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Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | src/main/cb.c | 252 |
1 files changed, 252 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/main/cb.c b/src/main/cb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65e484f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/main/cb.c @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * cb.c + * + * Version: $Id$ + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA + * + * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com> + * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project + */ + +RCSID("$Id$") +USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */ + +#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h> + +#ifdef WITH_TLS +void cbtls_info(SSL const *s, int where, int ret) +{ + char const *role, *state; + REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(s, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *) SSL_get_ex_data(s, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + + if ((where & ~SSL_ST_MASK) & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { + role = "Client "; + } else if (((where & ~SSL_ST_MASK)) & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { + role = "Server "; + } else { + role = ""; + } + + state = SSL_state_string_long(s); + state = state ? state : "<none>"; + + if ((where & SSL_CB_LOOP) || (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) || (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)) { + if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) { + char const *abbrv = SSL_state_string(s); + size_t len; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *client_ciphers; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *server_ciphers; +#endif + + /* + * Trim crappy OpenSSL state strings... + */ + len = strlen(abbrv); + if ((len > 1) && (abbrv[len - 1] == ' ')) len--; + + RDEBUG3("(TLS) %s - Handshake state [%.*s] - %s%s (%d)", conf->name, + (int)len, abbrv, role, state, SSL_get_state(s)); + + /* + * After a ClientHello, list all the proposed ciphers from the client + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) { + int i; + int num_ciphers; + const SSL_CIPHER *this_cipher; + + server_ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + if (server_ciphers) { + RDEBUG3("Server preferred ciphers (by priority)"); + num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(server_ciphers); + for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) { + this_cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(server_ciphers, i); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) [%i] %s", i, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(this_cipher)); + } + } + + client_ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(s); + if (client_ciphers) { + RDEBUG3("(TLS) %s - Client preferred ciphers (by priority)", conf->name); + num_ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(client_ciphers); + for (i = 0; i < num_ciphers; i++) { + this_cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(client_ciphers, i); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) [%i] %s", i, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(this_cipher)); + } + } + } +#endif + } else { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) %s - Handshake state - %s%s", conf->name, role, state); + } + return; + } + + if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { + if ((ret & 0xff) == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) return; + + RERROR("(TLS) %s - Alert %s:%s:%s", conf->name, (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read": "write", + SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); + return; + } + + if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { + if (ret == 0) { + RERROR("(TLS) %s - %s: Failed in %s", conf->name, role, state); + return; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + if (SSL_want_read(s)) { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) %s - %s: Need to read more data: %s", conf->name, role, state); + return; + } + if (SSL_want_write(s)) { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) %s - %s: Need to write more data: %s", conf->name, role, state); + return; + } + RERROR("(TLS) %s - %s: Error in %s", conf->name, role, state); + } + } +} + +/* + * Fill in our 'info' with TLS data. + */ +void cbtls_msg(int write_p, int msg_version, int content_type, + void const *inbuf, size_t len, + SSL *ssl UNUSED, void *arg) +{ + uint8_t const *buf = inbuf; + tls_session_t *state = (tls_session_t *)arg; + + /* + * OpenSSL 1.0.2 calls this function with 'pseudo' + * content types. Which breaks our tracking of + * the SSL Session state. + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + if ((msg_version == 0) && (content_type > UINT8_MAX)) { +#else + /* + * "...we do not see the need to resolve application breakage + * just because the documentation now is incorrect." + * + * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/17262 + */ + if ((content_type > UINT8_MAX) && (content_type != SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE)) { +#endif + DEBUG4("(TLS) Ignoring cbtls_msg call with pseudo content type %i, version %08x", + content_type, msg_version); + return; + } + + if ((write_p != 0) && (write_p != 1)) { + DEBUG4("(TLS) Ignoring cbtls_msg call with invalid write_p %d", write_p); + return; + } + + /* + * Work around bug #298, where we may be called with a NULL + * argument. We should really log a serious error + */ + if (!state) return; + + if (rad_debug_lvl > 3) { + size_t i, j, data_len = len; + char buffer[3*16 + 1]; + uint8_t const *in = inbuf; + + DEBUG("(TLS) Received %zu bytes of TLS data", len); + if (data_len > 256) data_len = 256; + + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i += 16) { + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + if ((i + j) >= data_len) break; + + sprintf(buffer + 3 * j, "%02x ", in[i + j]); + } + + DEBUG("(TLS) %s", buffer); + } + } + + /* + * 0 - received (from peer) + * 1 - sending (to peer) + */ + state->info.origin = write_p; + state->info.content_type = content_type; + state->info.record_len = len; + state->info.initialized = true; + + if (content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + state->info.alert_level = buf[0]; + state->info.alert_description = buf[1]; + state->info.handshake_type = 0x00; + + } else if (content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + state->info.handshake_type = buf[0]; + state->info.alert_level = 0x00; + state->info.alert_description = 0x00; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + } else if (content_type == SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE && buf[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + /* let tls_ack_handler set application_data */ + state->info.content_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEARTBEAT + } else if (content_type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { + uint8_t *p = buf; + + if ((len >= 3) && (p[0] == 1)) { + size_t payload_len; + + payload_len = (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; + + if ((payload_len + 3) > len) { + state->invalid_hb_used = true; + ERROR("OpenSSL Heartbeat attack detected. Closing connection"); + return; + } + } +#endif + } + + tls_session_information(state); +} + +int cbtls_password(char *buf, + int num, + int rwflag UNUSED, + void *userdata) +{ + size_t len; + + len = strlcpy(buf, (char *)userdata, num); + if (len >= (size_t) num) { + ERROR("Password too long. Maximum length is %i bytes", num - 1); + return 0; + } + + return len; +} + +#endif |