ++i) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, schemes[i], 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* GREASE SignatureAlgorithms:
+ * A client MAY select one or more GREASE signature algorithm values and
+ * advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or
+ * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1].
+ *
+ * When sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as
+ * follows: [...] A server MAY select one or more GREASE signature
+ * algorithm values and advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or
+ * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if present
+ * [RFC8701, Section 4.1]. */
+ if (grease &&
+ ((!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) ||
+ (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3))) {
+ PRUint16 value;
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(&value);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ value = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_sigalg];
+ }
+ rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, value, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * In TLS 1.3 we are permitted to advertise support for PKCS#1
+ * schemes. This doesn't affect the signatures in TLS itself, just
+ * those on certificates. Not advertising PKCS#1 signatures creates a
+ * serious compatibility risk as it excludes many certificate chains
+ * that include PKCS#1. Hence, forCert is used to enable advertising
+ * PKCS#1 support. Note that we include these in signature_algorithms
+ * because we don't yet support signature_algorithms_cert. TLS 1.3
+ * requires that PKCS#1 schemes are placed last in the list if they
+ * are present. This sorting can be removed once we support
+ * signature_algorithms_cert.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool disableRsae,
+ PRBool forCert,
+ unsigned int maxSchemes, SSLSignatureScheme *filteredSchemes,
+ unsigned int *numFilteredSchemes)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(filteredSchemes);
+ PORT_Assert(numFilteredSchemes);
+ PORT_Assert(maxSchemes >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount);
+ if (maxSchemes < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ *numFilteredSchemes = 0;
+ PRBool allowUnsortedPkcs1 = forCert && minVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i],
+ allowUnsortedPkcs1)) {
+ filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i];
+ }
+ }
+ if (forCert && !allowUnsortedPkcs1) {
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i],
+ PR_FALSE) &&
+ ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i],
+ PR_TRUE)) {
+ filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i];
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PRBool isTLS12;
+ const PRUint8 *certTypes;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 length;
+ const SECItem *names;
+ unsigned int calen;
+ unsigned int nnames;
+ const SECItem *name;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int certTypesLength;
+ PRUint8 sigAlgs[2 + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2];
+ sslBuffer sigAlgsBuf = SSL_BUFFER(sigAlgs);
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ certTypes = certificate_types;
+ certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types;
+
+ length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen;
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, ss->version, PR_TRUE /* forCert */,
+ PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, &sigAlgsBuf);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ length += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ if (isTLS12) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&sigAlgsBuf),
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello_done, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b;
+ const PRUint32 savedLen = length;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) {
+ desc = unexpected_message;
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record);
+ rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ goto loser; /* alert already sent */
+ }
+ rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(
+ ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = illegal_parameter;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len,
+ ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme),
+ &hashes);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record);
+ sigScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE;
+ desc = decrypt_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* malformed. */
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */
+ rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signed_hash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ signed_hash.data = NULL;
+
+ if (length != 0) {
+ desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter;
+ goto alert_loser; /* malformed */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify,
+ savedMsg, savedLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+loser:
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA.
+ * Then generate and return the PMS.
+ * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use
+ * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above)
+ * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above)
+ * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below)
+ * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ SECItem param;
+ CK_VERSION version;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3];
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ SSLCipherAlgorithm calg;
+ /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on
+ ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null
+ ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch);
+
+ calg = spec->cipherDef->calg;
+
+ /* First get an appropriate slot. */
+ mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN;
+ mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+ mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg);
+
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND);
+ return pms; /* which is NULL */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion temp;
+
+ temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ version.major = MSB(temp);
+ version.minor = LSB(temp);
+ } else {
+ version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+ }
+
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&version;
+ param.len = sizeof version;
+
+ pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, &param, 0, pwArg);
+ if (!serverKeySlot)
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return pms;
+}
+
+static void
+ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(PK11SymKey **x, PK11SymKey **y, PRBool c)
+{
+ uintptr_t mask = (uintptr_t)c;
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 1; i < sizeof(uintptr_t) * 8; i <<= 1) {
+ mask |= mask << i;
+ }
+ uintptr_t x_ptr = (uintptr_t)*x;
+ uintptr_t y_ptr = (uintptr_t)*y;
+ uintptr_t tmp = (x_ptr ^ y_ptr) & mask;
+ x_ptr = x_ptr ^ tmp;
+ y_ptr = y_ptr ^ tmp;
+ *x = (PK11SymKey *)x_ptr;
+ *y = (PK11SymKey *)y_ptr;
+}
+
+/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER
+ * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message,
+ * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message.
+ * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly
+ * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS.
+ * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection.
+ * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure
+ * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where
+ * the failure must occur.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
+ PRUint8 *b,
+ PRUint32 length,
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem enc_pms;
+ PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *fauxPms = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch);
+
+ enc_pms.data = b;
+ enc_pms.len = length;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */
+ PRUint32 kLen;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &kLen, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) {
+ enc_pms.len = kLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1
+ * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface.
+ *
+ * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246
+ * calls R).
+ * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what
+ * RFC 5246 calls M).
+ * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M
+ * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive
+ * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version
+ * check and length check.
+ * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or
+ * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard
+ * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M.
+ *
+ * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having
+ * a function that only performs the PMS version and length
+ * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF,
+ * which isn't necessary here.
+ */
+
+ /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */
+ slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey);
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL);
+ if (!slot) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (fauxPms == NULL) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer
+ * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do
+ * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the
+ * unwrapped pms will be used.
