Adding upstream version 3.2.3+dfsg.upstream/3.2.3+dfsg

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 54 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/raddb/policy.d/eap b/raddb/policy.d/eap
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8dac22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/raddb/policy.d/eap
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#
+#       Forbid all EAP types.  Enable this by putting "forbid_eap"
+#       into the "authorize" section.
+#
+forbid_eap {
+	if (&EAP-Message) {
+		reject
+	}
+}
+
+#
+#       Forbid all non-EAP types outside of an EAP tunnel.
+#
+permit_only_eap {
+	if (!&EAP-Message) {
+		#  We MAY be inside of a TTLS tunnel.
+		#  PEAP and EAP-FAST require EAP inside of
+		#  the tunnel, so this check is OK.
+		#  If so, then there MUST be an outer EAP message.
+		if (!&outer.request || !&outer.request:EAP-Message) {
+			reject
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+#
+#       Remove Reply-Message from response if were doing EAP
+#
+#  Be RFC 3579 2.6.5 compliant - EAP-Message and Reply-Message should
+#  not be present in the same response.
+#
+remove_reply_message_if_eap {
+	if (&reply:EAP-Message && &reply:Reply-Message) {
+		update reply {
+			&Reply-Message !* ANY
+		}
+	}
+	else {
+		noop
+	}
+}
+
+verify_tls_client_common_name {
+	#
+	#  If the User-Name is anonymized, then don't check it.
+	#
+	#  But if User-Name is realm AND there's a certificate name, then check
+	#  if they match.  This is not always the case, but it is the case
+	#  often enough that it matters.
+	#
+	if ((&User-Name !~ /^@/) && &TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name && (&TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name != &User-Name)) {
+		reject
+	}
+}