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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This file is PRIVATE to SSL.
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslt.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "selfencrypt.h"
#include "tls13con.h"
#include "tls13ech.h"
#include "tls13err.h"
#include "tls13hashstate.h"
/*
* The cookie is structured as a self-encrypted structure with the
* inner value being.
*
* struct {
* uint8 indicator = 0xff; // To disambiguate from tickets.
* uint16 cipherSuite; // Selected cipher suite.
* uint16 keyShare; // Requested key share group (0=none)
* PRUint8 echConfigId; // ECH config_id
* HpkeKdfId kdfId; // ECH KDF (uint16)
* HpkeAeadId aeadId; // ECH AEAD (uint16)
* opaque echHpkeCtx<0..65535>; // ECH serialized HPKE context
* opaque applicationToken<0..65535>; // Application token
* opaque ch_hash[rest_of_buffer]; // H(ClientHello)
* } CookieInner;
*
* An empty echConfigId means that ECH was not offered in the first ClientHello.
* An empty echHrrPsk means that ECH was not accepted in CH1.
*/
SECStatus
tls13_MakeHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup,
const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen,
PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxlen)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL3Hashes hashes;
PRUint8 cookie[1024];
sslBuffer cookieBuf = SSL_BUFFER(cookie);
static const PRUint8 indicator = 0xff;
SECItem *echHpkeCtx = NULL;
/* Encode header. */
rv = sslBuffer_Append(&cookieBuf, &indicator, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf,
selectedGroup ? selectedGroup->name : 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->xtnData.ech) {
/* Record that we received ECH. See sslEchCookieData */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, PR_TRUE, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->configId,
1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->kdfId, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->aeadId, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* We need to send a ECH HRR Extension containing a signal for the client,
* we must store the signal in the cookie so we can reconstruct the transcript
* later. To avoid leaking whether ECH was accepted in the length of the cookie
* we include the empty signal in the cookie regardless.
*/
PR_ASSERT(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf) == TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(&cookieBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* There might be no HPKE Context, e.g. when we lack a matching ECHConfig. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
rv = PK11_HPKE_ExportContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, NULL, &echHpkeCtx);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&cookieBuf, echHpkeCtx->data, echHpkeCtx->len, 2);
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE);
} else {
/* Zero length HPKE context. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, 0, 2);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, PR_FALSE, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
/* Application token. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&cookieBuf, appToken, appTokenLen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Compute and encode hashes. */
rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_Append(&cookieBuf, hashes.u.raw, hashes.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Encrypt right into the buffer. */
rv = ssl_SelfEncryptProtect(ss, cookieBuf.buf, cookieBuf.len,
buf, len, maxlen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Given a cookie and cookieLen, decrypt and parse, returning
* any values that were requested via the "previous_" params. If
* recoverState is true, the transcript state and application
* token are restored. Note that previousEchKdfId, previousEchAeadId,
* previousEchConfigId, and previousEchHpkeCtx are not modified if ECH was not
* previously negotiated (i.e., previousEchOffered is PR_FALSE). */
SECStatus
tls13_HandleHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss,
unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen,
ssl3CipherSuite *previousCipherSuite,
const sslNamedGroupDef **previousGroup,
PRBool *previousOfferedEch,
sslEchCookieData *echData,
PRBool recoverState)
{
SECStatus rv;
unsigned char plaintext[1024];
unsigned int plaintextLen = 0;
sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
sslReadBuffer echHpkeBuf = { 0 };
PRBool receivedEch;
PRUint64 sentinel;
PRUint64 cipherSuite;
sslEchCookieData parsedEchData = { 0 };
sslReadBuffer greaseReadBuf = { 0 };
PRUint64 group;
PRUint64 tmp64;
const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup;
PRUint64 appTokenLen;
rv = ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotect(ss, cookie, cookieLen,
plaintext, &plaintextLen, sizeof(plaintext));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SSL_TRC(100, ("Error decrypting cookie."));
return SECFailure;
}
sslReader reader = SSL_READER(plaintext, plaintextLen);
/* Should start with the sentinel value. */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &sentinel);
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (sentinel != TLS13_COOKIE_SENTINEL)) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
/* The cipher suite should be the same or there are some shenanigans. */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &cipherSuite);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
/* The named group, if any. */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &group);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
selectedGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group);
/* Was ECH received. */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmp64);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
receivedEch = tmp64 == PR_TRUE;
*previousOfferedEch = receivedEch;
if (receivedEch) {
/* ECH config ID */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmp64);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
parsedEchData.configId = (PRUint8)tmp64;
/* ECH Ciphersuite */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmp64);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
parsedEchData.kdfId = (HpkeKdfId)tmp64;
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmp64);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
parsedEchData.aeadId = (HpkeAeadId)tmp64;
/* ECH accept_confirmation signal. */
rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN, &greaseReadBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(parsedEchData.signal, greaseReadBuf.buf, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN);
/* ECH HPKE context may be empty. */
rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 2, &echHpkeBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
if (echData && echHpkeBuf.len) {
const SECItem hpkeItem = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(unsigned char, echHpkeBuf.buf),
echHpkeBuf.len };
parsedEchData.hpkeCtx = PK11_HPKE_ImportContext(&hpkeItem, NULL);
if (!parsedEchData.hpkeCtx) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
/* Application token. */
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &appTokenLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
sslReadBuffer appTokenReader = { 0 };
rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, appTokenLen, &appTokenReader);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(appTokenReader.len == appTokenLen);
if (recoverState) {
PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len == 0);
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.applicationToken,
appTokenLen) == NULL) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(ss->xtnData.applicationToken.data, appTokenReader.buf, appTokenLen);
ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len = appTokenLen;
/* The remainder is the hash. */
unsigned int hashLen = SSL_READER_REMAINING(&reader);
if (hashLen != tls13_GetHashSize(ss)) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now reinject the message. */
SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss);
rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, 0,
SSL_READER_CURRENT(&reader), hashLen,
ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* And finally reinject the HRR. */
rv = tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(ss, cipherSuite,
selectedGroup,
cookie, cookieLen,
parsedEchData.signal,
&messageBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, 0,
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf),
SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf),
ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes);
sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
if (previousCipherSuite) {
*previousCipherSuite = cipherSuite;
}
if (previousGroup) {
*previousGroup = selectedGroup;
}
if (echData) {
PORT_Memcpy(echData, &parsedEchData, sizeof(parsedEchData));
}
return SECSuccess;
}
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