Adding upstream version 1:2.43.0.upstream/1%2.43.0

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1119 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48f43c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1119 @@
+#include "git-compat-util.h"
+#include "commit.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "date.h"
+#include "gettext.h"
+#include "run-command.h"
+#include "strbuf.h"
+#include "dir.h"
+#include "ident.h"
+#include "gpg-interface.h"
+#include "path.h"
+#include "sigchain.h"
+#include "tempfile.h"
+#include "alias.h"
+#include "environment.h"
+
+static int git_gpg_config(const char *, const char *,
+			  const struct config_context *, void *);
+
+static void gpg_interface_lazy_init(void)
+{
+	static int done;
+
+	if (done)
+		return;
+	done = 1;
+	git_config(git_gpg_config, NULL);
+}
+
+static char *configured_signing_key;
+static const char *ssh_default_key_command, *ssh_allowed_signers, *ssh_revocation_file;
+static enum signature_trust_level configured_min_trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+
+struct gpg_format {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *program;
+	const char **verify_args;
+	const char **sigs;
+	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
+				    size_t signature_size);
+	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
+			   const char *signing_key);
+	const char *(*get_default_key)(void);
+	const char *(*get_key_id)(void);
+};
+
+static const char *openpgp_verify_args[] = {
+	"--keyid-format=long",
+	NULL
+};
+static const char *openpgp_sigs[] = {
+	"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----",
+	"-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const char *x509_verify_args[] = {
+	NULL
+};
+static const char *x509_sigs[] = {
+	"-----BEGIN SIGNED MESSAGE-----",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const char *ssh_verify_args[] = { NULL };
+static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
+	"-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
+				    size_t signature_size);
+static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
+				    size_t signature_size);
+static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
+			   const char *signing_key);
+static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
+			   const char *signing_key);
+
+static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void);
+
+static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void);
+
+static struct gpg_format gpg_format[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "openpgp",
+		.program = "gpg",
+		.verify_args = openpgp_verify_args,
+		.sigs = openpgp_sigs,
+		.verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer,
+		.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg,
+		.get_default_key = NULL,
+		.get_key_id = NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "x509",
+		.program = "gpgsm",
+		.verify_args = x509_verify_args,
+		.sigs = x509_sigs,
+		.verify_signed_buffer = verify_gpg_signed_buffer,
+		.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_gpg,
+		.get_default_key = NULL,
+		.get_key_id = NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "ssh",
+		.program = "ssh-keygen",
+		.verify_args = ssh_verify_args,
+		.sigs = ssh_sigs,
+		.verify_signed_buffer = verify_ssh_signed_buffer,
+		.sign_buffer = sign_buffer_ssh,
+		.get_default_key = get_default_ssh_signing_key,
+		.get_key_id = get_ssh_key_id,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct gpg_format *use_format = &gpg_format[0];
+
+static struct gpg_format *get_format_by_name(const char *str)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gpg_format); i++)
+		if (!strcmp(gpg_format[i].name, str))
+			return gpg_format + i;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct gpg_format *get_format_by_sig(const char *sig)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gpg_format); i++)
+		for (j = 0; gpg_format[i].sigs[j]; j++)
+			if (starts_with(sig, gpg_format[i].sigs[j]))
+				return gpg_format + i;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void signature_check_clear(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->payload);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->output);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->gpg_status);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->signer);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->fingerprint);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->primary_key_fingerprint);
+}
+
+/* An exclusive status -- only one of them can appear in output */
+#define GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE	(1<<0)
+/* The status includes key identifier */
+#define GPG_STATUS_KEYID	(1<<1)
+/* The status includes user identifier */