+ */
+ pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms,
+ CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
+ /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */
+ ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, pms == NULL);
+
+ /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to
+ * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we
+ * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this
+ * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS
+ * since it is correctly formatted. */
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, NULL);
+
+ /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS, else select the FPMS. */
+ ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, (rv != SECSuccess) & (fauxPms != NULL));
+
+ /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE);
+
+ /* Clear both PMS. */
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(fauxPms);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
+ PRUint8 *b,
+ PRUint32 length,
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *pms;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len;
+ clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue,
+ 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime,
+ &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ if (isTLS)
+ target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else
+ target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+
+ /* Determine the PMS */
+ pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ const ssl3KEADef *kea_def;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
+
+ if (kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
+ /* There should be exactly one pair. */
+ PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+ PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==
+ PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+ keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+ serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits =
+ SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ } else {
+ serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits;
+ }
+
+ if (!serverKeyPair) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey);
+ PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey);
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType;
+
+ switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher;
+ } else {
+ /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange
+ * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so
+ * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an
+ * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */
+ PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE;
+ const SECItem *context;
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested);
+ context = &ss->xtnData.certReqContext;
+ len = context->len + 1;
+ isTLS13 = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, len + 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewSessionTicket
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+ SECStatus rv;
+ NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 };
+
+ rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, NULL, 0,
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec->masterSecret, &ticket);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* Serialize the handshake message. Length =
+ * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket,
+ 4 + 2 + ticket.len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* This is a fixed value. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_ticket_lifetime, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ /* Encode the ticket. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser;
+
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ if (ticket.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem ticketData;
+ PRUint32 temp;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
+ * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in
+ * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details.
+ */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(ss);
+ if (length < 4) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = temp;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure; /* malformed */
+ }
+ /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the
+ * existing ticket. */
+ if (ticketData.len != 0) {
+ rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket,
+ &ticketData);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+static PRInt32 connNum = 0;
+
+static SECStatus
+get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex)
+{
+ PRFileDesc *cf;
+ char *testdir;
+ char *startat;
+ char *stopat;
+ const char *extension;
+ int fileNum;
+ PRInt32 numBytes = 0;
+ PRStatus prStatus;
+ PRFileInfo info;
+ char cfn[100];
+
+ pCertItem->data = 0;
+ if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root"));
+ extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der");
+ fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1;
+ if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) {
+ fileNum += atoi(startat);
+ }
+ if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL &&
+ fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) {
+ *pIndex = -1;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ snprintf(cfn, sizeof(cfn), "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension);
+ cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (!cf) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info);
+ if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) {
+ PR_Close(cf);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size);
+ if (pCertItem) {
+ numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size);
+ }
+ PR_Close(cf);
+ if (numBytes != info.size) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn);
+ *pIndex = -1;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Used by both client and server.
+ * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CERTCertificateList *certChain;
+ int certChainLen = 0;
+ int i;
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ SECItem fakeCert;
+ int ndex = -1;
+#endif
+ PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+ SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned int contextLen = 0;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending);
+
+ if (ss->sec.localCert)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert);
+
+ certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain;
+ ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert);
+ } else {
+ certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain;
+ ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+ }
+
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex);
+#endif
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested);
+ context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext;
+ contextLen += context.len;
+ }
+ }
+ if (certChain) {
+ for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
+ certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3;
+ } else {
+ certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
+ }
+#else
+ certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate,
+ contextLen + certChainLen + 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS13) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data,
+ context.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ if (certChain) {
+ for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) {
+#ifdef NISCC_TEST
+ if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data,
+ fakeCert.len, 3);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
+ certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
+ }
+#else
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data,
+ certChain->certs[i].len, 3);
+#endif
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Used by server only.
+ * single-stapling, send only a single cert status
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int len = 0;
+ SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL;
+ const sslServerCert *serverCert;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+
+ if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn))
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */
+ serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
+ if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
+ statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray;
+ }
+ if (!statusToSend)
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+ /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */
+ len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3;
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_status, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
+ statusToSend->items[0].data,
+ statusToSend->items[0].len,
+ 3);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain
+ * from the cert database after they've been validated.
+ */
+void
+ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena;
+ ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain;
+
+ for (; certs; certs = certs->next) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert);
+ }
+ if (arena)
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL;
+
+ if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) {
+ if (ss->sec.peerKey) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey);
+ ss->sec.peerKey = NULL;
+ }
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ PRUint32 status, len;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+
+ /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &status, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || status != 1 /* ocsp */) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || len != length) {
+ return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ }
+
+#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
+ if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) {
+ ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+#undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN
+
+ /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */
+ SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1);
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items)
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length);
+
+ if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure; /* code already set */
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length);
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length;
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Certificate message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) ||
+ (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss);
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ ssl3CertNode *c;
+ ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL;
+ PRUint32 remaining = 0;
+ PRUint32 size;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ SSL3AlertDescription desc;
+ int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE;
+ SECItem certItem;
+
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+
+ /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message
+ ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a
+ ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability.
+ */
+ if (length) {
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+ if (remaining > length)
+ goto decode_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (!remaining) {
+ if (!(isTLS && isServer)) {
+ desc = bad_certificate;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */
+ /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ } else {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished);
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
+ }
+
+ /* First get the peer cert. */
+ if (remaining < 3)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ remaining -= 3;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+ if (size == 0 || remaining < size)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ certItem.data = b;
+ certItem.len = size;
+ b += size;
+ length -= size;
+ remaining -= size;
+
+ ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+ PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) {
+ /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the
+ * problem was just some local problem, like memory error.
+ */
+ goto ambiguous_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now get all of the CA certs. */
+ while (remaining > 0) {
+ if (remaining < 3)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ remaining -= 3;
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */
+ if (size == 0 || remaining < size)
+ goto decode_loser;
+
+ certItem.data = b;
+ certItem.len = size;
+ b += size;
+ length -= size;
+ remaining -= size;
+
+ c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */
+ }
+
+ c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+ PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+ if (c->cert == NULL) {
+ goto ambiguous_err;
+ }
+
+ c->next = NULL;
+ if (lastCert) {
+ lastCert->next = c;
+ } else {
+ ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c;
+ }
+ lastCert = c;
+ }
+
+ SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert);
+
+ if (!isServer &&
+ ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+
+ambiguous_err:
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ switch (errCode) {
+ case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR:
+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE:
+ case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
+ if (isTLS) {
+ desc = internal_error;
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
+ goto loser;
+
+decode_loser:
+ desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+
+loser:
+ (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 minKey = 0;
+ PRInt32 optval;
+ PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE;
+
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG);
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey);
+ switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ minKey = SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case dsaKey:
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ minKey = SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case dhKey:
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ minKey = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ecKey:
+ rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval)
+ : SECFailure;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) {
+ minKey = (PRUint32)optval;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we
+ * only support curves we like. */
+ minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */
+ if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY,
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0
+ ? insufficient_security
+ : illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* PreliminaryChannelInfo.authKeyBits, scheme, and peerDelegCred are now valid. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_peer_auth;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleServerSpki(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) {
+ sslDelegatedCredential *dc = ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred;
+ pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(dc->spki);
+ if (!pubKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Because we have only a single authType (ssl_auth_tls13_any)
+ * for TLS 1.3 at this point, set the scheme so that the
+ * callback can interpret |authKeyBits| correctly.
