diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/sign.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sign.c | 621 |
1 files changed, 326 insertions, 295 deletions
@@ -385,8 +385,9 @@ do_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pksk, PKT_signature *sig, goto leave; } - /* Check compliance. */ - if (! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 1, mdalgo)) + /* Check compliance but always allow for key revocations. */ + if (!IS_KEY_REV (sig) + && ! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 1, mdalgo)) { log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"), gcry_md_algo_name (mdalgo), @@ -395,9 +396,10 @@ do_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pksk, PKT_signature *sig, goto leave; } - if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_SIGNING, - pksk->pubkey_algo, 0, - pksk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pksk), NULL)) + if (!IS_KEY_REV (sig) + && ! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_SIGNING, + pksk->pubkey_algo, 0, + pksk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pksk), NULL)) { log_error (_("key %s may not be used for signing in %s mode\n"), keystr_from_pk (pksk), @@ -749,14 +751,13 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode) if (!opt.no_literal) pt=setup_plaintext_name(fname,inp); - /* try to calculate the length of the data */ + /* Try to calculate the length of the data. */ if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) && *fname ) { - off_t tmpsize; - int overflow; + uint64_t tmpsize; - if( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp, &overflow)) - && !overflow && opt.verbose) + tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength (inp); + if (!tmpsize && opt.verbose) log_info (_("WARNING: '%s' is an empty file\n"), fname); /* We can't encode the length of very large files because @@ -921,62 +922,68 @@ int sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, int encryptflag, strlist_t remusr, const char *outfile ) { - const char *fname; - armor_filter_context_t *afx; - compress_filter_context_t zfx; - md_filter_context_t mfx; - text_filter_context_t tfx; - progress_filter_context_t *pfx; - encrypt_filter_context_t efx; - IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL; - PACKET pkt; - int rc = 0; - PK_LIST pk_list = NULL; - SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; - SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; - int multifile = 0; - u32 duration=0; - - pfx = new_progress_context (); - afx = new_armor_context (); - memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx); - memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx); - memset( &efx, 0, sizeof efx); - efx.ctrl = ctrl; - init_packet( &pkt ); - - if( filenames ) { - fname = filenames->d; - multifile = !!filenames->next; + const char *fname; + armor_filter_context_t *afx; + compress_filter_context_t zfx; + md_filter_context_t mfx; + text_filter_context_t tfx; + progress_filter_context_t *pfx; + encrypt_filter_context_t efx; + iobuf_t inp = NULL; + iobuf_t out = NULL; + PACKET pkt; + int rc = 0; + PK_LIST pk_list = NULL; + SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; + SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; + int multifile = 0; + u32 duration=0; + char peekbuf[32]; + int peekbuflen = 0; + + + pfx = new_progress_context (); + afx = new_armor_context (); + memset (&zfx, 0, sizeof zfx); + memset (&mfx, 0, sizeof mfx); + memset (&efx, 0, sizeof efx); + efx.ctrl = ctrl; + init_packet (&pkt); + + if (filenames) + { + fname = filenames->d; + multifile = !!filenames->next; } - else - fname = NULL; + else + fname = NULL; - if( fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encryptflag) ) - log_bug("multiple files can only be detached signed"); + if (fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encryptflag)) + log_bug ("multiple files can only be detached signed"); - if(encryptflag==2 - && (rc=setup_symkey(&efx.symkey_s2k,&efx.symkey_dek))) - goto leave; + if (encryptflag == 2 + && (rc = setup_symkey (&efx.symkey_s2k,&efx.symkey_dek))) + goto leave; - if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch) - duration = ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire); - else - duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire); + if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch) + duration = ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire); + else + duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire); - /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to - unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */ - if( (rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) ) - goto leave; + /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to + unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */ + if ((rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG ))) + goto leave; - if (encryptflag - && (rc=build_pk_list (ctrl, remusr, &pk_list))) - goto leave; + if (encryptflag + && (rc=build_pk_list (ctrl, remusr, &pk_list))) + goto leave; - /* prepare iobufs */ - if( multifile ) /* have list of filenames */ - inp = NULL; /* we do it later */ - else { + /* Prepare iobufs. */ + if (multifile) /* have list of filenames */ + inp = NULL; /* we do it later */ + else + { inp = iobuf_open(fname); if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) { @@ -992,276 +999,300 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, goto leave; } - handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname); + peekbuflen = iobuf_ioctl (inp, IOBUF_IOCTL_PEEK, sizeof peekbuf, peekbuf); + if (peekbuflen < 0) + { + peekbuflen = 0; + if (DBG_FILTER) + log_debug ("peeking at input failed\n"); + } + + handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname); } - if( outfile ) { - if (is_secured_filename ( outfile )) { - out = NULL; - gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); + if (outfile) + { + if (is_secured_filename ( outfile )) + { + out = NULL; + gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } - else - out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0); - if( !out ) - { - rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); - log_error(_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) ); - goto leave; - } - else if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile ); + else + out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0); + if (!out) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error(_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) ); + goto leave; + } + else if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile); } - else if( (rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, - opt.armor? 1: detached? 2:0, 0, &out))) - goto leave; + else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, + opt.armor? 1: detached? 