+#define GPG_STATUS_UID		(1<<2)
+/* The status includes key fingerprints */
+#define GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT	(1<<3)
+/* The status includes trust level */
+#define GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL	(1<<4)
+
+/* Short-hand for standard exclusive *SIG status with keyid & UID */
+#define GPG_STATUS_STDSIG	(GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE|GPG_STATUS_KEYID|GPG_STATUS_UID)
+
+static struct {
+	char result;
+	const char *check;
+	unsigned int flags;
+} sigcheck_gpg_status[] = {
+	{ 'G', "GOODSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG },
+	{ 'B', "BADSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG },
+	{ 'E', "ERRSIG ", GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE|GPG_STATUS_KEYID },
+	{ 'X', "EXPSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG },
+	{ 'Y', "EXPKEYSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG },
+	{ 'R', "REVKEYSIG ", GPG_STATUS_STDSIG },
+	{ 0, "VALIDSIG ", GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT },
+	{ 0, "TRUST_", GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL },
+};
+
+/* Keep the order same as enum signature_trust_level */
+static struct sigcheck_gpg_trust_level {
+	const char *key;
+	const char *display_key;
+	enum signature_trust_level value;
+} sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[] = {
+	{ "UNDEFINED", "undefined", TRUST_UNDEFINED },
+	{ "NEVER", "never", TRUST_NEVER },
+	{ "MARGINAL", "marginal", TRUST_MARGINAL },
+	{ "FULLY", "fully", TRUST_FULLY },
+	{ "ULTIMATE", "ultimate", TRUST_ULTIMATE },
+};
+
+static void replace_cstring(char **field, const char *line, const char *next)
+{
+	free(*field);
+
+	if (line && next)
+		*field = xmemdupz(line, next - line);
+	else
+		*field = NULL;
+}
+
+static int parse_gpg_trust_level(const char *level,
+				 enum signature_trust_level *res)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level); i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[i].key, level)) {
+			*res = sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[i].value;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *buf = sigc->gpg_status;
+	const char *line, *next;
+	int i, j;
+	int seen_exclusive_status = 0;
+
+	/* Iterate over all lines */
+	for (line = buf; *line; line = strchrnul(line+1, '\n')) {
+		while (*line == '\n')
+			line++;
+		if (!*line)
+			break;
+
+		/* Skip lines that don't start with GNUPG status */
+		if (!skip_prefix(line, "[GNUPG:] ", &line))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Iterate over all search strings */
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_status); i++) {
+			if (skip_prefix(line, sigcheck_gpg_status[i].check, &line)) {
+				/*
+				 * GOODSIG, BADSIG etc. can occur only once for
+				 * each signature.  Therefore, if we had more
+				 * than one then we're dealing with multiple
+				 * signatures.  We don't support them
+				 * currently, and they're rather hard to
+				 * create, so something is likely fishy and we
+				 * should reject them altogether.
+				 */
+				if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_EXCLUSIVE) {
+					if (seen_exclusive_status++)
+						goto error;
+				}
+
+				if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].result)
+					sigc->result = sigcheck_gpg_status[i].result;
+				/* Do we have key information? */
+				if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_KEYID) {
+					next = strchrnul(line, ' ');
+					replace_cstring(&sigc->key, line, next);
+					/* Do we have signer information? */
+					if (*next && (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_UID)) {
+						line = next + 1;
+						next = strchrnul(line, '\n');
+						replace_cstring(&sigc->signer, line, next);
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* Do we have trust level? */
+				if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_TRUST_LEVEL) {
+					/*
+					 * GPG v1 and v2 differs in how the
+					 * TRUST_ lines are written.  Some
+					 * trust lines contain no additional
+					 * space-separated information for v1.
+					 */
+					size_t trust_size = strcspn(line, " \n");
+					char *trust = xmemdupz(line, trust_size);
+
+					if (parse_gpg_trust_level(trust, &sigc->trust_level)) {
+						free(trust);
+						goto error;
+					}
+					free(trust);
+				}
+
+				/* Do we have fingerprint? */
+				if (sigcheck_gpg_status[i].flags & GPG_STATUS_FINGERPRINT) {
+					const char *limit;
+					char **field;
+
+					next = strchrnul(line, ' ');
+					replace_cstring(&sigc->fingerprint, line, next);
+
+					/*
+					 * Skip interim fields.  The search is
+					 * limited to the same line since only
+					 * OpenPGP signatures has a field with
+					 * the primary fingerprint.