+ */
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg;
+ } else {
+ pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (!pubKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SECStatus rv = ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(ss, pubKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* Alert sent and code set. */
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ int errCode;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) ==
+ ssl_preinfo_all);
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* Set the |spki| used to verify the handshake. When verifying with a
+ * delegated credential (DC), this corresponds to the DC public key;
+ * otherwise it correspond to the public key of the peer's end-entity
+ * certificate. */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerSpki(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* Alert sent and code set (if not SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE).
+ * In either case, we're done here. */
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain.
+ */
+ rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd,
+ PR_TRUE, isServer);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ if (errCode == 0) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ if (rv != SECWouldBlock) {
+ if (ss->handleBadCert) {
+ rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert);
+ }
+ ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify);
+ } else {
+ /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) {
+ /* require server_key_exchange */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key;
+ } else {
+ /* disallow server_key_exchange */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request;
+ /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange
+ * details to compensate for that. */
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Server */
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key;
+ } else {
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* The caller should have cleared the callback. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail;
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (error != 0) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail;
+ ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
+ sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
+
+ if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
+ " with peer's finished message",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ }
+
+ rv = target(ss);
+ } else {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
+ " peer's finished message",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake);
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
+ !ss->firstHsDone &&
+ !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+ ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) {
+ /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
+ * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
+ * haven't received all of the server's second round yet.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
+ } else {
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ PRBool isServer,
+ const SSL3Hashes *hashes,
+ TLSFinished *tlsFinished)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params;
+ SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PK11Context *prf_context;
+ unsigned int retLen;
+
+ PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret);
+ if (!spec->masterSecret) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF;
+ } else {
+ tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss);
+ }
+ tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12;
+ tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params;
+ param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params);
+ prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN,
+ spec->masterSecret, &param);
+ if (!prf_context)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen,
+ sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data);
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate
+ * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for
+ * ss->ssl3.crSpec).
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
+ const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen,
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen)
+{
+ SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL;
+ PK11Context *prf_context;
+ unsigned int retLen;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (!spec->masterSecret) {
+ PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+ /* Bug 1312976 non-SHA256 exporters are broken. */
+ if (ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss) != CKM_SHA256) {
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256;
+ }
+ prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN,
+ spec->masterSecret, &param);
+ if (!prf_context)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen);
+ PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen);
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
+ * ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int padding_len;
+ static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 };
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 ||
+ ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32);
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2 + padding_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data,
+ ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendFinished and tls13_DeriveSecret.
+ *
+ * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a
+ * SECStatus. */
+void
+ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss, const char *label, PK11SymKey *secret)
+{
+#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem *keyData;
+ /* Longest label is "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", master secret is 48
+ * bytes which happens to be the largest in TLS 1.3 as well (SHA384).
+ * Maximum line length: "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" (31) + " " (1) +
+ * client_random (32*2) + " " (1) +
+ * traffic_secret (48*2) + "\n" (1) = 194. */
+ char buf[200];
+ unsigned int offset, len;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ssl_keylog_iob)
+ return;
+
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(secret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return;
+
+ /* keyData does not need to be freed. */
+ keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(secret);
+ if (!keyData || !keyData->data)
+ return;
+
+ len = strlen(label) + 1 + /* label + space */
+ SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 + 1 + /* client random (hex) + space */
+ keyData->len * 2 + 1; /* secret (hex) + newline */
+ PORT_Assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+ if (len > sizeof(buf))
+ return;
+
+ /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */
+
+ /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the
+ * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to
+ * fwrite. */
+
+ strcpy(buf, label);
+ offset = strlen(label);
+ buf[offset++] += ' ';
+ hexEncode(buf + offset, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ offset += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2;
+ buf[offset++] = ' ';
+ hexEncode(buf + offset, keyData->data, keyData->len);
+ offset += keyData->len * 2;
+ buf[offset++] = '\n';
+
+ PORT_Assert(offset == len);
+
+ PZ_Lock(ssl_keylog_lock);
+ if (fwrite(buf, len, 1, ssl_keylog_iob) == 1)
+ fflush(ssl_keylog_iob);
+ PZ_Unlock(ssl_keylog_lock);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound
+ * ssl3_HandleClientHello
+ * ssl3_HandleFinished
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ TLSFinished tlsFinished;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender);
+ if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */
+ }
+
+ if (isTLS) {
+ if (isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ } else {
+ if (isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s;
+ PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s;
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */
+ }
+
+ ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, "CLIENT_RANDOM", ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+fail:
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID.
+ * Caller holds the Spec read lock.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid,
+ PK11SymKey *secret)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL;
+ PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot;
+ void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+
+ symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(secret);
+ if (!isServer) {
+ int wrapKeyIndex;
+ int incarnation;
+
+ /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex =
+ PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot);
+ PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation =
+ PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot);
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
+ /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before
+ * placing it in the SID cache entry. */
+ wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex,
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation,
+ pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
+ } else {
+ int keyLength;
+ /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it.
+ * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot
+ * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection,
+ * but we will not be able to restart this session.
+ */
+ mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
+ keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism);
+ /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error.
+ * It's ambiguous.
