Adding upstream version 3.2.3+dfsg.upstream/3.2.3+dfsg

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 5354 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/radius.c b/src/lib/radius.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2de15b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/radius.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5354 @@
+/*
+ *   This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ *   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ *   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *   This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ *   Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ *   License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
+ */
+
+/**
+ * $Id$
+ *
+ * @file radius.c
+ * @brief Functions to send/receive radius packets.
+ *
+ * @copyright 2000-2003,2006  The FreeRADIUS server project
+ */
+
+RCSID("$Id$")
+
+#include	<freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
+
+#include	<freeradius-devel/md5.h>
+#include	<freeradius-devel/rfc4849.h>
+
+#include	<fcntl.h>
+#include	<ctype.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+#include	<freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *	Some messages get printed out only in debugging mode.
+ */
+#define FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF if (fr_debug_lvl) fr_strerror_printf
+
+#if 0
+#define VP_TRACE printf
+
+static void VP_HEXDUMP(char const *msg, uint8_t const *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("--- %s ---\n", msg);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf("%04x: ", (unsigned int) i);
+		printf("%02x ", data[i]);
+		if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
+	}
+	if ((len == 0x0f) || ((len & 0x0f) != 0x0f)) printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+#else
+#define VP_TRACE(_x, ...)
+#define VP_HEXDUMP(_x, _y, _z)
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ *	The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
+ *	request.  If there are more attributes than this, the request
+ *	is rejected.
+ *
+ *	This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
+ *	attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
+ *	Message-Authenticator attribute.  This means that the packet
+ *	is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
+ *	even if the end request is rejected.
+ */
+uint32_t fr_max_attributes = 0;
+FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
+
+typedef struct radius_packet_t {
+  uint8_t	code;
+  uint8_t	id;
+  uint8_t	length[2];
+  uint8_t	vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+  uint8_t	data[1];
+} radius_packet_t;
+
+static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool;	/* across multiple calls */
+static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
+static uint8_t nullvector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* for CoA decode */
+#endif
+
+char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
+  "",					//!< 0
+  "Access-Request",
+  "Access-Accept",
+  "Access-Reject",
+  "Accounting-Request",
+  "Accounting-Response",
+  "Accounting-Status",
+  "Password-Request",
+  "Password-Accept",
+  "Password-Reject",
+  "Accounting-Message",			//!< 10
+  "Access-Challenge",
+  "Status-Server",
+  "Status-Client",
+  "14",
+  "15",
+  "16",
+  "17",
+  "18",
+  "19",
+  "20",					//!< 20
+  "Resource-Free-Request",
+  "Resource-Free-Response",
+  "Resource-Query-Request",
+  "Resource-Query-Response",
+  "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
+  "NAS-Reboot-Request",
+  "NAS-Reboot-Response",
+  "28",
+  "Next-Passcode",
+  "New-Pin",				//!< 30
+  "Terminate-Session",
+  "Password-Expired",
+  "Event-Request",
+  "Event-Response",
+  "35",
+  "36",
+  "37",
+  "38",
+  "39",
+  "Disconnect-Request",			//!< 40
+  "Disconnect-ACK",
+  "Disconnect-NAK",
+  "CoA-Request",
+  "CoA-ACK",
+  "CoA-NAK",
+  "46",
+  "47",
+  "48",
+  "49",
+  "IP-Address-Allocate",
+  "IP-Address-Release",			//!< 50
+};
+
+
+void fr_printf_log(char const *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
+		va_end(ap);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static char const tabs[] = "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t";
+
+static void print_hex_data(uint8_t const *ptr, int attrlen, int depth)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
+		if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%.*s", depth, tabs);
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
+		if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
+	}
+	if ((i & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
+}
+
+
+void rad_print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!packet->data || !fr_log_fp) return;
+
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Socket:\t%d\n", packet->sockfd);
+#ifdef WITH_TCP
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Proto:\t%d\n", packet->proto);
+#endif
+
+	if (packet->src_ipaddr.af == AF_INET) {
+		char buffer[32];
+
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Src IP:\t%s\n",
+			inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				  &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				  buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "    port:\t%u\n", packet->src_port);
+
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Dst IP:\t%s\n",
+			inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
+				  &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				  buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "    port:\t%u\n", packet->dst_port);
+	}
+
+	if (packet->data[0] < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE) {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Code:\t\t(%d) %s\n", packet->data[0], fr_packet_codes[packet->data[0]]);
+	} else {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
+	}
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
+				   (packet->data[3])));
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Vector:\t");
+	for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x", packet->data[i]);
+	}
+	fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
+
+	if (packet->data_len > 20) {
+		int total;
+		uint8_t const *ptr;
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Data:");
+
+		total = packet->data_len - 20;
+		ptr = packet->data + 20;
+
+		while (total > 0) {
+			int attrlen;
+			unsigned int vendor = 0;
+
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t");
+			if (total < 2) { /* too short */
+				fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x\n", *ptr);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
+				for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+					fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+			attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
+
+			if ((ptr[0] == PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) &&
+			    (attrlen > 4)) {
+				vendor = (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5];
+				fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  ",
+				       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5], vendor);
+				attrlen -= 4;
+				ptr += 6;
+				total -= 6;
+
+			} else {
+				ptr += 2;
+				total -= 2;
+			}
+
+			print_hex_data(ptr, attrlen, 3);
+
+			ptr += attrlen;
+			total -= attrlen;
+		}
+	}
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+/** Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all possible combinations
+ *
+ */
+static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+		      fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t src_port,
+#else
+		      UNUSED fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, UNUSED uint16_t src_port,
+#endif
+		      fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t dst_port)
+{
+	int rcode;
+	struct sockaddr_storage	dst;
+	socklen_t		sizeof_dst;
+
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+	struct sockaddr_storage	src;
+	socklen_t		sizeof_src;
+
+	fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
+#endif
+
+	if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+	/*
+	 *	And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
+	 *	use udpfromto.
+	 */
+	if (((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) || (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6)) &&
+	    (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC) &&
+	    !fr_inaddr_any(src_ipaddr)) {
+		rcode = sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
+				   (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
+				   (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
+		goto done;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
+	 */
+	rcode = sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
+		       (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+done:
+#endif
+	if (rcode < 0) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
+	}
+
+	return rcode;
+}
+
+
+void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
+{
+	uint8_t			header[4];
+	struct sockaddr_storage	src;
+	socklen_t		sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+
+	(void) recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+			(struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+}
+
+/** Basic validation of RADIUS packet header
+ *
+ * @note fr_strerror errors are only available if fr_debug_lvl > 0. This is to reduce CPU time
+ *	consumed when discarding malformed packet.
+ *
+ * @param[in] sockfd we're reading from.
+ * @param[out] src_ipaddr of the packet.
+ * @param[out] src_port of the packet.
+ * @param[out] code Pointer to where to write the packet code.
+ * @return
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ *	- 1 on decode error.
+ *	- >= RADIUS_HDR_LEN on success. This is the packet length as specified in the header.
+ */
+ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port, int *code)
+{
+	ssize_t			data_len, packet_len;
+	uint8_t			header[4];
+	struct sockaddr_storage	src;
+	socklen_t		sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+
+	data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK, (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+	if (data_len < 0) {
+		if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Convert AF.  If unknown, discard packet.
+	 */
+	if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Unknown address family");
+		rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
+
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Too little data is available, discard the packet.
+	 */
+	if (data_len < 4) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Expected at least 4 bytes of header data, got %zu bytes", data_len);
+invalid:
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Invalid data from %s: %s",
+					 fr_inet_ntop(src_ipaddr->af, &src_ipaddr->ipaddr),
+					 fr_strerror());
+		rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
+
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	See how long the packet says it is.
+	 */
+	packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
+
+	/*
+	 *	The length in the packet says it's less than
+	 *	a RADIUS header length: discard it.
+	 */
+	if (packet_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Expected at least " STRINGIFY(RADIUS_HDR_LEN)  " bytes of packet "
+					 "data, got %zu bytes", packet_len);
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
+	 *	Anything after 4k will be discarded.
+	 */
+	if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Length field value too large, expected maximum of "
+					 STRINGIFY(MAX_PACKET_LEN) " bytes, got %zu bytes", packet_len);
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+
+	*code = header[0];
+
+	/*
+	 *	The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
+	 *	size could still be smaller.
+	 */
+	return packet_len;
+}
+
+
+/** Wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all possible combinations
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags,
+			    fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
+			    fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage	src;
+	struct sockaddr_storage	dst;
+	socklen_t		sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+	socklen_t		sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
+	ssize_t			data_len;
+	size_t			len;
+	uint16_t		port;
+	uint8_t			buffer[MAX_PACKET_LEN];
+
+	memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
+	memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Receive the packet.  The OS will discard any data in the
+	 *	packet after "len" bytes.
+	 */
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+	data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, buffer, sizeof(buffer), flags,
+			      (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
+			      (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
+#else
+	data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, buffer, sizeof(buffer), flags,
+			    (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Get the destination address, too.
+	 */
+	if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
+			&sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
+#endif
+	if (data_len <= 0) {
+		return data_len;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *      See how long the packet says it is.
+	 */
+	len = (buffer[2] * 256) + buffer[3];
+
+	/*
+	 *	Header says it's smaller than a RADIUS header, *or*
+	 *	the RADIUS header says that the RADIUS packet islarger
+	 *	than our buffer.  Discard it.
+	 */
+	if ((len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) || (len > (size_t) data_len)) return 0;
+
+	if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
+		return -1;	/* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
+	}
+	*src_port = port;
+
+	fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
+	*dst_port = port;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Different address families should never happen.
+	 */
+	if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	packet->data = talloc_memdup(packet, buffer, len);
+	if (!packet->data) return -1;
+
+	packet->data_len = len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Return the length of the RADIUS packet.  There may be
+	 *	stuff after the end of the RADIUS packet, so we don't
+	 *	want to parse that as RADIUS.
+	 */
+	return len;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+#define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
+/** Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply packet
+ *
+ * The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest created from
+ * the shared secret and the authentication vector.
+ * We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from that used when
+ * encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
+ */
+static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t const *vector,
+			char const *secret, uint8_t const *value, size_t length)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX context;
+	size_t	     i;
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+	fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+	for ( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) {
+		digest[i] ^= value[i];
+	}
+
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+}
+
+#define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
+static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
+			uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen,
+			char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+	uint8_t	digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
+	size_t	i, n;
+	size_t	len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	If the length is zero, round it up.
+	 */
+	len = inlen;
+
+	if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
+
+	memcpy(passwd, input, len);
+	if (len < sizeof(passwd)) memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
+
+	if (len == 0) {
+		len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+	}
+
+	else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
+		len += 0x0f;
+		len &= ~0x0f;
+	}
+	*outlen = len;
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_init(&old);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+	fr_md5_copy(old, context);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Do first pass.
+	 */
+	fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+
+	for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		if (n > 0) {
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			fr_md5_update(&context,
+				       passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
+				       AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+		}
+
+		fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+		for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+			passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	memcpy(output, passwd, len);
+
+	fr_md5_destroy(&old);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+}
+
+
+static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
+			       uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
+			       char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+	uint8_t	digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	size_t	i, n;
+	size_t	encrypted_len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	The password gets encoded with a 1-byte "length"
+	 *	field.  Ensure that it doesn't overflow.
+	 */
+	if (room > 253) room = 253;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Limit the maximum size of the input password.  2 bytes
+	 *	are taken up by the salt, and one by the encoded
+	 *	"length" field.  Note that if we have a tag, the
+	 *	"room" will be 252 octets, not 253 octets.
+	 */
+	if (inlen > (room - 3)) inlen = room - 3;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Length of the encrypted data is the clear-text
+	 *	password length plus one byte which encodes the length
+	 *	of the password.  We round up to the nearest encoding
+	 *	block.  Note that this can result in the encoding
+	 *	length being more than 253 octets.
+	 */
+	encrypted_len = inlen + 1;
+	if ((encrypted_len & 0x0f) != 0) {
+		encrypted_len += 0x0f;
+		encrypted_len &= ~0x0f;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	We need 2 octets for the salt, followed by the actual
+	 *	encrypted data.
+	 */
+	if (encrypted_len > (room - 2)) encrypted_len = room - 2;
+
+	*outlen = encrypted_len + 2;	/* account for the salt */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Copy the password over, and zero-fill the remainder.
+	 */
+	memcpy(output + 3, input, inlen);
+	memset(output + 3 + inlen, 0, *outlen - 3 - inlen);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Generate salt.  The RFCs say:
+	 *
+	 *	The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
+	 *	packet should be unique, and they should be random
+	 *
+	 *	So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
+	 *	add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
+	 */
+	output[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
+		     (fr_rand() & 0x07));
+	output[1] = fr_rand();
+	output[2] = inlen;	/* length of the password string */
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_init(&old);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+	fr_md5_copy(old, context);
+
+	fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, &output[0], 2);
+
+	for (n = 0; n < encrypted_len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		size_t block_len;
+
+		if (n > 0) {
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			fr_md5_update(&context,
+				       output + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
+				       AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+		}
+
+		fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+		if ((2 + n + AUTH_PASS_LEN) < room) {
+			block_len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+		} else {
+			block_len = room - 2 - n;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < block_len; i++) {
+			output[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+	fr_md5_destroy(&old);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+}
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+static int do_next_tlv(VALUE_PAIR const *vp, VALUE_PAIR const *next, int nest)
+{
+	unsigned int tlv1, tlv2;
+
+	if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) return 0;
+
+	if (!vp) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Keep encoding TLVs which have the same scope.
+	 *	e.g. two attributes of:
+	 *		ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV3 = data1
+	 *		ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV4 = data2
+	 *	both get put into a container of "ATTR.TLV1.TLV2"
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Nothing to follow, we're done.
+	 */
+	if (!next) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Not from the same vendor, skip it.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->vendor != next->da->vendor) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	In a different TLV space, skip it.
+	 */
+	tlv1 = vp->da->attr;
+	tlv2 = next->da->attr;
+
+	tlv1 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
+	tlv2 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
+
+	if (tlv1 != tlv2) return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, int nest,
+			   VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			   uint8_t *start, size_t room);
+
+static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			   unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room);
+
+/** Encode the *data* portion of the TLV
+ *
+ * This is really a sub-function of vp2data_any().  It encodes the *data* portion
+ * of the TLV, and assumes that the encapsulating attribute has already been encoded.
+ */
+static ssize_t vp2data_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			    RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			    char const *secret, int nest,
+			    VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			    uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	size_t my_room;
+	uint8_t *ptr = start;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *svp = vp;
+
+	if (!svp) return 0;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("vp2data_tlvs: attribute nesting overflow");
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	while (vp) {
+		VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+		if (room <= 2) return ptr - start;
+
+		ptr[0] = (vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest]) & fr_attr_mask[nest];
+		ptr[1] = 2;
+
+		my_room = room;
+		if (room > 255) my_room = 255;
+
+		len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
+				  &vp, ptr + 2, my_room - 2);
+		if (len < 0) return len;
+		if (len == 0) return ptr - start;
+		/* len can NEVER be more than 253 */
+
+		ptr[1] += len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+		if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+			print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
+		}
+#endif
+
+		room -= ptr[1];
+		ptr += ptr[1];
+		*pvp = vp;
+
+		if (!do_next_tlv(svp, vp, nest)) break;
+	}
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		DICT_ATTR const *da;
+
+		da = dict_attrbyvalue(svp->da->attr & ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest ]) - 1), svp->da->vendor);
+		if (da) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t%s = ...\n", da->name);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return ptr - start;
+}
+
+/** Encodes the data portion of an attribute
+ *
+ * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data portion.
+ */
+static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, int nest,
+			   VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			   uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+	uint32_t lvalue;
+	ssize_t len;
+	uint8_t const *data;
+	uint8_t *ptr = start;
+	uint8_t	array[4];
+	uint64_t lvalue64;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	/*
+	 *	See if we need to encode a TLV.  The low portion of
+	 *	the attribute has already been placed into the packer.
+	 *	If there are still attribute bytes left, then go
+	 *	encode them as TLVs.
+	 *
+	 *	If we cared about the stack, we could unroll the loop.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (nest < fr_attr_max_tlv) &&
+	    ((vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]) != 0)) {
+		return vp2data_tlvs(packet, original, secret, nest + 1, pvp,
+				    start, room);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Set up the default sources for the data.
+	 */
+	len = vp->vp_length;
+
+	switch (vp->da->type) {
+	case PW_TYPE_STRING:
+	case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
+		data = vp->data.ptr;
+		if (!data) return 0;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IFID:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
+	case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
+	case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:	/* just in case */
+		data = (uint8_t const *) &vp->data;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+		len = 1;	/* just in case */
+		array[0] = vp->vp_byte;
+		data = array;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+		len = 2;	/* just in case */
+		array[0] = (vp->vp_short >> 8) & 0xff;
+		array[1] = vp->vp_short & 0xff;
+		data = array;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
+		len = 4;	/* just in case */
+		lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
+		memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
+		data = array;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
+		len = 8;	/* just in case */
+		lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
+		data = (uint8_t *) &lvalue64;
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 *  There are no tagged date attributes.
+		 */
+	case PW_TYPE_DATE:
+		lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
+		data = (uint8_t const *) &lvalue;
+		len = 4;	/* just in case */
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+	{
+		int32_t slvalue;
+
+		len = 4;	/* just in case */
+		slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
+		memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
+		data = array;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	default:		/* unknown type: ignore it */
+		fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->da->type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	No data: skip it.
+	 */
+	if (len == 0) {
+		*pvp = vp->next;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Bound the data to the calling size
+	 */
+	if (len > (ssize_t) room) len = room;
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	/*
+	 *	RADIUSV11 does not encrypt any attributes.
+	 */
+	if (packet->radiusv11) goto tag;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	Encrypt the various password styles
+	 *
+	 *	Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
+	 *	128 bytes long.
+	 */
+	switch (vp->da->flags.encrypt) {
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
+		make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
+			    secret, packet->vector);
+		break;
+
+	case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
+		lvalue = 0;
+		if (vp->da->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Check if there's enough room.  If there isn't,
+		 *	we discard the attribute.
+		 *
+		 *	This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
+		 *	in one Vendor-Specific, though.
+		 */
+		if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
+
+		switch (packet->code) {
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+		default:
+			if (!original) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->da->name);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
+					   room - lvalue,
+					   secret, original->vector);
+			break;
+		case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+		case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+		case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+			make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
+					   room - lvalue,
+					   secret, packet->vector);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (lvalue) ptr[0] = TAG_VALID(vp->tag) ? vp->tag : TAG_NONE;
+		len += lvalue;
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	The code above ensures that this attribute
+		 *	always fits.
+		 */
+	case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
+		if (len > AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
+		make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data, len);
+		len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
+		break;
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+	default:
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	tag:
+#endif
+		if (vp->da->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->tag)) {
+			if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
+				if (len > ((ssize_t) (room - 1))) len = room - 1;
+				ptr[0] = vp->tag;
+				ptr++;
+			} else if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+				array[0] = vp->tag;
+			} /* else it can't be any other type */
+		}
+		memcpy(ptr, data, len);
+		break;
+	} /* switch over encryption flags */
+
+	*pvp = vp->next;
+	return len + (ptr - start);
+}
+
+static ssize_t attr_shift(uint8_t const *start, uint8_t const *end,
+			  uint8_t *ptr, int hdr_len, ssize_t len,
+			  int flag_offset, int vsa_offset)
+{
+	int check_len = len - ptr[1];
+	int total = len + hdr_len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Pass 1: Check if the addition of the headers
+	 *	overflows the available room.  If so, return
+	 *	what we were capable of encoding.
+	 */
+
+	while (check_len > (255 - hdr_len)) {
+		total += hdr_len;
+		check_len -= (255 - hdr_len);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Note that this results in a number of attributes maybe
+	 *	being marked as "encoded", but which aren't in the
+	 *	packet.  Oh well.  The solution is to fix the
+	 *	"vp2data_any" function to take into account the header
+	 *	lengths.
+	 */
+	if ((ptr + ptr[1] + total) > end) {
+		return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Pass 2: Now that we know there's enough room,
+	 *	re-arrange the data to form a set of valid
+	 *	RADIUS attributes.
+	 */
+	while (1) {
+		int sublen = 255 - ptr[1];
+
+		if (len <= sublen) {
+			break;
+		}
+
+		len -= sublen;
+		memmove(ptr + 255 + hdr_len, ptr + 255, sublen);
+		memmove(ptr + 255, ptr, hdr_len);
+		ptr[1] += sublen;
+		if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += sublen;
+		ptr[flag_offset] |= 0x80;
+
+		ptr += 255;
+		ptr[1] = hdr_len;
+		if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] = 3;
+	}
+
+	ptr[1] += len;
+	if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += len;
+
+	return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
+}
+
+
+/** Encode an "extended" attribute
+ */
+int rad_vp2extended(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+		    RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		    char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+		    uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+	int len;
+	int hdr_len;
+	uint8_t *start = ptr;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	if (!vp->da->flags.extended) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2extended called for non-extended attribute");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	The attribute number is encoded into the upper 8 bits
+	 *	of the vendor ID.
+	 */
+	ptr[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
+
+	if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
+		if (room < 3) return 0;
+
+		ptr[1] = 3;
+		ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
+
+	} else {
+		if (room < 4) return 0;
+
+		ptr[1] = 4;
+		ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
+		ptr[3] = 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Only "flagged" attributes can be longer than one
+	 *	attribute.
+	 */
+	if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended && (room > 255)) {
+		room = 255;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Handle EVS VSAs.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
+		uint8_t *evs = ptr + ptr[1];
+
+		if (room < (size_t) (ptr[1] + 5)) return 0;
+
+		ptr[2] = 26;
+
+		evs[0] = 0;	/* always zero */
+		evs[1] = (vp->da->vendor >> 16) & 0xff;
+		evs[2] = (vp->da->vendor >> 8) & 0xff;
+		evs[3] = vp->da->vendor & 0xff;
+		evs[4] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
+
+		ptr[1] += 5;
+	}
+	hdr_len = ptr[1];
+
+	len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
+			  pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - hdr_len);
+	if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
+	 *	the attribute.  If so, move the data up in the packet,
+	 *	and copy the existing header over.  Set the "M" flag ONLY
+	 *	after copying the rest of the data.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->flags.long_extended && (len > (255 - ptr[1]))) {
+		return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, 4, len, 3, 0);
+	}
+
+	ptr[1] += len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		int jump = 3;
+
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+		if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  ", ptr[2]);
+
+		} else {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x  ", ptr[2], ptr[3]);
+			jump = 4;
+		}
+
+		if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  %02x  ",
+				ptr[jump], ptr[jump + 1],
+				ptr[jump + 2], ptr[jump + 3],
+				((ptr[jump + 1] << 16) |
+				 (ptr[jump + 2] << 8) |
+				 ptr[jump + 3]),
+				ptr[jump + 4]);
+			jump += 5;
+		}
+
+		print_hex_data(ptr + jump, len, 3);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
+}
+
+
+/** Encode a WiMAX attribute
+ *
+ */
+int rad_vp2wimax(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+		 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+		 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+	int len;
+	uint32_t lvalue;
+	int hdr_len;
+	uint8_t *start = ptr;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Double-check for WiMAX format.
+	 */
+	if (!vp->da->flags.wimax) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2wimax called for non-WIMAX VSA");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Not enough room for:
+	 *		attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen, continuation
+	 */
+	if (room < 9) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Build the Vendor-Specific header
+	 */
+	ptr = start;
+	ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+	ptr[1] = 9;
+	lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
+	memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
+	ptr[6] = (vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[1]);
+	ptr[7] = 3;
+	ptr[8] = 0;		/* continuation byte */
+
+	hdr_len = 9;
+
+	len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1],
+			  room - hdr_len);
+	if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
+	 *	the attribute.  If so, move the data up in the packet,
+	 *	and copy the existing header over.  Set the "C" flag
+	 *	ONLY after copying the rest of the data.
+	 */
+	if (len > (255 - ptr[1])) {
+		return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, hdr_len, len, 8, 7);
+	}
+
+	ptr[1] += len;
+	ptr[7] += len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  %02x %02x %02x   ",
+		       ptr[0], ptr[1],
+		       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
+		       (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5],
+		       ptr[6], ptr[7], ptr[8]);
+		print_hex_data(ptr + 9, len, 3);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
+}
+
+/** Encode an RFC format attribute, with the "concat" flag set
+ *
+ * If there isn't enough room in the packet, the data is
+ * truncated to fit.
