Adding upstream version 1:2.45.1.upstream/1%2.45.1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 66 insertions, 138 deletions

diff --git a/fsck.c b/fsck.c
index 6a0bbc5..8ef9621 100644
--- a/fsck.c
+++ b/fsck.c
@@ -16,12 +16,10 @@
 #include "refs.h"
 #include "url.h"
 #include "utf8.h"
-#include "decorate.h"
 #include "oidset.h"
 #include "packfile.h"
 #include "submodule-config.h"
 #include "config.h"
-#include "credential.h"
 #include "help.h"
 
 static ssize_t max_tree_entry_len = 4096;
@@ -329,7 +327,8 @@ static int fsck_walk_tree(struct tree *tree, void *data, struct fsck_options *op
 		return -1;
 
 	name = fsck_get_object_name(options, &tree->object.oid);
-	if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, tree->buffer, tree->size, 0))
+	if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, &tree->object.oid,
+				  tree->buffer, tree->size, 0))
 		return -1;
 	while (tree_entry_gently(&desc, &entry)) {
 		struct object *obj;
@@ -600,7 +599,8 @@ static int fsck_tree(const struct object_id *tree_oid,
 	const char *o_name;
 	struct name_stack df_dup_candidates = { NULL };
 
-	if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, buffer, size, TREE_DESC_RAW_MODES)) {
+	if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, tree_oid, buffer, size,
+				  TREE_DESC_RAW_MODES)) {
 		retval += report(options, tree_oid, OBJ_TREE,
 				 FSCK_MSG_BAD_TREE,
 				 "cannot be parsed as a tree");
@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ static int fsck_tree(const struct object_id *tree_oid,
 				retval += report(options, tree_oid, OBJ_TREE,
 						 FSCK_MSG_MAILMAP_SYMLINK,
 						 ".mailmap is a symlink");
+			oidset_insert(&options->symlink_targets_found,
+				      entry_oid);
 		}
 