+ */
+ wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL,
+ keyLength, pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ /* The thread safety characteristics of PK11_[SG]etWrapKey is
+ * abominable. This protects against races in calling
+ * PK11_SetWrapKey by dropping and re-acquiring the canonical
+ * value once it is set. The mutex in PK11_[SG]etWrapKey will
+ * ensure that races produce the same value in the end. */
+ PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey);
+ wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex,
+ CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, pwArg);
+ if (!wrappingKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* server socket using session cache. */
+ mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot);
+ if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ wrappingKey =
+ ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, mechanism, pwArg);
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot);
+
+ if (wrappingKey) {
+ SECItem wmsItem;
+
+ wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
+ rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey,
+ secret, &wmsItem);
+ /* rv is examined below. */
+ sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len;
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered
+ * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
+ dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss);
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, &hashes,
+ isServer ? sender_client : sender_server);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ if (isTLS) {
+ TLSFinished tlsFinished;
+
+ if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) {
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+#endif
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
+ &hashes, &tlsFinished);
+ if (!isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess ||
+ 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b,
+ PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) {
+#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ return SECFailure;
+#endif
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) {
+ (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!isServer)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s;
+ PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s;
+ if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes.u.s, b, length)) {
+ (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
+
+ if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) ||
+ (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) {
+ PRInt32 flags = 0;
+
+ /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us
+ * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify.
+ * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the
+ * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the
+ * ServerHello message.)
+ */
+ if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+ ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) &&
+ ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) {
+ /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the
+ * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending
+ * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's
+ * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data)
+ ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the
+ ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished)
+ ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data.
+ */
+ if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) {
+ flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER;
+ }
+
+ if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+xmit_loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake;
+ PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey *secret)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(secret);
+
+ /* fill in the sid */
+ sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite;
+ sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy;
+ sid->version = ss->version;
+ sid->authType = ss->sec.authType;
+ sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+ sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType;
+ sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits;
+ if (ss->sec.keaGroup) {
+ sid->keaGroup = ss->sec.keaGroup->name;
+ } else {
+ sid->keaGroup = ssl_grp_none;
+ }
+ sid->sigScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme;
+ sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss);
+ sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (ssl_ticket_lifetime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC);
+ sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ sid->namedCurve = ss->sec.serverCert->namedCurve;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT &&
+ ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE);
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(
+ NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error already set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */
+ return ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret);
+}
+
+/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
+ * to have type sslRestartTarget.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL);
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus sidRv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* The first handshake is now completed. */
+ ss->handshake = NULL;
+
+ if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) {
+ /* If the wrap fails, don't cache the sid. The connection proceeds
+ * normally, so the rv is only used to determine whether we cache. */
+ sidRv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid, ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret);
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid
+ * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server
+ * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until
+ * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished
+ * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid.
+ *
+ * This must be done before we call ssl_CacheSessionID(ss)
+ * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also
+ * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and
+ * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) {
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+ if (sidRv == SECSuccess) {
+ /* The sid takes over the ticket data */
+ ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid,
+ &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket,
+ PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (sidRv == SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached);
+ ssl_CacheSessionID(ss);
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
+
+ return ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct,
+ PRUint32 dtlsSeq,
+ const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
+ sslUpdateHandshakeHashes updateHashes)
+{
+ PRUint8 hdr[4];
+ PRUint8 dtlsData[8];
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Hash handshake message:", b, length));
+
+ hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ct;
+ hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
+ hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
+ hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length);
+
+ rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+
+ /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */
+ if (IS_DTLS_1_OR_12(ss)) {
+ /* Sequence number */
+ dtlsData[0] = MSB(dtlsSeq);
+ dtlsData[1] = LSB(dtlsSeq);
+
+ /* Fragment offset */
+ dtlsData[2] = 0;
+ dtlsData[3] = 0;
+ dtlsData[4] = 0;
+
+ /* Fragment length */
+ dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16);
+ dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8);
+ dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length);
+
+ rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, sizeof(dtlsData));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+ }
+
+ /* The message body */
+ rv = updateHashes(ss, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv; /* err code already set. */
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq,
+ b, length, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq,
+ b, length, ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes);
+}
+SECStatus
+ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq,
+ b, length, ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct,
+ const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq,
+ b, length, ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3
+ * handshake message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
+ PRBool endOfRecord)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRUint16 epoch;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(),
+ ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type)));
+
+ /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == ssl_hs_client_hello) {
+ ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss);
+ }
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case ssl_hs_hello_request:
+ case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request:
+ /* We don't include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages
+ * in the handshake hashes */
+ break;
+
+ /* Defer hashing of these messages until the message handlers. */
+ case ssl_hs_client_hello:
+ case ssl_hs_server_hello:
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+ case ssl_hs_finished:
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type, b, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_certificate_status) {
+ /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred
+ * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage.
+ * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did
+ * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the
+ * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will
+ * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus.
+ */
+ rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* This can't block. */
+ PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch;
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case ssl_hs_client_hello:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_hello:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length);
+ } else {
+ rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) {
+ /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any
+ * data in the input queue. */
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* We consider the record to have been handled if SECSuccess or else WOULD_BLOCK is set
+ * Whoever set WOULD_BLOCK must handle any remaining actions required to finsih processing the record.
+ * e.g. by setting restartTarget.
+ */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv == SECSuccess || (rv == SECFailure && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR))) {
+ /* Increment the expected sequence number */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++;
+ }
+
+ /* Taint the message so that it's easier to detect UAFs. */
+ PORT_Memset(b, 'N', length);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b,
+ PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case ssl_hs_hello_request:
+ if (length != 0) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss);
+ break;
+
+ case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request:
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_status:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_request:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_server_hello_done:
+ if (length != 0) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange:
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket:
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ case ssl_hs_finished:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record.
+ * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content.
+ * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
+{
+ sslBuffer buf = *origBuf; /* Work from a copy. */
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ while (buf.len > 0) {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) {
+ PRUint8 t;
+ t = *(buf.buf++);
+ buf.len--;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0)
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)t;
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t;
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4)
+ continue;
+
+#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) {
+ (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN
+
+ /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through,
+ ** even if buf.len is zero.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new
+ * data available for this message. If it can be done right out
+ * of the original buffer, then use it from there.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf.len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
+ /* handle it from input buffer */
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len,
+ buf.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ buf.buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
+ buf.len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */
+ unsigned int bytes;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ bytes = PR_MIN(buf.len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len);
+
+ /* Grow the buffer if needed */
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len,
+ buf.buf, bytes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes;
+ buf.buf += bytes;
+ buf.len -= bytes;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len);
+
+ /* if we have a whole message, do it */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(
+ ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len,
+ buf.len == 0);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ } else {
+ PORT_Assert(buf.len == 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } /* end loop */
+
+ origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser : {
+ /* Make sure to remove any data that was consumed. */
+ unsigned int consumed = origBuf->len - buf.len;
+ PORT_Assert(consumed == buf.buf - origBuf->buf);
+ if (consumed > 0) {
+ memmove(origBuf->buf, origBuf->buf + consumed, buf.len);
+ origBuf->len = buf.len;
+ }
+}
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if
+ * rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */
+static unsigned int
+SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
+{
+ return PORT_CT_EQ(rv, SECSuccess);
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xffffffff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+ return PORT_CT_GE(a, b);
+}
+
+/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ returns 0xffffffff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
+ return PORT_CT_EQ(a, b);
+}
+
+/* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */
+static unsigned char
+ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
+ return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ unsigned int blockSize,
+ unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned int paddingLength, good;
+ const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
+
+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+ * time. */
+ if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+ /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
+ good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead);
+ /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+ good &= PORT_CT_GE(blockSize, paddingLength + 1);
+ plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1);
+ return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned int paddingLength, good, toCheck, i;
+ const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
+
+ /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+ * time. */
+ if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+ good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead);
+
+ /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then
+ * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte.
+ * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of
+ * padding.
+ *
+ * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks
+ * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+ * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+ * public information so we can use it.) */
+ toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */
+ if (toCheck > plaintext->len) {
+ toCheck = plaintext->len;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
+ /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
+ * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */
+ unsigned char mask = PORT_CT_LE(i, paddingLength);
+ unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i];
+ /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value
+ * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+ good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b));
+ }
+
+ /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+ * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+ * bits. */
+ good &= good >> 4;
+ good &= good >> 2;
+ good &= good >> 1;
+ good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1;
+ good = PORT_CT_DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+ plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1);
+ return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
+}
+
+/* On entry:
+ * originalLength >= macSize
+ * macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
+ * plaintext->len >= macSize
+ */
+static void
+ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ unsigned int originalLength,
+ PRUint8 *out,
+ unsigned int macSize)
+{
+ unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the
+ * MAC. */
+ unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
+ unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
+ /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+ * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+ unsigned scanStart = 0;
+ unsigned i, j;
+ unsigned char rotateOffset;
+
+ if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) {
+ scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1);
+ }
+
+ /* We want to compute
+ * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize
+ * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus
+ * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo
+ * using Barrett reduction:
+ * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k
+ * rotateOffset -= q * n
+ * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n
+ */
+ rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart;
+ /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */
+ if (macSize == 16) {
+ rotateOffset &= 15;
+ } else if (macSize == 20) {
+ /*
+ * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1
+ * with rotateOffset <= 853
+ */
+ unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9;
+ rotateOffset -= q * 20;
+ rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20),
+ 20, 0);
+ } else if (macSize == 32) {
+ rotateOffset &= 31;
+ } else if (macSize == 48) {
+ /*
+ * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1
+ * with rotateOffset < 768
+ */
+ unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9;
+ rotateOffset -= q * 48;
+ rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48),
+ 48, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never
+ * get here.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize;
+ }
+
+ memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize);
+ for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) {
+ for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) {
+ unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart);
+ unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd);
+ unsigned char b = 0;
+ b = plaintext->buf[i];
+ rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line
+ * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
+ memset(out, 0, macSize);
+ rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset;
+ rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize),
+ 0, rotateOffset);
+ for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
+ out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(j, rotateOffset);
+ }
+ rotateOffset++;
+ rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize),
+ 0, rotateOffset);
+ }
+}
+
+/* MAX_EXPANSION is the amount by which a record might plausibly be expanded
+ * when protected. It's the worst case estimate, so the sum of block cipher
+ * padding (up to 256 octets), HMAC (48 octets for SHA-384), and IV (16
+ * octets for AES). */
+#define MAX_EXPANSION (256 + 48 + 16)
+
+/* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext.
+ *
+ * If SECFailure is returned, we:
+ * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent.
+ * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code.
+ *
+ * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock.
+ * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert().
+ *
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
+ SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ SSL3AlertDescription *alert)
+{
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef;
+ PRBool isTLS;
+ unsigned int good;
+ unsigned int ivLen = 0;
+ SSLContentType rType;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion rVersion;
+ unsigned int minLength;
+ unsigned int originalLen = 0;
+ PRUint8 headerBuf[13];
+ sslBuffer header = SSL_BUFFER(headerBuf);
+ PRUint8 hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ PRUint8 givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
+ PRUint8 *givenHash;
+ unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(spec->direction == ssl_secret_read);
+
+ good = ~0U;
+ minLength = spec->macDef->mac_size;
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
+ minLength++;
+ if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */
+ minLength += cipher_def->iv_size;
+ }
+ } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size;
+ }
+
+ /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
+ * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
+ if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states
+ * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and
+ * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV
+ * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then
+ * discard it before decrypting the rest.
+ */
+ PRUint8 iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int decoded;
+
+ ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) {
+ *alert = internal_error;
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen));
+
+ /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away
+ * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block
+ * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block.
+ */
+ rv = spec->cipher(spec->cipherContext, iv, &decoded,
+ sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen);
+
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen,
+ cText->buf->len - ivLen));
+
+ /* Check if the ciphertext can be valid if we assume maximum plaintext and
+ * add the maximum possible ciphersuite expansion.
+ * This way we detect overlong plaintexts/padding before decryption.
