Adding upstream version 2.2.40.upstream/2.2.40

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2343 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b6da96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2343 @@
+/* trustdb.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
+ *               2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "gpg.h"
+#include "../common/status.h"
+#include "../common/iobuf.h"
+#include "../regexp/jimregexp.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
+#include "../common/i18n.h"
+#include "tdbio.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "tofu.h"
+#include "key-clean.h"
+
+static void write_record (ctrl_t ctrl, TRUSTREC *rec);
+static void do_sync(void);
+
+
+typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
+
+/*
+ * Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
+ * the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL.
+ * Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
+ */
+struct key_array
+{
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+};
+
+
+/* Control information for the trust DB.  */
+static struct
+{
+  int init;
+  int level;
+  char *dbname;
+  int no_trustdb;
+} trustdb_args;
+
+/* Some globals.  */
+static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
+static struct key_item *utk_list;      /* all ultimately trusted keys */
+
+static int pending_check_trustdb;
+
+static int validate_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, int interactive);
+
+
+/**********************************************
+ ************* some helpers *******************
+ **********************************************/
+
+static struct key_item *
+new_key_item (void)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
+  return k;
+}
+
+static void
+release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
+{
+  struct key_item *k2;
+
+  for (; k; k = k2)
+    {
+      k2 = k->next;
+      xfree (k->trust_regexp);
+      xfree (k);
+    }
+}
+
+#define KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE 1024
+
+/*
+ * For fast keylook up we need a hash table.  Each byte of a KeyID
+ * should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
+ * for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
+ * can just use 10 bits to index a table of KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE key items.
+ * Possible optimization: Do not use key_items but other hash_table when the
+ * duplicates lists get too large.
+ */
+static KeyHashTable
+new_key_hash_table (void)
+{
+  struct key_item **tbl;
+
+  tbl = xmalloc_clear (KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE * sizeof *tbl);
+  return tbl;
+}
+
+static void
+release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (!tbl)
+    return;
+  for (i=0; i < KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    release_key_items (tbl[i]);
+  xfree (tbl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
+ */
+static int
+test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return 1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a new key to the hash table.  The key is identified by its key ID.
+ */
+static void
+add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
+{
+  int i = kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE;
+  struct key_item *k, *kk;
+
+  for (k = tbl[i]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return; /* already in table */
+
+  kk = new_key_item ();
+  kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  kk->next = tbl[i];
+  tbl[i] = kk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release a key_array
+ */
+static void
+release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
+{
+    struct key_array *k;
+
+    if (keys) {
+        for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
+            release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
+        xfree (keys);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ **********  Initialization  *****************
+ *********************************************/
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
+ * before initializing the validation module.
+ * FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
+ */
+static void
+tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = keyid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = keyid[1];
+  k->next = user_utk_list;
+  user_utk_list = k;
+}
+
+
+void
+tdb_register_trusted_key (const char *string)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  u32 kid[2];
+
+  err = classify_user_id (string, &desc, 1);
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
+        {
+          tdb_register_trusted_keyid (desc.u.kid);
+          return;
+        }
+      if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
+          || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20)
+        {
+          kid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr+12);
+          kid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr+16);
+          tdb_register_trusted_keyid (kid);
+          return;
+        }
+    }
+  log_error (_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
+ * Returns: true = inserted, false = already in list.
+ */
+static int
+add_utk (u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (kid))
+    return 0;
+
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
+  k->next = utk_list;
+  utk_list = k;
+  if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+    log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Add/remove KID to/from the list of ultimately trusted keys.  */
+void
+tdb_update_utk (u32 *kid, int add)
+{
+  struct key_item *k, *k_prev;
+
+  k_prev = NULL;
+  for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      break;
+    else
+      k_prev = k;
+
+  if (add)
+    {
+      if (!k)
+        {
+          k = new_key_item ();
+          k->kid[0] = kid[0];
+          k->kid[1] = kid[1];
+          k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
+          k->next = utk_list;
+          utk_list = k;
+          if ( opt.verbose > 1 )
+            log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (k)
+        {
+          if (k_prev)
+            k_prev->next = k->next;
+          else
+            utk_list = NULL;
+
+          xfree (k->trust_regexp);
+          xfree (k);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
+ */
+static void
+verify_own_keys (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  ulong recnum;
+  int rc;
+  struct key_item *k, *k2;
+  int need_revalidation = 0;
+
+  if (utk_list)
+    return; /* Has already been run.  */
+
+  /* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
+  for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
+    {
+      if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
+           && (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+        {
+          byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
+          int fprlen;
+          u32 kid[2];
+
+          /* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
+           * we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
+           * use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20 bytes
+           * fpr - it does not work always so we better change the
+           * whole validation code to only work with fingerprints */
+          fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
+          keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl, fpr, fprlen, kid);
+          if (!add_utk (kid))
+            log_info(_("key %s occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
+                     keystr(kid));
+          else if ((rec.r.trust.flags & 1))
+            {
+              /* Record marked as inserted via --trusted-key.  Is this
+               * still the case?  */
+              for (k2 = user_utk_list; k2; k2 = k2->next)
+                if (k2->kid[0] == kid[0] && k2->kid[1] == kid[1])
+                  break;
+              if (!k2) /* No - clear the flag.  */
+                {
+                  if (DBG_TRUST)
+                    log_debug ("clearing former --trusted-key %s\n",
+                               keystr (kid));
+                  rec.r.trust.ownertrust = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+                  rec.r.trust.flags &= ~(rec.r.trust.flags & 1);
+                  write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+                  need_revalidation = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (need_revalidation)
+    {
+      tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+
+  /* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */
+  for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      if ( add_utk (k->kid) )
+        { /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
+          PKT_public_key pk;
+
+          memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
+          rc = get_pubkey_with_ldap_fallback (ctrl, &pk, k->kid);
+          if (rc)
+	    log_info(_("key %s: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
+		     keystr(k->kid));
+          else
+	    {
+	      tdb_update_ownertrust
+                (ctrl, &pk, ((tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, &pk, 0) & ~TRUST_MASK)
+                             | TRUST_ULTIMATE ),  1);
+	      release_public_key_parts (&pk);
+	    }
+
+          if (!opt.quiet)
+            log_info (_("key %s marked as ultimately trusted\n"),
+                      keystr(k->kid));
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* release the helper table table */
+  release_key_items (user_utk_list);
+  user_utk_list = NULL;
+  return;
+}
+
+/* Returns whether KID is on the list of ultimately trusted keys.  */
+int
+tdb_keyid_is_utk (u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return 1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return the list of ultimately trusted keys.  */
+struct key_item *
+tdb_utks (void)
+{
+  return utk_list;
+}
+
+/*********************************************
+ *********** TrustDB stuff *******************
+ *********************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Read a record but die if it does not exist
+ */
+static void
+read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
+{
+  int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
+                recno, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+  if (rectype != rec->rectype)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
+                rec->recnum, rectype);
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a record and die on error
+ */
+static void
+write_record (ctrl_t ctrl, TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+  int rc = tdbio_write_record (ctrl, rec);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
+			    rec->recnum, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * sync the TrustDb and die on error
+ */
+static void
+do_sync(void)
+{
+    int rc = tdbio_sync ();
+    if(rc)
+      {
+        log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
+        g10_exit(2);
+      }
+}
+
+const char *
+trust_model_string (int model)
+{
+  switch (model)
+    {
+    case TM_CLASSIC:  return "classic";
+    case TM_PGP:      return "pgp";
+    case TM_EXTERNAL: return "external";
+    case TM_TOFU:     return "tofu";
+    case TM_TOFU_PGP: return "tofu+pgp";
+    case TM_ALWAYS:   return "always";
+    case TM_DIRECT:   return "direct";
+    default:          return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Perform some checks over the trustdb
+ *  level 0: only open the db
+ *	  1: used for initial program startup
+ */
+int
+setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
+{
+    /* just store the args */
+    if( trustdb_args.init )
+	return 0;
+    trustdb_args.level = level;
+    trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void
+how_to_fix_the_trustdb ()
+{
+  const char *name = trustdb_args.dbname;
+
+  if (!name)
+    name = "trustdb.gpg";
+
+  log_info (_("You may try to re-create the trustdb using the commands:\n"));
+  log_info ("  cd %s\n", default_homedir ());
+  log_info ("  %s --export-ownertrust > otrust.tmp\n", GPG_NAME);
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+  log_info ("  del %s\n", name);
+#else
+  log_info ("  rm %s\n", name);
+#endif
+  log_info ("  %s --import-ownertrust < otrust.tmp\n", GPG_NAME);
+  log_info (_("If that does not work, please consult the manual\n"));
+}
+
+
+/* Initialize the trustdb.  With NO_CREATE set a missing trustdb is
+ * not an error and the function won't terminate the process on error;
+ * in that case 0 is returned if there is a trustdb or an error code
+ * if no trustdb is available.  */
+gpg_error_t
+init_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl, int no_create)
+{
+  int level = trustdb_args.level;
+  const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
+
+  if( trustdb_args.init )
+    return 0;
+
+  trustdb_args.init = 1;
+
+  if(level==0 || level==1)
+    {
+      int rc = tdbio_set_dbname (ctrl, dbname, (!no_create && level),
+                                 &trustdb_args.no_trustdb);
+      if (no_create && trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
+        {
+          /* No trustdb found and the caller asked us not to create
+           * it.  Return an error and set the initialization state
+           * back so that we always test for an existing trustdb.  */
+          trustdb_args.init = 0;
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT);
+        }
+      if (rc)
+	log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
+    }
+  else
+    BUG();
+
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO)
+    {
+      /* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says
+	 it is. */
+      opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model();
+
+      /* Sanity check this ;) */
+      if(opt.trust_model != TM_CLASSIC
+	 && opt.trust_model != TM_PGP
+	 && opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU_PGP
+	 && opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU
+	 && opt.trust_model != TM_EXTERNAL)
+	{
+	  log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - "
+		     "assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"pgp");
+	  opt.trust_model = TM_PGP;
+	}
+
+      if(opt.verbose)
+	log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),
+                 trust_model_string (opt.trust_model));
+    }
+
+  if (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC
+      || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
+    {
+      /* Verify the list of ultimately trusted keys and move the
+	 --trusted-keys list there as well. */
+      if(level==1)
+	verify_own_keys (ctrl);
+
+      if(!tdbio_db_matches_options())
+	pending_check_trustdb=1;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Check whether we have a trust database, initializing it if
+   necessary if the trust model is not 'always trust'.  Returns true
+   if we do have a usable trust database.  */
+int
+have_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  return !init_trustdb (ctrl, opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts.  Special
+ * feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
+ * when a check is due.  This can be used to run the check from a crontab
+ */
+void
+check_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+  if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
+      || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
+    {
+      if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
+	{
+	  ulong scheduled;
+
+	  scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+	  if (!scheduled)
+	    {
+	      log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
+	      return;
+	    }
+
+	  if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
+	    {
+	      log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+			strtimestamp (scheduled));
+	      return;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      validate_keys (ctrl, 0);
+    }
+  else
+    log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with '%s' trust model\n"),
+	      trust_model_string(opt.trust_model));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recreate the WoT.
+ */
+void
+update_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+  if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
+      || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
+    validate_keys (ctrl, 1);
+  else
+    log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with '%s' trust model\n"),
+	      trust_model_string(opt.trust_model));
+}
+
+void
+tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return;
+
+  /* We simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
+     so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled.  */
+  if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, 1))
+    do_sync ();
+  pending_check_trustdb = 1;
+}
+
+int
+trustdb_pending_check(void)
+{
+  return pending_check_trustdb;
+}
+
+/* If the trustdb is dirty, and we're interactive, update it.
+   Otherwise, check it unless no-auto-check-trustdb is set. */
+void
+tdb_check_or_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  if (trustdb_pending_check ())
+    {
+      if (opt.interactive)
+	update_trustdb (ctrl);
+      else if (!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
+	check_trustdb (ctrl);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+read_trust_options (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                    byte *trust_model, ulong *created, ulong *nextcheck,
+		    byte *marginals, byte *completes, byte *cert_depth,
+		    byte *min_cert_level)
+{
+  TRUSTREC opts;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    memset (&opts, 0, sizeof opts);
+  else
+    read_record (0, &opts, RECTYPE_VER);
+
+  if(trust_model)
+    *trust_model=opts.r.ver.trust_model;
+  if(created)
+    *created=opts.r.ver.created;
+  if(nextcheck)
+    *nextcheck=opts.r.ver.nextcheck;
+  if(marginals)
+    *marginals=opts.r.ver.marginals;
+  if(completes)
+    *completes=opts.r.ver.completes;
+  if(cert_depth)
+    *cert_depth=opts.r.ver.cert_depth;
+  if(min_cert_level)
+    *min_cert_level=opts.r.ver.min_cert_level;
+}
+
+/***********************************************
+ ***********  Ownertrust et al. ****************
+ ***********************************************/
+
+static int
+read_trust_record (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+  rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (ctrl, pk, rec);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+        log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
+                   gpg_strerror (rc));
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
+    {
+      log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
+                 rec->recnum);
+      return GPG_ERR_TRUSTDB;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.  The
+ * key should be the primary key.  If NO_CREATE is set a missing
+ * trustdb will not be created.  This comes for example handy when we
+ * want to print status lines (DECRYPTION_KEY) which carry ownertrust
+ * values but we usually use --always-trust.
+ */
+unsigned int
+tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int no_create)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  /* If the caller asked not to create a trustdb we call init_trustdb
+   * directly and allow it to fail with an error code for a
+   * non-existing trustdb.  */
+  if (no_create && init_trustdb (ctrl, 1))
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
+  if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
+  if (err)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
+    }
+
+  return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
+}
+
+
+unsigned int
+tdb_get_min_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int no_create)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  /* If the caller asked not to create a trustdb we call init_trustdb
+   * directly and allow it to fail with an error code for a
+   * non-existing trustdb.  */
+  if (no_create && init_trustdb (ctrl, 1))
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
+  if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
+  if (err)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
+    }
+
+  return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
+ * The key should be a primary one.
+ */
+void
+tdb_update_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust,
+                       int as_trusted_key)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return;
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u%s\n",
+                   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust,
+                   as_trusted_key? " via --trusted-key":"");
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+          /* Clear or set the trusted key flag if the new value is
+           * ultimate.  This is required so that we know which keys
+           * have been added by --trusted-keys.  */
+          if ((rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+            {
+              if (as_trusted_key)
+                rec.r.trust.flags |= 1;
+              else
+                rec.r.trust.flags &= ~(rec.r.trust.flags & 1);
+            }
+          else
+            rec.r.trust.flags &= ~(rec.r.trust.flags & 1);
+          write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+          tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+          do_sync ();
+        }
+    }
+  else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    { /* no record yet - create a new one */
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u%s\n", new_trust,
+                   as_trusted_key? " via --trusted-key":"");
+
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+      if ((rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE
+          && as_trusted_key)
+        rec.r.trust.flags = 1;
+      write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+      tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+update_min_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust)
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return;
+
+  pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+  err = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, kid);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
+                 keystr (kid), gpg_strerror (err));
+      xfree (pk);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("key %08lX%08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
+                   (ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
+		   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust,
+		   new_trust );
+      if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
+          write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+          tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+          do_sync ();
+        }
+    }
+  else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    { /* no record yet - create a new one */
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
+
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
+      write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+      tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+
+  free_public_key (pk);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values.
+ *
+ * Return: True if a change actually happened.
+ */
+int
+tdb_clear_ownertrusts (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return 0;
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+	{
+	  log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
+		     (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
+	  log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
+		     (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust);
+	}
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust || rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+          rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0;
+          write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+          tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
+          do_sync ();
+          return 1;
+        }
+    }
+  else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: Caller has to do a sync
+ */
+static void
+update_validity (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
+                 int depth, int validity)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  ulong recno;
+
+  namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec);
+  if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return;
+    }
+  if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      /* No record yet - create a new one. */
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
+      trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
+      trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+      }
+
+  /* locate an existing one */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+      if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
+        break;
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+
+  if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
+    {
+      memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
+      vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
+      vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
+      memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
+      vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+      trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
+    }
+  vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
+  vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
+  vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
+  write_record (ctrl, &vrec);
+  trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
+  write_record (ctrl, &trec);
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************
+ *********  Query trustdb values  **************
+ ***********************************************/
+
+/* Return true if key is disabled.  Note that this is usually used via
+   the pk_is_disabled macro.  */
+int
+tdb_cache_disabled_value (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  TRUSTREC trec;
+  int disabled = 0;
+
+  if (pk->flags.disabled_valid)
+    return pk->flags.disabled;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
+    return 0;  /* No trustdb => not disabled.  */
+
+  err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec);
+  if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      /* No record found, so assume not disabled.  */
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
+    disabled = 1;
+
+  /* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every
+     time */
+  pk->flags.disabled = disabled;
+  pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
+
+ leave:
+  return disabled;
+}
+
+
+void
+tdb_check_trustdb_stale (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  static int did_nextcheck=0;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
+    return;  /* No trustdb => can't be stale.  */
+
+  if (!did_nextcheck
+      && (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
+          || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU))
+    {
+      ulong scheduled;
+
+      did_nextcheck = 1;
+      scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+      if ((scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
+	  || pending_check_trustdb)
+        {
+          if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
+            {
+              pending_check_trustdb = 1;
+              if (!opt.quiet)
+                log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n"));
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              if (!opt.quiet)
+                log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
+              validate_keys (ctrl, 0);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the validity information for KB/PK (at least one of them
+ * must be non-NULL).  This is the core of get_validity.  If SIG is
+ * not NULL, then the trust is being evaluated in the context of the
+ * provided signature.  This is used by the TOFU code to record
+ * statistics.
+ */
+unsigned int
+tdb_get_validity_core (ctrl_t ctrl,
+                       kbnode_t kb,
+                       PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
+                       PKT_public_key *main_pk,
+		       PKT_signature *sig,
+		       int may_ask)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  gpg_error_t err = 0;
+  ulong recno;
+#ifdef USE_TOFU
+  unsigned int tofu_validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+  int free_kb = 0;
+#endif
+  unsigned int validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  if (kb && pk)
+    log_assert (keyid_cmp (pk_main_keyid (pk),
+                           pk_main_keyid (kb->pkt->pkt.public_key)) == 0);
+
+  if (! pk)
+    {
+      log_assert (kb);
+      pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    }
+
+#ifndef USE_TOFU
+  (void)sig;
+  (void)may_ask;
+#endif
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+
+  /* If we have no trustdb (which also means it has not been created)
+     and the trust-model is always, we don't know the validity -
+     return immediately.  If we won't do that the tdbio code would try
+     to open the trustdb and run into a fatal error.  */
+  if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+
+  check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
+
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
+    {
+      /* Note that this happens BEFORE any user ID stuff is checked.
+	 The direct trust model applies to keys as a whole. */
+      validity = tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, main_pk, 0);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+#ifdef USE_TOFU
+  if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
+    {
+      kbnode_t n = NULL;
+      strlist_t user_id_list = NULL;
+      int done = 0;
+
+      /* If the caller didn't supply a user id then use all uids.  */
+      if (! uid)
+        {
+          if (! kb)
+            {
+              kb = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, main_pk->keyid);
+              free_kb = 1;
+            }
+          n = kb;
+        }
+
+      if (DBG_TRUST && sig && sig->signers_uid)
+        log_debug ("TOFU: only considering user id: '%s'\n",
+                   sig->signers_uid);
+
+      while (!done && (uid || (n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_USER_ID))))
+	{
+	  PKT_user_id *user_id;
+          int expired = 0;
+
+	  if (uid)
+            {
+              user_id = uid;
+              /* If the caller specified a user id, then we only
+                 process the specified user id and are done after the
+                 first iteration.  */
+              done = 1;
+            }
+	  else
+	    user_id = n->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+          if (user_id->attrib_data)
+            /* Skip user attributes.  */
+            continue;
+
+          if (sig && sig->signers_uid)
+            /* Make sure the UID matches.  */
+            {
+              char *email = mailbox_from_userid (user_id->name);
+              if (!email || !*email || strcmp (sig->signers_uid, email) != 0)
+                {
+                  if (DBG_TRUST)
+                    log_debug ("TOFU: skipping user id '%s', which does"
+                               " not match the signer's email ('%s')\n",
+                               email, sig->signers_uid);
+                  xfree (email);
+                  continue;
+                }
+              xfree (email);
+            }
+
+          /* If the user id is revoked or expired, then skip it.  */
+          if (user_id->flags.revoked || user_id->flags.expired)
+            {
+              if (DBG_TRUST)
+                {
+                  char *s;
+                  if (user_id->flags.revoked && user_id->flags.expired)
+                    s = "revoked and expired";
+                  else if (user_id->flags.revoked)
+                    s = "revoked";
+                  else
+                    s = "expire";
+
+                  log_debug ("TOFU: Ignoring %s user id (%s)\n",
+                             s, user_id->name);
+                }
+
+              if (user_id->flags.revoked)
+                continue;
+
+              expired = 1;
+            }
+
+          add_to_strlist (&user_id_list, user_id->name);
+          user_id_list->flags = expired;
+        }
+
+      /* Process the user ids in the order they appear in the key
+         block.  */
+      strlist_rev (&user_id_list);
+