+					 */
+					limit = strchrnul(line, '\n');
+					for (j = 9; j > 0; j--) {
+						if (!*next || limit <= next)
+							break;
+						line = next + 1;
+						next = strchrnul(line, ' ');
+					}
+
+					field = &sigc->primary_key_fingerprint;
+					if (!j) {
+						next = strchrnul(line, '\n');
+						replace_cstring(field, line, next);
+					} else {
+						replace_cstring(field, NULL, NULL);
+					}
+				}
+
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return;
+
+error:
+	sigc->result = 'E';
+	/* Clear partial data to avoid confusion */
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->primary_key_fingerprint);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->fingerprint);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->signer);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(sigc->key);
+}
+
+static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
+				    size_t signature_size)
+{
+	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	struct tempfile *temp;
+	int ret;
+	struct strbuf gpg_stdout = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf gpg_stderr = STRBUF_INIT;
+
+	temp = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX");
+	if (!temp)
+		return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file"));
+	if (write_in_full(temp->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 ||
+	    close_tempfile_gently(temp) < 0) {
+		error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"),
+			    temp->filename.buf);
+		delete_tempfile(&temp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	strvec_push(&gpg.args, fmt->program);
+	strvec_pushv(&gpg.args, fmt->verify_args);
+	strvec_pushl(&gpg.args,
+		     "--status-fd=1",
+		     "--verify", temp->filename.buf, "-",
+		     NULL);
+
+	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
+	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+
+	delete_tempfile(&temp);
+
+	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
+	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
+	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);
+
+	parse_gpg_output(sigc);
+
+	strbuf_release(&gpg_stdout);
+	strbuf_release(&gpg_stderr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *line, *principal, *search;
+	char *to_free;
+	char *key = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * ssh-keygen output should be:
+	 * Good "git" signature for PRINCIPAL with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT
+	 *
+	 * or for valid but unknown keys:
+	 * Good "git" signature with RSA key SHA256:FINGERPRINT
+	 *
+	 * Note that "PRINCIPAL" can contain whitespace, "RSA" and
+	 * "SHA256" part could be a different token that names of
+	 * the algorithms used, and "FINGERPRINT" is a hexadecimal
+	 * string.  By finding the last occurence of " with ", we can
+	 * reliably parse out the PRINCIPAL.
+	 */
+	sigc->result = 'B';
+	sigc->trust_level = TRUST_NEVER;
+
+	line = to_free = xmemdupz(sigc->output, strcspn(sigc->output, "\n"));
+
+	if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature for ", &line)) {
+		/* Search for the last "with" to get the full principal */
+		principal = line;
+		do {
+			search = strstr(line, " with ");
+			if (search)
+				line = search + 1;
+		} while (search != NULL);
+		if (line == principal)
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		/* Valid signature and known principal */
+		sigc->result = 'G';
+		sigc->trust_level = TRUST_FULLY;
+		sigc->signer = xmemdupz(principal, line - principal - 1);
+	} else if (skip_prefix(line, "Good \"git\" signature with ", &line)) {
+		/* Valid signature, but key unknown */
+		sigc->result = 'G';
+		sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+	} else {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	key = strstr(line, "key ");
+	if (key) {
+		sigc->fingerprint = xstrdup(strstr(line, "key ") + 4);
+		sigc->key = xstrdup(sigc->fingerprint);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Output did not match what we expected
+		 * Treat the signature as bad
+		 */
+		sigc->result = 'B';
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	free(to_free);
+}
+
+static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
+				    size_t signature_size)
+{
+	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	struct tempfile *buffer_file;
+	int ret = -1;
+	const char *line;
+	char *principal;
+	struct strbuf ssh_principals_out = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
+
+	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
+		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_vtag_tmpXXXXXX");
+	if (!buffer_file)
+		return error_errno(_("could not create temporary file"));
+	if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, signature, signature_size) < 0 ||
+	    close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) {
+		error_errno(_("failed writing detached signature to '%s'"),
+			    buffer_file->filename.buf);
+		delete_tempfile(&buffer_file);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
+	/* Find the principal from the signers */
+	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
+		     "-Y", "find-principals",
+		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
+		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
+		     NULL);
+	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
+			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);
+	if (ret && strstr(ssh_principals_err.buf, "usage:")) {
+		error(_("ssh-keygen -Y find-principals/verify is needed for ssh signature verification (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)"));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ret || !ssh_principals_out.len) {
+		/*
+		 * We did not find a matching principal in the allowedSigners
+		 * Check without validation
+		 */
+		child_process_init(&ssh_keygen);
+		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
+			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
+			     "-n", "git",
+			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
+			     NULL);
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
+				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * Fail on unknown keys
+		 * we still call check-novalidate to display the signature info
+		 */
+		ret = -1;
+	} else {
+		/* Check every principal we found (one per line) */
+		const char *next;
+		for (line = ssh_principals_out.buf;
+		     *line;
+		     line = next) {
+			const char *end_of_text;
+
+			next = end_of_text = strchrnul(line, '\n');
+
+			 /* Did we find a LF, and did we have CR before it? */
+			if (*end_of_text &&
+			    line < end_of_text &&
+			    end_of_text[-1] == '\r')
+				end_of_text--;
+
+			/* Unless we hit NUL, skip over the LF we found */
+			if (*next)
+				next++;
+
+			/* Not all lines are data.  Skip empty ones */
+			if (line == end_of_text)
+				continue;
+
+			/* We now know we have an non-empty line. Process it */
+			principal = xmemdupz(line, end_of_text - line);
+
+			child_process_init(&ssh_keygen);
+			strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
+			strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+			strvec_push(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program);
+			/*
+			 * We found principals
+			 * Try with each until we find a match
+			 */
+			strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-Y", "verify",
+				     "-n", "git",
+				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
+				     "-I", principal,
+				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
+				     NULL);
+
+			if (ssh_revocation_file) {
+				if (file_exists(ssh_revocation_file)) {
+					strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "-r",
+						     ssh_revocation_file, NULL);
+				} else {
+					warning(_("ssh signing revocation file configured but not found: %s"),
+						ssh_revocation_file);
+				}
+			}
+
+			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
+					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
+			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+
+			FREE_AND_NULL(principal);
+
+			if (!ret)
+				ret = !starts_with(ssh_keygen_out.buf, "Good");
+
+			if (!ret)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, '\0');
+	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, '\0');
+	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */
+	strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_principals_err.buf, ssh_principals_err.len);
+	strbuf_add(&ssh_keygen_out, ssh_keygen_err.buf, ssh_keygen_err.len);
+	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&ssh_keygen_out, NULL);
+	sigc->gpg_status = xstrdup(sigc->output);
+
+	parse_ssh_output(sigc);
+
+out:
+	if (buffer_file)
+		delete_tempfile(&buffer_file);
+	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_out);
+	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
+	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
+	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+		signer_header = "committer";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+		signer_header = "tagger";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
+		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
+{
+	struct gpg_format *fmt;
+	int status;
+
+	gpg_interface_lazy_init();
+
+	sigc->result = 'N';
+	sigc->trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+
+	fmt = get_format_by_sig(signature);
+	if (!fmt)
+		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
+
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
+
+	if (status && !sigc->output)
+		return !!status;
+
+	status |= sigc->result != 'G';
+	status |= sigc->trust_level < configured_min_trust_level;
+
+	return !!status;
+}
+
+void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
+{
+	const char *output = flags & GPG_VERIFY_RAW ? sigc->gpg_status :
+							    sigc->output;
+
+	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
+
+	if (output)
+		fputs(output, stderr);
+}
+
+size_t parse_signed_buffer(const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t len = 0;
+	size_t match = size;
+	while (len < size) {
+		const char *eol;
+
+		if (get_format_by_sig(buf + len))
+			match = len;
+
+		eol = memchr(buf + len, '\n', size - len);
+		len += eol ? eol - (buf + len) + 1 : size - len;
+	}
+	return match;
+}
+
+int parse_signature(const char *buf, size_t size, struct strbuf *payload, struct strbuf *signature)
+{
+	size_t match = parse_signed_buffer(buf, size);
+	if (match != size) {
+		strbuf_add(payload, buf, match);
+		remove_signature(payload);
+		strbuf_add(signature, buf + match, size - match);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void set_signing_key(const char *key)
+{
+	gpg_interface_lazy_init();
+
+	free(configured_signing_key);
+	configured_signing_key = xstrdup(key);
+}
+
+static int git_gpg_config(const char *var, const char *value,
+			  const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED,
+			  void *cb UNUSED)
+{
+	struct gpg_format *fmt = NULL;
+	char *fmtname = NULL;
+	char *trust;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "user.signingkey")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		set_signing_key(value);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.format")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		fmt = get_format_by_name(value);
+		if (!fmt)
+			return error(_("invalid value for '%s': '%s'"),
+				     var, value);
+		use_format = fmt;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.mintrustlevel")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+
+		trust = xstrdup_toupper(value);
+		ret = parse_gpg_trust_level(trust, &configured_min_trust_level);
+		free(trust);
+
+		if (ret)
+			return error(_("invalid value for '%s': '%s'"),
+				     var, value);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.defaultkeycommand")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		return git_config_string(&ssh_default_key_command, var, value);
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.allowedsignersfile")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		return git_config_pathname(&ssh_allowed_signers, var, value);
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.revocationfile")) {
+		if (!value)
+			return config_error_nonbool(var);
+		return git_config_pathname(&ssh_revocation_file, var, value);
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.program") || !strcmp(var, "gpg.openpgp.program"))
+		fmtname = "openpgp";
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.x509.program"))
+		fmtname = "x509";
+
+	if (!strcmp(var, "gpg.ssh.program"))
+		fmtname = "ssh";
+
+	if (fmtname) {
+		fmt = get_format_by_name(fmtname);
+		return git_config_string(&fmt->program, var, value);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if `string` contains a literal ssh key, 0 otherwise
+ * `key` will be set to the start of the actual key if a prefix is present.
+ */
+static int is_literal_ssh_key(const char *string, const char **key)
+{
+	if (skip_prefix(string, "key::", key))
+		return 1;
+	if (starts_with(string, "ssh-")) {
+		*key = string;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *get_ssh_key_fingerprint(const char *signing_key)
+{
+	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	int ret = -1;
+	struct strbuf fingerprint_stdout = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf **fingerprint;
+	char *fingerprint_ret;
+	const char *literal_key = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * With SSH Signing this can contain a filename or a public key
+	 * For textual representation we usually want a fingerprint
+	 */
+	if (is_literal_ssh_key(signing_key, &literal_key)) {
+		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf", "-", NULL);
+		ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, literal_key,
+				   strlen(literal_key), &fingerprint_stdout, 0,
+				   NULL, 0);
+	} else {
+		strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, "ssh-keygen", "-lf",
+			     configured_signing_key, NULL);
+		ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &fingerprint_stdout, 0,
+				   NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (!!ret)
+		die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"),
+			  signing_key);
+
+	fingerprint = strbuf_split_max(&fingerprint_stdout, ' ', 3);
+	if (!fingerprint[1])
+		die_errno(_("failed to get the ssh fingerprint for key '%s'"),
+			  signing_key);
+
+	fingerprint_ret = strbuf_detach(fingerprint[1], NULL);
+	strbuf_list_free(fingerprint);
+	strbuf_release(&fingerprint_stdout);
+	return fingerprint_ret;
+}
+
+/* Returns the first public key from an ssh-agent to use for signing */
+static const char *get_default_ssh_signing_key(void)
+{
+	struct child_process ssh_default_key = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	int ret = -1;
+	struct strbuf key_stdout = STRBUF_INIT, key_stderr = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf **keys;
+	char *key_command = NULL;
+	const char **argv;
+	int n;
+	char *default_key = NULL;
+	const char *literal_key = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_default_key_command)
+		die(_("either user.signingkey or gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand needs to be configured"));
+
+	key_command = xstrdup(ssh_default_key_command);
+	n = split_cmdline(key_command, &argv);
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		die("malformed build-time gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: %s",
+		    split_cmdline_strerror(n));
+
+	strvec_pushv(&ssh_default_key.args, argv);
+	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_default_key, NULL, 0, &key_stdout, 0,
+			   &key_stderr, 0);
+
+	if (!ret) {
+		keys = strbuf_split_max(&key_stdout, '\n', 2);
+		if (keys[0] && is_literal_ssh_key(keys[0]->buf, &literal_key)) {
+			/*
+			 * We only use `is_literal_ssh_key` here to check validity
+			 * The prefix will be stripped when the key is used.
+			 */
+			default_key = strbuf_detach(keys[0], NULL);
+		} else {
+			warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand succeeded but returned no keys: %s %s"),
+				key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf);
+		}
+
+		strbuf_list_free(keys);
+	} else {
+		warning(_("gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand failed: %s %s"),
+			key_stderr.buf, key_stdout.buf);
+	}
+
+	free(key_command);
+	free(argv);
+	strbuf_release(&key_stdout);
+
+	return default_key;
+}
+
+static const char *get_ssh_key_id(void) {
+	return get_ssh_key_fingerprint(get_signing_key());
+}
+
+/* Returns a textual but unique representation of the signing key */
+const char *get_signing_key_id(void)
+{
+	gpg_interface_lazy_init();
+
+	if (use_format->get_key_id) {
+		return use_format->get_key_id();
+	}
+
+	/* GPG/GPGSM only store a key id on this variable */
+	return get_signing_key();
+}
+
+const char *get_signing_key(void)
+{
+	gpg_interface_lazy_init();
+
+	if (configured_signing_key)
+		return configured_signing_key;
+	if (use_format->get_default_key) {
+		return use_format->get_default_key();
+	}
+
+	return git_committer_info(IDENT_STRICT | IDENT_NO_DATE);
+}
+
+const char *gpg_trust_level_to_str(enum signature_trust_level level)
+{
+	struct sigcheck_gpg_trust_level *trust;
+
+	if (level < 0 || level >= ARRAY_SIZE(sigcheck_gpg_trust_level))
+		BUG("invalid trust level requested %d", level);
+
+	trust = &sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[level];
+	if (trust->value != level)
+		BUG("sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[] unsorted");
+
+	return sigcheck_gpg_trust_level[level].display_key;
+}
+
+int sign_buffer(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature, const char *signing_key)
+{
+	gpg_interface_lazy_init();
+
+	return use_format->sign_buffer(buffer, signature, signing_key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows.
+ * NEEDSWORK: make it trim only CRs before LFs and rename
+ */
+static void remove_cr_after(struct strbuf *buffer, size_t offset)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = j = offset; i < buffer->len; i++) {
+		if (buffer->buf[i] != '\r') {
+			if (i != j)
+				buffer->buf[j] = buffer->buf[i];
+			j++;
+		}
+	}
+	strbuf_setlen(buffer, j);
+}
+
+static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
+			  const char *signing_key)
+{
+	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	int ret;
+	size_t bottom;
+	const char *cp;
+	struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT;
+
+	strvec_pushl(&gpg.args,
+		     use_format->program,
+		     "--status-fd=2",
+		     "-bsau", signing_key,
+		     NULL);
+
+	bottom = signature->len;
+
+	/*
+	 * When the username signingkey is bad, program could be terminated
+	 * because gpg exits without reading and then write gets SIGPIPE.