+ * This check enforces size limitations more strict than the RFC.
+ * [RFC5246, Section 6.2.3] */
+ if (cText->buf->len > (spec->recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION)) {
+ *alert = record_overflow;
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ rType = (SSLContentType)cText->hdr[0];
+ rVersion = ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) |
+ (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2];
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) {
+ /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the
+ * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general.
+ * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the
+ * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */
+ const unsigned int explicitNonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size;
+ const unsigned int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size;
+ unsigned int nonceLen = explicitNonceLen;
+ unsigned int decryptedLen = cText->buf->len - nonceLen - tagLen;
+ /* even though read doesn't return and IV, we still need a space to put
+ * the combined iv/nonce n the gcm 1.2 case*/
+ unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *iv = NULL;
+ unsigned char *nonce = NULL;
+
+ ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size;
+
+ rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ spec->epoch, cText->seqNum,
+ rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header, spec->version);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+
+ /* build the iv */
+ if (explicitNonceLen == 0) {
+ nonceLen = sizeof(cText->seqNum);
+ iv = spec->keyMaterial.iv;
+ nonce = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header);
+ } else {
+ PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, spec->keyMaterial.iv, ivLen);
+ PORT_Memset(ivOut + ivLen, 0, explicitNonceLen);
+ iv = ivOut;
+ nonce = cText->buf->buf;
+ nonceLen = explicitNonceLen;
+ }
+ rv = tls13_AEAD(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE,
+ CKG_NO_GENERATE, 0, /* iv generator params
+ * (not used in decrypt)*/
+ iv, /* iv in */
+ NULL, /* iv out */
+ ivLen + explicitNonceLen, /* full iv length */
+ nonce, nonceLen, /* nonce in */
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), /* aad */
+ SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), /* aadlen */
+ plaintext->buf, /* output */
+ &plaintext->len, /* out len */
+ plaintext->space, /* max out */
+ tagLen,
+ cText->buf->buf + explicitNonceLen, /* input */
+ cText->buf->len - explicitNonceLen); /* input len */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ good = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
+ rv = spec->cipher(
+ spec->cipherContext, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len,
+ plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
+
+ originalLen = plaintext->len;
+
+ /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
+ const unsigned int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size;
+
+ if (!isTLS) {
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(
+ plaintext, blockSize, macSize));
+ } else {
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(
+ plaintext, macSize));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compute the MAC */
+ rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(
+ spec->epoch, cText->seqNum,
+ rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss),
+ plaintext->len - spec->macDef->mac_size, &header, spec->version);
+ PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
+ spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header),
+ plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen,
+ hash, &hashBytes);
+
+ ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf,
+ spec->macDef->mac_size);
+ givenHash = givenHashBuf;
+
+ /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC
+ * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust
+ * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we
+ * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */
+ plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */
+ plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
+ spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header),
+ plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes);
+
+ /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location
+ * is public when a stream cipher is used. */
+ givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len;
+ }
+
+ good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+
+ if (hashBytes != (unsigned)spec->macDef->mac_size ||
+ NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, spec->macDef->mac_size) != 0) {
+ /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */
+ good = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (good == 0) {
+ decrypt_loser:
+ /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ *alert = bad_record_mac;
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType rType,
+ DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum,
+ sslBuffer *databuf)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* check for Token Presence */
+ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if
+ ** they return SECFailure.
+ */
+ switch (rType) {
+ case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf);
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_alert:
+ rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf);
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_handshake:
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf);
+ } else {
+ rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, epoch, seqNum, databuf);
+ }
+ break;
+ case ssl_ct_ack:
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) && tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) {
+ rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, databuf);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Fall through. */
+ default:
+ /* If a TLS implementation receives an unexpected record type,
+ * it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
+ * alert [RFC8446, Section 5].
+ *
+ * For TLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in
+ * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotectRecord(),
+ * For DTLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in
+ * ssl3gthr.c/dtls_GatherData.
+ * The inner content types will be checked here.
+ *
+ * In DTLS generally invalid records SHOULD be silently discarded,
+ * no alert is sent [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7].
+ */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE);
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rType));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Find the cipher spec to use for a given record. For TLS, this
+ * is the current cipherspec. For DTLS, we look up by epoch.
+ * In DTLS < 1.3 this just means the current epoch or nothing,
+ * but in DTLS >= 1.3, we keep multiple reading cipherspecs.
+ * Returns NULL if no appropriate cipher spec is found.
+ */
+static ssl3CipherSpec *
+ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec = NULL;
+ DTLSEpoch epoch;
+
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return crSpec;
+ }
+ epoch = dtls_ReadEpoch(crSpec->version, crSpec->epoch, cText->hdr);
+ if (crSpec->epoch == epoch) {
+ return crSpec;
+ }
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ /* Try to find the cipher spec. */
+ newSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read,
+ epoch);
+ if (newSpec != NULL) {
+ return newSpec;
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: %s couldn't find cipherspec from epoch %d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), epoch));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* if cText is non-null, then decipher and check the MAC of the
+ * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
+ * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
+ * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type,
+ * unless it's an application record.
+ *
+ * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and
+ * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL
+ * Handshake message.
+ *
+ * DOES NOT process the decrypted application data.
+ * On return, databuf contains the decrypted record.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake
+ * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
+ *
+ * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock.
+ *
+ * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the
+ * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than
+ * Application Data records.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool isTLS, isTLS13;
+ DTLSEpoch epoch;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL;
+ PRUint16 recordSizeLimit, cTextSizeLimit;
+ PRBool outOfOrderSpec = PR_FALSE;
+ SSLContentType rType;
+ sslBuffer *plaintext = &ss->gs.buf;
+ SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+
+ /* check for Token Presence */
+ if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear out the buffer in case this exits early. Any data then won't be
+ * processed twice. */
+ plaintext->len = 0;
+
+ /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted.