+ */
+static ssize_t vp2attr_concat(UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			      UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			      UNUSED char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			      unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+	uint8_t *ptr = start;
+	uint8_t const *p;
+	size_t len, left;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	p = vp->vp_octets;
+	len = vp->vp_length;
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		if (room <= 2) break;
+
+		ptr[0] = attribute;
+		ptr[1] = 2;
+
+		left = len;
+
+		/* no more than 253 octets */
+		if (left > 253) left = 253;
+
+		/* no more than "room" octets */
+		if (room < (left + 2)) left = room - 2;
+
+		memcpy(ptr + 2, p, left);
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+		if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+			print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
+		}
+#endif
+		ptr[1] += left;
+		ptr += ptr[1];
+		p += left;
+		room -= left;
+		len -= left;
+	}
+
+	*pvp = vp->next;
+	return ptr - start;
+}
+
+/** Encode an RFC format TLV.
+ *
+ * This could be a standard attribute, or a TLV data type.
+ * If it's a standard attribute, then vp->da->attr == attribute.
+ * Otherwise, attribute may be something else.
+ */
+static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			   unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (room <= 2) return 0;
+
+	ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
+	ptr[1] = 2;
+
+	if (room > 255) room = 255;
+
+	len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - ptr[1]);
+	if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+	ptr[1] += len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+		print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return ptr[1];
+}
+
+
+/** Encode a VSA which is a TLV
+ *
+ * If it's in the RFC format, call vp2attr_rfc.  Otherwise, encode it here.
+ */
+static ssize_t vp2attr_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			   unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
+			   uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	DICT_VENDOR *dv;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+	/*
+	 *	Unknown vendor: RFC format.
+	 *	Known vendor and RFC format: go do that.
+	 */
+	dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
+	if (!dv ||
+	    (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (dv->type == 1) && (dv->length == 1))) {
+		return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+				   attribute, ptr, room);
+	}
+
+	switch (dv->type) {
+	default:
+		fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
+				   " type %u", (unsigned) dv->type);
+		return -1;
+
+	case 4:
+		ptr[0] = 0;	/* attr must be 24-bit */
+		ptr[1] = (attribute >> 16) & 0xff;
+		ptr[2] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
+		ptr[3] = attribute & 0xff;
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		ptr[0] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
+		ptr[1] = attribute & 0xff;
+		break;
+
+	case 1:
+		ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (dv->length) {
+	default:
+		fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
+				   " length %u", (unsigned) dv->length);
+		return -1;
+
+	case 0:
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		ptr[dv->type] = 0;
+		ptr[dv->type + 1] = dv->type + 2;
+		break;
+
+	case 1:
+		ptr[dv->type] = dv->type + 1;
+		break;
+
+	}
+
+	if (room > 255) room = 255;
+
+	len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
+			  ptr + dv->type + dv->length, room - (dv->type + dv->length));
+	if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+	if (dv->length) ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] += len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		switch (dv->type) {
+		default:
+			break;
+
+		case 4:
+			if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
+				fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
+					ptr[0], ptr[1], ptr[2], ptr[3]);
+			break;
+
+		case 2:
+			if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
+				fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x ",
+					ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+		break;
+
+		case 1:
+			if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
+				fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x ", ptr[0]);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		switch (dv->length) {
+		default:
+			break;
+
+		case 0:
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  ");
+			break;
+
+		case 1:
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  ",
+				ptr[dv->type]);
+			break;
+
+		case 2:
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x  ",
+				ptr[dv->type], ptr[dv->type] + 1);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		print_hex_data(ptr + dv->type + dv->length, len, 3);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return dv->type + dv->length + len;
+}
+
+
+/** Encode a Vendor-Specific attribute
+ *
+ */
+int rad_vp2vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *ptr,
+		size_t room)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	uint32_t lvalue;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	if (vp->da->vendor == 0) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa called with rfc attribute");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Double-check for WiMAX format.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
+		return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp, ptr, room);
+	}
+
+	if (vp->da->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa: Invalid arguments");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Not enough room for:
+	 *		attr, len, vendor-id
+	 */
+	if (room < 6) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Build the Vendor-Specific header
+	 */
+	ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+	ptr[1] = 6;
+	lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
+	memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
+
+	if (room > 255) room = 255;
+
+	len = vp2attr_vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+			  vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor,
+			  ptr + ptr[1], room - ptr[1]);
+	if (len < 0) return len;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+		fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  ",
+		       ptr[0], ptr[1],
+		       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
+		       (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5]);
+		print_hex_data(ptr + 6, len, 3);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	ptr[1] += len;
+
+	return ptr[1];
+}
+
+
+/** Encode an RFC standard attribute 1..255
+ *
+ */
+int rad_vp2rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+	       RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+	       char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+	       uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	if (room < 2) return -1;
+
+	if (vp->da->vendor != 0) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with VSA");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((vp->da->attr == 0) || (vp->da->attr > 255)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with non-standard attribute %u", vp->da->attr);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Only CUI is allowed to have zero length.
+	 *	Thank you, WiMAX!
+	 */
+	if ((vp->vp_length == 0) &&
+	    (vp->da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
+		ptr[0] = PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY;
+		ptr[1] = 2;
+
+		*pvp = vp->next;
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Message-Authenticator is hard-coded.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+		/*
+		 *	RADIUSV11 does not encode or verify Message-Authenticator.
+		 */
+		if (packet->radiusv11) {
+			*pvp = (*pvp)->next;
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		if (room < 18) return -1;
+
+		ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
+		ptr[1] = 18;
+		memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16);
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+		if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
+			fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t50 12 ...\n");
+		}
+#endif
+
+		*pvp = (*pvp)->next;
+		return 18;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hacks for NAS-Filter-Rule.  They all get concatenated
+	 *	with 0x00 bytes in between the values.  We rely on the
+	 *	decoder to do the opposite transformation on incoming
+	 *	packets.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->attr == PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE) {
+		uint8_t const *end = ptr + room;
+		uint8_t *p, *attr = ptr;
+		bool zero = false;
+
+		attr[0] = PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE;
+		attr[1] = 2;
+		p = ptr + 2;
+
+		while (vp && !vp->da->vendor && (vp->da->attr == PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE)) {
+			if ((p + zero + vp->vp_length) > end) {				
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (zero) {
+				if (attr[1] == 255) {
+					attr = p;
+					if ((attr + 3) >= end) break;
+
+					attr[0] = PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE;
+					attr[1] = 2;
+					p = attr + 2;
+				}
+
+				*(p++) = 0;
+				attr[1]++;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 *	Check for overflow
+			 */
+			if ((attr[1] + vp->vp_length) < 255) {
+				memcpy(p, vp->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_length);
+				attr[1] += vp->vp_length;
+				p += vp->vp_length;
+
+			} else if (attr + (attr[1] + 2 + vp->vp_length) > end) {
+				break;
+
+			} else if (vp->vp_length > 253) {
+				/*
+				 *	Drop VPs which are too long.
+				 *	We don't (yet) split one VP
+				 *	across multiple attributes.
+				 */
+				vp = vp->next;
+				continue;
+
+			} else {
+				size_t first, second;
+
+				first = 255 - attr[1];
+				second = vp->vp_length - first;
+
+				memcpy(p, vp->vp_strvalue, first);
+				p += first;
+				attr[1] = 255;
+				attr = p;
+
+				attr[0] = PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE;
+				attr[1] = 2;
+				p = attr + 2;
+
+				memcpy(p, vp->vp_strvalue + first, second);
+				attr[1] += second;
+				p += second;
+			}
+
+			vp = vp->next;
+			zero = true;
+		}
+
+		*pvp = vp;
+		return p - ptr;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	EAP-Message is special.
+	 */
+	if (vp->da->flags.concat && (vp->vp_length > 253)) {
+		return vp2attr_concat(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
+				      ptr, room);
+	}
+
+	return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
+			   ptr, room);
+}
+
+static ssize_t rad_vp2rfctlv(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
+			     RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			     char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
+			     uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	if (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not a TLV");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) != 0) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not an RFC TLV");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (room < 5) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Encode the first level of TLVs
+	 */
+	start[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
+	start[1] = 4;
+	start[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
+	start[3] = 2;
+
+	len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
+			  start + 4, room - 4);
+	if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+	if (len > 253) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	start[1] += len;
+	start[3] += len;
+
+	return start[1];
+}
+
+/** Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute
+ *
+ */
+int rad_vp2attr(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *start,
+		size_t room)
+{
+	VALUE_PAIR const *vp;
+
+	if (!pvp || !*pvp || !start || (room <= 2)) return -1;
+
+	vp = *pvp;
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	/*
+	 *	RFC format attributes take the fast path.
+	 */
+	if (!vp->da->vendor) {
+		if (vp->da->attr > 255) {
+			*pvp = vp->next;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+				  start, room);
+	}
+
+	if (vp->da->flags.extended) {
+		return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+				       start, room);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	The upper 8 bits of the vendor number are the standard
+	 *	space attribute which is a TLV.
+	 */
+	if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) == 0) {
+		return rad_vp2rfctlv(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+				     start, room);
+	}
+
+	if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
+		return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
+				    start, room);
+	}
+
+	return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp, start, room);
+}
+
+
+/** Encode a packet
+ *
+ */
+int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+	       char const *secret)
+{
+	radius_packet_t		*hdr;
+	uint8_t			*ptr;
+	uint16_t		total_length;
+	int			len;
+	VALUE_PAIR const	*reply;
+
+	/*
+	 *	A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
+	 */
+	uint64_t	data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
+
+	/*
+	 *	Double-check some things based on packet code.
+	 */
+	switch (packet->code) {
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+		if (!original) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	These packet vectors start off as all zero.
+		 */
+	case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+		memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use memory on the stack, until we know how
+	 *	large the packet will be.
+	 */
+	hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Build standard header
+	 */
+	hdr->code = packet->code;
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	if (packet->radiusv11) {
+		uint32_t id = packet->id;
+
+		hdr->id = 0;
+
+		id = htonl(id);
+		memcpy(hdr->vector, &id, sizeof(id));
+		memset(hdr->vector + sizeof(id), 0, sizeof(hdr->vector) - sizeof(id));
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		hdr->id = packet->id;
+
+		memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
+	}
+
+	total_length = RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Load up the configuration values for the user
+	 */
+	ptr = hdr->data;
+	packet->offset = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list.  The first time,
+	 *	calculate the total length of data.  The second time,
+	 *	allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
+	 *
+	 *	Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
+	 *	memcpy.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
+	 */
+	reply = packet->vps;
+	while (reply) {
+		size_t last_len, room;
+		char const *last_name = NULL;
+
+		VERIFY_VP(reply);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
+		 *	attributes.
+		 */
+		if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
+		    ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
+		    !reply->da->flags.extended && !reply->da->flags.long_extended) {
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+			/*
+			 *	Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
+			 *	attributes with a debug build.
+			 */
+			if (reply->da->attr == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
+				memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->vp_length);
+				len = reply->vp_length;
+				reply = reply->next;
+				goto next;
+			}
+#endif
+			reply = reply->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+		/*
+		 *	Do not encode Message-Authenticator for RADIUS/1.1
+		 */
+		if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) && (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
+			reply = reply->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+
+		/*
+		 *	Do not encode Original-Packet-Code for RADIUS/1.1
+		 */
+		if (reply->da->vendor == ((unsigned int) PW_EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTE_1 << 24) && (reply->da->attr == 4)) {
+			reply = reply->next;
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 *	We allow zero-length strings in "unlang", but
+		 *	skip them (except for CUI, thanks WiMAX!) on
+		 *	all other attributes.
+		 */
+		if (reply->vp_length == 0) {
+			if ((reply->da->vendor != 0) ||
+			    ((reply->da->attr != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY) &&
+			     (reply->da->attr != PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR))) {
+				reply = reply->next;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	How much room do we have left?
+		 */
+		room = ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
+		 *	length and initial value.
+		 */
+		if (!reply->da->vendor && (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+			/*
+			 *	RADIUSV11 does not encode or verify Message-Authenticator.
+			 */
+			if (packet->radiusv11) {
+				reply = reply->next;
+				continue;
+			}
+#endif
+
+			if (room < 18) break;
+
+			/*
+			 *	Cache the offset to the
+			 *	Message-Authenticator
+			 */
+			packet->offset = total_length;
+			last_len = 16;
+		} else {
+			if (room < (2 + reply->vp_length)) break;
+
+			last_len = reply->vp_length;
+		}
+		last_name = reply->da->name;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Note that this also checks "room", as the
+		 *	attribute may be a VSA, etc.
+		 */
+		len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, &reply, ptr, room);
+		if (len < 0) return -1;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
+		 *	the packet is full.
+		 */
+		if (len == 0) {
+			if (last_len != 0) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Failed encoding attribute %s\n", last_name);
+				break;
+			} else {
+				fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Skipping zero-length attribute %s\n", last_name);
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	next:			/* Used only for Raw-Attribute */
+#endif
+		ptr += len;
+		total_length += len;
+	} /* done looping over all attributes */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
+	 *	from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
+	 *
+	 *	Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
+	 *	that we only allocate the minimum amount of
+	 *	memory for a request.
+	 */
+	packet->data_len = total_length;
+	packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, packet->data_len);
+	if (!packet->data) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
+	hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
+
+	total_length = htons(total_length);
+	memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+#define RADIUSV11_UNUSED UNUSED
+#else
+#define RADIUSV11_UNUSED
+#endif
+
+/** Sign a previously encoded packet
+ *
+ */
+int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+	     RADIUSV11_UNUSED char const *secret)
+{
+	radius_packet_t	*hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
+
+	if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) ||
+	    (packet->offset < 0)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	/*
+	 *	RADIUSV11 uses the authenticator field for matching
+	 *	requests to responses, and does not otherwise verify
+	 *	it.
+	 */
+	if (packet->radiusv11) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
+	 */
+	if (packet->id < 0) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Set up the authentication vector with zero, or with
+	 *	the original vector, prior to signing.
+	 */
+	switch (packet->code) {
+	case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+		memset(packet->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
+		if (!original) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		memcpy(packet->vector, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
+	default:
+		break;		/* packet->vector is already random bytes */
+	}
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	/*
+	 *	If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
+	 *	now.
+	 */
+	if ((packet->offset > 0) && ((size_t) (packet->offset + 18) <= packet->data_len)) {
+		uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+
+		switch (packet->code) {
+		case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
+			if (original && original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) {
+				goto do_ack;
+			}
+			/* FALL-THROUGH */
+
+		case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+		case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+		case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
+		case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
+		case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+		case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
+		case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
+			memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			break;
+
+		do_ack:
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+		case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+			memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Set the authentication vector to zero,
+		 *	calculate the HMAC, and put it
+		 *	into the Message-Authenticator
+		 *	attribute.
+		 */
+		fr_hmac_md5(calc_auth_vector, packet->data, packet->data_len,
+			    (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+		memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
+		       calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+	}
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Copy the request authenticator over to the packet.
+	 */
+	memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	/*
+	 *	Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
+	 *	sign the packet.
+	 */
+	switch (packet->code) {
+		/*
+		 *	Request packets are not signed, but
+		 *	have a random authentication vector.
+		 */
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Reply packets are signed with the
+		 *	authentication vector of the request.
+		 */
+	default:
+		{
+			uint8_t digest[16];
+
+			FR_MD5_CTX	context;
+			fr_md5_init(&context);
+			fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+			fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret,
+				     strlen(secret));
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+			fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+			memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			break;
+		}
+	}/* switch over packet codes */
+#endif	 /* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Reply to the request
+ *
+ * Also attach reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
+ */
+int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+	     char const *secret)
+{
+	/*
+	 *	Maybe it's a fake packet.  Don't send it.
+	 */
+	if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *  First time through, allocate room for the packet
+	 */
+	if (!packet->data) {
+		/*
+		 *	Encode the packet.
+		 */
+		if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Re-sign it, including updating the
+		 *	Message-Authenticator.
+		 */
+		if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	If packet->data points to data, then we print out
+		 *	the VP list again only for debugging.
+		 */
+	}
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_TCP
+	/*
+	 *	If the socket is TCP, call write().  Calling sendto()
+	 *	is allowed on some platforms, but it's not nice.  Even
+	 *	worse, if UDPFROMTO is defined, we *can't* use it on
+	 *	TCP sockets.  So... just call write().
+	 */
+	if (packet->proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+		ssize_t rcode;
+
+		rcode = write(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+		if (rcode >= 0) return rcode;
+
+		fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	And send it on it's way.
+	 */
+	return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
+			  &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
+			  &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
+}
+
+/** Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing the FULL digest
+ *
+ * Otherwise, the server can be subject to timing attacks that allow attackers
+ * find a valid message authenticator.
+ *
+ * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
+ */
+int rad_digest_cmp(uint8_t const *a, uint8_t const *b, size_t length)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+		result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+	}
+
+	return result;		/* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
+}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+/** Validates the requesting client NAS
+ *
+ * Calculates the request Authenticator based on the clients private key.
+ */
+static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char const *secret)
+{
+	uint8_t		digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	FR_MD5_CTX		context;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
+	 *	Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
+	 *	and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
+	 *	as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
+	 */
+	memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+	/*
+	 *  MD5(packet + secret);
+	 */
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+	fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
+	 */
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/** Validates the requesting client NAS
+ *
+ * Calculates the response Authenticator based on the clients
+ * private key.
+ */
+static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+			    char const *secret)
+{
+	uint8_t		calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	FR_MD5_CTX		context;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Very bad!
+	 */
+	if (original == NULL) {
+		return 3;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *  Copy the original vector in place.
+	 */
+	memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+	/*
+	 *  MD5(packet + secret);
+	 */
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+	fr_md5_final(calc_digest, &context);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+	/*
+	 *  Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
+	 */
+	memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
+	 */
+	if (rad_digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+/** Check if a set of RADIUS formatted TLVs are OK
+ *
+ */
+int rad_tlv_ok(uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
+	       size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length)
+{
+	uint8_t const *end = data + length;
+
+	VP_TRACE("checking TLV %u/%u\n", (unsigned int) dv_type, (unsigned int) dv_length);
+
+	VP_HEXDUMP("tlv_ok", data, length);
+
+	if ((dv_length > 2) || (dv_type == 0) || (dv_type > 4)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_tlv_ok: Invalid arguments");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	while (data < end) {
+		size_t attrlen;
+
+		if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header overflow");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		switch (dv_type) {
+		case 4:
+			if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0) &&
+			    (data[2] == 0) && (data[3] == 0)) {
+			zero:
+				fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute 0");
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			if (data[0] != 0) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute > 2^24");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 2:
+			if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0)) goto zero;
+			break;
+
+		case 1:
+			/*
+			 *	Zero is allowed, because the Colubris
+			 *	people are dumb and use it.
+			 */
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		switch (dv_length) {
+		case 0:
+			return 0;
+
+		case 2:
+			if (data[dv_type] != 0) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("Attribute is longer than 256 octets");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			/* FALL-THROUGH */
+		case 1:
+			attrlen = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
+			break;
+
+
+		default:
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (attrlen < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header has invalid length");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (attrlen > length) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Attribute overflows container");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		data += attrlen;
+		length -= attrlen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/** See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
+ *
+ * Packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len, if there's more data
+ * in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
+ *
+ * @param packet to check
+ * @param flags to control decoding
+ * @param reason if not NULL, will have the failure reason written to where it points.
+ * @return bool, true on success, false on failure.
+ */
+bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
+{
+	uint8_t			*attr;
+	size_t			totallen;
+	int			count;
+	radius_packet_t		*hdr;
+	char			host_ipaddr[128];
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	bool			require_ma = false;
+	bool			seen_ma = false;
+	bool			eap = false;
+	bool			non_eap = false;
+#endif
+	uint32_t		num_attributes;
+	decode_fail_t		failure = DECODE_FAIL_NONE;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
+	 *
+	 *	RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+	 *
+	 *	"The minimum length is 20 ..."
+	 */
+	if (packet->data_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %zu < minimum %d)",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+				     packet->data_len, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_PACKET;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+
+	/*
+	 *	Check for packets with mismatched size.
+	 *	i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
+	 *	says it's 256 bytes long.
+	 */
+	totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
+	hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Code of 0 is not understood.
+	 *	Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
+	 */
+	if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
+	    (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+			   hdr->code);
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_UNKNOWN_PACKET_CODE;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
+	 *	packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
+	 */
+	if (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = true;
+
+	/*
+	 *	It's also required if the caller asks for it.
+	 */
+	if (flags) require_ma = true;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Repeat the length checks.  This time, instead of
+	 *	looking at the data we received, look at the value
+	 *	of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
+	 *
+	 *	Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
+	 *
+	 *	RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+	 *
+	 *	"The minimum length is 20 ..."
+	 */
+	if (totallen < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %zu < minimum %d)",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+				     totallen, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_FIELD;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
+	 *
+	 *	RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+	 *
+	 *	" ... and maximum length is 4096."
+	 *
+	 *	HOWEVER.  This requirement is for the network layer.
+	 *	If the code gets here, we assume that a well-formed
+	 *	packet is an OK packet.
+	 *
+	 *	We allow both the UDP data length, and the RADIUS
+	 *	"length" field to contain up to 64K of data.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+	 *
+	 *	"If the packet is shorter than the Length field
+	 *	indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
+	 *
+	 *	i.e. No response to the NAS.
+	 */
+	if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %zu octets, packet length says %zu",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+				     packet->data_len, totallen);
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+	 *
+	 *	"Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
+	 *	treated as padding and ignored on reception."
+	 */
+	if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
+		/*
+		 *	We're shortening the packet below, but just
+		 *	to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
+		 */
+		memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
+		packet->data_len = totallen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
+	 *	they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
+	 *
+	 *	If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
+	 *	or over-fill the packet.  Any parsing of the packet
+	 *	is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
+	 *
+	 *	This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
+	 *	or with an intentional attack.  Either way, we do NOT want
+	 *	to be vulnerable to this problem.
+	 */
+	attr = hdr->data;
+	count = totallen - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+	num_attributes = 0;
+
+	while (count > 0) {
+		/*
+		 *	We need at least 2 bytes to check the
+		 *	attribute header.
+		 */
+		if (count < 2) {
+			FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+					     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+					     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+			failure = DECODE_FAIL_HEADER_OVERFLOW;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
+		 */
+		if (attr[0] == 0) {
+			FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+					     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+					     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+			failure = DECODE_FAIL_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
+		 *	fields.  Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
+		 */
+		if (attr[1] < 2) {
+			FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+					     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+					     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+				   attr[0]);
+			failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_SHORT;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
+		 *	attribute, it's a bad packet.
+		 */
+		if (count < attr[1]) {
+			FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+					     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+					     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+					   attr[0]);
+			failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_OVERFLOW;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+		/*
+		 *	Sanity check the attributes for length.
+		 */
+		switch (attr[0]) {
+		default:	/* don't do anything by default */
+			break;
+
+			/*
+			 *	If there's an EAP-Message, we require
+			 *	a Message-Authenticator.
+			 */
+		case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
+			require_ma = true;
+			eap = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD:
+		case PW_ARAP_PASSWORD:
+			non_eap = true;
+			break;
+
+		case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+			/*
+			 *	RADIUSV11 does not encode or verify Message-Authenticator.
+			 */
+			if (packet->radiusv11) break;
+#endif
+
+			if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
+				FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
+					   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+						     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+						     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+					   attr[1] - 2);
+				failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_INVALID_LENGTH;
+				goto finish;
+			}
+			seen_ma = true;
+			break;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 *	FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
+		 *	dictionary, and switch over their type.  For
+		 *	integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
+		 *	be 6.
+		 */
+		count -= attr[1];	/* grab the attribute length */
+		attr += attr[1];
+		num_attributes++;	/* seen one more attribute */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
+	 *
+	 *	If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
+	 */
+	if (count != 0) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_UNDERFLOW;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
+	 *	attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
+	 *	then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
+	 */
+	if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+	    (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+			   num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_TOO_MANY_ATTRIBUTES;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 	http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
+	 *
+	 *	A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
+	 *	a Message-Authenticator attribute.
+	 *
+	 *	A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
+	 *
+	 *	Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
+	 *	Message-Authenticator attributes.
+	 */
+	if (require_ma &&
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	    /*
+	     *	RADIUSV11 does not encode or verify Message-Authenticator.
+	     */
+	    !packet->radiusv11 &&
+#endif
+	    !seen_ma) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	if (eap && non_eap) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Bad packet from host %s:  Packet contains EAP-Message and non-EAP authentication attribute",
+			   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+		failure = DECODE_FAIL_TOO_MANY_AUTH;
+		goto finish;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	Fill RADIUS header fields
+	 */
+	packet->code = hdr->code;
+	packet->id = hdr->id;
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	if (packet->radiusv11) {
+		uint32_t id;
+
+		memcpy(&id, hdr->vector, sizeof(id));
+		packet->id = ntohl(id);
+	}
+#endif
+	memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+
+	finish:
+
+	if (reason) {
+		*reason = failure;
+	}
+	return (failure == DECODE_FAIL_NONE);
+}
+
+
+/** Receive UDP client requests, and fill in the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure
+ *
+ */
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int fd, int flags)
+{
+	int sock_flags = 0;
+	ssize_t data_len;
+	RADIUS_PACKET		*packet;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Allocate the new request data structure
+	 */
+	packet = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
+	if (!packet) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (flags & 0x02) {
+		sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
+		flags &= ~0x02;
+	}
+
+	data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, packet, sock_flags,
+				&packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
+				&packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Check for socket errors.
+	 */
+	if (data_len < 0) {
+		FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Error receiving packet: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
+		/* packet->data is NULL */
+		rad_free(&packet);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	No data read from the network.
+	 */
+	if (data_len == 0) {
+		rad_free(&packet);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
+	 */
+	if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags, NULL)) {
+		rad_free(&packet);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Remember which socket we read the packet from.
+	 */
+	packet->sockfd = fd;
+
+	/*
+	 *	FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
+	 *	certain IP's.  The problem is that we don't know
+	 *	how to do this properly for all possible clients...
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
+	 */
+	packet->vps = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
+#endif
+
+	return packet;
+}
+
+
+/** Verify the Request/Response Authenticator (and Message-Authenticator if present) of a packet
+ *
+ */
+int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUSV11_UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET *original, RADIUSV11_UNUSED char const *secret)
+{
+	uint8_t		*ptr;
+	int		length;
+	int		attrlen;
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	int		rcode;
+#endif
+	char		buffer[32];
+
+	if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	/*
+	 *	RADIUSV11 uses the authenticator field for matching
+	 *	requests to responses, and does not otherwise verify
+	 *	it.
+	 */
+	if (packet->radiusv11) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
+	 *	sanity checking.
+	 */
+	ptr = packet->data + RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+	length = packet->data_len - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+	while (length > 0) {
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+		uint8_t	msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+		uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+#endif
+
+		attrlen = ptr[1];
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+		switch (ptr[0]) {
+		default:	/* don't do anything. */
+			break;
+
+			/*
+			 *	Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
+			 *	attribute is invalid.
+			 */
+		case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+			/*
+			 *	Ignore Message-Authenticator for RADIUSV11 packets.
+			 */
+			if (packet->radiusv11) break;
+#endif
+
+			memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
+			memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+			switch (packet->code) {
+			default:
+				break;
+
+			case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
+				if (original &&
+				    (original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER)) {
+					goto do_ack;
+				}
+				/* FALL-THROUGH */
+
+			case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+			case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+			case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+				memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+				break;
+
+			do_ack:
+			case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+			case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+			case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+			case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
+			case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
+			case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
+			case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
+				if (!original) {
+					fr_strerror_printf("Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response "
+							   "packet without a request packet");
+					return -1;
+				}
+				memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			fr_hmac_md5(calc_auth_vector, packet->data, packet->data_len,
+				    (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
+			if (rad_digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
+				   sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator!  "
+						   "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+						   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+							     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+							     buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
+				/* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
+				return -1;
+			} /* else the message authenticator was good */
+
+			/*
+			 *	Reinitialize Authenticators.
+			 */
+			memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			break;
+		} /* switch over the attributes */
+#endif		  /* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+		ptr += attrlen;
+		length -= attrlen;
+	} /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
+
+	/*
+	 *	It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we don't know what it is
+	 *	so can't validate the authenticators.
+	 */
+	if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
+				   "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator.",
+				   packet->code,
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				             buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+				   packet->src_port);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	/*
+	 *	RADIUSV11 uses the authenticator field for matching
+	 *	requests to responses, and does not otherwise verify
+	 *	it.
+	 */
+	if (packet->radiusv11) return 0;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 *	Calculate and/or verify Request or Response Authenticator.
+	 */
+	switch (packet->code) {
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
+		/*
+		 *	The authentication vector is random
+		 *	nonsense, invented by the client.
+		 */
+		break;
+
+	case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+		if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+					   "from client %s with invalid Request Authenticator!  "
+					   "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+					   fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+					   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+						     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+						     buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
+			return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+		/* Verify the reply digest */
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+	case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
+	case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
+	case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
+		rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
+		if (rcode > 1) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+					   "from home server %s port %d with invalid Response Authenticator!  "
+					   "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+					   fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+					   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+						     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+						     buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+					   packet->src_port);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
+				   "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator",
+				   packet->code,
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+				             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+				             buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+				   packet->src_port);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/** Convert one or more NAS-Filter-Rule attributes to one or more
+ * attributes.
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_nas_filter_rule(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+				       DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
+				       size_t const packetlen, VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	uint8_t const *p = start;
+	uint8_t const *attr = start;
+	uint8_t const *end = start + packetlen;
+	uint8_t const *attr_end;
+	uint8_t *q;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	uint8_t buffer[253];
+
+	q = buffer;
+
+	/*
+	 *	The packet has already been sanity checked, so we
+	 *	don't care about walking off of the end of it.
+	 */
+	while (attr < end) {
+		if ((attr + 2) > end) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: Failure (1) to call rad_packet_ok");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (attr[1] < 2) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: Failure (2) to call rad_packet_ok");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (attr[0] != PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE) break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Now decode one, or part of one rule.
+		 */
+		p = attr + 2;
+		attr_end = attr + attr[1];
+
+		if (attr_end > end) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: Failure (3) to call rad_packet_ok");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Coalesce data until the zero byte.
+		 */
+		while (p < attr_end) {
+			/*
+			 *	Once we hit the zero byte, create the
+			 *	VP, skip the zero byte, and reset the
+			 *	counters.
+			 */
+			if (*p == 0) {
+				/*
+				 *	Discard consecutive zeroes.
+				 */
+				if (q > buffer) {
+					vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
+					if (!vp) {
+						fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: Out of memory");
+						return -1;
+					}
+
+					fr_pair_value_bstrncpy(vp, buffer, q - buffer);
+
+					*pvp = vp;
+					pvp = &(vp->next);
+					q = buffer;
+				}
+
+				p++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			*(q++) = *(p++);
+
+			/*
+			 *	Not much reason to have rules which
+			 *	are too long.
+			 */
+			if ((size_t) (q - buffer) > sizeof(buffer)) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: decoded attribute is too long");
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Done this attribute.  There MAY be things left
+		 *	in the buffer.
+		 */
+		attr = attr_end;
+	}
+
+	if (q == buffer) return attr + attr[2] - start;
+
+	vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
+	if (!vp) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("decode NAS-Filter-Rule: Out of memory");
+		return -1;
+	}
+				
+	fr_pair_value_bstrncpy(vp, buffer, q - buffer);
+
+	*pvp = vp;
+
+	return p - start;
+}
+
+/** Convert a "concatenated" attribute to one long VP
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_concat(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+			      DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
+			      size_t const packetlen, VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	size_t total;
+	uint8_t attr;
+	uint8_t const *ptr = start;
+	uint8_t const *end = start + packetlen;
+	uint8_t *p;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+
+	total = 0;
+	attr = ptr[0];
+
+	/*
+	 *	The packet has already been sanity checked, so we
+	 *	don't care about walking off of the end of it.
+	 */
+	while (ptr < end) {
+		if (ptr[1] < 2) return -1;
+		if ((ptr + ptr[1]) > end) return -1;
+
+		total += ptr[1] - 2;
+
+		ptr += ptr[1];
+
+		if (ptr == end) break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Attributes MUST be consecutive.
+		 */
+		if (ptr[0] != attr) break;
+	}
+
+	end = ptr;
+
+	vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
+	if (!vp) return -1;
+
+	vp->vp_length = total;
+	vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->vp_length);
+	if (!p) {
+		fr_pair_list_free(&vp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	total = 0;
+	ptr = start;
+	while (ptr < end) {
+		memcpy(p, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2);
+		p += ptr[1] - 2;
+		total += ptr[1] - 2;
+		ptr += ptr[1];
+	}
+
+	*pvp = vp;
+
+	return ptr - start;
+}
+
+
+/** Convert TLVs to one or more VPs
+ *
+ */
+ssize_t rad_data2vp_tlvs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+			    RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			    char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
+			    uint8_t const *start, size_t length,
+			    VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	uint8_t const *data = start;
+	DICT_ATTR const *child;
+	VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
+
+	if (length < 3) return -1; /* type, length, value */
+
+	VP_HEXDUMP("tlvs", data, length);
+
+	if (rad_tlv_ok(data, length, 1, 1) < 0) return -1;
+
+	head = NULL;
+	tail = &head;
+
+	while (data < (start + length)) {
+		ssize_t tlv_len;
+
+		child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], da->vendor);
+		if (!child) {
+			unsigned int my_attr, my_vendor;
+
+			VP_TRACE("Failed to find child %u of TLV %s\n",
+				 data[0], da->name);
+
+			/*
+			 *	Get child attr/vendor so that
+			 *	we can call unknown attr.
+			 */
+			my_attr = data[0];
+			my_vendor = da->vendor;
+
+			if (!dict_attr_child(da, &my_attr, &my_vendor)) {
+				fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, my_attr, my_vendor);
+			if (!child) {
+				fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		tlv_len = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				  data + 2, data[1] - 2, data[1] - 2, tail);
+		if (tlv_len < 0) {
+			fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+		data += data[1];
+	}
+
+	*pvp = head;
+	return length;
+}
+
+/** Convert a top-level VSA to a VP.
+ *
+ * "length" can be LONGER than just this sub-vsa.
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_vsa(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+			   RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			   char const *secret, DICT_VENDOR *dv,
+			   uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
+			   VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	unsigned int attribute;
+	ssize_t attrlen, my_len;
+	DICT_ATTR const *da;
+
+	VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsa: length %u\n", (unsigned int) length);
+
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+	if (length <= (dv->type + dv->length)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	switch (dv->type) {
+	case 4:
+		/* data[0] must be zero */
+		attribute = data[1] << 16;
+		attribute |= data[2] << 8;
+		attribute |= data[3];
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		attribute = data[0] << 8;
+		attribute |= data[1];
+		break;
+
+	case 1:
+		attribute = data[0];
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (dv->length) {
+	case 2:
+		/* data[dv->type] must be zero, from rad_tlv_ok() */
+		attrlen = data[dv->type + 1];
+		break;
+
+	case 1:
+		attrlen = data[dv->type];
+		break;
+
+	case 0:
+		attrlen = length;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	See if the VSA is known.
+	 */
+	da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, dv->vendorpec);
+	if (!da) da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, attribute, dv->vendorpec);
+	if (!da) return -1;
+
+	my_len = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
+			 data + dv->type + dv->length,
+			 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
+			 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
+			 pvp);
+	if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
+
+	return attrlen;
+}
+
+
+/** Convert a fragmented extended attr to a VP
+ *
+ * Format is:
+ *
+ * attr
+ * length
+ * extended-attr
+ * flag
+ * data...
+ *
+ * But for the first fragment, we get passed a pointer to the "extended-attr"
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_extended(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+				RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+				char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
+				uint8_t const *data,
+				size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
+				VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	ssize_t rcode;
+	size_t ext_len;
+	bool more;
+	uint8_t *head, *tail;
+	uint8_t const *attr, *end;
+	DICT_ATTR const *child;
+
+	/*
+	 *	data = Ext-Attr Flag ...
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Not enough room for Ext-Attr + Flag + data, it's a bad
+	 *	attribute.
