From af754e596a8dbb05ed8580c342e7fe02e08b28e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2024 16:11:00 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 3.2.3+dfsg. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- src/main/tls.c | 5420 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 5420 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/main/tls.c (limited to 'src/main/tls.c') diff --git a/src/main/tls.c b/src/main/tls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8cae3b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/main/tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,5420 @@ +/* + * tls.c + * + * Version: $Id$ + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA + * + * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. + * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok + * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project + */ + +RCSID("$Id$") +USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef WITH_TLS +# ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H +# include +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H +# include +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H +# include +# endif +# include + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L +# include + +static OSSL_PROVIDER *openssl_default_provider = NULL; +static OSSL_PROVIDER *openssl_legacy_provider = NULL; +#endif + +#define LOG_PREFIX "tls" + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L +#define ERR_get_error_line(_file, _line) ERR_get_error_all(_file, _line, NULL, NULL, NULL) + +#define FIPS_mode(_x) EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) +#define PEM_read_bio_DHparams(_bio, _x, _y, _z) PEM_read_bio_Parameters(_bio, &dh) +#define SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(_ctx, _dh) SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(_ctx, _dh) +#define DH EVP_PKEY +#define DH_free(_dh) +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK +typedef struct libssl_defect { + uint64_t high; + uint64_t low; + + char const *id; + char const *name; + char const *comment; +} libssl_defect_t; + +/* Record critical defects in libssl here, new versions of OpenSSL to older versions of OpenSSL. */ +static libssl_defect_t libssl_defects[] = +{ + { + .low = 0x01010001f, /* 1.1.0a */ + .high = 0x01010001f, /* 1.1.0a */ + .id = "CVE-2016-6309", + .name = "OCSP status request extension", + .comment = "For more information see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160926.txt" + }, + { + .low = 0x01010000f, /* 1.1.0 */ + .high = 0x01010000f, /* 1.1.0 */ + .id = "CVE-2016-6304", + .name = "OCSP status request extension", + .comment = "For more information see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt" + }, + { + .low = 0x01000209f, /* 1.0.2i */ + .high = 0x01000209f, /* 1.0.2i */ + .id = "CVE-2016-7052", + .name = "OCSP status request extension", + .comment = "For more information see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160926.txt" + }, + { + .low = 0x01000200f, /* 1.0.2 */ + .high = 0x01000208f, /* 1.0.2h */ + .id = "CVE-2016-6304", + .name = "OCSP status request extension", + .comment = "For more information see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt" + }, + { + .low = 0x01000100f, /* 1.0.1 */ + .high = 0x01000114f, /* 1.0.1t */ + .id = "CVE-2016-6304", + .name = "OCSP status request extension", + .comment = "For more information see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt" + }, + { + .low = 0x010001000, /* 1.0.1 */ + .high = 0x01000106f, /* 1.0.1f */ + .id = "CVE-2014-0160", + .name = "Heartbleed", + .comment = "For more information see http://heartbleed.com" + }, +}; +#endif /* ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK */ + +FR_NAME_NUMBER const fr_tls_status_table[] = { + { "invalid", FR_TLS_INVALID }, + { "request", FR_TLS_REQUEST }, + { "response", FR_TLS_RESPONSE }, + { "success", FR_TLS_SUCCESS }, + { "fail", FR_TLS_FAIL }, + { "noop", FR_TLS_NOOP }, + + { "start", FR_TLS_START }, + { "ok", FR_TLS_OK }, + { "ack", FR_TLS_ACK }, + { "first fragment", FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT }, + { "more fragments", FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS }, + { "length included", FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED }, + { "more fragments with length", FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH }, + { "handled", FR_TLS_HANDLED }, + { NULL , -1}, +}; + +/* index we use to store cached session VPs + * needs to be dynamic so we can supply a "free" function + */ +int fr_tls_ex_index_vps = -1; +int fr_tls_ex_index_certs = -1; + +/* Session */ +static void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn); +static void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn); + +/* record */ +static void record_init(record_t *buf); +static void record_close(record_t *buf); +static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *buf, void const *ptr, + unsigned int size); +static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *buf, void *ptr, + unsigned int size); + +typedef struct { + char const *name; + SSL_CTX *ctx; +} fr_realm_ctx_t; + +DIAG_OFF(format-nonliteral) +/** Print errors in the TLS thread local error stack + * + * Drains the thread local OpenSSL error queue, and prints out errors. + * + * @param[in] request The current request (may be NULL). + * @param[in] msg Error message describing the operation being attempted. + * @param[in] ap Arguments for msg. + * @return the number of errors drained from the stack. + */ +static int tls_verror_log(REQUEST *request, char const *msg, va_list ap) +{ + unsigned long error; + char *p; + int in_stack = 0; + char buffer[256]; + + int line; + char const *file; + + /* + * Pop the first error, so ERR_peek_error() + * can be used to determine if there are + * multiple errors. + */ + error = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line); + + if (msg) { + p = talloc_vasprintf(request, msg, ap); + + /* + * Single line mode (there's only one error) + */ + if (error && !ERR_peek_error()) { + ERR_error_string_n(error, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + + /* Extra verbose */ + if ((request && RDEBUG_ENABLED3) || DEBUG_ENABLED3) { + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) %s: %s[%i]:%s", p, file, line, buffer); + } else { + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) %s: %s", p, buffer); + } + + talloc_free(p); + + return 1; + } + + /* + * Print the error we were given, irrespective + * of whether there were any OpenSSL errors. + */ + ROPTIONAL(RERROR, ERROR, "(TLS) %s", p); + talloc_free(p); + } + + /* + * Stack mode (there are multiple errors) + */ + if (!error) return 0; + do { + ERR_error_string_n(error, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + /* Extra verbose */ + if ((request && RDEBUG_ENABLED3) || DEBUG_ENABLED3) { + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) %s[%i]:%s", file, line, buffer); + } else { + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) %s", buffer); + } + in_stack++; + } while ((error = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))); + + return in_stack; +} +DIAG_ON(format-nonliteral) + +/** Print errors in the TLS thread local error stack + * + * Drains the thread local OpenSSL error queue, and prints out errors. + * + * @param[in] request The current request (may be NULL). + * @param[in] msg Error message describing the operation being attempted. + * @param[in] ... Arguments for msg. + * @return the number of errors drained from the stack. + */ +int tls_error_log(REQUEST *request, char const *msg, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, msg); + ret = tls_verror_log(request, msg, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return ret; +} + +/** Print errors raised by OpenSSL I/O functions + * + * Drains the thread local OpenSSL error queue, and prints out errors + * based on the SSL handle and the return code of the I/O function. + * + * OpenSSL lists I/O functions to be: + * - SSL_connect + * - SSL_accept + * - SSL_do_handshake + * - SSL_read + * - SSL_peek + * - SSL_write + * + * @param request The current request (may be NULL). + * @param session The current tls_session. + * @param ret from the I/O operation. + * @param msg Error message describing the operation being attempted. + * @param ... Arguments for msg. + * @return + * - 0 TLS session cannot continue. + * - 1 TLS session may still be viable. + */ +int tls_error_io_log(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *session, int ret, char const *msg, ...) +{ + int error; + va_list ap; + + if (ERR_peek_error()) { + va_start(ap, msg); + tls_verror_log(request, msg, ap); + va_end(ap); + } + + error = SSL_get_error(session->ssl, ret); + switch (error) { + /* + * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt + * with" by our non-blocking environment. NB: + * "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error" + * indicating a successfully closed SSL + * tunnel. We let this happen because our IO + * loop should not appear to have broken on + * this condition - and outside the IO loop, the + * "shutdown" state is checked. + * + * Don't print anything if we ignore the error. + */ + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + break; + + /* + * These seem to be indications of a genuine + * error that should result in the SSL tunnel + * being regarded as "dead". + */ + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) System call (I/O) error (%i)", ret); + return 0; + + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) Protocol error (%i)", ret); + return 0; + + /* + * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b) + * crop up - we need to interpret what to do with + * them - so "politely inform" the caller that + * the code needs updating here. + */ + default: + ROPTIONAL(REDEBUG, ERROR, "(TLS) Session error %i (%i)", error, ret); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN +static bool identity_is_safe(const char *identity) +{ + char c; + + if (!identity) return true; + + while ((c = *(identity++)) != '\0') { + if (isalpha((uint8_t) c) || isdigit((uint8_t) c) || isspace((uint8_t) c) || + (c == '@') || (c == '-') || (c == '_') || (c == '.')) { + continue; + } + + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * When a client uses TLS-PSK to talk to a server, this callback + * is used by the server to determine the PSK to use. + */ +static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, + unsigned char *psk, + unsigned int max_psk_len) +{ + unsigned int psk_len = 0; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + REQUEST *request; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, + FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return 0; + + request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, + FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + if (request && conf->psk_query) { + size_t hex_len; + VALUE_PAIR *vp, **certs; + TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; + char buffer[2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN + 4]; /* allow for too-long keys */ + + /* + * The passed identity is weird. Deny it. + */ + if (!identity_is_safe(identity)) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Invalid characters in PSK identity %s", identity); + return 0; + } + + vp = pair_make_request("TLS-PSK-Identity", identity, T_OP_SET); + if (!vp) return 0; + + certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); + talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); + fr_assert(certs != NULL); /* pointer to sock->certs */ + fr_assert(talloc_ctx != NULL); /* sock */ + + fr_pair_add(certs, fr_pair_copy(talloc_ctx, vp)); + + hex_len = radius_xlat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), request, conf->psk_query, + NULL, NULL); + if (!hex_len) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) PSK expansion returned an empty string."); + return 0; + } + + /* + * The returned key is truncated at MORE than + * OpenSSL can handle. That way we can detect + * the truncation, and complain about it. + */ + if (hex_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Returned PSK is too long (%u > %u)", + (unsigned int) hex_len, 2 * max_psk_len); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Leave the TLS-PSK-Identity in the request, and + * convert the expansion from printable string + * back to hex. + */ + return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, buffer, hex_len); + } + + if (!conf->psk_identity) { + DEBUG("No static PSK identity set. Rejecting the user"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * No REQUEST, or no dynamic query. Just look for a + * static identity. + */ + if (strcmp(identity, conf->psk_identity) != 0) { + ERROR("(TKS) Supplied PSK identity %s does not match configuration. Rejecting.", + identity); + return 0; + } + + psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); + if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0; + + return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, conf->psk_password, psk_len); +} + +static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, UNUSED char const *hint, + char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, + unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) +{ + unsigned int psk_len; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, + FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return 0; + + psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); + if (psk_len > (2 * max_psk_len)) return 0; + + strlcpy(identity, conf->psk_identity, max_identity_len); + + return fr_hex2bin(psk, max_psk_len, conf->psk_password, psk_len); +} + +#endif + +#define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256) + + +void tls_session_id(SSL_SESSION *ssn, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) +{ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L + size_t size; + + size = ssn->session_id_length; + if (size > bufsize) size = bufsize; + + fr_bin2hex(buffer, ssn->session_id, size); +#else + unsigned int size; + uint8_t const *p; + + p = SSL_SESSION_get_id(ssn, &size); + if (size > bufsize) size = bufsize; + + fr_bin2hex(buffer, p, size); + +#endif +} + +static int _tls_session_free(tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + /* + * Free any opaque TTLS or PEAP data. + */ + if ((ssn->opaque) && (ssn->free_opaque)) { + ssn->free_opaque(ssn->opaque); + ssn->opaque = NULL; + } + + session_close(ssn); + + return 0; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +/* + * By setting the environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE to a filename keying + * material will be exported that you may use with Wireshark to decode any + * TLS flows. Please see the following for more details: + * + * https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/TLS#tls-decryption + * + * An example logging session is (you should delete the file on each run): + * + * rm -f /tmp/sslkey.log; env SSLKEYLOGFILE=/tmp/sslkey.log freeradius -X | tee /tmp/debug + */ +static void tls_keylog_cb(UNUSED const SSL *ssl, const char *line) +{ + int fd; + size_t len; + const char *filename; + // less than _POSIX_PIPE_BUF (512) guarantees writes are atomic for O_APPEND + char buffer[64 + 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2*SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + + filename = getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"); + if (!filename) return; + + len = strlen(line); + if ((len + 1) > sizeof(buffer)) { + DEBUG("SSLKEYLOGFILE buffer not large enough, max %lu, required %lu", sizeof(buffer), len + 1); + return; + } + + memcpy(buffer, line, len); + buffer[len] = '\n'; + + fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + if (fd < 0) { + fr_strerror_printf("Failed to open file %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + if (write(fd, buffer, len + 1) == -1) { + DEBUG("Failed to write to file %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); + } + + close(fd); +} +#endif + +tls_session_t *tls_new_client_session(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int fd, VALUE_PAIR **certs) +{ + int ret; + int verify_mode; + tls_session_t *ssn = NULL; + REQUEST *request; + + ssn = talloc_zero(ctx, tls_session_t); + if (!ssn) return NULL; + + talloc_set_destructor(ssn, _tls_session_free); + + ssn->ctx = conf->ctx; + ssn->mtu = conf->fragment_size; + ssn->conf = conf; + + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssn->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER | SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); + + ssn->ssl = SSL_new(ssn->ctx); + if (!ssn->ssl) { + talloc_free(ssn); + return NULL; + } + + request = request_alloc(ssn); + request->packet = rad_alloc(request, false); + request->reply = rad_alloc(request, false); + + SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, (void *)request); + + if (conf->fix_cert_order) { + SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_FIX_CERT_ORDER, (void *) &conf->fix_cert_order); + } + + /* + * Add the message callback to identify what type of + * message/handshake is passed + */ + SSL_set_msg_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_msg); + SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssn->ssl, ssn); + SSL_set_info_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_info); + + /* + * Always verify the peer certificate. + */ + DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate"); + verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; + SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); + + SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf); + SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN, (void *)ssn); + if (certs) SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs, (void *)certs); + + SSL_set_fd(ssn->ssl, fd); + + ret = SSL_connect(ssn->ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + switch (SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, ret)) { + default: + break; + + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + ssn->connected = false; + return ssn; + + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + ssn->connected = false; + return ssn; + } + } + + if (ret <= 0) { + tls_error_io_log(NULL, ssn, ret, "Failed in connecting TLS session."); + talloc_free(ssn); + + return NULL; + } + + ssn->connected = true; + return ssn; +} + + +/** Create a new TLS session + * + * Configures a new TLS session, configuring options, setting callbacks etc... + * + * @param ctx to alloc session data in. Should usually be NULL unless the lifetime of the + * session is tied to another talloc'd object. + * @param conf to use to configure the tls session. + * @param request The current #REQUEST. + * @param client_cert Whether to require a client_cert. + * @param allow_tls13 Whether to allow or forbid TLS 1.3. + * @return a new session on success, or NULL on error. + */ +tls_session_t *tls_new_session(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, REQUEST *request, bool client_cert, +#ifndef TLS1_3_VERSION + UNUSED +#endif + bool allow_tls13) +{ + tls_session_t *state = NULL; + SSL *new_tls = NULL; + int verify_mode = 0; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + X509_STORE *new_cert_store; + + rad_assert(request != NULL); + + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Initiating new session"); + + /* + * Replace X509 store if it is time to update CRLs/certs in ca_path + */ + if (conf->ca_path_reload_interval > 0 && conf->ca_path_last_reload + conf->ca_path_reload_interval <= request->timestamp) { + pthread_mutex_lock(&conf->mutex); + /* recheck conf->ca_path_last_reload because it may be inaccurate without mutex */ + if (conf->ca_path_last_reload + conf->ca_path_reload_interval <= request->timestamp) { + RDEBUG2("Flushing X509 store to re-read data from ca_path dir"); + + if ((new_cert_store = fr_init_x509_store(conf)) == NULL) { + RERROR("(TLS) Error replacing X509 store, out of memory (?)"); + } else { + if (conf->old_x509_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->old_x509_store); + /* + * Swap empty store with the old one. + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + conf->old_x509_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(conf->ctx); + /* Bump refcnt so the store is kept allocated till next store replacement */ + X509_STORE_up_ref(conf->old_x509_store); + SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(conf->ctx, new_cert_store); +#else + /* + * We do not use SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() call here because + * we are not sure that old X509 store is not in the use by some + * thread (i.e. cert check in progress). + * Keep it allocated till next store replacement. + */ + conf->old_x509_store = conf->ctx->cert_store; + conf->ctx->cert_store = new_cert_store; +#endif + conf->ca_path_last_reload = request->timestamp; + } + } + pthread_mutex_unlock(&conf->mutex); + } + + new_tls = SSL_new(conf->ctx); + if (new_tls == NULL) { + tls_error_log(request, "Error creating new TLS session"); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + /* + * Disallow TLS 1.3 for FAST. + * + * We need another magic configuration option to allow + * it. + */ + if (!allow_tls13 && (conf->max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + WARN("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"); + WARN("!! FORCING MAXIMUM TLS VERSION TO TLS 1.2 !!"); + WARN("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"); + WARN("!! There is no standard for using this EAP method with TLS 1.3"); + WARN("!! Please set tls_max_version = \"1.2\""); + WARN("!