 		if ((backslash = strchr(name, '\\'))) {
@@ -1048,138 +1050,6 @@ done:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int starts_with_dot_slash(const char *const path)
-{
-	return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_SLASH |
-				PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
-}
-
-static int starts_with_dot_dot_slash(const char *const path)
-{
-	return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_DOT_SLASH |
-				PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
-}
-
-static int submodule_url_is_relative(const char *url)
-{
-	return starts_with_dot_slash(url) || starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url);
-}
-
-/*
- * Count directory components that a relative submodule URL should chop
- * from the remote_url it is to be resolved against.
- *
- * In other words, this counts "../" components at the start of a
- * submodule URL.
- *
- * Returns the number of directory components to chop and writes a
- * pointer to the next character of url after all leading "./" and
- * "../" components to out.
- */
-static int count_leading_dotdots(const char *url, const char **out)
-{
-	int result = 0;
-	while (1) {
-		if (starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url)) {
-			result++;
-			url += strlen("../");
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (starts_with_dot_slash(url)) {
-			url += strlen("./");
-			continue;
-		}
-		*out = url;
-		return result;
-	}
-}
-/*
- * Check whether a transport is implemented by git-remote-curl.
- *
- * If it is, returns 1 and writes the URL that would be passed to
- * git-remote-curl to the "out" parameter.
- *
- * Otherwise, returns 0 and leaves "out" untouched.
- *
- * Examples:
- *   http::https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
- *   https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
- *   git://example.com/repo.git -> 0
- *
- * This is for use in checking for previously exploitable bugs that
- * required a submodule URL to be passed to git-remote-curl.
- */
-static int url_to_curl_url(const char *url, const char **out)
-{
-	/*
-	 * We don't need to check for case-aliases, "http.exe", and so
-	 * on because in the default configuration, is_transport_allowed
-	 * prevents URLs with those schemes from being cloned
-	 * automatically.
-	 */
-	if (skip_prefix(url, "http::", out) ||
-	    skip_prefix(url, "https::", out) ||
-	    skip_prefix(url, "ftp::", out) ||
-	    skip_prefix(url, "ftps::", out))
-		return 1;
-	if (starts_with(url, "http://") ||
-	    starts_with(url, "https://") ||
-	    starts_with(url, "ftp://") ||
-	    starts_with(url, "ftps://")) {
-		*out = url;
-		return 1;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
-{
-	const char *curl_url;
-
-	if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
-		return -1;
-
-	if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) {
-		char *decoded;
-		const char *next;
-		int has_nl;
-
-		/*
-		 * This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded;
-		 * check for malicious characters.
-		 */
-		decoded = url_decode(url);
-		has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n');
-
-		free(decoded);
-		if (has_nl)
-			return -1;
-
-		/*
-		 * URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite
-		 * the host field and previous components, resolving to
-		 * URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and
-		 * https:///example.com/submodule.git that were
-		 * susceptible to CVE-2020-11008.
-		 */
-		if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 &&
-		    (*next == ':' || *next == '/'))
-			return -1;
-	}
-
-	else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) {
-		struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
-		int ret = 0;
-		if (credential_from_url_gently(&c, curl_url, 1) ||
-		    !*c.host)
-			ret = -1;
-		credential_clear(&c);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
 	const struct object_id *oid;
 	struct fsck_options *options;
@@ -1298,6 +1168,56 @@ static int fsck_blob(const struct object_id *oid, const char *buf,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (oidset_contains(&options->symlink_targets_found, oid)) {
+		const char *ptr = buf;
+		const struct object_id *reported = NULL;
+
+		oidset_insert(&options->symlink_targets_done, oid);
+
+		if (!buf || size > PATH_MAX) {
+			/*
+			 * A missing buffer here is a sign that the caller found the
+			 * blob too gigantic to load into memory. Let's just consider
+			 * that an error.
+			 */
+			return report(options, oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+					FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_LENGTH,
+					"symlink target too long");
+		}
+
+		while (!reported && ptr) {
+			const char *p = ptr;
+			char c, *slash = strchrnul(ptr, '/');
+			char *backslash = memchr(ptr, '\\', slash - ptr);
+
+			c = *slash;
+			*slash = '\0';
+
+			while (!reported && backslash) {
+				*backslash = '\0';
+				if (is_ntfs_dotgit(p))
+					ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+						      FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+						      "symlink target points to git dir");
+				*backslash = '\\';
+				p = backslash + 1;
+				backslash = memchr(p, '\\', slash - p);
+			}
+			if (!reported && is_ntfs_dotgit(p))
+				ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+					      FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+					      "symlink target points to git dir");
+
+			if (!reported && is_hfs_dotgit(ptr))
+				ret |= report(options, reported = oid, OBJ_BLOB,
+					      FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_POINTS_TO_GIT_DIR,
+					      "symlink target points to git dir");
+
+			*slash = c;
+			ptr = c ? slash + 1 : NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1396,6 +1316,10 @@ int fsck_finish(struct fsck_options *options)
 			  FSCK_MSG_GITATTRIBUTES_MISSING, FSCK_MSG_GITATTRIBUTES_BLOB,
 			  options, ".gitattributes");
 
+	ret |= fsck_blobs(&options->symlink_targets_found, &options->symlink_targets_done,
+			  FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_MISSING, FSCK_MSG_SYMLINK_TARGET_BLOB,
+			  options, "<symlink-target>");
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1403,6 +1327,8 @@ int git_fsck_config(const char *var, const char *value,
 		    const struct config_context *ctx, void *cb)
 {
 	struct fsck_options *options = cb;
+	const char *msg_id;
+
 	if (strcmp(var, "fsck.skiplist") == 0) {
 		const char *path;
 		struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
@@ -1416,8 +1342,10 @@ int git_fsck_config(const char *var, const char *value,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (skip_prefix(var, "fsck.", &var)) {
-		fsck_set_msg_type(options, var, value);
+	if (skip_prefix(var, "fsck.", &msg_id)) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		fsck_set_msg_type(options, msg_id, value);
 		return 0;
 	}