+	 */
+	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, buffer->buf, buffer->len,
+			   signature, 1024, &gpg_status, 0);
+	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+
+	for (cp = gpg_status.buf;
+	     cp && (cp = strstr(cp, "[GNUPG:] SIG_CREATED "));
+	     cp++) {
+		if (cp == gpg_status.buf || cp[-1] == '\n')
+			break; /* found */
+	}
+	ret |= !cp;
+	if (ret) {
+		error(_("gpg failed to sign the data:\n%s"),
+		      gpg_status.len ? gpg_status.buf : "(no gpg output)");
+		strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
+
+	/* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */
+	remove_cr_after(signature, bottom);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sign_buffer_ssh(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
+			   const char *signing_key)
+{
+	struct child_process signer = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+	int ret = -1;
+	size_t bottom, keylen;
+	struct strbuf signer_stderr = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct tempfile *key_file = NULL, *buffer_file = NULL;
+	char *ssh_signing_key_file = NULL;
+	struct strbuf ssh_signature_filename = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const char *literal_key = NULL;
+	int literal_ssh_key = 0;
+
+	if (!signing_key || signing_key[0] == '\0')
+		return error(
+			_("user.signingKey needs to be set for ssh signing"));
+
+	if (is_literal_ssh_key(signing_key, &literal_key)) {
+		/* A literal ssh key */
+		literal_ssh_key = 1;
+		key_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_key_tmpXXXXXX");
+		if (!key_file)
+			return error_errno(
+				_("could not create temporary file"));
+		keylen = strlen(literal_key);
+		if (write_in_full(key_file->fd, literal_key, keylen) < 0 ||
+		    close_tempfile_gently(key_file) < 0) {
+			error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key to '%s'"),
+				    key_file->filename.buf);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ssh_signing_key_file = strbuf_detach(&key_file->filename, NULL);
+	} else {
+		/* We assume a file */
+		ssh_signing_key_file = interpolate_path(signing_key, 1);
+	}
+
+	buffer_file = mks_tempfile_t(".git_signing_buffer_tmpXXXXXX");
+	if (!buffer_file) {
+		error_errno(_("could not create temporary file"));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (write_in_full(buffer_file->fd, buffer->buf, buffer->len) < 0 ||
+	    close_tempfile_gently(buffer_file) < 0) {
+		error_errno(_("failed writing ssh signing key buffer to '%s'"),
+			    buffer_file->filename.buf);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	strvec_pushl(&signer.args, use_format->program,
+		     "-Y", "sign",
+		     "-n", "git",
+		     "-f", ssh_signing_key_file,
+		     NULL);
+	if (literal_ssh_key)
+		strvec_push(&signer.args, "-U");
+	strvec_push(&signer.args, buffer_file->filename.buf);
+
+	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+	ret = pipe_command(&signer, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &signer_stderr, 0);
+	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		if (strstr(signer_stderr.buf, "usage:"))
+			error(_("ssh-keygen -Y sign is needed for ssh signing (available in openssh version 8.2p1+)"));
+
+		error("%s", signer_stderr.buf);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	bottom = signature->len;
+
+	strbuf_addbuf(&ssh_signature_filename, &buffer_file->filename);
+	strbuf_addstr(&ssh_signature_filename, ".sig");
+	if (strbuf_read_file(signature, ssh_signature_filename.buf, 0) < 0) {
+		ret = error_errno(
+			_("failed reading ssh signing data buffer from '%s'"),
+			ssh_signature_filename.buf);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Strip CR from the line endings, in case we are on Windows. */
+	remove_cr_after(signature, bottom);
+
+out:
+	if (key_file)
+		delete_tempfile(&key_file);
+	if (buffer_file)
+		delete_tempfile(&buffer_file);
+	if (ssh_signature_filename.len)
+		unlink_or_warn(ssh_signature_filename.buf);
+	strbuf_release(&signer_stderr);
+	strbuf_release(&ssh_signature_filename);
+	FREE_AND_NULL(ssh_signing_key_file);
+	return ret;
+}