/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND #include "stubs.h" #endif #include "prerror.h" #include "secerr.h" #include "prtypes.h" #include "prinit.h" #include "blapi.h" #include "blapii.h" #include "nssilock.h" #include "secitem.h" #include "sha_fast.h" #include "sha256.h" #include "secrng.h" /* for RNG_SystemRNG() */ #include "secmpi.h" /* PRNG_SEEDLEN defined in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1 * for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 it's 440 bits. * for SHA-384 and SHA-512 it's 888 bits */ #define PRNG_SEEDLEN (440 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) #define PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES PR_INT64(0x100000000) /* 2^35 bits or 2^32 bytes */ #define PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 0x10000 /* 2^19 bits or 2^16 bytes */ #define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8 * 1024) /* must be less than \ * PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES \ */ #define PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE SHA256_LENGTH /* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed * under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we * self-reseed with RNG_SystemRNG(). Count can be a large number. For code * simplicity, we specify count with 2 components: RESEED_BYTE (which is * the same as LOG256(RESEED_COUNT)) and RESEED_VALUE (which is the same as * RESEED_COUNT / (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE)). Another way to look at this is * RESEED_COUNT = RESEED_VALUE * (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE). For Hash based DRBG * we use the maximum count value, 2^48, or RESEED_BYTE=6 and RESEED_VALUE=1 */ #define RESEED_BYTE 6 #define RESEED_VALUE 1 #define PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) \ PORT_Memset((rng)->reseed_counter, 0, sizeof(rng)->reseed_counter); \ (rng)->reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE] = 1; /* * The actual values of this enum are specified in SP 800-90, 10.1.1.* * The spec does not name the types, it only uses bare values */ typedef enum { prngCGenerateType = 0, /* used when creating a new 'C' */ prngReseedType = 1, /* used in reseeding */ prngAdditionalDataType = 2, /* used in mixing additional data */ prngGenerateByteType = 3 /* used when mixing internal state while * generating bytes */ } prngVTypes; /* * Global RNG context */ struct RNGContextStr { PZLock *lock; /* Lock to serialize access to global rng */ /* * NOTE, a number of steps in the drbg algorithm need to hash * V_type || V. The code, therefore, depends on the V array following * immediately after V_type to avoid extra copies. To accomplish this * in a way that compiliers can't perturb, we declare V_type and V * as a V_Data array and reference them by macros */ PRUint8 V_Data[PRNG_SEEDLEN + 1]; /* internal state variables */ #define V_type V_Data[0] #define V(rng) (((rng)->V_Data) + 1) #define VSize(rng) ((sizeof(rng)->V_Data) - 1) PRUint8 C[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* internal state variables */ /* If we get calls for the PRNG to return less than the length of our * hash, we extend the request for a full hash (since we'll be doing * the full hash anyway). Future requests for random numbers are fulfilled * from the remainder of the bytes we generated. Requests for bytes longer * than the hash size are fulfilled directly from the HashGen function * of the random number generator. */ PRUint8 reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE + 1]; /* number of requests since the * last reseed. Need only be * big enough to hold the whole * reseed count */ PRUint8 data[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* when we request less than a block * save the rest of the rng output for * another partial block */ PRUint8 dataAvail; /* # bytes of output available in our cache, * [0...SHA256_LENGTH] */ /* store additional data that has been shovelled off to us by * RNG_RandomUpdate. */ PRUint8 additionalDataCache[PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE]; PRUint32 additionalAvail; PRBool isValid; /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */ PRBool isKatTest; /* true if running NIST PRNG KAT tests */ /* for continuous entropy check */ PRUint8 previousEntropyHash[SHA256_LENGTH]; }; typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext; static RNGContext *globalrng = NULL; static RNGContext theGlobalRng; /* * The next several functions are derived from the NIST SP 800-90 * spec. In these functions, an attempt was made to use names consistent * with the names in the spec, even if they differ from normal NSS usage. */ /* * Hash Derive function defined in NISP SP 800-90 Section 10.4.1. * This function is used in the Instantiate and Reseed functions. * * NOTE: requested_bytes cannot overlap with input_string_1 or input_string_2. * input_string_1 and input_string_2 are logically concatentated. * input_string_1 must be supplied. * if input_string_2 is not supplied, NULL should be passed for this parameter. */ static SECStatus prng_Hash_df(PRUint8 *requested_bytes, unsigned int no_of_bytes_to_return, const PRUint8 *input_string_1, unsigned int input_string_1_len, const PRUint8 *input_string_2, unsigned int input_string_2_len) { SHA256Context ctx; PRUint32 tmp; PRUint8 counter; tmp = SHA_HTONL(no_of_bytes_to_return * 8); for (counter = 1; no_of_bytes_to_return > 0; counter++) { unsigned int hash_return_len; SHA256_Begin(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, &counter, 1); SHA256_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof tmp); SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_1, input_string_1_len); if (input_string_2) { SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_2, input_string_2_len); } SHA256_End(&ctx, requested_bytes, &hash_return_len, no_of_bytes_to_return); requested_bytes += hash_return_len; no_of_bytes_to_return -= hash_return_len; } SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE); return SECSuccess; } /* * Hash_DRBG Instantiate NIST SP 800-90 10.1.1.2 * * NOTE: bytes & len are entropy || nonce || personalization_string. In * normal operation, NSS calculates them all together in a single call. */ static SECStatus prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int len) { if (!rng->isKatTest && len < PRNG_SEEDLEN) { /* If the seedlen is too small, it's probably because we failed to get * enough random data. * This is stricter than NIST SP800-90A requires. Don't enforce it for * tests. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); return SECFailure; } prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), bytes, len, NULL, 0); rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType; prng_Hash_df(rng->C, sizeof rng->C, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data, NULL, 0); PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) return SECSuccess; } static PRCallOnceType coRNGInitEntropy; static PRStatus prng_initEntropy(void) { size_t length; PRUint8 block[PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; SHA256Context ctx; /* For FIPS 140-2 4.9.2 continuous random number generator test, * fetch the initial entropy from the system RNG and keep it for * later comparison. */ length = RNG_SystemRNG(block, sizeof(block)); if (length == 0) { return PR_FAILURE; /* error is already set */ } PORT_Assert(length == sizeof(block)); /* Store the hash of the entropy block rather than the block * itself for backward secrecy. */ SHA256_Begin(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block)); SHA256_End(&ctx, globalrng->previousEntropyHash, NULL, sizeof(globalrng->previousEntropyHash)); PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE); return PR_SUCCESS; } static SECStatus prng_getEntropy(PRUint8 *buffer, size_t requestLength) { size_t total = 0; PRUint8 block[PRNG_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; PRUint8 hash[SHA256_LENGTH]; SHA256Context ctx; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; if (PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInitEntropy, prng_initEntropy) != PR_SUCCESS) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* For FIPS 140-2 4.9.2 continuous random generator test, * iteratively fetch fixed sized blocks from the system and * compare consecutive blocks. */ while (total < requestLength) { size_t length = RNG_SystemRNG(block, sizeof(block)); if (length == 0) { rv = SECFailure; /* error is already set */ goto out; } PORT_Assert(length == sizeof(block)); /* Store the hash of the entropy block rather than the block * itself for backward secrecy. */ SHA256_Begin(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, block, sizeof(block)); SHA256_End(&ctx, hash, NULL, sizeof(hash)); if (PORT_Memcmp(globalrng->previousEntropyHash, hash, sizeof(hash)) == 0) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); rv = SECFailure; goto out; } PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->previousEntropyHash, hash, sizeof(hash)); length = PR_MIN(requestLength - total, sizeof(block)); PORT_Memcpy(buffer, block, length); total += length; buffer += length; } out: PORT_Memset(hash, 0, sizeof hash); PORT_Memset(block, 0, sizeof block); return rv; } /* * Update the global random number generator with more seeding * material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90 * section 10.1.1.3 * * If entropy is NULL, it is fetched from the noise generator. */ static SECStatus prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len) { PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data) + PRNG_SEEDLEN]; PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0]; SECStatus rv; /* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */ if (entropy == NULL) { entropy_len = PRNG_SEEDLEN; rv = prng_getEntropy(&noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], entropy_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; /* error is already set */ } } else { /* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */ /* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */ if (entropy_len > PRNG_SEEDLEN) { noise = PORT_Alloc(entropy_len + (sizeof rng->V_Data)); if (noise == NULL) { return SECFailure; } } PORT_Memcpy(&noise[sizeof rng->V_Data], entropy, entropy_len); } if (entropy_len < 256 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) { /* noise == &noiseData[0] at this point, so nothing to free */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); return SECFailure; } rng->V_type = prngReseedType; PORT_Memcpy(noise, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), noise, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len, additional_input, additional_input_len); /* clear potential CSP */ PORT_Memset(noise, 0, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len); rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType; prng_Hash_df(rng->C, sizeof rng->C, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data, NULL, 0); PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) if (noise != &noiseData[0]) { PORT_Free(noise); } return SECSuccess; } /* * SP 800-90 requires we rerun our health tests on reseed */ static SECStatus prng_reseed_test(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len) { SECStatus rv; /* do health checks in FIPS mode */ rv = PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests(); if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* error set by PRNGTEST_RunHealTests() */ rng->isValid = PR_FALSE; return SECFailure; } return prng_reseed(rng, entropy, entropy_len, additional_input, additional_input_len); } /* * build some fast inline functions for adding. */ #define PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, start, carry) \ { \ int k1; \ for (k1 = start; carry && k1 >= 0; k1--) { \ carry = !(++dest[k1]); \ } \ } /* * NOTE: dest must be an array for the following to work. */ #define PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ carry = 0; \ PORT_Assert((dest_len) >= (len)); \ { \ int k1, k2; \ for (k1 = dest_len - 1, k2 = len - 1; k2 >= 0; --k1, --k2) { \ carry += dest[k1] + add[k2]; \ dest[k1] = (PRUint8)carry; \ carry >>= 8; \ } \ } #define PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len, carry) \ PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, dest_len - len - 1, carry) /* * This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number * of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more * than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf. * * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen */ static void prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes) { PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)]; PRUint8 thisHash[SHA256_LENGTH]; PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng)); while (no_of_returned_bytes) { SHA256Context ctx; unsigned int len; unsigned int carry; SHA256_Begin(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data); SHA256_End(&ctx, thisHash, &len, SHA256_LENGTH); if (no_of_returned_bytes < SHA256_LENGTH) { len = no_of_returned_bytes; } PORT_Memcpy(returned_bytes, thisHash, len); returned_bytes += len; no_of_returned_bytes -= len; /* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not). * This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */ carry = no_of_returned_bytes; PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data) - 1, carry); SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE); } PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data); PORT_Memset(thisHash, 0, sizeof thisHash); } /* * Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state. * additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing. * * This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4 */ static SECStatus prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes, const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len) { PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they * aren't used concurrently */ unsigned int carry; if (!rng->isValid) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* This code only triggers during tests, normal * prng operation does not use additional_input */ if (additional_input) { SHA256Context ctx; /* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations, * w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used * at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse * them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for * easy comparison to the spec */ #define w H rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType; SHA256_Begin(&ctx); SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len); SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w); PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w, carry) PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w); SHA256_DestroyContext(&ctx, PR_FALSE); #undef w } if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) { /* short_cut to hashbuf and a couple of copies and clears */ SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng)); } else { prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes); } /* advance our internal state... */ rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType; SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data); PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H, carry) PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C, carry); PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter, sizeof rng->reseed_counter, carry) carry = 1; PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter, (sizeof rng->reseed_counter) - 1, carry); /* if the prng failed, don't return any output, signal softoken */ PORT_Memset(H, 0, sizeof H); if (!rng->isValid) { PORT_Memset(returned_bytes, 0, no_of_returned_bytes); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } /* Use NSPR to prevent RNG_RNGInit from being called from separate * threads, creating a race condition. */ static const PRCallOnceType pristineCallOnce; static PRCallOnceType coRNGInit; static PRStatus rng_init(void) { PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN * 2]; /* entropy + nonce */ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; if (globalrng == NULL) { /* bytes needs to have enough space to hold * a SHA256 hash value. Blow up at compile time if this isn't true */ PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(bytes) >= SHA256_LENGTH); /* create a new global RNG context */ globalrng = &theGlobalRng; PORT_Assert(NULL == globalrng->lock); /* create a lock for it */ globalrng->lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); if (globalrng->lock == NULL) { globalrng = NULL; PORT_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR); return PR_FAILURE; } /* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */ rv = prng_getEntropy(bytes, sizeof bytes); if (rv == SECSuccess) { /* if this is our first call, instantiate, otherwise reseed * prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix * any previous entropy we may have collected */ if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) { rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, sizeof bytes); } else { rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, sizeof bytes, NULL, 0); } memset(bytes, 0, sizeof bytes); } else { PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock); globalrng->lock = NULL; globalrng = NULL; return PR_FAILURE; } if (rv != SECSuccess) { return PR_FAILURE; } /* the RNG is in a valid state */ globalrng->isValid = PR_TRUE; globalrng->isKatTest = PR_FALSE; /* fetch one random value so that we can populate rng->oldV for our * continous random number test. */ prng_generateNewBytes(globalrng, bytes, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL, 0); /* Fetch more entropy into the PRNG */ RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(); } return PR_SUCCESS; } /* * Clean up the global RNG context */ static void prng_freeRNGContext(RNGContext *rng) { PRUint8 inputhash[VSize(rng) + (sizeof rng->C)]; /* destroy context lock */ SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock)); /* zero global RNG context except for C & V to preserve entropy */ prng_Hash_df(inputhash, sizeof rng->C, rng->C, sizeof rng->C, NULL, 0); prng_Hash_df(&inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng), V(rng), VSize(rng), NULL, 0); memset(rng, 0, sizeof *rng); memcpy(rng->C, inputhash, sizeof rng->C); memcpy(V(rng), &inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng)); memset(inputhash, 0, sizeof inputhash); } /* * Public functions */ /* * Initialize the global RNG context and give it some seed input taken * from the system. This function is thread-safe and will only allow * the global context to be initialized once. The seed input is likely * small, so it is imperative that RNG_RandomUpdate() be called with * additional seed data before the generator is used. A good way to * provide the generator with additional entropy is to call * RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(). Note that C_Initialize() does exactly that. */ SECStatus RNG_RNGInit(void) { /* Allow only one call to initialize the context */ PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInit, rng_init); /* Make sure there is a context */ return (globalrng != NULL) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; } /* ** Update the global random number generator with more seeding ** material. */ SECStatus RNG_RandomUpdate(const void *data, size_t bytes) { SECStatus rv; /* Make sure our assumption that size_t is unsigned is true */ PR_STATIC_ASSERT(((size_t)-1) > (size_t)1); #if defined(NS_PTR_GT_32) || (defined(NSS_USE_64) && !defined(NS_PTR_LE_32)) /* * NIST 800-90 requires us to verify our inputs. This value can * come from the application, so we need to make sure it's within the * spec. The spec says it must be less than 2^32 bytes (2^35 bits). * This can only happen if size_t is greater than 32 bits (i.e. on * most 64 bit platforms). The 90% case (perhaps 100% case), size_t * is less than or equal to 32 bits if the platform is not 64 bits, and * greater than 32 bits if it is a 64 bit platform. The corner * cases are handled with explicit defines NS_PTR_GT_32 and NS_PTR_LE_32. * * In general, neither NS_PTR_GT_32 nor NS_PTR_LE_32 will need to be * defined. If you trip over the next two size ASSERTS at compile time, * you will need to define them for your platform. * * if 'sizeof(size_t) > 4' is triggered it means that we were expecting * sizeof(size_t) to be greater than 4, but it wasn't. Setting * NS_PTR_LE_32 will correct that mistake. * * if 'sizeof(size_t) <= 4' is triggered, it means that we were expecting * sizeof(size_t) to be less than or equal to 4, but it wasn't. Setting * NS_PTR_GT_32 will correct that mistake. */ PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) > 4); if (bytes > (size_t)PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES) { bytes = PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES; } #else PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) <= 4); #endif PZ_Lock(globalrng->lock); /* if we're passed more than our additionalDataCache, simply * call reseed with that data */ if (bytes > sizeof(globalrng->additionalDataCache)) { rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, data, (unsigned int)bytes); /* if we aren't going to fill or overflow the buffer, just cache it */ } else if (bytes < ((sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache) - globalrng->additionalAvail)) { PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache + globalrng->additionalAvail, data, bytes); globalrng->additionalAvail += (PRUint32)bytes; rv = SECSuccess; } else { /* we are going to fill or overflow the buffer. In this case we will * fill the entropy buffer, reseed with it, start a new buffer with the * remainder. We know the remainder will fit in the buffer because * we already handled the case where bytes > the size of the buffer. */ size_t bufRemain = (sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache) - globalrng->additionalAvail; /* fill the rest of the buffer */ if (bufRemain) { PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache + globalrng->additionalAvail, data, bufRemain); data = ((unsigned char *)data) + bufRemain; bytes -= bufRemain; } /* reseed from buffer */ rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, globalrng->additionalDataCache, sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache); /* copy the rest into the cache */ PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache, data, bytes); globalrng->additionalAvail = (PRUint32)bytes; } PZ_Unlock(globalrng->lock); return rv; } /* ** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator ** object. */ static SECStatus prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(RNGContext *rng, void *dest, size_t len) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; PRUint8 *output = dest; /* check for a valid global RNG context */ PORT_Assert(rng != NULL); if (rng == NULL) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } /* FIPS limits the amount of entropy available in a single request */ if (len > PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } /* --- LOCKED --- */ PZ_Lock(rng->lock); /* Check the amount of seed data in the generator. If not enough, * don't produce any data. */ if (rng->reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) { rv = prng_reseed_test(rng, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); PZ_Unlock(rng->lock); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(); PZ_Lock(rng->lock); } /* * see if we have enough bytes to fulfill the request. */ if (len <= rng->dataAvail) { memcpy(output, rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), len); memset(rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), 0, len); rng->dataAvail -= len; rv = SECSuccess; /* if we are asking for a small number of bytes, cache the rest of * the bytes */ } else if (len < sizeof rng->data) { rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, rng->data, sizeof rng->data, rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL, rng->additionalAvail); rng->additionalAvail = 0; if (rv == SECSuccess) { memcpy(output, rng->data, len); memset(rng->data, 0, len); rng->dataAvail = (sizeof rng->data) - len; } /* we are asking for lots of bytes, just ask the generator to pass them */ } else { rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, output, len, rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL, rng->additionalAvail); rng->additionalAvail = 0; } PZ_Unlock(rng->lock); /* --- UNLOCKED --- */ return rv; } /* ** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator ** object. */ SECStatus RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(void *dest, size_t len) { return prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(globalrng, dest, len); } void RNG_RNGShutdown(void) { /* check for a valid global RNG context */ PORT_Assert(globalrng != NULL); if (globalrng == NULL) { /* Should set a "not initialized" error code. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); return; } /* clear */ prng_freeRNGContext(globalrng); globalrng = NULL; /* reset the callonce struct to allow a new call to RNG_RNGInit() */ coRNGInit = pristineCallOnce; } /* * Test case interface. used by fips testing and power on self test */ /* make sure the test context is separate from the global context, This * allows us to test the internal random number generator without losing * entropy we may have previously collected. */ RNGContext testContext; SECStatus PRNGTEST_Instantiate_Kat(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len, const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len) { testContext.isKatTest = PR_TRUE; return PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, entropy_len, nonce, nonce_len, personal_string, ps_len); } /* * Test vector API. Use NIST SP 800-90 general interface so one of the * other NIST SP 800-90 algorithms may be used in the future. */ SECStatus PRNGTEST_Instantiate(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len, const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len) { int bytes_len = entropy_len + nonce_len + ps_len; PRUint8 *bytes = NULL; SECStatus rv; if (entropy_len < 256 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); return SECFailure; } bytes = PORT_Alloc(bytes_len); if (bytes == NULL) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); return SECFailure; } /* concatenate the various inputs, internally NSS only instantiates with * a single long string */ PORT_Memcpy(bytes, entropy, entropy_len); if (nonce) { PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len], nonce, nonce_len); } else { PORT_Assert(nonce_len == 0); } if (personal_string) { PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len + nonce_len], personal_string, ps_len); } else { PORT_Assert(ps_len == 0); } rv = prng_instantiate(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len); PORT_ZFree(bytes, bytes_len); if (rv == SECFailure) { return SECFailure; } testContext.isValid = PR_TRUE; return SECSuccess; } SECStatus PRNGTEST_Reseed(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len) { if (!testContext.isValid) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* This magic input tells us to set the reseed count to it's max count, * so we can simulate PRNGTEST_Generate reaching max reseed count */ if ((entropy == NULL) && (entropy_len == 0) && (additional == NULL) && (additional_len == 0)) { testContext.reseed_counter[0] = RESEED_VALUE; return SECSuccess; } return prng_reseed(&testContext, entropy, entropy_len, additional, additional_len); } SECStatus PRNGTEST_Generate(PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int bytes_len, const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len) { SECStatus rv; if (!testContext.isValid) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* replicate reseed test from prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes */ if (testContext.reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) { rv = prng_reseed(&testContext, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } } return prng_generateNewBytes(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len, additional, additional_len); } SECStatus PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate() { if (!testContext.isValid) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext); return SECSuccess; } SECStatus PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests() { static const PRUint8 entropy[] = { 0x8e, 0x9c, 0x0d, 0x25, 0x75, 0x22, 0x04, 0xf9, 0xc5, 0x79, 0x10, 0x8b, 0x23, 0x79, 0x37, 0x14, 0x9f, 0x2c, 0xc7, 0x0b, 0x39, 0xf8, 0xee, 0xef, 0x95, 0x0c, 0x97, 0x59, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x85, 0x41, 0x76, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x67, 0x00, 0x4e, 0x19, 0x12, 0x02, 0x16, 0x53, 0xea, 0xf2, 0x73, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0x7f, 0x7e, 0xc8, 0xae, 0x9c, 0x09, 0x99, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x9e, 0x48, 0x7f, 0xbb, 0x96, 0x46, 0xb3, 0x03, 0x75, 0xf8, 0xc8, 0x69, 0x45, 0x3f, 0x97, 0x5e, 0x2e, 0x48, 0xe1, 0x5d, 0x58, 0x97, 0x4c }; static const PRUint8 rng_known_result[] = { 0x16, 0xe1, 0x8c, 0x57, 0x21, 0xd8, 0xf1, 0x7e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x25, 0xb4, 0x24, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x54, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x13, 0x66, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x1b, 0x22, 0x33, 0x2e, 0x4a, 0x14, 0x07, 0x9d, 0x52, 0xfc, 0x73, 0x61, 0x48, 0xac, 0xc1, 0x22, 0xfc, 0xa4, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xa4, 0xdb, 0xda, 0x5b, 0x27, 0x33, 0xc4, 0xb3 }; static const PRUint8 reseed_entropy[] = { 0xc6, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x67, 0x07, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0x24, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x6f, 0x5f, 0x85, 0x3e, 0x5d, 0x67, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0xb1, 0x52, 0xc6, 0x1b, 0xc9, 0x46, 0xa8, 0x62, 0x79 }; static const PRUint8 additional_input[] = { 0x86, 0x82, 0x28, 0x98, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0x01, 0x14, 0xae, 0x87, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0x99, 0x1b, 0xc7, 0x41, 0x33, 0xff, 0x33, 0x66, 0x40, 0x95, 0x54, 0xc6, 0x67, 0x4d, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x1f, 0xf9, 0xeb, 0x65 }; static const PRUint8 rng_reseed_result[] = { 0x02, 0x0c, 0xc6, 0x17, 0x86, 0x49, 0xba, 0xc4, 0x7b, 0x71, 0x35, 0x05, 0xf0, 0xdb, 0x4a, 0xc2, 0x2c, 0x38, 0xc1, 0xa4, 0x42, 0xe5, 0x46, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0x47, 0x88, 0xb8, 0x0e, 0xc6, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x13, 0xef, 0xa6, 0x87, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x76, 0x61, 0xc7, 0x80, 0x5d, 0x0f, 0x05, 0x76, 0x85 }; static const PRUint8 rng_no_reseed_result[] = { 0xc4, 0x40, 0x41, 0x8c, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x70, 0x23, 0x88, 0xf2, 0x7b, 0x30, 0xc3, 0xca, 0x1e, 0xf3, 0xef, 0x53, 0x81, 0x5d, 0x30, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xf1, 0xff, 0x89, 0xa5, 0xee, 0x92, 0xf8, 0xc0, 0x0f, 0x88, 0x53, 0xdf, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0x1d, 0x64, 0x37, 0x3e, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x02, 0xff, 0x0a, 0x7f, 0xe5, 0xe9, 0x2b, 0x6d }; SECStatus rng_status = SECSuccess; PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(rng_known_result) >= sizeof(rng_reseed_result)); PRUint8 result[sizeof(rng_known_result)]; /********************************************/ /* First test instantiate error path. */ /* In this case we supply enough entropy, */ /* but not enough seed. This will trigger */ /* the code that checks for a entropy */ /* source failure. */ /********************************************/ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, 256 / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* we failed with the proper error code, we can continue */ /********************************************/ /* Generate random bytes with a known seed. */ /********************************************/ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, sizeof entropy, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { /* Error set by PRNGTEST_Instantiate */ return SECFailure; } rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_known_result, NULL, 0); if ((rng_status != SECSuccess) || (PORT_Memcmp(result, rng_known_result, sizeof rng_known_result) != 0)) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, sizeof reseed_entropy, additional_input, sizeof additional_input); if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { /* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */ PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); return SECFailure; } rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0); if ((rng_status != SECSuccess) || (PORT_Memcmp(result, rng_reseed_result, sizeof rng_reseed_result) != 0)) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* This magic forces the reseed count to it's max count, so we can see if * PRNGTEST_Generate will actually when it reaches it's count */ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(NULL, 0, NULL, 0); if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); /* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */ return SECFailure; } /* This generate should now reseed */ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0); if ((rng_status != SECSuccess) || /* NOTE we fail if the result is equal to the no_reseed_result. * no_reseed_result is the value we would have gotten if we didn't * do an automatic reseed in PRNGTEST_Generate */ (PORT_Memcmp(result, rng_no_reseed_result, sizeof rng_no_reseed_result) == 0)) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* make sure reseed fails when we don't supply enough entropy */ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, 4, NULL, 0); if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) { PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); if (rng_status != SECSuccess) { /* Error set by PRNG_Uninstantiate */ return rng_status; } /* make sure uninstantiate fails if the contest is not initiated (also tests * if the context was cleared in the previous Uninstantiate) */ rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate(); if (rng_status == SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { return rng_status; } return SECSuccess; }