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"); + + if (SSL_set_max_proto_version(new_tls, TLS1_2_VERSION) == 0) { + tls_error_log(request, "Failed limiting maximum version to TLS 1.2"); + return NULL; + } + } +#endif + + /* We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back */ + SSL_set_app_data(new_tls, NULL); + + if ((state = talloc_zero(ctx, tls_session_t)) == NULL) { + RERROR("(TLS) Error allocating memory for SSL state"); + return NULL; + } + session_init(state); + talloc_set_destructor(state, _tls_session_free); + + state->ctx = conf->ctx; + state->ssl = new_tls; + state->conf = conf; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* + * Set the keylog file if the admin requested it. + */ + if (getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE") != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(state->ctx, tls_keylog_cb); +#endif + + /* + * Initialize callbacks + */ + state->record_init = record_init; + state->record_close = record_close; + state->record_plus = record_plus; + state->record_minus = record_minus; + + /* + * Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the + * SSL. This is *very important* as we want to handle + * the transmission part. Now the only IO interface + * that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers. + * + * This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory, + * and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've + * received. + */ + state->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + state->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + SSL_set_bio(state->ssl, state->into_ssl, state->from_ssl); + + /* + * Add the message callback to identify what type of + * message/handshake is passed + */ + SSL_set_msg_callback(new_tls, cbtls_msg); + SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(new_tls, state); + SSL_set_info_callback(new_tls, cbtls_info); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + /* + * Allow policies to load context-specific certificate chains. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_TLS_SESSION_CERT_FILE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + VALUE_PAIR *key = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_TLS_SESSION_CERT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (!key) key = vp; + + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Loading session certificate file \"%s\"", vp->vp_strvalue); + + if (conf->realms) { + fr_realm_ctx_t my_r, *r; + + /* + * Use a pre-existing SSL CTX, if + * available. Note that due to OpenSSL + * issues, this really changes only the + * certificate files, and leaves all + * other fields alone. e.g. you can't + * select a different TLS version. + * + * This is fine for our purposes in v3. + * Due to how we build them, the various + * additional SSL_CTXs are identical to + * the main one, except for certs. + */ + my_r.name = vp->vp_strvalue; + r = fr_hash_table_finddata(conf->realms, &my_r); + if (r) { + (void) SSL_set_SSL_CTX(state->ssl, r->ctx); + goto after_chain; + } + + /* + * Else fall through to trying to dynamically load the certs. + */ + } + + if (conf->file_type) { + if (SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(state->ssl, vp->vp_strvalue) != 1) { + tls_error_log(request, "Failed loading TLS session certificate \"%s\"", + vp->vp_strvalue); + error: + talloc_free(state); + return NULL; + } + } else { + if (SSL_use_certificate_file(state->ssl, vp->vp_strvalue, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) != 1) { + tls_error_log(request, "Failed loading TLS session certificate \"%s\"", + vp->vp_strvalue); + goto error; + } + } + + /* + * Note that there is either no password, or it + * has to be the same as what's in the + * configuration. + * + * There is just no additional security to + * putting a password into the same file system + * as the private key. + */ + if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(state->ssl, key->vp_strvalue, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) { + tls_error_log(request, "Failed loading TLS session certificate \"%s\"", + key->vp_strvalue); + goto error; + } + + if (SSL_check_private_key(state->ssl) != 1) { + tls_error_log(request, "Failed validating TLS session certificate \"%s\"", + vp->vp_strvalue); + goto error; + } + } +after_chain: +#endif + + /* + * In Server mode we only accept. + */ + SSL_set_accept_state(state->ssl); + + /* + * Verify the peer certificate, if asked. + */ + if (client_cert) { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Setting verify mode to require certificate from client"); + verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; + } + SSL_set_verify(state->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); + + SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf); + SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN, (void *)state); + state->length_flag = conf->include_length; + + /* + * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU + * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account + * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is + * large, because that config item looks to be confusing. + * + * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here + * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size. + * asking the administrator to know the internal details + * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is + * just too much. + */ + state->mtu = conf->fragment_size; +#define EAP_TLS_MAGIC_OVERHEAD (63) + + /* + * If the packet contains an MTU, then use that. We + * trust the admin! + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + if ((vp->vp_integer > 100) && (vp->vp_integer < state->mtu)) { + state->mtu = vp->vp_integer; + } + + } else if (request->parent) { + /* + * If there's a parent request, we look for what + * MTU was set there. Then, we use an MTU which + * accounts for the extra overhead of nesting EAP + * + TLS inside of EAP + TLS. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->parent->state, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp && (vp->vp_integer > (100 + EAP_TLS_MAGIC_OVERHEAD)) && (vp->vp_integer <= state->mtu)) { + state->mtu = vp->vp_integer - EAP_TLS_MAGIC_OVERHEAD; + } + } + + /* + * Cache / update the Framed-MTU in the session-state + * list. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->state, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (!vp) { + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(request->state_ctx, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0); + fr_pair_add(&request->state, vp); + } + if (vp) vp->vp_integer = state->mtu; + + if (conf->session_cache_enable) state->allow_session_resumption = true; /* otherwise it's false */ + + return state; +} + +/* + * We are the server, we always get the dirty data + * (Handshake data is also considered as dirty data) + * During handshake, since SSL API handles itself, + * After clean-up, dirty_out will be filled with + * the data required for handshaking. So we check + * if dirty_out is empty then we simply send it back. + * As of now, if handshake is successful, then we keep going, + * otherwise we fail. + * + * Fill the Bio with the dirty data to clean it + * Get the cleaned data from SSL, if it is not Handshake data + */ +int tls_handshake_recv(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + int err; + + if (ssn->invalid_hb_used) { + REDEBUG("(TLS) OpenSSL Heartbeat attack detected. Closing connection"); + return 0; + } + + if (ssn->dirty_in.used > 0) { + err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used); + if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) { + REDEBUG("(TLS) Failed writing %zd bytes to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used, err); + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + return 0; + } + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + } + + err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used, + sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used); + if (err > 0) { + ssn->clean_out.used += err; + return 1; + } + + if (!tls_error_io_log(request, ssn, err, "Failed reading from OpenSSL")) return 0; + + /* Some Extra STATE information for easy debugging */ + if (!ssn->is_init_finished && SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) { + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + char const *str_version; + + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Connection Established"); + ssn->is_init_finished = true; + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(request->state_ctx, PW_TLS_SESSION_CIPHER_SUITE, 0); + if (vp) { + fr_pair_value_strcpy(vp, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssn->ssl))); + fr_pair_add(&request->state, vp); + RINDENT(); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + REXDENT(); + } + + switch (SSL_version(ssn->ssl)) { + case SSL2_VERSION: + str_version = "SSL 2.0"; + break; + case SSL3_VERSION: + str_version = "SSL 3.0"; + break; + case TLS1_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.0"; + break; +#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION + case TLS1_1_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.1"; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION + case TLS1_2_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.2"; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + case TLS1_3_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.3"; + break; +#endif + default: + str_version = "UNKNOWN"; + break; + } + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(request->state_ctx, PW_TLS_SESSION_VERSION, 0); + if (vp) { + fr_pair_value_strcpy(vp, str_version); + fr_pair_add(&request->state, vp); + RINDENT(); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + REXDENT(); + } + } + else if (SSL_in_init(ssn->ssl)) { RDEBUG2("(TLS) In Handshake Phase"); } + else if (SSL_in_before(ssn->ssl)) { RDEBUG2("(TLS) Before Handshake Phase"); } + else if (SSL_in_accept_init(ssn->ssl)) { RDEBUG2("(TLS) In Accept mode"); } + else if (SSL_in_connect_init(ssn->ssl)) { RDEBUG2("(TLS) In Connect mode"); } + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L + /* + * Cache the SSL_SESSION pointer. + */ + if (!ssn->ssl_session) { + ssn->ssl_session = SSL_get_session(ssn->ssl); + + /* + * Some versions of OpenSSL don't allow you to + * get the session before the init is finished. + * In that case, this error is a soft fail. + * + * If the session init is finished, then failure + * to get the session is a hard fail. + */ + if (!ssn->ssl_session && ssn->is_init_finished) { + RDEBUG("(TLS) Failed getting session"); + return 0; + } + } + +#else +#error You must use a newer version of OpenSSL +#endif + + err = BIO_ctrl_pending(ssn->from_ssl); + if (err > 0) { + err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data, + sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data)); + if (err > 0) { + RDEBUG3("(TLS) got %d bytes of data", err); + ssn->dirty_out.used = err; + + } else if (BIO_should_retry(ssn->from_ssl)) { + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Asking for more data in tunnel."); + return 1; + + } else { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Error reading from OpenSSL"); + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + return 0; + } + } else { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Application data."); + /* Its clean application data, leave whatever is in the buffer */ +#if 0 + record_init(&ssn->clean_out); +#endif + } + + /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */ + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Take cleartext user data, and encrypt it into the output buffer, + * to send to the client at the other end of the SSL connection. + */ +int tls_handshake_send(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + int err; + + /* + * If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write + * that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function + * to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into + * a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet. + * + * Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to + * contain the data to send to the client. + */ + if (ssn->clean_in.used > 0) { + int written; + + written = SSL_write(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_in.data, ssn->clean_in.used); + record_minus(&ssn->clean_in, NULL, written); + + /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */ + err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data + ssn->dirty_out.used, + sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data) - ssn->dirty_out.used); + if (err > 0) { + ssn->dirty_out.used += err; + } else { + if (!tls_error_io_log(request, ssn, err, "Failed writing to OpenSSL")) { + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + ssn->ssl = NULL; + ssn->into_ssl = ssn->from_ssl = NULL; + record_init(&ssn->clean_in); + record_init(&ssn->clean_out); + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + record_init(&ssn->dirty_out); + + memset(&ssn->info, 0, sizeof(ssn->info)); + + ssn->mtu = 0; + ssn->fragment = false; + ssn->tls_msg_len = 0; + ssn->length_flag = false; + ssn->opaque = NULL; + ssn->free_opaque = NULL; +} + +static void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + if (ssn->ssl) { + SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ssn->ssl, 1); + SSL_shutdown(ssn->ssl); + + SSL_free(ssn->ssl); + ssn->ssl = NULL; + } + + record_close(&ssn->clean_in); + record_close(&ssn->clean_out); + record_close(&ssn->dirty_in); + record_close(&ssn->dirty_out); + session_init(ssn); +} + +static void record_init(record_t *rec) +{ + rec->used = 0; +} + +static void record_close(record_t *rec) +{ + rec->used = 0; +} + + +/* + * Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send + * it somewhere. + */ +static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *rec, void const *ptr, + unsigned int size) +{ + unsigned int added = MAX_RECORD_SIZE - rec->used; + + if(added > size) + added = size; + if(added == 0) + return 0; + memcpy(rec->data + rec->used, ptr, added); + rec->used += added; + return added; +} + +/* + * Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller. + */ +static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *rec, void *ptr, + unsigned int size) +{ + unsigned int taken = rec->used; + + if(taken > size) + taken = size; + if(taken == 0) + return 0; + if(ptr) + memcpy(ptr, rec->data, taken); + rec->used -= taken; + + /* + * This is pretty bad... + */ + if (rec->used > 0) memmove(rec->data, rec->data + taken, rec->used); + + return taken; +} + +void tls_session_information(tls_session_t *tls_session) +{ + char const *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type = ""; + char const *str_details1 = "", *str_details2= ""; + char const *details = NULL; + REQUEST *request; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + char content_type[16], alert_buf[16]; + char buffer[32]; + + /* + * Don't print this out in the normal course of + * operations. + */ + if (rad_debug_lvl == 0) return; + + /* + * OpenSSL calls this function with 'pseudo' content + * types. The user doesn't care about them, so suppress them. + */ + if (tls_session->info.content_type > UINT8_MAX) return; + + request = SSL_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + if (!request) return; + + str_write_p = tls_session->info.origin ? "(TLS) send" : "(TLS) recv"; + +#define FROM_CLIENT (tls_session->info.origin == 0) + + switch (SSL_version(tls_session->ssl)) { + case SSL2_VERSION: + str_version = "SSL 2.0 "; + break; + case SSL3_VERSION: + str_version = "SSL 3.0 "; + break; + case TLS1_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.0 "; + break; +#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION + case TLS1_1_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.1 "; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION + case TLS1_2_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.2 "; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + case TLS1_3_VERSION: + str_version = "TLS 1.3 "; + break; +#endif + + default: + sprintf(buffer, "UNKNOWN TLS VERSION '%04X'", SSL_version(tls_session->ssl)); + str_version = buffer; + break; + } + + if (1) { + switch (tls_session->info.content_type) { + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec"; + break; + + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + str_content_type = "Alert"; + break; + + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + str_content_type = "Handshake"; + break; + + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + str_content_type = "ApplicationData"; + break; + + default: + snprintf(content_type, sizeof(content_type), "content=%d", tls_session->info.content_type); + str_content_type = content_type; + break; + } + + if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + str_details1 = ", ???"; + + if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) { + + switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) { + case SSL3_AL_WARNING: + str_details1 = ", warning"; + break; + case SSL3_AL_FATAL: + str_details1 = ", fatal"; + break; + } + + str_details2 = " ???"; + details = "there is a failure inside the TLS protocol exchange"; + + switch (tls_session->info.alert_description) { + case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + str_details2 = " close_notify"; + details = "the connection has been closed, and no further TLS exchanges will take place"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: + str_details2 = " unexpected_message"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: + str_details2 = " bad_record_mac"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: + str_details2 = " decryption_failed"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: + str_details2 = " record_overflow"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: + str_details2 = " decompression_failure"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: + str_details2 = " handshake_failure"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: + str_details2 = " no_certificate"; + details = "the server did not present a certificate to the client"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: + str_details2 = " bad_certificate"; + details = "it believes the server certificate is invalid or malformed"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: + str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate"; + details = "it does not understand the certificate presented by the server"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: + str_details2 = " certificate_revoked"; + details = "it believes that the server certificate has been revoked"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: + str_details2 = " certificate_expired"; + details = "it believes that the server certificate has expired. Either renew the server certificate, or check the time on the client"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: + str_details2 = " certificate_unknown"; + details = "it does not recognize the server certificate"; + break; + + case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: + str_details2 = " illegal_parameter"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: + str_details2 = " unknown_ca"; + details = "it does not recognize the CA used to issue the server certificate. Please update the client so that it knows about the CA"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: + str_details2 = " access_denied"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR: + str_details2 = " decode_error"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: + str_details2 = " decrypt_error"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: + str_details2 = " export_restriction"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: + str_details2 = " protocol_version"; + details = "the client does not accept the version of TLS negotiated by the server"; + +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + /* + * Complain about OpenSSL bugs. + */ + if ((SSL_version(tls_session->ssl) > tls_session->conf->max_version) && + (rad_debug_lvl > 0)) { + WARN("TLS 1.3 has been negotiated even though it was disabled. This is an OpenSSL Bug."); + WARN("Please set: cipher_list = \"DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1\" in the tls {...} section."); + } +#endif + break; + + case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: + str_details2 = " insufficient_security"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: + str_details2 = " internal_error"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED: + str_details2 = " user_canceled"; + break; + + case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: + str_details2 = " no_renegotiation"; + break; + +#ifdef TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSIONS + case TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSIONS: + str_details2 = " missing_extensions"; + details = "the server did not present a TLS extension which the client expected to be present. Please check the TLS libraries on the client and server for compatibility"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS13_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED + case TLS13_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED: + str_details2 = " certificate_required"; + details = "the server did not present a certificate"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION + case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: + str_details2 = " unsupported_extension"; + details = "the server has sent a TLS message which the client does not recognize. Please check the TLS libraries on the client and server for compatibility"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE + case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: + str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME + case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: + str_details2 = " unrecognized_name"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE + case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: + str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE + case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: + str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY + case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: + str_details2 = " unknown_psk_identity"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL + case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: + str_details2 = " no_application_protocol"; + break; +#endif + } + } + } + + if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + str_details1 = ""; + + if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0) switch (tls_session->info.handshake_type) { + case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST: + str_details1 = ", HelloRequest"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: + str_details1 = ", ClientHello"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: + str_details1 = ", ServerHello"; + break; + +#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET: + str_details1 = ", NewSessionTicket"; + break; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + case SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + str_details1 = ", EncryptedExtensions"; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: + str_details1 = ", Certificate"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: + str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange"; + break; + + case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: + str_details1 = ", Finished"; + break; + +#ifdef SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE + case SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE: + str_content_type = "KeyUpdate"; + break; +#endif + + default: + snprintf(alert_buf, sizeof(alert_buf), ", type=%d", tls_session->info.handshake_type); + str_details1 = alert_buf; + break; + } + } + } + + snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description, + sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description), + "%s %s%s%s%s", + str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type, + str_details1, str_details2); + + /* + * Cache the TLS session information in the session-state + * list, so it can be accessed by Post-Auth-Type + * Client-Lost { ... } + */ + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(request->state_ctx, PW_TLS_SESSION_INFORMATION, 0); + if (vp) { + fr_pair_value_strcpy(vp, tls_session->info.info_description); + fr_pair_add(&request->state, vp); + } + + RDEBUG2("%s", tls_session->info.info_description); + + if (FROM_CLIENT && details) RDEBUG2("(TLS) The client is informing us that %s.", details); +} + +static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = { + { "enable", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_enable), "no" }, + + { "lifetime", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_lifetime), "24" }, + { "name", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_id_name), NULL }, + + { "max_entries", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_size), "255" }, + { "persist_dir", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_path), NULL }, + { "virtual_server", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_server), NULL }, + CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR +}; + +static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = { + { "skip_if_ocsp_ok", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_skip_if_ocsp_ok), "no" }, + { "tmpdir", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_tmp_dir), NULL }, + { "client", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL }, + CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR +}; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H +static CONF_PARSER ocsp_config[] = { + { "enable", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_enable), "no" }, + { "override_cert_url", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_override_url), "no" }, + { "url", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_url), NULL }, + { "use_nonce", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_use_nonce), "yes" }, + { "timeout", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_timeout), "yes" }, + { "softfail", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_softfail), "no" }, + CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR +}; +#endif + +static CONF_PARSER tls_server_config[] = { + { "verify_depth", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), "0" }, + { "CA_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT | PW_TYPE_DEPRECATED, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, + { "ca_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, + { "pem_file_type", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), "yes" }, + { "private_key_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL }, + { "certificate_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL }, + { "CA_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT | PW_TYPE_DEPRECATED, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, + { "ca_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, + { "private_key_password", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL }, +#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + { "psk_identity", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_identity), NULL }, + { "psk_hexphrase", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_password), NULL }, + { "psk_query", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, psk_query), NULL }, +#endif + { "dh_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL }, + { "random_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_EXISTS, fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL }, + { "fragment_size", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), "1024" }, + { "include_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), "yes" }, + { "auto_chain", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, auto_chain), "yes" }, + { "disable_single_dh_use", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_single_dh_use), NULL }, + { "check_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), "no" }, +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL + { "check_all_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_all_crl), "no" }, +#endif + { "ca_path_reload_interval", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path_reload_interval), "0" }, + { "allow_expired_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, allow_expired_crl), NULL }, + { "check_cert_cn", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL }, + { "cipher_list", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL }, + { "cipher_server_preference", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_server_preference), NULL }, + { "check_cert_issuer", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL }, + { "require_client_cert", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, require_client_cert), NULL }, + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + { "sigalgs_list", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, sigalgs_list), NULL }, +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + { "reject_unknown_intermediate_ca", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disallow_untrusted), .dflt = "no", }, +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + { "ecdh_curve", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), "prime256v1" }, +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + { "disable_tlsv1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1), NULL }, +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 + { "disable_tlsv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_1), NULL }, +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 + { "disable_tlsv1_2", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_2), NULL }, +#endif + + { "tls_max_version", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, tls_max_version), NULL }, + + { "tls_min_version", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, tls_min_version), +#if defined(TLS1_2_VERSION) + "1.2" +#elif defined(TLS1_1_VERSION) + "1.1" +#else + "1.0" +#endif + }, + +#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + { "radiusv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, radiusv11_name), NULL }, +#endif + + { "realm_dir", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, realm_dir), NULL }, + + { "cache", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) cache_config }, + + { "verify", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) verify_config }, + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + { "ocsp", FR_CONF_POINTER(PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, NULL), (void const *) ocsp_config }, +#endif + CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR +}; + + +static CONF_PARSER tls_client_config[] = { + { "verify_depth", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), "0" }, + { "ca_path", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL }, + { "pem_file_type", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), "yes" }, + { "private_key_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL }, + { "certificate_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL }, + { "ca_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_FILE_INPUT, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL }, + { "private_key_password", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING | PW_TYPE_SECRET, fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL }, + { "dh_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL }, + { "random_file", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL }, + { "fragment_size", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), "1024" }, + { "include_length", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), "yes" }, + { "check_crl", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), "no" }, + { "check_cert_cn", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL }, + { "cipher_list", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL }, + { "check_cert_issuer", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL }, + { "ca_path_reload_interval", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_INTEGER, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path_reload_interval), "0" }, + + { "fix_cert_order", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, fix_cert_order), NULL }, + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + { "ecdh_curve", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), "prime256v1" }, +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + { "disable_tlsv1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1), NULL }, +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 + { "disable_tlsv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_1), NULL }, +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 + { "disable_tlsv1_2", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, fr_tls_server_conf_t, disable_tlsv1_2), NULL }, +#endif + + { "tls_max_version", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, tls_max_version), NULL }, + + { "tls_min_version", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, tls_min_version), +#if defined(TLS1_2_VERSION) + "1.2" +#elif defined(TLS1_1_VERSION) + "1.1" +#else + "1.0" +#endif + }, + +#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + { "radiusv1_1", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, radiusv11_name), NULL }, +#endif + + { "hostname", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_STRING, fr_tls_server_conf_t, client_hostname), NULL }, + + CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR +}; + + +/* + * TODO: Check for the type of key exchange * like conf->dh_key + */ +static int load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file) +{ + DH *dh = NULL; + BIO *bio; + + /* + * Prior to trying to load the file, check what OpenSSL will do with it. + * + * Certain downstreams (such as RHEL) will ignore user-provided dhparams + * in FIPS mode, unless the specified parameters are FIPS-approved. + * However, since OpenSSL >= 1.1.1 will automatically select parameters + * anyways, there's no point in attempting to load them. + * + * Change suggested by @t8m + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + if (FIPS_mode() > 0) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Ignoring user-selected DH parameters in FIPS mode. Using defaults."); + file = NULL; + } + + /* + * No dh file, set auto context. + */ + if (!file) { + if (!SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to set DH parameters"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; + } + + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Setting DH parameters from %s - this is no longer necessary.", file); + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": You should comment out the 'dh_file' configuration item."); + +#else + if (!file) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Cannot set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work."); + return 0; + } +#endif + + + if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to open DH file - %s", file); + return -1; + } + + dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + BIO_free(bio); + if (!dh) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!"); + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf"); + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to set DH parameters"); + DH_free(dh); + return -1; + } + + DH_free(dh); + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Print debugging messages, and free data. + */ +static void cbtls_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) +{ + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + + tls_session_id(sess, buffer, MAX_SESSION_SIZE); + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); + if (!conf) { + DEBUG(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); + return; + } + + { + int rv; + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + + DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Removing session %s from the cache", buffer); + + /* remove session and any cached VPs */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + rv = unlink(filename); + if (rv != 0) { + DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Could not remove persisted session file %s: %s", + filename, fr_syserror(errno)); + } + /* VPs might be absent; might not have been written to disk yet */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + unlink(filename); + } + + return; +} + +static int cbtls_new_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) +{ + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + unsigned char *sess_blob = NULL; + + REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); + return 0; + } + + tls_session_id(sess, buffer, MAX_SESSION_SIZE); + + { + int fd, rv, todo, blob_len; + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + unsigned char *p; + + RDEBUG2("Serialising session %s, and storing in cache", buffer); + + /* find out what length data we need */ + blob_len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); + if (blob_len < 1) { + /* something went wrong */ + if (request) RWDEBUG("(TLS) Session serialisation failed, could not determine required buffer length"); + return 0; + } + + /* Do not convert to TALLOC - Thread safety */ + /* alloc and convert to ASN.1 */ + sess_blob = malloc(blob_len); + if (!sess_blob) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Session serialisation failed, couldn't allocate buffer (%d bytes)", blob_len); + return 0; + } + /* openssl mutates &p */ + p = sess_blob; + rv = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); + if (rv != blob_len) { + if (request) RWDEBUG("(TLS) Session serialisation failed"); + goto error; + } + + /* open output file */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + fd = open(filename, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, S_IWUSR); + if (fd < 0) { + if (request) RERROR("(TLS) Session serialisation failed, failed opening session file %s: %s", + filename, fr_syserror(errno)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Set the filename to be temporarily write-only. + */ + if (request) { + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(request->state_ctx, PW_TLS_CACHE_FILENAME, 0); + if (vp) { + fr_pair_value_strcpy(vp, filename); + fr_pair_add(&request->state, vp); + } + } + + todo = blob_len; + p = sess_blob; + while (todo > 0) { + rv = write(fd, p, todo); + if (rv < 1) { + if (request) RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed writing session: %s", fr_syserror(errno)); + close(fd); + goto error; + } + p += rv; + todo -= rv; + } + close(fd); + if (request) RWDEBUG("(TLS) Wrote session %s to %s (%d bytes)", buffer, filename, blob_len); + } + +error: + free(sess_blob); + + return 0; +} + +/** Convert OpenSSL's ASN1_TIME to an epoch time + * + * @param[out] out Where to write the time_t. + * @param[in] asn1 The ASN1_TIME to convert. + * @return + * - 0 success. + * - -1 on failure. + */ +static int ocsp_asn1time_to_epoch(time_t *out, char const *asn1) +{ + struct tm t; + char const *p = asn1, *end = p + strlen(p); + + memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t)); + + if ((end - p) <= 13) { + if ((end - p) < 2) { + fr_strerror_printf("ASN1 date string too short, expected 2 additional bytes, got %zu bytes", + end - p); + return -1; + } + + t.tm_year = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_year += (*(p++) - '0'); + if (t.tm_year < 70) t.tm_year += 100; + } else { + t.tm_year = (*(p++) - '0') * 1000; + t.tm_year += (*(p++) - '0') * 100; + t.tm_year += (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_year += (*(p++) - '0'); + t.tm_year -= 1900; + } + + if ((end - p) < 4) { + fr_strerror_printf("ASN1 string too short, expected 10 additional bytes, got %zu bytes", + end - p); + return -1; + } + + t.tm_mon = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_mon += (*(p++) - '0') - 1; // -1 since January is 0 not 1. + t.tm_mday = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_mday += (*(p++) - '0'); + + if ((end - p) < 2) goto done; + t.tm_hour = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_hour += (*(p++) - '0'); + + if ((end - p) < 2) goto done; + t.tm_min = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_min += (*(p++) - '0'); + + if ((end - p) < 2) goto done; + t.tm_sec = (*(p++) - '0') * 10; + t.tm_sec += (*(p++) - '0'); + + /* Apparently OpenSSL converts all timestamps to UTC? Maybe? */ +done: + *out = timegm(&t); + return 0; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) +#else +static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) +#endif +{ + size_t size; + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; + + SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; + unsigned char *sess_data = NULL; + PAIR_LIST *pairlist = NULL; + + REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + + rad_assert(request != NULL); + + size = len; + if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; + + fr_bin2hex(buffer, data, size); + + RDEBUG2("Peer requested cached session: %s", buffer); + + *copy = 0; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); + return NULL; + } + + talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); + + { + int rv, fd, todo; + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + + unsigned char const **o; + unsigned char **p; + uint8_t *q; + + struct stat st; + VALUE_PAIR *vps = NULL; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + /* load the actual SSL session */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) No persisted session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); + goto error; + } + + rv = fstat(fd, &st); + if (rv < 0) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed stating persisted session file %s: %s", filename, fr_syserror(errno)); + close(fd); + goto error; + } + + sess_data = talloc_array(NULL, unsigned char, st.st_size); + if (!sess_data) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed allocating buffer for persisted session (%d bytes)", (int) st.st_size); + close(fd); + goto error; + } + + q = sess_data; + todo = st.st_size; + while (todo > 0) { + rv = read(fd, q, todo); + if (rv < 1) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed reading persisted session: %s", fr_syserror(errno)); + close(fd); + goto error; + } + todo -= rv; + q += rv; + } + close(fd); + + /* + * OpenSSL mutates what's passed in, so we assign sess_data to q, + * so the value of q gets mutated, and not the value of sess_data. + * + * We then need a pointer to hold &q, but it can't be const, because + * clang complains about lack of consting in nested pointer types. + * + * So we memcpy the value of that pointer, to one that + * does have a const, which we then pass into d2i_SSL_SESSION *sigh*. + */ + q = sess_data; + p = &q; + memcpy(&o, &p, sizeof(o)); + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, o, st.st_size); + if (!sess) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed loading persisted session: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + goto error; + } + + /* read in the cached VPs from the .vps file */ + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + rv = pairlist_read(talloc_ctx, filename, &pairlist, 1); + if (rv < 0) { + /* not safe to un-persist a session w/o VPs */ + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed loading persisted VPs for session %s", buffer); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + goto error; + } + + /* + * Enforce client certificate expiration. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(pairlist->reply, PW_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_EXPIRATION, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + time_t expires; + + if (ocsp_asn1time_to_epoch(&expires, vp->vp_strvalue) < 0) { + RDEBUG2("Failed getting certificate expiration, removing cache entry for session %s - %s", buffer, fr_strerror()); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + goto error; + } + + if (expires <= request->timestamp) { + RDEBUG2("Certificate has expired, removing cache entry for session %s", buffer); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + goto error; + } + + /* + * Account for Session-Timeout, if it's available. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_SESSION_TIMEOUT, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + if ((request->timestamp + vp->vp_integer) > expires) { + vp->vp_integer = expires - request->timestamp; + RWDEBUG2("(TLS) Updating Session-Timeout to %u, due to impending certificate expiration", + vp->vp_integer); + } + } + } + + /* + * Resumption MUST use the same EAP type as from + * the original packet. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(pairlist->reply, PW_EAP_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + VALUE_PAIR *type = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_EAP_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + + if (type && (type->vp_integer != vp->vp_integer)) { + REDEBUG("Resumption has changed EAP types for session %s", buffer); + REDEBUG("Rejecting session due to protocol violations"); + goto error; + } + } + + /* move the cached VPs into the session */ + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, &vps, &pairlist->reply, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); + + SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(sess, fr_tls_ex_index_vps, vps); + RDEBUG("Successfully restored session %s", buffer); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vps, "reply:"); + + /* + * The "restore VPs from OpenSSL cache" code is + * now in eaptls_process() + */ + } +error: + if (sess_data) talloc_free(sess_data); + if (pairlist) pairlist_free(&pairlist); + + return sess; +} + +static size_t tls_session_id_binary(SSL_SESSION *ssn, uint8_t *buffer, size_t bufsize) +{ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L + size_t size; + + size = ssn->session_id_length; + if (size > bufsize) size = bufsize; + + memcpy(buffer, ssn->session_id, size); + return size; +#else + unsigned int size; + uint8_t const *p; + + p = SSL_SESSION_get_id(ssn, &size); + if (size > bufsize) size = bufsize; + + memcpy(buffer, p, size); + return size; +#endif +} + +/* + * From TLS-Cache-Method + * + * All of the save / clear / load callbacks are done with any + * OpenSSL locks *unlocked*. So says the OpenSSL code. + */ +#define CACHE_SAVE (1) +#define CACHE_LOAD (2) +#define CACHE_CLEAR (3) +#define CACHE_REFRESH (4) + +static REQUEST *cache_init_fake_request(fr_tls_server_conf_t const *conf, SSL_SESSION *sess, SSL *ssl, + uint8_t const *data, size_t size) +{ + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + REQUEST *fake, *request = NULL; + uint8_t buffer[MAX_SESSION_SIZE]; + + if (sess) { + size = tls_session_id_binary(sess, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + data = buffer; + } + + /* + * We get called essentially at random by OpenSSL, with + * no information other than the session ID. As a + * result, we have to manually set up our own request. + */ + if (ssl) request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + + if (request) { + fake = request_alloc_fake(request); + } else { + fake = request_alloc(NULL); + fake->packet = rad_alloc(fake, false); + fake->reply = rad_alloc(fake, false); + } + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(fake->packet, PW_TLS_SESSION_ID, 0); + if (!vp) { + talloc_free(fake); + return NULL; + } + + fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, data, size); + fr_pair_add(&fake->packet->vps, vp); + + fake->server = conf->session_cache_server; + + return fake; +} + +/* + * Clear cached data + */ +static void cbtls_cache_clear(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + REQUEST *fake; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx); + if (!conf) { + DEBUG(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed to find TLS configuration in session"); + return; + } + + /* + * Find the SSL ID from the session, and delete it. + * + * Don't bother with any parent request. We're in a + * timer callback, and there is no request available. + */ + fake = cache_init_fake_request(conf, sess, NULL, NULL, 0); + if (!fake) return; + + /* + * Use &request:TLS-Session-Id to clear the cache entry. + */ + (void) process_post_auth(CACHE_CLEAR, fake); + talloc_free(fake); + return; +} + +/* + * OpenSSL calls this function in order to save the session + * BEFORE it has sent the final TLS success. So our process here + * is to say "yes, we saved it", and then do the *actual* saving + * after the TLS success has been sent. + */ +static int cbtls_cache_save(UNUSED SSL *ssl, UNUSED SSL_SESSION *sess) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cbtls_cache_save_vps(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess, VALUE_PAIR *vps) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + REQUEST *fake = NULL; + size_t size, rv; + uint8_t *p, *sess_blob = NULL; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return 0; + + /* + * Find the SSL ID from the session, and save it. + * + * Save anything from the parent request. + */ + fake = cache_init_fake_request(conf, sess, ssl, NULL, 0); + if (!fake) return 0; + + /* find out what length data we need */ + size = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); + if (size < 1) return 0; + + /* Do not convert to TALLOC - it's passed to OpenSSL */ + /* alloc and convert to ASN.1 */ + MEM(sess_blob = malloc(size)); + + /* openssl mutates &p */ + p = sess_blob; + rv = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); + if (rv != size) goto error; + + vp = fr_pair_afrom_num(fake->state_ctx, PW_TLS_SESSION_DATA, 0); + if (!vp) goto error; + + fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, sess_blob, size); + fr_pair_add(&fake->state, vp); + + if (vps) fr_pair_add(&fake->reply->vps, fr_pair_list_copy(fake->reply, vps)); + + /* + * Use &request:TLS-Session-Id to save the + * &session-state:TLS-Session-Data values. + * + * The current &reply: list is the list of VPs which + * should be cached. + * + * Any other attributes which need to be saved can be + * read from the &outer.reply: list. + */ + (void) process_post_auth(CACHE_SAVE, fake); + +error: + if (fake) talloc_free(fake); + free(sess_blob); + + return 0; +} + +static int cbtls_cache_refresh(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + REQUEST *fake = NULL; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return 0; + + /* + * Find the SSL ID from the session, and save it. + * + * Save anything from the parent request. + */ + fake = cache_init_fake_request(conf, sess, ssl, NULL, 0); + if (!fake) return 0; + /* + * Use &request:TLS-Session-Id to update the cache + * entry so that it doesn't not expire. + */ + (void) process_post_auth(CACHE_REFRESH, fake); + + talloc_free(fake); + + return 0; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_cache_load(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) +#else +static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_cache_load(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) +#endif +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + size_t size; + uint8_t const *p; + VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps; + TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; + SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; + REQUEST *fake = NULL; + REQUEST *request = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return NULL; + + rad_assert(request); + + size = len; + if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE; + + if (fr_debug_lvl > 1) { + fr_bin2hex(buffer, data, size); + RDEBUG2("Peer requested cached session: %s", buffer); + } + + *copy = 0; + + /* + * Take the given SSL ID, and create a fake request. + * + * Don't bother parenting it from another request. We do + * this for a number of reasons. + * + * One is that rest of the code expects that the VPs will + * be added to fr_tls_ex_index_vps. So we don't want to + * be poking the request directly, as that will result in + * a change of behavior. + * + * The larger reason is that we do _not_ want to actually + * update the reply, until such time as we know that the + * user has been authenticated. + */ + fake = cache_init_fake_request(conf, NULL, NULL, data, size); + if (!fake) return 0; + + /* + * Use &request:TLS-Session-Id to load the cached + * session. + * + * The "cache load { ...}" section should put the reply + * attributes into the &reply: list, and the + * &session-state:TLS-Session-Data attribute. + * + * Why? Because v4 does it that way, and there aren't + * really good reasons for doing it differently. + */ + (void) process_post_auth(CACHE_LOAD, fake); + + /* + * Enforce client certificate expiration. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(fake->reply->vps, PW_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_EXPIRATION, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + time_t expires; + + if (ocsp_asn1time_to_epoch(&expires, vp->vp_strvalue) < 0) { + RDEBUG2("Failed getting certificate expiration, removing cache entry for session %s - %s", buffer, fr_strerror()); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + goto error; + } + + if (expires <= request->timestamp) { + RDEBUG2("Certificate has expired, removing cache entry for session %s", buffer); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + goto error; + } + + /* + * Account for Session-Timeout, if it's available. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_SESSION_TIMEOUT, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + if ((request->timestamp + vp->vp_integer) > expires) { + vp->vp_integer = expires - request->timestamp; + RWDEBUG2("(TLS) Updating Session-Timeout to %u, due to impending certificate expiration", + vp->vp_integer); + } + } + } + + /* + * Try to de-serialize the session data. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(fake->state, PW_TLS_SESSION_DATA, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (!vp) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed to find TLS-Session-Data in 'session-state' list for session %s", buffer); + goto error; + } + + /* + * OpenSSL mutates what's passed in, so we assign sess_data to q, + * so the value of q gets mutated, and not the value of sess_data. + * + * We then need a pointer to hold &q, but it can't be const, because + * clang complains about lack of consting in nested pointer types. + * + * So we memcpy the value of that pointer, to one that + * does have a const, which we then pass into d2i_SSL_SESSION *sigh*. + */ + p = vp->vp_octets; + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, vp->vp_length); + if (!sess) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Failed loading persisted session: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + goto error; + } + + talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); + vps = NULL; + + /* move the cached VPs into the session */ + fr_pair_list_mcopy_by_num(talloc_ctx, &vps, &fake->reply->vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY); + + SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(sess, fr_tls_ex_index_vps, vps); + RDEBUG("Successfully restored session %s", buffer); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vps, "reply:"); + + /* + * The "restore VPs from OpenSSL cache" code is + * now in eaptls_process() + */ + +error: + if (fake) talloc_free(fake); + + return sess; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + +/** Extract components of OCSP responser URL from a certificate + * + * @param[in] cert to extract URL from. + * @param[out] host_out Portion of the URL (must be freed with free()). + * @param[out] port_out Port portion of the URL (must be freed with free()). + * @param[out] path_out Path portion of the URL (must be freed with free()). + * @param[out] is_https Whether the responder should be contacted using https. + * @return + * - 0 if no valid URL is contained in the certificate. + * - 1 if a URL was found and parsed. + * - -1 if at least one URL was found, but none could be parsed. + */ +static int ocsp_parse_cert_url(X509 *cert, char **host_out, char **port_out, + char **path_out, int *is_https) +{ + int i; + bool found_uri = false; + + AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aia; + ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad; + + aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL); + + for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) { + ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, i); + if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) != NID_ad_OCSP) continue; + if (ad->location->type != GEN_URI) continue; + found_uri = true; + + if (OCSP_parse_url((char *) ad->location->d.ia5->data, host_out, + port_out, path_out, is_https)) return 1; + } + return found_uri ? -1 : 0; +} + +/* + * This function sends a OCSP request to a defined OCSP responder + * and checks the OCSP response for correctness. + */ + +/* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */ +#define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60) + +typedef enum { + OCSP_STATUS_FAILED = 0, + OCSP_STATUS_OK = 1, + OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED = 2, +} ocsp_status_t; + +static ocsp_status_t ocsp_check(REQUEST *request, X509_STORE *store, X509 *issuer_cert, X509 *client_cert, + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) +{ + OCSP_CERTID *certid; + OCSP_REQUEST *req; + OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; + OCSP_BASICRESP *bresp = NULL; + char *host = NULL; + char *port = NULL; + char *path = NULL; + char hostheader[1024]; + int use_ssl = -1; + long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1; + BIO *cbio, *bio_out; + ocsp_status_t ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_FAILED; + int status; + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev = NULL, *thisupd, *nextupd; + int reason; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000003f + OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx; + int rc; + struct timeval now; + struct timeval when; +#endif + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + if (issuer_cert == NULL) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Could not get issuer certificate"); + goto skipped; + } + + /* + * Create OCSP Request + */ + certid = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, client_cert, issuer_cert); + req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); + OCSP_request_add0_id(req, certid); + if (conf->ocsp_use_nonce) OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, 8); + + /* + * Send OCSP Request and get OCSP Response + */ + + /* Get OCSP responder URL */ + if (conf->ocsp_override_url) { + char *url; + + use_ocsp_url: + memcpy(&url, &conf->ocsp_url, sizeof(url)); + /* Reading the libssl src, they do a strdup on the URL, so it could of been const *sigh* */ + OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl); + if (!host || !port || !path) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Host or port or path missing from configured URL \"%s\". Not doing OCSP", url); + goto skipped; + } + } else { + int ret; + + ret = ocsp_parse_cert_url(client_cert, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl); + switch (ret) { + case -1: + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Invalid URL in certificate. Not doing OCSP"); + break; + + case 0: + if (conf->ocsp_url) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: No OCSP URL in certificate, falling back to configured URL"); + goto use_ocsp_url; + } + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: No OCSP URL in certificate. Not doing OCSP"); + goto skipped; + + case 1: + break; + } + } + + RDEBUG2("ocsp: Using responder URL \"http://%s:%s%s\"", host, port, path); + + /* Check host and port length are sane, then create Host: HTTP header */ + if ((strlen(host) + strlen(port) + 2) > sizeof(hostheader)) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Host and port too long"); + goto skipped; + } + snprintf(hostheader, sizeof(hostheader), "%s:%s", host, port); + + /* Setup BIO socket to OCSP responder */ + cbio = BIO_new_connect(host); + + bio_out = NULL; + if (rad_debug_lvl) { + if (default_log.dst == L_DST_STDOUT) { + bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + } else if (default_log.dst == L_DST_STDERR) { + bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); + } + } + + BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000003f + BIO_do_connect(cbio); + + /* Send OCSP request and wait for response */ + resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req); + if (!resp) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't get OCSP response"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } +#else + if (conf->ocsp_timeout) + BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1); + + rc = BIO_do_connect(cbio); + if ((rc <= 0) && ((!conf->ocsp_timeout) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't connect to OCSP responder"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } + + ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1); + if (!ctx) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't create OCSP request"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } + + if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", hostheader)) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't set Host header"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } + + if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req)) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't add data to OCSP request"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } + + gettimeofday(&when, NULL); + when.tv_sec += conf->ocsp_timeout; + + do { + rc = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx); + if (conf->ocsp_timeout) { + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + if (!timercmp(&now, &when, <)) + break; + } + } while ((rc == -1) && BIO_should_retry(cbio)); + + if (conf->ocsp_timeout && (rc == -1) && BIO_should_retry(cbio)) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Response timed out"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } + + OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (rc == 0) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't get OCSP response"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + goto ocsp_end; + } +#endif + + /* Verify OCSP response status */ + status = OCSP_response_status(resp); + if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Response status: %s", OCSP_response_status_str(status)); + goto ocsp_end; + } + bresp = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp); + if (!bresp) { + RDEBUG("ocsp: Failed parsing response"); + goto ocsp_end; + } + + if (conf->ocsp_use_nonce && OCSP_check_nonce(req, bresp)!=1) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: Response has wrong nonce value"); + goto ocsp_end; + } + if (OCSP_basic_verify(bresp, NULL, store, 0)!=1){ + REDEBUG("ocsp: Couldn't verify OCSP basic response"); + goto ocsp_end; + } + + /* Verify OCSP cert status */ + if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bresp, certid, &status, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) { + REDEBUG("ocsp: No Status found"); + goto ocsp_end; + } + + if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) { + if (bio_out) { + BIO_puts(bio_out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n"); + ERR_print_errors(bio_out); + } + goto ocsp_end; + } + + if (bio_out) { + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tThis Update: "); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, thisupd); + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); + if (nextupd) { + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tNext Update: "); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, nextupd); + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); + } + } + + switch (status) { + case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD: + RDEBUG2("ocsp: Cert status: good"); + vp = pair_make_request("TLS-OCSP-Cert-Valid", NULL, T_OP_SET); + vp->vp_integer = 1; /* yes */ + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_OK; + break; + + default: + /* REVOKED / UNKNOWN */ + REDEBUG("ocsp: Cert status: %s", OCSP_cert_status_str(status)); + if (reason != -1) REDEBUG("ocsp: Reason: %s", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason)); + + if (bio_out && rev) { + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tRevocation Time: "); + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, rev); + BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n"); + } + break; + } + +ocsp_end: + /* Free OCSP Stuff */ + OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); + OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); + free(host); + free(port); + free(path); + BIO_free_all(cbio); + if (bio_out) BIO_free(bio_out); + OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bresp); + + switch (ocsp_status) { + case OCSP_STATUS_OK: + RDEBUG2("ocsp: Certificate is valid"); + break; + + case OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED: + skipped: + vp = pair_make_request("TLS-OCSP-Cert-Valid", NULL, T_OP_SET); + vp->vp_integer = 2; /* skipped */ + if (conf->ocsp_softfail) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Unable to check certificate, assuming it's valid"); + RWDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: This may be insecure"); + + /* Remove OpenSSL errors from queue or handshake will fail */ + while (ERR_get_error()); + + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_SKIPPED; + } else { + REDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Unable to check certificate, failing"); + ocsp_status = OCSP_STATUS_FAILED; + } + break; + + default: + vp = pair_make_request("TLS-OCSP-Cert-Valid", NULL, T_OP_SET); + vp->vp_integer = 0; /* no */ + REDEBUG("(TLS) ocsp: Certificate has been expired/revoked"); + break; + } + + return ocsp_status; +} +#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */ + +/* + * For creating certificate attributes. + */ +static char const *cert_attr_names[9][2] = { + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Dns", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Dns" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Upn", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Upn" }, + { "TLS-Client-Cert-Valid-Since", "TLS-Cert-Valid-Since" } +}; + +#define FR_TLS_SERIAL (0) +#define FR_TLS_EXPIRATION (1) +#define FR_TLS_SUBJECT (2) +#define FR_TLS_ISSUER (3) +#define FR_TLS_CN (4) +#define FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL (5) +#define FR_TLS_SAN_DNS (6) +#define FR_TLS_SAN_UPN (7) +#define FR_TLS_VALID_SINCE (8) + +static const char *cert_names[2] = { + "client", "server", +}; + +/* + * Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the + * certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your + * application can take in determining if a certificate is + * valid. Commonly used steps are: + * + * 1.Verifying the certificate's signature, and verifying that + * the certificate has been issued by a trusted Certificate + * Authority. + * + * 2.Verifying that the certificate is valid for the present date + * (i.e. it is being presented within its validity dates). + * + * 3.Verifying that the certificate has not been revoked by its + * issuing Certificate Authority, by checking with respect to a + * Certificate Revocation List (CRL). + * + * 4.Verifying that the credentials presented by the certificate + * fulfill additional requirements specific to the application, + * such as with respect to access control lists or with respect + * to OCSP (Online Certificate Status Processing). + * + * NOTE: This callback will be called multiple times based on the + * depth of the root certificate chain + */ +int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */ + char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */ + char attribute[1024]; + char value[1024]; + char common_name[1024]; + char cn_str[1024]; + char buf[64]; + X509 *client_cert; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ext_list; +#else + STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ext_list; +#endif + SSL *ssl; + int err, depth, lookup, loc; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + int my_ok = ok; + + ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL; + ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL; + VALUE_PAIR **certs; + char **identity; +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL; + X509 *issuer_cert; + bool do_verify = false; +#endif + VALUE_PAIR *vp; + TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; + + REQUEST *request; + + client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); + err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); + + lookup = depth; + + /* + * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated + * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. + */ + ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + if (!conf) return 1; + + request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST); + rad_assert(request != NULL); + certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); + + identity = (char **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY); +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + ocsp_store = conf->ocsp_store; +#endif + + talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); + + /* + * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log + * issuing cert. + * + * Inbound: 0 = client, 1 = server (intermediate CA), 2 = issuing CA + * Outbound: 0 = server, 2 = issuing CA. + * + * Our array of certificates uses 0 for client, and 1 for server. We + * also ignore subsequent certs. + */ + if (lookup > 1) { + if (!my_ok) lookup = 1; + + } else if (lookup == 0) { + /* + * This flag is only set for outbound + * connections. And then allows us to remap SSL + * offset 0 (server) to our offset 1 (also + * server). + */ + lookup = (SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_FIX_CERT_ORDER) != NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the Serial Number + */ + buf[0] = '\0'; + sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert); + + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Creating attributes from %s certificate", cert_names[lookup ]); + RINDENT(); + + /* + * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if + * we're at the client or issuing certificate. + */ + if (certs && + (lookup <= 1) && sn && ((size_t) sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) { + char *p = buf; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) { + sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]); + p += 2; + } + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the Expiration Date + */ + buf[0] = '\0'; + asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert); + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time && + (asn_time->length < (int) sizeof(buf))) { + memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length); + buf[asn_time->length] = '\0'; + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the Valid Since Date + */ + buf[0] = '\0'; + asn_time = X509_get_notBefore(client_cert); + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time && + (asn_time->length < (int) sizeof(buf))) { + memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length); + buf[asn_time->length] = '\0'; + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_VALID_SINCE][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the Subject & Issuer + */ + subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0'; + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject, + sizeof(subject)); + subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0'; + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && subject[0]) { + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(client_cert), issuer, + sizeof(issuer)); + issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0'; + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && issuer[0]) { + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the Common Name, if there is a subject. + */ + X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), + NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name)); + common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0'; + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] && subject[0]) { + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + + /* + * Get the RFC822 Subject Alternative Name + */ + loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(client_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1); + if (certs && (lookup <= 1) && (loc >= 0)) { + X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL; + GENERAL_NAMES *names = NULL; + int i; + + if ((ext = X509_get_ext(client_cert, loc)) && + (names = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { + GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); + + switch (name->type) { +#ifdef GEN_EMAIL + case GEN_EMAIL: + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL][lookup], + (char const *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.rfc822Name), T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + break; +#endif /* GEN_EMAIL */ +#ifdef GEN_DNS + case GEN_DNS: + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_DNS][lookup], + (char const *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.dNSName), T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + break; +#endif /* GEN_DNS */ +#ifdef GEN_OTHERNAME + case GEN_OTHERNAME: + /* look for a MS UPN */ + if (NID_ms_upn == OBJ_obj2nid(name->d.otherName->type_id)) { + /* we've got a UPN - Must be ASN1-encoded UTF8 string */ + if (name->d.otherName->value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) { + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_UPN][lookup], + (char const *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string), T_OP_SET); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + break; + } else { + RWARN("Invalid UPN in Subject Alt Name (should be UTF-8)"); + break; + } + } + break; +#endif /* GEN_OTHERNAME */ + default: + /* XXX TODO handle other SAN types */ + break; + } + } + } + if (names != NULL) + GENERAL_NAMES_free(names); + } + + /* + * If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK. + */ + if (!my_ok && + (conf->allow_expired_crl) && + (err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) { + my_ok = 1; + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 ); + } + + if (!my_ok) { + char const *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err); + RERROR("(TLS) OpenSSL says error %d : %s", err, p); + REXDENT(); + + /* + * Copy certs even on failure so that they can be logged. + */ + if (certs && request) fr_pair_add(&request->packet->vps, fr_pair_list_copy(request->packet, *certs)); + + return my_ok; + } + + if (lookup == 0) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + ext_list = X509_get0_extensions(client_cert); +#else + X509_CINF *client_inf; + client_inf = client_cert->cert_info; + ext_list = client_inf->extensions; +#endif + } else { + ext_list = NULL; + } + + /* + * Grab the X509 extensions, and create attributes out of them. + * For laziness, we re-use the OpenSSL names + */ + if (certs && (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list) > 0)) { + int i, len; + EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku; + char *p; + BIO *out; + + out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + strlcpy(attribute, "TLS-Client-Cert-", sizeof(attribute)); + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list); i++) { + ASN1_OBJECT *obj; + X509_EXTENSION *ext; + + ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(ext_list, i); + + obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); + i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, obj); + len = BIO_read(out, attribute + 16 , sizeof(attribute) - 16 - 1); + if (len <= 0) continue; + + attribute[16 + len] = '\0'; + + for (p = attribute + 16; *p != '\0'; p++) { + if (*p == ' ') *p = '-'; + } + + if (X509V3_EXT_get(ext)) { /* Known extension, converting value into plain string */ + X509V3_EXT_print(out, ext, 0, 0); + len = BIO_read(out, value, sizeof(value) - 1); + if (len <= 0) continue; + value[len] = '\0'; + } else { + /* + * An extension not known to OpenSSL, dump it's value as a value of an unknown attribute. + */ + value[0] = '0'; + value[1] = 'x'; + const unsigned char *srcp; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + const ASN1_STRING *srcasn1p; + srcasn1p = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); + srcp = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(srcasn1p); +#else + ASN1_STRING *srcasn1p; + srcasn1p = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); + srcp = ASN1_STRING_data(srcasn1p); +#endif + int asn1len = ASN1_STRING_length(srcasn1p); + /* 3 comes from '0x' + \0 */ + if ((size_t)(asn1len << 1) >= sizeof(value) - 3) { + RDEBUG("Value of '%s' attribute is too long to be stored, it will be truncated", attribute); + asn1len = (sizeof(value) - 3) >> 1; + } + fr_bin2hex(value + 2, srcp, asn1len); + } + + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, attribute, value, T_OP_ADD); + if (!vp) { + RDEBUG3("Skipping %s += '%s'. Please check that both the " + "attribute and value are defined in the dictionaries", + attribute, value); + } else { + /* + * rdebug_pair_list indents (so pre REXDENT()) + */ + REXDENT(); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + RINDENT(); + } + } + + BIO_free_all(out); + + /* Export raw EKU OIDs to allow matching a single OID regardless of its name */ + eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(client_cert, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL); + if (eku != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) { + len = OBJ_obj2txt(value, sizeof(value), sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i), 1); + if ((len > 0) && ((unsigned) len < sizeof(value))) { + vp = fr_pair_make(talloc_ctx, certs, + "TLS-Client-Cert-X509v3-Extended-Key-Usage-OID", + value, T_OP_ADD); + rdebug_pair(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vp, NULL); + } + else { + RDEBUG("Failed to get EKU OID at index %d", i); + } + } + EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku); + } + } + + REXDENT(); + + switch (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx)) { + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: + RERROR("(TLS) unable to get issuer certificate for issuer=%s", issuer); + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: + RERROR("(TLS) Failed with certificate not yet valid."); + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: + RERROR("(TLS) Failed with error in certificate 'not before' field."); +#if 0 + ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert)); +#endif + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: + RERROR("(TLS) Failed with certificate has expired."); + break; + + case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: + RERROR("(TLS) Failed with err in certificate 'no after' field.."); + break; + +#if 0 + ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert)); +#endif + break; + } + + /* + * If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional + * checks. + */ + if (depth == 0) { + tls_session_t *ssn = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted = NULL; +#endif + + rad_assert(ssn != NULL); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + /* + * See if there are any untrusted certificates. + * If so, complain about them. + */ + untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx); + if (untrusted) { + if (conf->disallow_untrusted || RDEBUG_ENABLED2) { + int i; + + WARN("Certificate chain - %i cert(s) untrusted", + X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(ctx)); + for (i = sk_X509_num(untrusted); i > 0 ; i--) { + X509 *this_cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i - 1); + + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(this_cert), subject, sizeof(subject)); + subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0'; + + WARN("(TLS) untrusted certificate with depth [%i] subject name %s", + i - 1, subject); + } + } + + if (conf->disallow_untrusted) { + AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": There are untrusted certificates in the certificate chain. Rejecting."); + my_ok = 0; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer + * against the specified value and fail + * verification if they don't match. + */ + if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_issuer && + (strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) { + AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", + issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer); + my_ok = 0; + } + + /* + * If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the + * cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the + * previous checks passed. + */ + if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) { + if (radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), request, conf->check_cert_cn, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + /* if this fails, fail the verification */ + my_ok = 0; + } else { + RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str); + if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) { + AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", + common_name, cn_str); + my_ok = 0; + } + } + } /* check_cert_cn */ + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + if (my_ok) { + /* + * No OCSP, allow external verification. + */ + if (!conf->ocsp_enable) { + do_verify = true; + + } else { + RDEBUG2("Starting OCSP Request"); + + /* + * If we don't have an issuer, then we can't send + * and OCSP request, but pass the NULL issuer in + * so ocsp_check can decide on the correct + * return code. + */ + issuer_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(ctx); + + /* + * Do the full OCSP checks. + * + * If they fail, don't run the external verify. We don't want + * to allow admins to force authentication success for bad + * certificates. + * + * If the OCSP checks succeed, check whether we still want to + * run the external verification routine. If it's marked as + * "skip verify on OK", then we don't do verify. + */ + my_ok = ocsp_check(request, ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf); + if (my_ok != OCSP_STATUS_FAILED) { + do_verify = !conf->verify_skip_if_ocsp_ok; + } + } + } +#endif + + if ((my_ok != OCSP_STATUS_FAILED) +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + && do_verify +#endif + ) while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) { + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + int fd; + FILE *fp; + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX", + conf->verify_tmp_dir, main_config.name); + fd = mkstemp(filename); + if (fd < 0) { + RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s", + conf->verify_tmp_dir, fr_syserror(errno)); + break; + } + + fp = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (!fp) { + close(fd); + RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s", + filename, fr_syserror(errno)); + break; + } + + if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) { + fclose(fp); + RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file"); + goto do_unlink; + } + fclose(fp); + + if (!pair_make_request("TLS-Client-Cert-Filename", + filename, T_OP_SET)) { + RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename"); + + goto do_unlink; + } + + RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s", conf->verify_client_cert_cmd); + if (radius_exec_program(request, NULL, 0, NULL, request, conf->verify_client_cert_cmd, + request->packet->vps, + true, true, EXEC_TIMEOUT) != 0) { + AUTH(LOG_PREFIX ": Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name); + my_ok = 0; + + } else if (request) { + RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name); + } + + do_unlink: + unlink(filename); + break; + } + + /* + * Track that we've verified the client certificate. + */ + ssn->client_cert_ok = (my_ok == 1); + } /* depth == 0 */ + + /* + * Copy certs to request even on failure, so that the + * user can log them. + */ + if (certs && request && !my_ok) { + fr_pair_add(&request->packet->vps, fr_pair_list_copy(request->packet, *certs)); + } + + if (RDEBUG_ENABLED3) { + RDEBUG3("(TLS) chain-depth : %d", depth); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) error : %d", err); + + if (identity) RDEBUG3("identity : %s", *identity); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) common name : %s", common_name); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) subject : %s", subject); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) issuer : %s", issuer); + RDEBUG3("(TLS) verify return : %d", my_ok); + } + + return (my_ok != 0); +} + + +/* + * Configure a X509 CA store to verify OCSP or client repsonses + * + * - Load the trusted CAs + * - Load the trusted issuer certificates + * - Configure CRLs check if needed + */ +X509_STORE *fr_init_x509_store(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) +{ + X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new(); + + if (store == NULL) return NULL; + + /* Load the CAs we trust */ + if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) + if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Error reading Trusted root CA list \"%s\"", conf->ca_file); + X509_STORE_free(store); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK + if (conf->check_crl) + X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); +#endif +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL + if (conf->check_all_crl) + X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); +#endif + +#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) + X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN); +#endif + + return store; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH +static int set_ecdh_curve(SSL_CTX *ctx, char const *ecdh_curve, bool disable_single_dh_use) +{ + if (!disable_single_dh_use) { + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE); + } + + if (!ecdh_curve) return 0; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL + /* + * A colon-separated list of curves. + */ + if (*ecdh_curve) { + char *list; + + memcpy(&list, &ecdh_curve, sizeof(list)); /* const issues */ + + if (SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx, list) == 0) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unknown ecdh_curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve); + return -1; + } + } + + (void) SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); +#else + /* + * Use APIs for older versions of OpenSSL. + */ + { + int nid; + EC_KEY *ecdh; + + nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdh_curve); + if (!nid) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unknown ecdh_curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve); + return -1; + } + + ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); + if (!ecdh) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Unable to create new curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve); + return -1; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh); + + EC_KEY_free(ecdh); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CRYPTO_H) && defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_SET_LOCKING_CALLBACK) +#define TLS_UNUSED +#else +#define TLS_UNUSED UNUSED +#endif + +/** Add all the default ciphers and message digests reate our context. + * + * This should be called exactly once from main, before reading the main config + * or initialising any modules. + */ +int tls_global_init(TLS_UNUSED bool spawn_flag, TLS_UNUSED bool check) +{ + SSL_load_error_strings(); /* readable error messages (examples show call before library_init) */ + SSL_library_init(); /* initialize library */ + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* required for SHA2 in OpenSSL < 0.9.8o and 1.0.0.a */ + CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, 0); + + /* + * Initialize the index for the certificates. + */ + fr_tls_ex_index_certs = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_CRYPTO_H) && defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_SET_LOCKING_CALLBACK) + /* + * If we're linking with OpenSSL too, then we need + * to set up the mutexes and enable the thread callbacks. + * + * 'check' and not 'check_config' because it's a global, + * and we don't want to have tls.c depend on globals. + */ + if (spawn_flag && !check && (tls_mutexes_init() < 0)) { + ERROR("(TLS) FATAL: Failed to set up SSL mutexes"); + return -1; + } +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L + /* + * Load the default provider for most algorithms + */ + openssl_default_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(NULL, "default"); + if (!openssl_default_provider) { + ERROR("(TLS) Failed loading default provider"); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Needed for MD4 + * + * https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man7/migration_guide.html#Legacy-Algorithms + */ + openssl_legacy_provider = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(NULL, "legacy"); + if (!openssl_legacy_provider) { + ERROR("(TLS) Failed loading legacy provider"); + return -1; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL_VERSION_CHECK +/** Check for vulnerable versions of libssl + * + * @param acknowledged The highest CVE number a user has confirmed is not present in the system's libssl. + * @return 0 if the CVE specified by the user matches the most recent CVE we have, else -1. + */ +int tls_global_version_check(char const *acknowledged) +{ + uint64_t v; + bool bad = false; + size_t i; + + if (strcmp(acknowledged, "yes") == 0) return 0; + + /* Check for bad versions */ + v = (uint64_t) SSLeay(); + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(libssl_defects) / sizeof(*libssl_defects)); i++) { + libssl_defect_t *defect = &libssl_defects[i]; + + if ((v >= defect->low) && (v <= defect->high)) { + /* + * If the CVE is acknowledged, allow it. + */ + if (!bad && (strcmp(acknowledged, defect->id) == 0)) return 0; + + ERROR("Refusing to start with libssl version %s (in range %s)", + ssl_version(), ssl_version_range(defect->low, defect->high)); + ERROR("Security advisory %s (%s)", defect->id, defect->name); + ERROR("%s", defect->comment); + + /* + * Only warn about the first one... + */ + if (!bad) { + INFO("Once you have verified libssl has been correctly patched, " + "set security.allow_vulnerable_openssl = '%s'", defect->id); + + bad = true; + } + } + } + + if (bad) return -1; + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/** Free any memory alloced by libssl + * + */ +void tls_global_cleanup(void) +{ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L + ERR_remove_state(0); +#elif OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE_cleanup(); +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L + if (openssl_default_provider && !OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(openssl_default_provider)) { + ERROR("Failed unloading default provider"); + } + openssl_default_provider = NULL; + + if (openssl_legacy_provider && !OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(openssl_legacy_provider)) { + ERROR("Failed unloading legacy provider"); + } + openssl_legacy_provider = NULL; +#endif + + CONF_modules_unload(1); + ERR_free_strings(); + EVP_cleanup(); + CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); +} + + +/* + * Map version strings to OpenSSL macros. + */ +static const FR_NAME_NUMBER version2int[] = { + { "1.0", TLS1_VERSION }, +#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION + { "1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION }, +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION + { "1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION }, +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + { "1.3", TLS1_3_VERSION }, +#endif + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION +#define CHECK_FOR_PSK_CERTS (1) +#endif +#endif + +/** Create SSL context + * + * - Load the trusted CAs + * - Load the Private key & the certificate + * - Set the Context options & Verify options + */ +SSL_CTX *tls_init_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int client, char const *chain_file, char const *private_key_file) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + X509_STORE *certstore; + int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; + int ctx_options = 0, ctx_available = 0; + int type; +#ifdef CHECK_FOR_PSK_CERTS + bool psk_and_certs = false; +#endif + int min_version; + int max_version; + + /* + * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't + * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX + * certificates. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256 + EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); +#endif + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()); /* which is really "all known SSL / TLS methods". Idiots. */ + if (!ctx) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed creating OpenSSL context"); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Save the config on the context so that callbacks which + * only get SSL_CTX* e.g. session persistence, can get it + */ + SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, conf); + + /* + * Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded + */ + if (conf->file_type) { + type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; + } else { + type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1; + } + + /* + * Set the password to load private key + */ + if (conf->private_key_password) { +#ifdef __APPLE__ + /* + * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check + * for our special string which indicates we should get the password + * programmatically. + */ + char const* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin"; + if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password, special_string, strlen(special_string)) == 0) { + char cmd[256]; + char *password; + long const max_password_len = 128; + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1, "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"", + conf->private_key_file); + + DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd); + + FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r"); + if (!cmd_pipe) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": %s command failed: Unable to get private_key_password", cmd); + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file); + return NULL; + } + + rad_const_free(conf->private_key_password); + password = talloc_array(conf, char, max_password_len); + if (!password) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Can't allocate space for private_key_password"); + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file); + pclose(cmd_pipe); + return NULL; + } + + fgets(password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe); + pclose(cmd_pipe); + + /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */ + password[strlen(password) - 1] = '\0'; + + DEBUG3(LOG_PREFIX ": Password from command = \"%s\"", password); + conf->private_key_password = password; + } +#endif + + { + char *password; + + memcpy(&password, &conf->private_key_password, sizeof(password)); + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, password); + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password); + } + } + +#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + /* + * A dynamic query exists. There MUST NOT be a + * statically configured identity and password. + */ + if (conf->psk_query) { + if (!*conf->psk_query) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be empty"); + return NULL; + } + + if (conf->psk_identity && *conf->psk_identity) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_identity and psk_query cannot be used at the same time."); + return NULL; + } + + if (conf->psk_password && *conf->psk_password) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_password and psk_query cannot be used at the same time."); + return NULL; + } + + if (client) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_query cannot be used for outgoing connections"); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Now check that if PSK is being used, that the config is valid. + */ + } else if (conf->psk_identity) { + if (!*conf->psk_identity) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_identity is empty"); + return NULL; + } + + + if (!conf->psk_password || !*conf->psk_password) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_identity is set, but there is no psk_password"); + return NULL; + } + + } else if (conf->psk_password) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Invalid PSK Configuration: psk_password is set, but there is no psk_identity"); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Set the server PSK callback if necessary. + */ + if (!client && (conf->psk_identity || conf->psk_query)) { + SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_callback); + } + + /* + * Do more sanity checking if we have a PSK identity. We + * check the password, and convert it to it's final form. + */ + if (conf->psk_identity) { + size_t psk_len, hex_len; + uint8_t buffer[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + + if (client) { + SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, + psk_client_callback); + } + + if (!conf->psk_password || !*conf->psk_password) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase cannot be empty"); + return NULL; + } + + psk_len = strlen(conf->psk_password); + if (strlen(conf->psk_password) > (2 * PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is too long (max %d)", PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Check the password now, so that we don't have + * errors at run-time. + */ + hex_len = fr_hex2bin(buffer, sizeof(buffer), conf->psk_password, psk_len); + if (psk_len != (2 * hex_len)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": psk_hexphrase is not all hex"); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef CHECK_FOR_PSK_CERTS + /* + * RFC 8446 says: + * + * When authenticating via a certificate, the server will send the + * Certificate (Section 4.4.2) and CertificateVerify (Section 4.4.3) + * messages. In TLS 1.3 as defined by this document, either a PSK or + * a certificate is always used, but not both. Future documents may + * define how to use them together. + */ + if (((conf->psk_identity || conf->psk_password || conf->psk_query)) && + (conf->certificate_file || conf->private_key_password || conf->private_key_file)) { + psk_and_certs = true; + } +#endif + + goto post_ca; + } +#else + (void) client; /* -Wunused */ +#endif + + /* + * Load our keys and certificates + * + * If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use + * of cert chain authentication using openssl api call + * SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how + * the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from + * openSSL.org + */ + if (!chain_file) chain_file = conf->certificate_file; + if (!chain_file) goto load_ca; + + if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { + if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, chain_file))) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed reading certificate file \"%s\"", + chain_file); + return NULL; + } + + } else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, chain_file, type))) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed reading certificate file \"%s\"", + chain_file); + return NULL; + } + +load_ca: + /* + * Load the CAs we trust and configure CRL checks if needed + */ + if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) { + if ((certstore = fr_init_x509_store(conf)) == NULL ) return NULL; + SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, certstore); + } else { +#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx), X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN); +#endif + } + + if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file)); + + conf->ca_path_last_reload = time(NULL); + conf->old_x509_store = NULL; + + /* + * Disable reloading of cert store if we're not using CA path + */ + if (!conf->ca_path) conf->ca_path_reload_interval = 0; + + if (conf->ca_path_reload_interval > 0 && conf->ca_path_reload_interval < 300) { + DEBUG2("ca_path_reload_interval is set too low, reset it to 300"); + conf->ca_path_reload_interval = 300; + } + + /* Load private key */ + if (!private_key_file) private_key_file = conf->private_key_file; + if (private_key_file) { + if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, private_key_file, type))) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed reading private key file \"%s\"", + private_key_file); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Check if the loaded private key is the right one + */ + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Private key does not match the certificate public key"); + return NULL; + } + } + +#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN +post_ca: +#endif + + /* + * We never want SSLv2 or SSLv3. + */ + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + + /* + * If set then dummy Change Cipher Spec (CCS) messages are sent in + * TLSv1.3. This has the effect of making TLSv1.3 look more like TLSv1.2 + * so that middleboxes that do not understand TLSv1.3 will not drop + * the connection. This isn't needed for EAP-TLS, so we disable it. + * + * EAP (hopefully) does not have middlebox deployments + */ +#ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT + ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT; +#endif + + /* + * SSL_CTX_set_(min|max)_proto_version was included in OpenSSL 1.1.0 + * + * This version already defines macros for TLS1_2_VERSION and + * below, so we don't need to check for them explicitly. + * + * TLS1_3_VERSION is available in OpenSSL 1.1.1. + */ + + /* + * Get the max version from the configuration files. + */ + if (conf->tls_max_version && *conf->tls_max_version) { + max_version = fr_str2int(version2int, conf->tls_max_version, 0); + if (!max_version) { + ERROR("Invalid value for tls_max_version '%s'", conf->tls_max_version); + return NULL; + } + } else { + /* + * Pick the maximum version available at compile + * time. + */ +#if defined(TLS1_3_VERSION) +#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + /* + * RADIUS 1.1 requires TLS 1.3 or later. + */ + if (conf->radiusv11) { + max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + } else +#endif + + + max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; /* yes, we only use TLS 1.3 if it's EXPLICITELY ENABLED */ +#elif defined(TLS1_2_VERSION) + max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; +#elif defined(TLS1_1_VERSION) + max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; +#else + max_version = TLS1_VERSION; +#endif + } + + /* + * Get the min version from the configuration files. + */ + if (conf->tls_min_version && *conf->tls_min_version) { + min_version = fr_str2int(version2int, conf->tls_min_version, 0); + if (!min_version) { + ERROR("Unknown or unsupported value for tls_min_version '%s'", conf->tls_min_version); + return NULL; + } + } else { +#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + /* + * RADIUS 1.1 requires TLS 1.3 or later. + */ + if (conf->radiusv11) { + min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + } else +#endif + /* + * Allow TLS 1.0. It is horribly insecure, but + * some systems still use it. + */ + min_version = TLS1_VERSION; + } + + /* + * Compare the two. + */ + if ((min_version > max_version) || (max_version < min_version)) { + ERROR("tls_min_version '%s' must be <= tls_max_version '%s'", + conf->tls_min_version, conf->tls_max_version); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef CHECK_FOR_PSK_CERTS + /* + * Disable TLS 1.3 when using PSKs and certs. + * This doesn't work. + * + * It's best to disable the offending + * configuration and warn about it. The + * alternative is to have the admin wonder why it + * doesn't work. + * + * Note that the admin can over-ride this by + * setting "min_version = max_version = 1.3" + */ + if (psk_and_certs && + (min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) && (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + radlog(L_DBG | L_WARN, "Disabling TLS 1.3 due to PSK and certificates being configured simultaneously. This is not supported by the standards."); + } +#endif + + /* + * No one should be using TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 any more + * + * If TLS1.2 isn't defined by OpenSSL, then we _know_ + * it's an insecure version of OpenSSL. + */ +#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION + if (max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) +#endif + { + if (rad_debug_lvl) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": The configuration allows TLS 1.0 and/or TLS 1.1. We STRONGLY recommned using only TLS 1.2 for security"); + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Please set: tls_min_version = '1.2'"); + } + } + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + /* + * Check min / max against the old-style "disable" flag. + */ + if (conf->disable_tlsv1) { + if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1' is set, but 'min_version = 1.0'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1' is set, but 'max_version = 1.0'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; + } + + if (min_version > TLS1_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; + + ctx_available |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 + /* + * Check min / max against the old-style "disable" flag. + */ + if (conf->disable_tlsv1_1) { + if (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1_1' is set, but 'min_version <= 1.1'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1_1' is set, but 'max_version = 1.1'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + } + + if (min_version > TLS1_1_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + if (max_version < TLS1_1_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + + ctx_available |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 + /* + * Check min / max against the old-style "disable" flag. + */ + if (conf->disable_tlsv1_2) { + if (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1_2' is set, but 'min_version <= 1.2'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": 'disable_tlsv1_1' is set, but 'max_version = 1.2'. These cannot both be true."); + return NULL; + } + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; + } + ctx_available |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; + + if (min_version > TLS1_2_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; + if (max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 + ctx_available |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; + if (min_version > TLS1_3_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; + if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif + + +#ifdef WITH_RADIUSV11 + /* + * RADIUS 1.1 requires TLS 1.3 or later. + */ + if (conf->radiusv11 && (min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Please set 'tls_min_version = 1.2' or greater to use 'radiusv1_1 = true'"); + return NULL; + } +#endif + + /* + * Set the cipher list if we were told to do so. We do + * this before setting min/max TLS version. In a sane + * world, OpenSSL would error out if we set the max TLS + * version to something which was unsupported by the + * current security level. However, this is OpenSSL. If + * you set conflicting options, it doesn't give an error. + * Instead, it just picks something to do. + */ + if (conf->cipher_list) { + if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed setting cipher list"); + return NULL; + } + } + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + if (conf->sigalgs_list) { + char *list; + + memcpy(&list, &(conf->sigalgs_list), sizeof(list)); /* const issues */ + + if (SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, list) == 0) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed setting signature list '%s'", conf->sigalgs_list); + return NULL; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Tell OpenSSL PRETTY PLEASE MAY WE USE TLS 1.1. + * + * Because saying "use TLS 1.1" isn't enough. We have to + * send it flowers and cake. + */ + if (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + int seclevel = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); + int required;; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L + required = 0; +#else + required = 1; +#endif + + if (seclevel != required) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": In order to use TLS 1.0 and/or TLS 1.1, you likely need to set: cipher_list = \"DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=%d\"", required); + } + +#else + /* + * No API to get the security level. Just guess based on the string in the cipher_list. + */ + if (conf->cipher_list && + !strstr(conf->cipher_list, "DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1")) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": In order to use TLS 1.0 and/or TLS 1.1, you likely need to set: cipher_list = \"DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1\""); + } +#endif + } + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L + if (conf->disable_tlsv1) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Please use 'tls_min_version' and 'tls_max_version' instead of 'disable_tlsv1'"); + } + if (conf->disable_tlsv1_1) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Please use 'tls_min_version' and 'tls_max_version' instead of 'disable_tlsv1_1'"); + } + if (conf->disable_tlsv1_2) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Please use 'tls_min_version' and 'tls_max_version' instead of 'disable_tlsv1_2'"); + } + + ctx_options &= ~(ctx_available); /* clear these flags, as they're not needed. */ + + if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version)) { + ERROR("Failed setting TLS maximum version"); + return NULL; + } + if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version)) { + ERROR("Failed setting TLS minimum version"); + return NULL; + } +#endif /* OpenSSL version < 1.1.0 */ + + if ((ctx_options & ctx_available) == ctx_available) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": You have disabled all available TLS versions. EAP will not work"); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Cache min / max TLS version so that we can + * programatically disable TLS 1.3 for TTLS, PEAP, and + * FAST. + */ + conf->min_version = min_version; + conf->max_version = max_version; + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; +#endif + + if (!conf->disable_single_dh_use) { + /* + * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent + * small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always + * using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the + * computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not + * very large. + */ + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE; + } + + /* + * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues + * in Windows Vista client. + * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt + * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html + */ + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; + + if (conf->cipher_server_preference) { + /* + * SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE to follow best practice + * of nowday's TLS: do not allow poorly-selected ciphers from + * client to take preference + */ + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options); + + /* + * TLS 1.3 introduces the concept of early data (also known as zero + * round trip data or 0-RTT data). Early data allows a client to send + * data to a server in the first round trip of a connection, without + * waiting for the TLS handshake to complete if the client has spoken + * to the same server recently. This doesn't work for EAP, so we + * disable early data. + * + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L + SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, 0); +#endif + + /* + * TODO: Set the RSA & DH + * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa); + * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh); + */ + + /* + * set the message callback to identify the type of + * message. For every new session, there can be a + * different callback argument. + * + * SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg); + */ + + /* + * Set eliptical curve crypto configuration. + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (set_ecdh_curve(ctx, conf->ecdh_curve, conf->disable_single_dh_use) < 0) { + return NULL; + } +#endif +#endif + + /* + * OpenSSL will automatically create certificate chains, + * unless we tell it to not do that. The problem is that + * it sometimes gets the chains right from a certificate + * signature view, but wrong from the clients view. + */ + if (!conf->auto_chain) { + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN); + } + + /* Set Info callback */ + SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info); + + /* + * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption. + */ + if (conf->session_cache_enable) { + /* + * Cache sessions on disk if requested. + */ + if (conf->session_cache_path && *conf->session_cache_path) { + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session); + } + + /* + * Or run the cache through a virtual server. + */ + if (conf->session_cache_server && *conf->session_cache_server) { + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_cache_save); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_cache_load); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_cache_clear); + } + + SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); + if (fr_tls_ex_index_vps < 0) + fr_tls_ex_index_vps = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + + /* + * Check the certificates for revocation. + */ +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK + if (conf->check_crl) { + certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); + if (certstore == NULL) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Error reading Certificate Store"); + return NULL; + } + X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); + +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS + /* + * If set, delta CRLs (if present) are used to + * determine certificate status. If not set + * deltas are ignored. + * + * So it's safe to always set this flag. + */ + X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS); +#endif + +#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL + if (conf->check_all_crl) + X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); +#endif + } +#endif + + /* + * Set verify modes + * Always verify the peer certificate + */ + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT; + verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify); + + if (conf->verify_depth) { + SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth); + } + +#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER + /* Load randomness */ + if (conf->random_file) { + if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*10))) { + tls_error_log(NULL, "Failed loading randomness"); + return NULL; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Setup session caching + */ + if (conf->session_cache_enable) { + /* + * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration. + */ + if (conf->session_id_name) { + snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id), + "FR eap %s", conf->session_id_name); + } else { + snprintf(conf->session_context_id, sizeof(conf->session_context_id), + "FR eap %p", conf); + } + + /* + * Cache it, DON'T auto-clear it, and disable the internal OpenSSL session cache. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); + + SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, + (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id, + (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id)); + + /* + * Our lifetime is in hours, this is in seconds. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_lifetime * 3600); + + /* + * Set the maximum number of entries in the + * session cache. + */ + SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(ctx, 1); +#endif + + } else { + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* + * This controls the number of stateful or stateless tickets + * generated with TLS 1.3. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 it's also + * required to disable sending session tickets, + * SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF is not good enough. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(ctx, 0); +#endif + } + + return ctx; +} + + +/* + * Free TLS client/server config + * Should not be called outside this code, as a callback is + * added to automatically free the data when the CONF_SECTION + * is freed. + */ +static int _tls_server_conf_free(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) +{ + if (conf->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(conf->ctx); + + if (conf->cache_ht) fr_hash_table_free(conf->cache_ht); + + pthread_mutex_destroy(&conf->mutex); + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + if (conf->ocsp_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->ocsp_store); + conf->ocsp_store = NULL; +#endif + + if (conf->realms) fr_hash_table_free(conf->realms); + +#ifndef NDEBUG + memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf)); +#endif + return 0; +} + +fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + + conf = talloc_zero(ctx, fr_tls_server_conf_t); + if (!conf) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Out of memory"); + return NULL; + } + + talloc_set_destructor(conf, _tls_server_conf_free); + + return conf; +} + +static uint32_t store_hash(void const *data) +{ + DICT_ATTR const *da = data; + return fr_hash(&da, sizeof(da)); +} + +static int store_cmp(void const *a, void const *b) +{ + DICT_ATTR const *one = a; + DICT_ATTR const *two = b; + + return (one < two) - (one > two); +} + +static uint32_t realm_hash(void const *data) +{ + fr_realm_ctx_t const *r = data; + + return fr_hash_string(r->name); +} + +static int realm_cmp(void const *a, void const *b) +{ + fr_realm_ctx_t const *one = a; + fr_realm_ctx_t const *two = b; + + return strcmp(one->name, two->name); +} + +static void realm_free(void *data) +{ + fr_realm_ctx_t *r = data; + + SSL_CTX_free(r->ctx); +} + +static int tls_realms_load(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf) +{ + fr_hash_table_t *ht; + DIR *dir; + struct dirent *dp; + char buffer[PATH_MAX]; + char buffer2[PATH_MAX]; + + ht = fr_hash_table_create(realm_hash, realm_cmp, realm_free); + if (!ht) return -1; + + dir = opendir(conf->realm_dir); + if (!dir) { + ERROR("Error reading directory %s: %s", conf->realm_dir, fr_syserror(errno)); + error: + if (dir) closedir(dir); + fr_hash_table_free(ht); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Read only the PEM files + */ + while ((dp = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + char *p; + struct stat stat_buf; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + fr_realm_ctx_t *r; + char const *private_key_file = buffer; + + if (dp->d_name[0] == '.') continue; + + p = strrchr(dp->d_name, '.'); + if (!p) continue; + + if (memcmp(p, ".pem", 5) != 0) continue; /* must END in .pem */ + + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s/%s", conf->realm_dir, dp->d_name); /* ignore directories */ + if ((stat(buffer, &stat_buf) != 0) || + S_ISDIR(stat_buf.st_mode)) continue; + + strcpy(buffer2, buffer); + p = strchr(buffer2, '.'); /* which must be there... */ + if (!p) continue; + + /* + * If there's a key file, then use that. + * Otherwise assume that the private key is in + * the chain file. + */ + strcpy(p, ".key"); + if (stat(buffer2, &stat_buf) != 0) private_key_file = buffer2; + + ctx = tls_init_ctx(conf, 1, buffer, private_key_file); + if (!ctx) goto error; + + r = talloc_zero(conf, fr_realm_ctx_t); + if (!r) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + goto error; + } + + r->name = talloc_strdup(r, buffer); + r->ctx = ctx; + + if (fr_hash_table_insert(ht, r) < 0) { + ERROR("Failed inserting certificate file %s into hash table", buffer); + goto error; + } + } + + conf->realms = ht; + closedir(dir); + + return 0; +} + + +fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + + /* + * If cs has already been parsed there should be a cached copy + * of conf already stored, so just return that. + */ + conf = cf_data_find(cs, "tls-conf"); + if (conf) { + DEBUG(LOG_PREFIX ": Using cached TLS configuration from previous invocation"); + return conf; + } + + conf = tls_server_conf_alloc(cs); + + if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_server_config) < 0) { + error: + talloc_free(conf); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Save people from their own stupidity. + */ + if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100; + + /* + * Disallow sessions of more than 7 days, as per RFC + * 8446. + * + * Note that we also enforce this on TLS 1.2, etc. + * Because there's just no reason to have month-long TLS + * sessions. + */ + if (conf->session_lifetime > (7 * 24)) conf->session_lifetime = 7 * 24; + + /* + * Only check for certificate things if we don't have a + * PSK query. + */ +#ifdef PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + if (conf->psk_identity) { + if (conf->private_key_file) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Ignoring private key file due to psk_identity being used"); + } + + if (conf->certificate_file) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Ignoring certificate file due to psk_identity being used"); + } + + } else +#endif + { + if (!conf->private_key_file) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": TLS Server requires a private key file"); + goto error; + } + + if (!conf->certificate_file) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": TLS Server requires a certificate file"); + goto error; + } + } + + /* + * Initialize configuration mutex + */ + pthread_mutex_init(&conf->mutex, NULL); + + /* + * Initialize TLS + */ + conf->ctx = tls_init_ctx(conf, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (conf->ctx == NULL) { + goto error; + } + + if (conf->session_cache_enable) { + CONF_SECTION *subcs; + CONF_ITEM *ci; + + subcs = cf_section_sub_find(cs, "cache"); + if (!subcs) goto skip_list; + subcs = cf_section_sub_find(subcs, "store"); + if (!subcs) goto skip_list; + + /* + * Largely taken from rlm_detail for laziness. + */ + conf->cache_ht = fr_hash_table_create(store_hash, store_cmp, NULL); + + for (ci = cf_item_find_next(subcs, NULL); + ci != NULL; + ci = cf_item_find_next(subcs, ci)) { + char const *attr; + DICT_ATTR const *da; + + if (!cf_item_is_pair(ci)) continue; + + attr = cf_pair_attr(cf_item_to_pair(ci)); + if (!attr) continue; /* pair-anoia */ + + da = dict_attrbyname(attr); + if (!da) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": TLS Server requires a certificate file"); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Be kind to minor mistakes. + */ + if (fr_hash_table_finddata(conf->cache_ht, da)) { + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Ignoring duplicate entry '%s'", attr); + continue; + } + + + if (!fr_hash_table_insert(conf->cache_ht, da)) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed inserting '%s' into cache list", attr); + goto error; + } + } + + /* + * If we didn't suppress anything, delete the hash table. + */ + if (fr_hash_table_num_elements(conf->cache_ht) == 0) { + fr_hash_table_free(conf->cache_ht); + conf->cache_ht = NULL; + } + } + +skip_list: + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H + /* + * Initialize OCSP Revocation Store + */ + if (conf->ocsp_enable) { + conf->ocsp_store = fr_init_x509_store(conf); + if (conf->ocsp_store == NULL) goto error; + } +#endif /*HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H*/ + + { + char *dh_file; + + memcpy(&dh_file, &conf->dh_file, sizeof(dh_file)); + if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, dh_file) < 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) { + if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", + conf->verify_tmp_dir, fr_syserror(errno)); + goto error; + } + } + + if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) { + ERROR(LOG_PREFIX ": You MUST set the 'tmpdir' directory in order to use '%s' cmd", conf->verify_client_cert_cmd); + goto error; + } + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 + /* + * OpenSSL 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g get the MS-MPPE keys wrong. + */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010106L) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1010107L) + conf->disable_tlsv1_2 = true; + WARN(LOG_PREFIX ": Disabling TLSv1.2 due to OpenSSL bugs"); +#endif +#endif + + /* + * Load certificates and private keys from the realm directory. + */ + if (conf->realm_dir && (tls_realms_load(conf) < 0)) goto error; + + /* + * Cache conf in cs in case we're asked to parse this again. + */ + cf_data_add(cs, "tls-conf", conf, NULL); + + return conf; +} + +fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_client_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs) +{ + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + + conf = cf_data_find(cs, "tls-conf"); + if (conf) { + DEBUG2(LOG_PREFIX ": Using cached TLS configuration from previous invocation"); + return conf; + } + + conf = tls_server_conf_alloc(cs); + + if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_client_config) < 0) { + error: + talloc_free(conf); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Save people from their own stupidity. + */ + if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100; + + /* + * Initialize TLS + */ + conf->ctx = tls_init_ctx(conf, 1, NULL, NULL); + if (conf->ctx == NULL) { + goto error; + } + + { + char *dh_file; + + memcpy(&dh_file, &conf->dh_file, sizeof(dh_file)); + if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, dh_file) < 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + cf_data_add(cs, "tls-conf", conf, NULL); + + return conf; +} + + +int tls_success(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) +{ + VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL; + fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf; + TALLOC_CTX *talloc_ctx; + + conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF); + rad_assert(conf != NULL); + + talloc_ctx = SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC); + + /* + * If there's no session resumption, delete the entry + * from the cache. This means either it's disabled + * globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to + * disable it for this user. + * + * This also means you can't turn it on just for one + * user. + */ + if ((!ssn->allow_session_resumption) || + (((vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_ALLOW_SESSION_RESUMPTION, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) && + (vp->vp_integer == 0))) { + SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, + ssn->ssl_session); + ssn->allow_session_resumption = false; + + /* + * If we're in a resumed session and it's + * not allowed, + */ + if (SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) { + RDEBUG("(TLS) cache - Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is administratively disabled."); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the + * user data in the cache. + */ + } else if ((!SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) || ssn->session_not_resumed) { + VALUE_PAIR **certs; + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + + tls_session_id(ssn->ssl_session, buffer, MAX_SESSION_SIZE); + + RDEBUG("(TLS) cache - Setting up attributes for session resumption"); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_DOMAIN, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->packet->vps, PW_EAP_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + vp = fr_pair_list_copy_by_num(talloc_ctx, request->reply->vps, PW_CACHED_SESSION_POLICY, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) fr_pair_add(&vps, vp); + + if (conf->cache_ht) { + vp_cursor_t cursor; + + /* Write each attribute/value to the log file */ + for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &request->reply->vps); + vp; + vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { + VALUE_PAIR *copy; + + if (!fr_hash_table_finddata(conf->cache_ht, vp->da)) { + continue; + } + + copy = fr_pair_copy(talloc_ctx, vp); + if (copy) fr_pair_add(&vps, copy); + } + } + + /* + * Hmm... the certs should probably be session data. + */ + certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); + if (certs) { + /* + * @todo: some go into reply, others into + * request + */ + fr_pair_add(&vps, fr_pair_list_copy(talloc_ctx, *certs)); + + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(vps, PW_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_EXPIRATION, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + time_t expires; + + if (ocsp_asn1time_to_epoch(&expires, vp->vp_strvalue) < 0) { + RDEBUG2("Failed getting certificate expiration, removing cache entry for session %s", buffer); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl_session); + return -1; + } + + if (expires <= request->timestamp) { + RDEBUG2("Certificate has expired, removing cache entry for session %s", buffer); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl_session); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Account for Session-Timeout, if it's available. + */ + vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_SESSION_TIMEOUT, 0, TAG_ANY); + if (vp) { + if ((request->timestamp + vp->vp_integer) > expires) { + vp->vp_integer = expires - request->timestamp; + RWDEBUG2("(TLS) Updating Session-Timeout to %u, due to impending certificate expiration", + vp->vp_integer); + } + } + } + } + + if (vps) { + SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl_session, fr_tls_ex_index_vps, vps); + rdebug_pair_list(L_DBG_LVL_2, request, vps, " caching "); + + if (conf->session_cache_path) { + /* write the VPs to the cache file */ + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1], buf[1024]; + FILE *vp_file; + + RDEBUG2("Saving session %s in the disk cache", buffer); + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", conf->session_cache_path, + FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + vp_file = fopen(filename, "w"); + if (vp_file == NULL) { + RWDEBUG("(TLS) Could not write session VPs to persistent cache: %s", + fr_syserror(errno)); + } else { + VALUE_PAIR *prev = NULL; + vp_cursor_t cursor; + /* generate a dummy user-style entry which is easy to read back */ + fprintf(vp_file, "# SSL cached session\n"); + fprintf(vp_file, "%s\n\t", buffer); + + for (vp = fr_cursor_init(&cursor, &vps); + vp; + vp = fr_cursor_next(&cursor)) { + /* + * Terminate the previous line. + */ + if (prev) fprintf(vp_file, ",\n\t"); + + /* + * Write this one. + */ + vp_prints(buf, sizeof(buf), vp); + fputs(buf, vp_file); + prev = vp; + } + + /* + * Terminate the final line. + */ + fprintf(vp_file, "\n"); + fclose(vp_file); + } + + } else if (conf->session_cache_server) { + cbtls_cache_save_vps(ssn->ssl, ssn->ssl_session, vps); + + } else { + RDEBUG("Failed to find 'persist_dir' in TLS configuration. Session will not be cached on disk."); + } + } else { + RDEBUG2("No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for session %s", buffer); + SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl_session); + } + + /* + * Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached reply. + */ + } else { + RDEBUG("(TLS) cache - Refreshing entry for session resumption"); + + /* + * The "restore VPs from OpenSSL cache" code is + * now in eaptls_process() + */ + if (conf->session_cache_path) { + char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + /* + * OpenSSL frees the underlying session out from + * under us in TLS 1.3. + */ + if (SSL_version(ssn->ssl) == TLS1_3_VERSION) ssn->ssl_session = SSL_get_session(ssn->ssl); +#endif +#endif + + tls_session_id(ssn->ssl_session, buffer, MAX_SESSION_SIZE); + + /* "touch" the cached session/vp file */ + char filename[3 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1]; + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.asn1", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + utime(filename, NULL); + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s%c%s.vps", + conf->session_cache_path, FR_DIR_SEP, buffer); + utime(filename, NULL); + } + + if (conf->session_cache_server) { + cbtls_cache_refresh(ssn->ssl, ssn->ssl_session); + } + + /* + * Mark the request as resumed. + */ + pair_make_request("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET); + RDEBUG(" &request:EAP-Session-Resumed := 1"); + } + + return 0; +} + + +void tls_fail(tls_session_t *ssn) +{ + /* + * Force the session to NOT be cached. + */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl_session); +} + +fr_tls_status_t tls_application_data(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) + +{ + int err; + VALUE_PAIR **certs; + + /* + * Decrypt the complete record. + */ + if (ssn->dirty_in.used > 0) { + err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, + ssn->dirty_in.used); + if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) { + REDEBUG("(TLS) Failed writing %zd bytes to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used, err); + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + } + + record_init(&ssn->dirty_in); + } + + /* + * tls_handshake_recv() may read application data. So + * don't touch clean_out. But only if the BIO_write() + * above didn't do anything. + */ + else if (ssn->clean_out.used > 0) { + RDEBUG("(TLS) We already have %zd bytes of application data, processing it.", + (ssn->clean_out.used)); + goto add_certs; + } + + /* + * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the + * SSL session, and put it into the decrypted + * data buffer. + */ + err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used, + sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used); + if (err <= 0) { + int code; + + RDEBUG3("(TLS) SSL_read Error"); + + code = SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, err); + switch (code) { + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + if (ssn->clean_out.used > 0) { /* just process what application data we have */ + err = 0; + break; + } + + RDEBUG("(TLS) OpenSSL says that it needs to read more data."); + return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS; + + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + if (ssn->clean_out.used > 0) { /* just process what application data we have */ + err = 0; + break; + } + + REDEBUG("(TLS) Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE"); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + RDEBUG2("(TLS) No application data received. Assuming handshake is continuing..."); + err = 0; + break; + + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Other end closed the TLS tunnel."); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + + default: + REDEBUG("(TLS) Error in fragmentation logic - code %d", code); + tls_error_io_log(request, ssn, err, "Failed reading application data from OpenSSL"); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + } + } + + /* + * Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data + */ + ssn->clean_out.used += err; + +add_certs: + /* + * Add the certificates to intermediate packets, so that + * the inner tunnel policies can use them. + */ + certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs); + + if (certs) fr_pair_add(&request->packet->vps, fr_pair_list_copy(request->packet, *certs)); + + return FR_TLS_OK; +} + + +/* + * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier + * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success + * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure + * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment + */ +fr_tls_status_t tls_ack_handler(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request) +{ + if (ssn == NULL){ + REDEBUG("(TLS) Unexpected ACK received: No ongoing SSL session"); + return FR_TLS_INVALID; + } + if (!ssn->info.initialized) { + RDEBUG("(TLS) No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data"); + return FR_TLS_REQUEST; + } + + if ((ssn->info.content_type == handshake) && (ssn->info.origin == 0)) { + REDEBUG("(TLS) Unexpected ACK received: We sent no previous messages"); + return FR_TLS_INVALID; + } + + switch (ssn->info.content_type) { + case alert: + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Peer ACKed our alert"); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + + case handshake: + if (ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Peer ACKed our handshake fragment"); + /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */ + return FR_TLS_REQUEST; + } + + if (ssn->is_init_finished || SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) { + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Peer ACKed our handshake fragment. handshake is finished"); + + /* + * From now on all the content is + * application data set it here as nobody else + * sets it. + */ + ssn->info.content_type = application_data; + return FR_TLS_SUCCESS; + } /* else more data to send */ + + REDEBUG("(TLS) Cannot continue, as the peer is misbehaving."); + return FR_TLS_FAIL; + + case application_data: + RDEBUG2("(TLS) Peer ACKed our application data fragment"); + return FR_TLS_REQUEST; + + /* + * For the rest of the conditions, switch over + * to the default section below. + */ + default: + REDEBUG("(TLS) Invalid ACK received: %d", ssn->info.content_type); + return FR_TLS_INVALID; + } +} +#endif /* WITH_TLS */ + -- cgit v1.2.3