+	 */
+	if (attrlen < 3) {
+	raw:
+		/*
+		 *	It's not an Extended attribute, it's unknown...
+		 */
+		child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, (da->vendor/ FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff, 0);
+		if (!child) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				data, attrlen, attrlen, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
+		return attrlen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	No continued data, just decode the attribute in place.
+	 */
+	if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
+				data + 2, attrlen - 2, attrlen - 2,
+				pvp);
+
+		if ((rcode < 0) || (((size_t) rcode + 2) != attrlen)) goto raw; /* didn't decode all of the data */
+		return attrlen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	It's continued, but there are no subsequent fragments,
+	 *	it's bad.
+	 */
+	if (attrlen >= packetlen) goto raw;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Calculate the length of all of the fragments.  For
+	 *	now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
+	 *	MUST be all of the same Type and Ext-Type
+	 *
+	 *	We skip the first fragment, which doesn't have a
+	 *	RADIUS attribute header.
+	 */
+	ext_len = attrlen - 2;
+	attr = data + attrlen;
+	end = data + packetlen;
+
+	while (attr < end) {
+		/*
+		 *	Not enough room for Attr + length + Ext-Attr
+		 *	continuation, it's bad.
+		 */
+		if ((end - attr) < 4) goto raw;
+
+		if (attr[1] < 4) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	If the attribute overflows the packet, it's
+		 *	bad.
+		 */
+		if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) goto raw;
+
+		if (attr[0] != ((da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff)) goto raw; /* not the same Extended-Attribute-X */
+
+		if (attr[2] != data[0]) goto raw; /* Not the same Ext-Attr */
+
+		/*
+		 *	Check the continuation flag.
+		 */
+		more = ((attr[2] & 0x80) != 0);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Or, there's no more data, in which case we
+		 *	shorten "end" to finish at this attribute.
+		 */
+		if (!more) end = attr + attr[1];
+
+		/*
+		 *	There's more data, but we're at the end of the
+		 *	packet.  The attribute is malformed!
+		 */
+		if (more && ((attr + attr[1]) == end)) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Add in the length of the data we need to
+		 *	concatenate together.
+		 */
+		ext_len += attr[1] - 4;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Go to the next attribute, and stop if there's
+		 *	no more.
+		 */
+		attr += attr[1];
+		if (!more) break;
+	}
+
+	if (!ext_len) goto raw;
+
+	head = tail = malloc(ext_len);
+	if (!head) goto raw;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Copy the data over, this time trusting the attribute
+	 *	contents.
+	 */
+	attr = data;
+	memcpy(tail, attr + 2, attrlen - 2);
+	tail += attrlen - 2;
+	attr += attrlen;
+
+	while (attr < end) {
+		if (attr[1] > 4) memcpy(tail, attr + 4, attr[1] - 4);
+		tail += attr[1] - 4;
+		attr += attr[1]; /* skip VID+WiMax header */
+	}
+
+	VP_HEXDUMP("long-extended fragments", head, ext_len);
+
+	rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
+			head, ext_len, ext_len, pvp);
+	free(head);
+	if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+
+	return end - data;
+}
+
+/** Convert a Vendor-Specific WIMAX to VPs
+ *
+ * @note Called ONLY for Vendor-Specific
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_wimax(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+			     RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			     char const *secret, uint32_t vendor,
+			     uint8_t const *data,
+			     size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
+			     VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	ssize_t rcode;
+	size_t wimax_len;
+	bool more;
+	uint8_t *head, *tail;
+	uint8_t const *attr, *end;
+	DICT_ATTR const *child;
+
+	/*
+	 *	data = VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Not enough room for WiMAX Vendor + Wimax attr + length
+	 *	+ continuation, it's a bad attribute.
+	 */
+	if (attrlen < 8) {
+	raw:		
+		/*
+		 *	It's not a Vendor-Specific, it's unknown...
+		 */
+		child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC, 0);
+		if (!child) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				data, attrlen, attrlen, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
+		return attrlen;
+	}
+
+	if (data[5] < 3) goto raw;		/* WiMAX-Length is too small */
+
+	child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
+	if (!child) goto raw;
+
+	/*
+	 *	No continued data, just decode the attribute in place.
+	 */
+	if ((data[6] & 0x80) == 0) {
+		if (((size_t) (data[5] + 4)) != attrlen) goto raw; /* WiMAX attribute doesn't fill Vendor-Specific */
+
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				data + 7, data[5] - 3, data[5] - 3,
+				pvp);
+
+		if ((rcode < 0) || (((size_t) rcode + 7) != attrlen)) goto raw; /* didn't decode all of the data */
+		return attrlen;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Calculate the length of all of the fragments.  For
+	 *	now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
+	 *	MUST be all of the same VSA, WiMAX, and WiMAX-attr.
+	 *
+	 *	The first fragment doesn't have a RADIUS attribute
+	 *	header.
+	 */
+	wimax_len = 0;
+	attr = data + 4;
+	end = data + packetlen;
+
+	while (attr < end) {
+		/*
+		 *	Not enough room for Attribute + length +
+		 *	continuation, it's bad.
+		 */
+		if ((end - attr) < 3) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Must have non-zero data in the attribute.
+		 */
+		if (attr[1] <= 3) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	If the WiMAX attribute overflows the packet,
+		 *	it's bad.
+		 */
+		if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Check the continuation flag.
+		 */
+		more = ((attr[2] & 0x80) != 0);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Or, there's no more data, in which case we
+		 *	shorten "end" to finish at this attribute.
+		 */
+		if (!more) end = attr + attr[1];
+
+		/*
+		 *	There's more data, but we're at the end of the
+		 *	packet.  The attribute is malformed!
+		 */
+		if (more && ((attr + attr[1]) == end)) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Add in the length of the data we need to
+		 *	concatenate together.
+		 */
+		wimax_len += attr[1] - 3;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Go to the next attribute, and stop if there's
+		 *	no more.
+		 */
+		attr += attr[1];
+		if (!more) break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	data = VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
+		 *
+		 *	attr = Vendor-Specific VSA-Length VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
+		 *
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 *	No room for Vendor-Specific + length +
+		 *	Vendor(4) + attr + length + continuation + data
+		 */
+		if ((end - attr) < 9) goto raw;
+
+		if (attr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) goto raw;
+		if (attr[1] < 9) goto raw;
+		if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) goto raw;
+		if (memcmp(data, attr + 2, 4) != 0) goto raw; /* not WiMAX Vendor ID */
+
+		if (attr[1] != (attr[7] + 6)) goto raw; /* WiMAX attr doesn't exactly fill the VSA */
+
+		if (data[4] != attr[6]) goto raw; /* different WiMAX attribute */
+
+		/*
+		 *	Skip over the Vendor-Specific header, and
+		 *	continue with the WiMAX attributes.
+		 */
+		attr += 6;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	No data in the WiMAX attribute, make a "raw" one.
+	 */
+	if (!wimax_len) goto raw;
+
+	head = tail = malloc(wimax_len);
+	if (!head) return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Copy the data over, this time trusting the attribute
+	 *	contents.
+	 */
+	attr = data;
+	while (attr < end) {
+		memcpy(tail, attr + 4 + 3, attr[4 + 1] - 3);
+		tail += attr[4 + 1] - 3;
+		attr += 4 + attr[4 + 1]; /* skip VID+WiMax header */
+		attr += 2;		 /* skip Vendor-Specific header */
+	}
+
+	VP_HEXDUMP("wimax fragments", head, wimax_len);
+
+	rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+			head, wimax_len, wimax_len, pvp);
+	free(head);
+	if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+
+	return end - data;
+}
+
+
+/** Convert a top-level VSA to one or more VPs
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t data2vp_vsas(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+			    RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+			    char const *secret, uint8_t const *data,
+			    size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
+			    VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	size_t total;
+	ssize_t rcode;
+	uint32_t vendor;
+	DICT_VENDOR *dv;
+	VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
+	DICT_VENDOR my_dv;
+
+	if (attrlen > packetlen) return -1;
+	if (attrlen < 5) return -1; /* vid, value */
+	if (data[0] != 0) return -1; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
+
+	VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas\n");
+
+	memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
+	vendor = ntohl(vendor);
+	dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
+	if (!dv) {
+		/*
+		 *	RFC format is 1 octet type, 1 octet length
+		 */
+		if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4, 1, 1) < 0) {
+			VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas: unknown tlvs not OK: %s\n", fr_strerror());
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	It's a known unknown.
+		 */
+		memset(&my_dv, 0, sizeof(my_dv));
+		dv = &my_dv;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Fill in the fields.  Note that the name is empty!
+		 */
+		dv->vendorpec = vendor;
+		dv->type = 1;
+		dv->length = 1;
+
+		goto create_attrs;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	WiMAX craziness
+	 */
+	if (dv->flags) {
+		rcode = data2vp_wimax(ctx, packet, original, secret, vendor,
+				      data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
+		return rcode;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	VSAs should normally be in TLV format.
+	 */
+	if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4,
+		       dv->type, dv->length) < 0) {
+		VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas: tlvs not OK: %s\n", fr_strerror());
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	There may be more than one VSA in the
+	 *	Vendor-Specific.  If so, loop over them all.
+	 */
+create_attrs:
+	data += 4;
+	attrlen -= 4;
+	packetlen -= 4;
+	total = 4;
+	head = NULL;
+	tail = &head;
+
+	while (attrlen > 0) {
+		ssize_t vsa_len;
+
+		vsa_len = data2vp_vsa(ctx, packet, original, secret, dv,
+				      data, attrlen, tail);
+		if (vsa_len < 0) {
+			fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Vendors can send zero-length VSAs.
+		 */
+		if (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+
+		data += vsa_len;
+		attrlen -= vsa_len;
+		packetlen -= vsa_len;
+		total += vsa_len;
+	}
+
+	*pvp = head;
+	return total;
+}
+
+/** Create any kind of VP from the attribute contents
+ *
+ * "length" is AT LEAST the length of this attribute, as we
+ * expect the caller to have verified the data with
+ * rad_packet_ok().  "length" may be up to the length of the
+ * packet.
+ *
+ * @return -1 on error, or "length".
+ */
+ssize_t data2vp(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+		RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		char const *secret,
+		DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
+		size_t const attrlen, size_t const packetlen,
+		VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	int8_t tag = TAG_NONE;
+	size_t datalen;
+	ssize_t rcode;
+	uint32_t vendor;
+	DICT_ATTR const *child;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	uint8_t const *data = start;
+	char *p;
+	uint8_t buffer[256];
+
+	/*
+	 *	FIXME: Attrlen can be larger than 253 for extended attrs!
+	 */
+	if (!da || (attrlen > packetlen) ||
+	    ((attrlen > 253) && (attrlen != packetlen)) ||
+	    (attrlen > 128*1024)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("data2vp: invalid arguments");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	VP_HEXDUMP("data2vp", start, attrlen);
+
+	VP_TRACE("parent %s len %zu ... %zu\n", da->name, attrlen, packetlen);
+
+	datalen = attrlen;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hacks for CUI.  The WiMAX spec says that it can be
+	 *	zero length, even though this is forbidden by the
+	 *	RADIUS specs.  So... we make a special case for it.
+	 */
+	if (attrlen == 0) {
+		if (!((da->vendor == 0) &&
+		      (da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY))) {
+			*pvp = NULL;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Create a zero-length attribute.
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
+		if (!vp) return -1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hacks for tags.  If the attribute is capable of
+	 *	encoding a tag, and there's room for the tag, and
+	 *	there is a tag, or it's encrypted with Tunnel-Password,
+	 *	then decode the tag.
+	 */
+	if (da->flags.has_tag && (datalen > 1) &&
+	    ((data[0] < 0x20)
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	     || (da->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD)
+#endif
+		    )) {
+
+		/*
+		 *	Only "short" attributes can be encrypted.
+		 */
+		if (datalen >= sizeof(buffer)) return -1;
+
+		if (da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data + 1, datalen - 1);
+			tag = data[0];
+			datalen -= 1;
+
+		} else if (da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
+			tag = buffer[0];
+			buffer[0] = 0;
+
+		} else {
+			return -1; /* only string and integer can have tags */
+		}
+
+		data = buffer;
+	}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+	/*
+	 *	Decrypt the attribute.
+	 */
+	if (secret && packet &&
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	    /*
+	     *	RADIUSV11 does not encrypt any attributes.
+	     */
+	    !packet->radiusv11 &&
+#endif
+
+	    (da->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE)) {
+		VP_TRACE("data2vp: decrypting type %u\n", da->flags.encrypt);
+		/*
+		 *	Encrypted attributes can only exist for the
+		 *	old-style format.  Extended attributes CANNOT
+		 *	be encrypted.
+		 */
+		if (attrlen > 253) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (data == start) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
+		}
+		data = buffer;
+
+		switch (da->flags.encrypt) { /* can't be tagged */
+		/*
+		 *  User-Password
+		 */
+		case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
+			if (original) {
+				rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
+					     attrlen, secret,
+					     original->vector);
+			} else {
+				rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
+					     attrlen, secret,
+					     packet->vector);
+			}
+			buffer[253] = '\0';
+
+			/*
+			 *	MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys are 24 octets, and
+			 *	encrypted.  Since it's binary, we can't
+			 *	look for trailing zeros.
+			 */
+			if (da->flags.length) {
+				if (datalen > da->flags.length) {
+					datalen = da->flags.length;
+				} /* else leave datalen alone */
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 *	Take off trailing zeros from the END.
+				 *	This allows passwords to have zeros in
+				 *	the middle of a field.
+				 *
+				 *	However, if the password has a zero at
+				 *	the end, it will get mashed by this
+				 *	code.  There's really no way around
+				 *	that.
+				 */
+				while ((datalen > 0) && (buffer[datalen - 1] == '\0')) datalen--;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY in response
+		 *	packets.  They can have a tag, so datalen is
+		 *	not the same as attrlen.
+		 */
+		case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
+			if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(buffer, &datalen, secret,
+						original ? original->vector : nullvector) < 0) {
+				goto raw;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 *  Ascend-Send-Secret
+		 *  Ascend-Receive-Secret
+		 */
+		case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
+			if (!original) {
+				goto raw;
+			} else {
+				uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+				size_t secret_len;
+
+				secret_len = datalen;
+				if (secret_len > AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) secret_len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
+
+				make_secret(my_digest,
+					    original->vector,
+					    secret, data, secret_len);
+				memcpy(buffer, my_digest,
+				       AUTH_VECTOR_LEN );
+				buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
+				datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		} /* switch over encryption flags */
+	}
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Double-check the length after decrypting the
+	 *	attribute.
+	 */
+	VP_TRACE("data2vp: type %u\n", da->type);
+	switch (da->type) {
+	case PW_TYPE_STRING:
+	case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
+		if (datalen > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_DATE:
+	case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+		if (datalen != 4) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
+	case PW_TYPE_IFID:
+		if (datalen != 8) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
+		if (datalen != 16) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
+		if ((datalen < 2) || (datalen > 18)) goto raw;
+		if (data[1] > 128) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+		if (datalen != 1) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+		if (datalen != 2) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
+		if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR:
+		if (datalen == 4) {
+			child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
+						PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR);
+		} else if (datalen == 16) {
+			child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
+					     PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR);
+		} else {
+			goto raw;
+		}
+		if (!child) goto raw;
+		da = child;	/* re-write it */
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
+		if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
+		if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) goto raw;
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	The rest of the data types can cause
+		 *	recursion!  Ask yourself, "is recursion OK?"
+		 */
+
+	case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
+		if (datalen < 2) goto raw; /* etype, value */
+
+		child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
+		if (!child) goto raw;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Recurse to decode the contents, which could be
+		 *	a TLV, IPaddr, etc.  Note that we decode only
+		 *	the current attribute, and we ignore any extra
+		 *	data after it.
+		 */
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				data + 1, attrlen - 1, attrlen - 1, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+		return 1 + rcode;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
+		if (datalen < 3) goto raw; /* etype, flags, value */
+
+		child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
+		if (!child) {
+			if ((data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
+			    (datalen < (3 + 4 + 1))) {
+				/* da->attr < 255, da->vendor == 0 */
+				child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[0], da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR);
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 *	Try to find the VSA.
+				 */
+				memcpy(&vendor, data + 3, 4);
+				vendor = ntohl(vendor);
+
+				if (vendor == 0) goto raw;
+
+				child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[7], vendor | (da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR));
+			}
+
+			if (!child) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	This requires a whole lot more work.
+		 */
+		return data2vp_extended(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+					start, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
+
+	case PW_TYPE_EVS:
+		if (datalen < 6) goto raw; /* vid, vtype, value */
+
+		if (data[0] != 0) goto raw; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
+
+		memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
+		vendor = ntohl(vendor);
+		vendor |= da->vendor;
+
+		child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
+		if (!child) {
+			/*
+			 *	Create a "raw" attribute from the
+			 *	contents of the EVS VSA.
+			 */
+			da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[4], vendor);
+			data += 5;
+			datalen -= 5;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
+				data + 5, attrlen - 5, attrlen - 5, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+		return 5 + rcode;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_TLV:
+		/*
+		 *	We presume that the TLVs all fit into one
+		 *	attribute, OR they've already been grouped
+		 *	into a contiguous memory buffer.
+		 */
+		rcode = rad_data2vp_tlvs(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
+					 data, attrlen, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+		return rcode;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_VSA:
+		/*
+		 *	VSAs can be WiMAX, in which case they don't
+		 *	fit into one attribute.
+		 */
+		rcode = data2vp_vsas(ctx, packet, original, secret,
+				     data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
+		if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
+		return rcode;
+
+	default:
+	raw:
+		/*
+		 *	If it's already unknown, don't create a new
+		 *	unknown one.
+		 */
+		if (da->flags.is_unknown) break;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Re-write the attribute to be "raw".  It is
+		 *	therefore of type "octets", and will be
+		 *	handled below.
+		 *
+		 *      We allocate the VP *first*, and then the da
+		 *      from it, so that there are no memory leaks.
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_alloc(ctx);
+		if (!vp) return -1;
+
+		da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(vp, da->attr, da->vendor);
+		if (!da) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		tag = TAG_NONE;
+		vp->da = da;
+		goto alloc_raw;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	And now that we've verified the basic type
+	 *	information, decode the actual data.
+	 */
+	vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
+	if (!vp) return -1;
+
+alloc_raw:
+	vp->vp_length = datalen;
+	vp->tag = tag;
+
+	switch (da->type) {
+	case PW_TYPE_STRING:
+		p = talloc_array(vp, char, vp->vp_length + 1);
+#ifdef __clang_analyzer__
+		if (!p) goto fail;
+#endif
+		memcpy(p, data, vp->vp_length);
+		p[vp->vp_length] = '\0';
+		vp->vp_strvalue = p;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, data, vp->vp_length);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
+		if (vp->vp_length > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) {
+			vp->vp_length = sizeof(vp->vp_filter);
+		}
+		memcpy(vp->vp_filter, data, vp->vp_length);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+		vp->vp_byte = data[0];
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+		vp->vp_short = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, 4);
+		vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_integer64, data, 8);
+		vp->vp_integer64 = ntohll(vp->vp_integer64);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_DATE:
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_date, data, 4);
+		vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
+		memcpy(vp->vp_ether, data, 6);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, data, 4);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IFID:
+		memcpy(vp->vp_ifid, data, 8);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6addr, data, 16);
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
+		/*
+		 *	FIXME: double-check that
+		 *	(vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->vp_length + 2
+		 */
+		memcpy(vp->vp_ipv6prefix, data, vp->vp_length);
+		if (vp->vp_length < 18) {
+			memset(((uint8_t *)vp->vp_ipv6prefix) + vp->vp_length, 0,
+			       18 - vp->vp_length);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
+		/* FIXME: do the same double-check as for IPv6Prefix */
+		memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix, data, vp->vp_length);
+
+		/*
+		 *	/32 means "keep all bits".  Otherwise, mask
+		 *	them out.
+		 */
+		if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) {
+			uint32_t addr, mask;
+
+			memcpy(&addr, vp->vp_octets + 2, sizeof(addr));
+			mask = 1;
+			mask <<= (32 - (data[1] & 0x3f));
+			mask--;
+			mask = ~mask;
+			mask = htonl(mask);
+			addr &= mask;
+			memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix + 2, &addr, sizeof(addr));
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:	/* overloaded with vp_integer */
+		memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, 4);
+		vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef __clang_analyzer__
+	fail:
+#endif
+	default:
+		fr_pair_list_free(&vp);
+		fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+done:
+	vp->type = VT_DATA;
+	*pvp = vp;
+
+	return attrlen;
+}
+
+
+/** Create a "normal" VALUE_PAIR from the given data
+ *
+ */
+ssize_t rad_attr2vp(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+		    RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
+		    char const *secret,
+		    uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
+		    VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
+{
+	ssize_t rcode;
+
+	DICT_ATTR const *da;
+
+	if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp: Insufficient data");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	da = dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], 0);
+	if (!da) {
+		VP_TRACE("attr2vp: unknown attribute %u\n", data[0]);
+		da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[0], 0);
+	}
+	if (!da) return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Pass the entire thing to the decoding function
+	 */
+	if (da->flags.concat) {
+		VP_TRACE("attr2vp: concat attribute\n");
+		return data2vp_concat(ctx, da, data, length, pvp);
+	}
+
+	if (!da->vendor && (da->attr == PW_NAS_FILTER_RULE)) {
+		VP_TRACE("attr2vp: NAS-Filter-Rule attribute\n");
+		return data2vp_nas_filter_rule(ctx, da, data, length, pvp);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Note that we pass the entire length, not just the
+	 *	length of this attribute.  The Extended or WiMAX
+	 *	attributes may have the "continuation" bit set, and
+	 *	will thus be more than one attribute in length.
+	 */
+	rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
+			data + 2, data[1] - 2, length - 2, pvp);
+	if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
+
+	return 2 + rcode;
+}
+
+fr_thread_local_setup(uint8_t *, rad_vp2data_buff)
+
+/** Converts vp_data to network byte order
+ *
+ * Provide a pointer to a buffer which contains the value of the VALUE_PAIR
+ * in an architecture independent format.
+ *
+ * The pointer is only guaranteed to be valid between calls to rad_vp2data, and so long
+ * as the source VALUE_PAIR is not freed.
+ *
+ * @param out where to write the pointer to the value.
+ * @param vp to get the value from.
+ * @return -1 on error, or the length of the value
+ */
+ssize_t rad_vp2data(uint8_t const **out, VALUE_PAIR const *vp)
+{
+	uint8_t		*buffer;
+	uint32_t	lvalue;
+	uint64_t	lvalue64;
+
+	*out = NULL;
+
+	buffer = fr_thread_local_init(rad_vp2data_buff, free);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		int ret;
+
+		buffer = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * sizeof(value_data_t));
+		if (!buffer) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Failed allocating memory for rad_vp2data buffer");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		ret = fr_thread_local_set(rad_vp2data_buff, buffer);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			fr_strerror_printf("Failed setting up TLS for rad_vp2data buffer: %s", strerror(errno));
+			free(buffer);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	VERIFY_VP(vp);
+
+	switch (vp->da->type) {
+	case PW_TYPE_STRING:
+	case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
+		memcpy(out, &vp->data.ptr, sizeof(*out));
+		break;
+
+	/*
+	 *	All of these values are at the same location.
+	 */
+	case PW_TYPE_IFID:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
+	case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
+	case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
+	case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
+	case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR:
+	case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_PREFIX:
+	{
+		void const *p = &vp->data;
+		memcpy(out, &p, sizeof(*out));
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+		buffer[0] = vp->vp_byte & 0x01;
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+		buffer[0] = vp->vp_byte & 0xff;
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+		buffer[0] = (vp->vp_short >> 8) & 0xff;
+		buffer[1] = vp->vp_short & 0xff;
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
+		lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
+		memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
+		lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
+		memcpy(buffer, &lvalue64, sizeof(lvalue64));
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_DATE:
+		lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
+		memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+
+	case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+	{
+		int32_t slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
+		memcpy(buffer, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
+		*out = buffer;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case PW_TYPE_INVALID:
+	case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
+	case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
+	case PW_TYPE_EVS:
+	case PW_TYPE_VSA:
+	case PW_TYPE_TLV:
+	case PW_TYPE_TIMEVAL:
+	case PW_TYPE_MAX:
+		fr_strerror_printf("Cannot get data for VALUE_PAIR type %i", vp->da->type);
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Don't add default */
+	}
+
+	return vp->vp_length;
+}
+
+/** Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes
+ *
+ * @return -1 on decoding error, 0 on success
+ */
+int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+	       char const *secret)
+{
+	int			packet_length;
+	uint32_t		num_attributes;
+	uint8_t			*ptr;
+	radius_packet_t		*hdr;
+	VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail, *vp = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Extract attribute-value pairs
+	 */
+	hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
+	ptr = hdr->data;
+	packet_length = packet->data_len - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
+
+	head = NULL;
+	tail = &head;
+	num_attributes = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Loop over the attributes, decoding them into VPs.