+      /* It only makes sense to observe any signature before getting
+         the validity.  This is because if the current signature
+         results in a conflict, then we damn well want to take that
+         into account.  */
+      if (sig)
+        {
+          err = tofu_register_signature (ctrl, main_pk, user_id_list,
+                                         sig->digest, sig->digest_len,
+                                         sig->timestamp, "unknown");
+          if (err)
+            {
+              log_error ("TOFU: error registering signature: %s\n",
+                         gpg_strerror (err));
+
+              tofu_validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+            }
+        }
+      if (! err)
+        tofu_validity = tofu_get_validity (ctrl, main_pk, user_id_list,
+                                           may_ask);
+
+      free_strlist (user_id_list);
+      if (free_kb)
+        release_kbnode (kb);
+    }
+#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
+
+  if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP
+      || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
+      || opt.trust_model == TM_PGP)
+    {
+      err = read_trust_record (ctrl, main_pk, &trec);
+      if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+	{
+	  tdbio_invalid ();
+	  return 0;
+	}
+      if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+	{
+	  /* No record found.  */
+	  validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+
+      /* Loop over all user IDs */
+      recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+      validity = 0;
+      while (recno)
+	{
+	  read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+
+	  if(uid)
+	    {
+	      /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
+		 user ID ONLY.  If the namehash is not found, then
+		 there is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
+		 signed). */
+	      if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
+		{
+		  validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      /* If no user ID is given, we take the maximum validity
+		 over all user IDs */
+	      if (validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK))
+		validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+	    }
+
+	  recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+	}
+
+      if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
+	{
+	  validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+	  pk->flags.disabled = 1;
+	}
+      else
+	pk->flags.disabled = 0;
+      pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
+    }
+
+ leave:
+#ifdef USE_TOFU
+  validity = tofu_wot_trust_combine (tofu_validity, validity);
+#else /*!USE_TOFU*/
+  validity &= TRUST_MASK;
+
+  if (validity == TRUST_NEVER)
+    /* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else.  */
+    validity |= TRUST_NEVER;
+  if (validity == TRUST_EXPIRED)
+    /* TRUST_EXPIRED trumps everything but TRUST_NEVER.  */
+    validity |= TRUST_EXPIRED;
+#endif /*!USE_TOFU*/
+
+  if (opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU
+      && pending_check_trustdb)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;
+
+  return validity;
+}
+
+
+static void
+get_validity_counts (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  ulong recno;
+
+  if(pk==NULL || uid==NULL)
+    BUG();
+
+  namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+  uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0;
+
+  init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
+
+  if(read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec))
+    return;
+
+  /* loop over all user IDs */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+
+      if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
+	{
+	  uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count;
+	  uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count;
+	  /*  es_printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+list_trust_path( const char *username )
+{
+  (void)username;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
+ * the given key.  This function does not return the key itself or
+ * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain).  Only
+ * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
+ * are listed.	If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
+ * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
+ *
+ *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
+ *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
+ *     Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
+ *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
+ *     to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
+ *  4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
+ *     so that it can free its context.
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
+ */
+int
+enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
+		 unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
+{
+  (void)context;
+  (void)lid;
+  (void)ownertrust;
+  (void)validity;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print the current path
+ */
+void
+enum_cert_paths_print (void **context, FILE *fp,
+                       int refresh, ulong selected_lid)
+{
+  (void)context;
+  (void)fp;
+  (void)refresh;
+  (void)selected_lid;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************
+ *********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
+ ****************************************/
+
+static int
+ask_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *kid, int minimum)
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  int rc;
+  int ot;
+
+  pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+  rc = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, kid);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
+                 keystr(kid), gpg_strerror (rc) );
+      return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+
+  if(opt.force_ownertrust)
+    {
+      log_info("force trust for key %s to %s\n",
+	       keystr(kid),trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust));
+      tdb_update_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, opt.force_ownertrust, 0);
+      ot=opt.force_ownertrust;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      ot=edit_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, 0);
+      if(ot>0)
+	ot = tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, 0);
+      else if(ot==0)
+	ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+      else
+	ot = -1; /* quit */
+    }
+
+  free_public_key( pk );
+
+  return ot;
+}
+
+
+static void
+mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
+{
+  for ( ;node; node = node->next )
+    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+      {
+        u32 aki[2];
+
+        keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+        add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
+      }
+}
+
+
+static void
+dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
+{
+  struct key_array *kar;
+
+  for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+    {
+      KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
+      u32 kid[2];
+
+      keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+      es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
+                 depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');
+
+      for (; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+            {
+              int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
+
+              if (len > 30)
+                len = 30;
+              es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
+                         depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
+                         (node->flag & 4)? 'f':
+                         (node->flag & 2)? 'm':
+                         (node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
+              es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                  len, ":", NULL);
+              es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+              es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+store_validation_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int depth,
+                         kbnode_t keyblock, KeyHashTable stored)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int status;
+  int any = 0;
+
+  for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        {
+          PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+          if (node->flag & 4)
+            status = TRUST_FULLY;
+          else if (node->flag & 2)
+            status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
+          else if (node->flag & 1)
+            status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+          else
+            status = 0;
+
+          if (status)
+            {
+              update_validity (ctrl, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+			       uid, depth, status);
+
+	      mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock);
+
+              any = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (any)
+    do_sync ();
+}
+
+
+/* Returns a sanitized copy of the regexp (which might be "", but not
+   NULL). */
+/* Operator characters except '.' and backslash.