+ * Use the content type to tell whether this should be discarded. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr &&
+ cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/
+ spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText);
+ if (!spec) {
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ if (spec != ss->ssl3.crSpec) {
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss));
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Handling out-of-epoch record from epoch=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch));
+ outOfOrderSpec = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ if (dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, spec, cText->hdr,
+ SSL_BUFFER_BASE(cText->buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(cText->buf)) != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ /* code already set. */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &cText->seqNum)) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cText->seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum;
+ }
+ if (cText->seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->seqNum));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ isTLS13 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ recordSizeLimit = spec->recordSizeLimit;
+ cTextSizeLimit = recordSizeLimit;
+ cTextSizeLimit += (isTLS13) ? TLS_1_3_MAX_EXPANSION : TLS_1_2_MAX_EXPANSION;
+
+ /* Check if the specified recordSizeLimit and the RFC8446 specified max
+ * expansion are respected. recordSizeLimit is probably at the default for
+ * the first (hello) handshake message and then set to a smaller size by
+ * the Record Size Limit Extension.
+ * Stricter expansion size checks dependent on implemented cipher suites
+ * are performed in ssl3con.c/ssl3_UnprotectRecord() OR
+ * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotextRecord().
+ * After Decryption the plaintext size is checked (l. 13424). This also
+ * applies to unencrypted records. */
+ if (cText->buf->len > cTextSizeLimit) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/
+ /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ /* In debug builds the gather buffers are freed after the handling of each
+ * record for advanced ASAN coverage. Allocate the buffer again to the
+ * maximum possibly needed size as on gather initialization in
+ * ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). */
+ PR_ASSERT(sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH) == SECSuccess);
+#endif
+ /* This replaces a dynamic plaintext buffer size check, since the buffer is
+ * allocated to the maximum size in ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). The buffer
+ * was always grown to the maximum size at first record gathering before. */
+ PR_ASSERT(plaintext->space >= cTextSizeLimit);
+
+ /* Most record types aside from protected TLS 1.3 records carry the content
+ * type in the first octet. TLS 1.3 will override this value later. */
+ rType = cText->hdr[0];
+ /* Encrypted application data records could arrive before the handshake
+ * completes in DTLS 1.3. These can look like valid TLS 1.2 application_data
+ * records in epoch 0, which is never valid. Pretend they didn't decrypt. */
+ if (spec->epoch == 0 && ((IS_DTLS(ss) &&
+ dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(0, rType)) ||
+ rType == ssl_ct_application_data)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
+ alert = unexpected_message;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+ rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len,
+ plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len);
+#else
+ /* IMPORTANT:
+ * Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts
+ * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they
+ * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent.
+ * Additionaly, this is used to silently drop DTLS encryption/record
+ * errors/alerts using the error handling below as suggested in the
+ * DTLS specification [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. */
+ if (spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null && cText->buf->len == 0) {
+ /* Handle a zero-length unprotected record
+ * In this case, we treat it as a no-op and let later functions decide
+ * whether to ignore or alert accordingly. */
+ PR_ASSERT(plaintext->len == 0);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || spec->epoch == 0) {
+ rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert);
+ } else {
+ rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &rType,
+ &alert);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Error/Alert handling for ssl3/tls13_UnprotectRecord */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/
+
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* Ensure that we don't process this data again. */
+ plaintext->len = 0;
+
+ /* Ignore a CCS if compatibility mode is negotiated. Note that this
+ * will fail if the server fails to negotiate compatibility mode in a
+ * 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that did negotiate it.
+ * We don't care about that corner case right now. */
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
+ cText->buf->len == 1 &&
+ cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs) {
+ /* Allow only the first CCS. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ alert = unexpected_message;
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* All errors/alerts that might occur during unprotection are related
+ * to invalid records (e.g. invalid formatting, length, MAC, ...).
+ * Following the DTLS specification such errors/alerts SHOULD be
+ * dropped silently [RFC9147, Section 4.5.2].
+ * This is done below. */
+
+ if ((IS_DTLS(ss) && !dtls13_AeadLimitReached(spec)) ||
+ (!IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) {
+ /* Silently drop the packet unless we set ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent.
+ * (Manually or by using functions like
+ * SSL3_SendAlert(.., alert_fatal,..))
+ * This is not currently used in the unprotection functions since
+ * all TLS and DTLS errors are propagated to this handler. */
+ if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ int errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert);
+ /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called
+ * PORT_SetError(). */
+ PORT_SetError(errCode);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* SECSuccess */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, cText->seqNum);
+ spec->nextSeqNum = PR_MAX(spec->nextSeqNum, cText->seqNum + 1);
+ } else {
+ ++spec->nextSeqNum;
+ }
+ epoch = spec->epoch;
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/
+
+ /*
+ * The decrypted data is now in plaintext.
+ */
+
+ /* IMPORTANT: We are in DTLS 1.3 mode and we have processed something
+ * from the wrong epoch. Divert to a divert processing function to make
+ * sure we don't accidentally use the data unsafely. */
+
+ /* We temporary allowed reading the records from the previous epoch n-1
+ until the moment we get a message from the new epoch n. */
+
+ if (outOfOrderSpec) {
+ PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowPreviousEpoch && spec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch - 1) {
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: DTLS13[%d]: Out of order message %d is accepted",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch));
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ } else {
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, plaintext);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ /* Forbid (application) messages from the previous epoch.
+ From now, messages that arrive out of order will be discarded. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.allowPreviousEpoch = PR_FALSE;
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ }
+
+ /* Check the length of the plaintext. */
+ if (isTLS && plaintext->len > recordSizeLimit) {
+ plaintext->len = 0;
+ /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this
+ ** function, not by this function.
+ */
+ if (rType == ssl_ct_application_data) {
+ if (ss->firstHsDone)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
+ ss->sec.isServer &&
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) {
+ return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, plaintext);
+ }
+ plaintext->len = 0;
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message);
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, cText->seqNum,
+ plaintext);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ /* In Debug builds free and zero gather plaintext buffer after its content
+ * has been used/copied for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization.