2:0, 0, &out))) + goto leave; - /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */ - if( opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile ) - { - memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); - iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx ); - } + /* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */ + if (opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile) + { + memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); + iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx ); + } - if ( gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0) ) - BUG (); - if (DBG_HASHING) - gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "sign"); - - /* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the - hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is - best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are - cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2 - wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could - be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the - current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */ - if(pk_list) - { - if(opt.def_digest_algo) - { - if(!opt.expert && - select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, - opt.def_digest_algo, - NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo) - log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)" - " violates recipient preferences\n"), - gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo), - opt.def_digest_algo ); - } - else - { - int algo; - int conflict = 0; - struct pref_hint hint = { 0 }; - - /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something - unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then - don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live - on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we - may not be able to give the recipient what they want. - For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note - that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160 - key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key. - The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs - completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in - hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less - reasonable as it is under the control of the user which - keys they sign with for a given message and the fact - that the message with multiple signatures won't be - usable on an implementation that doesn't understand - DSA2 anyway. */ - - for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) - { - if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA - || sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) - { - int temp_hashlen = (gcry_mpi_get_nbits - (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1])); - - if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) - { - temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen); - if (!temp_hashlen) - conflict = 1; /* Better don't use the prefs. */ - temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; - /* Fixup for that funny nistp521 (yes, 521) - * were we need to use a 512 bit hash algo. */ - if (temp_hashlen == 66) - temp_hashlen = 64; - } - else + if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0)) + BUG (); + if (DBG_HASHING) + gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "sign"); + + /* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the + * hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is + * best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are + * cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2 + * wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could + * be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the + * current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */ + if (pk_list) + { + if (opt.def_digest_algo) + { + if (!opt.expert && + select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, + opt.def_digest_algo, + NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo) + log_info (_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)" + " violates recipient preferences\n"), + gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo), + opt.def_digest_algo ); + } + else + { + int algo; + int conflict = 0; + struct pref_hint hint = { 0 }; + + /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something + * unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then + * don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live + * on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we + * may not be able to give the recipient what they want. + * For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note + * that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160 + * key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key. + * The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs + * completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in + * hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less + * reasonable as it is under the control of the user which + * keys they sign with for a given message and the fact + * that the message with multiple signatures won't be + * usable on an implementation that doesn't understand + * DSA2 anyway. */ + for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) + { + if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + || sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) + { + int temp_hashlen = (gcry_mpi_get_nbits + (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1])); + + if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) + { + temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen); + if (!temp_hashlen) + conflict = 1; /* Better don't use the prefs. */ + temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; + /* Fixup for that funny nistp521 (yes, 521) + * were we need to use a 512 bit hash algo. */ + if (temp_hashlen == 66) + temp_hashlen = 64; + } + else temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; - /* Pick a hash that is large enough for our - largest q or matches our Q but if tehreare - several of them we run into a conflict and - don't use the preferences. */ - - if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen) - { - if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) - { - if (hint.exact) - conflict = 1; - hint.exact = 1; - } - hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen; - } - } - } - - if (!conflict - && (algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, - -1,&hint)) > 0) - { - /* Note that we later check that the algo is not weak. */ - recipient_digest_algo = algo; + /* Pick a hash that is large enough for our + * largest q or matches our Q but if tehreare + * several of them we run into a conflict and + * don't use the preferences. */ + if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen) + { + if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) + { + if (hint.exact) + conflict = 1; + hint.exact = 1; + } + hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen; + } } - } - } + } - for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) - gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk)); + if (!conflict + && (algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, + -1,&hint)) > 0) + { + /* Note that we later check that the algo is not weak. */ + recipient_digest_algo = algo; + } + } + } + + for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) + gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk)); - if( !multifile ) - iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx ); + if (!multifile) + iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx); - if( detached && !encryptflag) - afx->what = 2; + if (detached && !encryptflag) + afx->what = 2; - if( opt.armor && !outfile ) - push_armor_filter (afx, out); + if (opt.armor && !outfile) + push_armor_filter (afx, out); - if( encryptflag ) { - efx.pk_list = pk_list; - /* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */ - iobuf_push_filter( out, encrypt_filter, &efx ); + if (encryptflag) + { + efx.pk_list = pk_list; + /* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */ + iobuf_push_filter( out, encrypt_filter, &efx ); } - if (opt.compress_algo && !outfile && !detached) - { - int compr_algo=opt.compress_algo; + if (opt.compress_algo && !outfile && !detached) + { + int compr_algo = opt.compress_algo; - /* If not forced by user */ - if(compr_algo==-1) - { - /* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs - will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are - encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since - there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data. - Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the - default. */ - - if((compr_algo= - select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1) - compr_algo=default_compress_algo(); - } - else if(!opt.expert && pk_list - && select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP, - compr_algo,NULL)!=compr_algo) - log_info(_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)" - " violates recipient preferences\n"), - compress_algo_to_string(compr_algo),compr_algo); - - /* algo 0 means no compression */ - if( compr_algo ) - push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,compr_algo); - } + if (!opt.explicit_compress_option + && is_file_compressed (peekbuf, peekbuflen)) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info(_("'%s' already compressed\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]"); + compr_algo = 0; + } + else if (compr_algo==-1) + { + /* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs + * will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are + * encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since + * there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data. + * Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the + * default. */ + if ((compr_algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP, + -1, NULL)) == -1) + { + compr_algo = default_compress_algo(); + } + } + else if (!opt.expert && pk_list + && select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP, + compr_algo, NULL) != compr_algo) + { + log_info (_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)" + " violates recipient preferences\n"), + compress_algo_to_string (compr_algo), compr_algo); + } - /* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */ - if (!detached) { - rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, - opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00); - if (rc) - goto leave; + /* Algo 0 means no compression. */ + if (compr_algo) + push_compress_filter (out, &zfx, compr_algo); } - write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md); + /* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */ + if (!detached) + { + rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, + opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00); + if (rc) + goto leave; + } + + write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md); - /* Setup the inner packet. */ - if( detached ) { - if( multifile ) { - strlist_t sl; - - if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("signing:") ); - /* must walk reverse trough this list */ - for( sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl; - sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl ) ) { - inp = iobuf_open(sl->d); - if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) - { - iobuf_close (inp); - inp = NULL; - gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); - } - if( !inp ) - { - rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); - log_error(_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), - sl->d,strerror(errno)); - goto leave; - } - handle_progress (pfx, inp, sl->d); - if( opt.verbose ) - log_printf (" '%s'", sl->d ); - if(opt.textmode) - { - memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); - iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx ); - } - iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx ); - while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 ) - ; - iobuf_close(inp); inp = NULL; + /* Setup the inner packet. */ + if (detached) + { + if (multifile) + { + strlist_t sl; + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info(_("signing:") ); + /* Must walk reverse trough this list. */ + for (sl = strlist_last (filenames); sl; + sl = strlist_prev (filenames, sl)) + { + inp = iobuf_open(sl->d); + if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) + { + iobuf_close (inp); + inp = NULL; + gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); + } + if (!inp) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error(_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), + sl->d,strerror(errno)); + goto leave; + } + handle_progress (pfx, inp, sl->d); + if (opt.verbose) + log_printf (" '%s'", sl->d ); + if (opt.textmode) + { + memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); + iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx ); + } + iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx ); + while (iobuf_read (inp, NULL, 1<<30) != -1 ) + ; + iobuf_close(inp); inp = NULL; } - if( opt.verbose ) - log_printf ("\n"); + if (opt.verbose) + log_printf ("\n"); } - else { - /* read, so that the filter can calculate the digest */ - while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 ) - ; + else + { + /* Read, so that the filter can calculate the digest. */ + while (iobuf_read (inp, NULL, 1<<30) != -1 ) + ; } } - else { - rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, - opt.textmode && !outfile ? - (opt.mimemode? 'm':'t'):'b'); + else + { + rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, + opt.textmode && !outfile ? + (opt.mimemode? 'm':'t'):'b'); } - /* catch errors from above */ - if (rc) - goto leave; + /* Catch errors from above. */ + if (rc) + goto leave; - /* write the signatures */ - rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, - opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00, - 0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S', NULL); - if( rc ) - goto leave; + /* Write the signatures. */ + rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, + opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00, + 0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S', NULL); + if (rc) + goto leave; - leave: - if( rc ) - iobuf_cancel(out); - else { - iobuf_close(out); - if (encryptflag) - write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION ); + leave: + if (rc) + iobuf_cancel (out); + else + { + iobuf_close(out); + if (encryptflag) + write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION ); } - iobuf_close(inp); - gcry_md_close ( mfx.md ); - release_sk_list( sk_list ); - release_pk_list( pk_list ); - recipient_digest_algo=0; - release_progress_context (pfx); - release_armor_context (afx); - return rc; + iobuf_close(inp); + gcry_md_close ( mfx.md ); + release_sk_list( sk_list ); + release_pk_list( pk_list ); + recipient_digest_algo=0; + release_progress_context (pfx); + release_armor_context (afx); + return rc; } - /**************** * make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed */ |