// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license // , at your // option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed // except according to those terms. mod common; use neqo_common::{Datagram, Decoder, Encoder, Role}; use neqo_transport::{CloseReason, ConnectionParameters, Error, State, Version}; use test_fixture::{ default_client, default_server, header_protection::{ apply_header_protection, decode_initial_header, initial_aead_and_hp, remove_header_protection, }, new_client, now, split_datagram, }; #[test] fn connect() { let (_client, _server) = test_fixture::connect(); } #[test] fn truncate_long_packet() { let mut client = default_client(); let mut server = default_server(); let out = client.process(None, now()); assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now()); assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); // This will truncate the Handshake packet from the server. let dupe = out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); // Count the padding in the packet, plus 1. let tail = dupe.iter().rev().take_while(|b| **b == 0).count() + 1; let truncated = Datagram::new( dupe.source(), dupe.destination(), dupe.tos(), dupe.ttl(), &dupe[..(dupe.len() - tail)], ); let hs_probe = client.process(Some(&truncated), now()).dgram(); assert!(hs_probe.is_some()); // Now feed in the untruncated packet. let out = client.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now()); assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); // Throw this ACK away. assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); let out = client.process(None, now()); assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); assert!(client.state().connected()); let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now()); assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); assert!(server.state().connected()); } /// Test that reordering parts of the server Initial doesn't change things. #[test] fn reorder_server_initial() { // A simple ACK_ECN frame for a single packet with packet number 0 with a single ECT(0) mark. const ACK_FRAME: &[u8] = &[0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00]; let mut client = new_client( ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), ); let mut server = default_server(); let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned(); let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.as_dgram_ref(), now()).dgram(); let (server_initial, server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); let (protected_header, _, _, payload) = decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); // Now decrypt the packet. let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server); let (header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, payload); assert_eq!(pn, 0); let pn_len = header.len() - protected_header.len(); let mut buf = vec![0; payload.len()]; let mut plaintext = aead .decrypt(pn, &header, &payload[pn_len..], &mut buf) .unwrap() .to_owned(); // Now we need to find the frames. Make some really strong assumptions. let mut dec = Decoder::new(&plaintext[..]); assert_eq!(dec.decode(ACK_FRAME.len()), Some(ACK_FRAME)); assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x06)); // CRYPTO assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x00)); // offset dec.skip_vvec(); // Skip over the payload. let end = dec.offset(); // Move the ACK frame after the CRYPTO frame. plaintext[..end].rotate_left(ACK_FRAME.len()); // And rebuild a packet. let mut packet = header.clone(); packet.resize(1200, 0); aead.encrypt(pn, &header, &plaintext, &mut packet[header.len()..]) .unwrap(); apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len()); let reordered = Datagram::new( server_initial.source(), server_initial.destination(), server_initial.tos(), server_initial.ttl(), packet, ); // Now a connection can be made successfully. // Though we modified the server's Initial packet, we get away with it. // TLS only authenticates the content of the CRYPTO frame, which was untouched. client.process_input(&reordered, now()); client.process_input(&server_hs.unwrap(), now()); assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); let finished = client.process_output(now()); assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected); let done = server.process(finished.as_dgram_ref(), now()); assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed); client.process_input(done.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), now()); assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed); } fn set_payload(server_packet: &Option, client_dcid: &[u8], payload: &[u8]) -> Datagram { let (server_initial, _server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); let (protected_header, _, _, orig_payload) = decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); // Now decrypt the packet. let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(client_dcid, Role::Server); let (mut header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, orig_payload); assert_eq!(pn, 0); // Re-encode the packet number as four bytes, so we have enough material for the header // protection sample if payload is empty. let pn_pos = header.len() - 2; header[pn_pos] = u8::try_from(4 + aead.expansion()).unwrap(); header.resize(header.len() + 3, 0); header[0] |= 0b0000_0011; // Set the packet number length to 4. // And build a packet containing the given payload. let mut packet = header.clone(); packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0); aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload, &mut packet[header.len()..]) .unwrap(); apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len()); Datagram::new( server_initial.source(), server_initial.destination(), server_initial.tos(), server_initial.ttl(), packet, ) } /// Test that the stack treats a packet without any frames as a protocol violation. #[test] fn packet_without_frames() { let mut client = new_client( ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), ); let mut server = default_server(); let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.as_dgram_ref(), now()).dgram(); let modified = set_payload(&server_packet, client_dcid, &[]); client.process_input(&modified, now()); assert_eq!( client.state(), &State::Closed(CloseReason::Transport(Error::ProtocolViolation)) ); } /// Test that the stack permits a packet containing only padding. #[test] fn packet_with_only_padding() { let mut client = new_client( ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), ); let mut server = default_server(); let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.as_dgram_ref(), now()).dgram(); let modified = set_payload(&server_packet, client_dcid, &[0]); client.process_input(&modified, now()); assert_eq!(client.state(), &State::WaitInitial); } /// Overflow the crypto buffer. #[allow(clippy::similar_names)] // For ..._scid and ..._dcid, which are fine. #[test] fn overflow_crypto() { let mut client = new_client( ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), ); let mut server = default_server(); let client_initial = client.process_output(now()).dgram(); let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned(); let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.as_ref(), now()).dgram(); let (server_initial, _) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); // Now decrypt the server packet to get AEAD and HP instances. // We won't be using the packet, but making new ones. let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server); let (_, server_dcid, server_scid, _) = decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); // Send in 100 packets, each with 1000 bytes of crypto frame data each, // eventually this will overrun the buffer we keep for crypto data. let mut payload = Encoder::with_capacity(1024); for pn in 0..100_u64 { payload.truncate(0); payload .encode_varint(0x06_u64) // CRYPTO frame type. .encode_varint(pn * 1000 + 1) // offset .encode_varint(1000_u64); // length let plen = payload.len(); payload.pad_to(plen + 1000, 44); let mut packet = Encoder::with_capacity(1200); packet .encode_byte(0xc1) // Initial with packet number length of 2. .encode_uint(4, Version::Version1.wire_version()) .encode_vec(1, server_dcid) .encode_vec(1, server_scid) .encode_vvec(&[]) // token .encode_varint(u64::try_from(2 + payload.len() + aead.expansion()).unwrap()); // length let pn_offset = packet.len(); packet.encode_uint(2, pn); let mut packet = Vec::from(packet); let header = packet.clone(); packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0); aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload.as_ref(), &mut packet[header.len()..]) .unwrap(); apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, pn_offset..(pn_offset + 2)); packet.resize(1200, 0); // Initial has to be 1200 bytes! let dgram = Datagram::new( server_initial.source(), server_initial.destination(), server_initial.tos(), server_initial.ttl(), packet, ); client.process_input(&dgram, now()); if let State::Closing { error, .. } = client.state() { assert!( matches!(error, CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoBufferExceeded),), "the connection need to abort on crypto buffer" ); assert!(pn > 64, "at least 64000 bytes of data is buffered"); return; } } panic!("Was not able to overflow the crypto buffer"); }