+ * This frees buffer for non application data records, for application data
+ * records it is freed in sslsecur.c/DoRecv(). */
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.buf);
+#endif
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialization functions
+ */
+
+void
+ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec)
+{
+ sec->authType = ssl_auth_null;
+ sec->authKeyBits = 0;
+ sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none;
+ sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null;
+ sec->keaKeyBits = 0;
+ sec->keaGroup = NULL;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED;
+
+ ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec);
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+ rv = ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read);
+ rv |= ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write);
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL;
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* Rely on ssl_CreateNullCipherSpec() to set error code. */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : idle_handshake;
+
+ ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss);
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions);
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1;
+ PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
+ dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = 100;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_FALSE;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0;
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0;
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE;
+ PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0,
+ sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket));
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->policy = policy;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRInt32 policy;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ policy = suite->policy;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *oPolicy = policy;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* record the user preference for this suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->enabled = enabled;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* return the user preference for this suite */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRBool pref;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ pref = suite->enabled;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *enabled = pref;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */
+ }
+ suite->enabled = enabled;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite;
+ PRBool pref;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites);
+ if (suite) {
+ pref = suite->enabled;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ } else {
+ pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */
+ }
+ *enabled = pref;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int count)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int supported = 0;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!count) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) {
+ ++supported;
+ }
+ }
+ /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */
+ if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i]));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i];
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms,
+ unsigned int count)
+{
+ SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg;
+ }
+ return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes,
+ unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!schemes || !count ||
+ maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes,
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme));
+ *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms,
+ unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount)
+{
+ sslSocket *ss;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefGet",
+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!algorithms || !count ||
+ maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) {
+ algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
+ algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff;
+ }
+ *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+unsigned int
+SSL_SignatureMaxCount(void)
+{
+ return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES;
+}
+
+/* copy global default policy into socket. */
+void
+ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites));
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes,
+ sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes));
+ ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes);
+}
+
+/*
+** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state,
+** then start a new handshake.
+** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a
+** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done.
+**
+** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache)
+{
+ sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone || (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss);
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER ||
+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->version > ss->vrange.max || ss->version < ss->vrange.min) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (sid && flushCache) {
+ ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */
+ ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */
+ ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ /* start off a new handshake. */
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss);
+ } else {
+ rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation);
+ }
+
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */
+void
+ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL)
+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL)
+ ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss);
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) {
+ CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain);
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) {
+ CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list);
+ }
+
+ /* clean up handshake */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages);
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer.buf) {
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtls13ClientMessageBuffer);
+ }
+
+ /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf);
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE);
+
+ /* Destroy the DTLS data */
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) {
+ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy remote extensions */
+ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions);
+ ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions);
+ ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(&ss->xtnData);
+
+ /* Destroy cipher specs */
+ ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs);
+
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret);
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret);
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none;
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */
+ tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData);
+
+ /* Destroy TLS 1.3 PSKs. */
+ tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 ECH state. */
+ PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Free((void *)ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); /* CONST */
+ sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf);
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 GREASE (client) state. */
+ tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(ss);
+
+ /* TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation state. */
+ tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(ss);
+}
+
+/* check if the current cipher spec is FIPS. We only need to
+ * check the contexts here, if the kea, prf or keys were not FIPS,
+ * that status would have been rolled up in the create context
+ * call */
+static PRBool
+ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ssl3CipherSpec *spec)
+{
+ if (!spec || !spec->cipherDef) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) {
+ if (spec->keyMaterial.macContext == NULL) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->keyMaterial.macContext)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!spec->cipherContext) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->cipherContext);
+}
+
+/* return true if the current operation is running in FIPS mode */
+PRBool
+ssl_isFIPS(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ if (!ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.crSpec)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.cwSpec);
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse the policy value for a single algorithm in a cipher_suite,
+ * return TRUE if we disallow by the cipher suite by policy
+ * (we don't have to parse any more algorithm policies on this cipher suite),
+ * otherwise return FALSE.
+ * 1. If we don't have the required policy, disable by default, disallow by
+ * policy and return TRUE (no more processing needed).
+ * 2. If we have the required policy, and we are disabled, return FALSE,
+ * (if we are disabled, we only need to parse policy, not default).
+ * 3. If we have the required policy, and we aren't adjusting the defaults
+ * return FALSE. (only parsing the policy, not default).
+ * 4. We have the required policy and we are adjusting the defaults.
+ * If we are setting default = FALSE, set isDisabled to true so that
+ * we don't try to re-enable the cipher suite based on a different
+ * algorithm.
+ */
+PRBool
+ssl_HandlePolicy(int cipher_suite, SECOidTag policyOid,
+ PRUint32 requiredPolicy, PRBool *isDisabled)
+{
+ PRUint32 policy;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return PR_FALSE; /* no policy value, continue to the next algorithm */
+ }
+ /* first, are we allowed by policy, if not turn off allow and disable */
+ if (!(policy & requiredPolicy)) {
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE);
+ ssl_CipherPolicySet(cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* If we are already disabled, or the policy isn't setting a default
+ * we are done processing this algorithm */
+ if (*isDisabled || (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_NOT_VALID)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* set the default value for the cipher suite. If we disable the cipher
+ * suite, remember that so we don't process the next default. This has
+ * the effect of disabling the whole cipher suite if any of the
+ * algorithms it uses are disabled by default. We still have to
+ * process the upper level because the cipher suite is still allowed
+ * by policy, and we may still have to disallow it based on other
+ * algorithms in the cipher suite. */
+ if (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE) {
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_TRUE);
+ } else {
+ *isDisabled = PR_TRUE;
+ ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+#define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER)
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint32 policy = 0;
+
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) {
+ return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */
+ }
+
+ /* disable every ciphersuite */
+ for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) {
+ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i];
+ SECOidTag policyOid;
+ PRBool isDisabled = PR_FALSE;
+
+ /* if we haven't explicitly disabled it below enable by policy */
+ ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_ALLOWED);
+
+ /* now check the various key exchange, ciphers and macs and
+ * if we ever disallow by policy, we are done, go to the next cipher
+ */
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid);
+ if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX, &isDisabled)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid);
+ if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) {
+ policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(suite->mac_alg)->oid);
+ if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy();
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* End of ssl3con.c */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-07-05 11:38:44 +0000