+	 */
+	while (packet_length > 0) {
+		ssize_t my_len;
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+		/*
+		 *	Don't decode Message-Authenticator
+		 */
+		if (ptr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
+			packet_length -= ptr[1];
+			ptr += ptr[1];
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	Don't decode Original-Packet-Code
+		 */
+		if ((ptr[0] == PW_EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTE_1) && (ptr[1] >= 3) && (ptr[2] == 4)) {
+			packet_length -= ptr[1];
+			ptr += ptr[1];
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 *	This may return many VPs
+		 */
+		my_len = rad_attr2vp(packet, packet, original, secret,
+				     ptr, packet_length, &vp);
+		if (my_len < 0) {
+			fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		*tail = vp;
+		while (vp) {
+			num_attributes++;
+			tail = &(vp->next);
+			vp = vp->next;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	VSA's may not have been counted properly in
+		 *	rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
+		 *	then without using the dictionary.  We
+		 *	therefore enforce the limits here, too.
+		 */
+		if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+		    (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
+			char host_ipaddr[128];
+
+			fr_pair_list_free(&head);
+			fr_strerror_printf("Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+				   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+					     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+					     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+				   num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		ptr += my_len;
+		packet_length -= my_len;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Merge information from the outside world into our
+	 *	random pool.
+	 */
+	fr_rand_seed(packet->data, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);
+
+	/*
+	 *	There may be VP's already in the packet.  Don't
+	 *	destroy them.  Instead, add the decoded attributes to
+	 *	the tail of the list.
+	 */
+	for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
+		/* nothing */
+	}
+	*tail = head;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLY
+/** Encode password
+ *
+ * We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
+ * RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
+ * of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
+ * Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
+ *
+ * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
+ * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
+ */
+int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
+		 uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+	uint8_t	digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	int	i, n, secretlen;
+	int	len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
+	 *
+	 *	If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
+	 *
+	 *	If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
+	 *	zero out the extra data.
+	 */
+	len = *pwlen;
+
+	if (len > 128) len = 128;
+
+	if (len == 0) {
+		memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+		len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+	} else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
+		memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
+		len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+	}
+	*pwlen = len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+	 */
+	secretlen = strlen(secret);
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_init(&old);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
+	fr_md5_copy(old, context);		/* save intermediate work */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Encrypt it in place.  Don't bother checking
+	 *	len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
+	 */
+	for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		if (n == 0) {
+			fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+		} else {
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			fr_md5_update(&context,
+				     (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
+				     AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+			passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	fr_md5_destroy(&old);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Decode password
+ *
+ */
+int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, char const *secret,
+		 uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+	uint8_t	digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	int	i;
+	size_t	n, secretlen;
+
+	/*
+	 *	The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
+	 *	The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
+	 *	we don't need to do any length checking.
+	 */
+	if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Catch idiots.
+	 */
+	if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+	 */
+	secretlen = strlen(secret);
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_init(&old);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
+	fr_md5_copy(old, context);		/* save intermediate work */
+
+	/*
+	 *	The inverse of the code above.
+	 */
+	for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		if (n == 0) {
+			fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+				fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
+					     AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+			}
+		} else {
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
+				fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
+					     AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+			passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+ done:
+	fr_md5_destroy(&old);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+	passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
+	return strlen(passwd);
+}
+
+
+/** Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire
+ *
+ * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
+ * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
+ *
+ * This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
+ * value MD5 hash.
+ */
+ssize_t rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	uint8_t	buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
+	unsigned char	digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	char*   salt;
+	int	i, n, secretlen;
+	unsigned len, n2;
+
+	len = *pwlen;
+
+	if (len > 127) len = 127;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
+	 *	length, tag will be added automatically on packet send.
+	 */
+	for (n = len ; n >= 0 ; n--) passwd[n + 3] = passwd[n];
+	salt = passwd;
+	passwd += 2;
+
+	/*
+	 *	save original password length as first password character;
+	 */
+	*passwd = len;
+	len += 1;
+
+
+	/*
+	 *	Generate salt.  The RFC's say:
+	 *
+	 *	The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
+	 *	packet should be unique, and they should be random
+	 *
+	 *	So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
+	 *	add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
+	 */
+	salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
+		   (fr_rand() & 0x07));
+	salt[1] = fr_rand();
+
+	/*
+	 *	Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
+	 */
+	n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+	if (n) {
+		n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
+		for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
+			passwd[len] = 0;
+	}
+	/* set new password length */
+	*pwlen = len + 2;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+	 */
+	secretlen = strlen(secret);
+	memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
+
+	for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		if (!n2) {
+			memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+			memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
+			fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
+		} else {
+			memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+			fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+			passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+	passwd[n2] = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes
+ *
+ * Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
+ * initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
+ * above.
+ */
+ssize_t rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
+{
+	FR_MD5_CTX  context, old;
+	uint8_t		digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+	int		secretlen;
+	size_t		i, n, encrypted_len, reallen;
+
+	encrypted_len = *pwlen;
+
+	/*
+	 *	We need at least a salt.
+	 */
+	if (encrypted_len < 2) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	There's a salt, but no password.  Or, there's a salt
+	 *	and a 'data_len' octet.  It's wrong, but at least we
+	 *	can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
+	 *
+	 *	Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
+	 *	if the attribute length tells us that there's no
+	 *	more data.  So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
+	 *	but that's ok...
+	 */
+	if (encrypted_len <= 3) {
+		passwd[0] = 0;
+		*pwlen = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	encrypted_len -= 2;		/* discount the salt */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+	 */
+	secretlen = strlen(secret);
+
+	fr_md5_init(&context);
+	fr_md5_init(&old);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
+	fr_md5_copy(old, context);		/* save intermediate work */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Set up the initial key:
+	 *
+	 *	 b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
+	 */
+	fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+	fr_md5_update(&context, passwd, 2);
+
+	reallen = 0;
+	for (n = 0; n < encrypted_len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+		size_t base;
+		size_t block_len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Ensure we don't overflow the input on MD5
+		 */
+		if ((n + 2 + AUTH_PASS_LEN) > *pwlen) {
+			block_len = *pwlen - n - 2;
+		}
+
+		if (n == 0) {
+			base = 1;
+
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+
+			/*
+			 *	A quick check: decrypt the first octet
+			 *	of the password, which is the
+			 *	'data_len' field.  Ensure it's sane.
+			 */
+			reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
+			if (reallen > encrypted_len) {
+				fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			fr_md5_update(&context, passwd + 2, block_len);
+
+		} else {
+			base = 0;
+
+			fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
+
+			fr_md5_copy(context, old);
+			fr_md5_update(&context, passwd + n + 2, block_len);
+		}
+
+		for (i = base; i < block_len; i++) {
+			passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
+		}
+	}
+
+	*pwlen = reallen;
+	passwd[reallen] = 0;
+
+	fr_md5_destroy(&old);
+	fr_md5_destroy(&context);
+
+	return reallen;
+}
+
+/** Encode a CHAP password
+ *
+ * @bug FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
+ * we use vp->vp_length, and Ascend gear likes
+ * to send an extra '\0' in the string!
+ */
+int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
+		    VALUE_PAIR *password)
+{
+	int		i;
+	uint8_t		*ptr;
+	uint8_t		string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
+	VALUE_PAIR	*challenge;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Sanity check the input parameters
+	 */
+	if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Note that the password VP can be EITHER
+	 *	a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
+	 *	or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
+	 *	the library to encode it).
+	 */
+
+	i = 0;
+	ptr = string;
+	*ptr++ = id;
+
+	i++;
+	memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->vp_length);
+	ptr += password->vp_length;
+	i += password->vp_length;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
+	 *	Request Authenticator otherwise.
+	 */
+	challenge = fr_pair_find_by_num(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (challenge) {
+		memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->vp_length);
+		i += challenge->vp_length;
+	} else {
+		memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+		i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
+	}
+
+	*output = id;
+	fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* WITH_RADIUSV11_ONLYx */
+
+
+/** Seed the random number generator
+ *
+ * May be called any number of times.
+ */
+void fr_rand_seed(void const *data, size_t size)
+{
+	uint32_t hash;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Ensure that the pool is initialized.
+	 */
+	if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
+		int fd;
+
+		memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
+
+		fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+		if (fd >= 0) {
+			size_t total;
+			ssize_t this;
+
+			total = 0;
+			while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
+				this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
+					    sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
+				if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
+				if (this > 0) total += this;
+			}
+			close(fd);
+		} else {
+			fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
+			fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
+			fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
+		}
+
+		fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
+		fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
+		fr_rand_initialized = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!data) return;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Hash the user data
+	 */
+	hash = fr_rand();
+	if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
+	hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
+
+	fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt & 0xff] ^= hash;
+}
+
+
+/** Return a 32-bit random number
+ *
+ */
+uint32_t fr_rand(void)
+{
+	uint32_t num;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Ensure that the pool is initialized.
+	 */
+	if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
+		fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++ & 0xff];
+	if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
+		fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
+		fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
+	}
+
+	return num;
+}
+
+
+/** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
+ *
+ * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
+ *	the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
+ * @param new_vector if true a new request authenticator will be generated.
+ * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
+ */
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, bool new_vector)
+{
+	RADIUS_PACKET	*rp;
+
+	rp = talloc_zero(ctx, RADIUS_PACKET);
+	if (!rp) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	rp->id = -1;
+	rp->offset = -1;
+
+	if (new_vector) {
+		int i;
+		uint32_t hash, base;
+
+		/*
+		 *	Don't expose the actual contents of the random
+		 *	pool.
+		 */
+		base = fr_rand();
+		for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+			hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
+			memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
+		}
+	}
+	fr_rand();		/* stir the pool again */
+
+	return rp;
+}
+
+/** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET response
+ *
+ * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
+ *	the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
+ * @param packet The request packet.
+ * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
+ */
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
+{
+	RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
+
+	if (!packet) return NULL;
+
+	reply = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
+	if (!reply) return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Initialize the fields from the request.
+	 */
+	reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
+	reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
+	reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
+	reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
+	reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
+	reply->id = packet->id;
+	reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
+	memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
+	       sizeof(reply->vector));
+	reply->vps = NULL;
+	reply->data = NULL;
+	reply->data_len = 0;
+
+#ifdef WITH_TCP
+	reply->proto = packet->proto;
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+	reply->radiusv11 = packet->radiusv11;
+#endif
+#endif
+	return reply;
+}
+
+
+/** Free a RADIUS_PACKET
+ *
+ */
+void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
+{
+	RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
+
+	if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
+	radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
+
+	VERIFY_PACKET(radius_packet);
+
+	fr_pair_list_free(&radius_packet->vps);
+
+	talloc_free(radius_packet);
+	*radius_packet_ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+/** Duplicate a RADIUS_PACKET
+ *
+ * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
+ *	the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
+ * @param in The packet to copy
+ * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
+ */
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_copy_packet(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET const *in)
+{
+	RADIUS_PACKET *out;
+
+	out = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
+	if (!out) return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Bootstrap by copying everything.
+	 */
+	memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
+
+	/*
+	 *	Then reset necessary fields
+	 */
+	out->sockfd = -1;
+
+	out->data = NULL;
+	out->data_len = 0;
+
+	out->vps = fr_pair_list_copy(out, in->vps);
+	out->offset = 0;
+
+	return out;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11
+const FR_NAME_NUMBER radiusv11_types[] = {
+	{ "forbid",	FR_RADIUSV11_FORBID },
+	{ "allow",	FR_RADIUSV11_ALLOW },
+	{ "require",	FR_RADIUSV11_REQUIRE },
+	{ NULL, 0 }
+
+};
+#endif