+   See regex(7) on BSD.  */
+#define REGEXP_OPERATOR_CHARS "^[$()|*+?{"
+
+static char *
+sanitize_regexp(const char *old)
+{
+  size_t start=0,len=strlen(old),idx=0;
+  int escaped=0,standard_bracket=0;
+  char *new=xmalloc((len*2)+1); /* enough to \-escape everything if we
+				   have to */
+
+  /* There are basically two commonly-used regexps here.  GPG and most
+     versions of PGP use "<[^>]+[@.]example\.com>$" and PGP (9)
+     command line uses "example.com" (i.e. whatever the user specifies,
+     and we can't expect users know to use "\." instead of ".").  So
+     here are the rules: we're allowed to start with "<[^>]+[@.]" and
+     end with ">$" or start and end with nothing.  In between, the
+     only legal regex character is ".", and everything else gets
+     escaped.  Part of the gotcha here is that some regex packages
+     allow more than RFC-4880 requires.  For example, 4880 has no "{}"
+     operator, but GNU regex does.  Commenting removes these operators
+     from consideration.  A possible future enhancement is to use
+     commenting to effectively back off a given regex to the Henry
+     Spencer syntax in 4880. -dshaw */
+
+  /* Are we bracketed between "<[^>]+[@.]" and ">$" ? */
+  if(len>=12 && strncmp(old,"<[^>]+[@.]",10)==0
+     && old[len-2]=='>' && old[len-1]=='$')
+    {
+      strcpy(new,"<[^>]+[@.]");
+      idx=strlen(new);
+      standard_bracket=1;
+      start+=10;
+      len-=2;
+    }
+
+  /* Walk the remaining characters and ensure that everything that is
+     left is not an operational regex character. */
+  for(;start<len;start++)
+    {
+      if(!escaped && old[start]=='\\')
+	escaped=1;
+      else if (!escaped && strchr (REGEXP_OPERATOR_CHARS, old[start]))
+	new[idx++]='\\';
+      else
+	escaped=0;
+
+      new[idx++]=old[start];
+    }
+
+  new[idx]='\0';
+
+  /* Note that the (sub)string we look at might end with a bare "\".
+     If it does, leave it that way.  If the regexp actually ended with
+     ">$", then it was escaping the ">" and is fine.  If the regexp
+     actually ended with the bare "\", then it's an illegal regexp and
+     regcomp should kick it out. */
+
+  if(standard_bracket)
+    strcat(new,">$");
+
+  return new;
+}
+
+/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust
+   signature.  Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex
+   error. */
+static int
+check_regexp(const char *expr,const char *string)
+{
+  int ret;
+  char *regexp;
+
+  regexp=sanitize_regexp(expr);
+
+  {
+    regex_t pat;
+
+    ret=regcomp(&pat,regexp,REG_ICASE|REG_EXTENDED);
+    if(ret==0)
+      {
+	ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0);
+	regfree(&pat);
+      }
+    ret=(ret==0);
+  }
+
+  if(DBG_TRUST)
+    log_debug("regexp '%s' ('%s') on '%s': %s\n",
+	      regexp,expr,string,ret?"YES":"NO");
+
+  xfree(regexp);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
+ * key ID list.  User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
+ * flags as follows:
+ *  flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
+ *           1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
+ *           2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
+ *           8: Used for internal purposes.
+ *           9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
+ *          10: Ditto (ditto)
+ * This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
+ */
+static int
+validate_one_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t kb, struct key_item *klist,
+                       u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  struct key_item *kr;
+  KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
+  PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  u32 main_kid[2];
+  int issigned=0, any_signed = 0;
+
+  keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
+  for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      /* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
+	 to be built among only self-signed uids?  On the one hand, a
+	 self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
+	 intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
+	 signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
+	 even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
+	 key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key.  I'm
+	 going with the latter.  However, if the user ID was
+	 explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
+	 should stop validity through the user ID until it is
+	 resigned.  -dshaw */
+
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+        {
+          if (uidnode && issigned)
+            {
+              if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
+                  || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+                uidnode->flag |= 4;
+              else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
+                uidnode->flag |= 2;
+              uidnode->flag |= 1;
+              any_signed = 1;
+            }
+          uidnode = node;
+	  uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	  /* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
+	  if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
+	    *next_expire = uid->expiredate;
+
+          issigned = 0;
+	  get_validity_counts (ctrl, pk, uid);
+          mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl, kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
+                                 curtime, next_expire);
+        }
+      else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+	       && (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
+        {
+	  /* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
+          PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+          kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
+	  /* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig
+             did not exist.  This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
+             since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
+             trust sig. */
+          if (kr && (!kr->trust_regexp
+                     || !(opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
+                          || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
+                     || (uidnode
+                         && check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
+                                         uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
+            {
+	      /* Are we part of a trust sig chain?  We always favor
+                 the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
+                 lesser trust sig or value.  I could make a decent
+                 argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
+                 what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
+              if ((opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
+                   || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
+                  && sig->trust_depth
+                  && pk->trust_timestamp <= sig->timestamp)
+		{
+		  unsigned char depth;
+
+		  /* If the depth on the signature is less than the
+		     chain currently has, then use the signature depth
+		     so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
+		     signer wanted.  If the depth on the signature is
+		     more than the chain currently has, then use the
+		     chain depth so we use as much of the signature
+		     depth as the chain will permit.  An ultimately
+		     trusted signature can restart the depth to
+		     whatever level it likes. */
+
+		  if (sig->trust_depth < kr->trust_depth
+                      || kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+		    depth = sig->trust_depth;
+		  else
+		    depth = kr->trust_depth;
+
+		  if (depth)
+		    {
+		      if(DBG_TRUST)
+			log_debug ("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
+                                   " kr depth is %d\n",
+                                   uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                   sig->trust_depth,
+                                   kr->trust_depth);
+
+		      /* If we got here, we know that:
+
+			 this is a trust sig.
+
+			 it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
+			 sig on this key (not uid).
+
+			 it is legal in that it was either generated by an
+			 ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
+			 chain, and the depth does not violate the
+			 original trust sig.
+
+			 if there is a regexp attached, it matched
+			 successfully.
+		      */
+
+		      if (DBG_TRUST)
+			log_debug ("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
+                                   "depth %d with %d\n",
+                                   pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
+                                   pk->trust_depth,depth);
+
+		      pk->trust_value = sig->trust_value;
+		      pk->trust_depth = depth-1;
+
+		      /* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
+			 on the pk for the next round. */
+		      if (sig->trust_regexp)
+			pk->trust_regexp = sig->trust_regexp;
+		    }
+		}
+
+              if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+                uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+                uid->help_full_count++;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+                uid->help_marginal_count++;
+              issigned = 1;
+	    }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (uidnode && issigned)
+    {
+      if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
+	  || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+        uidnode->flag |= 4;
+      else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
+        uidnode->flag |= 2;
+      uidnode->flag |= 1;
+      any_signed = 1;
+    }
+
+  return any_signed;
+}
+
+
+static int
+search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid, int dummy_uid_no)
+{
+  (void)dummy_uid_no;
+  return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
+ * kllist.  The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
+ * to create our own.  Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
+ * an error.  No results found are indicated by an empty array.
+ * Caller hast to release the returned array.
+ */
+static struct key_array *
+validate_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust,
+                   struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
+  int rc;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+  maxkeys = 1000;
+  keys = xmalloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+  nkeys = 0;
+
+  rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      xfree (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+  desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
+  desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust;
+  rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
+  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+      return keys;
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search(first) failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      goto die;
+    }
+
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
+  do
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+      rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+	  goto die;
+        }
+
+      if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+        {
+          log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
+                     keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
+          dump_kbnode (keyblock);
+          release_kbnode(keyblock);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
+      merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
+      clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      if (pk->has_expired || pk->flags.revoked)
+        {
+          /* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
+          mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+        }
+      else if (validate_one_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, klist,
+                                      curtime, next_expire))
+        {
+	  KBNODE node;
+
+          if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
+              && pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
+            *next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+
+          if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
+            maxkeys += 1000;
+            keys = xrealloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+          }
+          keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
+
+	  /* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we
+	     never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */
+
+	  for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+	    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4))
+	      break;
+
+	  if(node==NULL)
+	    mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+
+          keyblock = NULL;
+        }
+
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      keyblock = NULL;
+    }
+  while (!(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL)));
+
+  if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      goto die;
+    }
+
+  keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+  return keys;
+
+ die:
+  keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+  release_key_array (keys);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Caller must sync */
+static void
+reset_trust_records (ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  ulong recnum;
+  int count = 0, nreset = 0;
+
+  for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
+    {
+      if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_TRUST)
+	{
+	  count++;
+	  if(rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
+	    {
+	      rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0;
+	      write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+	    }
+
+	}
+      else if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_VALID
+	      && ((rec.r.valid.validity&TRUST_MASK)
+		  || rec.r.valid.marginal_count
+		  || rec.r.valid.full_count))
+	{
+	  rec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
+	  rec.r.valid.marginal_count=rec.r.valid.full_count=0;
+	  nreset++;
+	  write_record (ctrl, &rec);
+	}
+
+    }
+
+  if (opt.verbose)
+    {
+      log_info (ngettext("%d key processed",
+                         "%d keys processed",
+                         count), count);
+      log_printf (ngettext(" (%d validity count cleared)\n",
+                           " (%d validity counts cleared)\n",
+                           nreset), nreset);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run the key validation procedure.
+ *
+ * This works this way:
+ * Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
+ *         mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
+ * Step 2: loop max_cert_times
+ * Step 3:   if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
+ *             ask user to assign ownertrust
+ * Step 4:   Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen
+ * Step 5:     if key is revoked or expired
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *                continue loop at Step 4
+ * Step 6:     For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
+ *                Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
+ *                Set validity of user ID
+ * Step 7:     If any signed user ID was found
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *             End Loop
+ * Step 8:   Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
+ *           End Loop
+ *         Ready
+ *
+ */
+static int
+validate_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, int interactive)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  int quit=0;
+  struct key_item *klist = NULL;
+  struct key_item *k;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  struct key_array *kar;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
+  KBNODE node;
+  int depth;
+  int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
+  KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust;
+  u32 start_time, next_expire;
+
+  /* Make sure we have all sigs cached.  TODO: This is going to
+     require some architectural re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
+     Perhaps combine this with reset_trust_records(), or only check
+     the caches on keys that are actually involved in the web of
+     trust. */
+  keydb_rebuild_caches (ctrl, 0);
+
+  kdb = keydb_new ();
+  if (!kdb)
+    return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+
+  start_time = make_timestamp ();
+  next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
+  stored = new_key_hash_table ();
+  used = new_key_hash_table ();
+  full_trust = new_key_hash_table ();
+
+  reset_trust_records (ctrl);
+
+  /* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
+   * here when needed */
+  if (!utk_list)
+    {
+      if (!opt.quiet)
+        log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to
+     ultimate */
+  for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      KBNODE keyblock;
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+      keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, k->kid);
+      if (!keyblock)
+        {
+          log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
+                       " trusted key %s not found\n"), keystr(k->kid));
+          continue;
+        }
+      mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock);
+      mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock);
+      mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+	    update_validity (ctrl, pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+                             0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
+        }
+      if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
+           && pk->expiredate < next_expire)
+        next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+
+  if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
+    /* In the TOFU trust model, we only need to save the ultimately
+       trusted keys.  */
+    goto leave;
+
+  klist = utk_list;
+
+  if (!opt.quiet)
+    log_info ("marginals needed: %d  completes needed: %d  trust model: %s\n",
+              opt.marginals_needed, opt.completes_needed,
+              trust_model_string (opt.trust_model));
+
+  for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
+    {
+      int valids=0,key_count;
+      /* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
+         klist.  */
+      ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
+      ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
+      for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
+        {
+	  int min=0;
+
+	  /* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */
+	  if(k->trust_value>=120)
+	    min=TRUST_FULLY;
+	  else if(k->trust_value>=60)
+	    min=TRUST_MARGINAL;
+
+	  if(min!=k->min_ownertrust)
+	    update_min_ownertrust (ctrl, k->kid,min);
+
+          if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+	    {
+	      k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (ctrl, k->kid,min);
+
+	      if (k->ownertrust == (unsigned int)(-1))
+		{
+		  quit=1;
+		  goto leave;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  /* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb
+	     before trust sigs.  It can also happen if a user uses two
+	     different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model
+	     setting. */
+	  if(k->ownertrust<min)
+	    {
+	      if(DBG_TRUST)
+		log_debug("key %08lX%08lX:"
+			  " overriding ownertrust '%s' with '%s'\n",
+			  (ulong)k->kid[0],(ulong)k->kid[1],
+			  trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust),
+			  trust_value_to_string(min));
+
+	      k->ownertrust=min;
+	    }
+
+	  if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+            ot_unknown++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
+            ot_undefined++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
+            ot_never++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+            ot_marginal++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+            ot_full++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+            ot_ultimate++;
+
+	  valids++;
+        }
+
+      /* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
+      keys = validate_key_list (ctrl, kdb, full_trust, klist,
+				start_time, &next_expire);
+      if (!keys)
+        {
+          log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
+          rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
+        ;
+
+      /* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
+      if (opt.verbose > 1 && DBG_TRUST)
+        dump_key_array (depth, keys);
+
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+        store_validation_status (ctrl, depth, kar->keyblock, stored);
+
+      if (!opt.quiet)
+        log_info (_("depth: %d  valid: %3d  signed: %3d"
+                    "  trust: %d-, %dq, %dn, %dm, %df, %du\n"),
+                  depth, valids, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
+                  ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate );
+
+      /* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
+      if (klist != utk_list)
+        release_key_items (klist);
+      klist = NULL;
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+        {
+          for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+            {
+              if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
+                {
+		  u32 kid[2];
+
+		  /* have we used this key already? */
+                  keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+		  if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0)
+		    {
+		      /* Normally we add both the primary and subkey
+			 ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but
+			 since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc,
+			 that doesn't matter here. */
+		      add_key_hash_table (used,kid);
+		      k = new_key_item ();
+		      k->kid[0]=kid[0];
+		      k->kid[1]=kid[1];
+		      k->ownertrust =
+			(tdb_get_ownertrust
+                           (ctrl, kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, 0)
+                         & TRUST_MASK);
+		      k->min_ownertrust = tdb_get_min_ownertrust
+                        (ctrl, kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, 0);
+		      k->trust_depth=
+			kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth;
+		      k->trust_value=
+			kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value;
+		      if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp)
+			k->trust_regexp=
+			  xstrdup(kar->keyblock->pkt->
+				   pkt.public_key->trust_regexp);
+		      k->next = klist;
+		      klist = k;
+		      break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+      release_key_array (keys);
+      keys = NULL;
+      if (!klist)
+        break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  keydb_release (kdb);
+  release_key_array (keys);
+  if (klist != utk_list)
+    release_key_items (klist);
+  release_key_hash_table (full_trust);
+  release_key_hash_table (used);
+  release_key_hash_table (stored);
+  if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
+    {
+      int rc2;
+
+      if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time )
+        tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, 0);
+      else
+        {
+          tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, next_expire);
+          if (!opt.quiet)
+            log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+                      strtimestamp (next_expire));
+        }
+
+      rc2 = tdbio_update_version_record (ctrl);
+      if (rc2)
+	{
+	  log_error (_("unable to update trustdb version record: "
+                       "write failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc2));
+	  tdbio_invalid ();
+	}
+
+      do_sync ();
+      pending_check_trustdb = 0;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}